

HINDU LAW

AS ADMINISTERED IN BRITISH INDIA.

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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

I HAVE revised this book, have added a considerable amount of matter to it, and have brought it up to date.

I must again express my special and great obligation to the learned works of Sir Gooroo Dass Banerjee, Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, Dr. Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya, Sastri G. C. Sarkar, and Mr. J. C. Ghose. I have made frequent reference to them, and would recommend all who are interested in the subject to study those works at first hand. Without the help of works such as those it is impossible for one who is ignorant of Sanskrit to grasp sufficiently the real principles of Hindu law. I have also frequently referred to Mr. Mayne's well-known book on "Hindu Law."

E. J. TREVELYA .

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PREFACE	PAGES v
TABLE OF CASES CITED	xiii
TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED	xcvii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND AUTHORITIES	cv

INTRODUCTION.

What is Hindu Law?—Difference from other Systems—Application in British India—Sources of Hindu Law—The <i>Sastras</i> —The Schools—Works of Authority—To whom Law applicable—Illegitimate Children—Native Christians—Law of Origin—Custom—Conditions of Validity—Discontinuance—Proof	1-32
---	------

CHAPTER I.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MARRIAGE.

Creation of Relationship—Necessity—Duty of Guardian—Who may Marry—Defects—Age—Polygamy—Remarriage—Who may Intermarry—Restrictions—Identity of Caste—Exogamy—Prohibited Degrees of Relationship—Affinity—Adopted Son—Remarriage of Widows—Who may Give in Marriage—Consent of Ward—Loss of Right—Remedy of Guardian—Control by Courts—Guardian Appointed by Court—Absence of Consent—Agreement to pay Money—Marriage Expenses—Forms of Marriage—Ceremonies—Disputes as to Marriage—Divorce	33-64
---	-------

CHAPTER II.

HUSBAND AND WIFE—*Continued*.

RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

Agreement varying Rights—Right of Husband to Society of Wife—Right of Guardianship—Restraint of Wife—Duty to Wife—Right of Wife to Society of Husband—Enforcement of Right—Defences to Suit for Restitution of Rights—When Right arises—Limitation—Execution of Decree—Summary Remedies

	PAGES
Damages—Rights over Property—Power of Wife—Contract by Wife—Power of Husband—Maintenance of Wife—Maintenance of Widow—Loss of Right—Amount—When Charged on Property—When Purchaser Bound—Suit for Maintenance—Duty of Court—Alteration of Order—Execution of Decree—Criminal Procedure Code	65-98

CHAPTER III.

RELATIONSHIP OF PARENT AND CHILD, AND ADOPTION.

Legitimate Children—Presumption—Illegitimate Children— <i>Palaka Putra</i> —Sons Recognized in Ancient Times—Adoption according to Dattaka Form—Necessity—Motive—Custom Prohibiting Adoption—Agreement not to Adopt—Adoption of Girl—Who may Take—Missing Son—Death of Son—Consent of Son—Minor—Courts of Wards—Disqualified Persons—Assent of Wife—Adoption by Woman—Permission to Wife—Form of Authority—Revocation—Several Widows—Contingent Power—Construction—Specification of Boy—Motive of Widow—Adoption by Widow—Bengal School—Benares School—Dravida School—Maharashtra School—Mithila School—Punjab—Minor Widow—When Widow can Adopt—Successive Adoptions—Termination of Power—Unchaste Widow—Obligation to Adopt—Agreement—Capacity to Give—Who may be Taken—Relationship of Adopting Father to Natural Mother—Age of Boy—Orphan—Adoption by Two Persons—Personal Defects—Simultaneous Adoptions—Act of Adoption—Consideration for Gift—Conditional Gift—Mental Capacity—Fraud, etc.—Assent of Person Adopted—Religious Ceremonies—Requirements of Valid Adoption—Subsequent Event—Consent of Reversioners—Acquiescence—Cancellation or Renunciation— <i>Kritrima</i> form of Adoption—Special and Local Forms—Gyawals— <i>Illatom</i> —Malabar Adoptions—Nambudris—Adoption by Dancing Girls and Prostitutes—Disputes as to Adoption—Who Entitled to Dispute—Declaratory Decree—Specific Performance— <i>Res Judicata</i> —Limitation—Election—Burden of Proof—Estoppel—Mode of Proof—Probabilities—Presumption	99-177
--	--------

CHAPTER IV.

PARENT AND CHILD—*Continued.*

RESULTS OF DATTAKA ADOPTION.

Operates as Affiliation—Guardianship—Survivorship—Inheritance <i>ex parte paterna</i> —Inheritance <i>ex parte materna</i> —Descendants—Father's Power over Property—Will—Arrangement Restraining Disposition or Limiting Interest—Son Born after Adoption—Renunciation or Waiver of Rights—Exclusion from Natural Family— <i>Doyamushyayana</i> —Vesting and Devesting of Estate—Power to Dispute Acts of Widow—Alienations—Marriage and Adoption in Natural Family—Effect of <i>Kritrima</i> Adoption—Effects of Invalid Adoption— <i>Persona Designata</i>	178-205
---	---------

CHAPTER V.

PARENT AND CHILD—*Continued.*

DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF FATHER.

Maintenance of Children—Illegitimate Children—Widowed Daughter-in-Law—Impartible Property—Grandchildren—Parents—Duty of Heir as to Maintenance—Guardianship—Rights of Father and Mother—Loss of Right—Remarried Widows—Remedies . 206-217

CHAPTER VI.

THE JOINT FAMILY AND ITS PROPERTY.

Of what Family consists—Joint Family according to Mitakshara—Disintegration—Burden of Proof—Separation in Dwelling and Food—Separate Dealings—Presumption—Coparcenary Property—Who are Coparceners—Power of Disposition under Bengal School—Exclusion from Coparcenership—Rights of Coparceners—Coparcenary Property—Separate Property—Burden of Proof—Use of Name of Member—Impartible Property . . . 218-265

CHAPTER VII.

MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY
OF JOINT FAMILY.

Application of Proceeds—Payments—Parties to Transactions—To Suits—Manager—Duty—Account—Powers—Family Business—Compromise—Decree against Manager—Alienation and Charge—By Coparcenary—By Manager—Necessity—Discretion—Nature of Inquiry—Burden of Proof—Acts of Coparcener not Manager—Alienation of Undivided Share—Setting aside Alienation 266-307

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DEBTS OF A FATHER UNDER THE
MITAKSHARA LAW.

Duty of Son to Pay Father's Debts—Right to Alienate—Illegal or Immoral Purpose—Mortgage—Whether Sons Bound—Parties to Suits—When Interests of Sons Pass—Money Decree—Execution of Decree—Burden of Proof—Decree against Son—Simple Contract Debts—Limitation—Liability after Partition—Obligation of Heir 308-324

CHAPTER IX.

PARTITION.

What is Partition—Who is Entitled to Partition—Agreement not to Partition—Mitakshara Law—Women—Minor—Birth after

Partition—Absent Coparceners—Purchaser—Rights of Wife and Widow—Enforcement of Right—Allotment of Shares—Subject of Partition—How Separation and Partition can be Effected—Loss of Share by Limitation—Proof of Separation—Conversion from Hinduism—Suit for Partition—Partial Partition—Account—Provision for Debts, etc.—How made by Court—Revenue-paying Estates—Mortgage of Undivided Share—Partition Act, 1893—Partition by Revenue Authorities—Reunion	325-360
--	---------

CHAPTER X.

PRINCIPLES OF INHERITANCE.

Definition of Law of Inheritance—To what Property it Applies—Vesting—Devesting—Heir Succeeds by own Right—Disinheritance—Alteration of Course—Heir is Fresh Stock of Descent—Nearer excludes more Remote—Female Heirs—Succession after Female—Succession when <i>per stirpes</i> ; when <i>per capita</i> —Relinquishment of Heirship—Exclusion from Inheritance—Unchastity—Remarriage—Physical Defects—Murder by Heir—Result of Disqualification— <i>Stridhan</i> Property—Change of Religion—Abandonment of Worldly Affairs	361-375
---	---------

CHAPTER XI.

ORDER OF INHERITANCE TO MALES ACCORDING
TO THE MITAKSHARA LAW.

Connection between Religion and Law of Inheritance—Fixed Rules—Differences between Mitakshara and Bengal Systems—Mitakshara School—Guiding Principle—Classes of Heirs—Meaning of " <i>Sapinda</i> "; and of " <i>Samanodaka</i> "—Order of Succession— <i>Sagotra Sapindas</i> —Son—Illegitimate Son—Son's Son—Son's Son's Son—Widow—Daughter—Daughter's Son—Mother—Father—Brother—Brother's Son—Brother's Son's Son—Relationship of Half Blood—Sister and Sister's Son—Grandparents and their Descendants to the Third Degree—Great Grandparents and their Descendants to the Third Degree—Remote <i>Sapinda</i> Heirs— <i>Samanodakas</i> — <i>Bandhus</i> —Who Inherit—Kinds— <i>Atma Bandhus</i> — <i>Pitri Bandhus</i> — <i>Matri Bandhus</i> —Female Heirs in Bombay—In Madras—Inheritance on Reunion—Hermits and Members of Religious Orders—Escheat	376-416
---	---------

CHAPTER XII.

INHERITANCE TO MALES ACCORDING TO THE
BENGAL SCHOOL.

Founded on Spiritual Benefit—Meaning of " <i>Sapinda</i> "—Classes of <i>Pindas</i> — <i>Sakulyas</i> — <i>Samanodakas</i> — <i>Bandhus</i> —Order of Succession	417-433
--	---------

CHAPTER XIII.

STRIDHAN PROPERTY.

Meaning—Classification—Descriptions—Modes of Acquisition— Power to Deal with <i>Stridhana</i> —Gift of Immovable Property by Husband to Wife—Control by Husband	434-445
---	---------

CHAPTER XIV.

INHERITANCE TO STRIDHAN PROPERTY.

Principle—Maiden's Property—Devolution according to the "Mitakshara"—According to the "Mayukha"—According to the "Smriti Chandrika"—According to the Mithila School—According to the Bengal School—Escheat—Illegitimate Children—Dancing-girls and Prostitutes	446-463
--	---------

CHAPTER XV.

POWERS OF WOMEN OVER PROPERTY INHERITED BY THEM.

Limited Powers of Female Heirs—In Bombay—Maiden Daughter—Movable Property—Will—Share on Partition—Nature of Estate—Interference by Court—More than One Widow—Additions—Accumulations—Unappropriated Income—Leases—Alienation for Life—When can Alienate—Necessity—Consent of Reversioners—Surrender—Powers under Will—Powers given by Court—Proceedings by or against Restricted Heir—Compromise—Sale in Execution of Decree—For Arrears of Revenue	464-498
---	---------

CHAPTER XVI.

REVERSIONERS AND THEIR RIGHTS.

Interest of Reversioners—Avoidance of Alienation—Suit to Restrain Waste—Declaratory Decree—Limitation—Subsequent Reversioner—Rights on Death of Restricted Owner—Limitation—Proof of Necessity—Equities—Setting Aside Alienation—Rights of Crown	499-514
--	---------

CHAPTER XVII.

INHERITANCE TO PRIVATE IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY.

Principles of Inheritance—Mitakshara Law—Primogeniture—Bengal School—Sons	515-520
---	---------

CHAPTER XVIII.

GIFTS AND WILLS.

Power of Gift—Making over Possession—Transfer—Donations <i>mortis causa</i> —Gifts to Unborn Persons—Hindu Transfers and Bequests	
---	--

Act—Hindu Disposition of Property Act—Definition of Will— Law of Wills Founded on Gifts—Subject of Gift or Will— Testamentary Capacity—Form of Will—Construction—Disin- herison—Principles in Tagore Case—Whole Interest Passing— Alteration of Inheritance—Repugnant Condition—Bequest to Unborn Person—To a Class—Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act, 1914—Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916—Religious and Charitable Endowments—Perpetuities—Trusts—Life Es- tates—Accumulations—Hindu Wills Act—Probate and Ad- ministration Act—Malabar Law—Oudh Taluqdars	521-545
--	---------

CHAPTER XIX.

RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS.

Object—Powers of Court—Creation—Uncertainty—Colourable En- dowment—Scheme—Revocation—For Worship of Deity— Trustee or Manager—Powers—Account—Brotherhoods— <i>Mutts</i> — <i>Mohunt</i> —Powers of Manager—Limitation—Adverse Posses- sion—Devolution of Trust—Hereditary Right—Alienation— Partition Suits—Civil Procedure Code, s. 92—Removal of Manager—Statutory Provisions for Superintendence	546-596
INDEX	597-661

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

A.

	PAGE
Abaji Gangadhar v. Mukta	522
Abasi v. Dunne	217
Abbaku v. Ammu Shettati	96
Abbu v. Kuppammal	205
Abdool Kureem (Sheikh) v. Jaun Ali	320
Abdul (Haji) v. Hamid (Haji)	24
Abdul Aziz Khan v. Nirma	370
Abdul Aziz Khan Sahib v. Appayasami Naicker	265, 319
Abdul Gofur Mandal v. Umakanta Pandit	559
Abdul Haye v. Nawab Raj	296
Abdul Karim Sahib v. Badrudeen Sahib	354
Abdulla v. Ram Lal	490
Abdur Kahim v. Halimabai	24, 25
Abhachari v. Ramachendrayya	100, 521
Abhai Charan Ghose v. Dasmoni Dasi	205
Abhai Churn Jana v. Mangal Jana	359, 360, 415
Abhaychandra Roy Chowdhry v. Pyari Mohan Guho	272, 273
Abhesang Tirabhai v. Raisang Fatsang	484, 487
Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi	553, 564, 565, 566
Abhoy Churn Ghose v. Attarmoni Dassce	307, 489, 513
Abilakh Bhagat v. Bhekhi Mahto	374
Abilak Roy v. Rubbi Roy	283
Abinas Chandra Paul v. Probodh Chandra Paul	508
Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha	165, 170, 501, 502, 506, 507, 508
Abraham v. Abraham	23, 24, 25, 137, 350
Achal Ram (Lal) v. Kazim Husain Khan (Raja)	175
Achal Ram v. Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh	518
Achhan Kunwar v. Thakur Das	500, 511
Achhajibar Singh v. Ram Sarup Sahu	274
Achratlal Jekisandas v. Chimanlal Parbhudas	217
Achut v. Manjunath	494
Addoyto Churn Doss v. Woojan Beebee	208
Adhar Chandra Chatterjee v. Nobin Chandra Chatterjee	251
Adhibai v. Cursandas Nathu	79, 88, 210
Adi Kesavan Naidu v. Gurumatha Chetti	307
Adhirance Narain Coomary v. Shona Malee Pat Mahadai	79, 90, 92
Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Dukharan Singh	349, 502, 504, 505
Adit Narayan Singh v. Mahabir Prosad Tewari	378, 406
Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju	132, 156, 195
Adjoodhia Gir v. Kashce Gir	184, 298, 304, 527

	PAGE
Administrator-General of Madras <i>v.</i> Ananda Chari	61, 62, 64
Adrishappa <i>v.</i> Gurushidappa	261, 341
Adurmoni Deyi <i>v.</i> Chowdhry Sib Narain Kur	244, 309
Advocate-General <i>v.</i> Damothar	550
_____ <i>v.</i> Jimbabei	25
_____ <i>v.</i> Karmali Rahimbai	240, 241, 535
_____ <i>v.</i> Strangman	551
_____ <i>v.</i> Vishvanath Atmaran	547
Advaya <i>v.</i> Rudrava	368, 369, 388
Aghore Nath Mukhopadhyaya <i>v.</i> Grish Chunder Mukhopadhyaya	276
Aghori Ramasarg Sing <i>v.</i> Cochrane	304, 307
Agri Shama Embrandri <i>v.</i> Vistnu Embrandri	592
Alimad Raza Khan <i>v.</i> Ram Lal	234
Ahmedbhoy Hubibbhoy <i>v.</i> Cassumbhoy Ahmedbhoy	24, 246
Aholiya Bhai Debia <i>v.</i> Luckee Monee Debia	81
Aiyayagari Venkataramayya <i>v.</i> Aiyayagari Ramayya	301, 356
Ajabsing <i>v.</i> Nanabhau Valad Dhan Sing Raul	175
Ajei Ram <i>v.</i> Girdharee	293
Ajodhya Purshad <i>v.</i> Mahadeo Purshad	246, 344, 352
Ajudhia <i>v.</i> Ram Sumer Misir	296, 404
Akhoy Chunder Bagehi <i>v.</i> Kallapahar Haji	115, 117, 149
Akkanna <i>v.</i> Venkayya	475
Akkineri Sreeramulu <i>v.</i> Mullapudi Ramayya	488
Akoba Dada <i>v.</i> Sakharam	193
Akora Suth <i>v.</i> Boreani	370
Akshay Chandra Bhattacharya <i>v.</i> Hari Das Goswami	16, 359, 414, 417, 428
Alabi Koya <i>v.</i> Mussa Koya	523
Alagappa Chetti <i>v.</i> Vellian Chetti	267, 280
Alagappa Mudaliar <i>v.</i> Sivarasundara Mudaliar	573
Alamelu <i>v.</i> Rangasami	331
Alami <i>v.</i> Komu	299
Alangamanjori Dabee <i>v.</i> Sonamoni Dabee	534, 543
Alank Manjari <i>v.</i> Fakir Chand Sarkar	112, 134, 150
Alhadmoni Dassca <i>v.</i> Gokoolmoni Dassca	427
Ali Hasan <i>v.</i> Dhurja	533
Almelammal <i>v.</i> Arunachellam Pillai	328, 329
Ali Saheb <i>v.</i> Shabji	9
Alladnee Dossee (Sreemutty) <i>v.</i> Sreenath Chunder Bose	233
Mukmonee Dabee <i>v.</i> Banee Madhub Chuckerbutty	493
Allymalummaul <i>v.</i> Vencatoovien	262
Amar Chand Kundu <i>v.</i> Nani Gopal Mukerjee	567, 568
Amar Chandra Kundu <i>v.</i> Sebak Chand Chowdhury	319
Amarendra Nath Bose <i>v.</i> Shuradhani Das	443
Amarendra Nath Chatterjee <i>v.</i> Kashi Nath Chatterjee	544
Amarnath Sah (Lala) <i>v.</i> Achan Kuar (Rani)	286, 294, 479, 510
Amara <i>v.</i> Mahadgauda	23, 102, 124, 125, 130, 131, 194
Ambabai <i>v.</i> Govind	23, 26, 384
Ambaidas <i>v.</i> Jijibhai	412
Ambalal <i>v.</i> Rewa (Bai)	442
Ambika Dat <i>v.</i> Sukhmani Kuar	348, 349, 350
Ambika Partap Singh <i>v.</i> Dwarka Prasad	199
Amddoo Miyan <i>v.</i> Muhammad Davud Khan Bahadur	594
Amin Sahib (Syed) <i>v.</i> Ibram Sahib	592
Amir Singh <i>v.</i> Moazzum Ali Khan	269

	PAGE
Amirthayyan v. Ketharamayyan	116, 117, 118, 528
Amjad Ali v. Moniram Kalita	483
Ammakannu v. Appu	206, 210
Ammanga v. Upadorai Patter	249
Ammayee v. Yalumalai	544
Ammur Singh v. Murdun Singh	506
Amolak Ram v. Chandan Sing	302, 303
Amrit (Bai) v. Manik (Bai)	79, 364
Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhi Narayan Chuckerbutty	377, 398, 402, 118, 420
Amrita Lal Bagchi v. Jatindra Nath Chowdhry	200
Amrita Lal Mitter v. Manick Lal Mullick	92, 93, 333, 336
Amrit Dhar v. Bindesri Prasad	509, 510
Amrit Nath Chowdhry v. Gauri Nath Chowdhry	28, 29
Amrito Lall Dutt v. Surnomoni Dasi	362, 512
— v. Surnomoye Dasi	113, 116, 117, 512
Amulya Charan Seal v. Kali Das Sen	130
Ananda Bibee v. Nownit Lal	364, 366, 385
Anand Chandra Ghose v. Pian Kisto Dutt	325, 331
Anandi v. Hari Suba Pai	181, 390
Anandibai v. Hari Suba Pai	222, 313
— v. Kashibai	126, 130, 156, 157, 191
— v. Rajaram Chintaman Pethe	471
Anandrao Gunputrao v. Vasantrao Madhavrao	257
Anandrao Vinayak v. Administrator-General of Bombay	528, 534
Anandrav Bhikaji Phadke v. Shankar Daji Charya	5, 7, 8
Anandrav Sivaji v. Ganesh Eshvant Bokil	175
Ananta v. Ramabai	372
Ananta Balacharya v. Damodhar Makund	347
Anantanarayana Ayyar v. Kuttalam Pillai	589, 590
Anantanarayana Iyer v. Savitri Ammal	356
Anantha Tirtha Chariar v. Nagamuthu Ambalagaren	533, 540
Ananthaya v. Vishnu	209
Anant Ram v. Channu Lal	239, 267, 275
Anant Ramrav v. Gopal Balvant	236
Anant Singh (Thakur) v. Durga Singh (Thakur)	32, 390
Anath Nath Dey v. Mackintosh	325
Angamathu Pillai v. Kolandavelu Pillai	279
Angammal v. Venkata Reddy	369
Annada Kumar Roy v. Indra Bhusan Mukhopadhyia	490, 491
Annaji Dattatraya v. Chandrabai	413
Annaji Raghunath Gosavi v. Narayan Sitaram	581
Annaji Rau v. Ragubai	9
Annamalal Chetty v. Murugasa Chetty	270
Annammah v. Mabbu Bali Reddy	130, 156, 189, 194, 196, 197
Annapurni Nachiar v. Forbes	181, 182
Annapurni Nachiar (Ram) v. Swaminatha Chettiar	84
Annasami Pillai v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar	570, 571, 574, 591
Annayan v. Chinnan	383
Annoda Churn Roy v. Kally Coomar Roy	268
Annundo Mohun Roy v. Lamb	255
Anonymous	76, 129
Anooragee Kooer (Mussamut) v. Bhugobutty Kooer	320
Anpurnabai v. Durgapa Mahalapa Naik	287

	PAGE
Antaji v. Dattaji	186, 199
Anund Chunder Mookerjee v. Teetooram Chatterjee	427
Anund Chund Rai v. Kishen Mohun Bunoja	299, 523
Anund Chundra Mundul v. Nilmony Jourdar	475
Anund Koer (Rani) v. Court of Wards	164, 165, 506, 507
Anund Mohun Paul Chowdhry v. Shamasoondery (Sreemutty)	248
Anundec Koonwur (Mussumat) v. Khedoo Lal	349
Anundmoyee Chowdhurayan v. Sheebchunder Roy	168
Anundmoyee Chowdhrair v. Boykantnath Roy	342, 575, 576
Anundomohey Dossee v. Doe dem East India Company	532
Anundo Rai v. Kali Prosad Singh	324
Anyaba v. Daji	165
Apaji Chintaman Devdhar v. Gangabai	80
Apaji Narihar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni	326, 327
Appaji Bapuji v. Keshav Shamrav	324
Appandai Vathiyar v. Bagubali Mudaliyar	378, 401, 405
Appa Pillai v. Runga Pillai	348
Appasami v. Nagappa	569
Appaya v. Padappa	5, 7
Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan	238, 266, 345, 346, 347
A. P. Rajarav Chandrararao v. Nanarav Krishna Jahajirdar	84
Arayalprath Kunhi Pocker v. Kanthilath Ahmad Kuti	330
Archakam Srinivasa Dikshatulu v. Udayagiri Anantha Charlu	7
Ariabudra v. Dorasami	316, 319
Aiyaputri v. Alamelu	328
Armugam Pillai v. Sabapathi Padiachi	283
Annachellum Pillay v. Iyasawmy Pillay	135
Arruth Misser v. Juggurnath Indraswamco	563
Arumuga Mudali v. Viraraghava Mudali	66
Arumugam v. Tulukanam	36, 71
Arunachala Chetti v. Munisami Mudali	315
Arunachala Pillai v. Vythialinga Mudaliyar	267
Arunagiri Mudali v. Ranganayaki Ammal	462
Arundadi Ammal v. Kuppammal	102, 120
Asad Ali Mollah v. Haidur Ali	84, 98
Ashabai v. Tyeb Haji Rahimtulla (Haji)	452
Ashanullah v. Kali Kinkur Kur	342
Asharam Sadhani v. Chandi Churn Mukerjee	479
Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand	119, 135, 145, 172
Ashgar Ali v. Delroos Begum	585
Ashutosh Banerjee v. Lukhimoni Debia	98
Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee	533, 539, 549
Asima Krishna Deb (Kumara) v. Kumara Krishna Deb (Kumara)	540
Asita Mohun Ghosh Moulik v. Nerode Mohun Ghosh Moulik	22, 110, 111, 153, 185, 188
Assur Purshotam v. Ratanbai	134, 166, 167
Asud Ali Khan (Sheikh) v. Akbar Ali Khan	234
Atar Singh v. Thakar Singh	243, 253, 258
Athavulla v. Gouse	547
Atmaram v. Madho Rao	153, 154, 155
Atrani (Bad) v. Deep Sing Baria Thakor	167
Attorney General v. Brodie	579
Atul Krishna Sircar v. Sanyasi Churn Sircar	442
Audhkoomari v. Chandra Dai	387, 449

	PAGE
Aulim Chund Dhur v. Bejai Govind Burrall	363
Aumirtolall Bose v. Rajonee Kant Mitter	425
Aunjona Dasi v. Prahlad Chandra Ghose	46, 51, 61
Authikosavulu Chetty v. Ramanujam Chetty	51, 60, 63, 450
Avayambal v. Kamalambal	250
Awad Sarju Prasad Singh v. Sita Ram Singh	329
Ayabutee (Mussumaut) v. Raj Kishen Sahoo	364
Ayatunnessa Bibi v. Kulfu Khalifa	579
Ayyadori Pillai v. Solai Ammal	163
Ayyappa v. Venkata Krishnamarazu	268
Ayyavu Muppanar v. Niladatchi Ammal	187, 235
Azimunnissa Begum v. Dale	9

B.

Baba v. Timma	285, 303
Babaji v. Balaji Ganesh	467
----- v. Dhuri	283
Babaji Akobar v. Dathu Laxman	222, 234, 350, 352
Babaji Jivaji v. Bhagirthibai	138
Babaji Lakshman v. Vasudev Vinayak	300
Babaji Mahadaji v. Krishnaji Devji	290
Babaji Parshram v. Kashibai	347, 350, 351
Babajirao v. Luxmandas	555, 557, 558
Babashet v. Jirshet	350
Baboo Ram v. Gajadhar Singh	306
Babu v. Bhikaji	510
Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji Krishnarav	157, 196, 197, 500
Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram	377, 378, 379, 391, 398, 400
Babu Singh v. Bihari Lal	310, 311
Bachebi v. Makhan Lal	23
Bachcho Kuwar v. Dharam Das	253
Bachha Jha v. Jugmon Jha	451, 453, 456, 460
Bachiraju v. Venkatappadu	466
Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorobai	116, 125, 198, 263, 264, 284, 329
Bada v. Husso Bhai	262
Badamoo Kooer v. Wazeer Sing	350
Badaruth Tewary v. Jagurnath Dass	345
Badratanessa Bibee v. Ambika Charan Ghose	511
Badri Prasad v. Madan Lal	309
Badri Roy v. Bhugwat Narain Dobey	333
Badul Singh v. Chutterdharee Singh	222
Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh	197, 501
Baiji (Bai) v. Santok Bai	24
Bajinath v. Mahabir	388
Bajinath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh	252, 264, 348, 518
Bajun Doobey v. Brij Bhookun Lall Awusti	496
Baikanta Chandra Roy Chowdhury v. Kali Charan Roy Chowdhury	169
Bailur Krishna Rau v. Lakshmana Shanbhogue	209
Bainee Singh v. Bhurth Singh	234
Baisnab Chandra De v. Ramdhon Dhor	276
Baisnav Charan Das Bairagi v. Kishore Dass Mohanta	571
Baisni v. Rup Singh	87, 88

	PAGE
Bajaba v. Trimbak Vishvanath	252
Bajrangt Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Sing	388, 486, 487, 488
Bakhtawar v. Bhagwana	490, 506
Bakubai v. Manchhabai	371, 372, 387, 388, 449
Bala v. Balaji	285
Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai	222, 359, 360
Balaji v. Datto	150
— v. Nana	277
Balaji Baikaji Pinge v. Gopal	266
Balakrishna Iyer v. Muthusami Iyer	272
Balamma v. Pallayya	362, 363, 413, 414
Balaram Reddi (Sivada) v. Pera Reddi (Sivada)	160
Balaram Bhaskarji v. Ramchandra Bhaskarji	255, 259, 353, 354
Balbhadra v. Bhawani	502
Balbhadhar v. Bisheshar	300
Baldeo Das v. Sham Lal	226, 278
Baldeodas v. Manekchand	275
Baldeo Das Agarwalla v. Mohamaya Persad	51
Baldeo Sahai v. Jumna Kunwar	52
Baldeo Singh v. Mathura Kunwar	369
Baldeo Sonar v. Mobarak Ali Khan	274, 276, 278, 279, 280
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit (Shri)	113, 153, 154
Balvir v. Dhondgr	187
Balgobind v. Ramkumar	506, 507
Balgobind Das v. Naram Lal	301, 302, 303
Bal Gobind Ram v. Hirusanee	506
Balgovind Lall v. Rampertab Singh	371
Balgovinda (Musst) v. Lal Buhadoor	374
Bali Panda v. Jadumoney Santra	556, 557
Balkesen Lal v. Choudhuri Tapesur Singh	316
Balki Mahapatra v. Brojobasi Panda	281
Balkishen (Rai) v. Sitaram (Rai)	299, 300
Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu	330, 345, 346, 347, 360
Balkrishna v. Janardana	321
Balkrishna Babaji v. Hari Govind	9
Balkrishna Bapuji Apte v. Lakshman Dinkar	19, 390
Balkrishna Sakham v. Moro Krishna Dabholkar	267, 268
Balkrishna Trimbak Tendulkar v. Savitribai	348, 365, 382, 385
Balkrishna Vithal v. Hari Shankar	352
Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das	522
— v. Janki	217
Balusami Pandithar v. Narayana Rau	377, 378, 391, 403, 405, 418
Balvant Santaram v. Babaji	293
Balvantrav v. Purshotam	470
Balvantrav Bhaskar v. Bayabai	148
Balwantrao v. Ramkrishna	307
Balwant Singh (Raja) v. Clancy	298, 310, 322
Balwant Singh (Rao) v. Kishori (Rani)	3, 11, 249
Balvadru Samant Singh (Chowdhury) v. Bimbadhar Roy	260
Bama Soonduree Dossee v. Anund Moyee Dossee	363
— v. Bama Soonduree Dossee	506
Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Mussamut)	133, 179, 193, 199, 424
Banalata Das v. Monmotha Nath Goswami	498
Banarsi Das v. Maharani Kuar	267

Bandam Settah v. Bandam Maha Lakshmy	155, 156
Bando Subrao Jannis v. Jambu Tavnappa Adake	207
Bandhu Prasad v. Dhiraji Kuar	270, 271
Banee Madhub Ghose v. Thakoor Doss Mundul	176
Banee Madhub Mookerjee v. Bhuggobutty Churn Banerjee	221
Banee Pershad (Baboo) v. Abdool Hye (Moonshee Synd)	150, 152, 153
Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Acharjya Chowdhuri	87, 206, 510
Bangaru Ammal v. Vijayamachi Reddiar	98
Bank of England v. Vaghano	513
Bank of Hindustan v. Ahmedbhai Haubhai	522
————— v. Premchand	522
Bannoo v. Kashee Ram	222, 255
Bansidhar v. Ganeshi	366
Banymodht Ghose v. Juggodumba Dossee	362
Bapi (Bai) v. Jamnadas Hathising	550
Bapuji Jagannath	527
Bapuji Lakshman v. Pandurang	230, 374
Barada Prasad Pal v. Rama Pati Pal	113
Barah Debi v. Debkamini Debi	334
Barilly, Collector of, v. Nurien Day (Musst.)	103
Baroda Charan Dutt v. Hemlata Dassi	574
Baroda Kanta Chattopadhyaya v. Jatindra Narain Roy	107
Barot Naran v. Barot Jesang	169
Barsati v. Chamru	6
Basa Mal v. Maharaj Singh	281
Basangavda v. Basangavda	413
Basanta Kumari Dassya (Sreemutty) v. Mohesh Chandra Shaha	231
Basanta Kumari Debi v. Kamikshya Kumari Debi	437, 441, 458, 532
Basanta Kumar Singha v. Jogendra Nath Singha	360
Basappa v. Rayava	370
Basava v. Lingangauda	32, 185, 191, 192
Basdeo v. Gharib Das	568
———— v. Gopal	169
Bashettiappa v. Shivlingappa	136, 148, 159
Baso Koore v. Hurry Dass	308
Basoo Camummah v. Basoo Chinna Venkatasa	105, 156
Basoo Dhul v. Kishen Chunder Geer Gosain	540
Bata Krishna Naik v. Chintamani Naik	220, 223
Battas Kuar (Musst.) v. Lachman Singh	144, 145
Bawa Misser v. Bishen Prokash Narain Singh	530
Bawani Ghulam v. Deo Raj Kuari	263
Bawani Sankara Pandit v. Ambabay Ammal	203, 204
Bayabai v. Bala	19, 124, 125, 150, 152
Becha v. Mothina	79, 85
Becharam Banerjee v. Thakoormonee Debia (Sreemuttee)	262
Bechur Bhugwan v. Lukmee (Bace)	470
Beeby v. Kshitish Chandra Acharya	333, 336
Beem Churn Sen v. Heeraloll Seal	113, 116
Beer Chunder Manikkya v. Nobodeep Chunder Deb Burmono (Raj Coomar)	89
Beer Kishore Suhye Singh (Baboo) v. Hur Bullub Narain Singh (Baboo)	226, 307, 313
Beer Narain Sircar v. Teen Cowree Nundee	221

	PAGE
Bier Pershad v. Doorga Pershad	307
Bier Pertab Sahce (Baboo) v. Rajender Pertab Sahce (Maharajah)	30, 251, 259, 526, 527
Beharee Lal (Lalla) v. Modho Pershad (Lalla)	255, 257
Beharee Lall Roy v. Lall Chunder Roy	251
Beharilal v. Madholal Ahir	490
Behari Lal v. Shih Lal	192, 193
Beharilali v. Rajbai (Bai)	84, 89
Behari Lal Laha v. Kailas Chund Laha	189, 362
Behary Lall Mohurwar v. Mahdo Lall Shir Gyawal	502, 503
Behary Lall Sandyal v. Juggo Mohun Gossain	444
Behal Bahadur Singh v. Bhupindar Bahadur Singh	244
Behov Krishna Ghosh v. Ashutosh Ghosh	224
Belis Koer (Mussumut) v. Bhownance Baksh (Baboo)	221, 349
Bemali Dasse v. Mohun Dasse	274
Bhagares, Maharajah of, v. Ramkumar Misir	312
Bence Pershad v. Mohabbhoodhy (Mussumut)	237
Beni Madho v. Basdeo Patak	320
Beni Parshad v. Puran Chand	242, 316, 319
Beni Pershad v. Parbati Koer	318, 319
Beni Ram v. Man Singh	290
Bepin Behari Bundopadhya v. Brojonath Mookhopadhya	183, 196
Bepin Behari Maduck v. Lall Mohun Chattopadhya	331
Bepin Behary Das Bairagi v. Atul Krishna Das Bairagi	62
Bepin Behary Kundu v. Durga Charan Banerji	488
Beresford v. Ramasubba	265, 527
Berolah Move (Mt) v. Nubokissen Roy	363
Besant v. Narayaniah	213, 216
Beti Kunwar v. Janki Kunwar	333
Bhagaban Ramanuj Das (Mohunt) v. Roghunundun Ramanuj Das (Mohunt)	110, 229, 372
Bhagabati Barmanya v. Kalicharan Singh	240, 535, 541
Bhagabati Dasi (Srinati) v. Kanailal Mitter	79, 92
Bhagabati Koer v. Sahudra Koer	26, 474, 475, 476
Bhagat Lal Sahu v. Abdul Karim (Sk)	308, 311
Bhagavatamma v. Pampanna Gaud	199, 477
Bhagawan Das v. Balgobind Sing	28
Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussumat)	280, 310, 311, 316, 317, 319, 320, 321
Bhagbutti Dace (Mussumat) v. Bholanath Thakoor (Chowdhry)	475, 529
Bhagirathi v. Anantha Charia	84, 89, 90, 321
— v. Jokhu Ram Upadhia	53, 289
Bhagirathi Misr v. Sheobhik	302
Bhagirthubai v. Baya	411, 449
— v. Kahnujirav	388, 453, 467, 470
— v. Radhabai	138, 141
Bhagubai v. Tukaram	257
Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal	23, 29, 32, 102, 113, 136, 145
Bhagvan Dullabh v. Kala Shankar	527
Bhagwan Koer (Rani) v. Jogendra Chandra Bose	23, 24, 545
Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh	15, 17, 32, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144
Bhagwanta v. Sukhi	167, 170, 501, 508
Bhagwan Vithoba v. Warubai	19, 410
Bhagwat v. Nivrathi	482

	PAGE
Bhagwat Dassa v. Gourikunwar	319
Bhagwat Dayal Singh (Raja Rai) v. Debi Dayal Sahu	189, 311, 312
Bhagwat Pershad v. Murari Lall	168, 176, 399
Bhagwat Sahai v. Bopin Behari Mitter	325
Bhaiaji Thakur v. Jharula Dass	314
Bhairo v. Parmeshri Dayal	533
Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Indar Kunwar (Maharani)	114, 150, 186
Bhala Nahana v. Parbhu Hari	102, 184, 471, 472
Bhana v. Chindhu	279
Bhana Govind Guravi v. Vithoji Ladoji Guravi	234
Bhaoni v. Maharaj Singh	56, 382
Bharmangavda v. Rudrapgavda	465, 466, 467
Bharmawa v. Sangappa	157
Bhartpur State v. Gopal Dei	89, 92, 94
Bhaskari Kasavarayudu v. Bhaskaram Chalapatirayudu	269
Bhaskar Purshotam v. Sarasvatibai	522, 524
Bhaskar Trimbak Acharya v. Mahadev Ramji	465, 467, 481
Bhasker Buchajee v. Narro Raghunath	129, 150
Bhasker Tatya Shet v. Vijalal Nathu	277
Bhau v. Raghunath Krishna Gurav	441, 443, 450, 467, 468
Bhau Babaji v. Gopala Mahipati	482
Bhaudixit v. Ishwardixit	199
Bhawani v. Mahtab Kuar	368
Bhawani Ghulam v. Deo Raj Kuari	518
Bhawani Kunwar v. Himmat Bahadur	179
Bhawul Sahu v. Baij Nath Pertab Narain Singh	277
Bheeloo (Mussumaut) v. Phool Chund	87, 96
Bheem Ram Chuckerbutty v. Huree Kishore Roy	508
Bheknarain Singh v. Januk Singh	294, 309
Bhikaji Apaji v. Jagannath Vithal	164, 506, 507
Bhikaji Ramchandra Oke v. Yashvantrav Shripat Khopkar	319
Bhikam Das v. Pura	81
Bhuku v. Pattu	301
Bhikuo Koer (Musst.) v. Chamela Koer	214, 215
Bhikya v. Babu	388
Bhimabai v. Tayappa Murarao	195
Bhimacharya v. Ramacharya	450
Bhimana Gadu v. Tayappah	100
Bhimappa v. Basawa	197
Bhimaraddi v. Bhaskar	483, 510
Bhima Rout v. Dasarathi Doss	587, 589, 591
Bhimawa v. Sangawa	118
Bhimul Doss v. Choonee Lall	236, 339
Bhirgu Nath Chaube v. Narsingh Tiwari	307
Bhivray v. Sitaram	355
Bhoba Tarini Debya v. Peary Lall Sanyal	441, 443, 533, 535
Bhogaraju Venkatrama Jogiraju v. Addepalli Seshayya	477, 483, 494, 495, 500
Bhojahari Pal v. Ram Lal Das	567
Bhoje Mahadev Parab v. Gangabai	89
Bholanath v. Ghasi Ram	329
Bholanath Khettry v. Kartick Kissen Das Khettry	304, 305, 311
Bholanath Mahta v. Ajoodhia Persad Sookul	220, 221, 250, 257, 258
Bholanath Race v. Sabitra (Mussumaut)	372
Bhola Nath Roy v. Rakhal Dass Mukerji	429

	PAGE
Bholanath Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Bhagabatti Deyi (Musst)	475
Bhoobunesuree Debia v. Gourree Doss Turkopunchanun	110, 372
Bhoobun Mohinee Debya v. Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry	541, 542
Bhoobun Mohun Banerjee v. Muddun Mohun Sing	464
Bhoobunmoyee Debia v. Ramkishore Acharj Chowdhry	112, 130, 131, 146, 183, 194, 196, 197, 200, 530
Bhoobunmoyee Debia Chowdhrair v. Ramkissore Acharj Chowdhry	85, 224, 334
Bhoop Singh v. Phool Kower (Mussumat)	336
Bhoorun Koer (Mussumat) v. Sahebzadee	289, 294
Bhowani Proshad Shahu v. Juggernath Shahu	271, 272, 344, 353
Bhowana (Mussumat) v. Roop Kishore	291, 310, 317
Bhucharubehunder Dass v. Madhub Chunder Paramanie	75
Bhuhaneswari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri	194, 195, 198
Bhuban Mohini Dasi v. Gajulakshmi Debi	510, 511
Bhuzgobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen	529, 539, 541, 548, 552, 556, 557
Bhuzobutty Dayee (Mussumat) v. Chowdhry Bholanath Thakoor	189
Bhuzobutty Misrair v. Domun Misser	221
Bhuzwan Chunder Bose v. Bindoo Bashinee Dassce	88
Bhuzwan Dass v. Luchmee Narain	492
Bhuzwandeem Doobey v. Myna Bace	16, 387, 439, 464, 465, 469
Bhujanga Rau v. Ramayamma	442, 445
Bhujanarav v. Malojirav	519
Bhujjun Lal v. Gya Pershad	374
Bhupal Ram v. Lachma Kuar	491
Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Moitra	539, 551, 555, 556
Bhupendra Krishna Ghose v. Amarendra Nath Dey	183, 185, 197
Bhupendro Narayan Dutt v. Nemye Chand Mondul	287
Bhup Singh v. Lachman Kunwar	82
Bhyrobee Dossee v. Nubkissen Bhose	364, 427
Bhyroochund Rai v. Russoomunee	339, 424
Bhyrub Mundul v. Gungaram Bonnerjee	268
Bidya Prosad v. Bhupnarain	314, 322
Bihari Lal v. Dand Husain	496
Bijoy Chand Mahatab v. Kali Poda Chatterjee	556
Bijoy Keshub Roy Bahadoor (Koonwar) v. Shama Soonduree Dossee	299
Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Nil Ratan Mukerji	476, 486
— v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (Srimati)	476, 486, 509
— v. Girendra Nath Mukerji	485, 487, 488
Bijoy Krishna Karmakar v. Ranjit Lal Karmakar	119
Bijya Dibeh (Mussumaut) v. Unpoorna (Mussumaut)	466
Bika Singh v. Lochman Singh	319
Bilash Koonwar (Mussumat) v. Bhawanee Buksh Narain (Baboo)	221
Bilaso v. Dina Nath	333, 336
— v. Munnilal	541
Bimala Debi (Srimati) v. Tarasundari Debi (Srimati)	276
Bimola (Sreemutty) v. Dangoo Kansaree	425
Binda v. Kaunsilia	65, 67, 68, 71, 72
Bindaji Laxuman Tripotikar v. Mathurabai	270, 271
Bindoo Bashinee Debee v. Pearee Mohun Bose	75, 255
Bindoo Bassinee Dossee v. Bolie Chand Sett.	473
Binode Koomaree Dabee v. Purdhan Gopal Sahee.	387, 425, 448
Bipro Prosad Myree v. Kenae Dayee	254, 553

	PAGE
Birajun Koer <i>v.</i> Luchmi Narain Mahata	245, 470
Biresbur Das Dey <i>v.</i> Kamal Kumar Dutt	494, 496
Bireswar Mookerji <i>v.</i> Ardha Chunder Roy Chowdhry	119, 151, 204
Biry Lal (Lala) <i>v.</i> Inda Kunwar (Musammam)	296, 479, 510
Bishesar Alwi <i>v.</i> Dukharan Ahir	465
Biru <i>v.</i> Khandu	411
Bishambhar Das <i>v.</i> Drigbijai Singh	568
Bishambhar Nath <i>v.</i> Fateh Lal	275
— <i>v.</i> Sheo Narain	275
Bishambhur Naik <i>v.</i> Sudasheeb Mohapatte	284, 288, 289
Bishen Chand (Rai) <i>v.</i> Asmaida Koer	240, 322, 326, 526, 535
Bishen Chand Basawut <i>v.</i> Nadir Hossein (Syed)	567
Bishen Perakash Narain Singh (Raja) <i>v.</i> Bawa Misser	249
Bishenpirea Munec <i>v.</i> Soogunda (Ranee)	13
Bishesar Ahir <i>v.</i> Dukharan Ahir	465
Bishesar Das <i>v.</i> Ram Prasad	236
Bishesur <i>v.</i> Mata Gholam	64
Bishnath Singh (Rajah) <i>v.</i> Ram Churn Mujmoadar	102
Bissessur Chuckerbutty <i>v.</i> Ram Joy Mojomdar	171, 476
— <i>v.</i> Soetul Chunder Chuckerbutty	252
Bissessur Lall Sahoo <i>v.</i> Luchmessur Singh (Maharajah)	254, 279, 497
Bissonath Chunder <i>v.</i> Bamasoondery Dossee (Sreemutty)	529
Bissonath Dinda <i>v.</i> Dayaram Jana	544
Bissumbhur Sircar <i>v.</i> Soorodhun Dossee	221
Bissuram Koiree <i>v.</i> The Empress	37, 57
Bistobchari Sahoy <i>v.</i> Bijnath Prasad (Lala)	497, 502
Bistoo Pershad Bural <i>v.</i> Radha Soonder Nath	436, 460
Bistoopra Patmohadea (Ranee) <i>v.</i> Vasoodeb Dull Bewartec Patnaik	176, 177, 519
Biswambhar Lal (Lala) <i>v.</i> Rajaram	232
Biswanath Chandra <i>v.</i> Khantomani Das	471, 474
Biswanath Pershad Mahta <i>v.</i> Jagdip Narain Singh	282, 287, 297, 314, 321
Bithal Das <i>v.</i> Nand Kishore	299, 300
Bobbili, Maharajah of, <i>v.</i> Venkataramanjulu Naidu	302
— <i>v.</i> Zamindar of Chundi	492
Bodhnarain Singh (Baboo) <i>v.</i> Omrao Singh (Baboo)	371, 373
Bodhrao Hunmont <i>v.</i> Nursing Rao	261
Bodh Singh Doodhooia <i>v.</i> Gunesh Chunder Sen	221, 222, 246, 255
Boidya Nath Sett <i>v.</i> Durga Charan Basak	425
Bolakee Sahoo <i>v.</i> Court of Wards	252, 253
Bombay, Government of, <i>v.</i> Ganga	64
Bona Koorce (Mussamat) <i>v.</i> Boolee Singh (Baboo)	233, 246
Bool Chand Kalta <i>v.</i> Janokee (Mussamat)	61, 66
Boologam <i>v.</i> Swornam	249, 250
Booniadi Lall (Bukshee) <i>v.</i> Dewkee Nundun Lall (Bukshee)	246, 254
Brahmadeo Narayan <i>v.</i> Harjan Singh	500
Brahmamoyi Chowdhurain (Srimati) <i>v.</i> Gopi Mohan Chowdhury	232
Brahmappa <i>v.</i> Papanna	451
Braja Bhukan Lal Ahusti <i>v.</i> Bichan Dobi	371
Brajakishor Mitter Mazumdar <i>v.</i> Radha Gobind Dutt	432
Braja Kishora <i>v.</i> Kuldana Devi	442
Braja Lal Sen <i>v.</i> Jiban Krishna Roy	421, 422, 426, 431, 494, 496, 498
Brajanath Baisakh <i>v.</i> Matilal Baisakh	481, 486
Brajanath Dey Sirkar <i>v.</i> Anandamayi Dasi	536

	PAGE
Bramamoyi Dasi (Srimati) v. Jages Chandra Dutt	363, 536
Bramanund Mahanty v. Chowdhry Krishna Churn Putnaik	188
Brandon v. Sundarabai	167
Banbhokunjee Muharaj (Sree) v. Gokoolutsaojee Muharaj	129, 147
Bar Inlar Bahadur Singh v. Jauki Koer (Rance)	251, 439, 444
Barj Lal v. Saraj Bikram Singh	442, 510
Bijnandun Singh v. Bidya Prasad Singh	311, 322
Bijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh	271, 346, 528
Bela Bibun Chandra Kurmoker v. Chundia Kurmoker	47, 50, 60
Bela Chowdhraim v. Radhica Chowdhraim	78, 79, 90, 94
Bela Dabee Chowdhraim v. Pearce Lall Chowdhry	499
Bela Dama v. Radhamani	56, 59, 227, 382, 383
Bela Kishore Dasseo v. Sreenath Bose	164, 167, 172, 367, 514
Bela Ram Chandra Doss v. Harroball Doss	553, 576, 577
Bela Ram Mytee v. Balha Koomaree	435
Bengomohun Chose v. Luchmau Singh Thakoor	284
Bengo Mohun Thakoor v. Gourao Pershad Chowdry	363, 367
Bengsoondery Debia (Maharance) v. Luchmee Koonwarce (Rance)	548, 549, 553
Bramamoyee v. Kashi Chunder Sen	48, 61
Brown v. Ram Kunaee Dutt	295
Budhi Ramayya v. Jagapathi	469
Budha Singh v. Luitu Singh	378, 381, 392, 394
Budha Mal v. Bhagwan Das	346, 347
Budhul Manji v. Murarji Premji	213
Budh Singh Dhudhuria v. Niradburan Roy	553
Budree Das Mukun v. Chooni Lal Johurry	577, 578, 579
Budree Lall v. Kantee Lall	311, 320
Budree Lall v. Indurputtee Kowar (Mussamat)	348
Bulakhidas v. Keshavlall	388, 467
Buldeo Ram Tewaree v. Somessur Panray	298
Buldeo Singh (Rajah) v. Koonwer Mahabeer Singh	184, 304
Bulabakant Chowdree v. Kishenprea Dassea Chowdrain	146, 151
Bulwant Singh v. Aman Singh	281
Bulwant Narain Singh v. Ram Kishen Singh	478
Bunsee Singh v. Soodisht Lall	269
Bunsedhur (Lalla) v. Bindeseree Dutt Singh	291, 294, 296, 297
Bunsee Lall v. Aoladh Ahsan (Shaikh)	284, 302
Burwari Lal v. Daya Sunker Misser	303, 307
Buruk Chuttur Singh v. Gredharee Singh	283
Burhan Deo Roy v. Punchoo Roy	390
Burm Suroop Doss (Mohunt) v. Kheshee Jha	562, 563
Buryar Singh v. Hunsee (Mussumat)	387, 389
Bussunt Koomaree (Maharance) v. Kummul Koomaree (Maharance)	82
Buzloor Ruheem (Moonsee) v. Shumsoonissa Begum	67, 68, 73
Buzrung Sahoy Singh v. Mautora Chowdhraim (Mussumut)	297
Byari v. Puttanna	301
Byjnath Lall v. Ramoodeen Chowdry	303
Byjnath Pershad (Lalla) v. Bissen Beharee Sahoy Singh	479, 510
Byjnath Pershad v. Kopilmon Singh	26
Bykant Monee Roy v. Kisto Soonderee Roy	116, 130, 133, 193
Bykunt Nath Roy v. Grish Chunder Mookerjee	508

C.

Cally Churn Mullick <i>v.</i> Bhuggobutty Chura Mullick	264, 46
<i>v.</i> Janova Dossee	344
Cally Nath Naugh Chowdhry <i>v.</i> Chunder Nath Naugh Chowdhry	533, 534, 543
Caralapathi Chunna Cunniah <i>v.</i> Cota Nammalwariah	441, 443
Cassumbhoy Ahmedbhoy <i>v.</i> Ahmedbhoy Hubibhoy	226, 255, 327
Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah <i>v.</i> Collector of Masulipatam	116, 179
Chabildas Lalabhai <i>v.</i> Ramdas Chabildas	245, 250
Cham Sukh Ram <i>v.</i> Paibati	142
Chakalingam Pillai <i>v.</i> Mayandi Chettiar	566
Chalakonda Alasani <i>v.</i> Chalakonda Ratnachalam	163, 259
Chalamayya <i>v.</i> Varadayya	277
Challa Papi Reddi <i>v.</i> Challa Koti Reddi	161, 242
Challa Subbiah Sastri <i>v.</i> Palury Pattabhiramayya	291
Chamaili Kuar <i>v.</i> Ram Prasad	342
Chamanlal Maganlal (Shia) <i>v.</i> Doshu Ganesh Motulchand	405, 407, 470
Chamia, In the matter of	37
Champat <i>v.</i> Shiiba	451
Chandania <i>v.</i> Sahgram	170
Chandar Kishore <i>v.</i> Dampat Kishore	230, 302
Chandar Shekhar <i>v.</i> Kundan Lal	353
Chander Pershad <i>v.</i> Sham Koer	315
Chand Hurree Maitee <i>v.</i> Norendro Narain Roy (Rajah)	255
Chandika Bakhsh <i>v.</i> Muna Kuar	26, 32, 365, 391
Chandra <i>v.</i> Gojarabai	194, 195, 198, 209
Chandrabhagabai <i>v.</i> Kashinath Vithal	81, 86, 210
Chandradeo Singh <i>v.</i> Mata Prasad	309, 313, 314, 315
Chandra Kunwar (Rani) <i>v.</i> Narpat Singh (Chaudhri)	172, 175
Chandramala Patta Mahadevi (Sri Sri) <i>v.</i> Muktumala Patta Mahadevi (Sri)	154
Chandranath Chakrabarti <i>v.</i> Jadabendra Chakrabarti	570
Chandrareka <i>v.</i> Secretary of State	249
Chandra Sen <i>v.</i> Ganga Ram	312, 319
Chandu <i>v.</i> Subba	161
Chanvirrapa <i>v.</i> Danava	350
Charavur Teramath <i>v.</i> Urath Lakshmi	559
Charu Chunder Pal <i>v.</i> Nobo Sunderi Dasi	374, 424, 457
Chatarbhuj <i>v.</i> Chatarjit	539, 556
Chatranayan (Lala) <i>v.</i> Uba Kunwari	485
Chatturbhoj Meghji <i>v.</i> Dharamsi Narangji	184, 239, 241, 244, 249, 304
Chatturbhuj Patnaik <i>v.</i> Krishna Patnaik	383
Chatu Misser <i>v.</i> Jeeva Misser	501
Chedambaramma <i>v.</i> Hussainamma	177
Cheetha (Mussamut) <i>v.</i> Miheen Lall (Baboo)	221, 254
Chelikani Tirupati Rayaningaru <i>v.</i> Vencata Gopala Narasimha Rau Bahadur (Rajah Suraneni)	364, 366, 402
Chellammal <i>v.</i> Ranganatham Pillai	62, 228, 383
Chellaperoomall <i>v.</i> Verraperoomall	259
Chellummal <i>v.</i> Munummal	115
Chenava <i>v.</i> Basangavda	192
Chenchamma <i>v.</i> Subbaya	160, 161
Chengama Nayudu <i>v.</i> Munisami Nayudu	330

	PAGE
Chetti v. Chetti	39
Chetti Chalamanna v. Padmanji Subbamma	521
Chettikulam Venkitachala Reddiar v. Chettikulam Kumara Venkitachala Reddiar	312
Chetty Colum Comara Venkatachella Reddyer v. Rungasawmy Streetmanth Jyengar Bahadoor (Rajah)	147, 306
Chetty Colum Prasanna Venkatachella Reddyar v. Chetty Colum Moodoo Venkatachella Reddyar	147
Chibabala Manohund v. Jadavbai	349, 350
Chibamandla v. Bapubhai	96
Chidambaram Astikram v. Motigavri (Bai)	509
Chidambaram Mahtun v. Ganga Prasad	312
Chidambaram v. Dharm	415
Chidambaram v. Dura Bai	167, 501, 505
Chidambaram v. K. Natar v. Gama Kunwar	327
Chidambaram v. Narayandas	283, 284
Chidambaram v. Sheobarti Koer	503
Chidambaram Chettiar v. Gouri Nachiar	350
Chidambaram v. Hussainamma	500
Chidambaram Mudaliar v. Koothaperumal	314
Chidambaram Reddiar v. Nallammal	506
Chidambaram Chettiar v. Rangachariar (Sri)	504
Chidambaram Chetti v. Minammal	507
Chiddu v. Nambat	336
Chidman Lal v. Hari Chand	101, 148
Chinna v. Sada	282
Chinnaji Govind Godbole v. Dinkar Dhondev Godbole	274, 472, 482, 485
Chinna Veerayya v. Lakshminarasamma	505
Chinnammal v. Varadarajulu	99, 385
Chinnammal v. Venkatachala	404, 413
Chinna Nagayya v. Pedda Nagayya	144
Chinna Obayya v. Sura Reddi	160, 161
Chinnaramakristna Ayyar v. Minatchi Ammal	181
Chinna Rangayangar v. Subbraya Mudali	589
Chinnasami Pillai v. Kunja Pillai	392
Chinna Sanyasi Razu (Sripati) v. Suriya Razu (Sripati)	354
Chinna Unmayi v. Tegarai Chetti	29, 31
Chinnaya v. Perumal	285, 310, 313
Chinnaya Nayudu v. Gurunatham Chetti	277, 288
Chinna Pillu v. Kalimuthu Chetti	302
Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev	576, 577, 580, 581
Chintamanray Mehendale v. Kashinath	311, 314
Chintamony Dutt v. Mohesh Chundra Banerjee	513
Chintaman Singh (Chowdhry) v. Nowlukho Konwari (Mussamat)	27, 260, 264, 516, 517
Chintu v. Dhondur	173
Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perrazu	167, 499, 500, 502, 505
Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki	134, 173, 185, 186
Chooneelal v. Jusoo Mull Devedas	481
Chooney Money Dassee v. Ram Kinkur Dutt	478
Chooru v. Busuntee (Mussamat)	364
Chooramani Dasi v. Bajdy Nath Naik	481, 508
Chotalal Lakshmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar	554, 555, 557, 560, 576, 577

	PAGE
Chotay Lal v. Chunno Lal	23, 389, 404, 405
Chottoo Misser v. Jomah Misser	502
Chotun Bebee v. Ameer Chund	67, 68, 73
Choundawalee Bahoojee (Gosaen Sree) v. Giridharoojee	117
Chowdhurani v. Tariny Kanth Lahiry	75, 255, 435
Chowdhry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh	112, 117, 119, 171
Chuckrodhuj Thakoor v. Beer Chunder Joobraj	56, 57, 99
Chuckun Lal Singh v. Poran Chunder Singh	225, 270, 273
Chunmun Mohunt v. Rajendur Sahoo	503
Chunnu Lal v. Gunput Lal (Lalla)	211, 180, 184
Chundee Chowdhry v. Macnaghten	269
Chunder Coomar v. Hurbans Sahai	302
Chundercoomar Roy v. Gonesh Chunder Doss	196
Chunder Kant Chowdhry v. Nund Lal Chowdhry	232
Chunder Kant Surmah v. Bungshree Deb Surmah	424
Chunder Koomar Gangooly v. Rajkishen Banerjee	494, 504
Chunderkoomar Hazaree v. Dwarkanath Purdhan	506
Chunder Mohinee Dossee v. Hurrosoondree Dossee	526
Chunder Monee Debia v. Kristo Chunder Mopoonduat	229
Chundermoney Dossee v. Hurry Doss Mitter	191
Chundernath Nundi v. Hur Naram Deb	358
Chundernath Roy (Rajah) v. Gobindnath Roy (Koonar)	175
Chundi Churn Barua v. Sidheswari Debi (Rani)	533, 534, 536
Chundrabulce Debia v. Brody	175
Chundramoney Dossee v. Motilal Mullick	535
Chundro Seekur Roy v. Nobin Soondur Roy	27
Chundro Tara Deba v. Buksh Ali	256
Chunilal v. Muli (Bai)	442
Chunilal v. Surajram	54, 55, 60
Chunni Lal v. Sita Ram	168
Chunnu Datt Vyas v. Babu Nandan	6
Churamun Sahu v. Gopi Sahu	52, 53, 284, 436, 454, 485
Chuttan Lal v. Kallu	304
Chutter Dharee Lal v. Bikaroo Lal	306
Chutter Sein (Raja), Elder widow of, v. Chutter Sein (Raja), Younger widow of	575
Chuttur Narain (Lalla) v. Wooma Koonwaree (Mussamut)	502
Chyet Narain Singh v. Bunwaree Singh	233, 349
Civil Revision Petition 101 of 1882	504
Comulmony Dossee v. Ranmanath Bysack	78, 85, 87, 530
Coomara Yettapa Naikar v. Venkateswara Yettia	208, 382
Cooverji Hirji v. Dewsey Bhoja	316, 320
Cossinaut Bysack v. Hurrosoondery Dossee	81, 424, 469, 473, 526
Cotay Hegaday v. Manjoo Kumpty	161
Court of Wards v. Kopulmun Sing	229
— v. Mohessur Roy (Rajah)	438
Crowdee v. Bhokdhari Sing	232
Cursandas Govindji v. Vundravandas Purshotam	509

D.

Dabychurn Mitter v. Radhachurn Mitter	35
Dacca, Collector of v. Jagat Chunder Goswami	415

	PAGE
Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai	61, 67, 68, 69, 70
Dagai Dabee v. Mothuranath Chattopadhyaya	522
Dagdu v. Kamble	296
Dagdusa Shevakdas v. Ramchandra	9
Dagree v. Pacotti San Jao	22, 25
Dagumbaree Dabee v. Taramoney Dabee	145
Daivasikamani Pandarasannedhi (Srimath) v. Noor Mahomed Routhan	564, 567
Dakhina Kali Debi v. Jagadishwar Bhuttacharjee	476
Dal Chund v. Soonder (Musumat)	230, 365
Dalel Kunwar v. Ambika Partap Singh	87, 180
Dalibai v. Gopibai	291
Dalip v. Ganpat	227, 383
Dalip Singh v. Kundan Lal	277
Dal Koer (Musst.) v. Panbas Koer (Musst.)	328
Dalpat Narotam v. Bhagvan Khusal	454
Dalpatzing v. Nanabhai	293
Dalpatsinghji v. Raisinghji	203
Dal Singh v. Dini (Musammatt)	369
Dalsukram Mahasukram v. Lallubhai Motichand	80
Damodar v. Jankibai	478
Damodarbhat v. Bhogilal Karsondas	554, 577, 578, 580
Damodar Bhatji v. Bhat Bogilal Kasandas	581
Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das (Adhikari)	567, 571
Damodardas Maneklal v. Uttamram Maneklal	272, 273, 333, 334, 355, 576
Damodar Madhowji v. Purmanandas Jeewandas	441, 470
Damoderdas Tapidas v. Dayabhai Tapidas	531
Damoodur Misser v. Senabutty Misra	328, 329, 332, 333, 334, 337
Damoodur Mohapattur v. Birjo Mohapattur	293
Damoodur Surmah v. Mohee Kant Surmah	502
Danakoti Ammal v. Balasundara Mudaliar	123
Danesh Sheikh v. Tafir Mandal	63
Danno v. Darbo	387, 448
Darsu Pandey v. Bikarmajit Lal	309
Darves Haji Mahomed v. Jainudin	577
Dasaradhi Ravulo v. Joddumoni Ravulo	283
Dasharathi Kundu v. Bipin Behari Kundu	460
Dasondhay v. Muhammad Abu Nasar	579
Dattaji Sakhamam Rajadiksh v. Kalba Yose Parabhu	307, 513
Dattatraya v. Govind	190
——— v. Rukhmabai	86
——— v. Vishnu	314, 317
Dattatraya Vithal v. Mahadaji Parashram	341, 358
Datti Parisi Nayudu v. Datti Bangaru Nayudu	227, 383
Datto Govind Kulkarni v. Pandurang Vinayak	128
Daulat Ram v. Ram Lal	104
Daula Kuari v. Meghu Tiwari	82, 83
Davud Saiba (Sheikh) v. Hussein Saiba	589
Daya (Bai) v. Natha Govind Lal	80, 212
Daya Khushal v. Bhukhi (Bai)	362
Dayaldas Laldas v. Savitribai	452
Dayamani Debi v. Srinibash Kundu	476
Daya Shankar v. Hub Lal	329, 330
Debee Dial v. Hur Hor Singh	146
Debee Pershad v. Phool Koeree	348, 352

	PAGE
Debendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry v. Brojendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry	85, 224, 334, 530
Debendro Narain Roy (Rajah) v. Chundernath Roy (Coomar)	497
Debendro Nath Mullick v. Odit Churn Mullick	576
Debi Baksh Singh v. Chandrabhan Singh	519
Debi Das Chowdhuri v. Bipro Charan Ghosal	498
Debi Dat v. Jadu Rai	310, 313
Debi Dayal Sahoo v. Bhan Pertap Singh	294, 482, 483, 484
Debi Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh	336
Debi Parshad v. Thakur Dial	236, 237, 242, 339
Debiprasanna Roy Chowdhry v. Harendra Nath Ghose	459, 461
Debi Prosad Chaudhury v. Golap Bhagat	487, 488, 491
Debi Prosad Sahi v. Dharamjit Narayan Singh	282
Debi Sahai v. Sheo Shankar Lal	464
Debi Saran Shukul v. Doukata Shuklain	83
Debi Singh v. Jia Ram	281, 316
Debur Ramnath Roy Chowdhry v. Arnee Kally Debia (Sreemutty)	210
Deedar Hossain (Rajah) v. Zahoor-oon-Nissa (Ranee)	259
Deela Singh v. Toofance Singh	255, 257
Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh	300, 306, 319, 336
Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Doorga Pershad Mitter	127, 133
Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Tarachurn Koondoo Chowdhry	127, 129, 133
Deepo Debia v. Gobindo Deb	12, 424
Deepoo (Mussammaut) v. Gowree Shunkur	201
Delroos Banoo Begum v. Ashgar Ally Khan (Nawab Syud)	585
Delrus Banoo Begum v. Abdur Ruhman (Hadjee)	594
Denonath Shaw v. Hurrinarain Shaw	256
Deobomoyee Dossee v. Juggessur Hati	46
Deo Bunsco Kooer (Mussamat) v. Dwarkanath	329, 347
Deokee (Mussamat) v. Sookhdeo	369
Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash	229, 371, 374
Deoki Singh v. Anupa (Mussamat)	350
Deo Koonwur v. Umbaram Lala	76
Deonandan Pershad v. Udit Narayan Singh	486, 514
Deo Persad v. Lujoo Roy	405
Deotaroo Mahapattur v. Damoodhur Mahapattur	284, 286
Deowanti v. Dwarkanath	329, 347
Deraje Malinga Naika v. Marati Kaveri	98
Desai Ranchhoddas v. Rawal Nathubai	32
Devarayan Chetty v. Mutturaman Chetty	52
Deva Singh v. Rai Manohar	280
Devi Persad v. Gunwanti Koer	79, 87, 210
Devji v. Sambhu	317
Devkore (Bai) v. Amritram Jamiatram	380
— v. Sanmukram	80
Devshankar Naranbhai v. Motiram Jageshvar	550
Devu v. Deyi	380
Dhyanath Roy v. Muthoor Nath Ghose	421, 431
Dhadphale v. Gurav	576
Dhapabai v. Champalal	150
Dhanjibhoy Bomanji v. Hirabai	72
Dharam Chand v. Janki	98
Dharam Chand Lal v. Bhawani Misra	479, 510

E.

	PAGE
Ekradeswar Singh v. Janeshwari Babnasin	30, 263, 347
Elayachandidathil Kombi Achen v. Kenatomkora Lakshmi Amma	286
Elayalwar Reddiar v. Namberumal Chettiar	580, 591
Emperor v. Anthony	36
— v. Ganga (Bai)	37
— v. Lazar	23, 36
— v. Madan Gopal	39
— v. Ram Sarup	232
Empress v. Pitambur Singh	63
Emurtee (Mussamut) v. Nirmul	69
Endoori Venkataramaniah v. Venkatachaimulu	84
Esaías v. Gabriel	544
Eshan Chunder Roy v. Monmohini Dassi	575, 570
Eshan Kishor Acharjee Chowdhry v. Haris Chandra Chowdhry	151

F.

Faizuddin Ali Khan v. Tincowri Saha	130, 194, 195
Fakara Dobey v. Gopi Lall	474
Fakirapa v. Chanapa	301
Fakirappa v. Fakirappa	228, 386
— v. Yellappa	381
Fakir Chand v. Daya Rám	308
Fakirchand Motichand v. Motichand Hurruckchand	313
Fakirgauda v. Gangi	38, 62, 68, 72
Fakurudin Sahib v. Ackení Sahib	590, 591
Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Das	32, 56, 57, 102, 205
Fanindra Kumar Mitter v. Administrator-General of Bengal	540
Fannayama v. Manjaya Hebbar	169
Fatesangji Javatsangji (Maharana Shri) v. Harisanji Fatesangji (Kuvár)	25
Felaram Roy v. Bagalanand Banerjee	478, 482, 485, 512
Fernandez v. Alves	544
Francis Ghosal v. Gabri Ghosal	24
Fuggoo Daye v. Ranah Daye	216
Furzund Hossain v. Janu Bibee	72
Futtick Chunder Chatterjee v. Juggut Mohinee Dabee	229, 371
Futtoo Bibee v. Bhurrit Lall Bhukut	549

G.

G. v. K.	76
Gabind Prasad (Lala) v. Doulat Batti	71, 78
Gadadhar Bhat v. Chandrabhagabai	468, 470, 471
Gadadhar Roy v. Hari Krishna Sarkar	509
Gadappa Desai v. Apaji Jivanrao	492
Gadigeya v. Basaya	6
Gajadhar v. Kaunsilla	370
Gajadhar Pande v. Parbati	510
Gajanan Balkrishna v. Kashinath Narayan	143
Gajapati v. Bhagawan Das	568, 572
Gajendar Singh v. Sardar Singh	350
Gajindar Narain (Rai) v. Harihar Narain (Rai)	222, 269, 277, 279

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

xxxiii

	PAGE
Gambhirmal v. Hamirmal	94, 473
Ganap v. Subbi	479
Ganapathi Ayyar v. Vedavyasa Alasingha Bhattar (Sri)	583, 584, 589
Ganapati v. Bharati Swami	7
Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal	116, 179, 183, 184, 185
Gandavethara Ayyangar v. Devanayya Mudali	591
Gandhi Maganlal Motichand v. Jadab (Bai)	393, 410, 434, 447, 453, 466, 467, 468, 469
Gane Bhive Parab v. Kane Bhive	251, 291, 292
Ganendro Mohun Tagore v. Juttendro Mohun Tagore (Rajah)	533
Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row	277, 287
Ganesh Dharnidhar Maharajdev (Shri) v. Keshavrav Govind Kulgavkar	9, 565
Ganesh Dutt Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Jewach Thakoorain (Mussamat)	221, 333, 337, 349
Ganeshi Lal v. Ajudhia Prasad	451
Ganesh Vaman Kulkarni v. Waghu	394, 411
Ganes Sing v. Ramgopal Sing	591
Gangabai v. Anant	103
— v. Bandu	383, 384
— v. Tarabai	170
— v. Vamanaji	249, 283, 306
Ganga Bai v. Sita Ram	80, 210
Ganga Bisheshar v. Pirthi Pal	235
Gangadaraiya v. Parameswaramma	412
Ganga Das v. Taluk Das	572
Gangadhar v. Yellu	368
Gangadhar Bogla v. Hira Lal Bogla	188
Ganga Jati (Musammat) v. Ghasita	369, 446
Ganga Narayan Das v. Saroda Mohan Roy	268
Ganga Pershad Sahu v. Jhalo	216
Gangaram v. Ballia Vithoba	411
Ganga Sahai v. Hira Singh	146, 173, 229
— v. Kesri	392, 394
— v. Lekhraj Singh	15, 17, 156, 169
Gangayya v. Mahalakshmi	502
Gangbai v. Thavur Mulla	550, 551
Gangu v. Chandrabhagabai	373, 374, 412
Gangubai v. Ramanna	184, 303, 304
Gangulu v. Ancha Bapulu	308, 309
Ganpat v. Annaji	236, 272, 273, 352
— v. Tulsiram	481, 484
Ganpat Pandurang v. Adarji Dadabhai	8
Ganpat Rai v. Munni Lal	276
Ganpat Rao v. Ram Chandar	443
Ganpatrao Moroji v. Vamanrao Shamrao	466, 510
Ganpatrav Vireshvar v. Vithoba Khandappa	142
Ganpat Venkatesh Deshpande v. Gopalrao Venkatesh Deshpande	330
Ganraj Dubey v. Sheozore Singh	303
Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant	219, 279
Gantapalli Appalamma v. Gantapalli Yellaya	71
Garabini Dassi v. Pratap Chandra Shaha	90
Gatha Ram Mistree v. Mochita Kochin Atteah Domoonee	56, 65, 67
Gauranga Sahu v. Sudevi Mata	570
Gauri v. Chandramani	80

	PAGE
Gauri Dat v. Gur Sahai	506
Gauri Sahai v. Rukko	364, 366
Gaur Mohan Chowdhry v. Madan Mohan Chowdhry	575, 576
Gavdlappa v. Girimallappa	124, 127, 130, 131, 133, 194
Gavrishankar Parabhuram v. Atmaram Rajaram	343
Gavuridevamma Garu (Sri Rajah Yenumala) v. Ramandora Garu (Sri Rajah Yenumala)	260
Gayadin v. Raj Bansi Kuar	280
Genda Puri v. Chhatar Puri	568, 571
Ghana Kanta Mohanta v. Gereli	206, 207
Ghandarap Singh v. Lachman Singh	170
Ghansham Singh v. Badiya Lal	202, 293, 510
Gharib-ul-lah v. Khalak Singh	270, 282, 283, 287
Ghasiti v. Nanhi Jan	163
— v. Umrao Jan	29
Ghazaffar Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain	578, 579, 580
Ghazi v. Sukru	48, 50
Gholabai v. Hargovan	6
— v. Javer (Bai)	494
Gholabai Gavrishankar v. Uderam Icharam	579, 580
Ghunshyam Singh v. Runjeet Singh	266
Girdhar v. Kalya	8
Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall	304, 308, 310
Girdharlal Krishnavalabh v. Shiv (Bai)	323
Girhi Rani Misrani v. Chandra Lal Kanth	224, 226
Girianna Murkundi Naik v. Honama	81
Giriapa v. Ningapa	187
Giribala Dassi v. Srinath Chandra Singh	492
Girija Kanta Chakrabarty v. Mohim Chandra Acharjya	301
Girjanund Datta Jha v. Sailajanund Datta Jha	558, 560
Giriowa v. Bhimaji Raghunath	129, 144
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj	348
Girraj Bakhsh v. Hamid Ali (Kazi)	287
Girwurdharoo Sing (Baboo) v. Kulahul Sing	226
Girwar Narain Mahton v. Makbunessa (Mussammat)	267, 279
Gitabai v. Shivbakas	32, 34, 416
Giyana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran	415, 561, 562, 572, 579, 592
Gnanabhai v. C. Srinivasa Pillai	322
Gnanammal v. Muthusami	281
Gnasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram	565, 566, 567, 569, 570, 573
Gobardhan Dass v. Jasadamoni Dassi	64
Gobardhan Sahu v. Bulkhan Mahto	236, 245
Gobinda Chandra Babajee, <i>In the goods of</i>	210
Gobinda Kumar Roy Chowdhury v. Debendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury	574
Gobind Chandra Sarma Mazoomdar v. Anand Mohan Sarma Mazoomdar	179
Gobind Chander Ghose v. Ram Coomar Dey	232
Gobind Chander Mojoomdar v. Dulmeer Khan	476
Gobind Chander Mookerjee v. Doorgapersad Baboo	266
Gobind Krishna Narain v. Abdul Qayyum	350, 466
— v. Khunni Lal	350, 374, 495
Gobindmani Desai v. Shamlal Bysak	199, 477, 501, 502
Gobindo Hureekar v. Woomesh Chander Roy	431
Gobindo Nath Roy v. Ram Kanay Chowdhry	193, 200

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

XXXV

	PAGE
Gobind Prasad v. Gomti	549
Gobind Proshad Talookdar v. Mohesh Chunder Surma Ghuttuck	421, 423, 426, 429, 430
Gobind Singh v. Buldeo Singh	512
Goburdhun Nath v. Onoop Roy	493
Gocoolanund Dass v. Wooma Dace	138, 191
Godavaribai v. Sagunabai	82
Gojabai v. Maloji Raje Bhosle (Shrimant Shahajirao)	19, 63, 451, 454
Gokal Kastur v. Amarchand	275
Gokibai v. Lakhmidas Khimji	81, 82, 84, 86
Gokool Nath Guha v. Issur Lochun Roy	551
Gokool Pershad v. Etwaree Mahto	268
Gokul Chand v. Mangal Sen	527
Golab Chand v. Goluk Monee Dossee	247
Golab Koonwer (Musst) v. Shih Sahai	387, 501
Golab Koonwur (Mussumat) v. Collector of Benares	79
Golak Nath Roy Chowdhry v. Mathura Nath Roy Chowdhry	302
Golamee Gopee Ghose v. Juggessur Ghose	47, 48
Golapdi Meah v. Purna Chandra Dutta	274
Goluck Chunder Bose v. Rughoonath Sree Chunder Roy	566
Goluck Chunder Bose (Baboo) v. Ohilla Daye (Ranee)	92
Golukmonee Dassce v. Kishenpersad Kanoongoo	505
Gomain Sircar v. Prannath Goopto	292, 293
Gonda Koer v. Oodey Singh (Kooer)	474, 475
Gonesh Pandey v. Dabee Doyal Singh	316
Goolab (Mt) v. Phool (Mt)	386
Goolab Sing (Kooer) v. Kurun Sing (Rao)	393, 398, 488, 502, 507
Goornee (Mussumat) v. Oomrao Koonwer (Mussumat)	364
Gooroo Churn v. Goluckmonee	246
Gooroo Churn Sircar v. Koylash Chunder Sircar	367, 428
Gooroo Gobindo Chowdhry v. Huree Madhub Roy	421
Gooroopersaud Jena v. Muddunmohun Soor	288, 482
Gooroopershad Bose v. Rashbehary Bose	180
Gooroo Pershad Roy v. Debee Pershad Tewaree	255
Gooroo Prosunno Singh v. Nil Madhub Singh	172
Goor Pershad v. Sheodeen	302
Goor Surun Doss v. Ram Surun Bhukut	225, 300
Gooshaeen Teekumjee v. Pursotum Laljee	375, 508
Gopal v. Macnaghten	267
Gopala Ayyar v. Arunachallam Chetty	586
Gopala Krishnam v. Venkatanarasa	34, 53, 289
Gopal Anant v. Narayan Ganesh	106
Gopalasami v. Chinnasami	245
Gopalasami Chetti v. Arunachellam Chetti	99, 209, 228, 239
Gopalasami Pillai v. Chokalingam Pillai	317
Gopalayyan v. Raghupatiayyan	28, 31, 141, 174
Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale	124, 126, 127, 147, 157, 194, 197
Gopal Chand Pande v. Kunwar Singh (Babu)	285
Gopal Chandra Chakrabarty v. Radharaman Das Babaji	568
Gopal Chandra Pal v. Ram Chandra Pramanik	437, 459
Gopal Chunder Bose v. Kartick Chunder Dey	570
Gopal Chunder Daghorla v. Kenaram Daghorla	360, 414
Gopal Chunder Nath Coondoo v. Haridas Chini	429, 430, 431

	PAGE
Gopal Das v. Badri Nath	267
Gopal Das Sindh v. Nurotum Sindh	31
Gopal Dass (Mohunt) v. Kerparam Dass (Mohunt)	565, 572
Gopal Dei v. Kanno Dei	577
Gopal Dutt Pandey v. Gopallal Misser	242
Gopal Hari v. Ramakant	260, 261
Gopal Kastur v. Amarchand	275
Gopal Lal v. Mahadeo Prasad	303
Gopalnarain Mozoomdar v. Muddomutty Guptee	278
Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanmant Ganesh Safray	138, 141, 142, 156
Gopal Prosad Bhakat v. Raghunath Deb	265, 286
Gopalrav v. Trimbakrav	261
Gopal Singh v. Dhungazec	370, 374
Gopaul Chunder Manna v. Gour Monce Dossee	480
Gopee Kishen Gossain v. Hem Chunder Gossain	236
_____ v. Ryland	269
Gopee Kissen Gossamy v. Thakoor Doss Gossamy	575, 576
Gopeekrist Gossain v. Gungapersaud Gosain	255
Gopee Lall v. Bhugwan Doss (Mohunt)	255
Gopee Lall v. Chundraolee Buhooje (Mussamat) Sree	103, 113, 133, 173
Gopee Mohun Deb v. Raja Rajkrishna	188
Gopeenath Chowdhry v. Gooroo Dass Surma	552
Gopeshwar Misra v. Durgamani Baishnabi	488
Gopi v. Jaldhara	239
Gopichand v. Sujan Kuar	502
Gopikabai v. Dattatraya	97
Gopu Kolandavelu Chetty v. Sami Royar	581
Gora Chand Lurki v. Makhan Lal Chakravartty	567
Gordhan Das v. Chunni Lal	550, 552
Gordhandas v. Ramcoover (Bai)	362, 535
Gosaion Chund Kobraj v. Kishenmunnee (Mussummaut)	430, 441, 459, 461
Goswami Sri Girdharji v. Madhowdas Premji	534, 563
Goswami (Shriman) v. Girdharlalji (Goswami Shri)	563
Goura Chowdhraim (Mussamat) v. Chummun Chowdhry	304, 363
Gourbullub v. Jugernathpersaud Mitter	150, 180
Gour Chunder Biswas v. Groesh Chunder Biswas	257
Goureonath v. Collector of Monghyr	286, 371
Goureepershaud Rai v. Jymala (Mussummaut)	114
Gourhurreo Kubraj v. Rutnasurce Debia (Mussummut)	180, 182
Gourichurn Patni v. Sita Patni	370
Gouri Sunker Byas v. Niader Sing	416
Gour Lall Singh v. Mohesh Narain Ghose	221
Gourmoni Debi v. Chairman of Panihati Municipality	5, 7
Gournath Chowdhree v. Arnooporna Chowdhraim	129
Gour Pershad Narain v. Sheo Pershad Ram	290, 291
Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal	501, 506, 508
Govindan Nair v. Sankaran Nair	249, 362
Govind Annaji Bodhani v. Trimbak Govind Dhaneshwar	342
Govind Chandra Das v. Radhakristo Das	26, 256
Govind Krishna Gujar v. Sakharam Naraya	319
Govind Lakshman Joshi v. Ramkrishna Hari Joshi	574, 575
Govind Pandurang Kamat, <i>In re</i>	346
Govind Rani Dasi v. Radha Ballabh Das	211
Govind Rao (Sri Mahant) v. Sita Ram Kesho	251

	PAGE
Govindarazulu Narasimham v. Devarabhotla Venkatanarasayya	34, 53, 280
Govindayyar v. Dorasami	149, 153, 154
Govinddas Dhoolubhdas v. Muha Lukshumco	386
Govindji Khimji v. Lakmidas Nathubhoy	75
Govindnath Ray (Maharajah) v. Gulal Chand	120, 148
Greedharee Doss v. Nundkishore Dutt Mohunt	572
— v. Nundokishore Doss Mohunt	561, 568, 570, 571, 572
Groedhareejeo (Gossamee Sreo) v. Rumanlolljee Gossameo	546, 570
Greender Chunder Ghose v. Mackintosh	323
Grees Chund Roy (Maharajah) v. Sumbhoo Chund Roy	98
Grey v. Walker	275
Gridhari Lal Roy v. Bengal Government	17, 18, 19, 26, 398, 404, 408, 416
Grishchunder Banorjee v. Hemlota Debi	544
Grose v. Amirtamoyi Dasi	474, 502
Gudadhur Serma v. Ajodhearam Chowdry	247
Guiram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das	558
Gulab (Bai) v. Thakorelal Pranjiandas	521, 526
Gulabchund v. Fulbai	51, 52
Gulab Kuar v. Bansidhar	84
Gulappa Domingappa Kusugal v. Tayawa	453, 467
Gulbai, Re	214
Gul Mahomed, In the matter of	216
Gunes Gir v. Amrao Gir	571, 572
Gunesh Chunder Roy v. Nilkomul Roy	378, 405, 428
Gunesh Dutt v. Lal Mutteo Kooer (Mussamut)	501, 504, 505
Gunesh Dutt Singh (Baboo) v. Moheshur Singh	27, 259, 260
Gunga (Bae) v. Sheoshunkar (Bae)	141
Gunga Bae v. Hogg	79
Gungadhur Bogla (Kumar) v. Hira Lal Bogla (Kumar)	188, 451
Gunga Dhur Chatterjee v. Soorjo Nath Chatterjee	258
Gungagobind Bose v. Dhunnee (Sreemutty)	296
Gunga Mya v. Kishen Kishore Chowdhry	465
Gunga Narain Sircar v. Brindabun Chunder Kur Chowdhry	553
Gungapersad Roy v. Brijessuree Chowdhrair	181, 189
Gunga Pershad v. Phool Singh	285, 286, 290
Gunga Pershad v. Sheodyal Singh	225, 242, 289, 309, 314, 315
Gunga Pershad Kur v. Shumbhoonath Burmun	417, 424, 490
Gungapershad Sahu v. Maharani Bibi	291
Gunga Prosad v. Ajudhia Pershad Singh	225, 242, 289, 313
Gungaram Bhaduree v. Kashee Kaunt Roy	114
Gungoomull v. Bunseedhur	237
Guni Mahomed v. Doorga Proshad Mytse	268
Gunnaiyan v. Kamakohi Ayyar	249, 251
Gunnapa Deshpandee v. Gunkapa	106
Gunpat v. Gopalrao	330
Gunput Lal (Lalla) v. Toorun Koonwar (Mussamut)	53, 288, 289, 290
Gunput Narain Singh, In the matter of	59
Gunput Singh (Baboo) v. Gunga Pershad	442
Gur Dayal v. Kaunsila	88, 91
Gurlingapa v. Nandapa	302
Gurnak Prasad v. Jai Narain Lal	495
Gur Pershad Singh v. Dhani Rai	263, 264, 516
Gursangaya v. Tamana	6, 7
Guru Das Dhar v. Bijaya Gobinda Baral	232

	PAGE
Guru Das Nag v. Matilal Nag	105
Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar	366, 377, 416, 417, 418, 420, 421, 422, 423, 426, 428, 431, 433
Gurulingaswami v. Ramalakshamma	135, 165, 174
Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshamma (Sri Balusu)	2, 11, 15, 17, 101, 104, 121, 125, 135, 145, 146, 156, 176
Gurumurthi Reddi v. Gurammal	242, 253
Gurunatham Chetty v. Raghavelu Chetty	312
Gurunath Nilkanth v. Krishnaji Govind	465, 511
Guru Prasad Roy v. Nayar Das Roy	476
Gurusami Chetti v. Krishnasami Naikar	591
Gurusami Pillai v. Sivakami Ammal	529
Gurusami Sastrial v. Ganapathia Pillai	294, 311
Gurushantappa v. Channmallappa	267
Guruvappa v. Thumma	283, 298
Guruvayya Gouda v. Dattatraya Anant	267, 279
Gyanendro Chunder Lahiri v. Kallapahar Hajee	117, 149
Gyanendro Nath Roy v. Lobongomunjori Dabi	165
Gyan Koowur (Mussumant) v. Dookhurn Smgh	465

H.

Hafzoonnissa Begum v. Radhabinode Missur	361, 478, 491
Haimun Chull Sing (Raja) v. Ghunsheam Sing (Koomer)	119, 191
Hait Singh v. Dabee Singh	255
Hakim Khan v. Gool Khan	24
Hammuckah v. Rungapah	444
Hanmanta v. Gopal	278
Hanmantapa v. Jivubai	240, 284
Hanmant Ramchandra v. Bhimacharya	104, 187, 299, 363
Hanuman Kamat v. Dowlut Mundar	313, 315
Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhaganti Prasad	477, 494, 509
Hanuman Singh v. Nanak Chand	311
Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi	160, 161
Haradhun Gossamee v. Ram Newaz Missry	268
Haradhun Naug v. Isser Chunder Bose	477, 504
Haradhun Rai v. Biswanath Rai	127
Harakh v. Ram Lal	354
Haran Chunder Banerji v. Hurro Mohun Chuckerbutty	139, 143, 145
Hara Sunder Majumdar v. Basunta Kumar Roy	552
Hardai Narain v. Haruck Dhari Singh	241, 244, 280, 281, 309
Hardeo Bux (Thakoor) v. Jawahir Singh	245, 252
Hardwari Lal v. Gomi	526
Harek Chand Babu v. Bejoy Chand Mahatab	178
Harendranarayan, In the Goods of	471
Harendra Nath Chowdhury v. Brinda Rani Dassi	49
Hargawan Magan v. Baijnath Das	466, 500
Hargobind Kuari v. Dharam Singh	208, 227
Hari v. Maruti	234
— v. Vasudev	410
Haribhai v. Uka	477
Haribhat v. Damodharbhat	467
Hari Chintaman Dikshit v. Moro Lakshman	527
Hari Churn Agradani v. Sasti Churn Agradani	558

	PAGE
Haridas v. Velji	245
Haridas Dutt v. Ranganmani Dasj	465, 473
Haridas Lalji v. Narotam Raghavji	79, 223, 239, 240, 245, 254
Haridas Sanyal v. Pran Nath Sanyal	352, 353
Hari Gopal v. Gokaldas Kushabashet	267
Harihar Misser v. Mahomed (Syed)	21
Harihar Ojha v. Dasarathi Misra	486, 509
Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kaski Pershad Singh	487, 488, 489
Hari Kissen Bhagat v. Bajrang Sahai Singh	481, 512
Hari Krishna Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty) v. Radhika Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty)	50, 50, 382
Harikristna Chowdary (Duvvada) v. Venkata Lakshmi Narayana Pantulu (Sripada)	354
Harilal Bapuji v. Mani (Bai)	304
Harilal Harjivandas v. Pranvalavdas Parbhudas	470, 471
Hari Lal Mullick, In the matter of	9
Harilal Pranlal v. Rewa (Bai)	169, 442, 443
Hari Mahadaji Savarkar v. Balambhat Raghunath Khuro	9
Hari Narayan Brahme v. Ganpatrav Daji	353
Hari Narayan Jog v. Vitai	328, 477
Hari Prasad Jha (Baboo) v. Muddan Mohan Thakur	329
Hari Premji (Patil) v. Hakamchand	300, 313
Hari Ram v. Bishnath Singh	317
Hari Saran Moitra v. Bhubaneswari Debi	200
Harish Chandra Roy v. Atir Mahmud	361, 375, 416
Hari Singh v. Sher Sing	254
Hari Vithal v. Jaiaram Vithal	278
Hari Vydanathayyan v. Minakshi Ammal	493
Harjivan Anandram v. Naran Haribhai	522
Harnabh Pershad v. Mandil Dass	32, 120, 469
Harmanaye Narain Singh v. Ram Gopal Achari	481
Har Narain v. Bishambhar Nath	334
Haroon Mahomed, In the matter of	237, 275
Harpal Singh v. Lekhraj Kunwar	500
Har Prosad Das v. Harihar Prosad Singh (Bakshi)	277
Har Saran Das v. Nandi	370
Har Shankar Partab Singh v. Lal Raghuraj Singh	171, 172, 173, 176
Haru Dalmel (Chamar) v. Kashi	370
Hashim (Sayad) v. Husoin Sha	6
Hasmat Rai (Koer) v. Sunder Das	297, 309, 315, 352, 354
Hasha v. Ragho Ambo Gondhali	522
Hassan Ali v. Naga Mal	145
Hassan (Kazi) v. Sagun Balkrishna	590
Haunman Dutt Roy v. Kishen Kishor Narayan Sing (Baboo)	300, 307
Hayes v. Harendra Narain	486, 490
Hayward v. Hayward	71
Haza Hira v. Bhaiji Madan Isabji	320
Hazari Mall Babu v. Abaninath Adhuriya	244, 263, 265, 304, 311
Heera Lal v. Kousillah (Mussumat)	89, 69
Heera Lal Roy v. Bidyadur Roy	355
Heera Singh v. Buryar Singh	179
Helan Das v. Durga Das	229
Hema Kooeree (Mussumat) v. Ajoodhya Pershad	79, 210
Hemant Das v. Nobin Chand Ghose	553, 576

	PAGE
Hemangini Dasi (Srimati) v. Kodarnath Kudu Chowdhry	89, 333, 334
Hemchunder Ghose v. Thakomoni Debi	303
Hem Chunder Sanyal v. Sarnamayi Debi	466, 490, 491, 502
Hemchund Majoondar v. Tara Munnee (Mussumaut)	482
Hemlota Dabee, In the matter of	544
Hemlutta Debee v. Goluck Chunder Gosayn	426, 466
Hencower Bye (Doe dem) v. Hanscower Bye	163
Herasutollah (Chowdury) v. Brij Soondur Roy	175, 295
Hetnarain Singh v. Ram Dein Singh	9
Hidait-oon-nissa v. Afzul Hossain (Syud)	593
Himmat Bahadur v. Bhawani Kunwar	245, 479
Himnauth Bose, In the matter of	213
Hinulta Chowdrayn (Mussumaut) v. Pudoo Munee Chowdrayn (Mussumaut)	364
Himunchull v. Maharaj Singh	387
Hinmatsing Becharsing v. Ganpatsing	211
Hira v. Hansji Pema	54, 63
Hirabai v. Lakshmibai	443
Hirakore (Bai) v. Trikamdas	357
Hiralal Ichhalal (Majmudar) v. Narsilal Chaturbhajas (Desai)	9
Hira Lal Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldarin	309, 312, 314, 322
Hira Lal Sahu v. Parmeshur Rai	315
Hiralal Singha v. Tripura Charan Ray	463
Hiran Bibi (Mussumaut) v. Sohan Bibi	496
Hira Naikin v. Radha Naikin	163, 164, 204
Hiranath Koer (Maharani) v. Ramnarayan Sing (Baboo)	32, 517
Hira Panday v. Bachu Panday	7
Hira Singh (Chaudhri) v. Gunga Sahai (Chaudhri)	371
Hitendra Singh v. Rameshur Singh	319
Honamma v. Timannabhat	83, 374
Hoogly, Land Agents of Zillah v. Kishnanund Dundee	571
Hoolas Koonwer (Mussumat) v. Man Singh	344
Hoolash Koer v. Kassee Proshad	348, 350
Horendranarain Acharji Chowdhry v. Chandra Kanta Lahiri	544, 545
Hori Dasi Debi v. Secretary of State	570
Hori Lal v. Munman Kunwar	268, 274, 279, 282
Hossein Ali Khan v. Bhagaban Das (Mahanta)	563, 564
Hridoy Kant Bhattacharjee v. Behari Lal Mookerjee	335, 336
Huebut Rao Mankur v. Govind Rao Balwunt Rao Mankur	143, 154, 157
Hujmu Chul v. Bhadoorun (Ranee)	53
Hulodhur Mookerjee v. Ramnauth Mookerjee	341
Hulodhur Sein v. Gooroodoss Roy	231
Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonwerce (Mussumat Babooee)	284, 285, 287, 288, 291, 292, 294, 295, 308, 309, 478, 510
Hunsbutti Kerain v. Ishri Dutt Koer	475, 476
Hunsraj v. Monghibai (Bai)	454, 490
Huradhan Mookurjia v. Muthoranath Mookurjia	101, 174, 176
Hurday Narain Sahu (Baboo) v. Rooder Perakash Misser (Pundit Baboo)	300, 306, 319
Hurdwar Singh v. Luchmun Singh	347
Hur Dyal Nag v. Roy Krishto Bhoomick	171, 175, 176
Hurce Bhasee Nana v. Nuthoo Koober	36
Hureehur Mookerjee v. Raj Kishan Mookerjee	533
Huri Das Bundopadhya v. Bama Churn Chattopadhya	419, 422, 426, 429, 430

	PAGE
Huri Doyal Singh Sarmana v. Grish Chunder Mookerjee	464, 465
Hurish Chunder Doss v. Gouree Pershad Chatterjee	256
Hurish Chunder Mookerjee v. Mokhoda Debia	221, 256
Hurka Shunkur v. Raeejee Munohur	74
Hurkishor Das Bhooya v. Joogul Kishor Saha Roy.	268
Hurlall Singh v. Jorawun Singh	262
Hurodoot Narain Singh v. Beer Narain Singh	304, 305
Huromohun Audhikaree v. Auluck Monee Dassee	481
Huropershad Roy Chowdhry v. Shibo Shunkuree Chowdhraim	26, 27
Huro Soonduree Debia v. Doorga Doss Bhuttacharjee	251
Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal	27, 28, 29, 245, 251, 528
Hurra Soondree Dassee v. Chundermoney Dassee	135
Hurrinath Chatterjee v. Mothoor Mohun Goswami (Mohunt)	494
Hurronath Roy Bahadoor (Rajah) v. Rundhir Singh	291, 297
Hurrosoondery (Ranee) v. Kistonaath Roy (Cowan)	103
Hurrosundari Dabia, In the matter of the petition of	544, 545
Hurrosoondery Debea Chowdrance v. Rajcssuree Dabea	362
Hurry Churn Dass v. Nimai Chand Keyal	57
Hurry Doss Dutt v. Runjunmonce Dossee	472
----- v. Uppoonnah Dossee	473
Hurry Mohun Rai v. Gonesh Chunder Doss	483, 492
Hurry Mohun Roy v. Nyantara (Sreemutty)	87, 88
Hurymohun Shaha v. Shonaton Shaha	441, 459
Hurronath Roy Bahadoor (Rajah) v. Rundhir Singh	291
Huseni Begum v. Collector of Moradabad	577
Hussein Miyan (Sayad) v. Collector of Kaira	577

I.

Ibrahim Rowthen (Shakh) v. Muhamad Ibrahim Rowthen	25
Ibrahim Tharagan (Sheik) v. Rama Aiyar	266, 268
Iburamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naiek	354
Ilata Shavatri v. Ilata Narayanan Nambudin	78
Imam v. Balamma	84, 92, 94
Imrit Konwur v. Roop Narain Singh	174, 495
Inda v. Jehangira	169
Indar Kuar v. Lalta Prasad Singh	483
Indar Kunwar (Maharani) v. Jaipal Kunwar (Maharani)	108, 113, 115, 126
Indar Pal v. Imperial Bank	315
Indar Sahai (Munshi) v. Shiam Bahadur (Kunwar)	245
Indar Sen Singh v. Harpal Singh	576
Inderun Valungypooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talaver	38, 39, 62, 208, 227, 332
Indro Kooer (Mussamut) v. Abdool Burkat (Sheikh)	495
Indromoni Chowdhraim v. Beharilal Mullick	153, 154
Indur Chunder Singh v. Radhakishore Ghose	277, 493
Indurdeonarain Singh (Baboo) v. Toolseenarain Singh	232
Ishan Chunder Mitter v. Buksh Ali Soudagur	497
Ishen Chunder Chowdhry v. Bhyrub Chunder Chowdhry	427
Ishri Singh (Thakur) v. Baldeo Singh	518, 523
Israel v. Shamser Rahman	231
Ishwar Chunder Surma, In the matter of	218
Ishwar Narain v. Janki	508, 508
Ishwar Pershad Singh v. Nasib Kooer	225, 245, 333

	PAGE
Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain (Mussumut)	474, 475, 502, 503
Issur Chunder Sein v. Rancee Dossee	229, 372
Issuri Dutt Singh v. Ibrahim	306
Ittuni Panikkar v. Irani Nambudripad	586
Iyagaru Soobaroyadoo v. Iyagaru Sashama	77

J.

Jaddo Kunwar v. Sheo Shankar Ram	278
Jadomoney Dabee v. Saradaprosanno Mookerjee	472
Jadoo Shat v. Kadumbince Dassee	269
Jado Singh v. Rancee (Mussumat)	304
Jadubansi Kunwar v. Mahpal Singh	513
Jadubindu Odhikaree v. Lokenauth Gerce	549, 574
Jadu Dass v. Sutherland	269
Jadumani Dasi v. Kheytramohan Shil	81
Jadumani Dasi (Srimati) v. Gangadhar Seal	246, 247
Jadumani Debi (Srimati) v. Sarodaprosanno Mookerjee	490
Jadunath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ramji	552
Jagabhai Lalubhai v. Vijbhukandas Jagjivandas	317
Jagadamba Chowdhrahi v. Dakhina Mohun	169
Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur (Maharajah) v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (Rani)	549, 556, 558, 563, 570
Jaganatha v. Ramabhadra	30, 251, 352
Jagannada v. Papamma	186
Jaganadha Raja (Sri) v. Prasada Rao (Sri Rajah)	500
Jagannath v. Champa	366
— v. Dibbo	500
Jagan Nath v. Mannu Lal	277, 329
— v. Tirbeni Sahai	359
Jagannath Churn v. Akali Dassia	7
Jagannath Pal v. Bidyanund	104, 361
Jagannath Prasad v. Sitaram	300, 319
Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh	16, 17, 63, 169, 170, 450, 451, 570
Jagannath Raghunath v. Narayan	18, 19, 62, 450, 452, 453, 462
Jagannath Ramji	271
Jagannath Vithal v. Apaji Vishnu	478
Jagannath Prasad v. Jaikishun Prasad	483
Jagatnarain v. Sheo Das	366, 392, 393
Jagdish Bahadur v. Sheo Pertab Singh	519
Jagendra Chandra Banerjee v. Phani Bhushan Mookerjee	464
Jaggamoni Dasi v. Nilmoni Ghosal	549
Jagjivandas Javerdas v. Imdad Ali	324
Jagraj Singa v. Ajudhia Prasad	318
Jagun Kooer v. Rughoonundun Lal Shahoo	350
Jai Bansi Kunwar (Mussamat) v. Chattar Dhari Sing	570
Jaikisondas Gopaldas v. Harkisondas Hollochandas	54, 55, 56
Jaikumar v. Gauri Nath	312
Jaipal Kunwar (Thakurain) v. Indar Bahadur Singh (Bhaiya)	503
Jairam v. Kessowjee	442
Jai Ram Dhami v. Musan Dhami	119, 126
Jairam Luxmon	271
Jairam Narayan Raje v. Atmaram Narayan Raje	354
Jairam Narronji v. Kuverbai	534, 536, 543

	PAGE
Jairam Nathu v. Nathu Shamji	332, 356
Jai Singh Pal Singh v. Bijai Pal Singh	141
Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das	567, 568, 575
Jaleshar Rai v. Amrut Rai	321
Jallidar Singh v. Ram Lal	300
Jamal Saheb v. Murgaya Swami	566
Jamal-uddin v. Muftaba Husain	578, 579
Jameelah Khatoon v. Pegul Ram	28
Jamiyatram v. Jamna (Bai)	465
Jamiyatram Ramchandra v. Parbhudas Hathi	322
Jamna v. Machul Sahu	85
—— v. Nain Sukh	294, 313
Jamna (Bai) v. Bhaishankar	470
Jamnabai v. Dharsey	507, 542, 552
—— v. Khimji Vullubdass	387, 550
—— v. Raychand Nahalchand	111, 136, 146, 193, 198
Jamna Das v. Ramautar Pande	442
Jamna Prasad v. Ram Partap	225, 243
Jamsetji N. Tata v. Kashinath Jivan Manglia	201, 292, 310
Jamuna Pershad v. Ganga Pershad Singh	303
Janak Keshori Kuar v. Debi Prasad Singh	490, 495
Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyar	471, 499, 500, 503
Janakisetty Sooryudu v. Miriyala Hanumayya	469
Jan Ali v. Ramnath Mundal	579, 585, 591
Janardhan Pandurang v. Gopal	372
Janglubai v. Jetha Appaji Marwadi	447
Janhabai (Musst) v. Balbhadra Suar	510
Jankee Singh v. Bukhooree Singh	232
Janki v. Bhairon	442
—— v. Kallu Mal	528
—— v. Nand Ram	209, 210, 212, 242, 378
Jankibai v. Shrinivas Ganesh	79, 236
—— v. Sundra	19, 452, 467
Janki Dibeh v. Suda Sheo Rai	119
Janki Pershad Singh v. Dwarka Pershad Singh	262
Jankypersaud Agurwallah, <i>Ex. p.</i>	47
Jan Mahomad v. Datu Jaffar	24, 257
—— v. Nurudin (Syed)	580
Janmajay Mazumdar v. Keshab Lal Ghose	105
Janokce Dassee v. Kisto Komul Singh	257
Janokce Debea v. Gopaul Acharja	146
Janoki Debi (Srimati) v. Gopal Acharja	557, 568
Janokinath Mukhopadhyaya v. Mothuranath Mukhopadhyaya	328, 331, 477
Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh	220, 241, 242, 243, 245
Jas Ram v. Sher Singh	267
Jatha Naik v. Venktapa	493
Jati Kar v. Mukunda Deb	573, 574
Jatindra Nath Chaudhuri (Rai) v. Amrita Lal Bagchi	181, 193
Jatindra Nath Chowdhri (Roy) v. Prasanna Kumar Banerji	268
Jaudub Chunder Ghose v. Benodbeharry Ghose	222, 427, 428
Javerbai v. Kablibai	594
Jawahir Singh v. Guyan Singh	242, 253
Jawahra v. Akbar Husain	579
Jaya Nath v. Manjunath	462

	PAGE
Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma	77, 79, 80, 84, 88, 89, 90, 481
Jaykali Debi (Srimati) v. Shibnath Chatrjee	545
Jeeb Nath Singh (Thakoor) v. Court of Wards	100, 395, 397, 398
Jeebo Dhon Banyah v. Sundhoo (Mussamut)	68, 71
Jeeb Nath Saheo Deo (Thakoor) v. Lokenath Sahce Deo	32
Jeewanbai v. Manordas Lachmondas	8
Jeewun Punda v. Sona (Mussamat)	441, 442
Jekisondas v. Ranchodas	59
Jeo Lal Singh v. Gunga Pershad	279
Jeonco (Mussamat) v. Dhurum Kooer	345, 349
Jeram Laljee v. Veerbai	495
Jetha (Bai) v. Haribai	412
Jethubai Narsey v. Chapsey Cooverji	7
Jeyangarulavaru v. Hati Durma Dossji (Sri)	592
Jhabbu Singh v. Ganga Bishan	270
Jhamman Kunwar v. Tiloki	509, 510
Jhandu v. Tariff	506
Jharula Das v. Jalandhar Thakur	494, 507
Jhubboo Lal Sahoo v. Khoob Lal	341
Jhula v. Kanta Prasad	506
Jhunka Prasad v. Nathu	147
Jhunna v. Ramsarup	97
Jhunna Kuar v. Chain Sukh	328
Jib Lal Gir (Mohunt) v. Jaga Mohan Gir (Mohunt)	557, 562
Jijoyamba Bayi Saiba (H. H. M.) v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba (H. H. M.)	328, 387, 474
Jina (Bai) v. Kharwar Jina	24, 70
Jivabhai v. Vadilal	327
Jivani Bhai v. Jivu Bhai	138, 141, 142, 144, 204
Jivanbhat v. Anibhat	234
Jivi v. Ramji	96
Jirubai v. Krishnaji	349
Jiwan Lal v. Kallu Mal	144
Jiwan Singh v. Misri Lal	489
Jnananjan Banerjee v. Adoremoney Dassee	564, 565, 566, 567
Jodhi Rai v. Basdeo Prasad	556
Jodoonath Dey Sircar v. Brojonath Dey	333
Jogdamba Koer v. Secretary of State	364, 366
Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra (Raja) v. Nityanund Man- singh	13, 227, 383, 385, 516, 519
Jogendra Chunder Dutt v. Apurna Dasi	362
Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Fulkumari Dassi	93, 333, 336
Jogendra Nath Mukerji v. Jugobundhu Mukerji	353
Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baladeo Das	234, 343, 344, 351
Jogendra Nath Sarkar v. Gobinda Chandra Dutt	567
Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Nobin Chunder Chottopadhyaya	268
Jogendra Chundro Ghose v. Ganendra Nath Sircar	93, 333, 336
Jogendro Deb Roy Kut v. Funindro Deb Roy Kut	278
Jogendronundini Dossee v. Hurrydoss Ghose	67, 68, 73
Jogesh Chandra Banerjee v. Nrityakali Debi	135
Jogesh Chunder Bandopadhyaya v. Jonabali Bepari	135
Jogeswar Chakrabatti v. Panch Kauri Chakrabatti	52, 59
Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt	237, 239, 528
Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chunder Lahiry	358

	PAGE
Jogul Kishore v. Shib Sahai	326
Joharmal v. Eknath	310, 317
Joharmal Ladhooam v. Chetram Hari Sing	250, 275
Johurra Bibee v. Sroegopal Misser	92, 274, 275
Joitaram v. Ramkrishna	304, 521, 523
Joonas Noorani (Moosa Haji) v. Abdul Rahim (Haji)	25
Joseph Vathiar of Nazareth	25
Joshi Assam, In the matter of	215
Jotee Roy v. Bheechuck Meah	232
Joti Lal (Lala) v. Durani Kower (Mussamat)	390
Jowala Buksh v. Dharum Singh	24, 137
Joy Chunder Rukhit v. Bippro Churn Rukhit	232
Joy Chundro Race v. Bhyrub Chundroo Race	103, 117, 156
Joy Deb Surmah v. Huroputty Surmah	557
Joykishore Chowdhry v. Panchoo Baboo	178, 180
Joykisto Cowar v. Nittyanund Nundy	274, 275
Joymoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Sibosoondery Dossee (Sreemutty)	191
Joy Mooruth Koor v. Buldeo Singh	494, 504
Joynarain Giri v. Goluck Chunder Mytee	348, 349, 352
— v. Grish Chunder Myti	351
Joynarain Sing v. Roshun Sing	302
Joytara v. Ramhari Sirdar	85, 86, 530
Judoonath Dey Sircar v. Brojonath Dey Sircar	335
Judoonath Sircar v. Bussunt Coomar Roy Chowdhry	63, 438, 441, 459
Judoonath Tewaree v. Bishonath Tewaree	337
Juga Lal Chaudhuri v. Audh Behari Prosad Singh	319
Jugal Kishore v. Hulasi Ram	267
— v. Lakshmandas Raghunathdas	560, 576, 577
Jugdanund Gossamee v. Kessub Nund Gossamee	416
Juggendronath Banerjee v. Rajendronath Holdar	504
Juggernath Persad v. Janky Persad	52
Juggernath Sawunt v. Odhiranee Narain Koomaree	89
Juggessur Buttobyal v. Roodro Narain Roy (Rajah)	564, 566
Juggessur Sircar v. Nilambur Biswas	53, 289
Juggodumba Dossee v. Haran Chunder Dutt	268
— v. Puddomoney Dossee	558
Juggomohun Ghose v. Manickchund	28
Juggo Mohun Mullick (Doe dem) v. Saumcoomar Bebee	23, 58
Juggurnath Khootia v. Doobo Misser	284, 302
Juggurnath Roy Chowdhry v. Kishen Pershad Surmah	574, 575
Juggurnath Sahaie (Maharajah) v. Mukhun Koonwur (Musst.)	178
Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Sokheemoney Dossee (Mussamat)	539, 547, 552, 554
Juggurnarain Singh v. Collector of Manbhoom	429
Jugjeevan Nuthoojee v. Deosunkur Kaseeram	481
Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Mangaldas Nathubhoy (Sir)	28, 225, 241, 242, 244, 246, 249, 252, 327
Jugo Bundhoo Tewaree v. Kurum Singh	26
Jugodumba Debia v. Rohinee Debia	255
Jugol Kishore v. Jotindromohun Tagore (Maharajah)	496, 497
Jugomohan Haldar v. Sarodamoyee Dossee	333, 335
Jugoo Lall Oopadhya v. Manophur Lall Oopadhya	233
Jukaram v. Babaji	138
Jukni v. Queen-Empress	57
Jullasur Koor v. Uggur Roy	392, 406

	PAGE
Jummal Ali v. Tirbhee Lall Dass	323
Jumona Dassya Chowdhrani v. Bamasoonderai Dassya Chowdhrani	33, 106
	107, 109, 112, 167, 502
Jumona Persad Singh v. Dignarain Singh	276, 300
Junaruddeen Misser v. Nobin Chunder Perdham	26, 27
Junmejy Mullick (Chowdhry) v. Russomoyee Dossee	480
Jusagheri Gossamiar v. Collector of Tanjore	586
Jusoda Koonwur (Mussamut) v. Gourie Byjonath Sohae Singh	345
Jusoda Koor v. Nettya Lall (Lallah)	214
Jussoondah v. Ajodhia Pershad	257
Juswant Singh (Baboo) v. Doolee Chund	202
Jutadhari Lal v. Rughoobee Persad	282
Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore	86, 87, 88, 240, 365, 417,
	526, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 539, 540, 541, 568, 569
Jwala Nath v. Kulloo	504, 505
Jwala Prasad v. Protap Udainath Sahi Deo (Maharajah)	302, 305
Jye Koonwur (Musst.) v. Bhikaree Singh	372
Jymunee Dibiah (Mussumaut) v. Ramjoy Chowdree	364, 366

K.

Kachi Kaliyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar	96, 259, 260, 341, 515, 518
Kachi Yuva Rangappa Kallakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Kalyana Rangappa Kallakka Thola Udayar	30
Kachu Bayaji v. Kachoba Vithoba	522
Kader Batcha v. Kader Batcha Rowthan	558
Kagal Ganpaya v. Manjappa	319
Kahandas Narrandas, <i>In re</i>	4, 9
Kailur Singh v. Roop Singh	287, 288, 295, 482
Kailasam Pillai v. Natarajah Tambiran	561, 562
Kailash Chandra Bose v. Gijja Sundari Debi	496, 513
Kailash Chandra Chuckerbutty v. Kaashi Chandra Chuckerbutty	466
Kailash Chandra Adhikari v. Karuna Nath Chowdhry	421, 431
Kailashi Kunwar v. Badri Prasad	336
Kaithe v. Kulladasi Koundan	63
Kalahasti, Rajah of, v. Achigadu	204, 324, 516
Kalee Chunder Chowdhry v. Sheeb Chunder	100
Kalee Churn Giri v. Golabi	585, 591
Kaleenarain Roy Chowdhry v. Ram Coomar Chand	293
Kalee Pershad Sarma v. Bhoirabee Dabee	427, 429
Kalee Pudo Banerjee v. Chaitun Pandah	13
Kalee Sunkur Bhadooree v. Eshan Chunder Bhadooree	246, 254
Kalee Sunkur Sannyal v. Denendro Nath Sannyal	330
Kalgavda Tavanappa v. Somappa Tamangavda	179, 190
Kali v. Gouri	6
Kalian Rai v. Ram Chandar	392
Kalian Singh v. Pan Kuar (Mussamat)	379
— v. Sanwal Singh	503, 527
Kali Baksh Singh v. Ram Gopal Singh	511
Kalichand Dutt v. Moore	466
Kalichandra Chowdhry v. Shibchandra Bhaduri	175
Kali Chandra Singh v. Rajkissore Bhuddro	268
Kali Charan v. Jewat	319

	PAGE
Kalicharan Gir Gossain v. Bangshi Mohan Das Baboo	575
Kali Das v. Bijai Shankar	186
Kalidas Das v. Krishna Chandra Das	105, 196, 363, 371, 373, 374
Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan	269
Kali Das Mullick v. Kanhya Lal Pundit	522
Kalika Sahoy v. Gouree Sunkur	302, 349
Kalikishore Dutt Gupta Mozoomdar v. Bhusan Chunder	172
Kali Kishore Pal v. Abdul Karim	466, 487
Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra	178, 181
Kali Krishna Sarkar v. Raghunath Deb	264, 319, 324, 516, 517
Kaliparshad v. Ramcharan	327
Kali Pershad Singh (Tekait) v. Anund Roy	324
Kali Shankar v. Nawab Singh	302, 303, 309, 314
Kali Sunker Dass v. Koylash Chunder Dass	59
Kaliyanaramayyar v. Mustak Shah Sahib	589
Kalka Parshad v. Mathura Parshad	380
Kalka Pershad v. Budree Sah	372, 373
Kallapa v. Venkatesh Vinayak	300
Kallcepersaud Singh v. Kupoor Koowaree	88
Kallianji v. Bezoni	221, 258
Kalliyani v. Narayana	286
Kallu v. Faiyaz Ali Khan	492, 496
Kally Churn Shaw v. Dukhee Bebee	57
Kally Prosonno Ghose v. Gocool Chunder Mitter	194, 195, 199, 200
Kallyprosono Mitter v. Gopeenath Kur	539
Kalova v. Padapa Valad Bhujangrav	164
Kalpagathachi v. Ganapathi Pillai	89
Kalu v. Barsu	304
— v. Kashibai	80, 210, 211
Kalub Hossein (Hajee) v. Mehrun Beebee (Mussumat)	593, 594
Kamakshi v. Nagarathnam	31, 462, 463
Kamakshi Ammal v. Chakrapany Chettiar	284, 306
— v. Chidambara Reddi	328, 329
Kamala v. Bhagirathi	447
Kamalakshi v. Ramasami Chetti	163
Kamalam v. Sadagopa Sami	31
Kamavadhani Venkata Subbaiya v. Joysa Narasingappa	199, 471, 477, 501
Kambinayani Timmaji v. Kambinayani Subbaraju	477, 495
Kameswarama v. Venkata Subba Row	312, 323
Kameswari Sastri v. Veeracharlu	33, 34, 53, 289
Kameswar Pershad (Baboo) v. Run Bahadoor Singh	286, 294, 479, 510
Kamikhaprasad Roy v. Jagadamba Dasi (Srimati)	485, 512
Kamika Nath Mukerjee v. Hari Churn Sen	492
Kamineymoney Bewah. In the goods of	463
Kamini Dasee v. Krishna Chandra Mukerjee	511
Kamini Dasee v. Chandra Pole Mundle	210, 212
Kamini Debi v. Asutosh Mookerjee	546
Kamini Debi v. Pramatha Nath Mookerjee	565
Kanahi Ram v. Biddya Ram	35, 216
Kanakamma v. Venkataratnam	324
Kanakammal v. Ananthamathi Ammal	414, 451, 456
Kandalam Rajagopalacharyulu v. Secretary of State	439
Kandasami v. Akkammal	506
Kandasami v. Doraisami Ayyar	343

	PAGE
Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nodhi	270, 283
Kandasami Pillai v. Murugammal	78, 83, 97
Kandhia Lal v. Muna Bibi	202
Kanemar Venkappayya v. Krishna Chariya	312
Kanhaia Lal v. Raj Bahadur	281
Kanhai Ram v. Amri (Mussamat)	440
Kanhaiya Lal v. Kishori Lal	495
Kanhia v. Mahin Lal	442
Kanhia Lal v. Debi Das	255
Kanhya Lal v. Radha Churn	167
Kanji Bayla v. Arjun Shamji	7
Kanku (Bai) v. Jadav (Bai)	80
Kannammal v. Virasami	173
Kannan v. Nilakandan	573, 574
Kanna Pisharodi v. Kombi Achen	286, 302
Kannepalli Suryanarayana v. Pucha Venkata Ramana	129
Karni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal	466, 477, 478
Karti Chandra Mukerji v. Ali-i-Nabi	337, 340, 500
Kanuram Deb v. Kashi Chandra Sharma Chowdhuri	491
Kapildeo v. Thakur Prasad	309
Kapilnauth Sahai Deo (Thakoor) v. The Government	265
Karamsi Madhowji v. Karsandas Natha	205
Karan Singh v. Bhup Singh	316, 317, 318
Karedla Vijayaraghava Perumalayya Naidu v. Yemavarapu Sitaramayya	593
Karimuddin (Munshi) v. Gobind Krishna Narain (Kunwar)	290, 471, 482, 483
Karnataka Hanumantha v. Andukuri Hanumayya	319
Karoonamoyee Dabee (Sm.) v. Administrator-General of Bengal	87
Karpakambal Ammal v. Ganapathi Subbayyan	90
Karsandas Natha v. Ladvavahu	113, 529
Karsondas Dharamsey v. Gangabai	218, 223, 225, 238, 256
Kartick Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Gour Mohun Roy	481
Karunabdi Ganesa Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar	40, 121, 123, 142, 198
Karuna Mai v. Jai Chandra Ghose	427, 428
Karuppa Goundan v. Kolanthayari	6
— v. Kumarasami Goundan	385
Karuppai Nachiar v. Sankaranaryanan Chetty	225, 241, 243, 253, 254, 449, 450
Karuppannan Chetti v. Bulokam Chetti	227
Karuppa Thevan v. Alagu Pillai	465
Karuthedatta v. Mele Pullakatt Vassa Devan Namboodri	374
Karvetnagar, Zemindar of, v. Trustee of Tirumelai	263, 264, 319, 324
Kasee Dhoolubh v. Ruttun Bibee	63
Kaseeram Kriparam v. Umbaram Hureechund	64
Kashee Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Gour Kishore Gooho	441
Kashee Mohun Roy v. Raj Gobind Chuckerbutty	428
Kasheenath Bose v. Chunder Mohun Nundee	291, 294
Kasheenath Das v. Khetturmonee Dassee	80, 210
Kasheepershad v. Bunseedhur	189
Kasheeshuree Debia v. Greesh Chunder Lahoree	182
Kasheeshuree Dassee v. Krishna Kaminee Dassee	552
Kashibai v. Moreshvar Raghunath	394, 412, 413
— v. Tatia	146
— v. Tatyia	184
Kashi Chunder Sen, In the matter of	48

	PAGE
Kashinath Basak v. Harasundari Dasi	469, 471, 472, 481, 484
Kashinath Chinnaji v. Chinnaji Sadashiv	268, 279, 531
Kashi Prasad v. Inda Kunwar	467
Kasim Saiba v. Sahindra Thirtha Swami	564
Kassee Issoree Dibbeah (Musst) v. Goluck Chunder Gungolee	431
Kasturbai v. Shivajiram Devkurna	81, 22, 83
Kastur Bhavani v. Appa	300
Kasturi v. Chiranji Lal	50
—— v. Panna Lal	47, 48
Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga	168, 237, 238, 249, 251, 264, 301, 376, 386, 450, 464, 472, 494, 516, 518
Kateeram Dokanee v. Gendhence (Mussamut)	46, 66, 71
Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tevar	305, 499, 501, 503
Kathaperumal v. Venkabai	328
Kattama Nachiar v. Dorasingha Tevar	388, 389, 390, 405
Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna Pisharody v. Vallotil Manakel Narayanan Somayajipad	263
Kaulsra v. Jorai Kasaundan	214, 216
Kaviraja Sundara Murtiya Pillai v. Nalla Naikan Pillai	594
Kawal Nair v. Prabhu Lal	348
Kayarohana Pathan v. Subbaraya Thevan	372
Kazem Ali v. Azim Ali Khan	594
Kedar Nath (Maharaj) v. Ratan Singh (Thakur)	252, 343, 344
Kedar Nath Banerjee v. Hari Das Ghose	417, 431
Kedar Nath Dutt v. Atul Krishna Ghose	551
Kedar Nath Roy v. Amrita Lal Mukerjee	421, 431
Keerut Sing v. Koolahul Sing	386, 465
Kehri Singh v. Chumai Lal	316
Kelly v. Kelly	74
Kenchawa v. Ningapa	136, 160, 171, 174
Kery Kolitany v. Monceram Kolita	82, 368, 369, 405, 471
Kerutnaraen v. Bhobinesree (Mussumsut)	146
Kesabram Mahapattur v. Nandkishor Mahapattur	222, 427
Kesar (Bai) v. Ganga (Bai)	66
Kesaree v. Samardhan	57, 383, 384
Keshavan v. Vasudevan	102
Keshavbhat v. Bhagirathibai	537
Keshav Hargovan v. Gandhi (Bai)	31, 37, 63
Keshavlal v. Girja (Bai)	7
Keshavlal Girdharial v. Parvati (Bai)	67, 72
Keshav Ram Krishna v. Govind Ganesh	125, 130, 195, 196
Keshow Rao Diwakur v. Naro Junardhun Patunkur	55, 311
Keshub Lal Pynn v. Radha Raman Nundy	511
Kesri v. Ganga Sahai	322
Kesserbai v. Valab Raoji	390, 411, 413
Kesserbai (Bai) v. Hunaraj Morarji	19, 442, 451, 453, 454, 455, 456, 460, 462
Kesub Chunder Ghose v. Bishnopursaud Bose	362, 427
Kesubnath Ghose v. Hurgovind Bose	299
Keval Bhagvan Gujar v. Ganpati Narayan	323
Keyake-Ilate Kotel Kanri v. Yadattil Vellayangot	573
Khalilul Rahman v. Gobind Pershad	309, 313, 314, 317
Khandacharya v. Govindacharya	412, 413
Khandubai v. Pirbhai	264
Khawani Singh v. Uhet Ram	486, 490

	PAGE
Khodroo Ojha v. Deo Rance Koomar (Mussamut)	262
Khemkor v. Umiashankar Ranchhor	37, 63, 85
Kheri, Deputy Commissioner of, v. Khanjan Singh	297, 512
Kherodemoney Dossee v. Doorgamoney Dossee	535, 545
Khoter Monee Dassee v. Kishen Mohun Mitter	66, 296
Khetramani Dasi v. Kashinath Das	80, 210, 212
Khetterchunder Ghose v. Hari Das Bundopadhya	574
Khettermohan Mullick v. Gunganarain Mullick	535
Khettermoni Dassi (Sm.) v. Kadumbini Dassi (Sm.)	369, 373
Khetur Gopal Chatterjee v. Poorno Chunder Chatterjee	365
Khetur Monce Dossee v. Kasheenath Doss	210
Khiarajmal v. Daim	278
Khilut Chunder Ghose v. Koonj Lal Dhur	256, 349
Khimji Jairam Narronji v. Morarji Jairam Narronji	536
Khimji Vassonji v. Narsi Dhanji	37
Khitish Chandra Acharya Chowdhury v. Radhika Mohun Roy	324
Khodabhai Mahiji v. Bahdhar Dala	390
Khoja and Memon's case	24
Khoodceram Chatterjee v. Rookhinee Boistobee	104, 416
Khooshal v. Bhugwan Motee	37
Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser	404, 481, 564
Khuddo v. Durga Prasad	370
Khudiram Mookerjee v. Bonwarilal Roy	66
Khugender Narain Chowdhry v. Sharupgir Oghorenath	415
Khunni Lal (Lala) v. Gobind Krishna Narain (Kunwar)	374, 495, 496
Khusalchand v. Mahadevgiri	539, 547, 562, 564, 568
Khushalchand Lalchand v. Mani (Bai)	48, 50, 51
Khushali v. Rani	217
Khuttun Kooer (Mussamut) v. Poona Kooer (Mussamut)	544
Kidar Nath v. Mathu Mal	307, 513
King v. Kistnama Naick	48
— v. Nagapen	214
Kirpal Narain Tewari v. Sukurmoni	423
Kirpal Singh v. Balwant Singh	309
Kirpa Mayee Dibceah (Rajkoonwaree) v. Damoodur Chunder Deyb	427
Kisandas v. Rangubai	81
Kisansing Jivansing Pardesi v. Moreshwar Vishu Joshi	283
Kishan Lal v. Garuruddhwaja Prasad Singh	311
Kishen v. Enayet Hossain	217
Kishen Geer (Mohunt) v. Busgeet Roy	486
Kishen Kant Goswamee v. Purmanund Goswamee	119
Kishen Komul Singh v. Janokee Dossee	257
Kishenmunee (Ranee) v. Oodwunt Singh (Rajah)	199
Kishennath Roy v. Hureegobind Roy	180, 182
Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh	267, 268, 275
Kishen Sunker Dutt v. Moha Mya Dossee	174
Kishnee (Mussamut) v. Khealee Ram	504
Kishore Dossee (Sree Mohant) v. Coimbatore Spinning and Weaving Com- pany	502
Kishore Bose Mohunt v. Kalee Churn Giroo	592
Kishori Dubain v. Mundra Dubain	240
Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal	171
Kishori Mohun Ghose v. Monimohun Ghose	333, 334, 335
Kishori Pal v. Bhusaai Bhuiya (Sheikh)	486

	PAGE
Kishto Soondery Dabca v. Kishto Motee (Rance)	522
Kishun Pershad Chowdhry v. Tipan Pershad Singh	309, 313, 314
Kissen Chunder Shaw (Doe dem) v. Baidam Beebee	23
Kissen Lala v. Javallah Prasad Lala	407
Kisto Moyee Dassee v. Prosunno Narain Chowdhry	496
Knath Narain Singh v. Prem Lal Paurey	305
Koernarain Roy (Raja) v. Dhorinidhur Roy	341
Kojiyadu v. Lakshmi.	369
Kolandai Mudali v. Sankara Bharadhi	547
Kolandaya Sholagan v. Vedamuthu Sholagan	489
Kolla Subramanian Chetti v. Thellanayakulu Subramanian Chetti	533
Kollany Koer (Mussamut) v. Luchmee Pershad	442, 527, 528
Komul Monee Dossee v. Alladmonee Dossee	505
Komulmuni Dasee v. Bodhnarain Mujmoadar	210
Kondappa v. Subba	482
Konerrav v. Gurrav	272, 355, 356
Koobur Khansama v. Jan Khansama	73
Koodee Monee Debea v. Tarra Chand Chuckerbutty	81, 210
Kool Chunder Surmah v. Ramjoy Surmona	296
Kooldebnarain Shahee (Baboo) v. Woomacoomarce (Mussamut)	521, 528
Kooldeep Kooer (Mussamut) v. Runjeet Singh	310
Kooldeep Narain v. Rajbunssee Kowur	214
Koomud Chunder Roy v. Seetakanth Roy	26, 366
Koonjbehari Dhur v. Premchand Dutt	441, 442
Koonla Kant Ghosal v. Ram Hurce Nund Gramee	556
Kora Shunko Thakoor (Doe dem) v. Munnee (Beebe)	141, 142
Koroonamoyee Dasee v. Gobindnath Roy	505
Koshul Chukurwutty v. Radhanath Chukerwutty	247
Kosuri Ramaraju v. Ivalury Ramalingam	298, 310, 321
Kota Balabadra Patro v. Khetra Das	301
Kotamarti Sitaramayya v. Kotamarti Vardhanamma	166
Kotarbasapa v. Chanverova	442
Kotta Ramasami Chetti v. Bangari Seshama Nayanivaru	263, 274, 286, 301, 321
Koul Nath Singh v. Jagrup Singh	250
Kounla Kant Ghosal v. Ram Hurce Nund Gramee	299
Kovvidi Sattiraju v. Patamsetti Venkataswami	127, 128, 152, 156
Koylasnath Doss v. Gyamonee Dossee	362
Kripa Moyee Debia v. Goluck Chunder Roy	171
Kripa Sindhu Patjoshi v. Kanhaya Acharya.	247
Krishna v. Paramshri	146, 191, 192
— v. Reade	217
— v. Sani	230
— v. Subbanna	355
Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama Ayyangar	365, 401, 403, 404, 407
Krishna Ayyar v. Balammal	66, 72
— v. Krishnasami Ayyar	271, 276, 293
Krishnabai v. Khangowda	234, 330
Krishna Chandra Choudury v. Ratan Ram Pal	286
Krishna Chettiar v. Nagamani Ammal	276
Krishna Deb v. Woopendra Krishna Deb	523
Krishna Jiva Tewari v. Bishnath Kalwar	279, 282
Krishna Kishore Chakravarti v. Sukha Sindhu Sanyal	567
Krishna Pada Dutt v. Secretary of State	429

	PAGE
Krishna Panda v. Balaram Panda	351
Krishna Ramaya Naik v. Vasudev Venkatesh Pai	276, 291
Krishnai v. Shripati	451
Krishnaji Mahadev Mahajan v. Moro Mahadev Mahajan	245, 250
Krishnaji Vyanktosh v. Pandurang	16, 18, 19, 390
Krishnama v. Perumal	279
Krishnamachariar v. Krishnamachariar	527
Krishnama Chariar (Tiru) v. Krishnasami Tata Chariar	6
Krishnamma v. Papa.	227
Krishnan Nair v. Damodaran Nair	249
Krishnanath Narayan v. Atmaram Narayan.	535, 541
Krishna Prasad (Babu) v. Rampershad Singh (Babu)	314
Krishnaramani Dasi (S. M.) v. Ananda Krishna Bose	2, 535, 541, 547, 550
Krishnarao v. Bhagwantrao	85
Krishnarao Ramchandra v. Benabai	529, 535
Krishnarav Jahagirdar v. Govind Trimbak	263
Krishnarav Trimbak Hasabnis v. Shankarrav Vinayak Hasabnis	130, 196
Krishnasami v. Krishnama Chariar	6, 7
Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Rajagopala Ayyangar	246
— v. Samaram Singrachariar	5, 7, 559
Krishnasami Chetti v. Virasami Chetti.	5, 7
Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar	323
Krishnaswami Ayyangar v. Sivaswami Udayar	587
Krishnaswami Naidu v. Seethalakshmi Ammal	251
Krishnayya v. Pichamma	403, 405
Krishnayyan v. Muttusami.	227, 228, 382, 383, 385
Krishnendra Nath Sarkar v. Debendra Nath Sarkar	325
Krishniengar v. Vanamalay Iyengar	144
Kristayya v. Narasimham	352
Kristnappa Chetty v. Ramasawmy Iyer	246, 349, 350
Kristobhabiney Dossee v. Ashutosh Bosu Mullick	334
Kristo Chunder Kurmoker v. Rughoonath Kurmoker	256
Kristo Gobind Majumdar v. Hem Chunder Chowdhry	496
Kristo Kissor Neoghy v. Kadermoye Dossee.	215
Kristoromoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Norendro Krishna Badadoor (Maharajah)	529, 532, 534, 554
Krodesen Sen v. Kamini Mohun Sen	360
Kudapa Venkayamma v. Narasimma	536
Kudomee Dossee v. Joteeram Kolita	63
Kudutama v. Narasimbacharyulu	284
Kula Chandra Chakravarti v. Bama Sundari Dasee	475
Kulada Prasad Pandey v. Haripoda Chatterjee	26, 72, 323, 350
Kulada Prosad Deghoria v. Kali Das Naik	549, 554
Kulanthai Natchear v. Ramamani	385
Kullammal (Doe dem) v. Kuppu Pillai	444
Kulleen Sing v. Kirpa Sing	153, 157, 159
Kullianbutti Koer v. Tulapal Singh	441, 465
Kullyanessuree Debee v. Dwarkanath Surmah Chatterjee	78
Kuloda Prosad Chatterjee v. Jageshar Koer	84, 89, 91
Kulponath Doss v. Mewah Lall	347
Kumaran v. Narayanan	103
Kumarasami Nadan v. Pala Nagappa Chetti	277
Kumarasami Odayar v. Subramania Iyer	495
Kumaravelu v. Virana Goundan	390, 413

	PAGE
Kumla Kaunt Chukerbutty v. Gooroo Govind Chowdree	224
Kumola Pershad Narain Singh v. Nokh Lall Sahoo	204, 206
Kumud Lal Ray v. Jogendra Mohan Ray	231
Kunchi v. Ammu	235
Kundan Lal v. Shankar Lal	257
Kundee Lall (Lalla) v. Kalce Pershad (Lalla)	491
Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee	240
Kunhali Beari v. Keshava Shanbaga	316, 317, 320
Kunhamina (Mooriyat Peetikayil) v. Kunhambi (Mooriyat Peetikayil)	532
Kunhu Kutti Ammah v. Mallapratu	308
Kunja Lal Banerji v. Narsamba Debi	9
Kunjamani Dassi v. Nikunja Behari Das	558, 564, 570
Kunjan Chetti v. Sidda Pillai	278, 279
Kunwar Bahadoor v. Brindaban	506
Kupoor Bhuwancee v. Sevukram Seoshunkur	481
Kuppa v. Singaravelu	206, 207
Kuppa Gurukul v. Dorasami Gurukul	573
Kureem Chand Gurain v. Oodung Gurain	302
Kuroona Moyee Debee v. Gunga Dhur Surmah	67
Kurun Sing (Rao) v. Mahomed Fyz Ali Khan	402, 478
Kushal (Bai) v. Lakhma Mana	522, 523
Kusum Kumari Roy v. Satyaranjan Das	24, 137, 148, 172
Kuta Bully Viraya v. Kuta Chudappavuthamulu	360
Kutti Ammal v. Radakristna Aiyar	413, 466
Kuverji v. Babai	173
Kylash Chunder Sircar v. Gooroo Churn Sircar	428

L.

Labhu Ram v. Kanshi Ram	269
Lachhan Kunwar (Mussummat) v. Anant Singh	510
Lachman Das v. Dattu	281
——— v. Khunnu Lal	322
——— v. Rupchand	46
Lachman Kuar v. Mardan Singh	45, 62
Lachman Singh v. Sanwal Singh	344
Lachmi Chand v. Tori Lal	302
Lachmi Dai Mohutain (Musst.) v. Kissen Lall Pahari Mahaton Gayal	160
Lachmi Narain v. Balaram Sahai	215
——— v. Janki Das	354
——— v. Kunji Lal	319
Lachmi Narain Prasad v. Kishan Kishore Chand	225
Lachmin Kuar v. Debi Prasad	250
Lade v. Sadashiva	326, 346, 350
Ladooiah (Mussumat) v. Sanvaley	375, 508
Lahar Puri (Mahant) v. Puran Nath (Mahant)	568, 571
Lakhi Priya v. Bhairab Chandra Chaudhuri	37, 362, 372, 427, 428
Lakmi Chand v. Gatto Bai	102, 119, 145, 153, 180, 181, 193
Lakshmoni Dasi v. Nittyananda Day	522
Lakshman v. Gopal	345
——— v. Radhabai	199, 200
Lakshmanammal v. Tiruvengada Mudali	366, 402, 413
Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal	102, 133, 179, 185, 193

	PAGE
Lakshmana Sasamallo v. Siva Sasamallayani	370
Lakshmanaswami Naidu v. Rangamma	573
Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik 184, 244, 285, 301, 304, 339, 355, 356, 526	
Lakshman Darku v. Narayan Lakshman	351
Lakshmandas Parashram v. Ganpatrav Krishna	580
Lakshmandas Raghunath Das v. Jugalkishore	577
Lakshmandas Sarupchand v. Dasrat	9, 522
Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai	84, 89, 92, 93, 95, 213
Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai 78, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 210, 309, 333, 482	
Lakshmappa v. Ramava	29, 125, 136, 144, 146, 147, 156, 203
Lakshmi v. Dada Nanaji	411
— v. Kalian Sing	38
— v. Subramanya	85, 185, 528, 530
Lakshmibai v. Ganpat Moroba	244, 359, 465, 470, 526
— v. Hirabai	443, 529
— v. Jayram Hari	412
— v. Rajaji	118
— v. Ramchandra	111, 113, 132, 155
— v. Sarasvatibai	125, 126
— v. Shridhar Vasudev Takle	179, 213
— v. Vishnu Vasudev Bele	124, 126, 194
Lakshmibai Bapuji Oka v. Madhavrav Bapuji Oka	98
Lakshminayarana v. Dasu	480
Lakshminarayana Nainar v. Valliammal	541
Lakshmi Shankar v. Vajjnath	184, 304, 551
Laksman Mayaram v. Jamnabai	250
Laksmibai v. Ganpat Moroba	470
Lala v. Nahar Singh	178
Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaia Lal	244, 245, 246, 257
Lal Bahadur Singh v. Sispal Singh	330
Lal Chand Shaw v. Swarnamoye Dasi	247
Laldas Narandas v. Motibai	256
Lal Gajendra Nath Sahi Deo v. Lal Mathurlal Nath Sahi Deo	32
Lal Kunwar (Musammat) v. Chiranji Lal	171
Lali v. Murlidhar	141, 142, 169, 170, 204
Lali (Musammut) v. Murli Dhar	141, 204, 205, 528
Lalhtagar Keshargar v. Suraj (Bai)	72
Laliteshwar Singh v. Rameshwar Singh	264, 516, 517
Laliteswar Singh v. Bhabeswar Singh	263
Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy	530, 532, 533
Lalit Panday v. Sridhar Deo Narayan Singh	485, 511, 512
Laljee Sahoy v. Fakeer Chand	309, 313
Laljeet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh	327, 332, 334, 337, 352
Lalji Nensey v. Keshowji Punja	267, 275
Laljeet Singh (Baboo) v. Raj Coomar Singh (Baboo)	353
Lal Jha (Baboo) v. Juma Buksh (Shaikh)	300, 331
Lalji Sahay v. Goberdhone Jha	495
Lall Nath Misser v. Sheoburn Pandey	74
Lallu Bhagvan v. Tribhuvan Motiram	323
Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai 18, 135, 366, 377, 380, 386, 392, 393, 410, 411, 412	
Lallun Monee Dossee (Ranee) v. Nobin Mohun Singh	52

	PAGE
Lal Singh v. Deo Narain Singh	294, 315
— v. Pulandar Singh	281, 316
Lalta Prasad v. Salig Ram	204
Lalti Kuar (Musammat) v. Ganga Bishen	79
Lalubhai Surchand v. Amrit (Bai)	522
Laluchand v. Girjappa	231
Lamb v. Govindmoney (Musst.)	435
Latchumammal v. Gangammal	348
Laxman v. Vinayak	278, 279
Laxmana v. Ramappa	170
Laxmipatirao v. Venkatesh	191
Lekhraj Kooer (Musamut) v. Dyal Singh (Sirdar)	329
Lekhraj Kunwar (Thakurain) v. Harpal Singh (Thakur)	30
Lelanund Sing Bahadoor (Raja) v. The Bengal Government	262
Lenga Lalung v. Penguri Lalungni	31
Limba v. Rama	6
Lingappa Goundan v. Esudasan	25, 208
Lingayya v. Kanakamma	79
Lochun Singh v. Nemdharee Singh	253, 331
Loganada Mudali v. Ramasvami	492
Login v. Princess Victoria Gouramma of Coorg	27
Lokenath Misra v. Dasarathi Tewari	5
Lokenath Roy v. Shamasoonduree	180
Lokenath Singh v. Dhakeshwar Prosad Narayan Singh	234
Lokenath Surma v. Ooma Moyee Dabee	258
Loll Soonder Doss v. Hurry Kishen Doss	477, 504
Looloo Singh v. Rajendur Laha	291
Lootf Hossein (Syud) v. Dursun Lall Sahoo	291
Lootfulhuck v. Gopee Churn Mojoomdar	268
Lopes v. Lopes	23
Lopez v. Lopez	23
Lotlikar v. Wagle	575
Lowji v. Mithabai	403
Luchmeedhur Singh (Baboo) v. Ekbal Ali	293
Luchmeenarain Singh v. Gibbon	368
Luchmeswar Singh (Bahadoor) (Maharajah Sir) v. Manowar Hossein (Sheikh)	232
Luchmi Dai Koori v. Asman Sing	320
Luchmi Koer v. Roghunath Das (Chowdhry Mohunt)	62
Luchmun Chunder Geer Gossain v. Kalli Churn Singh	440
Luchmun Dass v. Giridhur Chowdhry	289, 309, 313, 317, 321
Luchmun Lal Chowdhry v. Kanhya Lal Mowar	160, 169
Luchmun Lal v. Mohun Lal Bhaya Gayal	29, 154, 155, 159, 160
Luchmun Pershad v. Moonnee Koonwer (Mussumat)	350
Luchomun Pershad v. Debee Pershad	385
Luckeenarain Muymodar v. Muddhosodun	46
Luckinarain Tagore's case	115, 197
Lukkea Deba v. Gungagobind Dobey	26
Lukmeeram v. Khooshalee	482
Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy v. Cassibai	366, 367, 378, 412, 413
Lutchmanen Chetty v. Siva Prokasa Modeliar	275, 280
Lutchmeeput Singh v. Sadaulla Nushyo	28, 29
Lutifunnissa Bibi v. Nazirun Bibi	578, 579
Luxman Row Sudasow v. Mullar Row Bajec	254
Lyons, Mayor of, v. Advocate-General of Bengal	552, 579

M.

	PAGE
Machhbai (Bai) v. Hirbai (Bai)	24, 110
Madana Mohana v. Purushothama	127, 130, 131
Madan Lal v. Kishan Singh	268, 282
Madan Mohan v. Puran Mal	490
Madan Mohan Lal v. Akbaryar Khan	494
Madari v. Malki	506
Madavarayya v. Tirtha Sami	440, 441
Madhawa Sidhanta Onahini Nidhi v. Venkataramanjulu	9
Madhavram Mugatram v. Dave Trambaklal Bhawanishankar	411, 413, 465, 466, 467, 468
Madhavrao Moreshwar v. Kashibai	441, 523
Madhavray Manohar v. Atmaram Keshav	211, 252, 260
Madho Das v. Kamta Das	571, 572
Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh	303, 307, 346, 347
Madho Prasad v. Ramrattan Gir	564
Madho Singh v. Bindessery Roy	339
_____ v. Hurmut Ally	304
Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani)	548, 552, 553, 571, 574
Madhub Chunder Hajrah v. Gobind Chunder Banerjee	489
Madhub Chunder Poramanick v. Rajcoomar Doss	8
Madhumala Dass (Srimati) v. Lakshan Chandra Pal	366, 457, 464
Madun Sudan v. Bhau	278, 279
Madura, Collector of, v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy	2, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 28, 96, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 129, 140, 199, 515
Magaluri Garudiah v. Narayana Rungiah	324
Magania v. Prensingh	64
Magniram v. Tukaram	279
Mahabalaya v. Timaya	300
Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh	283, 298, 302, 303, 307, 332, 333
Mahabeer Pershad v. Ram Surun	365
Mahabeer Pershad Singh v. Dumreram Opadhyay	292
Mahabir Kower v. Jubha Sing	241, 293
Mahabir Pershad v. Adhikari Koer	510
Mahabir Pershad (Rai Babu) v. Markunda Nath Sahai (Rai)	280, 320
Mahabir Pershad v. Moheswar Nath Sahai	280
Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh	241, 312, 316, 320
Mahablesvar Fondba v. Durgabai	118, 151
Mahableshtar v. Ramchandra	213, 270, 298, 307
Mahabir Singh v. Bhagwanth	238
Mahadei v. Baldeo	495
Mahadeo Singh v. Sheokaran Singh	513
Mahadevappa v. Basagawda	474
Mahadev Balvant v. Lakshman Balvant	328
Mahadev Laxman v. Govind Parashram	351
Mahadray Keshav Tilak v. Gangabai	88
Mahadu Gana v. Bayaji Sidu	157, 188
Mahalakshamma Garu (Sri Maniyam) v. Venkataratnamma Garu (Sri Maniyam)	89, 94, 97
Mahalinga v. Mariyamma	380
Mahalinga Rau v. Veraba Ghosami	592

	PAGE
Mahamad Umar v. Mankuar (Must.)	370
Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar	30
Mahantapa v. Nilgangawa	111
Mahantawa v. Gangawa	38
Maharaj Sing v. Balwant Singh	310, 311, 322
Maharani (Musst) v. Nanda Lall Misser	505
Maharaval Mohansingji Jeysingji v. Government of Bombay	547
Mahatab Chand v. Mirdad Ali	548
Mahendra Nath Maity v. Giris Chandra Maity	435, 459
Mahendra Singh (Rajah) v. Jokha Singh	32
Maheshar Baksh Singh v. Ratan Singh	286, 479, 482, 510, 511
Mahesh Partab Singh v. Dirgpal Singh	86, 87, 88
Maheswar Dutt v. Kishun Singh	306, 307, 313, 314
Mahoda v. Kuleani	430
Mahomed v. Ganapati	566, 587, 595
Mahomed Ally v. Jehangir	309
Mahomed Athar v. Ramjan Khan	585, 591
Mahomed Athor (Syed) v. Sultan Khan	588
Mahomed Ismail Ariff v. Ahmed Moolla Dawood	554
Mahomed Sadat Ali Mulki v. Hara Sundari Debya	496
Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvie) v. Shewukram	442, 501, 502, 513, 528, 529, 541
Mahomed Sidick v. Haji Ahmed	24
Mailathi Anni v. Subbaraya Mudaliar	26
Makhan v. Nikka	148
Makhan Lal v. Gayan Singh	481, 484
Makhun Lall Dutt v. Ram Lall Shaw	221, 275
Makjundi v. Sarabekkh	53, 289, 296
Malgauda Paragauda v. Babaji Dattu	125
Malhar Bhagvant v. Narasinha Krishna	579
Malji Thakersey v. Gomti	52
Malkappa v. Mudkappa	234
Mallan v. Puroshotama	251
Malla Reddi v. Padamma	160, 161
Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda	317, 322
Mallika Das (Srimati) v. Ratanmani Chakervati	573
Mallikarjuna (Srimantu Rajah Yarlagadda) v. Durga (Srimantu Rajah Yarlagadda)	261, 515
Mallikarjuna Prasada Naidu v. Durga Prasada Naidu	96
Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda) v. Durga Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda)	96, 211, 235, 351
Mallik Saheb v. Mallikarjunappa	487, 488
Malubhai v. Sursangji	340
Mamat Ram v. Bapu Ram	6
Mami v. Subbarayar	120, 122
Manada Sundari Dabi v. Mahananda Sarnakar	75
Man Bhari v. Nannidh	522
Mancharam v. Pranshankar	262, 574, 575
Manchha (Bai) v. Narotam Das	250
Mandil Dass v. Megh Narain Dabey	291
Mandit Koer (Mussammat) v. Phool Chand Lal	27, 150, 151
Mandodari Debi v. Joynarayan Pakrasi	94
Mangal (Bai) v. Rukhmini (Bai)	207, 212
Mangala Debi v. Dinanath Bose	81

	PAGE
Mangaldas v. Abdul Razak	25
Mangaldas Nathubhoy (Sir) v. Krishnabai	534
Mangaldas Parmanandas v. Tribhuvadas Narsidas	535
Manickam Pillai v. Ramalinga Pillai	500
Manickbai v. Hurmasji Bomanji	544
Manijan Bibee v. Khadem Hossein	57, 579, 580
Manik Chand Golecha v. Jagat Settani Prankumari Bibi	120, 130, 131, 407
Manika Gramani v. Ellappa Chetti	93
Maniklal Atmaram v. Manchery Dinsha Coachman	545
Manikka Vasaka Desikar v. Balagopala Krishna Chetty	567
Manikyamala Bose v. Nanda Kumar Bose	130, 532
Manilal v. Tara (Bai)	80
Manilal Hurgovan, <i>In re</i>	271
Manilal Rewadat v. Rewa (Bai)	435, 453, 454
Manjamma v. Padmanabhayya	535
— v. Sheshgirirao	163, 205
Manjanatha Shanabhaga v. Narayana Shanabhaga	237, 326, 339, 340, 343, 353
Manjappa Hegade v. Lakshmi	79, 413
Manjaya v. Shanmuga	302, 352, 354
Manjunath v. Kaveribai	142
— v. Shankar	573
Mankoonwur v. Bhugoo	235
Manmahini Dasi v. Balakchandra Pandit	211
Manohar v. Balvant	320
Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram	548, 554, 555, 556, 557, 560, 576, 577
Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Das	119, 148
Manokarani Debi (Srimutty) v. Haripada Mitter	501, 510
Manorama Dassi v. Kalicharan Banerjee	539
Mansha Devi v. Jiwan Mal	97
Maradevi v. Pammakka	235
Marappa Gaundan v. Rangasami Gaundan	305, 307
Mari v. Chinnammal	333, 366, 390
Marudayi v. Doraisami Karambian	359, 365, 366, 381, 382, 385
Marudamuthu Nadan v. Srinivasa Pillai	488, 490, 491
Maruti v. Rama	345
Maruti Narayan v. Lilachand	283, 300
Maruti Sakham v. Babaji	319, 320
Masulipatam, Collector of, v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah	416, 462, 465, 467, 472, 478, 480, 486, 514
Matadin v. Gayadin	310, 315, 316
Mata Pershad v. Bhageeruthee	510
Matangini Dasi v. Jogendra Chunder Mullick	65, 67, 68, 78
Mathura Das v. Bhikanmal	443, 528
Mathura Naikin v. Esu Naikin	4, 31, 163
Mathura Prasad v. Ramchandra Rao	317
Mathuri Jijai Amba (Rani), <i>Ex parte</i>	505
Matungini Gupta v. Ram Rutton Roy	370
Mayaram Bhairam v. Motiram Govindram	199, 477
Mayashankar v. Harishankar	7
Mayna Bai v. Uttaram	462, 463
McDowell and Co. v. Ragava Chetty	312
Meda Vengamma v. Mutta Chelalamaya	465

	PAGE
Meenakshi v. Muniandi Panikkan	402, 403
Meenakshi Ammal v. Rama Aiyar	9, 209
Meenakshi Anni v. Appakutti	385
Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subraminya Sastri	588
Meenakshi Naidu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramaya Koonden	311, 316, 317, 319, 320
Meenatchee v. Chedumbra Chetty	246, 332
Meghu Rai v. Ram Khelawan Rai	506
Meherban Rawoot v. Behari Lal Barik	358
Meherban Singh v. Sheo Koonwer (Mussumat)	79, 305, 368
Melaram Nudial v. Thanooram Bamun	38, 67, 68
Melgirappa v. Shivappa	199, 288, 477
Merangi, Zemindar of, v. Satrucharla Ramabhadra Razu (Sri Rajah)	30, 31
Merces v. Cones	547
Merryweather v. Jones	66
Mosraw (Musst) v. Girjanundan Tewari	504, 507, 509
Mewa Koonwer (Ranee) v. Oudh Beharee Lall	244
Mhalsabai v. Vithoba Khandappa Gulve	111, 135, 147
Millard, <i>In re</i>	23, 62, 64
Miller v. Runga Nath Moulick	283, 284, 306
Minakshi v. Chinnappa Udayan	278
— v. Ramanadha	40, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142
— v. Virappa	299, 304, 330, 363
Minakshi Achi v. Chinnappa Udayan	90
Mir Azmat Ali v. Mahmud-ul-nissa	61
Mitta Kunth Audhicarry v. Neerunjun Audhicarry	575, 576
Mittrajit Sing v. Raghubansi Sing	204
Miya v. Bava Sahab Santi Miya	547, 579
Miyaji v. Ahmed Sahib (Sheikh)	580, 592
Modhoo Dyal Singh v. Kolbur Singh	283, 306, 307
Modhoosoodun Mookerjee v. Jadub Chunder Banerjee	48, 50, 214, 215
Modhu Sudan Singh (Raja) v. Rooke	476, 486
Mohabbeer Pershad (Lalla) v. Kundun Koowar (Mussamat)	23, 27, 345, 349
Mohabir Prosad (Lala) v. Taj Begum (Mussamat)	511
Mohadeay Kooer v. Haruknarain	338
Mohamed Ushruf v. Brojessuree Dossee	481
Mohamoya Debi v. Haridas Haldar	573
Mohandas v. Krishnabai	391, 404, 405, 412
Mohan Lalji v. Govdhan Lalji Maharaj	568, 569, 570
— v. Madhsudan Lala	570
Mohanund Mondul v. Nafur Mondul	286, 485
Mohar Singh v. Het Singh	539, 551, 556
Mohendra Nath Biswas v. Shamsunnessa Khatum	494
Mohendrololl Mookerjee v. Rookincy Dabee	116, 117, 129, 156, 175, 177
Mohesh Chunder Bose v. Ugra Kant Banerjee	489
Mohesh Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Koylash Chunder Chuckerbutty	555, 581
Mohesh Chunder Dhal v. Satrugan Dhal	32, 260, 518, 519
Mohesh Chunder Roy v. Chunder Mohun Roy	371
Mohesh Narain Moonshi v. Taruck Nath Moitra	103, 169
Mohim Chunder Sanyal v. Kashi Kant Sanyal	440
Mohima Chunder Roy v. Durga Monee	74, 75, 444
Mohima Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Ram Kishore Acharjee Chowdhry	496
Mohima Chunder Roy Chowdhuri v. Gouri Nath Dey Chowdhuri	496, 498
Mohammad v. Sayiduddin	579

	PAGE
Mohroo Kooeree (Musst.) v. Gunsoo Kooeree (Musst.)	349
Mohun Dass v. Lutchmun Dass	576, 577
Mohun Geer v. Tota (Mussumat)	80
Mohunkoowur (Mussumat) v. Zoramun Singh (Baboo)	476
Mohun Lall Khan v. Siromunnee (Ranee)	424
Mohun Pershad Narain Singh v. Kishen Kishore Narain Singh	451, 456
Mohun Sing v. Chumun Rai	382
Mokhada Dossee v. Nundo Lall Haldar	81, 207, 212
Mokoond Lal Singh v. Nobodip Chunder Singha	213, 214, 215
Mokoondo Lal Shaw v. Gonesh Chunder Shaw	326, 533
Mokrund Deb Rackut v. Bissessuree (Ranee)	56
Mokunda Lal Chakrabarti v. Monmohini Debi	425
Mokundo Lal Roy v. Bykunt Nath Roy	180
Mondakini Dasi v. Adinath Dey	115, 127, 193, 194
Monemothonath Dey v. Ononthnath Dey	106, 149, 205
Monghyr, Collector of, v. Hurdai Narain Shahai	300, 319
Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolutany	18, 82, 336, 368, 374, 464, 465, 472, 499
Monsoor Ali v. Ramdial	46
Moola v. Nundy	65, 72
Mooniah (Mussumat) v. Teekno (Mussumat)	237
Moonsharam Chakravarty v. Gonesh Chandra Chakravarty	353
Moorsheadabad, Collector of, v. Shibessuree (Ranee)	569
Moosa Haji Joonas Noorani v. Abdul Rahim (Haji)	24, 25, 450, 453
Moothoosawmy Naidu v. Lutchmydavummah	136
Mootia Moodelly v. Uppen	201
Morarji Cullianji v. Nenbai	550
Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath	170, 178, 179, 199
Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vithal	223, 226, 227, 344, 348, 349, 350
Morrison v. Verschoyle	275
Morun Moe Debeah v. Bejoy Kishto Gossamee	143, 181
Motee Singh v. Dooluth Singh	215
Motilal Lalubhai v. Ratilal Mahiputram	470
Motilal Mithalal v. Advocate General of Bombay	442, 529
Motilal Prannath v. Kashi (Bai)	96
Moti Raiji v. Laldas Jibhai	490
Motiram Succram v. Mayaram Barkatram	454
Motirahoo (Bai) v. Mamobai (Bai)	526, 534, 540
Motivahu (Bai) v. Mamubai (Bai)	533, 550
Mouji Lal v. Chandrabati Kumari (Musammam)	34, 35, 62
Mozaffer Ali v. Hedayet Hossain	594
Mrinalini Dasi v. Abinash Chandra Dutt	473
Muchoo v. Arzoon Sahoo	68, 69, 70, 216
Muddun Gopal Lal (Lala) v. Khikhinda Koer (Mussumat)	229, 245, 371
Muddun Gopal Lal v. Gowrunbutty (Mussumat)	309
Muddun Gopal Thakoor v. Ram Buksh Pandey	244, 249, 307
Muddun Lal v. Komal Bibee (Sreemutty)	553
Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall	291, 316, 317, 320, 321
Mudhoobun Dass (Mohunt) v. Hurey Kishen Bhunj	415, 416
Mudit Narayan Singh v. Ranglal Singh	271, 351
Muhammad Abdullah Khan v. Kallu	579
Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Ram Singh	267, 270, 282
Muhammad v. Ahmed (Sayed)	6
Muhammad Hasan (Syed) v. Nazar Muhammad (Kazi)	587, 588
Muhammad Husain v. Dipchand	320

	PAGE
Muttammal v. Kamakshy Ammal	82, 83
— v. Vengalakshmiammal	390
Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasingha Tevar	30, 389, 390, 465, 515
Muttayan Chetti v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinna Tambiar	243
Muttayan Chettiar v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinna Tambiar	243, 321
Mutteeram Kowar v. Gopaul Sahoo	289, 480, 481, 513
Muttia v. Virammal	90
Muttuchidambara v. Karuppa	358
Muttukannu v. Paramasami	163
Muttu Ramalinga Setupati (Rajah) v. Perianayagum Pillai	560, 568
Muttusami v. Muttukumarasami	398, 401
Muttusamy Jagavira Yettapa Naikar v. Venkatasubha Yettia	209
Muttusawmy Jagavera Yettappa Naicker v. Vencataswara Yettaya	208, 209, 228, 382
Muttusvami Gaundan v. Subbiramanya Gaundan	266, 355
Muttuvaduganadha Tevar v. Periasami	389, 516, 518, 520
Muttuvaduganatha Tevar v. Periasami	365, 389, 518
Muttuvilaya v. Parasakti	372
Myna Boyce v. Ootaram	25

N.

Nabakumar Haldar v. Bhabasundari Debi	485
Nabin Chandra Saha v. Hem Chandra Ray	487, 497
Nachiappa Chettiar v. Chinnyasami Naicker	264, 324
Nafar Chandra Kundoo v. Ratan Mala Debi	534, 542
Nafar Chandra Pal Chowdhury v. Kammi Kumar Lahiri	494
Nagabhushanam v. Seshammagaru	104
Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar	244, 245, 249
Nagalinga Mudali v. Subbiramanaya Muda	327
Nagalutchmee Ummal v. Gopoo Nadaraja Chetty	183, 298
Nagamma v. Virabhadra	78, 82, 83
Nagappa Udapa v. Subba Sastry	106
Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu	275, 276
Nagendra Mohan Roy v. Pyari Mohan Saha	303
Nagendra Nath Mukerjee v. Probal Chandra Mukerjee	507
Nagesh v. Gurarao	340, 367, 368
Nagiah v. Venkatarama Sastrulu	298, 310, 321
Nagindas Bhagwandas v. Bachoo Hurkissondas	15, 188, 450
Nahalchand v. Bai Sheva	75
Nahalchand Harakchand v. Hemchand	412, 413
Naikram Lall v. Soorujbuns Saheo	506
Najju Khan v. Imtiaz-ud-din	232
Naku Amma v. Raghava Menon	235
Nalini Kanta Lahiri v. Sarnamayi Debya	352
Nallanna v. Ponnal	377, 413
Nallapa Reddi v. Balammal	329, 330
Nallatambi Chetti (Rayadur) v. Mukunda Chetti (Rayadur)	242, 253, 285
Nallayappa Pillian v. Ambalavahana Pandara Sannadhi	563, 565
Namasivaya Chetti v. Sivagami	406
Namaseyayam Pillai v. Annammai Ummal	47, 214
Nanabhai v. Giridhariji (Shriman Goswami)	570
Nanabhai Ganpatrav Dhairyavan v. Achratbai	243, 244, 259
— v. Janardhan Vasudev	47, 48, 49

	PAGE
Nanabhai Vallabhdas v. Nathabhai Haribhai	352
Nanaji Utpat (Bhan) v. Sundrabai	27, 28, 30, 388
Nana Narain Rao v. Hurce Punth Rao	249
Nana Tawker v. Ramachandra Tawker	381
Nanda Lal Roy v. Dhirendra Nath Chakravarti	9
Nand Kumar v. Radha Kuari	494
Nand Ram v. Bhupal Singh	297
———— v. Mangal Sen	285
Nandi Singh v. Sita Ram	304, 540
Nanhak Joti v. Jaimangal Chaubey	281
Nanhi v. Gauri Shankar	366
Nani (Bai) v. Chunilal	141, 142, 144
Nanja Pillai v. Suvabagyathachi	451
Nanomi Babuasin (Mussamut) v. Modun Mohun	244, 316, 317, 321
Naraganti Achammagaru v. Venkatachalapati Nayanivaru	252, 253, 578
Naragunty Lutchmeedavamah v. Vengama Naidoo	220, 221, 260, 264
Narainbati v. Ramdhari Singh	478, 485
Narain Das v. Brindabun Das	572
———— v. Hur Dayal	304, 311
———— v. Tirlok Tiwari	463
Narain Das (Lala) v. Ramanuj Dayal (Lala)	141
Narain Dass (Rai) v. Nownit Lal	300
Narain Dhara v. Rakhal Gain	38, 423
Naraini Kuar v. Chandu Din	380, 398, 402
Narain Khootia v. Lokenath Khootia	224, 265
Narain Mal v. Kooer Narain Mytee	178, 179
Narain Persad Mytee v. Roodur Narain Mungle	553
Narain Prasad v. Sarnam Singh	313, 314
Narana Maiya v. Vasteva Karanta	496
Naranbhai Vaghjibai v. Ranchod Premchand	233
Naranji v. Moti	267
Narasammal v. Balaramacharlu	13, 31, 44, 141, 201
Narasamma v. Gangu	164, 462, 463
Narasayya v. Venkayya	447, 469
Narasimha v. Venkatadri	469, 470
Narasimha Chari v. Gopala Ayyangar	566
Narasimha Charlu (Samudrala Varaha) v. Venkata Singaramma (Samudrala)	245, 359
Narasimha Razu v. Veerabhadra Razu	160, 363
Narasimha Thatta Acharya v. Anantha Bhatta	573
Narasimham v. Madhavaguduru	466
Narasimma v. Mangammal	404, 413
Narayan v. Chintaman	564, 565
———— v. Gumnaji	356
———— v. Kannan	533
———— v. Political Agent Sawantwadi	284
———— v. Rajaram	272
———— v. Satvaji	9
———— v. Venkatacharya Balkrishnacharya	312
Narayana v. Chengalamma	251
———— v. Krishna	75, 255, 435
———— v. Ramalinga	53, 285, 289, 350, 356
———— v. Ranga	573, 574
Narayana Aiyar v. Rama Aiyar	487, 489
Narayana Ayyar v. Kumarasami Mudaliar	591, 593

	PAGE
Narayana Charya v. Narsa Krishna	309, 317
Narayanan v. Lakshmanan	558
Narayanasami v. Kuppusami	134, 135
v. Ramasami	185
Narayanasami Chetti v. Samidas Mudali	277, 321
Narayanasami Naick v. Mangammal	122, 124
Narayanasvami Chetti v. Arunachala Chetti	530
Narayan Ayyar v. Lakshmi Ammal	345, 386
Narayan Bahaji v. Nana Manohar	19, 32, 112, 258, 352
v. Pandurang Ramchandra	352
Narayan Bharti v. Laving Bharti	36
Narayan Deshpande v. Anaji Deshpande	255
Narayani Dasi v. Administrator-General of Bengal	86
Narayan Jagannath Dikshit v. Vasudeo Vishnu Dikshit	260
Narayanrao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai	81, 82, 89, 95, 96
Narayanrao Damodar v. Balkrishna Mahadeo	315
Narayan Vithe Parab v. Krishnaji Sadashiv	6
Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan	76, 77, 78, 79, 84, 89, 94, 511
Narendra Nath Bairagi v. Dina Nath Das	112
Narendra Nath Pahari v. Ram Gobind Pahari	99
Narhar v. Bhau	18
Narhar Govind Kulkarni v. Narayan Vithal	150
Narhar Singh v. Dirgnath Kuar	87
Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram	518
Narmada (Bai) v. Bhagwantrao	453, 454
Naro v. Paragowda	298, 305, 308
Narotam v. Nanka	75
Narottam Jagjiwan v. Narsandas Harikisandas	184, 249, 298, 530
Narsappa Lingappa v. Sakhamam Krishna	466
Narvinbhat v. Chenapa	300
Narsingh Misra v. Lalji Misra	322
Natasayyan v. Ponnusami	310, 312, 317, 319, 322
Natchiarammal v. Gopalakrishna	92
Natesa v. Ganapatti	590, 592
Natha Hari v. Jamni	493
Nathaji Krishnaji v. Hari Jagoji	147
Nathubai Bhailal v. Javher Rajji	71, 75
Nathu v. Kundan Lall	289
Nathubhai Dhirajram v. Hansgavri (Bai)	342
Nathu Lal v. Lala	279
Nathu Lal Chowdhry v. Chadi Sahi	302, 315
Nathu Rai v. Dindayal Rai	290
Nathu Velji v. Keshawji	7
Nathuni Mahton v. Manraj Mahton	267
Nathuni Sahu v. Bajjnath Prasad	308, 323
Nathuram v. Shoma Chhagan	290
Natraji Krishnaji v. Hari Jagoji	199
Natthu Singh v. Gulab Singh	169
Navabram Atmaram v. Nandkishor Shivnarayan	467
Navroji Manekji Wadia v. Dastur Kharsedji Mancharji	579
Nawal Singh v. Bhagwan Singh	330
N. Chandrasekharadu v. N. Bramhanna	106
Neelkaunt Rai v. Munce Chowdraen	339
Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beerochunder Thakoor	29, 221, 264, 376, 427, 519

	PAGE
Nehalo v. Kishen Lal	368
Nellai Kumaru Chetti v. Marakathammal	438, 440, 441
Nemchand v. Savaichand	8
Nepenbala Debi v. Sitikanta Banerjee	25
Neti Rama Jogiah v. Venkatacharulu	577, 579
Nhance v. Hureeram Dhoolubh	313
Nidhoomoni Debha v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee	205
Nihal Khan v. Hur Churn Lall	475
Nilamani Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi) v. Radhamani Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi)	327, 328, 387
Nilcomul Lahuri v. Jotendro Mohun Lahuri	194, 195, 198, 362
Nilmadhub Doss v. Bishumber Doss	100, 176, 191, 192
Nilmadhab Mitter v. Jotindra Nath Mitter	212, 273
Nilmoney Bhooya v. Gunga Narain Shahur Roy	255
Nilmoney Singh Deo v. Baneshur	207, 208
Nilmoni Singh (Rajah) v. Bakranath Singh	260, 261, 324
Nilmony Singh v. Jagbandha Roy	566
Nilmony Singh Deo v. Hingoo Lall Singh Deo	211
Nimaye Churn Pojaree v. Mooroollee Chowdhry	554
Ningareddi v. Lakshmawa	85, 285
Nirmal Chander Bandopadhyaya v. Saratmoni Debha	544
Nirod Mohini Dassi v. Shibodas Pal Dewisi	574
Nissar Murtojah v. Dhunwunt Roy (Kowar)	385
Nistarini Dasi (S.M.) v. Makhanlal Dutt	95, 96
Nistarini Dassi v. Nundo Lal Bose	534
Nittanund Murdiraj v. Sreekurun Juggernath Bewartah Patnaik	519
Nitradaye (Ranee) v. Bholanath Doss	146
Nittianand Ghose v. Krishna Dyal Ghose	153, 175
Nittokissoree Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Jogendro Nauth Mullick	76, 87, 96
Nitye Gopal Sircar v. Nagendra Nath Mitter Mozumdar	544, 545
Nitye Laha v. Soondaree Dossee	77, 78
Nobin Chunder Banerjee v. Romesh Chunder Ghose	8
Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Guru Persad Doss	509
Nobodip Chundro Deb Burmun (Rajkumar) v. Bir Chundra Manikya Bahadoor (Rajah)	57
Nobokishore Sarma Roy v. Harinath Sarma Roy	486, 490
Noeury Lall Chuckerbutty v. Bindabun Chunder Chuckerbutty	232
Noferdoss Roy v. Modhu Soondari Burmonia	490
Nogendra Nandini Dassi v. Benoy Krishna Deb	369, 446, 539, 556
Nogendro Chundro Mittro v. Kishen Soondery Dossee (Sreemutty)	150, 166, 179, 213
Norendranath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi	543
Nowab Rai v. Bugawuttee Koowar	103
Nowbut Singh v. Lad Kooer (Mussumat)	59
Nowlao Kooeree (Mussumat) v. Lalljee Modi	272, 273
Nowruttun Kooer (Mussumat) v. Gouree Dutt Singh	291
Nubkissen Mitter v. Hurris Chunder Mitter	575
Nubo Gopal Roy v. Amrit Moyee Dossee	78, 96, 97
Nuffer Chunder Banerjee v. Guddadthur Mundle	293
Nufur Mitur v. Ram Komar Chuttooorya	466
Nugender Chunder Ghose v. Kaminee Dossee (Sreemutty)	496
Nugendur Narain (Rajah) v. Rughoonath Narain Dey	28, 29, 39, 381
Nullit Chunder Goocho v. Bugola Soonduree Dossee	229
Nunda Coomar Lall (Baboo) v. Razeeooddeen Hossein	243, 263

	PAGE
Nund Kishore Lal v. Kance Ram Tewary	500
Nundlal Baboo v. Bolakee Bebee	505
Nundlal Bhugwandas v. Tapeedas	46, 47, 55
Nundun Lal v. Lloyd	231, 267
Nunkoo Singh v. Purn Dhun Singh	144, 158, 172
Nunna Setti v. Chidaraboyina	275, 282
Nunnu Meah v. Krishnasawmi	443
Nurendro Narain Roy v. Isken Chunder Sen	593
Nursing Dass (Rai) v. Narain Dass (Rai)	221, 249, 255
Nursing Narain v. Bhuttun Lal	100, 103, 380
Nusserwanjee v. Laxman	8

O.

(Jahud Buksh (Cazee) v. Bindoo Bashinee Dossee	284
(Jahoy Churn Ghose v. Gobind Chunder Dey	222, 258, 259
Odit Narain Singh v. Dhurm Mahtoon	501
(Jati Pulliah Chetti v. Varadarajulu Chetti	466, 500
(Jmed Rai v. Heeralall	294
(Jmrit Koomaree Dabee v. Luckhee Narain Chuckerbutty	377, 418, 420
(Jmuthoonnissa (Mussamut) v. Puresmun Narain Singh	323
Ondy Kadarun v. Aroonachella	177
Oodey Singh (Koor) v. Phool Chund	75, 475, 484, 513
Oodit Narain Singh v. Hudson	266
Oodoy Chand Jha v. Dhun Monee Debia	502
Oodoychurn Mitter, In the matter of	429
Oojulmonee Dossee v. Sagormonee Dossee	472
Oojul Munnee Dossee v. Jyogopal Chowdhree	87
Ooma Dibya v. Rammuni Dibya	374
Ooman Dutt v. Kunhia Singh	158, 159
Oomrao Sing v. Man Koer	95
Oomrao Sing (Thakoor) v. Mehtab Koonwer (Thakooranee)	154, 155, 171
Oorhya Koor (Mussamut) v. Rajoo Nye Sookool	392
Ootum Chunder Bhuttacharjee v. Obhoychurn Misser	26, 27

P.

Pabitra Dasi v. Damudar Jana	442
Padajirav v. Ramrav	126, 169, 170
Padam Kumari v. Suraj Kumari	27, 38
Padarath v. Ram Narain Upadha (Pandit)	511
Padarath Singh v. Raja Ram	305
Padmamani Dasi (Srimati) v. Jagadamba Dasi (Srimati)	328, 352, 354
Padmavati, <i>Ex parte</i>	29
Pahaladh Singh v. Luchmunbutty (Mussamut)	352
Paigi v. Sheonarain	65, 67, 69, 71, 73
Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara	286, 564, 566
Palani Goundan v. Rangayya Goundan	282
Palani Konan v. Masa Konan	300, 354
Palanivelappa Kaundan v. Mannaru Naikan	285, 301
Panchanadayyan v. Nilakandayyan	261
Panchappa v. Sanganbasawa	132, 137
Panchcowree Mahtoon v. Kaleechurn	465, 478
Panchcowrie Mull v. Chumroolall	553, 576, 591, 594

	PAGE
Pandaiya Telaver v. Puli Telaver	38, 39, 208, 382
Pandarungy Annachariyar v. Iyathory Mudaly	589
Pandharinath Vishvanath v. Govind Shivram	470
Pandurang Anandray v. Bhaskar Shadashiv	300, 331, 354, 356
Pandurang Balaji v. Dnyanu	567
Pankhabatti Chandhurani v. Nani Lal Singh	500
Pannalal Seal v. Bamasundari Dasi (Srimati)	474, 483
Papamma v. Appa Rau	136, 147, 174, 189
Paparayudu v. Rattamuna	512, 513
Parameshwari Surma v. Empress	213
Parameswaran v. Shangaran	268
Parami v. Mahadevi	82, 83, 529
Paran Chandra Pal v. Karunamayi Dasi	297
Parasara Bhattar v. Rangaraja Bhattar	120, 121, 122, 123, 129
Paras Ram v. Sherjit	232
Parbati v. Muzaffar Ali Khan	234
—— v. Sundar	141
Parbati (Musammat) v. Naunihal Singh (Chaudhri)	329, 345
Parbati Bibee (Musst) v. Ram Barun Upadhya	551, 552
Parbati Churn Deb v. Ain-ud-deen	352
Parbati Dasi v. Baikuntha Nath De (Raja)	254, 257
Parbati Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani) v. Jagadis Chunder Dhabal	13, 26, 27, 236, 262, 517
Parbati Kunwar (Musammat) v. Chandarpal Kunwar (Rani)	32, 389, 517
Parbhudas Lakhmidas v. Shankarbai	358
Parbhu Lal (Lala) v. Mylne	119, 169, 172, 486
Parbutty Coomar v. Sudabut Pershad	221
Parekh Ranchor v. Vakhat (Bai)	495
Pareman Das v. Bhattu Mahton	309, 312
Parashmani Dasi v. Dinanath Das	371, 373, 374
Parichat (Rajah) v. Zalim Singh	208, 382
Parikh Girdarlal v. Thakor Fatchsing	300
Parmanandas v. Parbhudas	407
Parmappa v. Shivdappa	390, 451
Parmoshar Rai v. Bisheshar Singh	105
Parmoshar Dubey v. Gobind Dubey	272, 273
Parot Bapalal Sevakram v. Mehta Harilal Surajram	377, 401, 402, 404
Parsidh Narain Singh v. Hunoman Sahai	280
Parson (Bai) v. Somli (Bai)	241, 254, 449, 450
Parsotam Gir v. Dat Gir	564
Parsotam Rao Tantia v. Janki Bai	244, 347
—— v. Radha Bai	352
Partab Narain Singh v. Trilokinath Singh	494
Parthasarathy Pillai v. Thiruvengada Pillai	550
Parvathi v. Manjayakarantha	329
—— v. Thirumalai	228, 383, 384, 385
Parvathi Ammal v. Saminatha Gurukul	169
Parvati v. Bhiku	368
—— v. Ganpatrao Balal	209
—— v. Kisansing	80
Parvati (Bai) v. Tarwadi Dolatram	210
Parvatibai v. Bhagwant	303
—— v. Chatru	81, 96
Parvathamma v. Ramakrishna Rau	172, 173, 174

	PAGE
Paryag Sahu v. Kasi Sahu	312
Patni Mal (Rajah) v. Manohar Lal (Ray)	345, 386
Pattaravy Mudali v. Audimula Mudali	352
Pawadewa v. Venkatesh Hanmant Kulkarni	374
Payapa Akkapa Patel v. Appanna	127, 128, 130, 157, 197
Pearce Dayee (Mussamut) v. Hurbunsee Kooer (Mussamut)	133, 166
Pearce Monee Bibee v. Madhub Singh	221
Peary Lal v. Bhawoot Koer	221, 257
Peary Lal Sinha v. Chandicharan Sinha	312, 318
Peary Mohun Mookerjee (Rajah) v. Narendra Krishna Mukerjee	564
Peary Mohan Mukerji v. Norendra Nath Mukerji	558
Pedda Amani v. Zemindar of Marungapuri	99
Peddammuthulaty v. N. Timma Reddy	174, 301
Peddammuttu Viramani v. Appu Rau	364
Pedda Ramappa Nayanivaru v. Bangari Seshamma Nayanivaru	519
Peddaya v. Ramalingam	230, 344
Peet Koonwar v. Chuttur Dharee Singh	570
Pema v. Jas Kunwar	336
Pemraj Chandra Bhau v. Savalya Gajaba	280
Pem Sing v. Partab Singh	320
Peria Ammani v. Krishnasami	112, 120
Perianayakam v. Pottukanni	64
Periasami v. Periasami	361, 386, 518
Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar	321
Periya Gaundan v. Tirumala Gaundan	199
Perkash Chunder Roy v. Dhunmonee Dassea	153, 175
Pershad Singh v. Muhesree (Ranee)	208, 382
Pertab Narain Singh (Maharajah) v. Subhao Koer (Maharanee)	115
Perumal Nalk v. Saminatha Pillai	593
Petambur Dutt v. Hurrish Chunder Dutt	222
Pettachi Chettiar v. Sangili Veera Pandia	319
Phoolbas Kooer v. Juggessur Sahoy (Lalla)	233, 348
Phoolbas Koonwur (Mussumat) v. Juggeshur Sahoy	267, 348
Phool Chund Lal v. Rughoobuns Suhaye	485, 512, 513
Phool Koer (Mussamut) v. Dabee Pershad	483
Phukar Singh v. Ranjit Singh	466
Phul Chand v. Lachmi Chand	278
— v. Lakku	523
— v. Man Singh	284, 308, 309
Phulhari Koer (Mussamut), In the matter of	348
Phul Koeri, In the matter of	348
Phundan Lal v. Arya Prithi Nidhi	539
Phundo v. Janginath	144
Pichuvayyan v. Subbayyan	147
Pilu v. Babaji	486, 489
Pindripolu Sooraparaju v. Pindripolu Veerabhadru	500
Pirojshah v. Manibai	260, 325
Pirah v. Gurappa	185, 186, 528
Pirthee Lal Jha (Soobah) v. Doorga Lal Jha (Soobah)	213, 214
Pirthee Singh (Rajah) v. Raj Kower (Ranee)	78, 81, 82, 94
Pital Das Babaji v. Protap Chandra Sarma	571
Pitamber Ratansi v. Jagjivan Hansraj	52
Pitam Singh v. Ujagar Singh	253, 277
Pitum Koonwar (Musst) v. Joykishen Doss	361, 527

	PAGE
Pokurimull Augurwallah, In the goods of	246
Poli v. Narotum Bapu	387, 388, 449
Pollard v. Rouse	214
Ponduranga v. Nagappa	587, 588, 590
Ponnambala Madaliyar v. Varaguna Rama Pandia Chinnatambara	582, 583
Ponnambala Pillai v. Sundarapayyar	304
Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayyengar	280, 284, 285, 309, 316, 317, 319, 321, 323
Ponnusami v. Thatha	303
Ponnusami Nadan v. Dorasami Ayyan	23, 24, 25
Poolunder Singh v. Ram Pershad	294
Poorendra Nath Sen v. Hemangini Dasi	334, 335, 466, 530
Poorunmul v. Toolsee Ram	45, 57
Poraka Subbarami Reddi v. Vadlamuddi Seshachalam	298, 321
Poroshnath Mookerjee v. Omorto Nauth Mitter	352
Porthouse, In the goods of	543
Prafulla Chunder Mullick v. Jogendra Nath Sreemany	539, 548, 554, 555
Prag Das v. Harikishn	199, 477
Pragji Kalan v. Govind Gopal	7, 8
Pragjivan Dayaram v. Reva (Bai)	388
Pramada Nath Roy (Raja) v. Ramani Kanta Roy (Raja)	269
Pramada Nath Roy v. Purna Chandra Roy	558, 563, 567
Prandhur Roy v. Ramchender Mongraj	57
Pranjeevandas Toolseydas v. Dewcooverbaee	19, 387, 467, 470
Pranjivandas v. Ichharan	340
Prankishen Paul Chowdhry v. Mothooramohun Paul Chowdhry	254, 359
Prankishen Sing v. Bhagwutee (Mussummaut)	464
Prankissen Laha v. Noyanmoney Dassoe (Sreemutty)	464
Prankisto Chunder v. Bamasoondery Dassoe	529
Prankishna Surma, In the matter of	213
Prankrishna Tewary v. Jadu Nath Trivedy	9, 309, 313
Pran Kristo Mojoomdar v. Bhageeruttee Gooptia (Sreemutty)	256
Prannath Chowdhry v. Kashinath Roy Chowdhry	255
Prannath Das v. Calishunkar Ghosal	298
Pran Nath Surma Jowardar v. Surrut Chundra Bhuttacharjee	422, 426, 430
Pranputtee Koer v. Futteh Bahadoor Singh (Lalla)	502, 503
Pranvullubh v. Dookristn	189
Prasannamayi Dasi v. Kadambini Dasi	133
Pratabnarayan Das v. Court of Wards	285
Prawnkissen Mitter v. Muttysondery Dassoe	333
— v. Ram Sunderee Dassoe (Sreemutty)	351
Prayaga Doss Joe Varu v. Tirumala Sriranga Charylu Varu	554
Prayag Doss Ji Varu Mahant v. Tirumala Srirargacharlavaru	554, 578, 580
Preaj Nurain v. Ajodhyapurshad	53, 289, 484
Prem Chand Bauthra v. Radhika Lal Roy	274
Premchand Peparah v. Hulashchand Peparah	206
Prem Chund Dan v. Darimba Debia	258
Premkuvar (Bai) v. Bhika Kallianji	69
Premmoyi Choudhrani v. Preonath Dhur	513
Prithoe Singh v. Court of Wards	14, 306
Prithisingji v. Umedsingji	339
Prit Koer v. Mahadeo Pershad Singh	221
Probodh Lal Kundu v. Harish Chandra Day	205
Promotha Nath Roy v. Nagendrabala Chaudhrani	82, 85, 86, 90, 530
Promotho Dassoe v. Radhika Persaud Dutt	552

	PAGE
Prosanno Kumar Bose v. Sarat Shoshi Ghosh	458
Prosenno Koomar Bural v. Sajudoor Ruhman (Chowdree)	306
Prosunno Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Kristo Chytunno Pal	324
Prosunno Coomar Ghose v. Tarrucknath Sirkar	441, 442, 530
Prosunno Kumar Adhikari v. Saroda Prosunno Adhikari	506
Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo	555, 557, 562, 563, 564, 565, 567
Prosunno Kumar Nandi v. Umedur Raja Chowdhry	478, 492
Prosunnomoyee (Ranee) v. Ramsoonder Sein	183
Prosunno Moyee Dossee v. Koonjo Beharee Chowdhree	566
Protap Chandra Misser v. Brojonath Misser	585, 592, 594
Protap Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Joy Monee Dabce Chowdhrair (Sreemutty)	491
Puddo Kumaree Debee v. Juggut Kishore Acharjee	130, 131, 178, 180, 193
Puddolabh Roy v. Ram Gopal Chatterjee Bahadoor (Raja)	593
Puddo Monee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Dwarka Nath Biswas	475
Puddum Mookhee Dossee v. Rayee Monee Dossee	335
Pudma Coomari Dabi v. Court of Wards	130, 131, 156, 178, 180, 193, 196, 431, 432
Pudmanund Singh Bahadoor (Raja) v. Hayes	533, 534
Pudmavati (Rany) v. Doolar Singh (Baboo)	26, 27
Puhoop Singh v. Khooman	382
Pulin Chandra Mandal v. Bolai Mandal	488
Punchanund Ojhab v. Lalshan Misser	466
Punchanun Mullick v. Shib Chunder Mullick	352, 353, 354
Puncha Thakur v. Bindeshri Thakur	573
Punna Bibee v. Radha Kissen Das	76, 228
Puran Atal (Mohunt) v. Darshan Das	585
Purappavanalingam Chetti v. Nullasivan Chetti	509
Purmanund v. Orumbah Koer	297
Purmanund Bhattacharuj v. Oomakunt Lahoree	129
Purmesser Dutt Jha (Chowdree) v. Hunooman Dutt Roy	158, 202
Purmesser Ojha v. Goolbee (Mussamut)	288
Purna Chandra Chakrawarti v. Sarojini Debi	333, 335
Purna Sashi Bhattacharji v. Kalidhan Rai Chowdhuri	532
Purshotam v. Rakhmabai	185
Purshotamdas Maneklal v. Mani (Bai)	72
Purshotamdas Tribhovandas v. Purshotamdas Mangaldas Nathubhoy	59
Purshotam Shama Shenvi v. Vasudev Krishna Shenvi	183, 249, 530
Pursid Narain Sing v. Hunooman Sahay	332, 333
Pursun Sahoo v. Ramdeen Lall	306
Pursut Koer v. Palut Roy	509
Purtab Bahadur Sing v. Tilukdharce Sing	246, 247, 250
Purushottam v. Atmaram Janardan	353, 354
Pusi v. Mahadeo Prasad	75
Putlabai v. Mahadu	132, 136, 137, 216
Puttu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (Musammat)	17, 21, 133, 144, 149, 176

Q.

Queen v. Bahadur Singh	57
— v. Bezonji	216
— v. Marimuttu	64, 67, 78, 83

	PAGE
Queen-Empress <i>v.</i> Butchi	76
— <i>v.</i> Hurree Mohun Mythee	67
— <i>v.</i> Ramanna	29, 163

R.

Rachava <i>v.</i> Kalingapa	412
Rachawa <i>v.</i> Shivayogapa	92, 94
Radaik Gascrain <i>v.</i> Budaik Pershad Sing	519
Radha Bullubh Chund <i>v.</i> Jugutt Chunder Chowdree	566
Radha (Mussamat) <i>v.</i> Kour (Mussamat)	477, 487, 502
Radha (Mussumat) <i>v.</i> Bisheshur Dass	438, 441, 444
Radhabai <i>v.</i> Anantrav Bhagvant Deshpande	261
— <i>v.</i> Chinnaji	576
— <i>v.</i> Ganesh Tatya Gholap	186, 527
— <i>v.</i> Nanarav	239, 240, 251
Radha Churn Dass <i>v.</i> Kripa Sindhu Dass	222, 313
Radhachurn Rai <i>v.</i> Kishenchund Rai	424
Radha Kishen <i>v.</i> Bakhtawur Lall :	507
— <i>v.</i> Rajkuar	382
Radha Kishen Man <i>v.</i> Bachhaman	333
Radha Kishen Manjhee <i>v.</i> Ram Mundul (Rajah)	425
Radha Kishore Mookerjee <i>v.</i> Mirtoonjoy Gow	292
Radha Krishna Mudaliar <i>v.</i> Subraya Mudaliar	543
Radhamadhub Gossain <i>v.</i> Radhabullub Gossain	177
Radha Mohan Dhar <i>v.</i> Ram Dass Dey	504, 505
Radhamohun <i>v.</i> Hardai Bibi	11, 15, 17, 101, 104, 145, 146, 156, 176
Radha Mohun Mundul <i>v.</i> Soshi Bhoosun Biswas	496
Radhamonee Debea <i>v.</i> Jadubnarain Roy	183
Radhanath Mookerjee <i>v.</i> Tarrucknath Mookerjee	325
Radha Pearce Dossee <i>v.</i> Doorga Monee Dossia	428
Radha Pershad Singh <i>v.</i> Talook Raj Kooer (Mussamat)	287
Radha Prasad Mallick <i>v.</i> Ranimoni Dasi	240, 529, 535, 543
Radha Prasad Mullick <i>v.</i> Rance Mani Dassee	181
Radha Prosad Mullick <i>v.</i> Ranimoni Dassi	240, 443, 529
Radha Proshad Wasti <i>v.</i> Esuf	233
Radha Shyam Sircar <i>v.</i> Joyram Senapati	486, 487
Radhi, <i>In re</i> the petition of	75
Radhika Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi) <i>v.</i> Nilamani Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi)	56, 345, 386
Radhika Prasad Dey <i>v.</i> Dharma Dasi Debi (Mussumat)	256
Ragavendra Rau <i>v.</i> Jayaram Rau	44, 140, 142
Raghajorao Saheb (Shrimant Raje Bahadur) <i>v.</i> Lakshmanrao Saheb (Shrimant Raje Bahadur)	260
Raghubans Kunwar <i>v.</i> Bhagwant Kunwar	95
Raghubanund Doss <i>v.</i> Sadhu Churn Doss	13, 187, 188, 348, 450
Raghubar Dial <i>v.</i> Kesho Ramanuj Das	557, 591
Raghubir Singh <i>v.</i> Moti Kunwar	345, 346, 359
Raghumall <i>v.</i> Luchmondas	276
Raghunada (Sri) <i>v.</i> Brozo Kishoro (Sri)	13, 81, 101, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 141, 176, 195, 196, 199, 201, 264, 278
Raghubandan Ramanuja Das <i>v.</i> Bibhuti Bhusan Mukerjee	587, 598
Raghubandan Singh <i>v.</i> Parmeshur Dayal Singh	282

	PAGE
Raghunath v. Thakuri	506
Raghunath Damodhar v. Janardhan Gopal	7
Raghunathji Maharaj (Thakur) v. Shah Lal Chand	556
Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay	275, 276
Raghunath Kuari v. Munnar Misr	402
Raghunath Prasad v. Gobind Prasad	285
Raghupati v. Tirumalai	506
Rahi v. Govinda Valad Teja	63, 64, 208, 209, 227, 383, 384
Rahmed Bibee v. Rokeya Bibee	64
Raicharan Pal v. Pyari Mani Dasi	506
Rai Churn Paul v. Suroop Chunder Mytec	476
Raikishori Dasi v. Debendranath Sircar	326, 533, 540
Rai Sham Bullubh v. Prankishen Ghose	304
Raja v. Subbaraya	188
Raja Dei v. Umed Singh	490, 491, 507
Rajagopala Reddy v. Nathu Govinda Reddy	172
Rajah Lal v. Delputti Singh	291
Rajahmundry, Chairman, Municipal Council of v. Susurla Venkateswarlu	584
Raja Jee Bahadur Garu (Raja) v. Parthasaradhi Appa Row	211, 251
Rajamma v. Ramakrishnayya	249
Rajammal v. Authiammal	528
Rajan v. Basuva Chetti	174
Rajanikanth Biswas v. Ram Nath Neogy	299
Rajaram v. Ganesh	573, 574
Raja Ram Banerjee v. Sonatun Roy	498
Raja Ram Tewari v. Lachman Prasad	233, 267, 268, 327
Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Persad	225, 304, 305, 307
Raj Bahadoor Singh v. Achumbit Lal	169
Raj Bahadur v. Bishen Dayal	24, 25
Raj Bullubh Sen v. Oomesh Chunder Roos	486
Rajbulubh Bhooyar v. Buneta De (Mussumant)	298
Rajchunder Das v. Dhunmunee (Mussumant)	425
Raj Chunder Narain Chowdry v. Goculchund Goh	27, 428
Rajchunder Paramanik, Doe dem v. Bulloram Biswas	483
Rajcoomaree Dossee v. Gopal Chunder Bose	343
Rajcoomaree Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Nobocomar Mullick	133, 166, 203
Rajcoomar Lal v. Bissessur Dyal	22, 108, 141, 144
Rajender Dutt v. Sham Chund Mitter	102, 325, 326, 342, 539, 541
Rajender Nath Roy v. Putto Soondery Dassee (S. M. Rane)	98
Rajendra Lal Agarwalla v. Rajcoomari Debi	542, 550
Rajendro Lal Gossami v. Shama Churn Lahori	232
Rajendro Narain Lahoree v. Saroda Soonduree Dabee	100, 106, 107, 141
Rajendro Nath Holdar v. Jogendro Nath Banerjee	175
Rajeshwar Mullick v. Gopeshwar Mullick	560, 573, 575
Rajeswara Gajapaty Naraina Deo Maharajulungaru (Sri Sri Sri Rajah) v. Virapratapah Rudra Gajapaty Naraina Deo Maharajulungaru (Sri Sri Sri)	262
Rajeswari Ammal (Raja) v. Subramania Archakar	557
Raje Vyankatray Anandray Nimbalkar v. Jayavantrav	129, 179, 180, 181
Rajkishen Singh (Rajah) v. Ramjoy Surma Mozumdar	28, 30
Rajkishen Sircar v. Jaheeroorul Huq	514
Rajkishore v. Durga Charan Lal	490
Rajkishore Lahoory v. Gobind Chunder Lahoory	224, 414, 423, 427
Rajkisto Majee v. Noball Seal	7

	PAGE
Rajkoonwarce Dassee v. Golabce Dassee	363
Raj Krishna Dey v. Bipin Behary Dey	568, 571
Rajkristo Roy v. Kishoree Mohun Mojoomdar	200, 489
Raj Lukhee Dabce v. Gokool Chunder Chowdry	270, 206, 478, 487, 502
Rajlukhy Dabce (Sm.) v. Bhootnath Mookerjee	65, 78
Rajnarain Bose v. Universal Life Assurance Company	173
Rajnarain Singh v. Heeralal	236, 237, 339
Rajputty Koeri (Mussummat) v. Nripabati (Mussummat)	166
Raju Gramany v. Ammani Ammal	16, 17, 452, 455, 461
Rajya Lakshmi Devi Garu (Sri Raja Viravara Thodramal) v. Surya Narayana Dhatrazu Bahadur Garu (Sri Raja Viravara Thodramal)	347
Rakhal Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Mahtab Khan	268
Rakhaldas Bundopadhya v. Indru Monee Dobi	234
Rakhmabai v. Keshav Raghunath Bhise	505
——— v. Radhabai	118, 124, 125, 126, 194, 198
——— v. Tukaram	390, 413
Rama v. Ranga	481
Ramabai v. Rangrav	164
——— v. Raya	103
——— v. Trimbak Ganesh Desai	77, 79, 80, 86
Ramabhadra (Rajah Sstruchela) v. Virabhadra Suryanarayana (Rajah Setrucherla)	274, 345, 355
Ramachandra Naiker v. Vijayaragavulu Naidu	442, 443
Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti	323
Ramacharya v. Anantacharya	353
Rama Jogiah v. Venkatacharulu	577
Rama Kanta Das Mahapatra v. Shamanand Das (Chowdhuri)	28, 260
Ramakal v. Ramasami Naicken	387, 477
Ramakissoor Dossji v. Sriranga Charlu	594
Ramakrishna v. Tripurabai	199, 200
Ramakrishna Kuppaswami v. Tripurabai	199, 200
Ramakristna v. Subbakka	160, 161, 242
Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivananantha Perumal Sethurayar	27, 28, 29, 30, 341, 519
Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan	228, 384, 385, 386
Ramalinga Pillai v. Sadasiva Pillai	111, 142, 144, 175
Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai	569, 571
Ramamani Ammal v. Kulanthai Natchear	38, 99
Ramanadan v. Rajagopala	317
——— v. Rangammal	81, 82, 92, 94
Raman Ammal v. Subban Annavi	133
Rama Nand v. Surgiani	32, 390
Ramananda v. Raikishori Barmani	369
Rama Nand Singh v. Gobind Singh	392
Ramanarasu v. Buchamma	85
Ramanathan Chethar v. Ananthanarayana Aiyar	594
Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti	559, 569, 571, 575
Ramanathan Chetty v. Yegappa Chetty	276
Ramanayya v. Rangappayya	299
Ramanna v. Venkata	225, 246, 303
Rama Nooj Doss (Mohunt) v. Debraj Doss (Mohunt)	571
Ramanund Koer (Thakurain) v. Raghunath Koer (Thakurain)	252
Rangappa Naicken v. Sithammal	359, 381, 382
Ranganatha Udayan v. Arunagatha Udayan	377, 413

	PAGE
Rama Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rajah of Pittapur	263, 264
Ramasammayyan v. Virasami Ayyar	282, 305, 316
Ramasami v. Appavu	30
——— v. Narasamma	390
——— v. Papayya	442
——— v. Venkatesam	414
Ramasami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar	484, 485
Ramasami Chetti v. Mangaikarasu Nachiar	482
——— v. Saluckai Tevar	493
Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sunduralingasami Kamaya Naik	188, 263, 519
Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan	317, 321, 322
Ramasami Padeiyatchi v. Virasami Padeiyatchi	75
Ramasamy Aiyan v. Minakshi Ammal	80
Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar	282
Ramasawmi Aiyan v. Vencataramayan	181, 184, 185, 193, 306
——— v. Venkata Achari	7
Ramasheshaiya Panday v. Bhagavat Panday	246
Ramaswami Iyen v. Bhagati Ammal	122
Rama Varma Tambaran v. Raman Nayar	573
Ramawati Koer v. Manjhari Koer	79
Ram Avtar Singh v. Nursing Narain Singh	282, 287
Ramayya v. Venkataratnam	268, 322
Rambai (Bai) v. Mani (Bai)	523
Ram Baran Rai v. Rajwanti Kuar (Musammat)	380
Ramayyangaar v. Krishnayyangaar	577
Rambharti Jagrupbharti (Gosain) v. Sarajbharti Haribharti (Mohant)	562
Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay	102, 178, 179, 201, 304
——— v. Timmayya	52, 59
Ram Bromo Pandah v. Kaminee Soonduree Dossee	26, 27
Ram Bunsce Koonwaree (Maharance) v. Soobh Koonwarce (Maharance)	47, 48
Ram Chandar v. Kallu	499
Ramchandra v. Fakirappa	309
——— v. Gopal	40, 46, 139
——— v. Shamrao	130
Ramchandra Baji v. Bapu Khandu	118
Ramchandra Bhagavan v. Mulji Nanabhai	118, 124, 125
Ramchandra Dikshit v. Savitribai	95
Ramchandra Kashi Patkar v. Damodar Trimbak Patkar	233, 236
Ramchandra Mankeshwar v. Bhimrav Ravji	199, 477
Ramchandra Mantri v. Venkatrao	260
Ram Chandra Marwari v. Mudeshwar Singh	263, 300
Ramchandra Mortand Waikar v. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothokar	377, 379, 400
Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh	169, 522, 552, 553
Ram Chandra Panda v. Ram Krishna Mahapatra	225, 248, 569
Ramchandra Sakharan Vagh v. Sakharan Gopal Vagh	206, 211
Ramchandra Shankarbhava Dravid v. Kashinath Narayan Dravid	563
Ramchandra Vasudev v. Nanaji Timaji	150
Ramchandra Vinayak Kulkarni v. Narayan Babaji	169
Ramchandra Vishnu Bapat v. Sagunabai	82
Ram Chand Sen v. Audaito Sen	52
Ram Charan v. Ajudhia Prasad	354
——— v. Mihin Lal	286
Ram Charan Bajpai v. Bakhal Das Mookerjee	559
Ram Charan Lal v. Rahim Baksh	405

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

lxxv

	PAGE
Ram Chunder Adhikaree v. Ram Jeebun Adhikaree	568
Ramchunder Surma v. Gungagovind Bunhoojiah	481
Ram Churn Poorce v. Nunhoo Mundul	564
Ram Churun Tewaree v. Jasooda Koonwer	92, 94
Ramconnoy Audicarry v. Johur Lall Dutt	8
Ramcoomar Mitter v. Ichamoyi Dasi	53, 211, 484, 492
Ram Coomar Paul v. Jogender Nath Paul	342, 5
Ram Das v. Chabildas	
— v. Chandra Dassia	
Ramdas Gopaldas (Sadhu) v. Baldevdasji Kaushalyadasji	115
Ram Das Marwari v. Braja Behari Singh (Tekait)	5, 324
Ram Dass v. Gunga Dass	413
Ram Dayal v. Ajudhia Prasad	
— v. Durga Singh	
— v. Megu Lal	
Ram Debul Lall v. Mitterjeet Singh	299, 303
Ram Dei Kunwar v. Abu Jafar	509, 512
Ramdhan Puri (Gossain) v. Dalmir Puri (Gossain)	415, 416, 572
Ramdhari Singh v. Permanund Singh	88
Ramdhone Ghose v. Anund Chunder Ghose	325
Ram Dhun Doss v. Ram Ruttun Dutt	214
Ramdhun Sein v. Kishen Kanth Sein	340, 367
Ram Doss v. Mohesur Deb Missree	563
Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo	269
Ramdulol Sircar v. Joymoney Dabey (Sreemutty)	438, 441
Ramdut Sing v. Mahender Prasad	317
Ramdyaal Deb v. Magnee (Musst)	427
Rameshaiya Panday v. Bhagavat Panday	247
Rameshwar Prosad Singh v. Lachmi Prosad Singh	249, 260, 327, 533, 540
Rameswar Mondal v. Provabati Debi	496, 497
Ramgappa Naik v. Kamti Naik	491
Ram Ghulam Singh v. Ram Behari Singh	222, 258
Ram Gobind Koond v. Hossein Ali (Moulvie Syud)	258
Ram Gopal Bhuttacharjee v. Narain Chunder Bandopadhya	437, 440, 458, 459
Ramguttee Acharjee v. Kristosoonduree Debia	534
Ramgutty Doss v. Nundo Koomar Doss	368
Ram Gutty Kurmoker v. Boishtab Churn Mozoomdar	477
Ram Harakh v. Ram Lal	354
Ram Hari Sarma v. Trihi Ram Sarma	360
Ramiengar v. Gnasambanda Pandarasannada	500
Ramjewan Lal (Lala) v. Dal Koer	442
Ramji v. Ghamau	124, 126, 194
Ramji Dass (Mahanth) v. Lachhu Dass	568, 570, 571
Ram Joshi v. Laxmibai	337
Ramjoy Ghose v. Ram Runjun Chuckerbutti	353, 358
Ramjoy See v. Tarrachund	389
Ram Kali v. Jamma	382, 383
— v. Kedarnath	509
Ramkallee Koer v. Court of Wards	97
Ram Kant Chuckerbutty v. Chunder Narain Dutta Roy	481
Ram Kanye Audicary v. Cally Churn Dey	9
Ram Kanye Gossamee v. Meernomoyee Dossee	368
Ram Kawai Singh v. Ram Kishore Das	481
Ramkishen Das v. Tunda Mal	256, 259

	PAGE
Ramkishen Surkeyl v. Srimuttee Dibia (Mussummaut)	198
Ramkishore Acharj Chowdree v. Bhoobunmoyee Debea Chowdhraim	146, 224
Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v. Kally Kanto Chuckerbutty	496
Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal	164, 306
Ramkissen Singh (Maharajah) v. Sheonund Singh (Rajah)	349
Ram Koonwur v. Ummur	364
Ram Kore (Bai) v. Jannadas Mulchand	47, 48
Ram Krishna v. Narain	312
Ram Krishna v. Vinayak Narayan	282, 315
Ram Krishna Gopal Joshi v. Chinnaji Vyankatesh	142
Ram Krishna Kuppasami v. Tripurabai	487
Ram Krishna Mapahatra v. Padma Charan Deb Goswami	567, 568
Ram Krishna Ramchandra v. Shamrao Yeshwant	130
Ram Kuber Pande v. Ram Dasi	277, 282
Ram Kumari, In the matter of	39, 64
Ram Kunhae Rai v. Bung Chund Bunhoojea	299
Ram Kunwar v. Ram Dai	84, 89, 92
Ram Lal v. Debi Dat	348, 349
Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State	541, 570
Ram Lal Sett v. Kanailal Sett	240, 535
Ram Lal Shookool v. Akhoy Charan Mitter	38, 39, 497
Ramlal Thakursidas v. Lakhmichand Muniram	274
Ramalinga Khanapure v. Virupakshi Khanapure	325
Ram Lochi Koeri v. Collingridge	325, 341
Ram Lochun Pattuck v. Rughoobur Dyal	353
Ram Mohan Lal v. Mulchand	354
Ramnad case (see Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy)	129, 514
Ram Narain Lal v. Bhawani Prasad	280
Ram Narain Nursing Doss v. Ram Chunder Jankee	239
Ramnarin Poramanick v. Sreemutty Dossee	329
Ram Narain Sing v. Pearay Bhugut	441
Ram Narain Singh v. Ramoon Paurey	552, 553
Ram Narain Singh (Rajah) v. Pertum Singh	219, 220, 225, 237, 242, 249
Ram Nath Rai v. Lachman Rai	281
Ramnath Tolapattro v. Durga Sundari Debi	369
Ram Nirunjun Singh v. Prayag Singh	337, 340
Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer (Maharani)	251, 515, 518
Ram Pershad Chowdhry v. Jokhoo Roy	502
Ram Pershad Doss Adhikaree v. Sreehuree Doss Adhikaree	553, 557
Ram Pershad Narain Tewaree v. Court of Wards	341
Ram Pershad Sing v. Nagbungshee Kooer (Mussamut)	510
Ram Pershad Singh v. Lakhpati Koer	346, 349
Rampershad Tewarry v. Sheochurn Doss	239, 245, 246
Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kuari	487, 490
Ramphal Thakur v. Pan Mati Padain	404
Ramphul Singh v. Degnaram Singh	255, 309, 316, 321
Ram Prakash Das (Mohunt) v. Anand Das (Mohunt)	562
Ram Prasad v. Man Mohun	281
Ramprasanna Nandi Chowdhuri v. Secretary of State	564, 565
Rampriya v. Bhiguram	77
Ramprotab Misser v. Abhilaak Misser	171, 172
Ramrao Trimbak Deshpande v. Yeshvantrao Madhavrao Deshpande	261
Ram Ratan v. Lachman Das	284, 308

	PAGE
Ramratan Sukal v. Nandu (Mussumat)	510
Ram Rau v. Raja Rau	174
Ramrutun Das v. Bunmalee Das	572
Ram Sahai v. Kewal Singh	319
Ram Sahoy Singh v. Mohaboor Pershad	310
Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Laljee Sahye (Lalla)	228, 229, 305, 371
Ram Saran Garain v. Tekchand Garain	227, 423
Ram Saran Lall v. Ram Narayan Singh	261
Ram Saran Pathak v. Raghu Nandan Gur	558
Ram Sarup v. Bela (Mussumat)	533
— v. Ram Dei	495, 501
Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo	267, 269
Ram Sevak Das v. Raghubar Rai	279, 280
Ram Shankar Lal v. Ganesh Prasad	500
Ram Shewuk Roy v. Sheo Gobind Sahoo	496, 509
Ram Singh v. Sobha Ram	281
— v. Tursa Kunwar (Musst)	350
Ram Singh (Bhyah) v. Ugur Singh (Bhyah)	376, 378, 385, 394, 396, 398
Ram Soonder Das (Mohanth) v. Nathuni Singh	298, 303
Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut	228, 229, 305, 371
Ram Soonder Thakoor v. Taruck Chunder Turkoruthun	559
Ram Soondur Singh v. Surbanee Dossee	112, 131
Ram Sunder Das (Mahanth) v. Barhamdeo Narayan Thakur	298, 303
Ram Swaruth Pandey v. Basdeo Singh (Baboo)	307, 389
Ram Taran Goswami v. Rameswar Malia	281
Ramtonoo Chatterjee v. Issurchunder Neogee	299
Ramtonoo Mullick v. Ramgopaul Mullick	551
Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh (Diwan) v. Indarpal Singh	75, 435, 476
Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh (Dewan) v. Jagatpal Singh	373, 374
Ranchhoda Vithaldas (Desai) v. Rawal Nathubai Kesabhai	389
Ranchod Naran v. Ajoobai	412
Raneemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Premmoney Dossee (Sreemutty)	533, 542
Rangachariar v. Yegna Dikshatur	568
Rangammal v. Echammal	210, 243
Ranganadha Mudaliar v. Baghirathi Ammal	535
Ranganaikimmal v. Ramanuja Aiyangar	47, 53
Ranganatha Rao v. Narayanasami Naicker	222
Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti	111, 132, 149, 152, 154, 155, 177
Ranganamani Dasi (S.M.) v. Kasinath Dutt	273
Rangappa v. Bhimappa	587
Rangappa Naik v. Kamti Naik	486, 488, 490, 491
Rangasami v. Krishnayyan	302
— v. Ranga	573
Rangasami Naidu v. Sundarajulu Naidu	344
Rangayian v. Kalyam Ummall	77
Rangayya Chetti v. Thanikachalla Mudali	313
Rangilbhai Kalyandas v. Vilayak Vishnu	482
Rango Balaji v. Mudiyeppa	103, 105, 171
Rango Vinayak Dev v. Yamunabai	81
Rangubai v. Bhagirthibai	135, 150, 151
— v. Subaji Ramechandra	95
Ranimoni Dassi v. Radha Prosad Mullick	535
Ranjit v. Radha Rani	370
Ranjit Lal Karmakar v. Bijoy Krishna Karmakar	115, 117

	PAGE
Ranjit Sing v. Amullya Prosad Ghose	277, 287
Ranjit Singh (Raja) v. Ramchandra Mookerjee	202, 497
Ranjit Sinha Bahadur (Raja) v. Basunta Kumar Ghose	567
Ranmalsangi Bhagwatsangji (Maharana Shri) v. Kundankumar (Bai Shri)	78, 97, 98
Ranmal Singji (Maharana Shri) v. Vadilal Vakhatchand	277, 290, 493
Ranoji v. Kandoji	228, 384
Ran Singh v. Sobha Ram	314, 316
Raol Gorain v. Teza Gorain	233
Rarichan v. Perachi	386
Rash Beharee Roy v. Nimaye Churn	362, 363
Rashid Karmali v. Sherbanoo	24, 79, 212
Rashmohini Dasi v. Umesh Chunder Biswas	526
Rasik Lal Mandal v. Singheswar Rai	312
Rasul Jehan Begum v. Ram Surun Singh	370
Ratanchand v. Javherchand	88
Ratan Dabce v. Modhoosoodun	237
Rathnam v. Sivasubramania	184, 285, 304
Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Ayar	563
Ratnam v. Govindarajulu	272, 286, 290
Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal	169, 170
Ratna Subbu Chetti v. Ponnappa Chetti	398, 405
Ratnendra Lal Mitter v. Corporation of Calcutta	557
Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh	203, 478, 512
Ravji v. Sakuji	385
Ravji Janardan Sarangpani v. Gangadharbhat	278
Ravji Ranchod Naik v. Vishnu Ranchod Naik	542
Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmibai	111, 127, 132, 153, 154, 155, 173, 186, 193
Rayakkal v. Subbanna	285
Rayce Monoo Dossee v. Puddum Mookhee Dossee	335
Razabai v. Sadu	85, 93, 530
Reade v. Krishna	217
Reasut Hossein v. Chorwar Singh	268
Reg. v. Jaili Bhavin	29
— v. Karsan Goja	36, 63
— v. Manohar Rajji	37
— v. Natha Kalyan	75
— v. Sambhu Raghu	36, 37, 63
Regella Jogayya v. Nimushakavi Venkataratnamma	402
Retki v. Lak Pati Pujari	154
Retoo Raj Pandey v. Lalljee Pandey	305, 506
Rewa Prasad Sukal v. Deo Dutt Ram Sukal	257
Rewun Persad v. Radha Beeby (Mussumat)	220, 221, 343, 345, 346, 349, 362
Rukhai Rai v. Sheo Pujan Singh	513
Rindabai v. Anacharya	411, 467, 468
Rindamma v. Venkataramappa	328
Risal Singh v. Balwant Singh	168, 494, 495
Rita Kuer (Babui) v. Puran Mal (Babu)	100
Ritheurn Lalla v. Soojun Mull Lallah	148
Rivett Carnac v. Jivibai	476
Rojomoyee Dassee v. Troylucko Mohiney Dassoo	508, 535, 536, 539, 551, 556
Roma Nath v. Rajonimoni Dasi	82, 83
Romesh Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Soorjo Coomar Bhattacharjee	278

	PAGE
Rooder Chunder Chowdhry v. Sunabho Chunder Chowdhry	365, 366
Roopchund Tilukchund v. Phoolchund Dhurmchund	412
Roopchurn Mohapater v. Anund Lal Khan	431
Roop Lal v. Lakshmi Doss	552
Roopmonjooree Chowdrancee v. Ramlall Sircar	171, 174, 175, 176
Roopnarain Singh v. Gugadhur Pershad Narain	203
Roshan Singh v. Balwant Singh	208, 227
Rottala Runganatham Chetty v. Pulicat Ramasami Chetti	285, 301, 303
Rowvenkata Mahapati v. Mohipati Suriah	411, 412
Roymonce Dossee, In the goods of	515
Rudrapa v. Irava	411
Rudr Narain Singh v. Rup Kuar.	412
Rughonath Singh (Rajah) v. Hurrechur Singh (Rajah)	519
Rughoonath Panjah v. Luckhun Chunder Dhallal Chowdhry	331
Rujjomoney Dossee v. Shilbehunder Mullick	210, 212
Rujonee Kant Mitter v. Premchand Bose	368, 490
Ruka Bai v. Ganda Bai	97
Rukhab v. Chunilal Ambushet	23, 187, 188
Rukhmani (Bai) v. Keshavlal	468
Rukkini Dasi (Srimati) v. Kadarnath (Hoso)	427
Rukmini Koori (Musst) v. Nilmani Bandyopadhyia	511
Rulyat (Bacc) v. Jeychund Kewul	48, 50
Rumca v. Bhagee	387
Rumun Doss (Mohunt) v. Ashbul Doss (Mohunt)	570
Run Bahadoor Singh v. Luchoo Coowar (Musst.)	106
Runchod Naran v. Ajoobai.	372
Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parvatibhai	509, 550
Rungadhur Nurondra Mardraj Mahapattur v. Juggurnath Bhromurhur Roy	87
Rungama v. Atchama	15, 99, 103, 106, 149, 171, 174, 175, 179, 183, 204
Runganaigum v. Namesevoya Pillay	144
Runjeet Ram Koolal v. Mahomed Waris	481
Runjeet Singh v. Gujraj Singh	350
_____ v. Madud Ali	234, 257
Runjeet Sing (Baboo) v. Obhyo Narain Sing.	143, 158
Run Murdun Syn (Chuctorya) v. Sahub Puxhulad Syn	22, 206, 208, 227, 228, 382
Runnoo Pandey v. Buksh Ali	290
Rupa Jagshot v. Krishnaji (Govind)	555
Rup Chand (Lala) v. Jambu Parshad	102, 135, 145, 146, 148, 153
Rup Chand Chowdhry v. Latu Chowdhry	24
Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai	118, 124, 157, 194, 195, 197, 198
Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi (Mussamut)	141, 145, 175, 489, 503
Rup Narain Singh v. Junko Bye	573
Rup Ram v. Rowati (Musannmat)	491
Rup Singh v. Pirblu Narain Singh	265
Rup Singh (Rajah) v. Baisni Rani	516, 517
Rusi Mendli v. Sundar Mendli	300
Russio Lal Bhunj v. Purush Munnee	424
Russoobai v. Zoolekhabai	300, 412, 413
Rustam Singh v. Moti Singh	484
Ruteheputty Dutt Jha v. Rajunder Narain Rao	20, 26, 380, 381, 385, 398
Rutton Monee Dutt v. Brojomohun Dutt	233
Rutton Kisto Bosoo v. Bhugoban Chunder Bosoo	367
Rayee Bhadr v. Roopshunkur Shunkerjee	144, 157, 188, 203, 368

	PAGE
Sabo Bawa v. Nahagun Maiti	175
Saboo Sidick (Haji) v. Ally Muhomed Jan Mahomed	24, 362
----- v. Ayeshulalai	83
Sachindra Kishore Dey v. Rajani Kant Chackabutty	425
Sachit v. Budhua Kuar	494
Sadabart Prasad Sahu v. Foolbush Koer	237, 281, 300, 302
Sadagopa (Striman) v. Kristna Tatachariyar	6
Sadagopa Charari v. Rama Rao	5
Salai Naik v. Semi Naik	476
Sadashiv Bhaskar Joshi v. Dhakubai	8, 290, 483, 510, 513
Sadashiv Dinkar Joshi v. Dinkar Narayan Joshi	280, 281, 309, 311, 320
Sadashiv Moreshwar Ghate v. Hari Moreshwar Ghate	147, 173
Sadrai Koer v. Ramgobind Singh	471, 495
Sadu v. Baiza	227, 383, 384, 385
Sadul Ali Khan v. Abdul Ghouse (Khajeh)	503
Safuram Umar v. Emma	21
Saguna v. Sadashiv	392, 402, 404, 411
Sahadur v. Rajwanta	68, 69
Sahodra v. Ganesh Parshad	528
Sahodra (Museumat Bebea) v. Roy Jung Bahadoor	199, 177
Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh	314, 315
Saithri, In the matter of	214, 216
Sajan (Muss) v. Roop Ram	24
Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav	576, 577, 578, 579, 580
Sajjad Hussan (Miza) v. Wazir Ali Khan	511
Sakharan v. Devji	270
Sakharan Hari v. Laxmipriya Tirtha Swami	441
Sakharan Mahadev Dange v. Hari Krishna Dange	351
Sakharan Ramchandra Dikshit v. Govind Vaman Dikshit	323
Sakharan Sadashiv Adhikari v. Sitabai	18, 410, 466
Sakharanesh v. Sitaraneshet	320
Sakrabai Nathubai v. Maganlal Mulchand	274, 288, 492, 493
Sakrappa v. Shivappa	549
Sakarbai v. Bhavanjee Raja	94
Sakyabani Ingle Rao Sahib v. Bhavani Bozi Sahib	505
Salakshi v. Lakshmayee	81
Salehounissa Khatoun v. Mohesh Chunder Roy	268
Salemma v. Lutchmana Reddi	17, 431, 439, 448
Salimullah v. Prabhat Chandra Sen	325
Sallay Mahomed v. Janbai (Lady)	535
Samalibhai Nathubhai v. Someshwar	237, 274
Samaram Singarachariar v. Krishnasami Ayyangar	559
Samat v. Amra	390, 390, 391, 392
Sambanda Mudaliyar v. Nannasambandapundara	565
Sambasiva v. Ragava	500
Sambasiva Ayyar v. Venkataswara Ayyar	442
----- v. Visvam Ayyar	443
Sami Ayyangar v. Ponnammal	313
Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni	220, 241, 253
Saminatha v. Purushottama	564
Saminatha Pillai v. Manikkasami Pillai	474

	PAGE
Sammantha Pandara v. Sellapa Chetti	561
Sandarambal Ammal v. Yovanagarukkal	569
Sangappa v. Sahebanna	266
Sangili Virapandia Chinnathambiar v. Alwar Ayyangar	323
Sanjivi v. Jalajakshi	163
Sanka Krishnamurthi v. Bank of Burma	275
Sankamurti Mudaliar v. Chidambara Madan	563, 590
Sankaralingam Chetti v. Subban Chetti	29, 63
Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswari Dorai (Raja)	547, 559, 563, 561
Sankar Nath Mukerji v. Bejoy Gopal Mukerji	476
Sankar Nath Pundit v. Madan Mohan Das	318
Sanku v. Puttamma	371, 374
Santappayya v. Rangappayya	111, 173
Santhalva v. Manjanna Shetty	588
Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran	388, 389, 495, 503, 508
Sarabjit Partap Bahadur Sahi v. Indarjit Partap Bahadur Sahi	30, 262, 263
Sarada Charan Chakravarti v. Durgaram De Sinha	277
Sarada Prosad Ray v. Mahananda Ray	255, 256
Sarada Prosad Pal v. Rama Pati Pal	108, 112, 115
Sarasuti v. Mannu	227, 383, 384, 385
Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Bhupendra Nath Basu	515
Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Pratap Chandra Ghose	550, 551
Saret Chandra Mullick v. Kanai Lal Chunder	196
Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha	173
Saravana Tevan v. Muttayi Ammal	293
Sardar Singh v. Ratan Lal	8, 316
Sarkies v. Prosonomoyee Dossee	9
Sarnamoyee Bewah v. Secretary of State	463
Sarodasoondery Dossee (S.M.) v. Tincowry Nundy	101, 176, 177
Saroda Soondury Dossee v. Doyamoyee Dossee	352
Saroda Sundari Dassi v. Kristo Jiban Pal	441, 442, 443
Sartaj Kuari (Rani) v. Deoraj Kuari (Rani)	183, 225, 264, 265, 327, 527
Sarur Jigar Begum v. Barada Kanta Mitter	511
Sataram Pandit (Shri) v. Harihar Pandit (Shri)	284
Sathappayyar v. Periasami	562, 576, 577, 581, 585
Sathianama Bharati v. Saravanabagi Ammal	549, 566
Sathyabhama v. Kesavacharya	82, 83
Sato Koer v. Gopal Sahu	237
Saturluri Sektaramanuja Charyulu v. Nanduri Sektapati	585, 591
Saunadanappa v. Shivbasawa	322
Savitribai v. Luximbai	79, 80, 86, 210
Sayamalal Dutt v. Saudamini Dasi	132
Scott v. Scott	68
Secretary of State v. Abdul Hakkim Khan	547
Secretary of State v. Kamachoe Boye Sahaba	262, 325
Secretary of State v. Rangasami Ayyangar	301, 350
Seeb Chunder Bose v. Gooropersaud Bose	97
Sectaram v. Dhunnook Dharoo Sahyo	146
Secta Ram Gossain v. Fukeer Chand Chuckerbutty	362, 428
Seethai v. Nachiar	364, 390
Seetul Pershad Singh (Baboo) v. Gour Dyal Singh (Baboo)	307
Seith Gobin Das v. Ranchore	480
Sellam v. Chinnammal	234, 325, 326, 328, 330, 368
Sengamalaithammal v. Velaynda Mudali	449, 464, 466

	PAGE
Serumah Umah v. Palathan Vivil Marya Choofhy Umah	29
Seshamma v. Subbarayadu	96
Seshadri Aiyengar v. Ranga Bhattachar	559
Seshadri Ayyangar v. Nataraja Ayyar	589
Seshayya v. Narasamma	442, 443
Seth Mulchand Badharsha v. Mancha (Bai)	142, 526
Sethurama v. Ponnammal	407
Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar	215, 261, 571, 575
Sevagamy Nachiar v. Mooto Vizia Raghoonadhu Satoopathy	147
Sevak Kerpashankar Daji v. Gopalrao Manohar Tambekar	551
Shadi v. Anup Singh	232, 233
Shama Charan Nandi v. Abhiram Goswami	552
Shamachurn Audhicaree Byragee v. Roop Doss Byragee	229, 521
Shama sundery Dabee v. Kartick Churn Mittra	314
Shama Soonduree v. Shuruf Chunder Dutt	490
Shama Soonduree Chowdhraim v. Junoona Chowdhraim	199, 505, 506
Shamavahon v. Dwarkadas Vasanji	133, 205
Sham Chunder v. Narayni Dibeh	112
Sham Koer v. Dah Koer	228, 509, 510, 511
Sham Kuar v. Gaya Din	181
— v. Mohanunda Sahoy	270
Sham Lal v. Banna	8, 89, 91, 92
— v. Bindo	217
Sham Lal Mitra v. Amarendra Nath Bose	100
Sham Lal Set v. Huro Soonduree Goopta	557
Shammarain v. Court of Wards	238, 239, 248, 391, 411
Shammarain Sing v. Rughoooburdial	246, 252
Shamrao (Bhanji) v. Hajimiya Mahamad	234
Shamrathi Singh v. Kishan Prasad	268, 269, 280
Shamsing v. Santabai	136, 137, 216
Sham Sunder Lal v. Aashan Kunwar	480, 488, 500
Shankaran v. Kesavan	153
Shankar Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh	245, 274, 325, 355
Shankar Bharati Svami v. Venkapa Naik	562
Sharifa v. Muneekhan	217
Sharo Bibi v. Buldeo Das	515
Shashi Bhushan Beed v. Jotindra Nath Roy Chowdhry	353
Shashi Bhushan Lahiri v. Rajendra Nath Joardar	460
Shayatri (Hata) v. Nanyanan Nambudiri (Hata)	78, 207
Sheehankar Das v. Ulick Chunder Aych	46
Sheikh Chand v. Hiralal	281
Sheelarant Kuari v. Bhagywati Prasad	403
Sho Bukah Sing v. Futeh Sing	339
Sho Churn Narain Singh v. Chukrasee Porshad Narain Singh	267
Sho Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree	79, 247, 249, 333, 334, 335, 337
Sho Gobind v. Sham Narain Singh	351
Sho Loshun Singh (Babu) v. Sahch Singh (Babu)	474
Sho Narain v. Janki Prasad	333
Sho Narain Roy v. Mokshoda Das Mittra	306, 307, 315
Sho Narain Singh v. Khargo Koerry	495
Shomnath Rai v. Dayamyo Chowdhraim	372
Sheoprasan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh	503
Sheoprasad Sing v. Kullunder Singh	240

	PAGE
Sheopersad Singh v. Leela Singh	232
Sheo Pershad Ram v. Thakoor Pershad	294
Sheo Pershad Singh v. Raj Kumar Lal	274, 275, 278
Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh (Lal) v. Allahabad Bank	464, 465, 468
Sheo Prasad v. Aya Ram	570
Sheoproskash Doss (Mohunt) v. Joyram Doss (Mohunt)	415
Sheo Proshad v. Jung Bahadoor	317, 321
Sheoraji v. Ramjas Pande	509
Sheoraj Koor v. Nuckchedo Lall	288, 291, 293
Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash	570, 585, 591, 592
Sheo Schai Singh v. Omed Konwur (Mussummat)	367, 465
Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri	286, 564
Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai	434, 464, 465, 468
Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar	278, 281
Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (Mussumut)	23, 119, 145, 148, 386, 469
Sheo Soondary v. Pirthoe Singh	14, 224, 366, 423, 427
Sheo Soondooree (Mussumut) v. Pirthoe Singh	14, 366
Sherajoodeen Ahmed (Shaikh) v. Horel Singh	221
Sher Bahadur (Bhaiya) v. Ganga (Bhaiya)	25, 26
Sher Bahadur Singh (Thakur) v. Dariao Kuar (Thakurain)	251, 252
Shesgiri v. Girewa	384, 385
Shewak Ram (Rai) v. Bhowani Buksh Singh	513
Shewak Ram Roy v. Muhammed Shamsul Hoda	502
Shiamanand v. Har Lal	492
Shiam Lal v. Ganeshi Lal	317
Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad	78, 79, 86, 88, 235, 246, 285
Shibessuree Debia (Maharance) v. Mothooranath Acharjo	555, 557, 563, 565
Shibkooree (Mussumut) v. Joogun Singh	158, 159, 201, 504
Shiblall v. Bishumber	142
Shibnarain Bose v. Ram Nidhee Bose	347, 349
Shibsoondery Dossee v. Rakhall Doss Sirkar	256, 257, 298
Shib Pershad Chuckerbutty v. Gunga Monce Deboo	221, 255
Shib Sahai v. Saraswati	400
Shib Shankar Lal v. Soni Ram	472, 501
Shidappa v. Ninganganda	128, 197
Shidhojirav v. Naikojirav	29, 30, 261
Shimbhu Nath v. Gayan Chand	31, 469
Shiu Golam Sing v. Baran Sing	259
Shivajirao Madhavrao v. Vasantrao Madhavrao	230, 301, 330
Shiva Rao v. Nagappa	565
Shivgar Dayagar v. Rivett-Carnac	533
Shivjiram v. Vishnu	268
Shivmurteppa v. Virappa	352, 353, 354
Shivram v. Sakharan	317
Shollojanund Ojha v. Peary Charan Dey	575
Shome Shankar Rajendra Varere v. Rajesar Swami Jangam	385
Shosinath Ghose (Mahashoya) v. Krishna Soondari Dasi (Srimati)	149, 150, 153, 154
Shridhar v. Hiralal Vithal	47, 48, 49
Shrinivas Murar v. Hanmant Chavdo Deshapande	169, 170
Shrinivas Sarjerav v. Balwant Venkatesh	148, 169, 170
Shudanund Mohapattur v. Bonomalce Doss Mohapattur	246, 277, 285
Shumshere Mull (Raja) v. Dilraj Konwur (Rance)	119, 277, 285
Shurunnisa Bibee Chowdhraim v. Kylash Chunder Gungopadhya	277, 285

	PAGE
Shurno Moyee Dassoe v. Gopal Lall Doss	81, 82
Shurrut Chunder v. Rajkissen Mookerjee	287
Shurut Chunder Sein v. Muthooranath Pudatiek	501
Shushoo Mohun Pal Chowdhry v. Aukhil Chunder Banerjee	250
Shyama Charan Bhuttacharya v. Sarup Chandra Son	534
Shyam Lal Singh v. Bijay N. Kunda Bahadur (Raja)	324, 516
Shyam Chand Jui (Sri Sri Ishwar) v. Ram Kanai Ghose	566
Shyamanand Das Mohapatra v. Rama Kanta Das Mohapatra	260
Sibhosoondery Dabia v. Bussoomutty Dabia	333
Sibchunder Mullick v. Trepoorah Soundary Dossee	425, 550
Sibta v. Badri Prasad	389
Siddappa v. Ningangavda	157
Siddessury Dossee v. Doorga Churn Soff	149, 150, 205
----- v. Janardan Sarkar	81, 86, 96, 210, 211
Sidh Narayan v. Puteh Narayan	361
Siddlingappa v. Sidava	76, 77, 78, 97, 98
Sikher Chund v. Dulputty Singh	291, 296
Sikki v. Venkatasamy Gounden	85
Siliamedoo Runga Reddy v. Achummal	103
Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh	281, 315, 319
Simunani Ammal v. Muttarammal	388
Simammal v. Administrator-General of Madras	36, 37, 64
Sinaya Pillai v. Munisami	287
Singamma v. Vinjamuri Venkatacharlu	149, 151
Singam Setti Sanjivi Kondaya v. Draupadi Bayamma	485, 513
Sinthayee v. Thanakapudayen	82
Sitabai v. Ramchandrarao	68, 78
--- v. Vasanthrao	437, 452
Sita Koer (Musst) v. Deo Nath Sahay (Munshi)	528
Sital v. Madho	249
Sitanath Mookerjee v. Haimabutty Dabee (Sreenmutty)	61, 65, 68, 77
Sitapershad v. Thakur Dass	508
Sitarani v. Aheeroo Heerahnoo (Mussamut)	36, 61, 65
--- v. Chintaman	412, 413
--- v. Zalim Singh	311
Sitaramayya v. Venkatramanna	312
Sitarambhat v. Sitarani Ganesh	569, 571
Sitarani Pandit (Shri) v. Harihar Pandit (Shri)	151, 303, 309
Sithurama Chetty v. Subramania Iyer (Sir S.)	578, 586, 588
Siva Bhagiam v. Palani Padinchi	493
Sivaganga Zemindar v. Lakshumma	243, 307
Sivagiri Zemindar v. Tiruvengadu	310
Sivananjanja Perumal Sethurayar v. Mutta Ramalinga Sethurayar	28, 29, 30, 285
Sivananjanja Perumal Sethurayer v. Meenakshi Ammal	79
Sivarani Chola Pillay v. Bagavan Pillay	54
Sivasami Chetti v. Sevagan Chetti	284
Sivasangu v. Minai	31, 403
Sivasankama v. Vazlagiri	581
Siva Sankara Mudali v. Parvati Anni	320
Sivasubramania Naicker v. Krishnammal	205
Sivayya v. Rami Reddi	582, 585, 591, 592
Sobhagachand Gulabchand v. Bhaichand	522
Sobha Kaper (Mussamut) v. Hurley Narain Mohajun.	345

	PAGE
Sobhanadri Appa Rau v. Sriramulu	278
Soiru Padmanabh Rangappa v. Narayanrao	276
Sokkanadha Vannimundar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar	219, 276
Solukhna (Mussumaut) v. Ramdolal Pande	116, 117, 119, 186
Somasekhara Raja v. Subhadramaji	146, 152
Somasundara Mudaliar v. Ganga Bissen Soni	249, 532, 535
— v. Vythilinga Mudaliar	586
Somasundara Mudaly v. Duraisami Mudaliar	114, 222
Somungowda v. Bhurmun Gowda	222
Sona Dei v. Fakir Chand	576
Sonaluxmi v. Vishnuprasad Hariprasad	36, 58
Sonatin Bysack v. Juggutsoondree Dossee (Sreemutty)	342, 349, 539, 549
Sonatin Misser v. Rutton Mallah	26
Sonet Kowar (Rance) v. Himmat Bahadoor (Mirza)	416
Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal	472, 501
Soobhul Chunder Paul v. Nitye Churn Bysack	300
Soobuns Lal v. Hurbuns Lal	250
Sooda Ram Doss v. Jogul Kishore Goopto	75, 144
Soodasun Sain v. Lokenauth Mullick	74
Soogun Chand v. Gopal Gir	415
Sookhmoy Chunder Doss v. Monohurri Dasi (Srimati)	529, 533, 540
Sookraj Koowar (Mussumat Thukrain) v. Government	251, 252
Soondur Koomaroo Deba v. Gudadhur Pershad Towarree	111, 176, 177
Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramonee Burmoreah	26, 27, 28, 361, 376
Soorendro Pershad Dobey v. Nundun Misser	286, 291
Soorja Koer v. Nath Buksh Singh	92
Soorjemonay Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundhoo Mullick	224, 247, 273, 274, 474, 529, 541
Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund Mohapatler	178
Soorjoon (Musumut) v. Eshree Brahmun	361, 386
Soorjoo Pershad v. Krishan Pertab (Rajah)	288, 482, 483
Sootroogun Sutputty v. Subita Dye	100, 150, 151, 171, 174, 177
Sorolah Dossee v. Bhobun Mohun Neoghy	76, 84, 85, 89, 334, 335, 539
Soshi Bhusan Ghose v. Genshi Chunder Ghose	232
Soudaminy Dossee v. Jogesh Chunder Dutt	328, 535
Soundararajan v. Arunachalam Chetty	227, 348, 363
Sowdaminee Dossee v. Administrator-General of Bengal	474, 475
Sree Misser v. Crowdy	268
Sree Narain Borah v. Gooro Pershad Borah	247, 248
Sreenarain Mitter v. Kishan Soondory Dossee (Sreemutty)	150, 166, 167, 170, 213, 502, 503
Sreenarain Rai v. Bhya Jha	158, 201, 202, 402, 457, 471
Sreenath Roy v. Ruttunmalla Chowdhraia	199, 482, 483, 510
Sreenovassien v. Sashyummal	147
Sroepershad (Lalla) v. Akoonjoo Koonwar (Mussumat)	345
Sroeram Bhattacharjee v. Puddomokhee Debia	98
Sroeram Ghose v. Sroenath Dutt Chowdhry	222
Sroeramulu v. Kristamma	193, 198, 199, 477, 509
Sri Chand v. Ninchand Sahu	268
Sridhar Chattopadhyay v. Kalipada Chuckerbutty	475
Sri Kishan Lal v. Kashmiro (Mussumat)	511
Srimohan Jha v. Brijbehary Misser	288, 289, 290, 482, 483, 484
Srimohan Thakur v. Macgregor	325
Srimutty Dibeah (Rany) v. Koond Laita (Rany)	431, 486

	PAGE
Sri Narain v. Raghubans (Lala)	311
Srinarayan Mitter v. Krishna Sundari Dasi (Srinati)	150
Srinath Das v. Hari Pada Mitter	496, 497
Srinath Gangopadhy v. Sarbamangala Debi	457, 458
Srinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar Ghose	509
Srinath Serma v. Radhakaunt	157, 201, 424
Srinivasa v. Annasami	29
----- v. Dandayudapani	389
----- v. Tiruvengala	7
----- v. Venkata	594
Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Kuppan Ayyangar	189
----- v. Rangasami Ayyangar	124
----- v. Rangasami Ayyangar	402
Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar	579
Srinivasa Iyengar v. Thiruvengadathayangar	33, 355, 356
Srinivasammal v. Vijayammal	527
Srinivasa Nayudu v. Yehaya Nayudu	280
Srinivasa Reddi v. Sivarama Reddi	298, 310, 321
Srinivasa Swami v. Ramanuja Chariar	572, 577
Sri Pal Rai v. Surajbali	336
Sripat Sing v. Tagore	319, 320
Sriramulu v. Ramayya	138, 139, 143, 144
Sriramulu Naidu v. Andalammal	491
Stalkart v. Gopal Panday	231
Stevens v. Junki Ballabh	185
Stevens v. In re the wife of	70
Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Swami	579
Studd v. Brij Nundun Prasad Singh	280
Suba Singh v. Sarafraz Kunwar	17, 377, 378, 392, 397
Subba v. Venkatrami	298
Subba Ayyar v. Ganava Ayyar	327
Subbaluvammal v. Annakutti Ammal	148
Subbanana v. Subramanyam	490
Subhammal v. Ayudaiyammal	480, 495
Subbanna v. Venkatakrishnan	493
Subbanna Bhatta v. Subbanna	90
Subba Rau v. Rama Rau	353
Subbaraya v. Kylasa	402
----- v. Vedantachariar	6
Subbaraya Chetty v. Sadashiva Chetty	351
Subbaraya Mudali v. Kannu Chetty	251
----- v. Manika Mudali	350, 351
Subbarayana v. Subbappa	80, 211
Subbaraya Pillai v. Ramasami Pillai	61, 371, 403
Subbaraya Tawker v. Rajaram Tawker	325, 346
Subbarayar v. Subbammal	155
Subbarayar v. Subbammal	205
Subbarayudu v. Kotayya	573
Subbarayulu Chetty v. Kamalavallithayaramma	79
Subbarazu v. Venkataratnam	354
Subba Reddi v. Chongalamma	477
Subbaya v. Chellamma	255
----- v. Surayya	225, 236, 246, 249, 255, 530
Subbler v. Abhoy Naidu	598

	PAGE
Subbramania Mudaliar <i>v.</i> Kaliani Ammal	79, 94, 96
Subindra <i>v.</i> Budan	567
Subrahmanyam <i>v.</i> Venkamma	123, 124
Subramania Ayyar <i>v.</i> Gopala Aiyar	308
— <i>v.</i> Sita Lakshmi	521
Subramania Mudali <i>v.</i> Valu	209
Subramanian Chetti <i>v.</i> Arunachalam Chetti	138, 119, 449, 476
Subramaniyayyan <i>v.</i> Subramananiyayyan	279, 283
Subramanya <i>v.</i> Sadasiva	310, 311
Subramanya Ayyar <i>v.</i> Secretary of State	547
Subramanya Chettyar <i>v.</i> Padmanabha Chettyar	354
Subramanya Pandya Chokka Talavar <i>v.</i> Siva Subramanya Pillai	238, 340, 377, 517, 518, 519
Subramanyan <i>v.</i> Paramaswaran	161, 162
Subraya <i>v.</i> Nagappa	310
Subudra Chowdrayn (Mussamaut) <i>v.</i> Goluknath Chowdhry	134, 166
Succaram Morarji <i>v.</i> Kalidas Kallianji	296
Sudabart Pershad Sahoo <i>v.</i> Lott Ali Khan	237, 318
Sudanund Mohapattur <i>v.</i> Bonomallee	103, 106, 179, 183
— <i>v.</i> Soorjomonee Dayee	225, 256, 304
— <i>v.</i> Soorjo Monee Debee	178, 179
Sudarsanam Maistri <i>v.</i> Narasimulu Maistri	219, 222, 225, 230, 239, 240, 245, 343, 344
Sudharam Patar <i>v.</i> Sudharam	7
Sudisht Lal <i>v.</i> Sheoharat Koer (Mussammat)	511
Sugeeram Begum <i>v.</i> Juddoobhans Suhaye	485, 512
Sukulal <i>v.</i> Bapu Sakaram	9
Sukeonath Banoo <i>v.</i> Huro Churn Buruj	290, 292
Sukhbasi Lal <i>v.</i> Guman Singh	157, 173
Sukh Lal <i>v.</i> Bishambhar	573
Sukumari Bewa <i>v.</i> Ananta Malia	110
Suleman <i>v.</i> Ismail	589
Sultan Ackenai Sahib <i>v.</i> Bava Malimyar (Shaik)	586
Sumer Singh <i>v.</i> Laladhar	312
Sumbhoochunder Chowdry <i>v.</i> Narnini Debia	189
Sumbo Chunder Roy <i>v.</i> Gunga Churn Sein	428
Sumrun Singh <i>v.</i> Khadum Singh	310
Sumrun Thakur <i>v.</i> Chundermun Misser	300, 331, 332
Sumsuddin Goolam Husein <i>v.</i> Abdul Husein Kalimuddin	511
Samundra Koonwar <i>v.</i> Kaloo Churn Singh	349
Sundar (Mussammat) <i>v.</i> Parbati (Mussammat)	141, 327
Sundarabai <i>v.</i> Jayavant Bhikaji Nadgowda	8
Sundaralingasawmi Kamaya Naik <i>v.</i> Ramasawmi Kamaya Naik	188, 519
Sundaramayya <i>v.</i> Sitamma	285
Sundar Lal <i>v.</i> Brij Lal	303
— <i>v.</i> Chhitar Mal	226, 280, 283
Sundarambal Ammal <i>v.</i> Yogavanagurukkal	557, 569, 573
Sundari Ammal <i>v.</i> Subramania Ayyar	33, 53
Sundari Letani <i>v.</i> Pitambari Letani	369
Sunderji Damji <i>v.</i> Dahibai	87, 212
Sundarmani Dei <i>v.</i> Gokulanand Chowdhury	350
Sunder Bahu <i>v.</i> Monohur Lal	336
Sundrabai <i>v.</i> Shivnarayana	34, 53, 289
Sundarambai <i>v.</i> Rangasami Mudaliar	391, 413

	PAGE
Sundraraja Ayyangar v. Jagannadha Pillai	280
Sunker Lall v. Judoobuns Sahayo	296
Sunkur Bharti Swami (Sri) v. Sidha Lingayah Charanti	6
Sunkur Pershad v. Goury Pershad	276
Suntosh Ram Doss v. Gera Pattuck	66
Suppammal v. Collector of Tanjore	549, 552
Suraj Bansi Kunwar (Musammat) v. Mahipat Singh	504
Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh	225, 236, 285, 287, 290, 300, 301, 310, 311, 317, 327
Surajmani (Musammat) v. Rabi Nath Ojha	442, 443
Suraj Narain v. Ikbal Narain	348, 349
Suraj Prosad (Lala) v. Golab Chand	281, 319
Surampalli Bangaramma v. Surampalli Brambaze	78, 81, 210
Surat, Collector of v. Dhirsingji Vaghlbaji	136
Surbessur Methoor v. Gossain Doss Methoor	340
Surbomungola Dabee v. Mohendronath Nath	324, 551, 552
Surendra Keshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassce	115, 117, 149, 173, 181, 204, 205, 557
Surendra Nandan Das v. Sailaja Kant Das Mahapatra	113, 116, 120, 196, 198, 199
Surendra Narain Sinha v. Hari Mohan Misser	231
Surendra Nath Ghose v. Kala Chand Banerjee	183
Surendra Nath Sarkar v. Atul Chandra Roy	277, 493
Suresur Misser (Chowdhury) v. Mohesh Rani Mesrain (Musst)	487, 490, 491
Surja Kumari v. Gandhrup Singh	389
Surja Prasad v. Golab Chand	309, 314
Surja Prosad (Lala) v. Golab Chand	269
Surjokant Nandi v. Mohesh Chander Dutt	181
Surjyamoní Dasi v. Kalikanta Das	62, 66, 67, 69, 71, 73, 74
Surjya Narain Singh v. Sirdhary Lall	9
Surmst Khan v. Kadir Dad Khan	24
Surti v. Narain Das	371
Surubanund Purbut v. Deo Sing Purbut	572
Surub Narain Chowdhry v. Shew Gobind Pandey	293, 307
Suryanarayana v. Venkataramanna	124, 129
Suryanarayana Murti v. Taminanna	352
Surya Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao Venkata Mahapatni) v. Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao Venkata Mahapatni)	102
Sutputtee (Mussummat) v. Indranund Jha	100, 157, 159
Swamiyar Pillai v. Chokkalingam Pillai	329
Syama Churan Baiya v. Prafulla Sundari Gupta	499

T.

Tagore case, see Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore.	
Talukdal Kumri v. Gaya Pershad Sahu	390, 402
Taji Singh v. Kowilla (Musst)	274
Tajamal Ali v. Musnad Ali	359
Tajmulali (Moulvi Syed) v. Jaga Mohan Das	245
Tajoodoon Hossain (Sheikh) v. Bhugwanlal Sahoo	292
Takurmani Singh v. Dai Rani Koeri	480
Takumand Singh v. Rukmina	80
Tallwar Singh v. Pahlwan Singh	339
Tendavaraya Mudali v. Valli Ammal	280, 293

	PAGE
Tara v. Krishna	368, 388, 119, 163
Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram	25, 28, 211, 355
Tara Chand Ghose v. Pudum Lochun Ghose	359, 111
Tarachund Bose v. Nobeen Chunder Mitter	527
Tarachurn Chatterjee v. Suresh Chunder Mookerjee	116, 136
Tarachurn Mookerjee v. Joynarain Mookerjee	256, 257
Tarakeswar Roy (Kumar) v. Shoshi Shikareswar (Kumar)	365, 529, 532, 531, 511
Tarakumari (Thakurani) v. Chaturbhuj Narayan Singh	263, 265, 517
Tara Mohun Bhattacharjee v. Kripa Moyee Debia	180
Taramonce Gooptea v. Luckhemonce Dassce	125
Tara Munce Dibia (Musst.) v. Devnarayun Rai	119, 136, 189
Tara Munnee Dossca v. Motce Buncance	31, 163
Tara Naikin v. Nana Lakshman	31
Tarinee Churn Banerjee v. Nund Coomar Banerjee	177
Tarini Charan Chowdhry v. Saroda Sundari Dasi	135, 161, 171, 177
Tarini Charan Ganguli v. Watson	195
Tarini Prasad Chatterjee v. Bhola Nath Mookerjee	181
Tarnee Churn v. Dasee Dassce (Mussumant)	221
Taro Bibce v. Ghasiram	523
Taruck Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Hurro Sunkur Sandyal	171
Taruck Chunder Poddar v. Jodeshur Chunder Koondoo	221, 256
Tarucknath Sircar v. Prosono Coomar Ghose	530
Tarunginee Dossce v. Chowdhry Dwarkanath Mussant	212
Tasouwar Ali (Syud) v. Koonj Beharee Lal	296
Tatayya v. Ramakrishnamura	480, 481
Tatyarao v. Puttapa	282
Tayammaul v. Sashachalla Naiker	151, 152, 173, 511
Tayubunessa Bibce v. Sham Kishore Ray (Kuwar)	566
Tayumana Reddi v. Perumal Reddi	169
Teeluck Chunder v. Shama Churn Prokash	161, 375
Teencowree Chatterjee v. Denonath Banerjee	178, 181, 111
Tejpal v. Ganga	287
Tej Pratap Singh v. Champa Kabe Koer	331, 316, 359
Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh	65, 66, 67, 73
Tellis v. Saklanha	24
Thackersey Dowraj v. Hurbhum Nursey	551, 555, 560, 576, 577
Thaith Ottahil Kutte Ammu v. Purushotam Doss	276
Thakoorain Sahiba v. Mohun Lal	161
Thakoor Dayhce (Mussumat) v. Rai Baluk Ram	63, 439, 461, 465, 469, 471
Thakurmani Singh v. Dal Rani Koeri	270, 480, 512
Thakur Proshad (Chowdhry) v. Bhagbati	334
Thakur Singh v. Nokho Singh	412
Thamman Singh v. Dal Singh	178
Thana, Collector of, v. Hari Sitaram	561, 565
Thandavaraya Pillai v. Shunmugam Pillai	569
Thandayuthapani Kangiar v. Rangunatha Kangiar	351
Thandvaraya v. Subbayar	589
Thangam Pillai v. Suppa Pillai	228, 328
Thangathaani v. Ramu Mudali	110, 153
Thapita Pote v. Thapita Lakshmi	36, 63, 64
Thayammal v. Annamalai Mudali	361, 455, 456
Thayammal v. Kuppanna Koundan	215
Thayammal v. Vankatarama Aiyar	130, 131, 196

	PAGE
Thiruthipalli Raman Menon v. Variangattil Palisseri Raman Menon	161
Thiruvengadath Aiyangar v. Ponnappiengar	589
Tholappala v. Venkata	6
Thukoo Baco Bhide v. Ruma Baco Bhide	99, 132, 333
Tika Ram v. Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki	511
Tikaram v. Shama Charan	509
Tiluck Roy v. Phoolman Roy	482
Timannacharya v. Balacharya	245, 253
Timmappa v. Narsinha Timaya	320
Timmappa Bhat v. Parmeshriamma	80
Timmappa Heggade v. Mahalinga Heggade	261, 380
Timmi Reddy v. Achamma	344
Tincourie Chatterjee v. Denonath Banerjee	175
Tinumoni Dasi v. Nibarun Chunder Gupta	425
Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar	229, 371, 374
Tirbhuwan Bahadur Singh (Thakur) v. Rameshar Baksh Singh (Raja)	168, 169, 170
Tirhoot, Collector of, v. Huropershad Mohunt	158, 201, 202
Tirlok Nath Shukul v. Lachmin Kunwari (Musammat)	99
Tirumalachariar v. Andal Ammal	401, 403, 404
Tirumamagal Ammal v. Ramaswami Ayyangar	370
Tiruvambal Desikar v. Manikkavachaka Desikar	563
Tiruvengada Ayyangar v. Rangayyangar	587
Tiruvengadath Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar	589, 592
Toolsey Dass Seal v. Luckhymoney Dassie (Srn)	417, 416, 461
Toolseydas Ludha v. Premji Tricundas	258, 305
Torit Bhosun Bonnerjee v. Taraprosunno Bonnerjee	333, 334
Tota Ram v. Ram Charan	214
Totawa v. Busawa	387
Tottakara Alluttar Manakul Narrain Nambudripad v. Puvally Manikal Trivikrama Nambudripad	163
Tottempudi Venkataratnam v. Tottempudi Seshamma	245, 249, 250, 257, 304
Treelochun Roy v. Rajkishen Roy	221
Tribhovandas v. Smith	245
Tribhuvandas Ruttonji Mody v. Gangadas Tricunji	531, 535
Trishinopoly, Collector of, v. Lakkamani	515
Trikam Purshottam v. Natha Daji	411
Trikumdas Damodhar v. Haridas Morarji	62, 550
Trilochun Chuckerbutty v. Umesh Chunder Ishiri	486
Trimbak v. Lakshman	547, 575
Trimbak Balkrishna v. Narayan Damodar Dubholkar	280, 309, 316
Trimbak Dixit v. Narayan Dixit	233, 235
Trimbak Gopal Parichak v. Krishnarao Pandurang	579
Trimbakpuri Guru Sitalpuri v. Gangabai	571
Trimbuck Anunt v. Gopalishet	291, 292, 294
Tripura Charan Banerjee v. Harimati Dassi	463
Tripura Sundari Debi v. Dakshina Mohun Roy	335
Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan (Syud) v. Rughoonath Pershad	300
Tukaram v. Gunaji	74, 444
— v. Narayan	417
Tukaram Ambaidas v. Ramchandra	301
Tukarambhat v. Gangaram Mulchand Gujar	312
Tuljaram Morarji v. Mathuradas	411, 465, 466, 467, 468, 470
Tulsha v. Gopal Rai	207

	PAGE
Tulshi Ram v. Babu	305
— v. Behari Lal	17, 106, 119
Tulsidas Mahanta v. Bejoy Kishore Shome	555, 567
Twenty-four Pergunnahs, Collector of, v. Debnath Roy Chowdhry	232

U.

Uda Begam v. Imam-ud-din	171
Udai Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Ashutosh Das Mozumdar	182
Udai Raj Singh v. Bhagwan Bakhsh Singh	528
Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji	300, 301, 321, 323, 356
Udaya Aditya Deb (Rajah) v. Jadub Lal Aditya Deb	221, 265
Uddoy Additya Deb v. Jadub Lal Aditya Deb	224, 265
Udhar Singh v. Rancee Koonwer (Mussumut)	491
Udoy Chand Biswas v. Panchoo Ram Biswas	221
Ugarchand Manakchand v. Madapa Soman	522
Ugri (Bai) v. Purshottam Bhudar (Patel)	61
Ujagar Singh (Chaudhri) v. Pitam Singh (Chaudhri)	225
Uji v. Hathi Lahu	36, 37, 63
Ukoor Doss v. Chunder Sekur Doss	573
Umabai A. Bhavu Padmanji	371
Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolkund Das Mahapatra	138, 156, 191, 192, 388
Umaheswara v. Singaperumal	315
Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand	377, 398, 400, 401, 404
Uma Sunduri Dabee v. Sourabinee Dabee	133
Uma Sunker Moitra v. Kali Komul Mozumdar	141, 121
Umbica Prasad Tewary v. Ramsahoy Lall	319
Umed v. Khalsabai	338, 339
Umed Hathising v. Goman Bhaiji	317, 318, 319
Umed Kika v. Nagindas Narotandas	59
Umeshchandra Dutta v. Ravaneswar Prasad Singh	554
Ummanga v. Appadorai Patter	237
Umrao Kunwar v. Badri	503
Umritnath Chowdhry v. Gourcenath Chowdhry	29, 30, 210, 257
Umrit Kooreo v. Kidernath Ghose	81
Unnoda Persad Roy v. Erskine	267
Unnopoorna Dassan v. Gunga Narain Paul	322
Upendra Krishna Deb Bahadur (Kumara) v. Nabin Krishna Bose	523
Upendra Lal Boral v. Hem Chundra Boral	531, 539, 556
Upendra Lal Mookerjee v. Girinda Nath Mukherji	479
Upendra Mohan Tagore v. Thanda Dasi	364
Upendranarain Myti v. Gopeenath Ikra	222, 313, 502
Upendranath Bose v. Bindowri Prasad	479, 496
Upoma Kuchain v. Bholaram Dhubi	36
Upooroop Tewary v. Bandhjee Suhay (Lalla)	284
Uppala Raghava Charlu v. Uppala Ramanuja Charlu	341
Urjun Sing (Rawut) v. Ghuniam Sing (Rawut)	27, 260

V.

Vadali Mamidigadu v. Kotipalli Ramayya	477
Vadali Rama Kristnama v. Manda Appaiya	291
Vadilal Lalubhai v. Shah Khushal Dalpatram	297, 275
Vadivelam Pillai v. Natesan Pillai	305

	PAGE
Vaidyanatha Aiyar <i>v.</i> Aiyasami Aiyar	88, 222, 234, 314, 355
Vaikuntam Ammangar <i>v.</i> Kallapiran Ayyangar	52, 60, 235, 271
Vaithilingam Mudali <i>v.</i> Murugaiyan	136, 148, 174, 175, 203
Vaithyanatham <i>v.</i> Gangarazu	52
Vallabha <i>v.</i> Madhusudan	7
Vallabhdas Jannadas <i>v.</i> Sakarbai	412
Vallabhram Shivnarayan <i>v.</i> Hariganga (Bai)	371
Vallinayagam Pillai <i>v.</i> Pacheche	298, 527
Valloo (Chetty) (Paulhem) <i>v.</i> Sooryah (Chetty) (Paulhem)	250
Valu <i>v.</i> Ganga	82, 212
Valubhai <i>v.</i> Govind Kashinath	153, 154
Vaman Vishnu Gokhale <i>v.</i> Vasudev Morbhat Kale	357
Vandrayan Jekhan (Patel) <i>v.</i> Manilal Chumilal (Patel)	18, 19, 28, 29, 31, 102, 106, 107, 118, 121, 125, 205
Vangala Dilshatulu <i>v.</i> Vannala Gavaramma	466
Varjivan Rangji <i>v.</i> Ghelji Gokaldas	487, 488
Vasonji Morarji <i>v.</i> Chunda Bibi	478
Vasudeo Vishnu Manohar <i>v.</i> Ramchandra Vinayak Modak	127, 157, 194, 197
Vasudayan <i>v.</i> Secretary of State	26, 27, 103, 121, 162, 163, 192, 465
Vasudeva Aiyar <i>v.</i> Negapatam Devasthanam Committee	588
Vasudeva Padhu Khadanga Garu <i>v.</i> Muguni Devan Bakshi Mulapatruka Garu	246
Vasudev Bhut <i>v.</i> Venkatesh Sanbhav	300, 301, 302
— <i>v.</i> Narayan Daji Damle	522
Vasudev Morbhat Kale <i>v.</i> Krishnaji Ballal Gokhale	311
Vato Koer (Mussamut) <i>v.</i> Rowshan Singh	318, 350
Vayidinadha <i>v.</i> Appu	141, 142, 144
Vedammal <i>v.</i> Vedanayaga Mudaliar	369, 373
Vedanayaga Mudaliar <i>v.</i> Vedammal	373
Vedapuratti <i>v.</i> Vallabha	506
Vedavalli <i>v.</i> Narayana	256, 257
Veerabhadra Aiyar <i>v.</i> Marudugu Nachiar	392
Veerabhai Ajubhai <i>v.</i> Hiraba (Bai)	131
Veeraghava Reddi <i>v.</i> Kota Reddi	239
Veerapermal Pillay <i>v.</i> Narain Pillay	117, 118, 136, 147, 149
Veera Soorappa Nayani <i>v.</i> Perappa Naidu	313, 320, 321
Veerayya <i>v.</i> Gangamma	501
Veluga Mangamma <i>v.</i> Bandlamudi Veerayya	168, 169
Vellanki Venkata Krishnu Row (Rajah) <i>v.</i> Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narasayya	112, 113, 116, 118, 120, 121, 122, 127, 130, 133, 193, 194, 198, 390, 413
Velliyammal <i>v.</i> Katha Chetty	324
Venayack Anundrow <i>v.</i> Laxumeebhai	410, 411
Venkatachalla Krishna Chetty <i>v.</i> Kalliyannammayangar	590
Venkatachalla Chetty <i>v.</i> Parvatham	227, 383
Venatarani <i>v.</i> Venkata Latchemco Ummal	228, 382, 383
Vengamuthu <i>v.</i> Pandaveswara Gurukul	6
Venilal <i>v.</i> Parjaram	386, 391, 411
Venkaji Shridhar <i>v.</i> Vishnu Babaji Beri	485
Venkamma <i>v.</i> Savitramma	214, 216, 217
Venkamma (Jonnalagadda) <i>v.</i> Subrahmaniam (Jonnalagadda)	123
Venkanna <i>v.</i> Aitamma	97, 98
Venkantesaiya <i>v.</i> Venkata Charlu	147
Venkapa <i>v.</i> Holiyawa	412, 413

	PAGE
Venkappa v. Fakirgowda	185
Venkappa Bapu v. Jivaji Krishna	103, 125, 130, 131
Venkata v. Subhadra	112, 113, 114, 154, 155
Venkatachala Pillai v. Taluq Board, Saidapet	582, 583, 584, 585
Venkatachalapathi v. Subbarayudu	5, 7
Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu	32, 35, 40, 50, 51, 60
Venkatachella Maniyakarar v. Thathammal	523
Venkatachella Pillay v. Chinnaiya Mudaliar	394
Venkatachellum v. Venkataswamy	193
Venkataagiri v. Chandru	101, 104
Venkata (Gopalla Narasimha Row Bahadoor (Rajah Suraneni) v. Lakshma Venkama Row (Rajah Suraneni)	345, 346, 356
Venkatakrishnamma v. Annapurnamma	122, 123, 124
Venkata Kristnaya (Kalavagunta) v. Lakshmi Narayana (Kalavagunta)	51, 52
Venkata Mahapati Surya Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao) v. Venkata Mahapati (Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur (Hon. Sri Raja Rao)	364
Venkatammal v. Andiyappa Chetti	80, 84, 89, 94, 333
Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao Bahadur (Rajah) v. Venkata Puttocholu Irama Jagannadha Gopala Row Bahadur (Rajah Suraneni)	100, 113, 117, 444, 533
Venka Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja)	108, 112, 113, 115, 152, 182, 259, 260, 261, 544
Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Rajah) v. Court of Ward	545
Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rangayya Appa Row (Sri Rajah)	152, 180, 252
Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Rajah) v. Narayya Appa Row Bahadur (Rajah)	31, 355
Venkata Narasimha Naidu v. Bhaskynkarlu Naidu	265
Venkatannarayana Pillai v. Subbammal	114, 167, 168, 184, 299, 303, 505
Venkatappa Nayanam Bahadur (Rajah) v. Damara Renga Rao	124
Venkatarama v. Meera Labai	344
----- v. Senthivelu	319
Venkatarama Krishna Rau v. Bhujanga Rau	117, 161, 169
Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar	573, 579
Venkataramanayamma Garu (Sri Raja Chelikani) v. Appa Rau Bahadur	243, 268
Venkataramanaya Pantulu v. Venkataramana Dosa Pantulu	300
Venkatarama Raju v. Papamma	123
Venkata Rama Rao v. Venkata Suriya Rao	439, 440, 441, 442, 444
Venkatarayar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar	573
Venkata Subba Rao v. Puroshottam	371
Venkata Subramaniam Chetti v. Thayarammah	413, 451
Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao) v. Court of Ward	183, 264, 265, 527
Venkatasaia v. Venkata Charlu	147
Venkatasa Naidu v. Sadagopasamy Iyer	590
Venkatasa Nayudu v. Shatagopa Shri Shatagopa Swami (Shrivan)	584
Venkatasha Malia v. Ramaya Hegade	594
Venkataswara, In re	494
Venkateswari Aiyar v. Secretary of State	547
Venkatramanna v. Bramanna Sastrulu	337, 533
Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)	237, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245, 251, 258, 387, 390, 450, 463
Venkayya v. Lakshmayya	351

	PAGE
Venkopadhyaya v. Kavari Hengusu	94, 96
Venku v. Mahalinga	163, 164
Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanadhan Chetty	312
Verabhai Ajubhai v. Hiraba (Bai)	102, 131, 388, 389
Veraprashya v. Santauraja	105, 156
Vidyajurra Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami	555, 558, 559, 561, 562, 565
Vijaya v. Sripathi	97
Vijjarangam v. Lakshuman	18, 54, 55, 111, 132, 136, 377, 434, 435, 439, 441, 451, 452, 453, 454
Vijli (Bai) v. Prabhakalshmi (Bai)	406
Vinayak v. Gopal	326
Vinayak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog	183, 184, 185, 527, 530
Vinayak Narsinh v. Datto Govind	258
Vinayak Vithal Bhango v. Govind Venkatesh Kulkarni	186, 487, 488, 489
Vinayek Anundrao v. Luxmeebao	466, 467, 470
Virabhadra Gowdu v. Gurusvenkata Charlu	307
Viraragavamma v. Sanundrala	283
Viraragava v. Ramalinga	147
Virarumuthi Udayan v. Singaravelu	209
Virasami Nayudu v. Subba Rao	592
Virasangappa v. Rudrappa	37, 57
Virasangappa Shetti v. Rudrappa Shetti	434, 464, 466
Virasvami (Shetti) v. Appasvami (Shetti)	36, 71, 75, 77, 78
Virasvami Gramini v. Ayyasami Gramini	300, 301
Virayya v. Hanumanta	140, 143
Virupakshappa v. Nilganga	270, 271
Visalakshi Ammal v. Sivaramien	185
Visalatehi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry	79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 211, 252, 253
Visalatehmi Ammal v. Subbu Pillai	522, 523
Vishnu Nambudri v. Akkamma	23, 219
Vishnu Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath) v. Krishnan Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath)	141, 142, 173
Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma	82, 95, 97
Vishvanath v. Narayan	471
Vishvanath Gangadhar v. Krishnaji Gangadhar	359, 360
Vishvanath Govind Deshmone v. Rambhat	580
Visvanadha Naick v. Bungaroo Teroomala Naick	261
Visvanathan v. Saminathan	52, 55
Vithaldas Manickdas v. Jeshubai	413
Vithal v. Prohlad	334
Vithal Raghunath v. Haribayen	412
Vithudrao Krishna Vinchurkar v. Ramrao Krishna Vinchurkar	392
Vithappa v. Savitri	467, 468
Vithoba v. Bapu	118, 126, 198
Vithoba Bava v. Hariba Bava	356
Vithu v. Govinda	37, 369, 370
Vithu Dhondi v. Babaji	274, 279, 298
Vitta Butten v. Yamenamma	184, 301, 304
Vizianagaram (Rajah of) v. Sobruloorla Somasokharadaz (Rajah)	208
Vrandavandas Ramdas v. Yaminabai	85, 97, 209, 304
Vrijbhukandas v. Parvati (Bai)	212, 465, 468
Vrijbhukandas Dwarkadas v. Dayaram Jadavji	508, 513
Vullabhadra Damodhar v. Thukor Gordhandas Damodhar	532, 540

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

XCV

	PAGE
Vurdyengar v. Alagasingyengar	221
Vurmah Valiar (Rajah) v. Vurmah Mutha (Ravi)	29, 568, 573
Vyanji v. Sarjarao Apajirao	547
Vyasacharya v. Venkubai	185
Vyas Chimanlal v. Vyas Ramchandra	10, 139, 145, 173, 174, 176
Vythilinga Muppanar v. Vijayathammal	117
Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Soonasundara Muelaliar	559
Vythinatha Ayyar v. Yeggie Narayana Ayyar	241, 243

W.

Waghela Rajsanji v. Masludin (Shekh)	277, 493
Wahid Ali Khan v. Tori Ram	475
Wajed Hossain (Shah) v. Nanku Singh (Baboo)	309
Wajid Ali Shah v. Dianat-ul-lah Beg	578
Walihan (Mussummat) v. Jogeshwar Narayan	510
Walhai v. Heerbai	112
Waman Raghupati Bova v. Krishnaji Kashirav Bova	19, 111
Wannathan v. Keyakadath	522
Watson and Company v. Ram Chand Dutt	231
White v. Bishito Chunder Bose	283
Wooma Pershad Roy v. Grish Chunder Prochundo	371
Wooma Soonduree Dossee v. Dwarka Nath Roy	218
Woomesh Chunder Biswas v. Rashmohini Dassi	529
Woomesh Chunder Sircar v. Digamburee Dessee	290

Y.

Yachereddy Chinna Bassavapa v. Yachereddy Gowdappa	100, 160, 281
Yannabai v. Nanabhai	81, 89, 90, 92
Yannava v. Laxman Bhimrao Kulkarni	110
Yannubai v. Manubai	210, 219
— v. Narayan Moreshtar Pendse	68, 69, 71
Yannumula Venkayamah (Stree Rajah) v. Yannumula Boochia Vankondara (Stree Rajah)	255, 261, 516
Yashvant Putta Shenvi v. Radhubai	172
Yashvantrav v. Kashibai	85
Yekeyamian v. Agniswarjian	304, 330, 363
Yellawa v. Bhimangavda	63
Yenamandra Nitaramasami v. Midatana Nanyasi	309, 310
Yenumala (Javuridevamma Garu (Sri Rajah) v. Yenumala Ramandara (Garu (Sri Rajah))	226, 517
Yethirajulu Naidu v. Mukunthu Naidu	170, 240
Yusaf Ali Khan v. Chubbee Singh	234

Z.

Zafaryab Ali v. Bakhtawar Singh	570
Zubardust Khan	61
— v. Indurman	322
Zuhoorul Huq (Chowdhry) v. Gooroo Churn Roy	497, 499

TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED.

STATUTES.

	PAGE
21 Geo. III. c. 70, s. 17	3
37 Geo. III. c. 142, s. 13	3, 4
39, 40 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 5	3
4 Geo. IV. c. 71, s. 9	4
5, 6 Geo. V. c. 5, s. 112	3, 4

REGULATIONS.

Bengal.

1793—VIII.	359
XL	259
1810—X.	259
XIX.	581, 582
s. 2	582
s. 3	582, 583
s. 4	413
ss. 4-6	583
s. 7	582
ss. 8-15	583
1812—XVIII.	359
1814—XXIX.	262
1822—VII.	359

Madras.

1802—XXV.	261, 515
1803—II.	359
1804—V. s. 25	100
1817—VII.	580, 581, 583, 591
s. 2	583
s. 3	583
s. 4	583
s. 5	582
s. 6	413, 583
ss. 7-14	583

Bombay.

1827—II. s. 21	8
IV, s. 26.	4, 28

xcviii TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED.

Governor-General in Council.

	PAGE
1872—III. s. 3	216
1877—II.	359
III. s. 3	582
s. 4	5
1886—I. ss. 96-121, 154	359
III.	216
1888—I.	109
1890—III. s. 89	5
1892—IV.	596
1899—I.	359

ACTS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

1841—XIX. (Curators)	237
1850—XXI. (Freedom of Religion)	21, 23, 69, 78, 83, 105, 110, 111, 137, 216, 371, 375
1852—XI. (Rent Free Estates)	505
1856—XV. (Hindu Widows Remarriage)	21, 37, 46
s. 1	37
s. 2	82, 309, 370
s. 3	137, 217
s. 4	425
s. 5	216, 370, 425
s. 6	61
s. 7	61
1858—XL. (Minors, Bengal)	270, 287
1859—XI. (Revenue Sales), s. 54	498
1860—XXVII. (Certificates on Succession)	172
XLV. (Penal Code)	67, 163
s. 366	56
ss. 372, 373	29, 31, 163
s. 375	67
s. 378	76
ss. 494-498	63
1863—XX. (Religious Endowments)	578, 581, 584, 585 <i>et seq.</i>
s. 3	580, 587
s. 4	586
ss. 5, 6.	586
ss. 7, 9.	587
s. 10	587, 588
s. 12	589
s. 13	590
s. 14	580, 590, 591
s. 15	593
ss. 16, 17	593
s. 18	593, 594
ss. 19, 20	594
s. 21	595
s. 22	570, 595
1865—X. (Succession)	110, 542
s. 3	525
s. 46	107, 526, 545

TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED. xcix

	PAGE
1865—X. (Succession), s. 47	213
s. 48	515
s. 49	515
s. 50	114, 150, 513, 514, 515
s. 51	515
s. 54	515
s. 55	515
ss. 57-77	515
s. 57	114, 183
s. 69	528
s. 76	515, 530
s. 82	413, 531, 515
s. 83	515
s. 85	515
ss. 88-98	515
ss. 88-103	515
s. 93	510
s. 98	515
s. 100	537, 538
s. 101	530, 537, 538, 539
s. 103	532
ss. 106-177	515
ss. 113-123 (Part XVI.)	205, 530
ss. 114, 115	533
ss. 118-124	511
s. 125	320, 532
ss. 167-177	171
s. 187	515
s. 331	25
1866—XXI. (Native Converts Marriage Dissolution)	21, 37, 61
ss. 16-18	70
s. 19	61
s. 28	77
XXVIII. (Trustees and Mortgagees)	581
1869—I. (Oudh Estates)	114, 150, 441, 528
s. 19	150, 443, 515
s. 22 (8)	114, 150
IV. (Divorce)	25, 61
s. 33	68
sched. form 19	73
XVIII. (Stamps), Sched. II. art. 31	111
1870—VII. (Court Fees)	593
s. 2, art. 17, cl. 5	105
XXI. (Hindu Wills)	21, 107, 114, 205, 213, 411, 443, 512
s. 2	107, 114, 171, 183, 320, 443, 520, 528, 531, 532, 533, 530, 541, 543, 546, 530
s. 3	85, 181, 304, 527, 513
s. 6	178
1871—IX. (Limitation), Sched. II. art. 129	165, 169
XXIII. (Pensions), s. 4	547
1872—I. (Evidence), s. 13	32
s. 21	171
s. 32	32, 174, 176
s. 42	31, 42

C TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED.

	PAGE
1872—I. (Evidence), s. 43	61, 167
ss. 48, 49	32
s. 50	62, 63, 174, 175
s. 101	171
s. 102	171, 220
s. 103	173
s. 106	295
ss. 107, 108	105, 321
s. 109	221
s. 111	489
s. 112	99
s. 114	221
s. 115	172, 174, 271, 489
III. (Marriage)	58
IV. (Punjab Laws), s. 5	5, 28
IX. (Contracts)	8, 21
s. 11	75
s. 25	522
s. 26	36
s. 65, illus. (a)	52
s. 69	52, 231, 500
s. 73	59
ss. 90-91	523
s. 187	75
XV. (Christian Marriage)	25
XVIII. (Evidence)	175
1873—III. (Madras Civil Courts), s. 16	4, 28
1874—XV. (Scheduled Districts), s. 3	216
1875—IX. (Majority)	5, 21, 66, 136, 527
s. 2	47, 166
XX. (Central Provinces Laws), s. 5	5, 28
1876—X. (Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction)	359
XVIII. (Oudh Laws), s. 3	5, 28, 29
1877—I. (Specific Performances), s. 15	298, 321
s. 21	59, 67
s. 39	501, 502
s. 42	164, 165, 166, 169, 305, 499, 503, 563, 577
s. 43	168, 501, 505
s. 52	503
s. 54	167, 501
XV. (Limitation), s. 7	508, 563
Sched. II. art. 118	165
art. 119	169
art. 120	508, 558
art. 125	504
art. 141	509
1878—XII. (Punjab Laws)	4
s. 1	28, 29
1879—I. (Stamps), Sched. I. art. 38	114
XVII. (Dekhan Agriculturists' Relief)	482
1881—V. (Probate and Administration), s. 3	525
s. 4	184
s. 90	290, 492

TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED. ci

	PAGE
1881—V. (Probate and Administration), ss. 101-105	324
s. 154	548
XVIII. (Central Provinces Land Revenue), s. 136	359
1882—II. (Trustees)	581
IV. (Transfer of Property)	21, 280
s. 2	90
s. 6	84, 500
ss. 13, 14	525
s. 17	510
s. 20	525
s. 38	291, 292, 310
s. 39	84, 85, 90, 91
s. 44	301
s. 45	239
s. 51	307, 513
s. 52	93
s. 58	89, 91, 95
s. 59	89, 91
s. 85	281, 282
s. 88	95
s. 91	499
s. 99	318
s. 100	95
s. 117	546
s. 122	523
s. 123	197, 523
s. 127	521
s. 128	322
s. 129	523
XIV. (Civil Procedure), s. 11	5
s. 13	61
ss. 26, 28	352
s. 43	352
s. 209	9
s. 266	575
s. 437	281
s. 539	577, 578
XV. (Presidency Small Cause Courts), s. 16	4
1884—II. (Partitions, Madras)	346, 359
VIII. (Repeal)	582, 584
1885—XVII. (Central Provinces Wards), s. 24	109
1887—IX. (Provincial Small Cause Courts), Sched. II. art. 35	59
XII. (Bengal Civil Courts), s. 37	4
XVII. (Punjab Land Revenue), ss. 112-135, 158	359
1889—VII. (Certificates)	264
XI. (Lower Burma Courts), s. 4	28
XVI. (Central Provinces Land Revenue), s. 26	359
1890—VI. (Charitable Endowments), s. 6	595
s. 8	596
VIII. (Guardians and Wards), s. 6	213
s. 17	5, 214, 215
s. 19	66, 213, 214, 215
s. 21	66
s. 25	74, 217

cii TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED.

	PAGE
1890—VIII. (Guardians and Wards), s. 28	290
s. 29	287, 290
s. 41	66
s. 43	49
1892—IV. (Court of Wards, Bengal), s. 2	270
1893—IV. (Partition), s. 2	342, 350, 357, 358
s. 3	357, 358
s. 4	331, 341, 357, 358
s. 5	357
s. 6	357, 358
ss. 7, 8, 9, 10	358
1894—I. (Land Acquisition), s. 31	565
s. 32	473
1897—V. (Repeals)	582, 584
X. (General Clauses), s. 3 (18), (53)	178
1898—V. (Criminal Procedure), s. 88	301, 350
s. 100	74, 217
Chap. XXXVI.	98, 207
s. 145	558
s. 491	73, 217
s. 552	74, 217
XIII. (Burma Laws), s. 13	5
1899—II. (Stamps), Sched. I. art. 3	114
1900—VI. (Burma Courts)	358
1907—III. (Provincial Insolvency), s. 2 (c)	500
1908—V. (Civil Procedure), s. 2	358
s. 9	5, 517
s. 11	61, 167
s. 34	9
s. 50	317
s. 52	317
s. 53	317
s. 54	358
s. 56	75
s. 58	73
s. 60	84, 478, 575
s. 60 (m)	500
s. 92	577, 578, 579
s. 93	580
s. 99	580
s. 114	97
Sched. I. ord. i. r. 1	267
rr. 3, 4	267, 352
r. 13	267
ord. ii. r. 1	352
ord. xx. r. 12	355
ord. xxi. r. 32, 33	73
r. 57	317
ord. xxxii. r. 7	277
ord. xxxiv. r. 1	282
ord. xlv. r. 1	97
App. D. 4	281
IX. (Limitation), s. 6	508, 503
s. 19	472

TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED. ciii

	PAGE
1908—IX. (Limitation), Sched. I. art. 118	165, 168
art. 119	169, 170
art. 120	72, 322, 508, 558
art. 125	504
art. 126	306
art. 127	231, 331, 352
art. 128	96
art. 129	96
art. 131	565, 575
art. 132	96, 315
art. 134	566
art. 141	509
art. 144	170, 331
XVI. (Registration), s. 17.	114
s. 35.	108
1909—III. (Insolvency, Presidency Towns), s. 52	500
VII. (Anand Marriages)	58
1911—XVI. (Bengal, etc., Civil Courts)	4
1912—VII. (Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam Laws)	4
X. (Divorce), s. 2	105
XIII. (Delhi Laws), s. 3	64
1916—XV. (Hindu Disposition of Property)	21, 240, 530, 541
s. 2	524, 525, 536
s. 3	525, 536
s. 1	525
s. 5	524, 537

Acts of the Governor of Madras in Council.

1865—VIII. (Recovery of Rent)	208
1884—IV. (Madras Municipalities), s. 26	584
V. (Madras Local Boards), s. 51	584
1891—I. (General Clauses), s. 3 (30)	178
1896—IV. (Malabar Marriages)	58
s. 3	58
1898—V. (Malabar Wills)	545
1902—I. (Court of Wards), s. 17	270
s. 34 (c)	109
s. 63	370
s. 67	49
II. (Impartible Estates)	205
1903—II. (Impartible Estates)	205
1904—II. (Impartible Estates), s. 4	205
1909—VI. (Impartible Estates)	205
1914—I. (Hindu Transfers and Bequests)	21, 524, 536, 541
s. 2	524, 536
s. 3	524, 536
s. 4	524
s. 5	524, 536

Acts of the Governor of Bombay in Council.

1883—II. (Land Revenue), s. 8	505
1886—VII. (Ancestor's Debts)	21, 323

CIV TABLE OF STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND ACTS CITED.

	PAGE
1866—VII. (Ancestor's Debts), s. 2	323
s. 4	76
s. 5	277, 288
1874—III. (Hereditary Offices), s. 8	261
1879—V. (Land Revenue), ss. 113, 114	359
1887—VI. (Mafadars), ss. 9, 10	362
1888—VI. (Gujarat Taluqdars)	359
1904—I. (General Clauses), s. 3 (18), (15)	178
1905—I. (Court of Wards)	109

Acts of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in Council.

1876—VII. (Land Registration)	347
IX. (Court of Wards), s. 61	108
1880—VII. (Public Demands Recovery)	483
1897—V. (Partition)	359
1899—I. (General Clauses), s. 3 (12)	178
1904—III. (Settled Estates)	21, 549

Acts of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces in Council.

1900—II. (Oudh Settled Estates)	21
1901—II. (Agra Tenancy), s. 22	178, 383, 405
III. (Land Revenue), ss. 105-140, 203	359

Act of the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces in Council.

1900—II. (Oudh Settled Estates)	549
1904—I. (General Clauses), s. 4 (5), (42)	178
1912—IV. (Court of Wards), s. 37	109

Acts of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in Council.

1900—IV. (Jaghirs)	261
1903—II. (Court of Wards), s. 15	109

Act of the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam in Council.

1909—I. (General Clauses), s. 5 (24), (58)	178
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Act of the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma in Council.

1898—I. (General Clauses), s. 2 (59)	178
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 dalut for the Presidency of Bombay, 1800-1824. Bombay.
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HINDU LAW.

INTRODUCTION.

HINDU law, as the term is understood by British administrators of justice, consists of the rules of law which are believed to have been generally binding on Hindus in matters to which they relate, at the time of the commencement of the British dominion, with such variations as have been made by British legislation, or by the established custom of any tribe, caste, family, or locality. ^{What is Hindu law ?}

Sir H. S. Maine says : ¹—

"Indian ² law may be in fact affirmed to consist of a very great number of local bodies of usage, and of one set of customs reduced to writing, pretending to be a diviner authority than the rest,³ exercising consequently a great influence over them, and tending, if not checked, to absorb them. You must not understand that these bodies of custom are fundamentally distinct. They are all marked by the same general features ; but there are considerable differences of detail."

To use the words of a learned Brahmin judge of the High Court of Bengal,⁴ "Hindu law is a body of rules intimately mixed up with religion, and it was originally administered for the most part by private tribunals. The system was highly elastic, and had been gradually growing up by the assimilation of new usages and the modification of ancient text law under the guise of interpretation, when its spontaneous growth was suddenly arrested by the administration of the country passing into the hands of the English, and a degree of rigidity was given to it which it never before possessed."⁵

"There appears no trace of an intention on the part of the British

¹ Maine's "Village Communities," pp. 52, 53.

² I.e. Hindu.

³ This refers to the law of the *Sastras*, *post*, p. 10.

⁴ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 7.

⁵ Sir H. S. Maine ("Village Communities," pp. 44, 45) says, "At the touch of the judge of the Supreme Court, who had been trained in the English school of special pleading, and had probably come to the East

in the maturity of life, the rule of native law dissolved and, with or without his intention, was to a great extent replaced by rules having their origin in English law books. Under the hand of the judges of the Sudder Courts, who had lived since their boyhood among the people of the country, the native rules hardened, and contracted a rigidity which they never had in real practice." See article by Mr. Justice Nair of Madras in *Contemporary Review* for May,

Government to arrest the development of Hindu law in its natural course. The intention seems to have been to secure to Hindus a faithful administration, under the control of the British Courts, of their own law in its true spirit—such an administration as similar tribunals of their own might have furnished. And the early British tribunals were accordingly assisted by officers learned in the *Shastras*,¹ who were doubtless assumed to be also acquainted with the law as actually received, and who could consequently keep the Courts in touch with the living law in its growth and development, and thus enable them to administer a law adapted to actual needs, instead of leaving them to piece out a skeleton from the dry bones of archaic texts."

"The *pundits*, however, failed to answer the purpose, and were displaced. Thenceforth the Courts have been driven to rely upon such assistance as could be obtained from their own experience and from formal evidence, together with such aid as could be obtained from writers of reputation, and at times have shown a tendency to fall back upon the bare texts of the *Shastras*, without assurance that those texts were practically adopted as part of the actual current law, when evidence on the point was not produced, as it seldom was."²

"Questions of Hindu law never have been nor will be decided with reference solely to what the law was when originally propounded by Manu, or the very earliest writers. The Hindu law which the Courts administer, and are bound to administer, is that which they, availing themselves of all the sources of information at their command, find to be the Hindu law as recognized and accepted and acted upon by the general body of Hindus for the time being."³

"The duty of an European Judge who is under the obligation to administer Hindu law, is not so much to inquire whether a disputed doctrine is fairly deducible from the earliest authorities, as to ascertain whether it has been received by the particular school which governs the district with which he has to deal, and has there been sanctioned by usage. For, under the Hindu system of law, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law."⁴

"Factum
valet."

The doctrine, "*Quod fieri non debuit factum valet*," which has been treated as especially in force in the Bengal school on the ground that Jimutavahana says that "a fact cannot be altered by a hundred texts,"⁵ has given rise to a distinction between matters of legal and matters only of moral obligation.⁶ The doctrine is defined by Sastri (I. C. Sarkar⁷

1906. The extreme anxiety of English judges to administer to the Hindus the personal law by which they thought Hindus were bound, has induced them to accept as living law all that is to be found in the ancient law books, although much may have been abandoned in practice, and is otherwise inapplicable.

¹ *Post*, p. 10.

² Phillips and Trevelyan's "Law relating to Hindu Wills," 1st ed., pp. 16, 17.

³ *Krishnamani Dasi (S. M.) v. Ananda Krishna Bone* (1869), 4 B. L. R. (O. C.), 231, at pp. 287, 288.

⁴ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. L. A. 397, at p. 436; 1 B. L. R., P. C. 1, at p. 12; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 21.

⁵ *Daya Bhaga*, ch. ii., para. 30. This is the leading authority of the Bengal school; *post*, p. 14.

⁶ See *Gurulinguarami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalukshmanu* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at p. 114; 22 Mad. 308, at p. 423; 21 All. 400, at p. 487; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 448; 1 Bom. L. R. 226; *Lakshmappa v. Ramaya* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364.

⁷ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 10.

as follows: "An act or transaction done by a man in the exercise of a right or power, natural or recognized by law, cannot be undone or invalidated by reason of there being texts in the Shastras prohibiting such act or transaction." In discriminating between the two forms of obligation "the actual practice of the people is commonly accepted as a guide; and that which may in words appear to be a positive and imperative injunction may, in the light of actual practice, be regarded as merely directory or monitory but legally optional; as addressed to the conscience rather than to the tribunals; and may consequently fall beyond the scope of compulsory enforcement.¹ Where the act is illegal, it is not justified by the maxim.²

In three matters Hindu law differs from other systems of law, viz. in the family law, which arises from what is called by English lawyers the joint family system; secondly, in the law of adoption; and thirdly, in the law of succession and inheritance.

Difference from other systems of law.

Throughout British India, questions relating to the succession, inheritance, adoption, and marriage of Hindus, to caste, and to Hindu religious usages³ or institutions, are decided according to Hindu law.

Application of Hindu law in British India.

Although there is a variation in their language, the several enactments, which now prescribe the law to be administered in the Courts established in British India, are in substantial agreement in making this provision.

The following is a list of such enactments: -

The High Court of Bengal, in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 4em; margin-right: 10px;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <p>5, 6 Geo. V. c. 5, s. 112, High Court of Bengal.</p> <p>21 Geo. III. c. 70, s. 17, read with the Letters Patent, 1862, s. 18, and the Letters Patent, 1865, s. 19.</p> </div>

The High Court of Madras in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.	<div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; font-size: 4em; margin-right: 10px;">{</div> <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle;"> <p>5, 6 Geo. V. c. 5, s. 112, High Court of Madras.</p> <p>37 Geo. III. c. 142, s. 18, read with 39, 40 Geo. III. c. 79, s. 5, Letters Patent, 1862, s. 18, and Letters Patent, 1865, s. 19.</p> </div>

¹ Phillips and Trevelyan's "Law of Hindu Wills," 1st ed., p. 18.

C. W. N. 275, at p. 277.

² See *Bahwan Singh (Rao) v. Kishort (Bans)* (1898), 25 I. A. 54, at p. 59; 20 All. 267, at p. 285; 2

³ I.e. any usage or institution connected with religious ceremonies; see *post*, pp. 6, 7.

High Court of Bombay.	The High Court of Bombay in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.	5, 6 Geo. V. c. 5, s. 112, 37 Geo. III. c. 142, s. 13, read with 4 Geo. IV. c. 71; s. 9, ¹ Letters Patent, 1862, s. 18, and Letters Patent, 1865, s. 19.
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There is in the above enactments no express reference to questions of marriage, caste, or religious usages and institutions, but the Supreme Courts and High Courts have always dealt with such questions according to the personal law of the individuals concerned.²

Presidency Small Cause Courts.	The Presidency Small Cause Courts have to determine all questions according to the law administered by the High Courts in the exercise of their ordinary original civil jurisdiction. ³
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Bengal, Agra, Assam, Bihar, and Orissa Provincial Courts.	Bengal (outside Calcutta), the Province of Agra and Assam, and the Province of Bihar and Orissa. ⁴	Act XII. of 1887, s. 37, as amended by Act XVI. of 1911.
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Madras Provincial Courts.	The Courts of the Madras Presidency (outside the town of Madras), except the tracts respectively under the jurisdiction of the agents for Ganjam and Vizagapatam.	Act III. of 1873, s. 16.
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Bombay Provincial Courts.	The Bombay Presidency (outside the island of Bombay).	Bombay Regulation IV. of 1827, s. 26.
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The last-mentioned section is as follows: "The law to be observed in the trial of suits shall be Acts of Parliament, and Regulations of Government applicable to the case; in the absence of such Acts and Regulations, the usage of the country in which the suit arose; if none such appear, the law of the defendant; and in the absence of specific law, and usage, justice, equity, and good conscience alone."

Punjab.	The Punjab.	Act IV. of 1872, s. 5, as amended by Act XII. of 1878. ⁵
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¹ See *Mathura Naikin v. Esu Naikin* (1880), 4 Bom. 545, at p. 556.

² See *In re Kahandas Narrandus* (1880), 5 Bom. 154, at pp. 166, 167, 170.

³ Act XV. of 1882, s. 16.

⁴ As to Bihar and Orissa, see Act VII. of 1912.

⁵ As to Delhi, see Act XIII. of 1912, s. 3.

This enactment describes the topics of Hindu law to be dealt with by the Courts as "succession, special property of females, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, adoption, guardianship,¹ minority,² bastardy, family relations, wills, legacies, gifts, partitions, or any religious usage or institution," but in all these cases gives preference to a valid custom, which is not contrary to equity and good conscience. Although this description is more detailed than is to be found in the other enactments, the other Courts in practice apply Hindu law to all these cases when the status, act, or right of a Hindu is in question.

Oudh.—Act XVIII. of 1876, s. 3.

Oudh.

This section contains provisions similar to those in force in the Punjab.

The Central Provinces.—Act XX. of 1875, s. 5.

Central
Provinces.

In this enactment the topics of Hindu and Mahomedan law are described in the same way as for the Punjab, except that "divorce" is not included. In the few Hindu cases in which the question of divorce arises,³ the question would probably be held to be included in the expression "marriage."

Burma, except the Shan States.—Act XIII. of 1898, s. 13.

Burma.

British Beluchistan.—Reg. III. of 1890, s. 89.

British
Beluchistan.

Ajmere and Merwara.—Reg. III. of 1877, s. 4.

Ajmere and
Merwara.

The wording of this section corresponds with that of Act IV. of 1872, s. 5.⁴

Questions of caste, i.e. questions relating to matters which affect the internal autonomy of a caste or its social relations,⁵ and questions of religious usages and institutions can only be determined by the Civil Courts where their determination is necessary for the purpose of deciding a suit "of a civil nature."

Caste and religious
usages.

A suit in which the rights to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.⁶

In a Bengal case⁷ the following has been said on this subject: "It may be conceded that suits in which the principal question relates to the

¹ See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 17.

² Except in questions of marriage, dower, divorce, and adoption, the age of majority has been fixed by Act IX. of 1876.

³ *Pont*, pp. 63, 64.

⁴ Above.

⁵ *Appayya v. Padappa* (1898), 23 Bom. 122, at p. 130; *Anandray Bhi-kaji Phadke v. Shankar Daji Charya* (1883), 7 Bom. 323, at pp. 328, 329.

⁶ Act V. of 1908, s. 9; Act XIV. of 1892, s. 11. See the cases collected in the note to that section in O'Kinealy's

"Civil Procedure Code," and Mulla's "Civil Procedure Code." *Venkatachalapati v. Subbarayudu* (1890), 13 Mad. 293; *Krishnanami v. Virasami Chelli* (1886), 10 Mad. 133; *Krishnanami Ayyangar v. Samaram Singrachariar* (1906), 30 Mad. 158; *Lokenath Misra v. Dasarathi Tewari* (1905), 10 C. W. N. 505. See *Sadugopu Churair v. Rama Rao* (1907), 34 I. A. 93; 30 Mad. 185; 11 C. W. N. 685; 9 Bom. L. R. 603.

⁷ *Gourmoni Debi v. Chairman of Panikati Municipality* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 1057, at pp. 1061, 1062.

performance of religious rites or ceremonies are not suits of a Civil nature, and to the same category belong suits for vindication of a mere dignity attached to an office.¹ But it is well settled that suits in which the principal question relates to the right to an office, are suits of a Civil nature, and not the less so, because the right claimed may depend upon the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies or even religious tenets.² Now suits for offices of a religious character, that is, those in which the title to the office is dependent upon the performance of religious rites and ceremonies, may be divided into two classes, namely, *first*, religious offices to which fees are appurtenant as of right, and *secondly*, religious offices to which no fees are attached, but which entitle the holder thereof to receive such gratuities as may be paid to him. In the former class of cases, that is, in respect of offices to which fees are attached, there is no doubt that a suit will lie for a declaration that the office is vested in the plaintiff.³ As regards religious offices of the second class, there has been some divergence of judicial opinion upon the question, whether a suit will lie for an office to which no fees are attached. In "Bengal" the view has been maintained that a suit by a person claiming to be entitled to a religious office of this description against an usurper for declaration of his right to the office is a suit of a Civil nature maintainable in a Civil Court.⁴ The contrary view has apparently been maintained in Madras.⁵ In Bombay, a distinction has been made between an office which is attached to a particular temple or place, and an office which is entirely personal in character. As regards the former class it has been held that the suit is maintainable.⁶ As regards the latter, the balance of authority supports the view that the suit is not maintainable,⁷ though the contrary view was maintained in *Sayad Hashim v. Hussein Sha.*⁸ This distinction between local and personal offices has also been recognized in Allahabad.⁹

For instance, a suit lies—

(a) to determine a right to give offerings at a temple; ¹⁰

(b) to restrain the removal of an object of worship; ¹¹

¹ See *Sunkur Bharti Swami (Sri) v. Sidha Lingayah Charanti* (1843), 3 M. I. A. 198; 6 W. R. P. C. 39; S. C. on remand (1845), 2 Bom. 473; *Sadagopa (Striman) v. Krishna Tatachariyar* (1863), 1 Mad. II. C. 301; *Narayan Vithe Parab v. Krishnaji Sadashiv* (1885), 10 Bom. 233; *Karuppa Goundan v. Kolanthayen* (1883), 7 Mad. 91; *Gadigeya v. Basaya* (1910), 34 Bom. 455; 12 Bom. L. R. 358.

² *Krishnama Chariar (Tiru) v. Krishnaswami Tata Chariar* (1910), 6 I. A. 120; 2 Mad. 62; S. C. on remand *Krishnaswami v. Krishnama Chariar* (1882), 5 Mad. 313.

³ *Muhammad v. Ahmed (Sayad)* (1861), 1 Bom. H. C. App. 18.

⁴ *Mamat Ram v. Bapu Ram* (1887), 15 Cal. 159; *Kali v. Gouri* (1890), 17 Cal. 906; *Dinonath v. Protap Chandra* (1899), 27 Cal. 30; 4

C. W. N. 79.

⁵ *Tholappika v. Venkata* (1895), 19 Mad. 62; *Subbaraya v. Vedantachariar* (1904), 28 Mad. 23.

⁶ *Limba v. Rama* (1888), 13 Bom. 548; *Gursangaya v. Tamana* (1891), 16 Bom. 281. The right of hereditary priest to a family was upheld in *Ghelabhai v. Hargovan* (1911), 36 Bom. 94; 13 Bom. L. R. 1171.

⁷ *Murari v. Suba* (1882), 6 Bom. 725; *Gadigeya v. Basaya* (1910), 34 Bom. 455; 12 Bom. L. R. 358.

⁸ (1888), 13 Bom. 429.

⁹ *Chunnu Datt Vyas v. Babu Nandan* (1910), 32 All. 527; *Bernati v. Chhamru* (1907), 29 All. 683.

¹⁰ *Vengamuthu v. Pandarenwara Gurukul* (1882), 6 Mad. 151.

¹¹ *Dhurrum Singh Mohunt v. Kissen Singh* (1881), 7 Cal. 767; 9 C. L. R. 410.

- (c) to restrain the removal of religious marks in a temple, or unjustifiable changes in the character of a temple as a religious institution ; ¹
- (d) to assert an exclusive right to worship in a temple ; ²
- (e) to assert a right of access to the inner shrine of a temple ; ³
- (f) to assert a right to officiate exclusively as a priest on the occasion of the cremation of all dead bodies brought to a particular place ; ⁴
- (g) to assert the right to administer religious rites to pilgrims. ⁵
- (h) to assert a right to fees on marriages ; ⁶
- (i) to assert a right to certain honours as high priest of a temple ; ⁷
- (j) to assert a right to a certain office in a temple ; ⁸
- (k) to assert a right to enter a prayer hall belonging to a certain religious fraternity ; ⁹
- (l) to recover vessels borrowed by another division of the caste. ¹⁰

The Court cannot determine caste disputes, where no right of property ^{Caste} is involved. ¹¹ It will not interfere when an individual has been excluded from caste, or has been excommunicated or otherwise deprived of religious rights by an authority in that behalf, unless the exclusion is contrary to natural justice, as, for instance, where he has been condemned without having an opportunity of being heard. ¹² The loss of a mere social right does not justify the interference of the Court. ¹³

The principle was laid down by *Chandrasekhar, J.*, as follows in *Nadhu Velji v. Keshanji* (1901), 26 Bom. 174 ; 3 Bom. L. R. 718, as follows : -

"A suit raising a caste question must fall in one of three classes :

"I. It may be a suit brought by a member of a caste complaining of his exclusion from it and asking for a declaration that the expulsion is illegal, and that he is still a member of the caste, and as such entitled to its social privileges. The Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.

"II. It may be a suit, brought by a member of a caste expelled from it, for a declaration that the excommunication is illegal and that he is entitled to certain rights of property or office as a member of the caste. The Civil

¹ *Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Samarasinghachariar* (1906), 30 Mad. 158.

² *Anandran Bhikaji Phadke v. Shankar Daji Charya* (1883), 7 Bom. 323 ; *Krishnasami v. Krishnamma Chariar* (1882), 5 Mad. 313.

³ *Venkatachalapati v. Subbarayudu* (1880), 13 Mad. 203.

⁴ *Gourmani v. Chairman of Panikudi Municipality* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 1057. See *Hira Panday v. Basu Panday* (1916), 1 Patna L. J. 381.

⁵ *Ramaswamy Aiyar v. Venkata Achari* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 348 ; 2 W. R. P. C. 21.

⁶ *Guraagaya v. Tumanu* (1891), 16 Bom. 281.

⁷ *Archakam Srinivasa Dikshatulu v. Udayagiri Anantha Charlu* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 349.

⁸ *Srinivasa v. Tiruvengada* (1888), 11 Mad. 450.

⁹ *Jagannath Churn v. Akali Dassia*

(1893), 21 Cal. 163.

¹⁰ *Pragji Kaban v. Gopind Gopal* (1887), 11 Bom. 334.

¹¹ *Jethabai Naray v. Chapsey Cooverji* (1909), 34 Bom. 467 ; 11 Bom. L. R. 1014.

¹² See *Appaya v. Padappa* (1898), 23 Bom. 122 ; *Keshankal v. Girja (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 12 ; *Jagannath Churn v. Akali Dassia* (1893), 21 Cal. 463 ; *Janapati v. Bharati Siam* (1894), 17 Mad. 222 ; *Vallabha v. Madhusudan* (1880), 12 Mad. 495 ; *Krishnasami Chetti v. Virasami Chetti* (1886), 10 Mad. 133.

¹³ *Raghunath Damodhar v. Janardhan Gopal* (1891), 15 Bom. 599 ; *Mayashankar v. Harishankar* (1886), 10 Bom. 661 ; *Kanji Barlu v. Arjun Shamji* (1893), 18 Bom. 115 ; *Sudharam Patar v. Sudharam* (1890), 3 Ben. L. R. (A. C.) 91 ; 11 W. R. C. R. 457 ; *Raj Kinto Majee v. Nobase Sati* (1894), 1 W. R. C. 351.

Courts have jurisdiction to entertain such a suit, if the result of the excommunication is to deprive a man of his *civil rights*; but even here the jurisdiction is limited; all that the Court can inquire into is whether the order of excommunication was passed *bonâ fide* in accordance with natural justice. The inquiry is to be conducted from the point of view of the caste and not of the Court into the reasonableness of the rule for a breach of which the order of excommunication was passed. If these conditions are fulfilled, the Court must hold that the caste acted within its powers as a domestic tribunal with whose discretion it will not interfere.

"III. It may be a suit brought by an expelled member for damages on account of loss of caste or character. The Civil Courts have jurisdiction in such a suit; but the jurisdiction is subject to the law that a libel to a man's position in his caste can give them no right to claim damages from any of his caste-fellows if they have acted *bonâ fide* for the protection of their caste interests in the discharge of their caste duty."

In the Bombay Presidency (outside the island of Bombay), the Courts are prohibited from deciding caste questions, except in a suit instituted for the recovery of damages on account of an alleged injury to the caste and character of the plaintiff, arising from some illegal act or unjustifiable conduct of the other party.¹ The principle is, would the taking cognizance of the matter in dispute be an interference with the autonomy, i.e. the internal management, of the caste?²

Contracts and dealings.

The High Courts of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, in the exercise of their ordinary original civil jurisdiction, are also required to administer the Hindu law in all matters of contract and dealing between Hindus, except where such matters have been the subject of legislative enactment.

So far as it goes, the Indian Contract Act³ has superseded the Hindu law of contracts;⁴ but it may sometimes be necessary to refer to Hindu law as to matters of contract or dealing. For instance, the Hindu law of gifts is to some extent still applied to gifts by Hindus,⁵ and the law of *damdapat*, by which no greater arrear of interest can be recovered at any one time than what will amount to the principal sum, is applied in some cases.⁶ Although the law of *damdapat* only applies to contracts, and not

¹ Bom. Reg. II. of 1827, s. 21. See *Girdhar v. Kalya* (1880), 5 Bom. 53; *Nemchand v. Savaichand* (1866), 5 Bom. 84, note; *Pragji Kalan v. Govind Gopal* (1887), 11 Bom. 534.

² *Murari v. Suba* (1882), 6 Bom. 725, at p. 727; *Anandav Bhikaji Phadke v. Shankar Daji Charya* (1883), 7 Bom. 323, at pp. 328, 329.

³ IX. of 1872.

⁴ *Madhub Chunder Poramanick v. Rajcoomar Doss* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 76; 22 W. R. C. R. 370.

⁵ Post, Chap. XVIII.

⁶ It applies to Calcutta and Bombay, *Nobin Chunder Banerjee v. Romesh Chunder Ghose* (1887), 14 Calc. 781; *Rameonnoy Audicarry v. Johur Lall Dutt* (1880), 5 Calc. 867; 7 C. L. R. 204; *Ganpat Pandurang v. Adarji Dadabhai* (1877), 3 Bom. 312; *Nusserwanjee v. Laxman* (1906), 30 Bom. 452; 8 Bom. L. R. 82; *Jeevanbai v. Manordas Lachmondas* (1910), 35 Bom. 199; 12 Bom. L. R. 992. It applies to cases outside the island of Bombay, *Sundarabai v. Jayavant Bhikaji Nadgouda* (1899),

to judgment debts,¹ that law may be applied in cases where the Judge has a discretion as to the rate of interest.²

It has been held in Calcutta³ that the law of *damlupal* applies to mortgages, but a different view has been accepted in Madras.⁴

In some other matters, such as maintenance,⁵ the Courts may administer Hindu law between Hindus as matters of equity and good conscience.

In some of the enactments above referred to the Courts are required to administer the Hindu law only in cases where the defendant is a Hindu,⁶ and in some of them in cases where the parties are Hindus. In either case the question as to whether the Hindu law is to be applied depends rather upon whether the person whose inheritance, succession, etc., is in dispute was a Hindu, or the persons, whose dealing is in question, were Hindus, rather than upon the accident of the arrangement of the parties in the litigation.⁷

As to the application of their personal law to Hindus, apart from legislative enactment, see *In re Kahandas Narrandas* (1880), 5 Bom. 151, at pp. 166, 167, 170.

24 Bom. 114; 1 Bom. L. R. 551; *Sukulal v. Bapu Sakaram* (1899), 24 Bom. 305; 2 Bom. L. R. 18; *Dagdusa Shevakdas v. Ramchandra* (1895), 20 Bom. 611; *Ganesh Dharnidhar Maharajdev (Shri) v. Keshavrao Govind Kulavkar* (1890), 15 Bom. 625; *Balkrishna Babaji v. Hari Govind* (1890), 15 Bom. 84; *Ali Sahab v. Shahji* (1895), 21 Bom. 85; *Hari Mahadaji Navurkar v. Balambhat Raghunath Khare* (1884), 9 Bom. 233; *Narayan v. Satraji* (1872), 9 Bom. H. C. 83. It does not apply to the Bengal Presidency outside Calcutta, *Hetnarain Singh v. Rum Dein Singh* (1883), 9 Calc. 871; 12 C. L. R. 590; *Surjya Narain Singh v. Birkhary Lall* (1883), 9 Calc. 825; 12 C. L. R. 400; *Pran Krishna Tewary v. Jadu Nath Trivedy* (1898), 2 C. W. N. 603. It is not in force in Madras, *Y. Annaji Rau v. Ragubai* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 400.

¹ *Nanda Lal Ray v. Dharendra Nath Chakravarti* (1913), 40 Calc. 711; *In the matter of Huri Lall Mullick* (1906), 33 Calc. 1289. See *Ram Kanye Audhinary v. Gully Churn Dey* (1894), 21 Calc. 841.

² *Hirelal Ichhalal (Majmudar) v.*

Narsilal Chaturbhujdas (Dewan) (1913), 40 I. A. 68; 37 Bom. 329; 17 C. W. N. 573; 15 Bom. L. R. 483; Act XIV. of 1882 (Civil Procedure), s. 209; Act V. of 1908 (Civil Procedure), s. 34.

³ See *Mernakshi Ammal v. Rama Aiyar* (1912), 37 Mad. 390; *Kanja Lal Banaji v. Narsamba Debi* (1915), 42 Calc. 829; 20 C. W. N. 110.

⁴ *Madhuwa Sidhanta Onakini Nidhi v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu* (1903), 26 Mad. 602.

⁵ See *Mernakshi Ammal v. Rama Aiyar* (1912), 37 Mad. 396.

⁶ See law to be administered in High Courts in the exercise of their ordinary original civil jurisdiction, *ante*, pp. 3, 4.

⁷ This seems to be the effect of the following cases, *Azimunnissa Begum v. Dule* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 455, at pp. 474, 475; *Ali Sahab v. Shahji* (1895), 21 Bom. 85; *Lakshmandas Narupchand v. Dasrat* (1880), 6 Bom. 168, at pp. 183, 184; *Narkies v. Pronomoyee Dossan* (1881), 6 Calc. 794, at pp. 805, 806; 8 C. L. R. 70, at pp. 86, 87.

SOURCES OF HINDU LAW.

*Śruti.
Smṛiti.*

In the first stage of Hindu law, as writing was unknown, dependence had to be placed upon memory. The original sources were the *Śruti* (things heard) and the *Smṛiti* (things remembered). The former were said to be the actual utterings of the Creator. The latter, although of divine origin, were couched in the language of the *rishis* or sages of antiquity.

The *Śruti* were in words which would be recited and sung. They comprised the four Vedas, the six Vedāṅgas, or appendages to the Vedas, and the Upanishads. There are a few passages in the Vedas which incidentally allude to a rule of a law, or which gave an instance from which a rule of law may be inferred.

The *Smṛitis* are the principal sources of lawyers' law, but they contain much which has nothing to do with law. The earlier *Smṛitis* were mere manuals for the use of students.¹

*Sūtras.
Sāstras.*

In the second stage of Hindu law the authorities were in writing. They consisted of the Codes or *Sāstras*² or *Smṛitis* which were based upon older *Smṛitis* and on what are called *Sūtras*. Of these such as related to *Dharma*, or law or duty, only concern us. Even the *Dharma Sāstras* contain much connected with religious rites, expiation, and so forth.

Of the *Sūtras* (lit. Strings) those related to practical affairs are called *Dharma Sūtras*, the principal of which are those by Gautama, whose date is not earlier than 300 B.C., of Baudhayana, of Apastamba, of Vasishtha, and of Vishnu.

Although in theory Hindu law is ultimately based upon the *Vedas*, which are said to have been of divine origin, in matters of law the *Vedas* are of no greater authority than the *Smṛitis* (things heard by the *rishis*, or sages of antiquity), or codes of revealed law. For all practical purposes it is unnecessary to trace the law earlier than the *Dharma Sāstras*.

In modern practice the *Dharma Sāstras* are of less authority than the Commentaries and Digests, which are based upon them, and the views expressed in the Commentaries and Digests in their place give way to the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of the High Courts of British India.

¹ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 4.

² Scriptures.

With regard to the interpretation of ancient text-books on Hindu law the Judicial Committee say this,¹ "They now add that the further study of the subject necessary for the decision of these appeals has still more impressed them with the necessity of great caution in interpreting books of mixed religion, morality and law, lest foreign lawyers, accustomed to treat as law what they find in authoritative books and to administer a fixed legal system, should too hastily take for strict law precepts which are meant to appeal to the moral sense, and should thus fetter individual judgments in private affairs, should introduce restrictions into Hindu society, and impart to it an inflexible rigidity never contemplated by the original law givers."

Interpretation
of authorities.

The principal Codes or *Sanhitas* constituting the *Dharma* The *Sastras*.
*Sastras*² are—

1. The Code of Institutes of *Manu*.³

This is undoubtedly the most important of the *Dharma Sastras*. Its authorship is unknown, and there is great uncertainty as to its age. It was translated by Sir William Jones, who considered it was written in the thirteenth century B.C. Modern investigation has placed it much later.

Professor Macdonell⁴ considers that it "probably assumed its present shape not much later than 200 A.D." Dr. Bühler⁵ considers "that the work, such as we know it, existed in the second century A.D." Professor Jolly⁶ remarks that the code cannot well be placed later than the second to third century A.D. Professor Max Müller held⁷ that it cannot be earlier than 400 A.D., but this view has been met by Dr. Bühler.⁸

2. The Code or Institutes of *Yajñavalkya*.

This code is second in importance to that of *Manu*. It was apparently written in one of the early centuries of the Christian era. The *Mitākshara*⁹ is a commentary upon this code.

3. The Code or Institutes of *Narada*.

The translator (Dr. Jolly) of this code fixes its earliest possible date at about 400 or 500 A.D.

¹ *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshmanamma (Sri Balusu)*; *Radhakrishnan v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 20 I. A. 113, at p. 136; 22 Mad. 398, at pp. 415, 416; 21 All. 460, at pp. 478, 479; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 442; 1 Bom. L. R. 226; *Bahant Singh (Rao) v. Kishori (Rani)* (1898), 25 I. A. 54; 20 All. 267; 2 C. W. N. 273.

² Works of authority. For a list of all the *Sanhitas* (collections or Institutes), see Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," preface, and Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 25.

³ For an account of *Manu's* Code see the introduction to "Sacred Books

of the East," vol. xxv., by Dr. G. Bühler.

⁴ "History of Sanskrit Literature," p. 428.

⁵ "Sacred Books of the East," vol. xxv. p. cxiv.; "Imperial Gazetteer of India" (1908), II. 262.

⁶ "Recht und Sitte" (Encyclopedia of Indo-Aryan Research), p. 16.

⁷ "India, What can it Teach us?" pp. 91, 366.

⁸ "Sacred Books of the East," vol. xxv. p. 117. In 15 C. W. N. exi., Mr. Kashi Prasad Jayaswal fixes the date at about 150 B.C.

⁹ *Post*, p. 16.

Commentaries
and Digests.

After the *Sastras* the next step in the development of Hindu law consisted in the composition of a number of Commentaries and Digests based upon the *Sastras*.

The authority of the several commentators necessarily varied in different districts, and thus arose the schools of law, which are operative in different parts of India.¹

The differences between these schools are said to have risen in the main from the different views expressed by the commentators who were of authority in the districts which were governed by the schools respectively. Difference of the custom of districts may also have helped to differentiate the schools both directly and indirectly by influencing the opinions of the commentators.

The two principal schools² of Hindu law are—

Principal
schools of
Hindu law.

1. The Mitakshara³ school, which prevails throughout India, except where the Bengal school prevails.

This is the older and more orthodox system of Hindu law. It is a relic of the patriarchal system.

2. The Bengal or Daya-bhaga⁴ school, which prevails where the Bengal language is spoken by the inhabitants of the country.⁵

This school was founded by Jimutavahana⁶ and Raghunandana⁷ in the fifteenth century. It has been considered by some writers to owe its origin to Brahminical authority, but Mr. S. C. Mitra attributes the peculiarities of this school to the commercial activity of the Bengalees, and to their antagonism to Brahmanism.⁸ The former view is supported

¹ See *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Nuthupathy* (1868), 12 M. L. A., 397, at p. 435; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 11; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 21; G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 5. Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya ("Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 28, 29) considers that the Commentaries and Digests were the outcome of a desire to reconcile the Smritis at the time when Brahminism had regained its ascendancy. See also S. C. Mitra in "Law Quarterly Review," vol. xxi. p. 380, xxii. p. 50.

² This expression has been objected to, but it was defended by Colebrooke (*Strange's "Hindu Law,"* vol. i. p. 319) who originated it. See G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 6, 7; Rajkumar Servadhi-

kari's "Law of Inheritance," pp. 343-346.

³ So named after the treatise by *Vijnaneshekara* (*post*, p. 16), which is of authority throughout India, except where superseded by other works in Bengal and Western India.

⁴ Sometimes called the *Gauriya* school.

⁵ That is, the Revenue divisions of the Presidency of Bengal, Rajshahy, Dacca, Burdwan, and Chittagong, Manbhoom, the Assam Valley districts, Sylhet and Cachar. As to Assam, see *Dreepo Debta v. Gobindo Deb* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 42.

⁶ *Post*, p. 14.

⁷ *Post*, p. 15.

⁸ "Law Quarterly Review," vol. xxi. p. 380; vol. xxii. p. 50.

by the religious character of the system of inheritance (*post*, chap. xii.). The latter view is supported by the freedom of alienation allowed by the Bengal school.

The Mitakshara school is subdivided into four minor schools, Subdivision of Mitakshara school.
viz.—

1. The Benares school.

This school prevails in Behar, in the district of Benares, and in Central and North-western India, and in the whole of Northern India,¹ except that in the Punjab it is considerably modified by customary law.

2. The Dravida or Dravira school.

This school prevails in the Madras Presidency, *i.e.* in the southern portion of the peninsula. It was founded in the thirteenth century by Devananda Bhatta.²

Mr. Morley³ says that the Dravida school “may be subdivided into Subdivision of Dravida school. three districts in each of which some particular law treatises have more weight than others; these districts are: Dravida, properly so called,⁴ Karnātaka,⁵ and Andhra.”⁶

3. The Maharashtra school.

This school prevails where the Maratha language is spoken as a vernacular and in Guzerat and Kanara.

¹ Orissa is said, in Morley's “Digest” (Introduction, p. exo.), to be governed by this school. In a note to *Bishen-pirca Munce v. Soogunda (Rane)* (1801), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 37, at p. 39, note (2nd ed., 49, at p. 51, note), Mr. Macnaghten states that “the authorities followed in Orissa are the same with those of Bengal”; but the opinions of the pundits in this case were not founded on Bengal authorities, and as Mr. Mayne points out (8th ed., p. 11, note), in another Orissa case mentioned in Macnaghten's “Hindu Law,” ii. 306, the opinion of the pundits was founded on the Mitakshara. In *Raghunadha (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154; 1 Mad. 69; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, which was a case from Ganjam, which was included in the ancient Hindu kingdom of Orissa, the law of the Dravida school was applied apparently without question. Mr. Mayne (“Hindu Law,” 8th ed., p. 11) suggests that the Court applied the system of law with which it was most familiar. In *Raghunand Das v. Radha Churn Das* (1878), 4 Cal. 425; 3 C. L. R. 534, the Mitakshara

law was applied to a case from Orissa. See also *Kalca Pudo Banerjee v. Choitun Pandah* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 214; *Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra (Raja) v. Nilpanund Mansingh* (1890), 17 I. A. 128; 18 Cal. 151. In *Parbati Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani) v. Jagadis Chunder Dhabal* (1902), 29 I. A. 82; 29 Cal. 432; 6 C. W. N. 400; 4 Bom. L. R. 365, the decision of the Court in India showed that Orissa was governed by the Mitakshara, but the question was not decided by the Judicial Committee.

² *Post*, p. 17. See *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 433; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 10; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 20.

³ Morley's “Digest,” Introduction, p. exci.

⁴ Where the Tamil language is spoken.

⁵ Where the Kanarese language is spoken.

⁶ Where the Telugu language is spoken. See *Narasimma v. Balaramachari* (1863), 1 M. H. C. 420, at p. 425.

4. The Mithila school.

This school prevails in what was in ancient times the Province of Mithila, or Tirhoot,¹ and in the adjoining districts. It was founded by Chandeshwar, 1314 A.D., and Vachaspati Misra, who flourished in the fifteenth century.²

Punjab school. Sastri Golap Chundar Sarkar³ added to this enumeration a school which he called the Punjab school. This school is not recognized by other text writers, and is not referred to in the authorities by that name. There may be many differences between the Hindu law as administered in the Punjab and that which is administered in the other provinces, but such differences arise from the existence of local customs, upon which the law is there based,⁴ and do not, as in the case of the other schools,⁵ arise from differences of opinion as to the true construction of texts.

The geographical limits of these schools cannot be accurately defined.⁶ Where there is a dispute as to which school prevails in a particular locality the question must be determined upon evidence.

The redistribution of districts or other arbitrary divisions of land by the Government does not render the inhabitants of the locality dealt with liable to be subject to a different school of law.⁷

Paramount
works of
authority,
Bengal school.

The following are the principal works of authority in the Bengal school : 8—

1. *Daya-bhaga*,⁹ by Jimutavahana.

Nothing certain seems to be known of the author. According to Mr. Colebrooke and to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya he probably lived in

¹ "The district of Tirhoot, which is a corruption of the Sanskrit name *Tirabhukti*, is, as the name implies, bounded on three sides by three rivers, namely, by the Gandak on the west, the Kosi on the east, and the Ganges on the south." G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 416. See map of ancient Mithila annexed to P. C. Tagore's translation of the *Vivada Chintamani*.

² Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 19.

³ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 20. "Law of Adoption," pp. 228, 254.

⁴ See Tupper's "Punjab Customary Law," vol. ii. pp. 82-80.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶ See Merley's "Digest," Introduction, pp. clxxxix.-cxlii.

⁷ *Prihee Singh v. Court of Wards*

(1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 272. This decision was after remand by the Judicial Committee in *Shen Soondoree (Mussamut) v. Pirthee Singh* (1872), 21 W. R. C. R. 89. The judgment of the Judicial Committee seems to show that the burden was upon the person asserting the retention of the law originally applicable to the district, but this view of the judgment was not suggested in the judgment of the High Court on remand, nor was it referred to when the case came again before the Judicial Committee (*Shen Soondoree v. Pirthee Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 147).

⁸ See Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," p. 13; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 49.

⁹ *Lib.* : Partition of Inheritance.

Bengal in the fifteenth century.¹ Sastri Golap Chandra Sarkar,² considers that Jinutavahana flourished in the last quarter of the eleventh, and the first quarter of the twelfth century A.D. He identifies him as the minister of Viswakshena, a king of Bengal. The work was translated by Mr. H. T. Colebrooke. It is the highest authority in Bengal.³

2. *Smṛiti* of Raghunandana.

This author is said to be of the highest authority in Bengal except in matters of inheritance.⁴ The portion of the work relating to inheritance (*Dayatattwa*) in general strictly follows the *Daya-bhaga*. Raghunandana seems to have flourished in the latter half of the fifteenth century or beginning of the sixteenth century.⁵

3. *Daya-krama Sangraha*, by Sri Krishna Tarkalankar.

This is a treatise on the law of inheritance, following the *Daya-bhaga*, and apparently written early in the eighteenth century. It was translated by Mr. P. M. Wynch in 1818.

4. *Srikrishna's Commentary*. A commentary on the *Daya-bhaga*, by the last-named writer.

5. *Dattaka Chandrika*. A treatise on the law of adoption.

The translator (Mr. Sutherland) ascribed the authorship of this work to Devananda Bhatta, the author of the "*Smṛiti Chandrika*,"⁶ but it is now taken to be the work of a Bengal Pundit.⁷ It has been suggested that this work was forged for the purpose of a particular suit,⁸ but the Judicial Committee has treated the "*Dattaka Chandrika*" as of great authority in questions of adoption in Bengal.⁹

¹ See Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 33-35, and preface to Colebrooke's translation of "*Daya-bhaga*."

² "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., pp. 27, 28.

³ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 37.

⁴ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 36. The portion of his work dealing with inheritance (*Dayatattwa*) has been translated by G. C. Sarkar.

⁵ See Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., xvi. note.

⁶ *Post*, p. 17.

⁷ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 31, 32; V. N. Mandlik, *Introd.*, 73; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 32; Jolly's "Lectures," pp. 22, 23; *Gunga Sahai v. Lakhraj Singh* (1886), 9 All. 253, at pp. 323, 334.

⁸ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 124-125. This view is also taken by

Dr. Jolly in "Die Adoption in Indien," Würzburg, 1910.

⁹ *Rungtun v. Aichama* (1847), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 57; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at p. 59; *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 437; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 13; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 22; *Gurulingaswami (Sri Baluru) v. Ramalakshmanam (Sri Baluru)*, *Radhamohan v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at pp. 131, 132; 22 Mad. 398, at p. 411; 21 All. 460, at pp. 465, 466; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 439; 1 Bom. L. R. 226; *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1898), 26 I. A. 153, at p. 161; 21 All. 412, at p. 419; 3 C. W. N. 454, at p. 457; 1 Bom. L. R. 311; S.C. in Court below (1895), 17 All. 294; *Nagindas Bhugwandas v. Basoo Hukiesondas* (1915), 43 I. A. 56; 40 Bom. 270; 20 C. W. N. 272; 18 Bom. L. R. 172.

The *Mitakshara* is also of high authority in Bengal in matters where it does not conflict with the above-named works.¹

Mitakshara
school.

In the Mitakshara school the guiding authority² is the work from which the name of the school has been taken, viz. the *Mitakshara*, which is a commentary on *Yajñavalkya*,³ by Vijnaneshwara Jogi.

The author is said to have lived at the end of the eleventh century. "Vijnaneshwara's views and opinions are eminently practical. The high authority which his work enjoys almost throughout India is due partly to that reason and partly also to the fact that he was the councillor of the most powerful Hindu king of his time."⁴ He lived at Kalyana (probably the modern Kalyani in the Nizam's dominions), which was the capital of Vikramaditya VI., or Vikramanka, King of the Chalukya kingdom of the Deccan from 1076 for about half a century.⁵

The schools, which are subdivisions of the Mitakshara school, give preference to certain treatises and commentaries which control and explain passages of the *Mitakshara*. Thus arise the differences between those subdivisions.⁶

Where there is no consensus of opinion among the commentators or established usage, the doctrines of the *Mitakshara* prevail.⁷

The following are the principal works of authority in those schools : 8.—

In the Benares school.

1. *Vira Mitrodaya*.⁹

This work was written by Mitra Misra, who probably lived in the

¹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 34. *Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baer* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 487, at p. 507; 9 W. R. P. C. 23, at p. 29; *Akshay Chandra Bhattacharya v. Hari Das Gossami* (1908), 35 Calo. 721, at p. 727; 12 C. W. N. 511, at p. 515.

² *Jayannath Prasad (dupla v. Runjit Singh)* (1897), 25 Calo. 354, at p. 368. *Collector of Madura v. Mooltoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 435; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 11; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 21. *Krishnaji Vyanktesh v. Pandurang* (1876), 12 Bom. H. C. 65.

³ *Ante*, p. 11.

⁴ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 31.

⁵ V. A. Smith's "Early History of India," 3rd ed., p. 432.

⁶ *Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baer* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 487, at pp. 507, 508; 9 W. R. P. C. 23, at p. 29.

⁷ See *Raju (Ramany v. Ammani Ammal)* (1906), 29 Mad. 354.

⁸ Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., pp. 28, 29. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," p. 1.

⁹ See Introduction to G. C. Sarkar's translation, pp. xiii., xiv. Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 36.

sixteenth century, for the purpose of refuting the arguments of Jimuta Vahana¹ and the other writers of the Bengal school.²

The *Vira Mitrodaya* is of very high authority in the Benares school,³ but cannot be followed where it conflicts with a clear statement in the *Mitakshara*.⁴

2. *Niraya Sindhu*.

This work was written by Kamalakara, and was completed in 1612 A.D.

3. *Dattaka Mimansa*.

This is a treatise on adoption by Nanda Pandita, who lived at Benares in the seventeenth century. It has been translated by Mr. Sutherland. The authority of this work has been emphasized by the Judicial Committee on more than one occasion,⁵ but caution is to be applied in accepting the glosses of *Nanda Pandita*, where they deviate from or add to the *Smritis*.⁶

In the Dravida school.⁷

Dravida
school,

1. *Smriti Chandrika*, by Devananda Bhutta.

The author lived in Southern India about the thirteenth century.⁸ The authority of this work is, in the absence of usage to the contrary, subordinate to that of the *Mitakshara*.⁹ Its authority is said to be second only to that of the *Mitakshara*.¹⁰ It has been translated by T. Kristnasawmy Iyer.

2. *Parasara Madhavya*.

This is a commentary on the *Parasara Smriti* by Manhava, who was Prime Minister of Bukka, the third King of Vijayanagara, whose reign

¹ *Ante*, pp. 14, 15.

² S. C. Sircar's "Vyavastha Chandrika," vol. I, Introduction, p. 17, and note.

³ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 438; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 14; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 22; *Griidhari Lal Ray v. The Bengal Government* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 448, at p. 466; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 44, at p. 52; 10 W. R. P. C. 32, at p. 34; *Tulshi Ram v. Behari Lal* (1889), 12 All. 328, at pp. 340-342; *Suba Singh v. Sarafraz Kunwar* (1896), 19 All. 215, at p. 231.

⁴ *Jagunnath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh* (1897), 25 Cal. 354, at pp. 367, 368.

⁵ Cases, *ante*, p. 15, note 9. See *Tulshi Ram v. Behari Lal* (1889), 12 All. 328, at pp. 341, 342; *Ganga Sahai v. Lekhraj Singh* (1886), 9 All. 253, at pp. 322, 323.

⁶ *Patlu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar*

(1915), 42 I. A. 155; 37 All. 359; 19 C. W. N. 841; 17 Bom. L. R. 549, referring to *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshamma (Sri Balusu)*; *Rudhamohun v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 20 I. A. 113; 22 Mad. 398; 21 All. 400; 3 C. W. N. 427; 1 Bom. L. R. 226; *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1898), 26 I. A. 163; 21 All. 412; 3 C. W. N. 454; 1 Bom. L. R. 311.

⁷ See *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 437; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 13; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 22.

⁸ Jolly's "Lectures," 20, 21.

⁹ *Raju Gramany v. Ammani Ammal* (1906), 29 Mad. 358; *Muthappudayan v. Ammani Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 58; *Salemma v. Lutchmana Reddi* (1897), *Ibid.*, 100.

¹⁰ Strange's "Manual," 2nd ed., pp. 3, 4. Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 32.

commenced about 1361. It is said to be "in high esteem in Benares and in the Southern and Western schools."¹

3. *Sarasvati Vilasa*.²

This work was written by Pratapa Rudra Deva, a King of Orissa, early in the sixteenth century. It has been translated by Mr. Foulkes.

4. *Vyavahara Nirnaya*.

This was written by Varadaraja about the end of the sixteenth century. It has been translated by Dr. Burnell.

5. *Dattaka Chandrika*.³

The application of this work to Southern India is said to have been due to a mistake made by the translator in attributing the authorship to the author of the *Smṛiti Chandrika*; ⁴ but as it has been treated by the Judicial Committee as an authority in Southern India,⁵ the effect of this mistake, if it be one, cannot be altered.

The Judicial Committee has also affirmed the *Vira Mitrodaya* ⁶ to be a work of authority in Southern India,⁷ but it is submitted that that work is only of secondary authority elsewhere than in Benares.⁸

In the Maharashtra school.

1. *Vyavahara Mayukha*.

This was composed by Nilkantha Bhatta about the beginning of the seventeenth century. It is of paramount authority in Gujarat,⁹ in the Northern Konkan,¹⁰ and in the island of Bombay,¹¹ and apparently in

Maharashtra
school.

¹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 31. The portion relating to inheritance (*Daya-vibhaga*) has been translated by Dr. Burnell.

² Lit. : the recreations of *Sarasvati*, the goddess of learning. As to the authority of this work, see "Nelson's View of Hindu Law," pp. 112, 113.

³ *Ante*, p. 15.

⁴ See Jolly's "Lectures," p. 23.

⁵ See cases *ante*, p. 15, note 9.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 16, 17.

⁷ *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115, at p. 153; 5 Cal. 776, at pp. 788, 789; 6 C. L. R. 322, at p. 332, referring to *Gridhari Lal Roy v. The Bengal Government*, 12 M. I. A. 448, at p. 466; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 44, at p. 52; 10 W. R. P. C. 32, at p. 34, which merely states that the work in question is of high authority in Benares.

⁸ See *post*, p. 19.

⁹ See West and Bühler's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 3. This applies to the Kamathis, settled in Bombay; *Jagannath Raghunath v. Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 553; 12 Bom. L. R. 545. The *Hazur* Court of Baroda has held that the *Mitakshara* is paramount in Guzerat; see Acharya's "Codification in British India," pp. 345 *et seq.*

¹⁰ *Sakharam Sadashiv Adhikari v. Sitabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 353, at pp. 365 *et seq.* As to the limits of the Northern and Southern Konkan, see *Narhar v. Bhanu* (1916), 40 Bom. 621; 18 Bom. L. R. 744.

¹¹ *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565, at p. 574; *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvardai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 418; *Krishnaji Vyanktesh v. Pandurang* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 65. See *Vijayarangum v. Lakshman*

Sindh.¹ In the Mahratta country, and in the Southern Konkan and Northern 'anara, its authority is inferior only to that of the *Mitakshara*.² Throughout Western India it is of high authority,³ and its aid will be invoked where the *Mitakshara* is silent or obscure.⁴ It has been translated by Mr. Borradaile, and again by Mr. V. N. Mandlik.

"Questions on the Hindu law of inheritance to property in the island of Bombay are to be determined in accordance with the *Mitakshara*, subject to the doctrine to be found in the *Mayukha*, where the latter differs from it. But as laid down by Telang, J., in *Gojabai v. Shrimant Shahajirao Maloji Raje Bhosle*;⁵ 'Our general principle should be to construe the *Mitakshara* and the *Mayukha* so as to harmonize with one another wherever and so far as that is reasonably possible' "⁶

2. *Nirnaya Sindhu*.⁷

3. *Dattaka Mimamsa*.⁸

4. *Samskara Kaustaba*.⁹

This work is by Anantadeva. It is said to belong to the same period as the *Nirnaya Sindhu*.

In the introduction to West and Bühler's "Hindu Law"¹⁰ it is stated that the *Viramitrodaya*¹¹ and the *Dattaka Chandrika*¹² are also authorities in Western India. The latter is an authority in Western India on the subject of adoption,¹³ but the former is, it is submitted, rather a Benares than a Bombay authority.¹⁴

(1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244. This applies to Kamathis settled in Bombay, *Jugannath Raghunath v. Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 553; 12 Bom. L. R. 545.

¹ See 15 Bom. L. R. Journal, p. 49.

² *Balkrishna Bapuji Apte v. Lakshman Dinkar* (1890), 14 Bom. 605; *Junkibai v. Sundra* (1890), 14 Bom. 612; *Krishnaji Vyanktesh v. Pandurang* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 65.

³ *Vandaran Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 545, at p. 574.

⁴ *Bhagwan Vilhoba v. Warubai* (1908), 32 Bom. 300, at p. 312; 10 Bom. L. R. 389.

⁵ (1892), 17 Bom. 114, at p. 118.

⁶ *Kesurbai (Bai) v. Huneraj Morarji* (1906), 33 I. A. 176, at p. 187; 30 Bom. 431, at p. 442; 10 C. W. N. 802, at p. 807; *Bhagwan Vilhoba v. Warubai* (1908), 32 Bom. 300, at p. 312; 10 Bom. L. R. 389.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 17.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 17. See *Waman Raghupati Bora v. Krishnaji Kashirav Bora* (1889), 14 Bom. 249, at p. 259; *Narayan Babaji v. Nana Manohar*

(1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. 153, at p. 166; *Bayabai v. Bala* (1868), 7 Bom. H. C. App., i., at pp. x., xii., *Pranjeevandas Toolseydas v. Dewcoorverbae* (1859), 1 Bom. H. C. 130, at p. 131.

⁹ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 438; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 14; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 22.

¹⁰ 2nd ed., p. 1.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 16, 17.

¹² *Ante*, p. 15.

¹³ *Waman Raghupati Bora v. Krishnaji Kashirav Bora* (1889), 14 Bom. 249, at p. 259.

¹⁴ *Dhondu Gurav v. Gangabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 369; *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 438; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 14; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 22; *Gridhari Lal Roy v. The Bengal Government* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 448, at p. 460; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 44, at p. 52; 10 W. R. P. C. 32, at p. 34; K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," p. 199; see *ante*, pp. 16, 17.

Mithila
school.

In the Mithila school.

1. *Vivada Chintamani*.

This work was written by Vachaspati Misra, who flourished in Tirhoot in the beginning of the fifteenth century. It is the work of highest authority in this school. It has been translated by Prosono Coomar Tagore.

The *Vyavahara Chintamani* and the *Dvaita Nirnaya*, both by the author of the *Vivada Chintamani*, are also authorities in the Mithila country.

2. *Vivada Ratnakara*.

This is an older compilation, but of less authority than the *Vivada Chintamani*. The writer was Chandesvara Thakkura, Prime Minister of Hara Sinha Deva, King of Mithila. He flourished at the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the fourteenth century. This work has recently been translated by G. C. Sarkar and Digamvar Chatterjee.

3. *Dattaka Mimansa*.¹

Sudhivireka, by Rudradhara, *Dvaita Parishista*, by Keshav Misra,² and *Vivada Chandra*, by Iachunadevi,³ are also authorities in this school.

Differences
between the
schools.

The Bengal and the Mitakshara systems differ in two main particulars,⁴ viz.—

1. As to the persons who are coparceners, and their rights, as such, in property held in coparcenary, i.e. as a joint Hindu family.

Under the Mitakshara system rights in family property are acquired by birth and lapse by death.⁵ Individual rights are not generally recognized. The family is the unit and females have generally no right of succession, the male members having rights of survivorship. In Bengal, rights in joint property are required by inheritance or will. In consequence of this difference, the law as to the power to alienate an undivided share differs under the two systems.

2. As to inheritance.

The Mitakshara system prefers agnates to cognates generally. The Bengal school founds rights of inheritance upon the principle of the amount of religious efficacy which the person claiming can give by an offering to the *manes* of the person, whose property is in dispute, or of his ancestor.

¹ *Ante*, p. 17. *Collector of Madura v. Mooltoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 437; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 13; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 22.

² Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 49.

³ Colebrooke's "Digest," Introduction, p. xix; see *Rutcheputty Dutt Jha v. Rajunder Narain Raa* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 133, at p. 147.

⁴ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 40.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 225, 236, 237.

The subdivisions of the Mitakshara school differ between themselves, and from the Bengal school, as to the right of a widow to adopt a son to her deceased husband,¹ and in certain other matters connected with adoption. They also differ in some questions of inheritance.

The Maharashtra school differs from all other schools in conferring rights of inheritance upon certain female relations, and in giving greater powers to female owners.

The decisions of English Courts of law have played a considerable part in ascertaining, developing, and sometimes in crystallizing Hindu law. The Courts in India necessarily follow without question the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and of the High Courts² to which they are subordinate. Now that the volume of reported decisions upon questions of Hindu law has become so large, judicial decisions, in most cases, provide an answer to the questions which arise.

Decisions of
Courts of Law.

The High Court of Patna follows the decisions of the Bengal High Court except when they have been differed from by a Full Bench of the former Court.³

By the following enactments the Legislature has made some alterations in those portions of the Hindu law which the Courts are required to administer :—

Legislative
enactments.

1. Act XXI. of 1850 (Freedom of Religion).
2. Act XV. of 1856 (Hindu widows remarriage).
3. Act XXI. of 1866 (Native converts Marriage Dissolution).
4. Act VII. (Bom. C.) of 1866 (Hindu's liability for ancestor's debts).
5. Act XXI. of 1870 (Hindu wills).
6. Act IX. of 1872 (Contracts).⁴
7. Act IX. of 1875 (Majority).
8. Act IV. of 1882 (Transfer of Property).
9. Act III. (B. C.) of 1904 (Settled Estates Act).
10. Act II. (U. P. C.) of 1900 (Oudh Settled Estates Act).
11. Act I. (Mad. C.) of 1914 (Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act).
12. Act XV. of 1916 (Hindu Disposition of Property).

¹ *Post*, pp. 118, 119.

L. R. 549, at p. 554.

² See *Pattu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar* (Mussammat) (1915), 42 I. A. 185, at p. 186; 37 All. 390, at p. 396; 19 C. W. N. 841, at p. 847; 17 Bom.

³ *Harthar Misser v. Muhomed* (Syed) (1916), 20 C. W. N. 983.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 8, 9.

TO WHOM HINDU LAW IS APPLICABLE.

To what persons Hindu law is applicable.

The expression "Hindus," in the enactments above referred to; includes not only persons who profess what is called the Hindu religion,¹ but also such of their descendants as have not openly abjured that religion.²

"In doubtful cases conformity to the manners and observances of the Hindus is a safe guide for concluding that a particular family is to be governed by the Hindu law."³

"Hinduism is only recognized by the community to whom it is applied as denoting a distinction between them and the foreigner. The word was first used by the Muslim invaders for all Indian creeds in which the uncompromising Unitarianism of the followers of the Prophet detected signs of the worship of idols." In its conventional sense it means "the collection of rites, worships, beliefs, traditions and mythologies that are sanctioned by the sacred books and ordinances of the Brahmins, and are propagated by Brahmanic teaching."⁴

In dealing with the expression "Hindu" in the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 331, Dr. Whitley Stokes, in his edition of that Act, at p. 200, says, "But the term 'Hindu' would not, apparently, include the *Bábá Lális* who adore but one God, dispensing with all forms of worship, and directing their devotions by rules and objects derived from a medley of *Védanta* and *Súfi* tenets (H. H. Wilson's Works, i. 347); the *Prin Náthis* or *Dhámis* in Búndelkhand who consent to the real identity of the essence of the Hindu and Mahomedan creeds (*Ibid.*, 532); the *Sádhus* (Puritans), a sect of Hindu Unitarians who are found chiefly in the upper part of the Doáb from Farúkhábád to beyond Delhi (*Ibid.*, 352); the *Gira Narayanis*, who simply profess the worship of one God, and admit proselytes alike from Hindus and Mahomedans (*Ibid.*, 358); the *Junyavádés* whose doctrines are atheistical (*Ibid.*, 359)."

Castes.

Hindus are divided into the following four main divisions, or, as they are usually called, "castes"⁵ :—

1. The *Brahmins*, or priestly caste.
2. The *Kshatriyas*, or warrior caste.⁶

¹ See *Dugree v. Pacotti San Jan* (1895), 19 Bom. 788, at p. 788.

² Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 16.

³ Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," p. 50.

⁴ Bain's "Ethnography," citing Lyall's "Asiatic Studies."

⁵ This word is derived from the Latin "casta," pure, unmixed.

⁶ See *Ran Murdan Syn (Chuatarya) v. Sahub Purkulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18, at p. 46; 4 W. R. P. C. 132, at pp. 135, 136. As to the

almost complete disappearance of Kshatriyas and Vaisyas, see Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 39. The claims of the *Kayasthas* to be Kshatriyas is advocated by G. C. Sarkar, "Law of Adoption," 2nd ed., pp. 419c, 419d; but such claim has been negatived in a Bengal case (*Anita Mohun Ghosh Moulik v. Nirade Mohun Ghosh Moulik* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 901), and in a Bihar case (*Raj Coomarr Lall v. Binnaur Dyal* (1884), 10 Calo. 688).

3. The *Vaisyas*, or agricultural caste.4. The *Sudras*.

When caste first originated in the Epic Age, the pure Hindus were members of the first three of these divisions, and the members of those divisions are now styled regenerate, or twice-born, having regard to the ceremonies of initiation which are peculiar to them. Each of these castes is now divided into a number of sub-castes. In the case of the Sudras nearly every occupation has its caste.

In the Bengal Census report for 1901, Mr. Gait says (at p. 354), "A caste is an endogamous group in a collection of endogamous groups, bearing a common name, the members of which by reason of similarity of traditional occupation and reputed origin are generally regarded . . . as forming a single homogeneous community, the constituent parts of which are more nearly related to each other than they are to any other section of the society."

In the absence of a special custom; Hindu law is applied to Jains,¹ to Sikhs,² and to Nambudri Brahmins.³ Jains and
Sikhs.

Degradation from caste,⁴ or a departure from orthodoxy in the matter of diet or ceremonial observance,⁵ does not prevent the application of Hindu law. Loss of caste.

Except so far as the Hindu law may be inconsistent with the new religion (if any) adopted by persons who have renounced the Hindu religion,⁶ such law continues generally applicable to such persons and to their descendants, if they do not elect to abandon their subjection to Hindu law.⁷ Change of
religion.

¹ *Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (Mussamut)* (1878), 5 I. A. 87; 1 All. 688; S. C. in court below (1874), 6 N. W. P. 382; *Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall* (1878), 6 I. A. 15; 4 Calc. 744; 3 C. L. R. 465; *Ambabai v. Govind* (1898), 23 Bom. 257; *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416, at p. 418; *Rukhab v. Chunilal Ambushet* (1891), 16 Bom. 347; *Mohabeer Pershad (Lalla) v. Kundun Koovar (Mussamut)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 116; *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1875), 10 Bom. H. C. 241, at p. 258; *Bachebi v. Makhan Lal* (1880), 3 All. 55.

² *Bhagwan Koer (Rani) v. Jogendra Chandra Bose* (1903), 30 I. A. 249, at p. 254; 31 Calc. 11, at pp. 30, 31; 7 C. W. N. 895, at p. 901; 5 Bom. L. R. 845; *Kissen Chunder Shaw (Doe dem) v. Baidam Beebee* (1815), 2 Morley's "Digest," 220. See 1 Morley's "Digest," p. clxxvii; *Juggo Mohan Mullick (Doe dem) v. Saum-*

coomar Bebee (1815), 2 Morley's "Digest," 43; Sir Edward Hyde East's evidence before a committee of the House of Lords, referred to in *Lopes v. Lopes* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. O. C. 172, at p. 185.

³ *Vishnu Nambudri v. Akkamma* (1910), 34 Mad. 496.

⁴ Act XXI. of 1850.

⁵ *Bhagwan Kuar (Rani) v. Jogendra Chandra Bose* (1903), 30 I. A. 249, at p. 257; 31 Calc. 11, at p. 33; 7 C. W. N. 895, at p. 903; 5 Bom. L. R. 845.

⁶ As, for instance, persons converted to Christianity cannot retain the practice of polygamy, *post*, p. 36. *In re Millard* (1887), 10 Mad. 218; *Lopez v. Lopez* (1885), 12 Calc. 706, at p. 722; *Emperor v. Lazar* (1907), 30 Mad. 550.

⁷ *Abraham v. Abraham* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 199, at pp. 240-242; 1 W. R. P. C. 1, at pp. 5, 6 (a case of conversion to Christianity); *Ponnusami*

As to the effect of the conversion of a coparcener, see *post*, p. 350.

Conversion to
Mahomedan
religion.

But except on proof of a well-established custom,¹ and then only with regard to succession and inheritance,² converts to the Mahomedan religion, which in itself regulates the devolution of property, are bound by the Mahomedan law.³

Such custom has been fully established in the case of the Khoja Mahomedans,⁴ the Cutchi Memons,⁵ the Suni Borah Mahomedan community of the Dhandhuka Taluka in Gujerat,⁶ and the Molesalem

Nadan v. Dorasami Ayyan (1880), 2 Mad. 209 (ditto); *Bhagwan Koer (Rani) v. Jogendra Chandra Bose* (1903), 30 I. A. 249, at pp. 256, 257; 31 Calc. 11, at p. 33; 7 C. W. N. 895, at p. 903; 5 Bom. L. R. 854 (a case of an alleged Brahmo); *Kurum Kumari Roy v. Satyaranjan Das* (1903), 30 Calc. 999; 7 C. W. N. 784 (a case of a Brahmo). In *Francis Ghosal v. Gabri Ghosal* (1906), 31 Bom. 25, differing from *Telli v. Saldanha* (1886), 10 Mad. 69, it was held that coparcenership can be a part of the law governing the rights of a Christian family, converted from Hinduism. In *Raj Bahadur v. Bishen Dayal* (1882), 4 All. 343, at p. 347, it is said, "A Hindu or Mohammedan who becomes a convert to some other faith, is not deprived *ipso facto* of his rights to property by inheritance or otherwise. *Prima facie* he loses the benefits of the law of the religion he has abandoned, and acquires a new legal status according to the creed he has embraced, if such creed involves with it legal responsibilities and obligations."

¹ *Post*, pp. 27-32.

² *Khoja and Memon's case* (1847), Perry's O. C. 111. This only applies to separate and self-acquired property; *Jan Mahomed v. Dattu Jaffar* (1913), 38 Bom. 449; 15 Bom. L. R. 1044.

³ *Abraham v. Abraham* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 199, at p. 242; 1 W. R. P. C. 1, at p. 5; *Mahomed Sidick v. Haji Ahmed* (1886), 10 Bom. 1, at pp. 9, 10; *Raj Bahadur v. Bishen Dayal* (1882), 4 All. 343, at p. 347; *Sajan (Munes) v. Roop Ram* (1867), 2 Agra, 61; *Surmas Khan v. Kadir Dad Khan* (1865), Agra, F. B. 39 (edition 1874, p. 29); *Machhabai (Bai) v.*

Hirbai (Bai) (1911), 35 Bom. 564. See *Jowala Buksh v. Dharum Singh* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 511, at pp. 537, 538; *Hakim Khan v. Gool Khan* (1882), 8 Calc. 826; 10 C. L. R. 603, doubting *Rup Chand Chowdhry v. Latu Chowdhry* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 97. As to caste customs, see *Jina (Bai) v. Kharwar Jina* (1907), 31 Bom. 366. When the Hindu law of inheritance applies, converts to Islam take with all the liabilities annexed to the estate, such as the payment of maintenance and debts; *Rashid Karmali v. Sherbanoo* (1904), 29 Bom. 85; 6 Bom. L. R. 874.

⁴ See *Ahmedbhoy Hubibbhoy v. Casumbhoy Ahmedbhoy* (1889), 13 Bom. 534, and cases there cited. Khojas are governed by the Mayukha (*ante*, pp. 18, 19) with regard to inheritance and succession; *Rashid Karmali v. Sherbanoo* (1904), 29 Bom. 85; 6 Bom. L. R. 874.

⁵ *Mahomed Sidick v. Haji Ahmed* (1885), 10 Bom. 1, and cases there cited; *Saboo Sidick (Haji) v. Ally Mahomed Jan Mahomed* (1904), 30 Bom. 270; 6 Bom. L. R. 1135; *Moosa Haji Joonas Noorani v. Abdul Rahim (Haji)* (1905), 30 Bom. 197; 7 Bom. L. R. 447; S. C. in Court below, *Abdul (Haji) v. Hamid (Haji)* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 1010. This would also apparently apply to the Nassapooria Memons, see *Abdur Rahim v. Halimabai* (1915), 43 I. A. 35; 20 C. W. N. 362; 18 Bom. L. R. 635; and to the Bantwa Memons, *Safuran Umar v. Emma* (1916), 26 Kathiawar L. R. 174.

⁶ *Baiji (Bai) v. Santok (Bai)* (1894), 20 Bom. 53.

Girasias.¹ It has been held² that the Hindu law of joint family property has no application to Cutchi Memons. For similar reasons it would not apply in the case of any Mahomedans. It has been held that the Lubbais, Tamil speaking converts to Islam in the district of Coimbatore, follow the rule of Hindu law, excluding females from inheritance.³ As to Memons who have migrated to Africa, see *Abdur Rahim v. Halimabai* (1915), 43 I. A. 35 ; 20 C. W. N. 362 ; 18 Bom. L. R. 635.

The Indian Succession Act⁴ has brought under its provisions all native Christians, whether they have or have not elected to remain subject to the Hindu law.⁵ In marriage and divorce also they cease by conversion to be governed by Hindu law.⁶

The illegitimate children of Hindu parents are within the expression "Hindus."⁷

It has been held that the illegitimate children of a Hindu mother by a European father are to be treated as Hindus, if they have been brought up as such,⁸ but there is authority that where the mother is a non-Hindu the children cannot be treated as Hindus, even though the father is a Hindu.⁹ In one case, however, the son of a Mahomedan concubine was brought up as a Hindu and treated as such by his father, and his father's family.⁹

The mere circumstance that a man calls himself a Hindu is not sufficient to entitle him to the application of Hindu law,¹⁰ but in some cases, where the parties have followed the rules of Hindu law, that law may be applied as a rule of equity and good conscience.¹¹

Conversion to Hinduism is said to be common in Northern and Southern India.¹² Although the process of conversion may not be marked by any

¹ *Fatesangji Jasvalsangji (Maharana Shri) v. Harisangji Fatesangji (Kuvar)* (1894), 20 Bom. 181 ; *Moosa Haji Joonas Noorani v. Abdul Rahim (Haji)* (1905), 30 Bom. 197 ; 7 Bom. L. R. 447.

² *Mangaldas v. Abdul Razak* (1914), 16 Bom. L. R. 224 ; *Advocate-General v. Jimbaboi* (1915), 41 Bom. 181 ; 17 Bom. L. R. 799.

³ *Ibrahim Rowther (Sheik) v. Mohamed Ibrahim Rowther* (1915), 39 Mad. 664.

⁴ Act X. of 1865, s. 331.

⁵ *Dagree v. Pacotti San Jao* (1895), 19 Bom. 783 ; *Ponnusami Nadan v. Dorasami Ayyan* (1880), 2 Mad. 209 ; *Joseph Vathiar of Nazareth* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 121 ; *Nepenbala Debi v. Sittikanta Banerjee* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 158.

⁶ See Acts XV. of 1872 (Christian Marriage) ; IV. of 1869 (Divorce).

⁷ *Myna Boyee v. Ootaram* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 400 ; 2 W. R. P. C. 4 ; S. C. on remand (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 196. See *Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 50, at p. 53.

⁸ *Lingappa Goundan v. Esudasan* (1903), 27 Mad. 13. In that case the child was brought up as a Christian.

⁹ *Sher Bahadur (Bhaiya) v. Ganga Bakesh Singh (Bhaiya)* (1913), 41 I. A. 1 ; 36 All. 101 ; 18 C. W. N. 401 ; 16 Bom. L. R. 306.

¹⁰ *Raj Bahadur v. Bishen Dayal* (1882), 4 All. 343, at p. 348.

¹¹ *Ibid.* See also *Abraham v. Abraham* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 199, at p. 243 ; 1 W. R. P. C. 1, at p. 6. See *Muthusami Mudaliar v. Masilamani* (1909), 33 Mad. 342.

¹² *Muthusami Mudaliar v. Masilamani* (1909), 33 Mad. 342, at p. 349.

ceremonial acceptance, and is frequently a slow one, it seems possible throughout India, especially with regard to aborigines.¹

Who are
governed by
particular
schools of law.

As the Hindu law is a personal law, a Hindu is presumed to be governed by the school of law which governs the locality in which he resides.²

Families
governed by
law of origin.

If a Hindu migrates from one part of the country to another, the presumption is that he retains the laws and customs as to succession and family relations prevailing in the Province from which he came,³ at the time of the migration,⁴ and is not subject to the particular Hindu law administered in the place to which he migrates, or to the customs prevalent there,⁵ even with regard to property which he inherits from a person who is governed by the law prevalent in the place to which he migrates.⁶

This presumption also applies to migration from French India to British India.⁷

Such presumption may be rebutted by proof that the

¹ See Lyall's "Asiatic Studies," p. 104; Monier Williams' "Religious Thought and Life in India," pt. i. p. 57; W. J. Wilkins' "Modern Hinduism," p. 177; *Sher Bahadur (Bhaiya) v. Ganga Baksh Singh (Bhaiya)* (1913), 41 I. A. 1, at p. 14; 36 All. 101, at p. 116; 18 C. W. N. 401, at pp. 406, 407; 16 Bom. L. R. 306, at p. 316.

² *Ram Das v. Chandra Dassia* (1892), 20 Calc. 409; *Jugo Bundhoo Tewaree v. Kurum Singh* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 341.

³ *Parbati Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani) v. Jagadis Chunder Dhabal* (1902), 29 I. A. 82; 29 Calc. 433; 6 C. W. N. 490; 4 Bom. L. R. 365 (see this case as to evidence supporting this presumption); *Ambabai v. Govind* (1898), 23 Bom. 257, at p. 263; *Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramonee Burmoneah* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 81; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 26; 10 W. R. P. C. 35; *Grudhari Lall Roy v. Bengal Government* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 448, at pp. 458, 459; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 44, at p. 46; 10 W. R. P. C. 31; *Rutheputty Dutt Jha v. Rajunder Narain Rao* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 133, at p. 168; *Pudmaravati (Rany) v. Doolar Singh (Baboo)* (1847), 4 M. I. A. 259; 7 W. R. P. C. 41; *Kulada Prasad*

Pandey v. Haripada Chatterjee (1912), 40 Calc. 407; 17 C. W. N. 102; *Govind Chandra Das v. Radha Kristo Das* (1909), 31 All. 477; *Lukkea Debea v. Gungagobind Dobey*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 56; *Huopershad Roy Chowdhry v. Shibo Shunkuree Chowdhrair* (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 47; *Koomud Chunder Roy v. Seetakarath Roy* (1863), W. R. F. B. R. 75; *Sonatin Misser v. Ruttun Mallah* (1864), W. R. 1864, C. R. 95; *Ootum Chunder Bhutta-charjee v. Obhoychurn Misser* (1862), W. R. F. B. R. 67; S. C. sub nomine *Junaruddeen Misser v. Nobin Chunder Perdharn*, Marshall, 232; *Ram Bromo Pandah v. Kaminee Soonduree Dossee* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 295; *Mailathi Anni v. Subbaraya Mudaliar* (1901), 24 Mad. 650. See *Chandika Bakhsh v. Muna Kuar* (1902), 29 I. A. 70; 24 All. 273; 3 C. W. N. 425; 4 Bom. L. R. 376.

⁴ See *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at p. 162.

⁵ See *Byjnath Pershad v. Kopilmon Singh* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 95.

⁶ *Bhagabati Koer v. Sahudra Koer* (1911), 16 C. W. N. 834.

⁷ *Mailathi Anni v. Subbaraya Mudaliar* (1901), 24 Mad. 650.

individual or his ancestors had adopted the law, usages, or religious ceremonies of the country of his residence.¹

"It is not by looking merely at the performance of occasional local festivals that we can judge by what rule the family is governed. But we must look to the more important rites and ceremonies which are performed by them, namely, to those which attend births, marriages, and deaths in the family."²

Jains would ordinarily be governed by the Mitakshara school,³ but Jains. it has been held that in the absence of evidence the Hindu law applicable in that part of the country in which they dwell would apparently be applicable.⁴ Sastri (C. C. Sarkar⁵ says, "The Jains of Bengal . . . are governed by the Mitakshara law of the country of their origin, and not by the Daya-bhaga school prevailing here."

CUSTOM.

In administering the Hindu law, the Courts are required Custom. to give effect to a custom, i.e. to a rule in which a particular family⁶ or in a particular caste or class,⁷ or in a particular district,⁸ has from long usage obtained the force of law.⁹

¹ See *Ram Bromo Pandah v. Kaminee Soondree Dossee* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 295; *Parbati Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani) v. Jagadish Chunder Dhabal* (1902), 29 I. A. 82; 29 Calo. 433; 6 C. W. N. 490; 4 Bom. L. R. 365; *Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramonnee Burmoncah* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 81, at p. 96; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 26, at p. 36; 10 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 38; *Raj Chunder Narain Chowdry v. Goculchund Joh* (1801), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 43 (new edition, 56); *Ootum Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Obhoychurn Misser* (1862), W. R. F. B. R. 67; S. C. sub nomine *Junaruddeen Misser v. Nobin Chunder Ferdham*, Marshall, 232; *Chundro Seekhur Roy v. Nobin Soondur Roy* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 197.

² *Huro Pershad Roy Chowdhry v. Shibo Shunkuree Chowdhraim* (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 47. See *Pudmavati (Rany) v. Doolur Sing (Raboo)* (1847), 4 M. I. A. 259; 7 W. R. P. C. 41; *Login v. Princess Victoria Gouramma of Coorg* (1862), 1 Ind. Jur., O. S. 109.

³ *Mandit Koer (Mussamat) v. Phool Chand Lal* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 154.

⁴ *Mohabber Pershad (Lalla) v. Kun-*

dun Koovar (Mussamat) (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 116, at p. 118.

⁵ "Law of Adoption," p. 353.

⁶ A family custom is called a *Kolāchār*. See *Urfun Sing (Rawut) v. Ghunsiam Sing (Rawut)* (1851), 5 M. I. A. 169; *Ganesh Dutt Singh (Raboo) v. Moheshur Singh (Maharajah)* (1855), 6 M. I. A. 161; *Chintaman Singh (Chowdhry) v. Noolukho Konwari (Mussamat)* (1875), 2 I. A. 263; 1 Calo. 153; 24 W. R. C. R. 255; *Nanaji Ulput (Bhau) v. Sundrabai* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 219, at pp. 269, 270.

⁷ For instance, the customs of the Nambhudri Brahmins; see *Vasudevam v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157.

⁸ A local custom is called *Dadāchār*. Such custom is only applicable to persons domiciled in the place where it is in force; see *Padam Kumari v. Suraj Kumari* (1906), 28 All. 458.

⁹ *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1873), 3 I. A. 259, at p. 285; 26 W. R. C. R. 55, at p. 70; *Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanantha Perumal Sethurayar* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 570, at p. 585; 1 A. Sup. vol. 1, at p. 3; 12 B. L. R. 396, at p. 398; 17 W. R. C. R. 553.

“Under the Hindu system of law clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law.”¹

In the following enactments this principle has been recognized by the Legislature :—

Bom. Reg. IV. of 1827, s. 26; Madras Civil Courts Act (III. of 1873), s. 16; Lower Burma Courts Act (XI. of 1889), s. 4; Central Provinces Laws Act (XX. of 1875), s. 5; Oudh Laws Act (XVIII. of 1876), s. 3; Punjab Laws Act (IV. of 1872), s. 5, as amended by Act XII. of 1878, s. 1.

Conditions of
validity of
custom.

The Courts cannot give effect to a custom unless it be ancient,² definite,³ continuous,⁴ notorious,⁵ and reasonable.⁶

¹ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 436; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 12; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 21; *Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 50, at pp. 55-58; *Nanaji Utput (Bhai) v. Sundrabai* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 249. See “Manu,” chap. i. paras. 108, 110; chap. viii. paras. 41, 46; “Mitakshara,” chap. i. s. 3, para. 4; “Dayatattwa,” chap. i. para. 33; “Mayukha,” chap. i. s. 1, para. 13. Dr. J. N. Bhattacharya (“Hindu Law,” 2nd ed., pp. 50, 51) contends that according to the true translation of Manu’s Code, custom does not prevail against an express provision of law.

² *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259, at p. 285; 26 W. R. C. R. 55, at p. 70; *Ramakant Das Mahapatra v. Sivanantha Perumal Sethurayar* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 570, at pp. 585, 586; I. A. Sup. vol. 1, at p. 3; 12 B. L. R. 396, at p. 398; 17 W. R. C. R. 553; S. C. in court below, *Sivananjan Perumal Sethurayar v. Mutthu Ramalinga Sethurayar* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 75, at p. 77; *Nugendur Narain (Rajah) v. Rughoonath Narain Dey*, W. R. 1864, p. 20, at p. 23.

³ Or, as it may be expressed, certain, precise, and conclusive. *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259, at p. 285; 26 W. R. C. R. 55, at p. 70; *Ramakant Das Mahapatra v. Shakanand Das (Chowdhuri)* (1908), 36 I. A. 49; 36 Cal. 590; 13 C. W. N. 581; 11 Bom. L. R. 530; *Rajkishen Singh v. Ramjoy Surma Mozoomdar* (1872), 1 Cal. 186, at pp. 195, 196; 19 W. R. C. R. 8, at p. 11; *Bhagawan*

Das v. Balgobind Sing (1868), 1 B. L. R. S. N. ix.; *Doorga Pershad Singh (Tekact) v. Doorga Koorsee (Tekactnee)* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 154, at p. 157.

⁴ In other words, uniform, uninterrupted, invariable. *Nugendur Narain (Rajah) v. Rughoonath Narain Dey*, W. R. 1864, p. 20, at p. 24; *Ramakant Das Mahapatra v. Sivananjan Perumal Sethurayar* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 570, at pp. 585, 586; I. A. Sup. vol. 1, at p. 3; 12 B. L. R. 396, at p. 398; 17 W. R. C. R. 553; S. C. in Court below, *Sivananjan Perumal Sethurayar v. Mutthu Ramalinga Sethurayar* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 75, at p. 77; *Gopalayyan v. Raghupatayyan* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 250, at p. 254; *Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramonee Burmoneath* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 81, at p. 91; 10 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 36; *Rajkishen Singh (Rajah) v. Ramjoy Surma Mozoomdar* (1872), 1 Cal. 186, at p. 195; 19 W. R. C. R. 8, at p. 11; *Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Mangaldas Nathubhoy (Sir)* (1886), 10 Bom. 528, at p. 543. See *Amrit Nath Chowdhry v. Gauri Nath Chowdhry* (1870), 6 B. L. R. 232, at p. 238; *Jameelah Khatoon v. Pegul Ram* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 250; *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chumilal (Patel)* (1891), 16 Bom. 470, at p. 476.

⁵ See *Juggomohun Ghose v. Manickchand* (1859), 7 M. I. A. 263, at p. 282; 4 W. R. P. C. 8, at p. 10; *Gopalayyan v. Raghupatayyan* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 250, at p. 254.

⁶ *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259, at p. 285; 26 W. R. C. R. 55, at p. 70; *Lutchmeeput Singh v.*

It is invalid if it be opposed to an express enactment of the Legislature,¹ to morality, to public policy,² or to justice, equity, and good conscience.³ A custom must be established by clear and unambiguous proof,⁴ and must be construed strictly.⁵

With the exception of an old decision in Calcutta,⁶ by Grey, C.J., *Ancient*, which fixed 1773 the date of the Act of Parliament which established the Supreme Court, and 1793 the date when Regulations commenced to be registered, as the time for the commencement of legal memory in Calcutta and the Mofussil respectively, there is no decision which has professed to define the expression "ancient." That expression is apparently coincident with the expression "from time immemorial."⁷

Sadarulla Nushyo (1882), 9 Calc. 698, at p. 703; 12 C. L. R. 382, at p. 388.

¹ As, for instance, when the dedication of minors as dancing-girls of a pagoda amounts to an offence under ss. 372 and 373 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV. of 1860). *Ex parte Padmavati* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 415; *Queen Empress v. Ramanna* (1889), 12 Mad. 273; *Srinivasa v. Annasami* (1892), 15 Mad. 323; *Reg. v. Jaiji Bhavin* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. Cr. C. 60.

² *Chinna Ummayi v. Tegarai Chetti* (1876), 1 Mad. 168. See also *Sankaralingam Chetti v. Subban Chetti* (1894), 17 Mad. 479; *Ghasiti v. Umrao Jan* (1893), 20 I. A. 193; 21 Calc. 149. This is expressed by "Manu," chap. viii. para. 41, as "if they be not repugnant to the law of God."

³ See *Vurmah Valhar (Rajah) v. Ravi Vurmah Mutha* (1876), 4 I. A. 76; 1 Mad. 235. Oudh Laws Act (XVIII. of 1876), s. 3; Punjab Laws Act (XII. of 1878), s. 1. As to marriage brokerage contracts, see *post*, p. 52.

⁴ *Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanantha Perumal Sethurayar* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 570, at pp. 585, 586; I. A. Sup. vol. 1, at p. 3; 12 B. L. R. 306, at p. 398; 17 W. R. C. R. 553; S. C. in Court below, *Sivananjanja Perumal Sethurayar v. Muttu Ramalinga Sethurayar* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 75, at p. 77; *Nugendur Narain (Rajah) v. Rughoonath Narain Dey*, W. R. 1864, p. 20, at p. 23; *Serumah Umah v. Palathan Vstil Marya Coothy Umah* (1871), 15 W. R. P. C. 47; *Luchmun Lall v. Mohun Lall Bhaya Gayal* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R.

179; *Shidhojirav v. Narkojirav* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 228; *Vandranan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1891), 16 Bom. 470. See *Amrit Nath Chowdhry v. Gauri Nath Chowdhry* (1870), 6 B. L. R. 232, at p. 238; *Neelkanto Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 523, at p. 542; 3 B. L. R. (P. C.) 13, at p. 19; 12 W. R. P. C. 21, at p. 24; *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. A. C. 241; *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 362, at p. 383.

⁵ *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259, at p. 285; 26 W. R. C. R. 55, at p. 70.

⁶ Clarke's "Reports," pp. 113, 114. Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 314. The reason for this decision was that from the dates mentioned the powers of making laws were vested in the British Legislature. Sir G. D. Banerjee ("Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 235), questions the correctness of the above-mentioned decision of Grey, C.J., and adds, "We may at any rate fairly say, that in the Hindu law, not only is it unnecessary to trace back the existence of a custom to any definite date, but even the indefinite condition of being ancient may, in favour of some classes of customs, have to be dispensed with." It certainly seems unreasonable thus to fetter the growth of customs, which are encouraged by the Hindu law, and which are a means by which that law can be adapted to modern requirements.

⁷ See *Luchmun Lall v. Mohun Lall Bhaya Gayal* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 179; *Umrithnath Chowdhry v. Gou-*

"What the law requires before an alleged custom can receive the recognition of the Court, and so acquire legal force, is satisfactory proof of usage so long and invariably acted upon in practice as to show that it has by common consent been submitted to as the established governing rule of the particular family, class, or district or country."¹ Such proof raises a presumption that the usage was an ancient one.²

Discontinu-
ance of
custom.

So far as continuity is concerned there seems to be a distinction between a family custom and a local custom. In the former case it is competent to the family to discontinue the custom, as, for instance, a custom of impartibility,³ or it may have been accidentally discontinued.⁴ In the latter case the omission of individuals to follow the custom could not have the effect of destroying it, as it is a part of the *lex loci*, and binds all persons within the local limits in which it prevails.⁵

A well-established custom in a family cannot be defeated by the fact that in one case the custom was not enforced.⁶

When the custom has been proved the burden is upon the party alleging the discontinuance to prove that fact.⁷

New grant of
property
formerly im-
partible.

A family custom that property should remain impartible, is not necessarily destroyed by a new grant being made by the Government to a member of the family,⁸ but where a new tenure is created, and there is nothing in the circumstances under which the new grant was made to lead to the inference that the Government had in view in making the new grant the creation of an impartible zemindari as an exception to the ordinary rule of the Hindu law, the ordinary rules of Hindu law apply.⁹

reenath Chowdhry (1870), 13 M. I. A. 542, at p. 549; 15 W. R. P. C. 10, at p. 12; S. C. in Court below, 6 B. L. R. 232.

¹ *Sivananjan Perumal Sethurayar v. Mutta Ramalinga Sethurayar* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 75, at p. 77; S. C. on appeal, *Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivananiha Perumal Sethurayar* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 570; 1 A. Sup. vol. 1; 12 B. L. R. 396; 17 W. R. C. R. 553; *Shidhojirav v. Naikojirav* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 228, at p. 234. It was held in *Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar* (1914), 42 Calc. 455; 19 C. W. N. 208, that evidence showing exercise of a right in accordance with an alleged custom, as far back as living testimony can go, raises the presumption, though only a rebuttable one, as to the immemorial existence of the custom.

² See *Ramasami v. Appavu* (1887), 12 Mad. 9, at p. 14; *Nanaji Utpal (Bhav) v. Sundrabai* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 249.

³ It was assumed that such discontinuance was possible in *Lekhraj Kunwar (Thakurain) v. Harpal Singh (Thakur)* (1911), 39 I. A. 10; 34 All. 65; 16 C. W. N. 217; 14 Bom. L. R. 33.

⁴ *Rajkishen Singh v. Ramjoy Surma Mozoomdar* (1872), 1 Calc.

186, at p. 195; 19 W. R. C. R. 8, at p. 12; *Sarabjit Partap Bahadar Sahi v. Indarjit Partap Bahadar Sahi* (1904), 27 All. 203.

⁵ *Rajkishen Singh v. Ramjoy Surma Mozoomdar* (1872), 1 Calc. 186, at p. 195; 19 W. R. C. R. 8, at p. 12.

⁶ *Elkradeswar Singh v. Janeshwari Babuasin* (1914), 41 I. A. 275, at pp. 288, 289; 42 Calc. 582, at p. 606; 18 C. W. N. 1249, at p. 1259; 17 Bom. L. R. 18, at p. 31.

⁷ *Sarabjit Partap Bahadar Sahi v. Indarjit Partap Bahadar Sahi* (1904), 27 All. 203.

⁸ See *Beer Pertab Sahee (Baboo) v. Rajender Pertab Sahee (Maharajah)* (1867), 12 M. I. A. 1; 9 W. R. P. C. 15; *Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar* (1881), 8 I. A. 99; 3 Mad. 290; *Jaganatha v. Ramabhadra* (1888), 11 Mad. 380; *Kachi Yuva Rangappa Kallakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Kalyana Rangappa Kallakka Thola Udayar* (1901), 24 Mad. 562; upheld on appeal (1905), 32 J. A. 261; 28 Mad. 508; 10 C. W. N. 95; 7 Bom. L. R. 907.

⁹ *Merangi, Zemindar of, v. Satru-charla Ramabhadra Razu (Sri Rajah)*

A family custom is personal, and does not apply to subsequent owners of the land held by the family.¹

The following are illustrations of customs which have been held void Immorality. for immorality:—

A custom allowing a woman to remarry during the lifetime of her husband and without his consent.²

A custom authorizing a husband or wife to divorce the other against his or her will, and without giving any reason, on condition only of a payment to the caste.³

A custom for dancing-girls to adopt daughters under circumstances which would amount to a traffic in minors as prohibited by ss. 372 and 373 of the Indian Penal Code; ⁴ but except where the recognition of the rights alleged would countenance such a traffic, or the usage is in itself immoral,⁵ the Courts will give effect to the rights of dancing-girls attached to Hindu temples in respect of endowments for their support,⁶ and also to the peculiar usages of the dancing-girl and prostitute classes with regard to adoption ⁷ and succession.⁸

There is nothing immoral or opposed to public policy in a tribal custom which requires a son-in-law to reside in the family of his father-in-law.⁹

A custom will not be applied unless those following the custom are convinced in conscience that they are acting in accordance with law.¹⁰

Judicial recognition is not a condition precedent to the validity of a custom,¹¹ but such recognition may be of great value as evidence of the existence of that custom.¹² Judicial recognition.

(1891), 18 I. A. 45, at p. 53; 14 Mad. 237, at p. 245; *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Rajah) v. Narayya Appa Row Bahadur (Rajah)* (1879), 7 I. A. 38; 2 Mad. 128; 6 C. L. R. 153.

¹ *Gopal Das Sindh v. Nurotum Sindh* (1845), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 195 (2nd ed., 230).

² *Post*, p. 63.

³ *Keshav Hargovan v. Gandhi (Bai)* (1915), 39 Bom. 513; 17 Bom. L. R. 584.

⁴ Act XLV. of 1860.

⁵ *Chinna Ummayi v. Tegarai Chetti* (1876), 1 Mad. 168.

⁶ *Tara Naikin v. Nana Lakshman* (1889), 14 Bom. 90; *Kamalam v. Sadagopa Sami* (1878), 1 Mad. 356; *Mathura Naikin v. Eru Naikin* (1880), 4 Bom. 545, at p. 565. See *Chinna Ummayi v. Tegarai Chetti* (1876), 1 Mad. 168.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 163, 164.

⁸ *Tara Munnee Dossea v. Molee Buneanee* (1846), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 273 (2nd ed., 325); *Sivasangu v. Minal* (1889), 12 Mad. 277; *Kamakshi v.*

Nagarathnam (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 161.

⁹ *Lenga Lalung v. Penguri Lalungni* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 406.

¹⁰ *Gopalayyan v. Raghupatiayyan* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 250, at p. 254. See *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1891), 16 Bom. 470, at p. 476.

¹¹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 56-58. In *Narasammal v. Balaramachariu* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 420, at p. 424, Holloway, J., said, "A very short experience will suffice to satisfy any judge that a pundit will always overcome a passage of Hindu law too stubborn for other manipulation by the often baseless allegation of custom." He proceeds to say, "And in our judgment no custom, how long soever continued, which has never been judicially recognized, can be permitted to prevail against distinct authority." It is submitted that this last proposition cannot be supported.

¹² See Act I. of 1872, s. 42; *Shimbbu Nath v. Gayanchand* (1894), 16 All. 379.

Burden of
proof of
custom.

In the case of persons governed generally by the Hindu law, the burden of proving a custom derogatory to that law lies upon the person who asserts it.¹

If it be shown that a custom applies to a particular class or community, the burden of showing that the individual member is not bound by it lies upon the person asserting such exception.²

In the case of a tribe or family which are not originally Hindu, but which has adopted Hinduism, the burden of proving that the family is governed in a particular matter by the Hindu law is upon the person who asserts that it is so governed.³

Where a custom prevails in one branch of a family, it is strong evidence that it applies with equal force to another branch of the same family.⁴

As to proof of the devolution of an impartible Raj, see *Mohesh Chunder Dhal v. Satrugan Dhal* (1902), 29 I. A. 62; 29 Calc. 343; 6 C. W. N. 459; 4 Bom. L. R. 372.

As to proof of the customs of Jains, see *Harnabh Pershal v. Mandil Dass* (1899), 27 Calc. 379.

As to the mode of proof of a custom, see Act I. of 1872, ss. 13, 32, 42, 48, 49.

"The kind of evidence that ought to be regarded is evidence showing that the right claimed by custom was more or less contested and the contest abandoned by some one who, if the custom had not existed, would have been entitled, or evidence showing that generally in the district the custom was followed to the exclusion of persons who, if it had not been for the custom, would presumably have enforced the right under the general law."⁵ Decrees and an understanding in the family,⁶ entries in village records, and answers to official inquiries,⁷ declarations of the heads of families⁸ are all evidence.

¹ *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 153, at p. 165; 21 All. 412, at p. 423; 3 C. W. N. 454, at p. 459; 1 Bom. L. R. 311; *Chandika Baksh v. Muna Kuar* (1902), 29 I. A. 70; 24 All. 273; 6 C. W. N. 425; 4 Bom. L. R. 376; *Famindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Dass* (1885), 12 I. A. 72, at p. 81; 11 Calc. 463, at p. 476; *Basava v. Lingangudda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at p. 473; *Desai Ranchhodas v. Rawal Nathubai* (1895), 21 Bom. 110, at pp. 116, 117; *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 241, at p. 260; *Narayan Babaji v. Nana Manohar* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. 153, at p. 175; *Mahendra Singh (Rajah) v. Jokha Singh* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 211; *Jeetnath Sahee Deo (Thakoor) v. Lokenath Sahee Deo* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 239; and cases, ante, p. 29, note 4.

² See *Gitabai v. Shivbakas* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 376.

³ As, for instance, the law of adoption, *Famindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Dass* (1885), 2 I. A. 72, at p. 81; 11 Calc. 463, at p. 476.

⁴ *Lal Gajendra Nath Sahi Deo v. Lal Mathuralal Nath Sahi Deo* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 109.

⁵ *Rama Nand v. Surgiani* (1894), 16 All. 221, at p. 223.

⁶ *Mohesh Chunder Dhal v. Satrugan Dhal* (1902), 29 I. A. 62; 29 Calc. 343; 6 C. W. N. 459; 4 Bom. L. R. 372.

⁷ *Parbati Kunwar v. Chandurpal Kunwar (Rani)* (1909), 36 I. A. 125; 31 All. 457; 13 C. W. N. 1073; 11 Bom. L. R. 890. As to a *wajib ul arz*, see *Anant Singh (Thakur) v. Durga Singh (Thakur)* (1910), 37 I. A. 191; 32 All. 363; 14 C. W. N. 770; 12 Bom. L. R. 504.

⁸ *Hiranath Koer (Maharani) v. Ram Narayan Sing (Baboo)* (1872), 9 B. L. R. 224; 17 W. R. C. R. 316.

CHAPTER I.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MARRIAGE.

THE relationship of husband and wife is created by a marriage, entered into by two persons, who are each competent, according to Hindu law, to enter into the state of marriage,¹ and who are not debarred by that law from intermarrying,² such marriage being performed with the ceremonies prescribed by that law.³

According to Hindu ideas, marriage has for its object the performance of religious duties. It is a *sanskar*, that is, an essential ceremony, held indispensable to constitute the perfect purification of a Hindu.⁴ It is the last of the ten *sanskars* necessary for the regeneration of males of the twice-born classes,⁵ and is the only one prescribed for women and for *Sūdras*.⁶

Marriage is essential to a Hindu in order that by begetting a son he may be delivered from the hell called *put*, to which the shades of a sonless man are, according to Hindu ideas, doomed,⁷ that he may repay the debt he owes to his forefathers,⁸ and that he may be able to perform some of the most important religious acts.⁹

It is the imperative religious duty of a father, or other guardian,¹⁰ to cause a girl to be married, before she attains puberty, to a suitable husband, capable of procreating children.¹¹ There is, however, no legal obligation.¹²

¹ *Post*, pp. 34-38.

² *Post*, pp. 38-46.

³ *Post*, pp. 58-61.

⁴ Wilson's "Glossary," p. 463.

⁵ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii., p. 104, note.

⁶ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii., p. 95. See *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, at p. 318; *Kameswara Sastri v. Veerachariu* (1910), 34 Mad. 422; *Srinivasa Iyengar v. Thiravengadathaiyengar* (1914), 38 Mad. 556.

⁷ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 138; "Dayabhaga," chap. v. para. 6; "Dattaka Mimamsa," chap. i. para. 5; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii.,

pp. 158, 293, 294.

⁸ "Dattaka Mimamsa," chap. i. para. 5.

⁹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 81.

¹⁰ As to the persons upon whom the duty devolves, see *post*, pp. 46-48.

¹¹ *Jumoon Dassya Chowdhurani v. Bamasoonderei Dassya Chowdhurani* (1876), 3 I. A. 72, at p. 78; 1 Cal. 289, at pp. 294, 295; 25 W. R. C. R. 235, at p. 236; *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, at p. 322.

¹² *Sundari Ammal v. Subramania Ayyar* (1902), 26 Mad. 505.

Duty of
guardian of
boy.

Although the law permits the marriage of boys who have not attained majority,¹ and marriage is a religious necessity for them,² such marriages by male minors do not seem to have been contemplated by the sages and early writers on Hindu law.³ There is, it is submitted, a moral or religious obligation upon a parent, or other guardian, to provide a wife for a boy, as there is to provide a husband for a girl,⁴ and there is a right to provide for his marriage, and for its expenses.⁵

WHO MAY MARRY.

Who are
competent to
marry.

Unless expressly prohibited by a provision of the Hindu law, any male Hindu is competent to marry, and every unmarried Hindu female is competent to be given in marriage.⁶

A *garbari gosavi*⁷ is competent to contract a valid marriage.⁸

The Hindu law regards the bridegroom as the person who marries, and the bride as the person who is taken in marriage.⁹

Defects.

Physical and mental defects, even if they be such as to cause exclusion from inheritance,¹⁰ do not invalidate a marriage.¹¹

Lunacy.

Unsoundness of mind does not invalidate a marriage.

"To put it at the highest, the objection to a marriage on the ground of mental incapacity must depend upon a question of degree."¹²

¹ *Post*, p. 35.

² *Ante*, p. 33. *Sundrabai v. Shrinarayana* (1907), 32 Bom. 81; 9 Bom. L. R. 1366; *Gopalakrishnam v. Venkatanarasa* (1912), 37 Mad. 273.

³ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 94; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 81, 82. See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 37.

⁴ See *Kameswara Sastri v. Verracharu* (1910), 34 Mad. 422; *Sundrabai v. Shrinarayana* (1907), 32 Bom. 81; 9 Bom. L. R. 1366; *Gopalakrishnam v. Venkatanarasa* (1912), 37 Mad. 273, overruling *Govindarazulu Narasimham v. Devarabholla Venkatanarasayya* (1903), 27 Mad. 206.

⁵ *Kameswara Sastri v. Verracharu* (1910), 34 Mad. 422; *Gopalakrishnam v. Venkatanarasa* (1912), 37 Mad. 273, overruling *Govindarazulu Narasimham v. Devarabholla Venkatanarasayya* (1903), 27 Mad. 206, see *post*, pp. 52, 53.

⁶ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 34.

⁷ These are a class of religious mendicants.

⁸ *Gitabai v. Shivbakas* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 318.

⁹ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 35; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 81.

¹⁰ As to the physical defects which cause exclusion from inheritance, see Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 349-351; Sarkar's "Hindu Law," pp. 232-235; Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 829-837, and cases there cited; *post*, pp. 52, 53.

¹¹ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 203; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, paras. 9-11; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 244; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. v. s. 11, para. 11, "Smriti Chandrika," chap. v. para. 32.

¹² *Mouji Lal v. Chandrabati Kumari (Musammatt)* (1911), 38 I. A. 122, at p. 125; 38 Cal. 700, at p. 706; 15 C. W. N. 790, at p. 793; 13 Bom. L. R. 534, at p. 541.

Pundits both in Bengal¹ and Bombay² have given opinions that it does not invalidate a marriage. Sir G. D. Banerjee points out that "there are indications in the law from which it would appear that lunatics are considered competent to marry,"³ but he also says⁴ that, as a lunatic is incompetent to accept the gift of a bride, it is not easy to understand how his marriage can be regarded as marriage at all.

The question of mental incapacity is one of degree. The Court will presume in favour of the validity of the marriage, and the legitimacy of the children.⁵

The ancient authorities permitted a eunuch to marry on the ground Impotence, that his wife could raise up a son to him by a man legally appointed,⁶ but now that the system of *niyoga*⁷ is obsolete, it may be a question whether the Courts will not declare the marriage of an impotent person to be void.⁸

Except that in the case of the twice-born classes marriages cannot take place before investiture with the sacred thread,⁹ a male Hindu of any age can marry.¹⁰

A female Hindu of any age can be given in marriage.¹¹

The Hindu religion requires a girl to be given in marriage before she attains the age of puberty,¹² but there is nothing in the Hindu law to invalidate the marriage of a woman who has attained puberty.¹³

As to the necessity for the consent of a guardian in the case of the marriage of minors, see *post*, pp. 46-51

¹ See *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, at p. 318; *Dabychurn Mitter v. Radhachurn Mitter* (1817), 2 Morl. Dig. 99.

² West and Bühler's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 274.

³ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 38; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 203; "Daya Bhaga," chap. v. para. 18; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, paras. 9-11; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 244; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. v. para. 32; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 11, para. 11.

⁴ P. 39.

⁵ *Mouji Lal v. Chandrabati Kumari* (*Musammât*) (1911), 38 I. A. 122; 38 Calc. 700; 15 C. W. N. 790; 13 Bom. L. R. 534.

⁶ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 203; "Daya Bhaga," chap. v. para. 18.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 45, 100, 139-141.

⁸ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 40; Parasara, quoted in Vidyasagar's "Marriage

of Hindu Widows," pp. 4, 7; Steele, p. 167; *Kanahi Ram v. Biddya Ram* (1878), 1 All. 549, at p. 551.

⁹ The rule is that the investiture of a *Brahmin* should take place in the eighth, that of a *Kshatrya* in the eleventh, and that of a *Vaisya* in the twelfth year from his conception, "Manu," chap. ii. para. 36.

¹⁰ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 36. Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 82. See *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, at p. 318.

¹¹ Sir G. D. Banerjee ("Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 45) says, "Ordinarily the lowest age for marriage is eight years, but Manu allows a girl to be married even before the proper age, if a proper union is secured" ("Manu," chap. ix. para. 88, and note by Kulluka).

¹² *Ante*, p. 33.

¹³ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 45.

Polygamy.

A Hindu ¹ may at his pleasure marry any number of wives, although he has a wife or wives living.²

No effect can be given to an agreement purporting to avoid a marriage on the taking of a second wife during the lifetime of the first,³ and apparently an agreement not to enter into such second marriage would be against the policy of the Hindu Law.⁴

Contracting a second marriage during the lifetime of the wife is called *adhivedana*, or supersession, but does not in any way imply that the first wife is deserted.⁵

The Hindu writers prescribe that a present (*adhivedanika*) should be given to the wife as compensation for her supersession, but they do not agree as to the amount.⁶ Such compensation could not apparently be claimed in a Court of law.

Christian.

A Hindu, who has become a Christian, cannot take to himself another wife while his wife is alive.⁷

He can do so on his return to Hinduism.⁸

Bigamy of women.

A woman cannot marry another man while her husband is alive.⁹

Although the Courts will not recognize a custom which permits a wife at her pleasure to desert her husband and marry another man,¹⁰ at

¹ Even if he has at one time professed Christianity, 3 Mad. H. C. App. vii.

² See *Virasvami Chetti v. Appasvami Chetti* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 375; *Arumugam v. Tulukanam* (1883), 7 Mad. 187, at p. 188; *Thapita Peter v. Thapita Lakshmi* (1894), 17 Mad. 235, at p. 239; *Huree Bhaee Nana v. Nuthoo Koobor* (1810), 1 Borr. 59; Banerjee, "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 40, 136; "Daya Bhaga," chap. ix. para. 6, note; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," p. 672. Polygamy is not permitted to members of the *Brahmo Samaj*; *Sonaluzmi v. Vishnuprasad Hariprasad* (1903), 28 Bom. 597; 6 Bom. L. R. 58.

³ *Sitaram v. Aheeree Heerahnee (Mussamul)* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 129; 20 W. R. C. R. 49.

⁴ See *ibid.*, per Kemp, J., 11 B. L. R., at p. 135; 20 W. R. C. R., at p. 50. Would it not be, from the Hindu point of view, an agreement in restraint of marriage, and therefore void under s. 26 of the Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872)?

⁵ See "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, paras. 2 (note) and 35; *Emperor v. Lazar* (1907), 30 Mad. 550.

⁶ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 138, 139; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, para. 35; "Dayakrama Sangraha," chap. vi. para. 31; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 561.

⁷ See *Thapita Peter v. Thapita Lakshmi* (1894), 17 Mad. 235; ante, p. 23, note 6.

⁸ *Emperor v. Anthony* (1910), 33 Mad. 371; (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. App. vii. See, however, *Emperor v. Lazar* (1907), 30 Mad. 550.

⁹ *Thapita Peter v. Thapita Lakshmi* (1894), 17 Mad. 235, at p. 239. "Manu," chap. viii. para. 226; chap. ix. paras. 46, 47, 71. See *Sinammal v. Administrator-General of Madras* (1885), 8 Mad. 169, at p. 173.

¹⁰ *Narayan Bharthi v. Laving Bharthi* (1877), 2 Bom. 140; *Reg. v. Sambhu Raghu* (1876), 1 Bom. 347; *Reg. v. Karsan Goja* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 124; *Uji v. Hathi Lahu* (1870),

any rate where the first husband does not consent to the second marriage,¹ it would apparently give effect to a custom permitting such remarriage on desertion by the husband.² A custom authorizing such remarriage in case of the husband's leprosy might also be valid.³ It has been held that a custom by which the marriage tie can be dissolved by either husband or wife against the wish of the divorced party, the sole condition being the payment of a sum of money fixed by the caste, is bad.⁴

No effect could be given to the decision of a *panchayet* or of a caste which authorizes a remarriage,⁵ except, perhaps, where by custom a valid divorce could be effected by such decision.⁶

Where divorce is permissible by custom,⁷ or where a divorce has been decreed under Act XXI. of 1866,⁸ a woman can remarry. Remarriage after divorce.

The marriage of a girl, who has been betrothed⁹ (but not betrothed girl married) to another man, is valid.¹⁰

A widow can remarry.¹¹

Remarriage of widow.

As to the forfeiture of her rights on remarriage, see *post*, pp. 369, 370.

Except in the case of a special custom¹² the remarriage of widows was prohibited by the Hindu law, which was in force at the time of the passing of Act XV. of 1856.¹³

The Hindu law placed certain restrictions upon marriage by rules, which are now treated as operating only as moral injunctions. Moral injunctions.

Impurity arising from the birth or death of a relation was treated as a disqualification.¹⁴

7 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 133; *Reg. v. Manohar Raiji* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. Cr. C. 17. See *In the matter of Chamia (Musst)* (1880), 7 C. L. R. 354.

¹ See *Khemkor v. Umiashankar Ranchhor* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 381.

² *Virasangappa v. Rudrappa* (1885), 8 Mad. 440. See *Sinammal v. Administrator-General of Madras* (1885), 8 Mad. 169, at p. 173.

³ See *Reg. v. Sambhu Raghu* (1876), 1 Bom. 347, at p. 352.

⁴ *Keshav Hargovan v. Gandhi (Bai)* (1915), 39 Bom. 538; 17 Bom. L. R. 584.

⁵ See *Bissuram Koiree v. The Empress* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 410, at p. 413; *Reg. v. Sambhu Raghu* (1876), 1 Bom. 347; *Emperor v. Ganga (Bai)* (1916), 19 Bom. L. R. 56.

⁶ See *post*, pp. 63, 64.

⁷ *Post*, p. 64.

⁸ *Post*, p. 64.

⁹ *Post*, pp. 58, 59.

¹⁰ *Khimji Vassonji v. Narsi Dhanji* (1915), 39 Bom. 682; 17 Bom. L. R. 225; *Lakhi Priya v. Bhairab Chandra Chaudhuri* (1835), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 315 (2nd ed., 369); *Khooshal v. Bhugwan Motee* (1813), 1 Borr. 138. See Act XV. of 1856, s. 1.

¹¹ Act XV. of 1856, s. 1.

¹² Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 400. As to such customs, see Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 113-117.

¹³ "Manu," chap. v. paras. 157, 161; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 37, 241, vol. ii. p. 400; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," p. 647. In *Vithu v. Govinda* (1896), 22 Bom. 321, at p. 331, Ranade, J., says that the prohibition only extended to the three superior castes.

¹⁴ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 106.

The marriage of a younger brother before an elder brother,¹ or of a younger sister before an elder sister,² was prohibited.

For other instances, see Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 54, 55; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 85, 86.

WHO MAY INTERMARRY.

Restrictions
on inter-
marriage.

The following rules³ as to identity of caste, exogamy, and prohibited degrees have been deduced from texts of the sages by Raghunandana,⁴ who is said to be the highest authority in Bengal in all matters excepting inheritance,⁵ and are reiterated by Kamalakara Bhatta in the *Nirnaya Sindhu*,⁶ which is said to be of authority in the Benares school,⁷ in the Bombay Presidency,⁸ and in Southern India.⁹

Identity of
caste.

1. Intermarriage between persons not belonging to the same primary caste is void.¹⁰

Subdivisions
of caste.

This rule only prevents intermarriage between the four primary castes.¹¹ It does not prevent marriage between persons belonging to different subdivisions of the same primary caste.¹²

¹ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 42; Bhattacharya ("Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 83) says that this rule is imperative.

² Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 56.

³ For a discussion of these rules, see Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., pp. 57-60.

⁴ In his "Udvahatattwa."

⁵ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 36.

⁶ Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 92.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 37.

⁸ Mandlik's "Vyavahara Mayukha," Introduction, p. 73; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 37.

⁹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 37.

¹⁰ *Padam Kumari v. Suraj Kumari* (1906), 28 All. 458; *Melaram Nudial v. Thanooram Bamun* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 552; *Lakshmi v. Kiliansing* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 128; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 85; Steele, pp. 26, 29, 30; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 141; "Vyavastha Darpana," 656; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 40; "Mitak-

shara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 2, and note. See *Ram Lal Shookool v. Akhoy Charan Mitter* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 619. In that case the judges assumed that Vaidyas were Vaisyas. As to the position of Vaidyas, see Bhattacharya's "Hindu Castes and Sects," pp. 159-171; Risley's "Tribes and Castes of Bengal," vol. i. pp. 46-50.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 22, 23.

¹² *Inderun Valungypooley Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talaver* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 141, at p. 158; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 4; 12 W. R. P. C. 41, at pp. 42, 43. See S. C. in Court below; *Pandarya Telaver v. Puh Telaver* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 478, at p. 483; *Upoma Kuchin v. Bholaram Dhubi* (1888), 15 Calc. 708; *Mahan-tawa v. Gangawa* (1909), 33 Bom. 693; 11 Bom. L. R. 822. See *Ramaman Ammal v. Kulanthai Natchear* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 346; 1 W. R. C. R. 1; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 85; Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 103. A contrary view was expressed in *Melaram Nudial v. Thanooram Bamun* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 552, and by Mitter, J., in *Narain Dhara v. Rakhal Gain* (1875), 1 Calc. 1, at p. 4; 23 W. R. C. R.

In the case of the marriage of an illegitimate person, who, strictly speaking, belongs to no caste, he or she must be treated as belonging to the caste the members of which have recognized him or her as a caste fellow.¹

A marriage between a Hindu and a Christian woman who had become a Hindu has been upheld.²

The question as to the effect of a marriage between a Hindu and a Mixed non-Hindu is not an easy one. Such a marriage when celebrated in England according to English forms may be effectual according to English law,³ but in India the position is different. If the marriage be in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act,⁴ it would be valid. The Hindu law did not contemplate any such marriages, and would not recognize them. If the marriage were attempted to be performed according to Hindu rites and ceremonies, it would apparently have no effect, but if it were performed according to other rites (*e.g.* Brahmo rites) the Court would apparently give effect to it. The inclination would be to support marriages, to which there could be no moral objection, to prevent children being rendered illegitimate, and to repudiate objections which however suited to ancient society have no application to modern times, when many people of divers communities and religions are to be found in India. The Court might well say that as there was no Hindu law dealing expressly with the subject, the case would be dealt with by principle of equity and good conscience. Legislation on this subject is much needed.

Marriages between members of different castes may be recognized by Custom. local custom.⁵

2. A member of one of the twice-born classes cannot marry the daughter of an agnate, *i.e.* of a person belonging to the same *gotra*,⁶ or primitive stock, as himself.⁷

334, at p. 335. It is said that in Bengal the practice is in accordance with Mitter, J.'s, view in the above case (Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 75). As to Bombay, see Steele, pp. 29, 30. As to intermarriage between different sects of Lingayets, see *Fakirganda v. Gangi* (1896), 22 Bom. 277. As to a family custom allowing intermarriage between sub-castes, see *Nugendur Narain (Rajah) v. Rughoonath Narain Dey*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 20, at p. 23.

¹ *In the matter of Ramkumari* (1891), 18 Calc. 264; *Emperor v. Madan Gopal* (1912), 34 All. 589. As to the daughter of a bastard, see *Indurun Valungypooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talaver* (1869), 13 M. L. A. 141; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 1; 12 W. R. P. C. 41; S. C. in Court below; *Pandaiya Telaver v. Puli Telaver* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 478.

² *Muthusami Mudaliar v. Masila-*

mani (1909), 33 Mad. 342.

³ *Chetti v. Chetti*, [1909] P. D. 67.

⁴ Act XV. of 1872.

⁵ See *Ram Lal Shookool v. Akhoy Charan Mitter* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 619. As to this case, see 7 C. W. N. pp. cccxxvii. and cccxxviii.

⁶ Lit. cow-pen, *i.e.* a place in which cows were kept or protected from plundering attacks; Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," p. 113. For a discussion as to the origin of the term, see Max Muller's "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. ii. p. 28; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 56, 57; Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 76.

⁷ "Manu," chap. iii. para. 5; Steele, p. 160; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 329; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 56, 57; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 88; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 657.

This prevents a marriage between persons who are connected with a common ancestor entirely through males.

In this connection the expression *gotra* "means a family descended from one of the several patriarchs, who are, according to some, twenty-four, and according to others, forty-two in number."

There seems to be no certainty as to what are the gotras at the present day. Apparently there are eight primitive gotras descended from the seven Rishis, Viswamitra, Jamadagni, Bharadwaja, Gotama, Attri, Vasistha, Kasyapa, together with Agastya. The remaining gotras are possibly subdivisions of these eight, but are not all identifiable with them.¹

"The theory of the gotra, as latterly described by Brahmanic writers, denies that either a Kshatriya, or a Vaisya, or a Sudra has a right to say that he belongs to a special gotra in the proper sense of the term."² Kshatriyas and Vaisyas have adopted the gotras of the spiritual guides or family priests of their remote progenitors.³ It is also said that a man is prohibited from marrying a girl belonging to a gotra having the same pravaras or principal sages as his own.⁴

3. A Hindu may not marry⁵—

- (a) A female descendant as far as the seventh⁶ degree from his father or from one of his father's six ancestors in the male line⁷

Prohibited
degrees of
relationship.
Descendants
of father and
paternal
ancestors.

Sastri G. C. Sarkar, in his "Law of Adoption,"⁸ says, "In fact the prohibited degrees for marriage are considered by the Sanskrit writers to constitute *sapindas* for the purpose of marriage, and they are different according to different sages. For instance, Vasishtha declares that a man may marry a girl who is *fifth* and *seventh* on the mother's and father's sides respectively, whilst Paithinasi says that a damsel may be espoused who is beyond the *third* on the mother's and *fifth* on the father's side."⁹

¹ See Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," pp. 111-113; Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar's "Widow Marriage," p. 193.

² Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," p. 111.

³ *Ibid.*; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 57; "Dattaka Mimamsa," chap. ii. para. 76.

⁴ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 56, note 4; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 329; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 88. See *Ramchandra v. Gopal* (1908), 32 Bom. 619, at p. 626; 10 Bom. L. R. 948.

⁵ See *Minakshi v. Ramanadha* (1887), 11 Mad. 49, at p. 53. These rules are taken from Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 59-62. In Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 93, diagrams illustrating these

rules will be found.

⁶ In the calculation of prohibited degrees Hindu lawyers count both of the persons whose relationship is under consideration. So in this case, according to the English mode of calculation, the prohibition would end at the sixth degree. See *post*, p. 43, note 4.

⁷ "Udvahatattwa," Raghunandana's "Institutes," vol. ii. p. 65, referred to in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 62. See *Vyas Chimanlal v. Vyas Ramchandra* (1899), 24 Bom. 473; 4 Bom. L. R. 163. As to marriage with a half-sister's daughter, see *Karunabdkhi Ganesa Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar* (1880), 7 I. A. 173, at p. 177; 2 Mad. 270, at p. 279.

⁸ P. 386.

⁹ "Mitakshara," chap. i. para. 53.

But seven degrees on both sides appears to be prohibited by Manu, for he declares that a man must not marry a girl who is sapinda to his mother,¹ and lays down generally in another place that sapinda relationship ceases with the seventh ancestor."²

- (b) A female descendant as far as the seventh degree from his father's *bandhus*³ or from one of their six ancestors, through whom such female is related to him.⁴

Descendants from father's *bandhus*, and their ancestors.

These six ancestors would be the *bandhu's* mother, mother's father, mother's father's father, mother's father's father's father, mother's father's father's father's father, and mother's father's father's father's father's father. It does not include mother's mother, &c., as "a line of female ancestors is not regarded as a line in the Hindu law."⁵

- (c) A female descendant as far as the fifth degree from his maternal grandfather or from one of his maternal grandfather's four ancestors in the male line.⁶

Descendants of maternal grandfather, and of his ancestors.

In the Presidency of Madras marriage with the daughter of a maternal uncle or of a paternal aunt is recognized by custom.⁷

According to some authorities a man cannot marry the daughter of an agnate of his maternal grandfather.⁸

- (d) A female descendant as far as the fifth⁹ degree from his mother's *bandhus*,¹⁰ or from one of their four ancestors through whom such female is related to him.¹¹

Descendants from mother's *bandhus* and their ancestors.

Where the *bandhu* in question is the son of the mother's maternal or paternal aunt, these four ancestors would be the *bandhu's* mother, mother's father, mother's father's father, and mother's father's father's father, and where the *bandhu* is the son of the mother's maternal uncle the four ancestors would be the father, father's father, father's father's father, and father's father's father's father.¹²

¹ Chap. iii. para. 5.

² Chap. v. para. 60.

³ A *bandhu* is a *sapinda*, related through a female.

⁴ "Udvahatattwa," Raghunandana's "Institutes," vol. ii. p. 65, referred to in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 62.

⁵ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 63.

⁶ "Udvahatattwa," Raghunandana's "Institutes," vol. ii. p. 65, referred to in G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 63.

⁷ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 105. See note by Mr. Anand Charlu, "Calcutta Weekly Notes," vol. vii. pp. lxxvii, xc., xcvi.

⁸ "Manu," chap. iii. para. 5. There seems to be a difference of opinion with regard to this note; see Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 91, 92; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 658.

⁹ See *ante*, p. 40.

¹⁰ See above, note 3. This includes the sons of his mother's maternal aunt, the sons of his mother's paternal aunt, and the sons of his mother's maternal uncle.

¹¹ "Udvahatattwa," Raghunandana's "Institutes," vol. ii. p. 65, referred to in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 63.

¹² Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 63.

Exceptions.

In spite of the above rules, a man may marry a girl who is removed by three *gotras*¹ from him, although she be related within the above degrees.²

"The three *gotras* in the case of the descendants of a *bandhu* are always to be counted from his (the *bandhu*'s) own *gotra*. So also in the case of the descendants of the ancestors of a *bandhu*, who is the father's or the mother's maternal uncle's son, they are to be counted from the *bandhu*'s own *gotra*. But in the case of the descendants of the ancestors of each of the other *bandhus*, the *gotras* are to be counted from his (the *bandhu*'s) maternal grandfather's *gotra*."³

Sir G. D. Banerjee⁴ gives the following illustration of the above rule:

"Suppose the paternal great-grandfather of the bridegroom to be of the *Sandilya gotra*; his daughter (by transfer of marriage) to be of the *Kasyapa gotra*; her daughter of the *Vatsya gotra*; and the daughter's daughter to be of the *Bharadwaja gotra*; the maiden daughter of this last, being of the *Bharadwaja gotra*, and being beyond three *gotras*, viz. the *Sandilya*, *Kasyapa*, and *Vatsya*, is eligible for marriage though within the prohibited degrees."

In practice these rules are, apparently, among all classes, not taken to exclude a *sapinda* girl beyond the fifth degree on the father's side, and the third degree on the mother's side,⁵ but in strictness this relaxation of the rule is said to be limited to the Kshatriyas in all the forms of marriage, and to the other classes only in the *Asura*,⁶ or other inferior forms of marriage.⁷

Origin of rules.

The above rules are enunciated by Sir G. D. Banerjee in his "Law of Marriage and Stridhan." They are based upon the interpretation put by Raghunandana upon the text of Manu. As so interpreted, the text prohibits a man from marrying a girl who is a *sapinda*⁸ of his father or of his maternal grandfather.⁹ This *sapinda* relationship ceases after the fifth or seventh degree from the mother and father respectively.¹⁰ Yajñavalkya¹¹ also requires that a man should not marry his *sapinda*. This rule is common to all schools, but there is a diversity between the view

Difference between schools.

¹ I.e. three females have intervened in the line between the man and the girl in question.

² Ragunandana's "Institutes," vol. i. p. 64, referred to in G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 64.

³ G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 64.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 91, see *ante*, pp. 40, 41.

⁶ *Post*, p. 55.

⁷ G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 64, 65; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., pp. 663, 664.

⁸ "Manu," chap. iii. para. 5.

⁹ See Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 88.

¹⁰ Yama, cited in the "Udvahatattwa," p. 7, referred to in Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 88.

¹¹ I, 52,

entertained by the Mitakshara school ¹ and that entertained by the Bengal school ² as to the meaning of *sapinda* relationship.

According to the Mitakshara ³ school a man cannot marry a girl if, Mitakshara
their common ancestor being traced through his or her father, such common school.
ancestor is not beyond the seventh ⁴ in the line of ascent from him or
her, or, their common ancestor being traced through their mothers, such
common ancestor is not beyond the fifth in the line of ascent from him
or her.

Dr. J. N. Bhattacharya says, ⁵ "I must note also the fact that those
who are governed by the Mitakshara school practically exclude, for pur-
poses of marriage, only the four lines ⁶ that are considered ineligible by
the Bengal school."

As to local and family customs permitting intermarriage within the Custom.
prohibited degrees, see Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 105, 106;
Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 98, 99.

A man cannot marry his stepmother's brother's daughter, Stepmother's
or daughter's daughter. ⁷ relations.

The prohibition is based on a text of Sumantu, ⁸ which specifies these
persons. According to a reading of the text, the Western schools exclude
also the stepmother's sisters and their daughters, and some persons hold
that *sapinda* relationship in the case of the stepmother is the same as in
the case of the natural mother up to the fifth degree. ⁹

Sastri G. C. Sarkar treats this rule of exclusion of certain of the
stepmother's relations as being one of merely moral obligation, and as
having no legal force. ¹⁰

¹ According to the "Mitakshara"
all the descendants of a common an-
cestor are *sapindas*, except that after
the fifth ancestor on the mother's
side, and after the seventh on the
father's side, the relationship ceases.
Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd
ed., p. 89.

² According to the Bengal school
the expression means connected by the
offering of the funeral cake, but "For
purposes relating to marriage, Raghu-
nandana," who is the chief authority
in that school on the subject of mar-
riage, "has not given any importance
to the definition of the term '*Sa-
pinda*.' He has relied upon express
texts to exclude girls within the
seventh degree on the father's side,
and the fifth degree on that of the
mother. There are, however, pas-
sages in the '*Udvalatattwa*,' in
which the term '*Sapinda*' is taken
to include in its denotation all agnates
and cognates within the aforesaid
limits." Bhattacharya's "Hindu

Law," 2nd ed., p. 91.

³ See Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law,
2nd ed., p. 90.

⁴ In this computation both the
common ancestor and the person in
question must be taken into con-
sideration. See *ante*, p. 40, note 6.

⁵ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 91.

⁶ The first of these lines include
girls belonging to the same *gotra*
(*ante*, pp. 39, 40). The second includes
girls belonging to the *gotra* of the
maternal grandfather of the bride-
groom (*ante*, p. 41). The two other
lines are comprised in the above rules.

⁷ "Udvalatattwa," Raghunanda-
na's "Institutes," vol. ii. p. 60, re-
ferred to in G. D. Bamerjee's "Law
of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 62.

⁸ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law,"
2nd ed., p. 95. Sumantu was the
author of one of the Smritis.

⁹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law,"
2nd ed., p. 95.

¹⁰ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 92.

Other rules of restriction.

There are other rules of restriction on intermarriage, which are now considered to be of mere moral obligation, and which are not universally observed.

The paternal uncle's wife's sister, and her daughter, and the wife's sister's daughter were excluded.¹ In all of these cases the marriage is valid in law.²

In former times a man could not marry the daughter of his spiritual guide or pupil,³ or a girl bearing his mother's name,⁴ or a girl older than him in age.⁵

Affinity.

Relationship by marriage does not *per se* operate as an impediment to a marriage. Thus a man can marry any relation of his wife whom he could have validly married if he was then marrying for the first time.⁶

Adopted son.

A son adopted according to the Dattaka form⁷ cannot marry any one of the persons whom he would have been prohibited from marrying if he had remained in his natural family.⁸ It is unsettled⁹ whether he is also prohibited from marrying any one of the girls, whom he could not have married, had he been a natural-born son of his adoptive father,¹⁰ or whether he is only prohibited from marrying a girl who belongs to the *gotra*

¹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 95.

² See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 67; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 95; Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 92. As to wife's sister's daughter, see *post*, note 6.

³ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 69; "Manu," chap. ii. para. 171; "Vyavastha Darpana," p. 665, note. Bhattacharya ("Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 96) treats this prohibition as still effectual, but a different view is adopted in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 69, and in Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 92. The reason for the rule seems to have ceased, as Vedic instruction is now usually of merely nominal duration.

⁴ "Udvahatattwa," referred to in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 70.

⁵ "Yajnavalkya," i. 52. In practice this rule is never departed from;

Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 70; Steele, 161.

⁶ See *Ragavendra Rau v. Jayaram Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 283, where it was held that a marriage between a Hindu and the daughter of his wife's sister is valid. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 67; G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 319.

⁷ *Post*, chap. iii.

⁸ *Narasammal v. Balaramacharlu* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 420, at p. 426; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 65; G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 387; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 95, 96; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 4, paras. 7-9; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 6, para. 39; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 5, para. 30.

⁹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 95, 96.

¹⁰ This view is taken in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 65, following the "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 4, paras. 7-9.

of his adoptive father, or is within three degrees of descent from the adoptive father and his two paternal ancestors.¹

The latter view has been accepted by Nanda Pandita in the "Dattaka Mimansa,"² and it is therefore to be supposed that it would be acceptable to the Benares, Maharashtra and Mithila schools.³

Where an adoption has been made by a widow, or by a wife in conjunction with her husband, an adopted son is prohibited from marrying a girl whom he could not have married had he been a legitimate son of his adoptive mother.⁴

Whether he is prohibited from marrying in the family of a wife of his adoptive father, who has not joined in the adoption, seems unsettled.⁵

As the Hindu law did not recognize the remarriage of widows, there are necessarily no rules providing for the case.

It would seem that a widow cannot marry a person whose relationship to her is such that she could not have married him if she had never been married. It is said⁶ that in order to ascertain what relatives of her first husband are forbidden to her in marriage reference should be made to the rules as to penance and appointment (*niyoga*), and to some special texts which pronounce certain relations as equal to mothers.

The rules in "Manu" as to penance would exclude a man from marrying the widow of his father,⁷ of his son,⁸ and of his *guru*.⁹

The application of the ancient rules of *niyoga* would apparently prevent a man from marrying the widow of his paternal or maternal grandfather, his father's widow, his father's or mother's sister, the widow of his paternal or maternal uncle, his father-in-law's widow, his sister or his daughter, his son's widow or daughter, or the widow of his *guru*.¹⁰

Vrihaspati¹¹ pronounces as equal to mothers, the mother's sister, the paternal and maternal uncle's wife, the father's sister, the mother-in-law and the wife of an elder brother.

Among the Jats of the Province of Agra, marriage between a widow and her husband's brother is allowed.¹²

¹ This view is taken in G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 387, following the "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 4, paras. 32-38.

² S. vi. paras. 32-38; see "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 5, para. 30.

³ *Ante*, pp. 17, 19, 20.

⁴ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 65, 66.

⁵ *Ibid.*; S. C. Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 890; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 6, paras. 50-53.

⁶ See Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 97. In *Lachman Kuar v.*

Mardan Singh (1886), 8 All. 143, the Court held that, in the absence of a special custom, the marriage of a Hindu with his cousin's widow was valid.

⁷ "Manu," chap. xi. paras. 55, 104-107.

⁸ *Ibid.*, chap. xi. para. 59.

⁹ *Ibid.*, chap. xi. paras. 49, 252.

¹⁰ See G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 321, 322.

¹¹ Cited in "Dayabhaga," chap. iv. s. 3, para. 31.

¹² *Poorunmul v. Toolsee Ram* (1868), 3 Agra. 350.

Void
marriage;

A marriage made within the prohibited degrees is void.¹

The woman is entitled to receive maintenance from the man.²

The Hindu law did not permit a woman whose marriage was void on account of identity of gotra, or as being within the prohibited degrees, to marry again, even if the marriage was not consummated.³ Where the marriage was void on account of difference of caste, the Hindu law, according to some authorities, allowed the woman to remarry if the error was discovered before the ceremony of *garbhadana*,⁴ but not otherwise.⁵ The case is unlikely to occur, but if it did, the Courts might decline to consider that a void marriage is any impediment to a subsequent marriage.⁶

WHO MAY GIVE IN MARRIAGE.

Consent of
guardian.

The gift of a female minor in marriage must be by, or with the consent of, her father or other guardian in marriage. The consent of the guardian is also necessary in the case of the marriage of a male minor.⁷

Where there is a gift by or with the consent of a legal guardian, and the marriage rite is duly solemnized, and where the marriage of a male minor takes place with the consent of such guardian, the marriage is irrevocable.⁸

For the purposes of marriage the age of majority, according to the Bengal school, is the end of the fifteenth year,⁹ and according to the

¹ Kullaka Bhatta's commentary on "Manu," chap. iii. paras. 5, 11; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 97; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 66.

² Texts cited in Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 97; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 329; *Ramchandra v. Gopal* (1908), 32 Bom. 619; 10 Bom. L. R. 948.

³ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 201; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 98; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 477; *Ramchandra v. Gopal* (1908), 32 Bom. 619, at p. 628; 10 Bom. L. R. 948.

⁴ A ceremony performed on the first appearance of the menses, and popularly called the second marriage.

⁵ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 201; Steele, 29, 30, 166.

⁶ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 191. *Aunja Dasi v. Prahlad Chandra Ghose* (1870), 6 B. L. R. 243, at pp. 253, 254; 14

W. R. C. R. 403, at p. 405. If this view be not accepted, then, on the death of the husband, the woman could take advantage of the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act (XV. of 1856, ante, p. 37).

⁷ *Nundlal Bhugwandas v. Tapeedas* (1809), 1 Borr. 14; 1 Morl. 287; Steele, p. 26.

⁸ *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, at p. 320. See *Kateeram Dokanee v. Gendhenee (Mussamut)* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 178.

⁹ *Lachman Das v. Rupchand* (1831), 5 Ben. Sel. Rep., 115, 2nd ed., 136; *Cally Churn Mullick v. Bhuggobutty Churn Mullick* (1872), 10 B. L. R. 231; 19 W. R. C. R. 110; *Monsoor Ali v. Ramdayal* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 50; *Deobomoyee Dossee v. Juggesur Hati* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 75; *Luckheenarain Mujmodar v. Mudhosodun*, Ben. S. D. A., 1853, p. 505; *Sheeksunker Dass v. Uluck Chunder Aych*, Ben. S. D. A., 1859, p. 885.

schools of law based on the Mitakshara, the end of the sixteenth year.¹ The age of majority for the purpose of marriage is not affected by the Indian Majority Act.²

The right, and duty, of giving a boy³ or a girl in marriage devolves upon the following persons in succession⁴ :—

Devolution of guardianship in marriage.

1. The father.⁵
2. The paternal grandfather,
3. The brother.⁶
4. Other paternal relations up to the tenth degree of affinity⁷

in order of proximity.

According to the Mitakshara school, the right then devolves upon the mother, and, failing her, upon the maternal grandfather, maternal uncle, and other maternal relations in order of proximity. According to the Bengal school, the right of the mother is postponed to that of the maternal grandfather and maternal uncle.⁸

Right of mother.

Where a relative, other than the father, seeks to exercise a right to give in marriage, it is his duty to consult the mother, and if her objection be not unreasonable, to allow it.⁹

¹ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 72; vol. ii. pp. 76, 77, 80; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. chap. vii. (ed. 1829), p. 103.

² Act IX. of 1875, s. 2.

³ See Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 204.

⁴ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 36; vol. ii. p. 28; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 204; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 651; West and Bühler, 3rd ed., pp. 272, 673. See *Ram Bunsee Koonwaree (Maharane) v. Soobh Koonwaree (Maharane)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 321, at p. 323; 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 193; *Shridhar v. Hiratal Vitthal* (1887), 12 Bom. 480, at p. 484. It has been held in *Madras (Ranganakimma) v. Ramanuja Aiyangar* (1911), 35 Mad. 728 that this refers only to the ceremonial act of giving, and not to the right of disposing, of the child in marriage, and that the mother was entitled to give her daughter in marriage; but in that case the marriage had been carried out (see *post*, p. 50). See *Ramkore (Bai) v. Jammadas Mulchand* (1912), 37 Bom. 18; 14 Bom. L. R. 766.

⁵ *Nanabhai Ganpatrao Dhairyawan*

v. Janardhan Vasudev (1886), 12 Bom. 110, at p. 118; *Golamee Gopee Ghose v. Juggessur Ghose* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 193; *Ex p. Jankypersaud Agurwallah* (1859), 2 Boul. 28, 114; *Nundlal Bhugwandass v. Tapeedass* (1809), 1 Borr. 14; 1 Morl. 287.

⁶ *Ex p. Jankypersaud Agurwallah* (1859), 2 Boul. 28, 114. Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 30; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 204.

⁷ As to the right of the paternal uncle, see *Brindabun Chandra Kurmoker v. Chundra Kurmoker* (1885), 12 Calc. 140, at p. 142; *Shridhar v. Hiratal Vitthal* (1887), 12 Bom. 480, at p. 484.

⁸ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 44; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 116; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 651; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 28; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 28. See "Narada Smriti," chap. xii. paras. 20, 21. As to the right of the maternal uncle, see *Kasturi v. Panna Lal* (1916), 38 All. 520.

⁹ See *S. Namasevayam Pillay v. Annammai Ummal* (1869), 4 Mad.

- Stepmother. A stepmother has no right to give in marriage.¹
- Consent of ward. A minor cannot be married or given in marriage against his or her will.

Although it would rarely happen that a Hindu girl would be consulted as to the choice of a bridegroom, and although the form of a Hindu marriage contemplates a gift of the girl by her father or other guardian rather than a contract between the parties to the marriage, a bridegroom cannot be forced upon an unwilling bride.² The gift is made merely in discharge of the duty of the guardian, and not in exercise of any right of property in the girl.³

- Delegation of right. A father can,⁴ expressly or by implication,⁵ delegate his authority to another person.

It is submitted that no other guardian can delegate his right, except, perhaps, to a person on whom the right might eventually devolve, as in the case of *Ram Bunsee Koonwaree (Maharanee) v. Soobh Koonwaree (Maharanee)*,⁶ where the nearest male kinsman assented to the paternal grandmother giving the girl in marriage.

- Loss of right. A father or other guardian loses his right to give in marriage when he has neglected to exercise the right for a long time, or has in other ways waived the right.⁷

The conviction of the father does not necessarily destroy his right to give his daughter in marriage.⁸

- Remedy of guardian. A father or other guardian in marriage can enforce his right by suing for an injunction to prevent the marriage of his ward to a person of whom he does not approve,⁹ and the

H. C. 339; *Ramkore (Bai) v. Jamnadas Mulchand* (1912), 37 Bom. 18; 14 Bom. L. R. 766.

¹ *Ram Bunsee Koonwaree (Maharanee) v. Soobh Koonwaree (Maharanee)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 321; 2 Ind. Jur. 193.

² See *Shridhar v. Hiralal Vitthal* (1887), 12 Bom. 480, at p. 4861. Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 481.

³ See *Khushalchand Lalchand v. Bai Mani* (1886), 11 Bom. 247, at p. 255.

⁴ *Golamee Gopee Ghose v. Juggessur Ghose* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 193.

⁵ *Golamee Gopee Ghose v. Juggessur Ghose* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 193.

⁶ (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 321; 2 Ind. Jur. 193.

⁷ See *Kashuri v. Panna Lal* (1916), 38 All. 520; *Khushalchand Lalchand*

v. Bai Mani (1886), 11 Bom. 247; *King v. Kistnama Naick* (1814), 2 Str. N. C. 89; 1 Norton L. C. 1; *Modhoo-soodun Mookerjee v. Jadub Chunder Banerjee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 194; *Ghazi v. Sukru* (1897), 19 All. 515; *Rulyat (Bae) v. Jeychund Kewul* (1843), Bellasis, 43; 1 Morl. (N. S.) 181. The fact that the father had given up worldly affairs, and had become a recluse would be evidence that he had waived his rights of guardianship.

⁸ See *Nanabhai Ganpatrav Dhairyavan v. Janardhan Vasudev* (1886), 12 Bom. 110.

⁹ See *In the matter of Kashi Chunder Sen* (1881), 8 Calc. 266, S. C. *Bromhomoyee v. Kashi Chunder Sen*, 10 C. L. R. 91; *Khushalchand Lalchand v. Mani (Bai)* (1886), 11 Bom. 247,

Court will in a suitable case grant an injunction *pendente lite* to restrain such marriage.¹

The order of the Court may be subject to restrictions upon the exercise of the rights of the guardian.²

The Court will restrain a guardian from an improper exercise of his authority ; but the Court will not, except in a case of gross misconduct, interfere with the exercise of the discretion by a father.³

Where a guardian of the person or property of a minor has been appointed by a High Court, or by a Civil Court acting under the powers contained in Act VIII. of 1890, the rights of such guardian are subject to the control of the Court appointing him,⁴ and such Court can, it is submitted, give all necessary directions with regard to the marriage of the ward,⁵ at any rate where the person appointed or declared guardian would under Hindu law be the person entitled to give the minor in marriage.

Where a minor is a ward of the Bengal Court of Wards, the leave of such Court must be obtained before the marriage.⁶

Whoever without the previous consent of the Courts of Wards abets the marriage of a minor ward of the Madras Court of Wards is liable on conviction before a Court of Session to a fine not exceeding Rs. 2000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both.⁷

The Hindu law permits a girl to choose a husband for herself, if there be no available relation having a right to give her in marriage,⁸ or if her guardian in marriage has neglected to provide a husband for her for, at any rate, three years after she has attained a marriageable age.⁹

at p. 253. In *Harendra Nath Chowdhury v. Brinda Rani Dassi* (1898), 2 C. W. N. 521, an injunction had been granted in a proceeding under the Guardians and Wards Act VIII. of 1890.

¹ *Nanabhai Ganpatrav Dhairyan v. Janardhan Vasudev* (1886), 12 Bom. 110.

² See *Shridhar v. Hiralal Vitthal* (1887), 12 Bom. 480.

³ See *Shridhar v. Hiralal Vitthal* (1887), 19 Bom. 480, at pp. 484, 485.

⁴ See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 43.

⁵ See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 43 ; *Harendra Nath Chowdhury v. Brinda Rani Dassi* (1898), 2 C. W. N. 521 ; Trevelyan's "Law of Minors" (5th ed.), p. 248. Doubt in *Diwali (Bai) v. Moti Karson* (1896), 22 Bom. 509, at p. 513 ; see Wilson's "Anglo-

Muhammadan Law," 4th ed., p. 198.

⁶ Court of Wards Rules, s. viii. (e) rule 5. The only penalty, apparently, for a disobedience of this rule is that the Court might refuse to authorize payment of the expenses of the marriage out of the ward's funds.

⁷ Act I. (M. C.) of 1902, s. 67.

⁸ "Narada," chap. xii. paras. 20-22. "Yajnavalkya," i. 63.

⁹ Strange's "Hindu Law," i. 36. "Manu," chap. ix. paras. 90, 91. Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 387. According to "Gautama" (xviii. 20-23), she need only wait three months. The marriageable age is said to be the completion of the eighth year. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 51. See "Manu," ix. 89.

In the former case the Hindu law required the girl to obtain permission from the King before selecting a husband for herself.¹ Although the Law Courts now exercise the functions relating to minors, which were formerly exercised by the Sovereign in person, no such application to the Court seems to be contemplated by modern practice.

The case would not be likely to occur, but effect would apparently be given to a marriage entered into by a girl who has no relations entitled to give her in marriage, provided the marriage be in other respects unexceptionable.

In the case of the guardian neglecting to give the girl in marriage, the right of the guardian next in order would apparently accrue,² rather than that the girl should be able to select a husband for herself.³

It is said that, if a girl chooses a husband for herself, she cannot take with her any ornaments which have been given to her by her father, mother, or brothers.⁴

Effect of
absence of
consent of
guardian in
marriage.

A marriage, otherwise legally contracted, and performed with the necessary ceremonies, is not rendered invalid by the mere absence of the consent of the guardian in marriage.⁵

"There is no case . . . in which the marriage of a Hindu girl effected without force and fraud by her relations has, after it has actually taken place, been declared to be invalid for want of the consent of the legal guardian."⁶

The rule would not, however, apparently prevent the Court setting aside a gift of a girl in marriage by a person having no pretence of authority.⁷

The circumstance that a marriage was contracted in disobedience of an order of a Civil Court would not render it invalid.⁸

Powers of
Court.

The Courts have power to declare that a marriage, which has been entered into without the consent of the guardian, is on that account invalid, and would probably do so, at any rate if the marriage has not been consummated, in a case where the interests of the child had been disregarded, and where a person

¹ "Narada," xii. 22. "Yajnavalkya," i. 63.

² See *ante*, p. 47.

³ See Strange's "Hindu Law," i. 36.

⁴ "Manu," ix. 92.

⁵ *Ghazi v. Sukru* (1897), 19 All. 515; *Kasturi v. Chiranjil Lal* (1913), 35 All. 265; *Mulchand Kuber v. Bhudia* (1897), 22 Bom. 812; *Diwali (Bai) v. Moti Karson* (1896), 22 Bom. 509; *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316; *Khushalchand Lalchand v. Mani (Bai)* (1886), 11

Bom. 247; *Brindabun Chandra Kurmoker v. Chandrar Kurmoker* (1885), 12 Calc. 140; *Modhoosoodun Mookerjee v. Jadub Chunder Banerjee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 194; *Rulyat (Bae) v. Jeychund Kewul* (1843), Bellasis 43; 1 Morl. Dig. N. S. 181.

⁶ *Kasturi v. Chiranjil Lal* (1913), 35 All. 265, at p. 269.

⁷ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 52.

⁸ *Diwali (Bai) v. Moti Karson* (1896), 22 Bom. 509.

having no pretence of authority had disposed of the child in marriage.¹

Where the marriage has been induced by force or fraud,² it would on that account be declared to be invalid, apart from any question as to the want of consent by the guardian.³

There would be great difficulties in setting aside a marriage which had been consummated, and in any case it would be difficult to obtain a bridegroom for a Hindu girl who had already gone through the form of marriage with another person.

A minor⁴ widow whose marriage has not been consummated cannot remarry without the consent of her father, or, if she has no father, of her paternal grandfather; or if she has no such grandfather, of her mother; or, failing all these, of her elder brother; or failing also brother, of her next male relative. Marriages made without such consent may be declared void by a Court of Law, but the consent is to be presumed until the contrary is proved, and no such marriage can be declared void after it has been consummated.⁵

In the case of a widow who is of full age, or whose marriage has been consummated, her own consent is sufficient consent to constitute her marriage valid.⁶

A father or other guardian cannot enforce an agreement to recompense him in consideration of the marriage of his child or ward, although the marriage be in the *asura*⁷ form.⁸

Consent to re-marriage of minor widow.

Agreement to pay money to guardian.

¹ See *Aunjona Dasi v. Prahlad Chandra Ghose* (1870), 6 B. L. R. 243; 14 W. R. C. R. 403; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 52. See, however, *Mulchand Kuber v. Bhudhia* (1897), 22 Bom. 812; *Khushalchand Lalchand v. Mani (Bai)* (1886), 11 Bom. 247.

² I.e. fraud on the person marrying, or being given in marriage. Mere fraud on the guardian such as in *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, where the mother falsely stated that she had the father's permission, would not of itself invalidate the marriage; see *Khushalchand Lalchand v. Mani (Bai)* (1886), 11 Bom. 247.

³ *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 311, at p. 320; *Aunjona Dasi v. Prahlad Chandra*

Ghose (1870), 6 B. L. R. 243, at p. 254; 14 W. R. C. R. 403, at p. 405; *Mulchand v. Bhudhia* (1897), 22 Bom. 812, at pp. 817, 818.

⁴ I.e. minor according to "Hindu Law," ante, pp. 46, 47.

⁵ Hindu Widow Remarriage Act (XV. of 1856), s. 7. This would not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside a marriage which had been brought about by force or fraud exercised upon the widow (see above).

⁶ Hindu Widow Remarriage Act (XV. of 1856), s. 7.

⁷ Post, p. 55.

⁸ *Gulabchand v. Fulbai* (1909), 33 Bom. 411; *Baldeo Das Agarwalla v. Mohamaya Persad* (1911), 15 C. W. N. 447; *Venkata Krishnayya (Kalavagunta) v. Lakshmi Narayana (Kalava-*

The Allahabad High Court holds that each case must be judged by its circumstances.¹

The father or other guardian can recover money which he has paid as the consideration for a marriage which has not taken place.²

Payment to
bridegroom.

There is no objection to a payment of money by the guardian of a girl to the proposed bridegroom in consideration of the marriage.³

Marriage
brocage con-
tract.

A contract, whereby a person undertakes for reward to bring about a marriage, cannot be enforced.⁴

Marriage
expenses.

The property of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara school of law is liable for the reasonable⁵ expenses of the marriages of the daughters of male members of such family,⁶ including the daughters of those who are excluded from inheritance.

gunta), (1908), 32 Mad. 185; *Devarayan Chetty v. Mutturaman Chetty* (1912), 37 Mad. 393; *Dholidas Ishwar v. Fulchand* (1897), 22 Bom. 658; *Dulari v. Vallabdas Pragji* (1888), 13 Bom. 126. See *Pitamber Ratansi v. Jagjivan Hansraj* (1884), 13 Bom. 131.

¹ *Baldeo Sahai v. Jumna Kunwar* (1901), 23 All. 495, following *Vasuvathan v. Saminathan* (1889), 13 Mad. 83. See *Vaihiyanatham v. Gangarazu* (1893), 17 Mad. 9; *Ram Chand Sen v. Audaito Sen* (1884), 10 Cal. 1054. *Lallun Monee Dossee (Ranee) v. Nobin Mohun Singh* (1875), 25 W. R. C. R. 32; *Jogeswar Chakrabatti v. Panch Kauri Chakrabatti* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 395; 14 W. R. C. R. 154; *Juggernath Persad v. Janky Persad* (1859), 2 Boul. 28; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 101, 102. "Manu" says (iii. 51), "Let no father, who knows the law, receive a gratuity, however small, for giving his daughter in marriage, since the man who through avarice takes gratuity for that purpose is a seller of his offspring," but the practice is very common.

² *Ramchand Sen v. Audaito Sen* (1884), 10 Cal. 1054; *Jogeswar Chakrabatti v. Panch Kauri Chakrabatti* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 395, 14 W. R. C. R. 154; *Rambhat v. Timmayya* (1892), 16 Bom. 673; *Malji Thakersey v. Gomis* (1887), 11 Bom. 412; *Gulabchand v. Fukai* (1909), 33 Bom.

411; 10 Bom. L. R. 649. See Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 65.

³ See Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 65, illus. (a).

⁴ *Vaihiyanatham v. Gangarazu* (1893), 17 Mad. 19; *Pitamber Ratansi v. Jagjivan Hansraj* (1884), 13 Bom. 131. See *Dulari v. Vallabdas Pragji* (1888), 13 Bom. 126, at p. 130; *Jogeswar Chakrabatti v. Panch Kauri Chakrabatti* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 395, 14 W. R. C. R. 154.

⁵ In *Vaikuntam Ammangar v. Kallapiran Ayyangar* (1902), 26 Mad. 497, the Court only allowed the expenses of ceremonies which invariably formed part of the marriage ceremonies, and disallowed the expenses of ceremonies which were usually, though not invariably, performed. It is submitted that greater latitude should be allowed to a guardian. The "Mitakshara" (chap. i., s. 7, paras. 5-14), and the "Viramitrodaya" (chap. ii., Part I. s. 24), provide for the dowry and marriage expenses of a daughter one-fourth of what she would have been entitled to receive if she had been a son, see *Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 994, at p. 997; Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 245.

⁶ See *Vaikuntam Ammangar v. Kallapiran Ayyangar* (1902), 26 Mad. 512. Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 69.

These expenses have been held to include a gift on the occasion of the *dwiragaman* or *gowna* ceremony which takes place subsequent to the marriage.¹ The Madras High Court has held that where a mother gave her daughter in marriage against the wish of her husband's father she was nevertheless entitled to be repaid the expenses out of the family property.²

The expenses of the marriage of a male member of a family must also be paid out of the family property.³

In the case of a joint family governed by the Bengal school of law the marriage expenses of the daughters of the co-sharers, and of persons who are excluded from inheritance, and of other unmarried female members of the family, such as daughters of adult sons of co-sharers, would be payable out of the family property.⁴

A father is not, in the absence of a contract, under a legal liability to pay the marriage expenses of any of his children,⁵ but after his death the reasonable expenses of the marriages of his daughters are payable out of his estate.⁶ Liability of father.

Such expenses create a charge upon the property to the same extent as rights of maintenance create a charge,⁷ and to such extent only.

There is also authority that the estate of a deceased Hindu is liable for the expenses of the marriage of the daughter of a son who pre-deceased him.⁸ Grandfather.

Where a ward has separate property a guardian would be entitled to pay thereout the reasonable expenses of his ward's marriage.⁹ Payment out of infant's property.

¹ *Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 994.

² *Ranganakimmal v. Ramanuja Aiyangar* (1911), 35 Mad. 728.

³ *Sundrabai v. Shivanarayana* (1907), 32 Bom. 81; 9 Bom. L. R. 1366; *Bhagirathi v. Jokhu Ram Upadhia* (1910), 32 All. 575; *Kameswari Sastri v. Veeracharu* (1910), 34 Mad. 422; *Gopalakrishnam v. Venkatanarasa* (1912), 37 Mad. 273, dissenting from *Govindarazulu Narasimhan v. Devarabholta Venkatanarasayya* (1903), 27 Mad. 206; *Narayana v. Ramalinga* (1915), 39 Mad. 587. The expenses of a second marriage will in some cases be payable out of the property, *Bhagirathi v. Jokhu Ram Upadhia* (1910), 32 All. 575.

⁴ Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., pp. 106, 107.

⁵ *Sundari Ammal v. Subramania Ayyar* (1902), 26 Mad. 505.

⁶ *Preaj Nurain v. Ajodhyapurshad* (1848), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 513, 2nd ed., 602; *Gunput Lall (Lalla) v. Toorun Koonwar (Mussamut)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52. See *Ramcoomar Mitter v. Ichamoyi Dasi* (1880), 6 Cal. 36, at p. 37; 6 C. L. R. 429, at 430.

⁷ See *post*, pp. 89-92.

⁸ *Ramcoomar Mitter v. Ichamoyi Dasi* (1880), 6 Cal. 36; 6 C. L. R. 429.

⁹ *Juggessur Sircar v. Nilambur Biswas* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 217; *Makundi v. Sarabsukh* (1881), 6 All. 417, at p. 421. See *ante*, p. 52, note 5.

FORMS OF MARRIAGE.

Forms of
marriage now
recognized.

The only forms of marriage now recognized by the general Hindu law are the *Brahma* form and the *Asura* form. Both forms are now applicable to all classes.

Where money is not paid for the bride the marriage is said to be in the *Brahma* form. Where there is a bride price the marriage is said to be in the *Asura* form.¹

Ancient forms
of marriage.

The ancient Hindu law allowed the following eight different forms of marriage.² The first four of these were considered approved forms.

1. The *Brahma*.³

Brahma.

This form of marriage originally contemplated the gift of the girl by her father to a man learned in the *Vedas*,⁴ and was, therefore, peculiar to Brahmins.

It is the only one now left of the four approved forms of marriage, and is now suitable for all classes.⁵

2. The *Daiva*.⁶

Daiva.

In this form, which was peculiar to Brahmins, the maiden was given in marriage to the officiating priest.⁷

3. The *Arsha*.⁸

Arsha.

In this form the father gave his daughter in consideration of one or two pair of oxen.⁹ It was peculiar to Brahmins.

¹ *Hira v. Hansji Pema* (1912), 37 Bom. 295; 14 Bom. L. R. 1182; *Chunilal v. Surajram* (1909), 33 Bom. 433; 11 Bom. L. R. 708; *Authike-savulu Chetty v. Ramanujam Chetty* (1909), 32 Mad. 512, at p. 517.

² See "Manu," chap. iii. paras. 21-41; "Yajnavalkya," i. 58-61; "Narada," chap. xii. paras. 39-54; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. 604. "The different forms of marriage recognized by the Hindu law are probably to be traced historically to the customs of different tribes which afterwards coalesced to form a single community," per West, J., in *Visharanga v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 254.

³ So called because peculiarly fit for Brahmins; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 604.

⁴ "Manu," chap. iii. para. 27.

⁵ *Jaikisondas Gopalidas v. Harkisondas Hullochandas* (1876), 2 Bom. 9, at p. 14; *Sivarama Casia Pillay v. Bagavan Pillay*, Mad. S. D. for 1859, p. 44, cited in Norton's "Leading Cases," Part I. p. 5.

⁶ Lit. divine: so called as being a ceremony proper for the gods.

⁷ "Manu," iii. 28. Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 604.

⁸ Lit. scriptural, anything for which a *Rishi* is an authority; Wilson's "Glossary," p. 32.

⁹ "Manu," chap. iii. para. 29.

4. The *Prajapatya* or *Kaya*.¹

In this form the bridegroom was an applicant for the bride. It was *Prajapaya*, peculiar to Brahmins.²

5. The *Asura*.³

In this form the bridegroom purchased the bride from her father.⁴ *Asura*. The only difference between this form and the *Arsha* form is that in this form property other than cattle is taken by the father of the bride.⁵ The mere giving of a present to the bride does not render the marriage an *Asura* marriage.⁶ Although there may be *Brahma* ceremonies, where there is a "bride price," the marriage is an *Asura* marriage.⁷

This form of marriage was permissible to *Vaisyas* and *Sudras*, but not to the two highest classes.⁸ It is now applicable to all classes⁹ and seems to be commonly practised throughout India. It is said to be, in fact, the most common form of marriage,¹⁰ at any rate among *Sudras* in Southern India,¹¹ and members of the *Bhandari* and other inferior castes in Western India.¹²

6. The *Gandharba*.¹³

This form depended solely upon the mutual consent of the parties *Gandharba* marrying. It was confined to the *Kshatriyas* or military class,¹⁴ and seems to have been effected by mere consummation.¹⁵ Although this form of marriage is not recognized by the general Hindu law, a form of that name is permitted in some cases by family usage. In a case decided by the Bengal Sudder Court in 1817, a marriage by a member of the military

Allowed by custom.

¹ So called as being the ceremony of the *Kas* or *Prajapatias*, the lords of created beings or progenitors of mankind; "Manu," chap. i. para. 34; chap. iii. para. 30.

² See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 82.

³ Lit. demoniacal; Wilson's "Glossary," p. 37. "It is called the *Asura* form, as being the ceremony of the *Asuras*, or the aboriginal non-Aryan tribes of India." Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 83.

⁴ "Manu," chap. iii. para. 31.

⁵ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 104.

⁶ *Jaisondas Gopaldas v. Harkisondas Hullochandas* (1876), 2 Bom. 9, at p. 15. "Manu," chap. iii. para. 54.

⁷ *Chunilal v. Surajram* (1909), 33 Bom. 433; 11 Bom. L. R. 708. See ante, p. 54.

⁸ *Jaisondas Gopaldas v. Harkisondas Hullochandas* (1876), 2 Bom. 9, at p. 14. Colebrooke's "Digest,"

vol. iii. p. 604. Steele, p. 31.

⁹ *Visvanathan v. Saminathan* (1889), 13 Mad. 83. See *Keshow Rao Diwakur v. Naro Junardhun Patunkur* (1821), 2 Borr. 194; *Nundlal Bhugwandas v. Tapeedas* (1810), 1 Borr. 14. As to Western India, see *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244.

¹⁰ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 83. Strange's "Hindu Law," i. 43.

¹¹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 99, 100.

¹² *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244.

¹³ The name is taken from that of "a kind of inferior divinity attendant upon Indra and Kuvira, and distinguished for musical proficiency." Wilson's "Glossary," p. 164.

¹⁴ See "Manu," chap. iii. paras. 32, 41.

¹⁵ Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 84.

class in this form was recognized,¹ and the same Court, in 1853,² upheld a similar marriage by a Rajah of Julpigoree, who belonged to an aboriginal tribe, which had to some extent adopted Hindu customs.³

This form of marriage is said to exist still in the family of the Tipperah Rajahs,⁴ and it was recently asserted to have taken place in a family in Ganjam.⁵ A religious ceremony is now as necessary in a marriage in this form as when the marriage takes place in the ordinary forms.⁶ The Gandharba form of marriage as now celebrated, and the ancient form seem, therefore, to resemble one another in name only

7. The *Rakshasa*.⁷

Rakshasa.

This was a marriage by capture,⁸ and would in the present day be dealt with by the criminal law.⁹ It was peculiar to the Kshatriyas, or warrior class.¹⁰

8. The *Paisacha*.¹¹

Paisacha.

In this form the Hindu law for the sake of the woman and her offspring treated as a marriage a seduction by fraud.

Customary
form of
marriage.

Where by immemorial and continuous custom¹² a form of marriage, which is not repugnant to the fundamental principles

¹ *Hujmu Chul v. Bhadoorun (Ranee)*, referred to in Ben. S. D. A. 1846, p. 340, and 7 Ben. Sel. R. 355 (new edition, pp. 355, 356).

² *Mokrund Deb Raikut v. Bissesuree (Ranee)*, Ben. S. D. A. 1853, p. 159.

³ See *Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Das* (1885), 12 I. A. 72; 11 Cal. 463.

⁴ See *Chuckrodhuj Thakoor v. Beer Chunder Joobraj* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 194.

⁵ *Brindavana v. Radhamani* (1888), 12 Mad. 72. A marriage in this form was also asserted in *Hari Krishna Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty) v. Radhika Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty)* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 369; S. C. on appeal, *Radhika Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi) v. Nilamani Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 497; 6 B. L. R. 202; 14 W. R. P. C. 33.

⁶ *Brindavana v. Radhamani* (1886), 12 Mad. 72; *Hari Krishna Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty) v. Radhika Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty)* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 369, at p. 374. See *Chuckrodhuj Thakoor v. Beer Chunder Joobraj* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 194;

Bhaoni v. Maharaj Singh (1881), 3 All. 738.

⁷ Lit. a fiend-like marriage. See Wilson's "Glossary," p. 436.

⁸ "The seizure of a maiden by force from her house while she weeps and calls for assistance, after her kinsmen and friends have been slain in battle or wounded, and their houses broken open, is the marriage styled *Rakshasa*." "Manu," chap. iii. para. 33.

⁹ Indian Penal Code (Act XLV. of 1860), s. 366.

¹⁰ *Jaikisondas Gopaldas v. Harkisondas Hullochandas* (1876), 2 Bom. 9, at p. 14.

¹¹ Lit. diabolical. Wilson's "Glossary," p. 389. "When the lover secretly embraces the damsel, either sleeping or flushed with strong liquor, or disordered in her intellect, that sinful marriage called *Paisacha* is the eighth and basest." "Manu," iii. para. 34.

¹² See *Gatha Ram Mistree v. Moohita Kochin Atteah Domoonee* (1875), 14 B. L. R. 298; 13 W. R. C. R. 179; "Manu," iii. 35. As to the necessary conditions for the validity of a custom, see *ante*, pp. 28, 29.

of Hindu law, is invariably practised by a particular class of persons or family, a marriage in such form is valid.

In the case of a family or race which is not Hindu by origin, but which has gradually, or otherwise, more or less adopted Hindu customs or Hindu law, a custom at variance with Hindu law would be upheld,¹ provided that it were not repugnant to general ideas of morality.

The following forms of marriage peculiar to individual families have (amongst others) been recognized by the Courts :—

In the Raj family of Hill Tipperah, marriage takes place in the *Gandharba*² or *Santigrihita*³ form, but the wife married in that form seems to be inferior to a wife married in accordance with the ordinary form.⁴

A Rajah of Orissa can marry a girl of a different caste in what is called the *phulbiha* form, which consists in putting a garland round the neck of the woman, or in an exchange of garlands.⁵

The *Sagai* form,⁶ by which widows of the *Namosudra* caste,⁷ and of the *Koiries* and other low castes in Behar,⁸ and of the *Huluwae* caste,⁹ remarry.

The *Kurao Dhureecha*, or the marriage of a widow with her deceased husband's brother, is common among Jats¹⁰ and the *Lodh* caste¹¹ in the North-West.

The *Serai Udiki*¹² form, by which wives, deserted by their husbands, can remarry according to the custom of the *Lingaits* of South Canara.¹³

¹ See *Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Das* (1885), 12 I. A. 72; 11 Calc. 463.

² See *ante*, p. 55.

³ Lit. one who receives holy water.

⁴ See *Chuckrodhuj Thakoor v. Beer Chunder Joobraj* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 194; *Nobodip Chundro Deb Burmun (Rajkumar) v. Bir Chundra Manikya Bahadoor (Rajah)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 404, at pp. 410, 414.

⁵ As to the customs of the Urya Rajahs and Chiefs, see the *Pachis Siwal*, or twenty-five questions put by the superintendent of the Tributary Mehals in 1814 to the leading Rajahs in those Mehals. These answers have been recognized by the Courts, e.g. see *Prandhur Roy v. Ramchender Mongraj*, Ben. S. D. A. 1861, p. 16; *Durrapp Sing Deo v. Buzurdhur Roy* (1863), 2 Hay. 335; *Bungadhur Nurendra Mardraj Mahagathur v. Juggurnath Bhrombur Roy* (1877), 1 Shome's "Law Reporter," C. R. 92, at p. 95. The substance

of the answers is given in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 242, 243.

⁶ In this form the main ceremony consists in putting a red or *Sindur* mark on the bride's forehead in the presence of assembled friends and relatives. *Bissuram Koiree v. Empress* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 410.

⁷ *Hurry Churn Dass v. Nimai Chand Keyal* (1883), 10 Calc. 138; 13 C. L. R. 207. See *Jukni v. Queen Empress* (1892), 19 Calc. 627.

⁸ *Bissuram Koiree v. Empress* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 40.

⁹ *Kally Churn Shaw v. Dukhee Bibee* (1879), 5 Calc. 692.

¹⁰ *Poorunmul v. Toolsee Ram* (1868), 3 Agra. 350; *Queen v. Bahadur Singh* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 128.

¹¹ *Kesaree v. Samardhan* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 94.

¹² Giving a cloth.

¹³ *Virasangappa v. Rudrappa* (1885), 8 Mad. 440.

As to the Sikh forms of marriage, see *Juggomohun Mullick (Doe dem) v. Saumcoomar Bebee* (1815), 2 Morl. Dig. 43; Anand Marriage Act (VII. of 1909).

Asto forms of marriage which are recognized by local, tribal, or family custom, see Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., Lecture VI.; Bhat-tacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 105, 111, 112; Risley's "Tribes and Castes of Bengal"; Crooke's "Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh"; Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 121-125.

As to the marriage of Hindus domiciled in the Madras Presidency following the Marumakkatayan or the Aliyasantana law of inheritance, see Madras Act IV. of 1896.

Among the Nairs of Malabar there is a form of marriage called "*San-bandham*." There are no ceremonies. It is dissoluble at the will of either party. The wife and children acquire no rights of maintenance or inheritance. It does not seem to have been recognized by the Courts,¹ but it has been recognized by the Legislature in permitting registration of such marriages.²

The Travancore Legislative Council has passed the Nair Regulation recognizing the present custom of presentation of cloth by a bridegroom to the bride as a legal form of marriage among Nairs.

New sect.

Where "a new Hindu sect comes into existence, and, from religious scruples, adopts a form of marriage somewhat different to the ordinary form, it would be going too far to hold that these marriages are void, and thus to bastardize a whole community, simply because the sect and its practices are of recent origin."³

The Provisions of the Marriage Act (III. of 1872) apparently apply to the Progressive Brahmos, but have no reference to the Adi or Conservative Brahmos who claim to be Hindus.

MARRIAGE CEREMONIES.

Betrothal.

It is usual, but not necessary, that marriage should be preceded by a betrothal, or formal promise by the father, or other guardian,⁴ to give the girl in marriage.⁵ Such betrothal

¹ 15 C. W. N. celx.

² Malabar Marriage Act (IV. of 1896, M. C.), s. 3.

³ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 235. As to the marriage of Brahmos, see *ibid.*, pp. 100, 104, 105, 264, 265, and *Sonahuzmi v. Vish-nuprasad Hariprasad* (1903), 28 Bom. 597; 6 Bom. L. R. 58, where a biga-

mous marriage of members of the Brahmo Samaj was held to be invalid. See *Muthusami Mudaliar v. Masila-mani* (1909), 33 Mad. 342.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 46, 47.

⁵ This is called *vagdana*, or gift by word. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 87; Wilson's "Glossary," p. 538.

is revocable,¹ and is not, in law, any obstacle to a marriage with another man.²

A promise of marriage cannot be enforced by a suit for specific performance,³ but a refusal to complete a betrothal or a promise of marriage by an actual marriage would give to the injured party a right to recover from the person making the promise compensation for the loss, if any, sustained by the breach of promise.⁴ In case of such breach, a father, or guardian, would be entitled to recover money properly expended in contemplation of such marriage.⁵ Such suits cannot be brought in a Provincial Small Cause Court.⁶

Should the betrothed damsel die before the marriage, the bridegroom is entitled to recover back the presents given by him to her, subject to paying such expenses as have been incurred.⁷

There can be no valid marriage in any form without a substantial performance of the requisite religious ceremonies.⁸

Even when the *gandharba* form of marriage⁹ is permissible by custom the Courts will not recognize it unless religious rites have been performed, although the gift of the bride is in a marriage in that form unnecessary.¹⁰

Hindu law does not recognize a marriage contracted by a Hindu, otherwise than with Hindu ceremonies, as, for instance, while he is a convert to another religion.¹¹

¹ See *In the matter of Gunput Narain Singh* (1875), 1 Calc. 74; *Umed Kika v. Nagindas Narotamdas* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. (O. C.) 122; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., pp. 645, 646. Steele, 24, 160. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 53, 87-89.

² *Ante*, p. 37.

³ Act I. of 1877 (Specific Relief), s. 21, cl. b. See illustration to that section, "A contracts to marry B." See *In the matter of Gunput Narain Singh* (1875), 1 Calc. 74; *Umed Kika v. Nagindas Narotamdas* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. (O. C.) 122.

⁴ Act IX. of 1872 (Contracts), s. 73. *Purshotamdas Tribhovandas v. Purshotamdas Mangaldas Nathubhoy* (1896), 21 Bom. 23; *Mulji Thakersey v. Gombi* (1887), 11 Bom. 412; *Umed Kika v. Nagindas Narotamdas* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. (O. C.) 122, at p. 136. See *Noubrut Singh v. Lad Kooer* (Mussumut) (1873), 5 N. W. P. 102; *In the matter of Gunput Narain Singh* (1875), 1 Calc. 74, at p. 76. A person not a party to the contract is not liable: *Jeksondas v. Ranchoddas* (1916), 41 Bom. 137.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, para. 28; *Rambhat v. Timmaya* (1892), 16 Bom. 673; *Jogeswar Chakrabatti v. Panch Kauri Chakrabatti* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 395.

⁶ Act IX. of 1887, Sched. II., art. 35; *Kali Sunker Dass v. Koylash Chunder Dass* (1888), 15 Calc. 833.

⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, paras. 29, 30; "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. ii., s. 1, para. 1.

⁸ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 99, 100, 105, and texts and other authorities there cited. Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 650. Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 42.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 55, 56.

¹⁰ *Brindavana v. Radhamani* (1888), 12 Mad. 72; *Hari Krishna Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty) v. Radhika Patta Mahadevi Guru (Sri Gajapaty)* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 369, at p. 374. See Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 42. Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 650.

¹¹ *Muthusami Mudaliar v. Masilamani* (1909), 33 Mad. 342, at pp. 348, 349.

Nature of ceremonies,

The ceremonies vary according to local or family or caste ¹ usage.

The ceremonies which are usually performed ² are described in detail by H. T. Colebrooke,³ and in lesser detail in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage" ⁴ and in Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law." ⁵ See also Risley's "Tribes and Castes of Bengal," vol. i. pp. 148-152.

Usual ceremonies.

The ceremonies usually commence with the performance of the *nandi-mukh*, or *vriddi shradda*, by the bride's father in honour of his ancestors,⁶ and the ceremonious bathing of the bride. On the bridegroom coming to the house he is ceremoniously received, and certain ceremonies, the most important of which is the gift of the bride to the bridegroom,⁷ are observed. On the night of that day, or on the day following, the operative marriage ceremonies are performed by the bridegroom and bride. This is called *panigrahana*, or the acceptance of the bride's hand by the bridegroom. The sacred fire is kindled and oblations are made. The bridegroom takes the bride's hand, she steps on a stone. The bridegroom recites a fixed text. A hymn is chanted. The bride and bridegroom walk round the fire, and then comes the most material of the marriage rites. The bride is conducted by the bridegroom, and directed by him to step successively into seven circles, a text being recited at each step. This is called *Sapti-padi*. On the taking of the seventh step, and not until then, the marriage is complete and irrevocable.⁸ The bride thenceforth becomes a member of her husband's family.⁹

Other ceremonies which are not essential to the validity of the marriage are subsequently performed.¹⁰

Conditional marriage.

Sata (exchange) marriage, which, according to the custom of the *Kudwa Kunbi* caste, is conditional upon the bridegroom's father providing a

¹ (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. App. vii.

² These ceremonies are observed whether the marriage be strictly in the *Brahma* form, or whether, in consequence of a payment having been made to the bride's family, the marriage is in the *Asura* form; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 94; *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, at p. 319; *Chunilal v. Surajram* (1909), 33 Bom. 433; 11 Bom. L. R. 708; *Authikesavulu Chetty v. Ramanujam Chetty* (1909), 32 Mad. 512.

³ Essay III. on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus and of the Brahmins especially, "Asiatic Researches," vol. vii. p. 288.

⁴ 3rd ed., pp. 95-98.

⁵ 2nd ed., chap. viii.

⁶ The performance of this *sraddh* is not essential; *Brindabun Chandra*

Kurmokar v. Chundra Kurmokar (1885), 12 Cal. 140, at p. 142.

⁷ This transfers the guardianship of the girl.

⁸ *Brindabun Chandra Kurmokar v. Chundra Kurmokar* (1885), 12 Cal. 140, at p. 143. See *Venkatacharyulu v. Rangacharyulu* (1890), 14 Mad. 316, at p. 318. Colebrooke's Essay on the Religious Ceremonies of the Hindus, "Asiatic Researches," vol. vii. p. 303. Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 37. Strange's "Manual," para. 38. "Manu," chap. viii. para. 227. Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. pp. 487, 488.

⁹ Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," pp. 140, 141.

¹⁰ For instance, see *Varkuntam Amangar v. Kallapiran Ayyangar* (1902), 26 Mad. 497.

girl to be married to the son of the bride's father, does not take effect until the condition has been performed, although the marriage ceremonies have been completed.¹

Whatever words spoken, ceremonies performed, or engagements made on the marriage of a Hindu female who has not been previously married, are sufficient to constitute a valid marriage, have the same effect, if spoken, performed, or made on the marriage of a Hindu widow; and no marriage can be declared invalid on the ground that such words, ceremonies, or engagements are inapplicable to the case of a widow.²

Although certain ceremonies are usual when the wife attains puberty, consummation is not necessary to the validity of a Hindu marriage.³

There may be a custom by which a ceremony is necessary on the wife obtaining puberty.⁴

DISPUTES AS TO MARRIAGE.

The Courts have power to determine the validity of a marriage either in a suit properly constituted for that purpose, or in a suit or proceeding in which the question incidentally arises.⁵

For instance, the question may arise in a suit for the possession of property, or for the restitution of conjugal rights, or in a proceeding relating to the guardianship of a minor, or as to the right to letters of administration, or in a criminal prosecution for bigamy, or adultery, or for enticing away a married woman.

A suit will lie for a declaration that the defendant was not, as he or she alleged himself or herself to be, the husband, or wife, of the plaintiff.⁶

A decision as to the fact or validity of a marriage can only bind the parties to the litigation,⁷ and then only if the case complies with the conditions prescribed by s. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.⁸

¹ *Ugri (Bai) v. Purshottam Bhudar (Patel)* (1892), 17 Bom. 400.

² *Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act* (XV. of 1856), s. 6.

³ *Administrator-General of Madras v. Anandachari* (1886), 9 Mad. 466, at p. 470; *Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai* (1886), 10 Bom. 301, at p. 311; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. II. 32, 33.

⁴ *Boolphand Kollia v. Janokee* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 386.

⁵ See *Aunjana Dasi v. Prahlad Chandra Ghose* (1870), 6 B. L. R. 243; 14 W. R. C. R. 403.

⁶ See *Mir Azmat Ali v. Mahmud-ul-nissa* (1897), 20 All. 96.

⁷ See *Bromhomoyee v. Kashi Chunder Sen* (1881), 8 Calc. 266; 10 C. L. R. 91.

⁸ Act V. of 1908; cf. Act XIV. of 1882, s. 13. See *Evidence Act* (I. of 1872), s. 43.

Presumption
as to validity
of marriage.

Where it has been proved that a marriage has been celebrated there is a presumption that it is valid in law,¹ and that all the necessary ceremonies were performed.²

A strong presumption arises when the parties are recognized by all persons concerned as man and wife, and so described in important documents and on important occasions.³

Suit for restitu-
tion of con-
jugal rights.

It has been held by a Bench in the Bengal High Court⁴ that this presumption, although it applies to questions of inheritance, does not apply to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, and that in such a suit the performance of the ceremonies must be strictly proved, but in an earlier case another Bench of the same Court⁵ applied the presumption to a similar suit. It is submitted that there is no valid reason for making this distinction. Evidence of treatment is sufficient to prove a marriage, even in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, where the parties are not subject to the Indian Divorce Act,⁶ which, of course, Hindus are not, so *à fortiori*, evidence of the marriage having been celebrated would, it is submitted, be sufficient.

Widow.

This presumption applies also in the case of the remarriage of a widow.⁷

It has no application when a former valid subsisting marriage of the woman has been proved.⁸

Presumption
as to form of
marriage.

There is also a presumption even among *Sudras*⁹ that the

¹ *Inderun Valungypooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talaver* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 141, at p. 158; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at pp. 3, 4; 12 W. R. P. C. 41, at p. 42; *Mouji Lal v. Chandrabatti Kumari* (*Musammatt*) (1911), 38 I. A. 122; 38 Cal. 700; 15 C. W. N. 790; 13 Bom. L. R. 534; *Fakir-gauda v. Gangi* (1896), 22 Bom. 277, at p. 279. As to the proof of a marriage, see *Luchms Koer v. Roghunath Das* (*Chowdhry Mohunt*) (1900), 27 I. A. 142; 27 Cal. 971; 4 C. W. N. 685. Act I. of 1872, s. 50. See *Mukhusami Mudaliar v. Masilamani* (1909), 33 Mad. 342.

² *Brindabun Chandra Kurmokar v. Chundra Kurmokar* (1885), 12 Cal. 140, at pp. 142, 143; *Administrator-General of Madras v. Anandachari* (1886), 9 Mad. 466, at pp. 469, 470. "If the evidence was sufficient to prove the performance of some ceremonies usually observed on such occasions, a presumption is always to be drawn that they are duly completed, until the contrary is shown." *Divah (Bai) v. Moti Karson* (1896),

22 Bom. 509, at p. 512.

³ *Mouji Lal v. Chandrabatti Kumari* (*Musammatt*) (1911), 38 I. A. 122; 38 Cal. 700; 15 C. W. N. 790; 13 Bom. L. R. 534; *Bepin Behary Das Baragi v. Atul Krishna Das Baragi* (1911), 17 C. W. N. 494.

⁴ *Surjyamoní Dosi v. Kalikanta Das* (1900), 28 Cal. 37, at p. 50; 5 C. W. N. 195, at pp. 204, 205.

⁵ *Brindabun Chandra Kurmokar v. Chundra Kurmokar* (1885), 12 Cal. 140, at pp. 142, 143.

⁶ Act I. of 1872 (Evidence), s. 50; see *Chellammal v. Ranganatham Pillai* (1910), 34 Mad. 277; *Mouji Lal v. Chandrabatti Kumari* (*Musammatt*) (1911), 38 I. A. 122; 38 Cal. 700; 15 C. W. N. 790; 13 Bom. L. R. 534.

⁷ *Lachman Kuar v. Mardan Singh* (1886) 8 All. 143.

⁸ *In re Millard* (1887), 10 Mad. 218, at p. 221.

⁹ *Jaganmath Raghunath v. Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 553; 12 Bom. L. R. 545; *Trikumdas Damodhar v. Haridas Morarji* (1907), 31 Bom. 583, at p. 587.

marriage was according to one of the approved forms.¹ As the *Brahma* form is the only one remaining of such forms,² it follows that there is a presumption that the marriage was in accordance with the *Brahma* form.³

In prosecutions under ss. 494, 495, 497, and 498 of the Indian Penal Code⁴ the fact⁵ and validity⁶ of the marriage must be strictly proved.⁷ Offences relating to marriage.

DIVORCE.

Divorce is unknown to the general Hindu law.⁸

Divorce is allowed by custom in certain localities and among certain low castes.⁹ Such custom will not be recognized if it is immoral or contrary to public policy.¹⁰ Divorce.

As to the castes and localities in which such custom exists, see Steele's "Law and Custom of Hindu Castes," pp. 168, 169; Risley's "Tribes and Castes of Bengal;" Crooke's "Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh;" Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 248-250, 257; Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 115-117.

Where it is allowed by custom, a divorce by mutual agreement is recognized by law.¹¹

Although matters of divorce are frequently adjudicated upon by a *panchayat*, or assembly of a caste, such *panchayat* has no power to declare a marriage void or to give permission to a woman to remarry.¹² In such

¹ *Thakoor Deyhee (Mussumat) v. Rai Baluk Ram* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 139, at p. 175; 10 W. R. P. C. 3, at p. 9; *Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh* (1897), 25 Calc. 354, at p. 360; *Gojabai v. Maloji Raje Bhosle (Shrimant Shahajirao)* (1892), 17 Bom. 114, at p. 117; *Judoonath Sircar v. Bussunt Coomar Roy Chowdhry* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 286, at p. 288; 16 W. R. C. R. 105, at p. 106; *Kaithe v. Kulladasi Koundan*, Mad. dec. of 1860, p. 201, Norton L. C. 5; *Authikesavulu Chetty v. RamanaJam Chetty* (1909), 32 Mad. 512.

² *Ante*, p. 54.

³ Even where the marriage is with a divorced woman who is entitled by custom to remarry; *Hira v. Haneji Pema* (1912), 37 Bom. 295; 14 Bom. L. R. 1182.

⁴ Act XLV. of 1860.

⁵ *Empress v. Pitambur Singh* (1879), 5 Calc. 566; 5 C. L. R. 597.

⁶ See *Danesh Sheikh v. Taifir Mandal* (1902), 7 C. W. N. 143.

⁷ Act I. of 1872 (Evidence), s. 50.

⁸ *Kudomee Dossee v. Joteeram Kolita* (1877), 3 Calc. 305; *Thapita Peter v. Thapita Lakshmi* (1894), 17 Mad. 235, at p. 236; "Manu," chap. ix. paras. 46, 101.

⁹ See *Kudomee Dossee v. Joteeram Kolita* (1877), 3 Calc. 305; *Reg. v. Sambhu Raghu* (1876), 1 Bom. 347; *Reg. v. Karsan Goja* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 124; *Khemkor v. Umiasankar Ranchhor* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 381; *Rahu v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97, at p. 114; *Dyaram Doolubh v. Umba (Bae)* (1843), Morley's "Digest," vol. i., N. S., p. 181; *Kasce Dhoolubh v. Ruttun Bibee* (1817), 1 Borr. 410.

¹⁰ See *Keshav Hargovan v. Gandi (Bai)* (1915), 39 Bom. 538; 17 Bom. L. R. 584.

¹¹ *Sankaralingam Chetti v. S. Chetti* (1894), 17 Mad. 479. was a case of members of the caste in Tinnevely.

¹² See *Reg. v. Sambhu Raghu* 1 Bom. 347; *Uji v. Hathi* 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. 13.

castes a divorce is generally not effectual, except with the authority of the *panchayat*.¹

It is incompetent to Hindus at the time of their marriage to arrange that the marriage be void in certain events,² whether divorce be or be not permissible in the particular caste.

Except under the circumstances provided for in Act XXI. of 1866, the Courts have no power to decree a divorce.³

Adultery. A dissolution of marriage is not effected by the adultery⁴ of the husband or wife.

Remedy of wife. The only remedy which a blameless wife has against an offending husband is to obtain a decree for her separate maintenance,⁵ such decree being practically equivalent to a decree for judicial separation.⁶

Indian Divorce Act. The Indian Divorce Act⁷ applies to a Hindu marriage contracted before the conversion of the parties to Christianity.⁸

Change of religion. The change of religion⁹ or the excommunication from caste¹⁰ of either party does not effect a divorce.

Divorce at instance of convert to Christianity. Where a Hindu husband or wife is deserted or repudiated on the ground of his or her conversion to Christianity, a decree for divorce can, under the provisions of the Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act (XXI. of 1866),¹¹ be made in favour of the person so deserted or repudiated, and the parties can marry again as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death.¹²

¹ See *Rahi v. Govind Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97, at p. 114.

² *Sitaram v. Aheeree Heerahnee (Mussamut)* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 129; 20 W. R. C. R. 49.

³ The Courts seem formerly to have granted divorces. See *Kaseeram Kriparam v. Umbaram Hureechund* (1811), 1 Borr. 387.

⁴ *Subbaraya Pillai v. Ramasami Pillai* (1899), 23 Mad. 171, at pp. 177, 178.

⁵ *Post*, p. 94.

⁶ See *Sitanath Mookerjee v. Harma-buttu Dabee (Sreemuttu)* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 377, at p. 379.

⁷ IV. of 1869.

⁸ Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 1912 (X. of 1912), s. 2. Before the coming into force of that Act the Courts entertained

different views on the subject. See *Haradhan Dass v. Jasadamoni* (1891), 18 Cal. 252; *Thapita Thapita Lakshmi* (1894), 17 Cal. 5; *Perianayakam v. Pottu-* (1901), 14 Mad. 382; *Maganiam* (1907), 8 Bom. L. R. 856;

Zuburdust Khan (1870), 2 N. W. P. 370.

⁹ *Government of Bombay v. Ganga* (1880), 4 Bom. 330; *Administrator-General of Madras v. Anandachari* (1886), 9 Mad. 466; *Perianayakam v. Pottukanni* (1890), 14 Mad. 382, at p. 384; *Thapita Peter v. Thapita Lakshmi* (1894), 17 Mad. 235, at p. 239; *In re Millard* (1887), 10 Mad. 218; *In the matter of Ram Kumari* (1891), 18 Cal. 264; *Govardhan Dass v. Jasadamoni Dass* (1891), 18 Cal. 252, at pp. 254, 255; *contra Sinammal v. Administrator-General of Madras* (1885), 8 Mad. 169; *Rahmed Babee v. Rokeya Babee* (1859), 1 Norton's L. C. 12.

¹⁰ See *Queen v. Marimuttu* (1881), 4 Mad. 243; *Administrator-General of Madras v. Anandachari* (1886), 9 Mad. 466; *Bisheshwar v. Mata Gholam* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 300; *contra Sinammal v. Administrator-General of Madras* (1885), 8 Mad. 169.

¹¹ See the procedure provided by that Act.

¹² S. 19 of the Act.

CHAPTER II.

HUSBAND AND WIFE (*continued*).

RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

THE parties to a marriage cannot by arrangement or otherwise Agreement vary the rights, duties, and other incidents which the law ^{varying} rights, etc. attaches to the marriage state.

An ante-nuptial agreement, by which the husband undertakes never to remove his wife from the parental abode, is not binding on him.¹ Similarly, no effect can be given to an agreement which provides that, on the husband taking another wife, the first marriage should be void.²

RIGHTS TO SOCIETY AND GUARDIANSHIP.

A husband is entitled to the society of his wife.³ He can ^{Rights of husband.} require her to live with him wherever he may choose to reside,⁴ and to submit herself obediently to his authority.⁵

⁶ Effect cannot be given to an arrangement between husband and wife Post-nuptial that they should separate, and that neither of them shall sue for restitution arrangement of conjugal rights, unless the agreement indicates a state of circumstances for separation. which would be an answer to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights.⁶

¹ *Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh* (1901), 28 Calc. 751; 5 C. W. N. 673; *Paigi v. Sheonarain* (1885), 8 All. 78, at pp. 79, 80.

² *Sitaram v. Aheeree Heerahnee (Mussamut)* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 129; 20 W. R. C. R. 49.

³ *Binda v. Kaunsiha* (1890), 13 All. 126; *Gatha Ram Mistree v. Moolita Kochin Atteah Domoonee* (1875), 14 B. L. R. 298, at p. 300; 23 W. R. C. R. 179.

⁴ *Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh* (1901), 28 Calc. 751, at p. 760; 5 C. W. N. 673, at p. 680. See *Matangini Dasi v. Jogendra Chunder Mullick* (1891), 19 Calc. 84, at pp. 90, 91; *Binda v.*

Kaunsiha (1890), 13 All. 126; *Sitanath Mookerjee v. Haimabrutty Dabee (Sreemutty)* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 377.

⁵ *Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh* (1901), 28 Calc. 751, at p. 760; 5 C. W. N. 673, at p. 680; *Sitanath Mookerjee v. Haimabrutty Dabee (Sreemutty)* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 377, at p. 379.

⁶ *Rajlukhy Dabee (Sm.) v. Bhootnath Mookerjee* (1900), 4 C. W. N. 488. See *Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh* (1901), 28 Calc. 751, at p. 765; 5 C. W. N. 673, at pp. 683, 684; *Moola v. Nundy* (1872), 4 N. W. P. p. 109.

An arrangement for a separation to commence at a future date is contrary to public policy.¹

Guardianship
of minor wife.

A husband, even if he has not attained the age of majority,² is the lawful guardian of the person of his minor³ wife,⁴ in preference to her parents or other relations, unless, according to the custom of the caste or community to which he belongs, he be precluded from such custody until the wife be fit for marital intercourse.⁵

It is the practice among the Hindu community in the Madras Presidency for a wife to be left with her parents until she attains puberty. The husband is only entitled to the custody of her person when such custody is necessary in her interests.⁶

Guardianship
of minor
widow.

After the husband's death the guardianship of his minor widow, and the management of her property, devolve upon the husband's heirs generally, or upon those who are entitled to inherit his estate after her death,⁷ in preference even to her own father.⁸ On failure of her husband's heirs the widow's paternal relations are her guardians, and failing them, her maternal kindred.⁹

Restraint of
wife.

Having regard to the custom of the country that women, at any rate in the higher positions of life, are secluded in the *zenana*, a Hindu husband would apparently be entitled to exercise, within reasonable limits, a certain amount of

¹ *Krishna Aiyar v. Balammal* (1910), 34 Mad. 398; *Merryweather v. Jones* (1863), 4 Giff. 590; 10 Jur. N. S. 90; 10 L. T. 62; referred to in *Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh* (1901), 28 Calc. 751, at p. 765; 5 C. W. N. 673, at p. 684.

² Act VIII. of 1890, s. 21.

³ I.e. minor within the meaning of the Indian Majority Act (IX. of 1875).

⁴ Guardians and Wards Act (VIII. of 1890), ss. 19, 41 (d). In the matter of *Dhuronidhur Ghose* (1889), 17 Calc. 298; *Kateeram Dokanee v. Gendhenee (Mussamut)* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 178. See *Surjyamoni Dasi v. Kalikanta Das* (1900), 28 Calc. 37, at p. 45; 5 C. W. N. 195, at p. 201.

⁵ *Suntosh Ram Doss v. Gera Pattuck* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 22; *Bool Chand Kalta v. Janokee (Mussa-*

mut) (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 228; S. C. (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 386.

⁶ *Arumuga Mudali v. Vvaramghava Mudali* (1900), 24 Mad. 255.

⁷ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," ed. 1829, vol. i. chap. vii. p. 104; vol. ii. chap. vii., cases 1, 3. *Kheter Monee Dassee v. Krishen Mohun Mitter* (1863), 2 Hay, 196; Marshall, 313; *Khudiram Mookerjee v. Bonwarilal Roy* (1889), 16 Calc. 584; *Kesar (Bai) v. Ganga (Bai)* (1872), 8 Bom. H. C. R., A. C. J. 31; see West and Bühler, 2nd ed., pp. 129, 134, 245, and 556; "Dayabhaga," chap. xi., s. 1, para. 64.

⁸ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," ed. 1829, vol. ii. chap. vii. case 3, p. 204.

⁹ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," ed. 1829, vol. i. chap. vii. p. 104.

restraint upon his wife, even if she be an adult, so as to keep her at home.¹

"The Hindu law, while it enjoins upon the wife the duty of attendance on, obedience to, and veneration for, the husband, inculcates that the husband must honour the wife and treat her with affection and courtesy."²

In spite of early texts, which give a husband power to correct his wife,³ it is clear that he is no way justified in chastising or assaulting her. The Indian Penal Code⁴ does not exempt a husband from liability for an offence committed against his wife's person, except that it provides⁵ that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under twelve years of age, is not rape.

A wife is entitled to live with⁶ and to be maintained by⁷ her husband in his house.

The mere fact that she has been excluded from caste does not make the wife a trespasser when coming to her husband's house.⁸ If she has been expelled from his house for proper cause, she might be treated as a trespasser on returning without his leave.

The right of a husband to the society of his wife, and that of a wife to the society of her husband, may be enforced against the other party to the marriage⁹ by a suit for restitution of conjugal rights.¹⁰

A suit for the purpose of obtaining possession of the person of a wife

¹ See *Matangini Das v. Jogendra Chunder Mullick* (1891), 19 Cal. 84, at pp. 90, 91.

² *Matangini Das v. Jogendra Chunder Mullick* (1891), 19 Cal. 84, at p. 90.

³ "Manu," chap. viii. paras. 299, 300.

⁴ Act XLV. of 1860.

⁵ S. 375. See *Queen-Empress v. Hurree Mohun Mythee* (1890), 18 Cal. 49.

⁶ See *Binda v. Kaunsiha* (1890), 13 All. 126, at pp. 132, 133; *Gatha Ram Mistree v. Mookhta Kochin Atteah Domoonee* (1875), 14 B. L. R. 298, at p. 300; 23 W. R. C. R. 179.

⁷ See *post*, pp. 76, 77.

⁸ *Queen v. Marimuthu* (1881), 4 Mad. 243.

⁹ As to the remedy against a third person for detaining a wife, see *post*, p. 74.

¹⁰ *Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v.*

Basanta Kumar Singh (1901), 28 Cal. 751; 5 C. W. N. 673; *Surjya Moni Das v. Kalikanta Das* (1900), 28 Cal. 37, at p. 45; 5 C. W. N. 195, at p. 201; *Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai* (1886), 10 Bom. 301; *Keshavlal Girdharlal v. Bai Parvati* (1893), 18 Bom. 327; *Binda v. Kaunsiha* (1890), 13 All. 126; *Paigi v. Sheonarain* (1885), 8 All. 78; *Jogendromundini Dossee v. Hurrydoss Ghose* (1879), 5 Cal. 500; 5 C. L. R. 65; *Gatha Ram Mistree v. Mookhta Kochin Atteah Domoonee* (1875), 14 B. L. R. 298; 23 W. R. C. R. 179; *Kuroona Moyee Debee v. Gunga Dhur Surmah* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 50; *Chotun Bebee v. Ameer Chund* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 105; *Melaram Nudial v. Thanooram Bamun* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 552. See *Burloor Ruheem (Moonshee) v. Shumsoonissa Begum* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 551, at pp. 606-610; 8 W. R. P. C. 3, at pp. 12, 13.

Duty of husband to wife.

Assault on wife.

Right of wife to society of husband.

Enforcement of right to society.

Suit for possession of person of wife.

will not lie against the wife; ¹ but such suit might be treated as in substance one for restitution of conjugal rights.²

Grounds for refusing decree.

The circumstances which justify desertion are an answer to a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights.³

Defence to suit for restitution.

In *Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai* ⁴ the Court said, "It may be advisable that the law should adopt stringent measures to compel the performance of conjugal duties; but, as long as the law remains as it is, Civil Courts, in our opinion, cannot, with due regard to consistency and uniformity of practice (except, perhaps, under the most special circumstances), recognize any plea of justification other than a marital offence by the complaining party, as was held to be the only grounds upon which the Divorce Courts in England would refuse relief in *Scott v. Scott*."⁵

The circumstances which justify desertion are—

Cruelty.

1. Cruelty, whether physical or moral, in a degree rendering it unsafe for the wife to return to the power of her husband, or reasonable apprehension of such cruelty.⁶

Cruelty to a less degree,⁷ as, for instance, an unfounded imputation upon the wife's chastity,⁸ or taking her jewels from her,⁹ or mere unkindness or neglect ¹⁰ short of cruelty, would not seem to be an answer to a

¹ *Chotun Bebee v. Ameer Chund* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 105, followed in *Melaram Nudal v. Thanooram Bamun* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 552.

² See *Fakirgauda v. Gangi* (1898), 23 Bom. 307, at p. 309.

³ See *Binda v. Kaunsilia* (1890), 14 All. 126, at p. 163.

⁴ (1886), 10 Bom. 301, at p. 313. See *Sahadur v. Rajwanta* (1904), 27 All. 96, following *Binda v. Kaunsilia* (1890), 13 All. 126.

⁵ (1864), 34 L. J. P. & M. 23; cf. Act IV. of 1869, s. 33. See, however, *Muchoo v. Arzoon Sahoo* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 235, at p. 236. It is submitted that this application of a principle of English law leads to difficulties, as a suit for judicial separation is inapplicable to Hindus. The matter must be dealt with by Hindu law (*ante*, pp. 3-5). See *Buzloor Ruheem (Moonshee) v. Shumsounissa Begum* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 551, at p. 614; 8 W. R. P. C. 3, at p. 15.

⁶ *Dular Koer v. Dwarkanath Misser* (1905), 34 Calc. 971; 9 C. W. N. 510; *Yamunabai v. Narayan Moreswar Pendse* (1876), 1 Bom. 164,

at p. 173; *Matangini Dasi v. Jogen-dra Chunder Mullick* (1891), 19 Calc. 84; *Binda v. Kaunsilia* (1890), 13 All. 126, at p. 184; *Sitabai v. Ramchandrarao* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 373. Cf. *Buzloor Ruheem (Moonshee) v. Shumsounissa Begum* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 551, at p. 615; 8 W. R. P. C. 3, at p. 15.

⁷ See *Jogendronundini Dossee v. Hurrydoss Ghose* (1879), 5 Calc. 500, at pp. 502, 507, 508; 5 C. L. R. 65, at pp. 71, 72.

⁸ *Yamunabai v. Narayan Moreswar Pendse* (1876), 1 Bom. 164, at p. 173.

⁹ *Jeebo Dhon Banyah v. Sundhoo (Mussamut)* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 522.

¹⁰ See *Sitanath Mookerjee v. Haimabuty Dabee* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 377, at p. 379. As to the ideas of the early Hindu law with regard to the power to correct a wife, see Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 48, 49, referred to in *Yamunabai v. Narayan Moreswar Pendse* (1876), 1 Bom. 164, at p. 173.

suit for restitution. In a case where a husband, a Brahmin, having expelled his wife, was living in his house with a low-caste prostitute, he was refused restitution.¹

There seem to be no reported decisions in India on the subject, and it is unlikely that any cases would occur, but there seems to be no reason why cruelty by the wife should not be an answer to a suit by her for restitution of conjugal rights.

2. The fact that the person suing for restitution of conjugal rights is suffering from a loathsome disease.²

Thus a decree was refused to a husband suffering from leprosy and syphilis.³ It would follow that the communication of a noxious disease would justify a wife in declining to consort with her husband.⁴

If the principle laid down in *Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai*⁵ be correct, diseases, which are not the result of marital offences, would be excluded from consideration.

3. Adultery by the wife⁶ in a suit by the wife.⁷

Adultery of wife.

As to adultery by a husband, see *post*, p. 71.

It is unsettled whether mere loss of caste is an answer to a suit for restitution of conjugal rights.

Under the ancient law a wife could not be compelled to live with an outcast husband.⁸ The High Courts at Agra⁹ and Allahabad¹⁰ have declined to accept loss of caste as an excuse for refusal to cohabit, but in another Allahabad case¹¹ the High Court made return to caste a condition precedent to a decree. The right to the society of the wife would, it is submitted, be a right within the meaning of Act XXI. of 1850,¹² but the Court would, it is also submitted, have to inquire into the reasons for the degradation, in order to satisfy itself that a decree would not inflict unnecessary hardship upon the wife. Where the loss of caste is

¹ *Dular Koer v. Dwarkanath Misser* (1905), 34 Calc. 971; 9 C. W. N. 510. See *Dular Koeri v. Dwarkanath Misser* (1904), 32 Calc. 234, at p. 239; 9 C. W. N. 270, at p. 274.

² See Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. pp. 414, 490.

³ *Premkumar (Bai) v. Bhika Kallianji* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 209. Devala considered phthisis as a disease justifying desertion of a husband. Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 470.

⁴ See *Yamunabai v. Narayan More-shwar Pendse* (1876), 1 Bom. 164, at p. 173.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 68.

⁶ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 415.

⁷ As to a suit by the husband, see *Surjyamoni Dasi v. Kalikanta Das* (1900), 28 Calc. 37, at p. 47; 5 C. W. N. 195, at p. 203.

⁸ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 413.

⁹ *Emurtee (Mussamut) v. Nirmul*, N. W. P. Repts., 1864, p. 583.

¹⁰ *Sahadur v. Rajwanta* (1904), 27 All. 96.

¹¹ *Paigi v. Sheonarain* (1885), 8 All. 78. See *Surjyamoni Dasi v. Kalikanta Das* (1900), 28 Calc. 37, at pp. 47, 48; 5 C. W. N. 195, at p. 203.

¹² Cf. *Muchoo v. Arzoon Sahoo* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 235.

capable of expiation the course adopted in the above case was, it is submitted, correct.¹ Where the loss is such as to involve no moral turpitude, the Court would not treat it as an excuse for desertion.

It is not easy to say, in the present state of Hindu society, what offences justify a degradation from caste.²

Change of
religion.

It is also unsettled whether the adoption of another religion by the person seeking restitution is an answer to the suit. It would apparently be an answer in most cases.³

The matter stands to some extent on the same footing as the case of degradation from caste. It would undoubtedly have been under the ancient law a ground for desertion. In the case of a conversion to Christianity the procedure provided by Act XXI. of 1866⁴ would by implication prevent a Court from forcing cohabitation upon a party refusing it on the ground of the conversion of the person seeking it to Christianity. In the case of a conversion to Mahomedanism it would be impossible to enforce cohabitation. The mere abandonment of Hinduism without any formal exclusion from caste would scarcely be an answer. A return to Hinduism after performance of the prescribed expiation would dispose of an objection to cohabitation on the ground of conversion.

As to the effect of a change of religion upon the marriage tie, see *ante*, p. 64.

Condonation.

Conduct which has been condoned is no answer to a suit for restitution, unless it has been revived by subsequent misconduct.⁵

A decree for restitution of conjugal rights cannot be refused on any of the following grounds:—

Non-consum-
mation.
Minority.

1. The fact that the marriage has not been consummated.⁶
2. Minority.

The minority of the husband can be no answer to a suit by him, as he is ordinarily entitled to be the guardian of his wife's person,⁷ and it can scarcely be an answer to a suit against him. The minority of the wife would be no answer to a suit by the husband, except under circumstances

¹ Cf. *Jina (Bai) v. Kharwar Jina* (1907), 31 Bom. 366; 9 Bom. L. R. 451.

² See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 195, 196.

³ See *Muchoo v. Arzoan Sahoo* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 235, at p. 236. See, however, *In re the wife of P. Streenevassa*, 1 Norton L. C. 13, where the Court ordered the wife of a converted Brahmin to be restored to

him on a writ of *habeas corpus*. If the rule adopted in *Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai* (*ante*, p. 68) be correct, change of religion would be no answer.

⁴ Ss. 16-18.

⁵ See *Jogendronundini Dossee v. Hurry Doss Ghose* (1879), 5 Calc. 500; 5 C. L. R. 65.

⁶ *Dadaji Bhikaji v. Rukmabai* (1886), 10 Bom. 301, at pp. 310, 311.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 66.

which would disentitle him to act as guardian of her person,¹ but it might in some cases be proper to put him upon terms; for instance, that she should be placed by him in charge of a female member of his family.² The minority of the wife could be no answer to a suit by her.

3. The unsoundness of mind of the plaintiff, whether it commenced before or after the marriage.³ The Court would not, however, make a decree, obedience to which might be a danger to the defendant.

Sir William Macnaghten⁴ considered that the insanity of the husband justified his wife in deserting him. He relies on a text of *Manu*,⁵ which has been otherwise interpreted.⁶ There is a text to the effect that the insanity of the wife is a ground for excluding her from the husband's bed, and from pilgrimage, but from nothing else.⁷

Mental infirmity short of insanity can clearly be no answer to a suit for restitution.⁸ Mental weakness.

4. A second marriage by the husband.⁹

5. Adultery by the husband.¹⁰

Second marriage.
Adultery.

Where the husband is actually living in adultery,¹¹ or his conduct has been such as to prevent his wife from returning to him without loss of caste (see *ante*, pp. 69, 70) or injury to her self-respect and religious feeling,¹² the Court might refuse a decree.

¹ *Ante*, pp. 66, 68, 69.

² *Surjyamoní Dasi v. Kalikanta Das* (1900), 28 Cal. 37; 5 C. W. N. 195; *Kateeram Dokanee v. Gendhenee (Mussamut)* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 178.

³ See *Binda v. Kaunsilia* (1890), 13 All. 126, at p. 155; Sircar's "Vyavastha Chandrika," vol. ii. p. 489, note. Cf. Indian Divorce Act (IV. of 1869), s. 33; *Hayward v. Hayward* (1858), 1 Sw. & Tr. 81.

⁴ "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 62. As insanity at the time of marriage does not invalidate the marriage (*ante*, pp. 34, 35), it could not be an answer to a suit for restitution.

⁵ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 79.

⁶ Gloss of *Culluka*, Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 412; Sircar's "Vyavastha Chandrika," vol. ii. p. 489, note.

⁷ Text of *Devala*, Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 414.

⁸ *Binda v. Kaunsilia* (1890), 13 All. 126, at p. 161.

⁹ *Arumugam v. Tuhukanam* (1883),

7 Mad. 187; *Nathubai Bhailal v. Javher Raiji* (1876), 1 Bom. 121, at p. 122; *Jeebo Dhon Banyah v. Sundhoo (Mussamut)* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 522; *Virasvami Chetti v. Appasvami Chetti* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 375; see *ante*, p. 36.

¹⁰ *Binda v. Kaunsilia* (1890), 13 All. 126, at p. 164; *Paigi v. Sheonarain* (1885), 8 All. 78, at p. 81; *Gantapalli Appalamma v. Gantapalli Yellayya* (1897), 20 Mad. 470; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," i. 61, 62. See Strange's "Hindu Law," ii. 46, 47.

¹¹ *Paigi v. Sheonarain* (1885), 8 All. 78, at p. 81. See *Dular Koer v. Dwarkanath Misser* (1905), 34 Cal. 971; 9 C. W. N. 510, *ante*, p. 69; and *Dular Koeri v. Dwarkanath Misser* (1904), 32 Cal. 234, at p. 239; 9 C. W. N. 270, at p. 274. See, however, case No. 457 of 1884, 20 Mad. 474, note.

¹² See *Gabind Prasad (Lala) v. Doulat Batti* (1870), 6 B. L. R. App. 85; 14 W. R. C. R. 451.

Impotence.

It is submitted that the impotence of the plaintiff¹ originating after marriage is no answer to a suit for restitution.

Whether it is an answer when it was existing at the time of the marriage would, it is submitted, depend upon whether the Court would set aside the marriage on that account.² *Manu*³ makes no distinction between impotence arising after and impotence arising before marriage, but the text by which he is said to permit a wife to abandon an impotent husband has been differently interpreted.⁴

Where order would be unjust.

Where it would be manifestly unjust to order restitution of conjugal rights, the Court can refuse to make such order.

For instance, in *Moola v. Nundy*,⁵ where, in consequence of the misconduct of the husband, a *panchayet* had adjudged a separation, and the parties had lived apart for thirteen years, the Court declined to make an order.

When right of suit arises.

A right of suit for restitution of conjugal rights arises on a refusal, express or implied, to return to cohabitation.⁶

A formal demand, and refusal, to return to cohabitation is not a condition precedent to such suit,⁷ but there must be a willingness on the part of the plaintiff to resume cohabitation.

The suit must be brought within six years from the time when the right to sue accrues.⁸

Repetition of refusal.

A second suit for restitution based upon the continued disobedience to the decree in the first suit would apparently be barred by the law of *res judicata*,⁹ but a second withdrawal from cohabitation would give a fresh cause of action.¹⁰

Form of decree.

The decree should declare that the plaintiff is entitled to the restitution of conjugal rights, and that the defendant (if the wife) be directed to go to her husband's house.¹¹ If the

¹ The impotence of the defendant is no answer, see *Purshotamdas Maneklal v. Mani (Bai)* (1896), 21 Bom. 610. Devala permitted a wife to desert her impotent husband. Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 470.

² See *ante*, p. 35.

³ Chap. ix. para. 79.

⁴ See Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 412; Sircar's "Vyavastha Chandrika," vol. ii. 489, note.

⁵ (1872), 4 N. W. P. H. C. 109.

⁶ Cf. *Dhanjibhoy Bomanji v. Hirabai* (1901), 25 Bom. 644; 3 Bom. L. R. 371.

⁷ *Binda v. Kaunsilia* (1890), 13 All. 126, at pp. 139 *et seq.* See *Fakirgauda v. Gangi* (1898), 23 Bom.

307, at p. 310. For the purpose of jurisdiction the cause of action is considered to arise at the husband's house. *Lakhtagar Keshargar v. Suraj (Bai)* (1893), 18 Bom. 316.

⁸ Limitation Act (IX. of 1908), sch. I, art. 120. See *Krishna Ayyar v. Balammal* (1910), 34 Mad. 398.

⁹ The Court declined to decide this question in *Keshavlal Girdharlal v. Parvati (Bai)* (1893), 18 Bom. 327, at pp. 329, 331.

¹⁰ *Keshavlal Girdharlal v. Parvati (Bai)* (1893), 18 Bom. 327.

¹¹ *Furzund Hossein v. Janu Bibee* (1878), 4 Cal. 588, at p. 591; *Fakirgauda v. Gangi* (1898), 23 Bom. 307,

defendant be the husband the decree should direct him to restore such rights to his wife.

The Court may make a decree for restitution of conjugal rights upon Conditional conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff. In one case¹ the decree was ^{decree.} made subject to the husband being restored to caste. In another case² the Court required "that the house which the husband provides shall be in every respect fit for the reception of a virtuous and respectable wife." The Court might also require proper security to be taken for the protection of the wife.³

When the party, against whom a decree for restitution of conjugal rights has been made, has had an opportunity of ^{Execution of} obeying it, and has wilfully failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced by his or her imprisonment,⁴ or by the attachment of his or her property, or by both. ^{decree.}

When the attachment has remained in force for one year, if the decree has not been obeyed, and the decree-holder has applied to have the attached property sold, the property may be sold, and out of the proceeds the Court may award to the decree-holder such compensation as it thinks fit, and may pay the balance (if any) to the judgment debtor on his or her application. Where the judgment debtor has obeyed the decree, and paid all costs of executing the same, which he or she is bound to pay, or if, at the end of one year from the date of the attachment, no application to have the property sold has been made or granted, the attachment should cease. The Court can refuse execution against the person, and may order periodical payments to the wife.⁵

Where the wife is within the Presidency towns of Calcutta, ^{Summary} Madras, and Bombay, the right of the husband to the custody ^{remedies.} of his minor wife may be enforced by an order of the nature of a *habeas corpus*.⁶

at p. 309; *Chotun Bebee v. Ameer Chund* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 105, followed in *Koobur Khansama v. Jan Khansama* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 467. Cf. Form 19 of schedule to Act IV. of 1869.

¹ *Pargi v. Sheonarain* (1885), 8 All. 78. In *Surjyamoni Dasi v. Kalikanta Das* (1900), 28 Calc. 37, at pp. 47, 48; 5 C. W. N. 195, at p. 203, a husband was required to get his wife restored to caste as a condition of obtaining a decree against her for restitution.

² *Jogendronundini Dossee v. Hurry Doss Ghose* (1879), 5 Calc. 500, at p. 508; 5 C. L. R. 65, at pp. 72, 73.

See *Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai v. Basanta Kumar Singh* (1901), 28 Calc. 751, at pp. 755, 766; 5 C. W. N. 673, at pp. 677, 684.

³ *Buzloor Ruheem (Moonshee) v. Shumsoonnissa Begum* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 551, at p. 617; 8 W. R. P. C. 3, at p. 16.

⁴ Six weeks is the limit of imprisonment; Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), s. 58.

⁵ Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), Sched. I., ord. xxi., rules 32, 33.

⁶ Criminal Procedure Code (Act V. of 1898), s. 491.

There is also, throughout India, a summary remedy by a magistrate's order.¹

Guardians and
Wards Act.

Where the husband has already had the custody of his minor wife, and she has left, or is removed from, his custody, there is also a remedy under sec. 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act.²

Damages.

The husband is also entitled to recover damages from the person harbouring his wife or enticing her away,³ whether or not for improper purposes, and to obtain an injunction against such person from interfering with his wife rejoining him.

"Every person who receives a married woman into his house, and suffers her to continue there after he has received notice from the husband not to harbour her, is liable to an action for damages, unless the husband has, by his cruelty or misconduct, forfeited his marital rights, or has turned his wife out of doors, or has, by some insult or ill-treatment, compelled her to leave him."⁴

A suit for damages against a person committing adultery with a wife would also apparently lie.⁵

It is not possible to lay down any exact rule as to the measure of damages in these cases. The principles adopted in English cases might, to some extent, be applied. On the one hand, the Court should consider the loss of the wife's society, affection, services and assistance in domestic affairs, and the social injury (if any) which the husband is likely to suffer from the act complained of. On the other hand, the behaviour of the husband towards his wife may be taken into account. The capacity of the defendant to pay damages is not generally (if ever) a circumstance for consideration.⁶

RIGHTS OVER PROPERTY.

Power of wife
over her
property.

Except that in times of pressing need he may use his wife's separate property,⁷ and that he has in certain cases a right of

¹ Criminal Procedure Code (Act V. of 1898), ss. 100, 552.

² VIII. of 1890.

³ See *Hurka Shunkur v. Raejees Munohur* (1908), 1 Borr. 353.

⁴ *Yamunabai v. Narayan Moreswar Pendse* (1876), 1 Bom. 164, at pp. 174, 175. See *Surjyamoní Dasi v. Kalikant Das* (1900), 28 Calc. 37, at p. 43; 5 C. W. N. 195, at p. 200; *Lall Nath Misser v. Sheoburn Pandey* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 92.

⁵ *Soodasun Sain v. Lokenauth Mullick* (1859), Montrion's cases of

Hindu law, p. 619. Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 46, vol. ii. p. 41. See *contra*, Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 61, and opinions of Colebrooke and Ellis, Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 40-44.

⁶ See *Kelly v. Kelly* (1869), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 67.

⁷ See *Mohima Chunder Roy v. Durga Monee* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 184; *Tukaram v. Gunaji* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 129; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, paras. 32, 33; "Dayabhaga," chap. iv. s. 1, paras. 19-25;

inheritance, a husband does not by marriage acquire any beneficial interest in his wife's property.¹

As to his power to control her disposal of property acquired by her in certain ways, see *post*, pp. 443, 444.

A Hindu married woman is competent to contract,² but unless she be an agent, either express or implied, of her husband, she does not thereby bind him or his property.³ Her own property is liable for her debts.⁴

A woman is exempt from imprisonment in execution of a money decree.⁵

Where the wife is living with her husband, or is living apart from him under such circumstances⁶ as would justify an order for separate maintenance, the Court would presume an authority to bind the husband for necessities,⁷ but such presumption can be rebutted by evidence that the authority has been revoked.

A Hindu married woman can sue or be sued in her own name.⁸

There is no presumption of law that transactions which stand in the name of the wife are the husband's transactions,⁹ although it may frequently happen that a husband buys property in his wife's name.

Suit by or against married women.

"Vivada Chintamani" (Tagore's translation), pp. 264-265; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 10, paras. 7-10; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. 2, para. 14.

¹ *Sooda Ram Doss v. Joogul Kishore Goopto* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 274; *Mohima Chunder Roy v. Durga Monee* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 184. See *Ramasami Padeiyatchi v. Virasami Padeiyatchi* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 272, at pp. 278, 279; *Reg. v. Natha Kalyan* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. Cr. C. 11.

² Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 11. The Hindu law permitted her to contract, see *Nathubhai Bhailal v. Javher Raiji* (1876), 1 Bom. 121, at p. 123; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 276.

³ *Pusi v. Mahadeo Prasad* (1880), 3 All. 122.

⁴ *Nahachand v. Bai Sheva* (1882), Bom. 470; *Oodey Singh (Kooer) v. Phool Chund* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 197. See *Nathubhai Bhailal v. Javher Raiji* (1876), 1 Bom. 121; *Govindji Khimji v. Lakmidas Nathubhoy* (1879), 4 Bom. 318; *Narotam v. Nanka* (1882), 6 Bom. 473; *In re the petition of Radhi*

(1887), 12 Bom. 229.

⁵ Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), s. 56.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 68-70.

⁷ *Virasami Chetti v. Appasvami Chetti* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 375, at p. 379; *Pusi v. Mahadeo Prasad* (1880), 3 All. 122; *Nathubhai Bhailal v. Javher Raiji* (1871), 1 Bom. 121, at p. 123; Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 187.

⁸ *Bhoyrubchunder Dass v. Madhubchunder Paramanic* (1863), 1 Hyde, 281.

⁹ *Manada Sundari Dabi v. Mahananda Sarnakar* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 367. See *Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh (Diwan) v. Indarpal Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 227; 26 Calc. 871; 4 C. W. N. 1; *Choudrani v. Tariny Kanth Lahiry* (1882), 8 Calc. 545; 11 C. L. R. 41 (on appeal this question did not arise, *Dharam Kant Lahiri Chowdhry v. Kristo Kumari Chowdhry* (1886), 13 I. A. 70; 13 Calc. 181); *Narayana v. Krishna* (1884), 8 Mad. 214; *contra*, *Bindoo Bashinee Debee v. Pearee Mohun Bose* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 312.

Power of husband over his property.

Except so far as she may be entitled to maintenance thereout,¹ to a share on partition,² and to rights of inheritance, a wife does not by marriage acquire any interest in her husband's property or any voice in its management.³

Debts of re-married widow.

A person who marries a Hindu widow is not, merely by reason of such marriage, liable for any of the debts of a prior deceased husband of such widow.⁴

Suits between husband and wife.

A husband may sue his wife, and a wife may sue her husband, in respect of any cause of action in the same way as if they were independent of one another.⁵

Theft.

There is nothing in the law to prevent a Hindu husband or wife from being convicted of theft of the property of the other, but having regard to the authority which, when husband and wife are living together, would necessarily arise from the married state, it would generally be difficult to prove a dishonest intention. Where the wife is acting in concert with her paramour the intention would be more obvious, as she would not in that case be likely to suppose that she had authority from her husband.⁶

MAINTENANCE.

Maintenance of wife.

A wife is entitled to receive from her husband⁷ food, raiment, lodging, and provision for religious or other duties incident to the status in life which she occupies.⁸

As to maintenance out of property belonging to a joint family of which her husband is a member, see *post*, pp. 78, 79; and as to her right to a share on partition in lieu of maintenance, see *post*, pp. 331-335. Except that she may have a right of maintenance against her father-in-law's

¹ See *infra*.

² *Post*, pp. 331-335.

³ *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy* (1888), 15 Cal. 292, at p. 306. See *Punna Bibee v. Radha Kissen Das* (1903), 31 Cal. 476; *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99, at p. 107.

⁴ See Bom. Act VII of 1866, s. 4. A different rule was, before the passing of that Act, applied by the Courts in the Mofussil of the Bombay Presidency.

⁵ *Strange's "Hindu Law,"* vol. ii. pp. 59, 60; *G. v. K.* (1794), 2 Morley's "Digest," 234; *Colebrooke's "Digest,"* bk. iv. chap. i. s. 1. See *Deokomvur v. Umbaram Lala* (1810),

1 Borr. 370, note, p. 371.

⁶ See *Queen - Empress v. Butcha* (1893), 17 Mad. 401; *Anonymous* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. App. xxii.; Act XLV, of 1860 (Penal Code), s. 378, illus. (n) and (o).

⁷ *Sidlingapa v. Sidava* (1878), 2 Bom. 624, at p. 628; S. C. 2 Bom. 634; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. chap. ii. cases i.-iii.; "Dayabhaga," chap. iv. s. 1, para. 25; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. xx. s. 1; *Colebrooke's "Digest,"* vol. ii. pp. 420-421.

⁸ See *Nittokissoree Dossee (Sreenutty) v. Jogendro Nauth Mullick* (1878), 5 I. A. 55, at p. 57.

estate,¹ she has no right to be maintained by her own or by her husband's relations,² unless they have property belonging to her husband in their hands.³

Except where she has been guilty of infidelity,⁴ a husband may be required to maintain his wife, even though she cannot compel him to restore her to other conjugal rights.⁵

Although under the Hindu law the right of a wife to be maintained by her husband does not depend upon the possession of any property by him,⁶ a wife would gain nothing by a suit against a penniless husband, and could only force him to maintain her by the fruits of his labour by a proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code.⁷

As to the right of a wife to pledge her husband's credit for necessities, see *ante*, p. 75.

Although the husband may abandon Hinduism, he cannot thereby destroy his wife's right of maintenance.⁸ Abandonment of Hinduism.

The Court can award maintenance to a wife whose marriage has been dissolved under the provisions of the "Native Converts' Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866."⁹ Dissolution of marriage.

Where the husband is excluded from inheritance on the ground of some disqualification,¹⁰ his wife is, if chaste, entitled to maintenance out of the property to which he would have succeeded if he had not been so disqualified.¹¹ If her sons succeed to the inheritance she has the right of a mother.¹² Husband disqualified from inheritance.

A wife would ordinarily be entitled to maintenance in her husband's house,¹³ but when he, without excuse,¹⁴ refuses to allow her to reside with him,¹⁵ or when she is justified in Place of maintenance.

¹ *Post*, pp. 210, 211.

² *Iyagaru Soobaroyadoo v. Iyagaru Sashama*, Mad. S. R. 1856, p. 22; *Rangayian v. Kalyam Ummall*, Mad. S. R. 1860, p. 86, cited in 1 Norton L. C. p. 39.

³ *Ramabai v. Trimbak Ganesb Desai* (1872), 9 Bom. H. C. 283. See *post*, p. 79.

⁴ *Post*, p. 78.

⁵ See "Manu," chap. xi. para. 189.

⁶ *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99, at p. 103. See *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma* (1902), 27 Mad. 45, at p. 48.

⁷ *Post*, p. 98.

⁸ See (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. App. iii.

⁹ Act XXI. of 1866, s. 28.

¹⁰ *Post*, pp. 370-373.

¹¹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, paras. 14, 15; "Dayabhaga," chap. v. para. 19; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 17, para. 12; Tagore's "Vivada Chintamani," p. 244; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. v. para. 43.

¹² See *post*, p. 79.

¹³ *Sitanath Mookerjee v. Haimabutti Dabee (Sreemutty)* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 377; *Virasvami Chetti v. Appasvami Chetti* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 375.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 68-70.

¹⁵ *Nitye Laha v. Soondaree Dossee* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 475. See *Sidlingapa v. Sidava* (1878), 2 Bom. 634; *Rampriya v. Bhriquram* (1815), 2 Wm. Macn. 109.

residing apart from him,¹ she is entitled to separate maintenance.²

Except where there is such refusal or justification, a wife cannot enforce an arrangement for separate maintenance.³

Release of
right.

A wife cannot release her right of maintenance, but an arrangement fixing the amount of her maintenance will, if fair, be upheld.⁴

The right of a Hindu female to maintenance is one peculiarly needing protection.⁵

Loss of right.

A wife who without just cause deserts her husband,⁶ or refuses to live with him,⁷ or is unchaste,⁸ loses her right of maintenance.

An unchaste wife loses her right of maintenance, even if it has been secured by a decree,⁹ or by an agreement.¹⁰

As to right of an unchaste wife to what is called "starving maintenance," see *post*, p. 83.

A wife does not lose the right by a mere loss of caste.¹¹

Maintenance
of widow.

A widow who succeeds to no property as heir to her husband, is (whether she has or has not a son)¹² entitled to maintenance

¹ *Sitabai v. Ramchandrarao* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 373. See *Gabind Pershad (Lalla) v. Doulat Bhatti* (1870), 6 B. L. R. App. 85; 14 W. R. C. R. 451. As to the circumstances which justify her in declining to live with her husband, see *ante*, pp. 68-70.

² *Matangini Dasi v. Jogendra Chunder Mullick* (1891), 19 Calc. 84; *Sidhngapa v. Sidava* (1878), 2 Bom. 634.

³ *Rajlukhy Dabee (Sm) v. Bhootnath Mookerjee* (1900), 4 C. W. N. 488.

⁴ *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99, at pp. 104-107.

⁵ *Ibid.*, at p. 107; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 505; *Comulmoney Dossee v. Ramnath Bysack* (1843), 1 Fulton, 189, at p. 203.

⁶ *Surampalli Bangaramma v. Surampalli Brambaze* (1908), 31 Mad. 338; *Virasvami Chetti v. Appasvami Chetti* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 375.

⁷ *Ilata Shavatri v. Ilata Narayanan Nambudiri* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 372, at pp. 373, 374; *Kulyanessuree Debee v. Dwarkanath Surmah Chat-*

terjee (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 116. She does not lose the right when she leaves him by his consent. *Nitye Laha v. Soondaree Dossee* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 475.

⁸ See *Pirthee Singh (Rajah) v. Raj Kower (Ranee)* (1873), 1 A. Sup., vol. 203, at p. 210; 12 B. L. R. 238, at p. 247; 20 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 24; *Ilata Shavatri v. Ilata Narayanan Nambudiri* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 372; *Kandasami Pillai v. Murugammal* (1898), 19 Mad. 6.

⁹ *Nubo Gopal Roy v. Amrit Moyee Dossee* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 428. See *post*, pp. 89, 91. The decree cannot be altered in execution. There must be a fresh suit. *Ranmalsangji Bhagwatsangji (Maharana Shri) v. Kundan Kuwar (Bai Shri)* (1902), 26 Bom. 707.

¹⁰ See *Nagamma v. Virabhadra* (1894), 17 Mad. 392.

¹¹ Act XXI. of 1850. *Queen v. Marimuttu* (1881), 4 Mad. 243.

¹² *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 63; *Brinda Chowdhraim v. Radhica Chowdhraim* (1885), 11 Calc. 492, at p. 494.

out of the whole¹ of the property in which her husband was interested as owner² or coparcener³ at the time of his death, or in which he would have been so interested if he had not been disabled from inheritance, or from being a coparcener,⁴ whether she have property of her own or not.⁵

A suit for partition, subsequent to the widow's suit for maintenance, will not affect her right against the whole property.⁶ When she has not brought such suit her maintenance will be payable out of the property allotted to the branch of the family to which she belongs.⁷

This applies to impartible property.⁸

A widow is not entitled to maintenance out of property belonging to her husband which had become forfeited to Government on his conviction for rebellion,⁹ but her right would be unaffected by a confiscation on account of the rebellion of her sons, or other heirs of her husband.¹⁰

A mother is entitled to be maintained by her son, and after

Right against relations of husband.

¹ *Subbarayulu Chetty v. Kamalavallithayaramma* (1911), 35 Mad. 147.

² *Brinda Chowdhrao v. Radhica Chowdhrao* (1885), 11 Calc. 492, at p. 494; *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99, at p. 106; *Bhagabati Dasi (Srimati) v. Kanailal Mitter* (1872), 8 B. L. R. 225. As to her maintenance out of property which has been divested on adoption, see *Dhurm Das Pandey v. Shamasondri Dibiah* (1843), 3 M. I. A. 229, at p. 243; 6 W. R. P. C. 43, at p. 45.

³ *Golab Koonwur (Mussumat) v. Collector of Benares* (1847), 4 M. I. A. 246, at p. 258; 7 W. R. P. C. 47, at p. 51; *Dev Persad v. Gunwanti Koer* (1895), 22 Calc. 410; *Becha v. Mothina* (1900), 23 All. 86; *Savitribai v. Luximibai* (1878), 2 Bom. 573, at p. 582, and cases there cited; *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma* (1902), 27 Mad. 45; *Adhibai v. Cursandas Nathu* (1886), 11 Bom. 199; *Manjappa Hegade v. Lakshmi* (1890), 15 Bom. 234; *Jankibai v. Shrinivas Ganesh* (1913), 38 Bom. 120; 15 Bom. L. R. 853; *Visalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150; *Subbramaniam Mudaliar v. Kaliani Ammal* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 226; *Amrit (Bai) v. Manik (Bai)* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 79; *Ramabai v. Trimbak Ganesh Desai* (1872), 9 Bom. H. C. 283; *Shib Dayee v. Dorga Pershad* (1872),

4 N. W. P. 63; *Lalti Kuar (Mussumat) v. Ganga Bishen* (1875), 7 N. W. P. 261; *Meherban Singh v. Sheo Koonwer (Mussumat)* (1866), 1 Agra. 106; *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 61, at p. 67; *Hema Kooeree (Mussumat) v. Ajoodhya Pershad* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 474. This rule applies to Khoja Mahomedans, *Rashid Karmali v. Sherbanoo* (1904), 29 Bom. 85.

⁴ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, para. 5; "Dayabhaga," chap. v. paras. 11, 14-16; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. v. paras. 10-14, 20.

⁵ *Lingayya v. Kanakamma* (1913), 38 Mad. 153, differing from *Ramavati Koer v. Manjhar Koer* (1906), 4 C. L. J. 74.

⁶ *Subbarayulu Chetty v. Kamalavallithayaramma* (1911), 35 Mad. 147.

⁷ *Haridas Lalji v. Narotam Raghavji* (1911), 14 Bom. L. R. 237.

⁸ *Sivananja Perumal Sethuroyer v. Meenakshi Ammal* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 377.

⁹ *Gunga Bae v. Hogg* (1867), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 124.

¹⁰ *Golab Koonwur (Mussumat) v. Collector of Benares* (1847), 4 M. I. A. 246; 7 W. R. P. C. 47; explained in *Gunga Bae v. Hogg* (1867), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 124; and in *Adhiranee Narain Coomary v. Shona Malee Pat Mahadai* (1876), 1 Calc. 365, at pp. 373, 374.

his death out of his property,¹ but with that exception, and also with the exception that a daughter-in-law may enforce a right to maintenance against the property of her father-in-law after his death,² a widow has no legal right of maintenance against any of the relatives of her husband, unless they are in possession of property which belonged to her husband, or in which he was a coparcener.³

The sale of ancestral property which would have bound her husband if alive, does not give a right against a father-in-law or other coparcener for maintenance.⁴

As to her rights to a share on a partition between her sons or grandsons, see *post*, pp. 333-335.

Although an heir or other person in possession of property may be liable to a widow for her maintenance, he is not liable to other persons on contracts made by her, even on account of her maintenance.⁵

Residence of
widow.

A widow is ordinarily entitled to reside in her husband's family dwelling-house.⁶

She cannot be ousted,⁷ except by a purchaser who has bought under a decree which binds her, or to whom the property has been sold for the purpose of satisfying claims which are paramount to her right of maintenance,⁸ such as for debts incurred for the benefit, or on account of the

¹ *Subbarayana v. Subbakka* (1884), 8 Mad. 236; "Manu," chap. viii. para. 389; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., pp. 375, 376. She has no such right against her step-son or step-grandson. *Daya (Bai) v. Natha Govindlal* (1885), 9 Bom. 279. See *Santribai v. Luximibai* (1878), 2 Bom. 573, at pp. 582, 583.

² *Post*, pp. 210, 211.

³ *Ganga Bai v. Sita Ram* (1876), 1 All. 170, at pp. 174-177; *Khetramani Dasi v. Kashinath Das* (1868), 2 B. L. A. C. 15, at p. 35; S. C. *Kasheerath Das v. Kheturmonee Dossee* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 413, at p. 422; *Ramabai v. Trimback Ganesh Desai* (1872), 9 Bom. H. C. 283; *Visalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150; *Savitribai v. Luximibai* (1878), 2 Bom. 573; *Apaji Chintaman Devdhar v. Ganga-bai* (1878), 2 Bom. 632; *Kalu v. Kashibai* (1882), 7 Bom. 127; *Kanku (Bai) v. Jaddav (Bai)* (1883), 8 Bom. 15; *Daya (Bai) v. Natha Govindlal* (1885), 9 Bom. 279. See, however,

Timmappa Bhat v. Parmeshriamma (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. 130, where Gibbs, J., said (p. 132), "Every Hindu widow, whether her husband was divided from the family or not, is entitled, when in needy circumstances, to claim from her husband's relatives."

⁴ *Ganga Bai v. Sita Ram* (1876), 1 All. 170, at p. 177.

⁵ *Ramasamy Aiyar v. Minakshi Ammal* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 409.

⁶ *Venkatammal v. Andiyappa Chetti* (1882), 6 Mad. 130; *Devkore (Bai) v. Sanmukhram* (1888), 13 Bom. 101.

⁷ *Dalsukhram Mahasukhram v. Lalrubhai Motichand* (1883), 7 Bom. 282; *Venkatammal v. Andiyappa Chetti* (1882), 6 Mad. 130; *Gauri v. Chandramani* (1876), 1 All. 262; *Talemand Singh v. Rukmina* (1880), 3 All. 353. See *Parvati v. Kisansing* (1882), 6 Bom. 567.

⁸ *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma* (1902), 27 Mad. 45; *Manilal v. Tara (Bai)* (1892), 17 Bom. 398. See *Mohun Geer v. Tota (Mussumat)* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 153;

necessities of the family,¹ or perhaps when another suitable residence is found for her.²

"The right of residence of Hindu females is ordinarily referable to the family house, and a purchaser may be presumed to have notice of that fact."³

This right of the widow is personal to her, and cannot be attached in execution of a decree.⁴

An adult widow⁵ is not bound to reside with the relatives of her husband, and she does not forfeit her right to property or maintenance merely on account of her residing with her own family, or leaving her husband's residence from any other cause than for unchaste or improper purposes.⁶

Where the husband has expressly directed that his wife's maintenance should be contingent on her residing in the family residence with his relatives,⁷ she would only be entitled to maintenance if she resided in the

Bhikam Das v. Pura (1879), 2 All. 141; *Yamnabai v. Nanabhai* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 1075.

¹ *Ramanadan v. Rangammal* (1888), 12 Mad. 260; *Yamnabai v. Nanabhai* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 1075; *Kisandas v. Rangubai* (1908), 9 Bom. L. R. 382.

² *Mangala Debi v. Dinanath Bose* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 72; 12 W. R. O. J. 35.

³ *Ramanadan v. Rangammal* (1888), 12 Mad. 260, at p. 270; *Yamnabai v. Nanabhai* (1910), 3 Bom. L. R. 1075, at p. 1079.

⁴ *Salakshi v. Lakshmayee* (1908), 31 Mad. 500.

⁵ As to a minor widow, see *ante*, p. 66.

⁶ *Pirthee Singh (Rajah) v. Raj Kower (Ranee)* (1873), 1 A. Sup., vol. 203; 12 B. L. R. 238; 20 W. R. C. R. 21; *Narayanrao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai* (1879), 6 I. A. 114, at p. 119; 3 Bom. 415, at p. 421; *Kasturbar v. Shivajiram Devkurna* (1879), 3 Bom. 372 (differing from *Rango Vinayak Dev. v. Yamunabai* (1878), 3 Bom. 44); *Surampalli Bangaramma v. Surampalli Brambaze* (1908), 31 Mad. 338; *Cossinaut Bysack v. Hurrosondry Dossee* (1819), Morley's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 198; Norton, 85; S. C. on appeal (1826), Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 97; Macnaghten's "Considera-

tions of Hindu Law," p. 93; Clarke, 91; Montrou's cases, 445; *Mokhada Dossee v. Nundo Lall Haldar* (1901), 28 Cal. 278, at p. 287; 5 C. W. N. 297, at p. 299; *Siddessury Dassee v. Janardan Sarkar* (1902), 29 Cal. 557; 6 C. W. N. 530 (a case of a widowed daughter-in-law); *Koodee Monee Debea v. Tarra Chand Chuckerbutty* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 134 (ditto); *Gokibai v. Lakhmidas Khimji* (1890), 14 Bom. 490; *Visalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150; *Ahollya Bhai Debia v. Luckhee Monee Debia* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 37; *Chandrabhagabhai v. Kashinath Vithal* (1866), 2 Bom. H. C. 341, 2nd ed., 323; *Jadumani Das v. Kheytramohan Shil* (1854), Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 384; *Shurno Moyee Dassee v. Gopal Lall Doss* (1863), Marshall, 497; *Unrit Koweree v. Kidernath Ghose* (1868), 3 Agra. H. C. 182; *Parvatibai v. Chatru* (1911), 13 Bom. L. R. 1023. In *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 191; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 81, the Judicial Committee said that it is in the husband's family that in strict contemplation of law the widow ought to reside.

⁷ *Mulji Bhaishankar v. Bai Ujam* (1888), 13 Bom. 218; *Girianna Murkundi Naik v. Honama* (1890), 15 Bom. 236. See *Shurno Moyee*

house in which her husband required her to be maintained, or if she from just cause abstained from residing in that house.¹

Where the family property is so small that the family cannot bear the strain of supporting the widow in a separate lodging, though it might be able to provide her with food in the family house, a Court might well in the exercise of its discretion refuse separate maintenance,² or, at any rate, in fixing the maintenance might decline to allow any amount on account of the expenses of a residence.³

By remarriage a widow loses her right to maintenance out of her husband's estate.⁴

Loss of right. A widow by unchastity forfeits her right of maintenance,⁵ even if such maintenance has been secured by agreement⁶ or decree;⁷ but where the maintenance has been given by a will it is not forfeited unless there be an express provision in the will.⁸

Where the agreement for maintenance is made by way of compromise of a claim for something more than maintenance, unchastity would not, in the absence of express provision, destroy the right to maintenance.⁹

Dassee v. Gopal Lall Doss (1863), Marshall, 497; *Pirthee Singh (Rajah) v. Raj Kower (Ranee)* (1873), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 203, at p. 210; 12 B. L. R. 238, at p. 247; 20 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 24; *Narayanrao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai* (1879), 6 I. A. 114, at p. 119; 3 Bom. 415, at p. 421; *Gokibai v. Lakhmidas Khimji* (1890), 14 Bom. 490, at pp. 496, 497; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 370.

¹ As to "just cause," see *Promothanath Roy v. Nagendrabala Chaudhrani* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 808.

² *Kasturbai v. Shrivaram Derkurna* (1879), 3 Bom. 372, at p. 376; *Godavaribai v. Sagunabai* (1896), 22 Bom. 52.

³ See *Ramchandra Vishnu Bapat v. Sagunabai* (1879), 4 Bom. 261.

⁴ Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act (XV. of 1856), s. 2, *post*, pp. 369, 370.

⁵ *Nagamma v. Virabhadra* (1894), 17 Mad. 392; *Valu v. Ganga* (1882), 7 Bom. 84; *Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma* (1884), 9 Bom. 108; *Roma Nath v. Rajonimoni Dasi* (1890), 17 Calc. 674; *Daulta Kuari v. Meghu Tiwari* (1893), 15 All. 382; *Fisalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry*

(1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150, at p. 160; *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kohitany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115, at p. 151; 5 Calc. 776, at p. 786; 6 C. L. R. 322, at p. 330; *Kery Kohitany v. Moneeram Kolita* (1873), 13 B. L. R. 1, at pp. 72, 73; 19 W. R. C. R. 367, at p. 405; *Muttiammal v. Kamakshy Ammal* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 337; *Sinthayee v. Thanakapudayen* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 183, at 185; *Bussunt Koomaree (Maharane)* v. *Kummul Koomaree (Maharane)* (1843), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 144, new edition, 168; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. chap. ii. case 5, pp. 112, 113; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 172, vol. ii. p. 310; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 1, para. 7; "Dayabhaga," chap. xi. s. 1, para. 48.

⁶ *Nagamma v. Virabhadra* (1894), 17 Mad. 392; *Sathyabhama v. Kesava-charya* (1915), 39 Mad. 658.

⁷ *Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma* (1884), 9 Bom. 108; *Daulta Kuari v. Meghu Tiwari* (1893), 15 All. 382; see *post*, p. 91.

⁸ *Parami v. Mahadevi* (1909), 34 Bom. 278; 13 Bom. L. R. 196.

⁹ *Bhup Singh v. Lachman Kunwar* (1904), 26 All. 321.

It is unsettled whether an unchaste wife or widow, on returning to a moral life, is entitled to what is called "starving maintenance," that is to say, just sufficient food to keep her alive. It is submitted that she is so entitled. In *Honamma v. Timannabhat*¹ the Bombay High Court allowed the right, but it was disallowed by the same Court in *Valu v. Ganga*.² In a recent Bombay case, the following was said, "The general rule to be gathered from 'the texts' is that a Hindu wife cannot be absolutely abandoned by her husband. If she is living an unchaste life, he is bound to keep her in the house under restraint, and provide her with food and raiment just sufficient to support life; she is not entitled to any other right. If, however, she repents, returns to purity and performs expiatory rites, she becomes entitled to all conjugal and social rights, unless her adultery was with a man of lower caste, in which case, after expiation, she can claim no more than bare maintenance and residence."³ The Madras High Court⁴ has held that there is such right. In an earlier case⁵ the same Court considered the question unsettled. In *Romanath v. Rajonimoni Dasi*⁶ the Bengal High Court was inclined to allow the right. Earlier authority is in favour of the right.⁷ It is submitted that the better view is that the right should be allowed.

She is not entitled even to "starving maintenance," so long as she persists in a vicious life,⁸ but it has been held that where "starving maintenance" has been allotted to her by decree, subsequent unchastity does not destroy the right.⁹

Mere loss of caste does not involve a loss of a right of maintenance.¹⁰

Where there is property liable for the maintenance of a widow, it lies upon the parties resisting the claim to separate maintenance to show that the circumstances are such as to disentitle the widow thereto.¹¹

For example, they may show that she resides separately from her husband's family for immoral purposes,¹² or that the family property is

¹ (1877), 1 Bom. 559.

² (1882), 7 Bom. 84.

³ *Parami v. Mahadevi* (1909), 34 Bom. 273, at p. 283; 12 Bom. L. R. 196, at p. 200.

⁴ *Sathyabhama v. Kesavacharya* (1915), 39 Mad 658; *contra Nagamma v. Virabhadra* (1894), 17 Mad. 392.

⁵ *Visalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150.

⁶ (1890), 17 Calc. 674, at p. 679.

⁷ Steele, para. xxv. (new edition), p. 36; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 172, 175, vol. ii. p. 39; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 8, para. 9; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 1, paras. 37, 38; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. pp. 423-425. See Norton's "Leading Cases," vol. i. p. 37.

⁸ *Kandasami Pillai v. Murugammal* (1895), 19 Mad. 6; *Romanath v. Rajonimoni Dasi* (1890), 17 Calc. 674, at p. 679; *Daulta Kuari v. Meghu Tiwari* (1893), 15 All. 382; *Debi Saran Shukul v. Doulata Shuklain* (1916), 39 All. 234; *Muttammal v. Kamakshy Ammal* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 337; see, however, *Parami v. Mahadevi* (1909), 34 Bom. 278; 12 Bom. L. R. 196.

⁹ *Honamma v. Timannabhat* (1877), 1 Bom. 559.

¹⁰ Act XXI. of 1850. See *Queen v. Marimuttu* (1881), 4 Mad. 243.

¹¹ See *Saboo Suddick (Haji) v. Ayesha-bai* (1903), 30 I. A. 127; 27 Bom. 485; 7 C. W. N. 665; 5 Bom. L. R. 475.

¹² *Kasturbai v. Shivajiram Devkurna* (1879), 3 Bom. 372, at p. 381.

so small as not reasonably to admit of an allotment to her of a separate maintenance, or that she has other means of maintenance.¹

Transfer of right.

A wife or widow cannot transfer her rights to maintenance.²

Attachment.

It has been said that maintenance which has been fixed by agreement or decree may be transferable,³ but it is submitted that the terms of s. 6 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882) prevent such transfer.

There is, it is submitted, no reason why arrears of maintenance should not be transferable.⁴

A right to future maintenance,⁵ or an interest in the income of immovable property assigned by way of maintenance,⁶ cannot be attached in execution of a decree, but there is nothing to prevent the attachment of arrears of maintenance.⁷

Loss of maintenance by transfer of property.

Unless their rights are secured by an arrangement or by decree,⁸ it is submitted that a Hindu can by a transfer for consideration dispose of his property so as to deprive his wife or such other person whom he is legally bound to maintain⁹ of any right of maintenance against the property so disposed of,¹⁰ except where such transfer is made with the intention of defeating the right, and the transferee has notice of such intention.¹¹

As to an alienation pending suit, see *post*, p. 93.

Gift or will.

Provided he leaves sufficient property for the maintenance of his widow and those whom by law he is legally bound to

¹ See *Gokibai v. Lakhmidas Khimji* (1890), 14 Bom. 490, at p. 496.

² See *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99, at pp. 103, 104.

³ *Annapurni Nachiar (Rani) v. Swaminatha Chettiar* (1910), 34 Mad. 7, at p. 9.

⁴ See *Endoori Venkataramaniah v. Venkatachaintulu* (1909), 33 Mad. 80.

⁵ Civil Procedure Code (V. of 1908), s. 60.

⁶ *Gulab Kuar v. Bansidhar* (1893), 15 All. 371.

⁷ *Ibid.* See *A. P. Rajerav Chandrarao v. Namarav Krishna Jahagirdar* (1887), 11 Bom. 528; *Asad Ali Molah v. Haidar Ali* (1910), 38 Cal. 13.

⁸ *Kuloda Prosad Chatterjee v. Jageshwar Koer* (1899), 27 Cal. 194. See *post*, p. 91.

⁹ As where the right is to be maintained from coparcenary property, *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma* (1902), 27 Mad. 45, at p. 49.

¹⁰ See *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy* (1888), 15 Cal. 202, at p. 306; *Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 69; *Ram Kunwar v. Ram Dai* (1900), 22 All. 326; *Venkatammal v. Andayappa Chetti* (1882), 6 Mad. 130; *Bhagirathi v. Ananiha Charia* (1893), 17 Mad. 268.

¹¹ *Imam v. Balamma* (1889), 12 Mad. 334; *Beharilalji v. Rajbai (Bai)* (1898), 23 Bom. 342; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 516. Cf. Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 39, *post*, pp. 90, 91.

support, but not otherwise,¹ a Hindu can dispose of his property by gift or will, so as to free it from claims to maintenance.²

He cannot by will exclude her right of maintenance,³ and he cannot by disposing of the whole of his property by will⁴ or gift⁵ deprive his widow of her right to be maintained out of such property.

A concubine, who has been kept by a Hindu up to the time of his death, is entitled to maintenance⁶ from the property (whether ancestral or self-acquired) of her deceased paramour, whether she have children or not,⁷ but loses the right by incontinence.⁸

A woman with whom a Hindu has only had casual intercourse,⁹ or one with whom he has carried on an adulterous intrigue,¹⁰ acquires no such right.

A discarded concubine has no right of maintenance against her paramour, or his estate.¹¹

The right to maintenance cannot be enforced where the Independent means of support.

¹ *Jamna v. Machal Sahu* (1879), 2 All. 315; *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99, at pp. 106, 108.

² *Debendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry v. Brojendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry* (1890), 17 Calc. 886; *Bhoobunmoyee Debia Chowdhraïn v. Ramkishore Achary Chowdhry*, Ben. S. D. A., 1860, p. 485, at p. 489; *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy* (1888), 15 Calc. 292, at p. 306. See *Razabai v. Sadu* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 98; *Lakshmi v. Subramanya* (1889), 12 Mad. 490, at p. 494; answers of law officers in *Mulraz Lachmia v. Chalekany Vencata Rama Jaganadha Row* (1838), 2 M. I. A. 54, at p. 57. The widow's claim to maintenance cannot be defeated merely by implication. *Joytara v. Ramhari Sirdar* (1884), 10 Calc. 638; *Comulmony Dossee v. Rammanath Bysack* (1843), 1 Fulton, 189, at p. 193. See Act XXI. of 1870, s. 3.

³ See *Promotha Nath Roy v. Nagen-drabala Chaudhrani* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 808.

⁴ *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99; *Jamna v. Machul Sahu* (1879), 2 All. 315; *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy* (1888), 15 Calc. 292, at p. 306;

Krishnarao v. Bhagwantrao (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 1082; *Becha v. Moithina* (1900), 23 All. 86.

⁵ See Act IV. of 1882 (Transfer of Property), s. 39, *post*, pp. 90, 91.

⁶ *Ningareddi v. Lakshmanu* (1901), 26 Bom. 163; 3 Bom. L. R. 647; *Ramanarasu v. Buchamma* (1899), 23 Mad. 282, at p. 291.

⁷ *Yashwantrav v. Kashibai* (1887), 12 Bom. 26; *Khemkor v. Umias Shankar Ranchhor* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 381; *Vrandavandas Ramdas v. Yamunabai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 229; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law" vol. ii. chap. ii. case 12; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 174; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 1, paras. 7, 27, 28; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 8, para. 5.

⁸ *Yashwantrav v. Kashibai* (1887), 12 Bom. 26. See "Dayabhaga," chap. xi. s. 1, para. 48.

⁹ *Sikki v. Vencatasamy Gounden* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 144.

¹⁰ *Sikki v. Vencatasamy Gounden* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 144. In *Khemkor v. Umias Shankar Ranchhor* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 381, above, note 7, the connection was apparently an adulterous one.

¹¹ *Ramanarasu v. Buchamma* (1899), 23 Mad. 282.

wife, or widow, or other person claiming it has full independent means of support¹ from property in possession capable of providing maintenance,² whether derived from her husband's property or from some other source. Where there is independent means of support, it must always be taken into account in fixing the amount of maintenance.³

Jewels and other property which are unproductive of income need not be taken into account.⁴

A previous provision of maintenance must be taken into account,⁵ even though it may have been expended.⁶

It has been held that a widow cannot enforce her right against property in which her husband was a coparcener, if the husband's separate property be sufficient for her maintenance.⁷ No reasons were given for this proposition.

Amount of
maintenance,
wife.

The amount which a wife is entitled to receive for her maintenance would ordinarily depend upon the position in life of the husband, the extent of his property, and the claims upon him being taken into consideration.

The views of the husband on the subject of the amount, whether expressed in his will or elsewhere, may be taken into consideration, but are not conclusive.⁸

Yajñavalkya⁹ fixed one-third of the husband's property as the proper amount, and this view has been acted upon in Bombay,¹⁰ but the Courts will not now consider themselves bound by any such fixed rule.¹¹

¹ *Siddessury Dossee v. Janardan Sarkar* (1902), 29 Calc. 557, at p. 576; 6 C. W. N. 530, at p. 547; *Chandrabhagabai v. Kashinath Vithal* (1866), 2 Bom. H. C., 2nd ed., 323; *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 63; *Savitribai v. Luxmibai* (1878), 2 Bom. 573, at p. 584; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 171, vol. ii. p. 305. See *Dattatraya v. Rukhmabai* (1908), 33 Bom. 50; 10 Bom. L. R. 770.

² Not a mere right of action, see *Gokibai v. Lakhmidas Khimji* (1890), 14 Bom. 490.

³ See *Mahesh Partab Singh v. Dirgpal Singh* (1899), 21 All. 232. As to the case of maintenance provided for in a will, see *Narayani Dasi v. Administrator-General of Bengal* (1894), 21 Calc. 683.

⁴ *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 63; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 305. See *Joytara v. Rambhari Sirdar* (1884),

10 Calc. 638.

⁵ See *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 82; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 413; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 373.

⁶ See *Savitribai v. Luxmibai* (1878), 2 Bom. 573.

⁷ See *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 63, at p. 72.

⁸ See *Promotha Nath Roy v. Nagen-drabala Chaudhrani* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 808.

⁹ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 420; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. xx. para. 1; see also Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 45, 48, 51.

¹⁰ *Ramabai v. Trimbak Ganes Desai* (1872), 9 Bom. H. C. 283.

¹¹ See Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. case 3; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 152. See cases as to amount of maintenance of widow, *post*, p. 87, notes 4, 5.

The conduct of the claimant to maintenance,¹ and, it is said,² the Conduct. conduct of the husband, may be taken into consideration.

In fixing the amount of maintenance for a widow, pro- Amount of maintenance, vision must be made for her reasonable wants, namely, for widow. the performance of charities and the discharge of religious obligations, such as religious ceremonies which by custom it is proper for her to perform,³ in addition to reasonable provision for her food, raiment, and residence, having regard to the amount of the estate which is liable for her maintenance, her position in life, and the circumstances of the family.⁴

The following has been held⁵ to be the principle upon which main- Principle of allotment of tenance is to be allotted to a widow:— maintenance.

"Where a widow has asked for separate maintenance, you look first at the mode of life of the family during her husband's lifetime and you try to find out what amount will be sufficient to allow the widow to live as far as may be consistently with the position of a widow in something like the same degree of comfort and with the same reasonable luxury of life as she had in her husband's lifetime. Then you see what the husband's estate is, and you also see how far that estate is sufficient to supply her with maintenance on this scale, without doing injustice to the other members of the family who also have their rights as heirs, or their rights to maintenance out of the estate."

The principles applicable to the fixing of the amount of maintenance of a widow apply *mutatis mutandis* to the cases of other claimants to maintenance.⁶

The life of austerity in which, according to the Shasters, a Hindu widow is required to live, is not taken into consideration;⁷ but, on the

¹ See *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 82; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 413; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 373.

² Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 152.

³ See *Sundarji Damji v. Dahibai* (1904), 29 Bom. 316; 6 Bom. L. R. 1052.

⁴ *Nittokissoree Dossee v. Jogendro Nauth Mullick* (1878), 5 I. A. 55, at pp. 56, 57; *Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Acharjya Chowdhuri* (1916), 43 I. A. 249; 44 Calc. 186; 21 C. W. N. 225; 18 Bom. L. R. 368; *Devi Persad v. Gunwanti Koer* (1895), 22 Calc. 410, at p. 418; *Baisni v. Rup Singh* (1890), 12 All. 558; *Hurry Mohun Roy v. Nyantara (Sreemutty)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 474; *Dale Kumar v. Ambika Partap Singh* (1903), 25 All. 266, at pp. 269,

270; *Karoanamoyee Dabee (Sm.) v. Administrator-General of Bengal* (1890), 9 C. W. N. 651. See *Nurhar Singh v. Dirgnath Kuar* (1879), 2 All. 407, where it was held that the fact that the widow had had a son made no difference in the amount to which she was entitled; *Comulmoney Dossee v. Rammanath Bysack* (1843), 1 Fulton, 189; *Oojul Munnee Dossee v. Jyggopal Chowdhree*, Ben. S. D. A. 1848, p. 491; *Bheeloo (Mussur-maut) v. Phool Chund* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 223, new edition, 298.

⁵ *Karoanamoyee Dabee (Sm.) v. Administrator-General of Bengal* (1889), 9 C. W. N. 651, at pp. 652, 653.

⁶ See *Mahesh Partab Singh v. Dirgpal Singh* (1899), 21 All. 232.

⁷ *Hurry Mohun Roy v. Nyantara (Sreemutty)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 474, at p. 476; *Baisni v. Rup Singh*

other hand, a widow is not necessarily entitled to be maintained in such a way that she can live in the same style as she lived in when her husband was alive.¹

Any saving that she may make by living with her own family is not to be taken into account.²

There is no general rule as to the amount of maintenance to be allotted to the person entitled thereto. The amount of the property available, the claims of the different persons entitled to maintenance thereout, and the reasonable wants of the claimant for the support of himself and his family in accordance with the position of the family must all be taken into consideration.³

"The amount of the property . . . is an element in determining the sufficiency of a maintenance, but it cannot be regarded as the criterion. Other circumstances, and even the position and conduct of the claimant . . . may reduce the maintenance."⁴

The necessities of the claimant are also not the sole criterion.⁵

Limited to husband's share.

A widow is not entitled to maintenance in excess of the annual proceeds of the share to which her husband would have been entitled on partition if he were living.⁶

If the produce of such share be insufficient for her support, it might be necessary to sell the share, and support her out of the proceeds.

Funeral expenses.

Her funeral expenses are also payable out of the estate chargeable with her maintenance.⁷

Debts have priority.

The maintenance of a wife or widow is postponed to the payment of the debts of the husband, or of the family, as the case may be.

Maintenance charged on property.

It is not settled whether debts take precedence of maintenance which is charged upon property by a decree or agreement. In two Allahabad cases,⁸ in which the question did not arise, the Court held that debts had such precedence. It is submitted that maintenance charged by a decree

(1890), 12 All. 558, at p. 563; *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 63, at p. 72.

¹ *Kallepersaud Singh v. Kupoor Koowaree* (1865), 4 W. R. C. R. 65.

² *Hurry Mohun Roy v. Nyantara (Sreemutty)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 474, at p. 476.

³ See *Maresh Partab Singh v. Dirpal Singh* (1899), 21 All. 232.

⁴ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 82; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 413; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 373.

⁵ *Bhugwan Chunder Bose v. Bindoo Bashinee Dasee* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 286.

⁶ *Mahadray Keshav Tilak v. Gan-gabai* (1878), 2 Bom. 639; *Adhibai v. Cursandas Naihu* (1886), 11 Bom. 199, at p. 209; *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma* (1902), 27 Mad. 45, at p. 49; *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 63, at p. 72.

⁷ *Ratanchund v. Jawherchand* (1897), 22 Bom. 818; *Sadashv Bhaskar Joshi v. Dhakubai* (1880), 5 Bom. 450; *Vaidyanatha Aiyar v. Aiyasami Aiyar* (1908), 32 Mad. 191; *Ramdhari Singh v. Permanund Singh* (1913), 19 C. W. N. 1183.

⁸ *Sham Lal v. Banna* (1882), 4 All. 296, at p. 300; *Gur Dayal v. Kaunsila* (1883), 5 All. 367.

is on the same footing as a mortgage, and takes precedence of subsequent charges, and of all simple contract debts¹ created by or entered into by the person against whom the decree is made, or his representatives. Maintenance charged by an agreement would also, it is submitted, when there is no fraud upon creditors, take precedence of the debts of the person entering into the agreement, or his representative, provided the agreement complies with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.² Maintenance charged by a will would not take precedence of the debts of the testator.

The maintenance of a wife or widow is in one sense a charge Maintenance not a charge. upon the property of the husband, whether ancestral or self-acquired,³ as it is payable thereout, but it is not a charge in the fullest sense of the term, because it does not necessarily bind any part of the property in the hands of a purchaser.⁴ It becomes a complete charge if it be fixed and charged upon such property, or a portion thereof, by a decree or by agreement,⁵ or by a will.⁶

This applies to the claims of other persons entitled to maintenance.⁷

It has been held that where a widow obtains a decree which creates a charge for maintenance, and takes no steps in execution, a subsequent purchaser is not bound by the decree.⁸ It is submitted that the charge Effect of decree.

¹ *Kuloda Prosad Chatterjee v. Jageshwar Koer* (1899), 27 Cal. 194; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 524. See cases post, note 5.

² Act IV. of 1882, s. 59. See definition of "mortgage," s. 58.

³ *Hemangini Dasi (Srimati) v. Kedarnath Kudu Chowdhry* (1889), 16 I. A. 115; 16 Cal. 758; *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99; *Ramanadan v. Rangam-mal* (1888), 12 Mad. 260, at p. 271; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494. In *Kalpagaathachi v. Ganapathi Pillai* (1881), 3 Mad. 184, at p. 191, the right was described as "a mere equity to a provision."

⁴ *Bhartpur State v. Gopal Dei* (1901), 24 All. 160, at p. 163; *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoo-bun Mohun Neoghy* (1888), 15 Calc. 292, at p. 307; *Sham Lal v. Banna* (1882), 4 All. 296; *Ram Kunwar v. Ram Dai* (1900), 22 All. 326; *Digambari Debi v. Dhan Kumari Bibi* (1906), 10 C. W. N. 1074. See *Ramanadan v. Rangam-mal* (1888), 12 Mad. 260, at p. 272; *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Man-*

gamma (1902), 27 Mad. 45, at p. 49; *Venkatammal v. Andyappa Chetti* (1882), 6 Mad. 130.

⁵ *Mahalakshamma Garu (Sri Maniyam) v. Venkataratnamma Garu (Sri Maniyam)* (1882), 6 Mad. 83, at p. 86; *Bhagirathi v. Ananta Charia* (1893), 17 Mad. 268; *Yamabai v. Nanabhai* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 1075; *Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 69, at p. 75, explaining *Heera Lal v. Kousillah (Mussumat)* (1867), 2 Agra, 42; *Juggernath Sawant v. Odhiranee Narai Koomaree* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 126.

⁶ See *Beharilalji Bhagwatprasadji (Shri) v. Rajbai (Bai)* (1898), 23 Bom. 342. Where the will directs maintenance but creates no charge, it would apparently be otherwise, see *Narayanrao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai* (1879), 6 I. A. 114, at p. 118; 3 Bom. 415, at p. 420.

⁷ *Beer Chunder Manikkyia v. Nobodeep Chunder Deb Burmono (Raj Coomar)* (1883), 9 Calc. 535, at p. 555; 12 C. L. R. 465, at pp. 471, 472.

⁸ *Bhoje Mahadev Parab v. Gangabai* (1913), 37 Bom. 621; 15 Bom. L. R. 809.

by decree has the same effect as a mortgage and binds subsequent purchasers.

Decree against manager of family.

Where a charge for maintenance has been imposed upon family property by a decree in a suit against the representative of the family, as such, a member of the family who was not a party to a suit cannot dispute the decree.¹ It is otherwise in the case of a decree against the father,² or other member of the family personally. A mere personal decree for maintenance does not create a charge.³

Right to dispute will.

By virtue of her right to maintenance a widow is entitled to contest the *factum* of her husband's will,⁴ or to discuss its construction so far as it affects her maintenance.⁵ She does not thereby acquire a right to dispute the will of her son.⁶

Transfer of property when claim to maintenance thereout.

The question as to whether a *bond fide* purchaser for valuable consideration is bound to satisfy a right of maintenance out of the property purchased by him has been the subject of considerable discussion in the Courts.

Although the 39th section of the Transfer of Property Act⁷ is not to be deemed as affecting any rule of Hindu law,⁸ its provisions are, it is submitted, in the main coincident with the law as laid down in the decisions.⁹

That section is as follows :—

“Where a third person has a right to receive maintenance, or a provision for advancement or marriage, from the profits of immovable property,¹⁰ and such property is transferred with the intention of defeating such right, the right may be enforced against the transferee, if he has notice of such intention or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against a transferee for consideration and without notice of the right, nor against such property in his hands.”

Illustration.

A, a Hindu, transfers Sultānpur to his sister-in-law B, in lieu of her claim against him for maintenance in virtue of his having become entitled to her deceased husband's property, and agrees with her that, if she is dispossessed of Sultānpur, A will transfer to her an equal area out of such

¹ *Minakshi Achi v. Chinnappa Udayan* (1901), 24 Mad. 689; *Subbanna Bhatta v. Subbanna* (1907), 30 Mad. 324.

² *Muttia v. Vrammal* (1887), 10 Mad. 283.

³ *Muttia v. Vrammal* (1887), 10 Mad. 283; *Karpakambal Ammal v. Ganapathi Subbayyan* (1882), 5 Mad. 234; *Bhagvathi v. Anantha Charia* (1893), 17 Mad. 268; *Minakshi Achi v. Chinnappa Udayan* (1901), 24 Mad. 689, at p. 694; *Adhiranee Narain Coomary v. Shona Malee Pat Mahadai* (1876), 1 Calo. 365.

⁴ *Brinda Chowdhraim v. Radhica*

(1885), 11 Calo. 492.

⁵ *Promotha Nath Roy v. Nagendrabala Chaudhrani* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 808.

⁶ *Garabini Dassi v. Pratap Chandra Shaha* (1900), 4 C. W. N. 602.

⁷ IV. of 1882.

⁸ Act IV. of 1882, s. 2.

⁹ See *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494; *Yamnabai v. Nanabhai* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 1075.

¹⁰ This includes coparcenary property: *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma* (1902), 27 Mad. 45, at p. 49.

of several other specified villages in his possession as she may elect. A sells the specified villages to C, who buys in good faith, without notice of the agreement. B is dispossessed of Sultánpur. She has no claim on the villages transferred to C.

The first portion of this section refers only to transfers made with the intention of defeating the right, but the latter portion, taken with the illustration, shows that it extends to other cases.

The following propositions are, it is submitted, justified by the decisions :—

1. A purchaser would be bound by a decree charging the property with the maintenance,¹ except where the purchase had been made in execution of a decree, which bound the widow, or which enforced a claim, which under the Hindu law takes precedence of a claim to maintenance.²

“When the maintenance has been expressly charged on the purchased property, it will be liable, although it be shown that there is property in the hands of the heirs sufficient to meet the claim.”³

2. A purchaser would be bound by an agreement for maintenance which satisfies the conditions required for a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act,⁴ or which has been followed by possession.

He would also, it is submitted, be bound by an agreement, which did not satisfy such conditions, but which was enforceable against a transferee with notice of such agreement.⁵

3. When the maintenance is not charged on the property by a decree, or by an agreement equivalent to a mortgage, the purchaser is bound by the right to maintenance if the transfer be made with the intention of defeating the right, and he has notice of such intention.⁶

4. When the maintenance is not so charged, and there is no such intention, or if there be such intention, the purchaser

¹ See *Kuloda Prosad Chatterjee v. Jageshwar Koer* (1899), 27 Calc. 194; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 524.

² *Shamlal v. Banna* (1882), 4 All. 296, at p. 300. Such as a debt incurred before the creation of the charge by the person out of whose property the maintenance is payable, *Gur Dayal v. Kaunsila* (1883), 5 All. 367.

³ *Shamlal v. Banna* (1882), 4 All. 296, at p. 300.

⁴ IV. of 1882, ss. 58, 59; *ante*, p. 89, note 2.

⁵ See *post*, p. 92.

⁶ Act IV. of 1882, s. 39. See *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 524. This involves a fraudulent intention: *Dugambari Debi v. Dhan Kumari Bibi* (1906), 10 C. W. N. 1074.

has no notice thereof, a *bonâ fide*¹ purchaser is not affected by the claim, whether he has notice of such claim or not.²

In earlier cases it was held that a *bonâ fide* purchaser without notice was not affected by the claim, but that a purchaser with notice of the claim³ or, at any rate, with notice of the existence of a claim likely to be unjustly impaired by the proposed transaction,⁴ or, as it has been put in another case,⁵ a notice that the right cannot be satisfied without recourse to the property purchased, was subject to it.

There is also authority that the widow must exhaust her remedies against the heir, or, at any rate, prove that there is no property of the deceased in the hands of the heir before recovering against the purchaser.⁶ The inconvenience of this doctrine has been pointed out by the Bombay High Court.⁷

The Hindu law places on the same footing all the so-called charges on the inheritance,⁸ as debts,⁹ expenses of initiation of sons,¹⁰ and marriage

¹ I.e. the property must be bought upon a rational and honest opinion that the sale was one which could be effected without any furtherance of wrong; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 524.

² *Ram Kunwar v. Ram Dai* (1900), 22 All. 326; *Bhartpur State v. Gopal Dei* (1901), 24 All. 160. See *Shamlal v. Banna* (1882), 4 All. 296; *Soorja Koer v. Nath Bux Singh* (1884), 11 Calc. 102; *Johurra Bibee v. Sreegopal Misser* (1876), 1 Calc. 470; *Natchiarammal v. Gopalakrishna* (1879), 2 Mad. 126, and cases ante, p. 89, notes 4, 5. There are observations in *Amrita Lal Mitter v. Manick Lal Mullick* (1900), 27 Calc. 551, 4 C. W. N. 764, to the contrary effect, but that was a case of a transfer of an undivided share of the whole property.

³ See *Bhagabati Dasi (Srimati) v. Kanailal Mitter* (1872), 8 B. L. R. 225; 17 W. R. C. R. 433, note. *Adhiranee Narain Coomary v. Shona Malee Pat Mahadai* (1876), 1 Calc. 365, and cases there cited; *Rachawa v. Shivayogapa* (1893), 18 Bom. 679; *Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 69; *Goluck Chunder Bose (Baboo) v. Ohilla Daye (Ranee)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 100; *Heera Lal v. Kousillak (Mussumal)* (1867), 2 Agra. 42. (In the last case the transfer was in terms subject to a specified sum for the maintenance of the widow.) Any fact which would put the purchaser upon inquiry

would amount to notice. Thus possession by the widow of the family dwelling-house or of other property may amount to notice. See *Ramanadan v. Rangammal* (1888), 12 Mad. 260, at p. 272; *Imam v. Balamma* (1889), 12 Mad. 334; *Yamnabai v. Nanabhar* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 1075.

⁴ *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 517.

⁵ *Ramanadan v. Rangammal* (1889), 12 Mad. 260, at p. 269.

⁶ *Adhiranee Narain Coomary v. Shona Malee Pat Mahadai* (1876), 1 Calc. 365, at p. 377; *Ram Churun Tewaree v. Jasooda Koonwer* (1867), 2 Agra. 134; *contra Goluck Chunder Bose (Baboo) v. Ohilla Daye (Ranee)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 100.

⁷ *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at pp. 515, 520.

⁸ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. chap. viii. In *Bhartpur State v. Gopal Dei* (1901), 24 All. 160, at p. 163, the Court said, "In fact, a widow's right to receive maintenance is one of an indefinite character, which, unless made a charge upon the property, by agreement or by decree of the Court, is only enforceable like any other liability in respect of which no charge exists."

⁹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, para. 24; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. v. s. 4, paras. 12, 14, 16, 17, 19.

¹⁰ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, paras. 38-40; "Mitakshara,"

of daughters.¹ It could scarcely be that a *bond fide* purchaser, even with notice of the existence of a claim in respect of any one of these so-called charges, should bear the burden of their payment.² In a case where the money had been raised by purchase for the purpose of paying any of these charges it would follow that the purchaser would be under no liability.³ Would it be reasonable in any case, except where the transaction was intended to the knowledge of the purchaser to be a fraud upon the charge, to require a purchaser from an absolute owner to inquire as to the purposes for which the money was being raised? Moreover, the texts give a charge on the inheritance to wives as to widows, but a wife cannot enforce her maintenance against a purchaser from her husband.⁴

"If there is an ample estate out of which to provide for the widow, so that she may get her claim fixed and secured, or if, knowing of the proposed sale, she does not take any step to secure her own interest, no imputation of bad faith, or of abetting it, can be made against the purchaser of a portion of the joint property. If the widow, on the other hand, is not accepting support from the coparcener in satisfaction of her claim; if she lives apart, and the estate is small and insufficient, it is the vendee's duty before purchasing to inquire into the reason for the sale, and not by a clandestine transaction to prevent the widow from asserting her right against the intending vendor."⁵

A right of maintenance is not affected by a transfer⁶ made or a suit for partition brought⁷ during the pendency of a suit for maintenance, unless such transfer be effected for the purpose of paying off a debt, which has priority over the claim for maintenance.⁸

Where the suit for maintenance does not seek to charge specific property, the doctrine of *lis pendens* does not apply.⁹

An heir or coparcener,¹⁰ or devisee,¹¹ or a purchaser with

Transfer or
partition
pending suit.

Possession of
property by
widow.

chap. i. s. 7, paras. 3-6; Colebrooke's "Digest," bk. v. paras. cxxiii., cxxv., cxxxii.

¹ Colebrooke's "Digest," bk. v. para. cxxiv.

² A creditor cannot follow the assets of an estate into the hands of a *bond fide* purchaser. See *Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 69, at p. 78, and cases there cited.

³ See *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 499.

⁴ See *Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 69, at p. 78.

⁵ *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494,

at p. 517.

⁶ See Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 52; *Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Fulkumari Dassi* (1899), 27 Cal. 77; S. C. *sub nomine Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Ganendra Nath Sircar*, 4 C. W. N. 254. See *Amrita Lal Mitter v. Manick Lal Mullick* (1900), 27 Cal. 551; 4 C. W. N. 764.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 79.

⁸ *Dose Thimmanna Bhutta v. Krishna Tantri* (1906), 29 Mad. 508

⁹ *Manika Gramani v. Ellappa Chetti* (1896), 19 Mad. 271, see *ante*, p. 79.

¹⁰ *Yellawa v. Bhimangavda* (1893), 18 Bom. 452.

¹¹ *Razabai v. Sadu* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 98.

notice of her claim and possession,¹ cannot oust a widow from property which is liable for her maintenance, without securing her maintenance.

The possession would, it is submitted, be in this case evidence of an arrangement charging the property.²

Right against
proceeds of
sale.

A widow may enforce her right of maintenance against the proceeds of the property in the hands of the heir.³

Where property held on mortgage has been allotted to a widow for her maintenance, and the mortgage has been paid off, the right of the widow attaches to the money.⁴

As to the allotment of a share to a mother or grandmother in lieu of her maintenance in case of partition between her sons or grandsons, see *post*, pp. 333 *et seq.*

Suit for
maintenance.

A widow may, for the purpose of securing her maintenance, sue to compel the persons in possession of the estate, out of which the maintenance is payable, to give security for the due payment of her maintenance, or to have it made a charge upon the estate, and may, in a proper case, obtain an injunction to restrain them from wasting or alienating the estate.⁵ If she does not wish for such charge, she may sue for maintenance already due,⁶ or for a declaration that it is payable, or she may combine a claim for arrears with a prayer for a charge or for security.

Suits for
arrears.

Although a Court may award arrears,⁷ a decree for arrears is not of

¹ *Imam v. Balamma* (1889), 12 Mad. 334; *Rachawa v. Shivayogappa* (1893), 18 Bom. 679.

² *Ante*, p. 89.

³ See *Venkatammal v. Andyappa* (1882), 6 Mad. 130, at p. 135; *Ram Churun Tewaree v. Jasooda Koonwer* (1867), 2 Agra. 134; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 519.

⁴ *Gambhirmal v. Hamirmal* (1896), 21 Bom. 747.

⁵ *Ramanadan v. Rangammal* (1889), 12 Mad. 260, at pp. 267, 268; *Mahalakshamma Garu (Sri Maniyam) v. Venkataratnamma Garu (Sri Maniyam)* (1882), 6 Mad. 83. See *Brinda Chowdhraim v. Radhika Chowdhraim* (1885), 11 Calc. 492, at p. 494.

⁶ *Pirthee Singh (Raja) v. Rajkooer*

(*Rani*) (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 203; 12 B. L. R. 238; 20 W. R. C. R. 21; *Venkopadhyaya v. Kavari Hengusu* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 36; *Sakwarbai v. Bhavanjee Raje* (1864), 1 Bom. H. C. 194; *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99. See *Bhartpur State v. Gopal Dei* (1901), 24 All. 160, at p. 163.

⁷ *Pirthee Singh (Rajah) v. Raj Kower (Ranee)* (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 203, at p. 211; 12 B. L. R. 238, at p. 248; 20 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 25; *Venkopadhyaya v. Kavari Hengusu* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 36; *Subbramaniam Mudaliar v. Kahani Ammal* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 226; *Mandodari Debi v. Joynarayan Pakrasi* (1833), Sir-car's "Vyavastha Darpana," p. 381; Montrieu's "Cases of Hindu Law," pp. 408-412.

right, but is in the discretion of the Court,¹ and depends upon her wants and exigencies.² Where the person claiming maintenance has been supported, without having incurred any expense or liability, the Court might well exercise its discretion by refusing to grant arrears.

The Court should discourage a multiplicity of suits for the maintenance of one person, and should, if possible, where necessary, make a decree for future maintenance.³

The widow is not entitled to sue for possession of the property.⁴

A wife, who is entitled to separate maintenance, has apparently similar remedies.

When maintenance is fixed by an agreement, which is equivalent to a mortgage, it may be enforced by a suit under the Transfer of Property Act.⁵

The widow is entitled to sue all or any of the heirs in possession of property subject to her maintenance.⁶

When the right of maintenance has been made a charge by agreement or decree the claimant may recover the amount from any person holding any portion of the property liable.⁷ The person paying it would have a right of contribution against other persons liable therefor.⁸

The right to sue for maintenance commences when there has been a wrongful withholding of payment of the proper amount. It accrues from time to time according to the wants and exigencies of the person claiming to be maintained.⁹

This withholding may be proved otherwise than by a claim

¹ *Raghubans Kunwar v. Bhagwant Kunwar* (1899), 21 All. 183.

² *Rangubai v. Subaji Ramchandra* (1912) 36 Bom. 383; 17 Bom. L. R. 207.

³ See *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at pp. 497, 498; *Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma* (1884), 9 Bom. 108, at p. 110.

⁴ *Oomrao Singh v. Man Konwer (Musst.)* (1867), 2 Agra 136. As to her right to remain in possession, see *ante*, pp. 93, 94.

⁵ IV. of 1882, ss. 58, 88, 100.

⁶ *Ramchandra Dikshit v. Savitribai* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 73, as explained in *Nistarini Dasi (S. M.)*

v. Makhanlal Dutt (1872), 9 B. L. R. 11, at p. 27; 17 W. R. C. R. 4.

⁷ *Ramchandra Dikshit v. Savitribai* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 73, explained in *Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 69, at p. 73, and in *Nistarini Dasi (S. M.) v. Makhanlal Dutt* (1872), 9 B. L. R. 11, at p. 27; 17 W. R. C. R. 4.

⁸ *Ramchandra Dikshit v. Savitribai* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 73.

⁹ *Narayanrao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai* (1879), 6 I. A. 114, at p. 118; 3 Bom. 415, at p. 420; 6 C. L. R. 162, at p. 166; *Rangubai v. Subaji Ramchandra* (1912), 36 Bom. 383; 14 Bom. L. R. 267.

and refusal.¹ Past non-payment is *prima facie* evidence of such withholding.³

The omission to claim maintenance apart from the effect of the law of limitation will not prejudice the claimant when he is obliged from his wants or exigencies to demand it.³

Limitation of
suit for arrears
of mainten-
ance.

A suit for arrears of maintenance must be brought within twelve years from the time when the arrears are payable.⁴

Thus past maintenance for twelve years,⁵ and no more, can be recovered by suit.

Limitation of
suit for
declaration.

A suit for a declaration of a right to maintenance must be brought within twelve years from the time when the right is denied.⁶

Apparently when the right has been denied, and twelve years has elapsed from such denial, the right to maintenance is barred.⁷

Fixing of
amount.

Where the parties do not agree, it is for the Court to fix the rate of maintenance payable.⁸

As to the principles upon which maintenance should be fixed, see *ante*, p. 87.

The Judicial Committee will not interfere with the exercise of the discretion by the Courts in India in fixing maintenance, except where strong grounds exist.⁹

¹ *Mallikarjuna Prasada Naidu v. Durga Prasada Naidu* (1894), 17 Mad. 362; S. C. on appeal (1900), 27 I. A. 151; 24 Mad. 147; 5 C. W. N. 74; 2 Bom. L. R. 945; *Seshamma v. Subbarayadu* (1893), 18 Mad. 403; *Motilal Prannath v. Kashi (Bai)* (1892), 17 Bom. 45; *Parvatibai v. Chatru* (1911), 36 Bom. 131; 13 Bom. L. R. 1023. See *Narayanrao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai* (1879), 6 I. A. 114, at p. 119; 3 Bom. 415, at p. 421.

² *Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda) v. Durga Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda)* (1900), 27 I. A. 151; 24 Mad. 147; 5 C. W. N. 74; 2 Bom. L. R. 945.

³ *Siddesury Dossee v. Janardan Sarkar* (1902), 29 Calc. 557, at p. 572; 6 C. W. N. 530, at p. 545. See, however, *Abbaku v. Ammu Shet-tati* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 137.

⁴ Act IX. of 1908, Sch. I., art. 128.
⁵ See *Subbaramana Mudaliar v. Kaliani Ammal* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C.

226; *Venkopadhyaya v. Kavari Hengusu* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 36.

⁶ Act IX. of 1908, Sch. I., arts. 129, 132.

⁷ *Chhaganlal v. Bapubhai* (1880), 5 Bom. 68. See *Jiri v. Ramji* (1879), 3 Bom. 207.

⁸ *Nubo Gopal Roy v. Amrit Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 428; *Bheeloo (Mussumaut) v. Phool Chund* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 223 (new edition, 298); *Nistarini Dasi (S. M.) v. Makhantal Dutt* (1872), 9 B. L. R. 11, at p. 28.

⁹ *Collector of Madura v. Mootloo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. L. A. 397, at p. 447; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 20; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 25; *Nittokissoree Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Jogendro Nauth Mullick* (1878), 5 I. A. 55, at p. 56; *Kachi Kalyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar* (1905), 32 I. A. 261; 28 Mad. 508; 10 C. W. N. 95; 7 Bom. L. R. 907.

The proper course for a Court in ordering maintenance is to make it Duty of Court. a charge upon specific property,¹ or to set apart a sum of money sufficient to yield the required allowance, and, if necessary, sell a part of the estate for that purpose.² In some cases the Court might be satisfied with security given by the reversioners.

The allowance fixed by the Court for maintenance should cover all necessary expenses for maintenance and house rent.³

It is better to fix an annual sum, and not a share of the income of the estate.⁴

It has also been held that "in decrees where maintenance is awarded, Courts should insert words which would enable them on application to set aside or modify their orders as circumstances might require."⁵ Such a course would, it is submitted, invite frequent litigation.

The amount of maintenance fixed by a decree may be altered by a decree in a subsequent suit, where the circumstances render an alteration necessary.

Such modification cannot be made in a proceeding in execution of a decree, unless the terms of the decree are such as to permit of such modification.⁶

As to the loss of the right by remarriage, see *post*, pp. 369, 370.

Maintenance may be cancelled if the wife or widow has become unchaste,⁷ or where, in the case of a wife, the circumstances have so changed that she should be called upon to return to her husband's house. The rate of maintenance may be diminished when there has been such a change in the circumstances of the wife or widow, or of the husband, or person liable for the maintenance,⁸ such change not arising from any fault of his own.⁹ Except where provision is made in the decree for that purpose,

¹ *Mansha Devi v. Jiwan Mal* (1884), 6 All. 617, at p. 621; *Mahalakshamma Garu (Sri Maniyam) v. Venkataratnamma Garu (Sri Maniyam)* (1882), 6 Mad. 83. See *Vrandavandas Ramdas v. Yamunabai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 229.

² See *Mundoodaree Dabee (Sree Mootee) v. Joyanarain Puckrasee* (1801), F. Maen. Cons. 60; *Seeb Chunder Bose v. Gooroopersaud Bose*, F. Maen. Cons. 63.

³ *Mansha Devi v. Jiwan Mal* (1884), 6 All. 617, at p. 620.

⁴ *Jhurna v. Ramsarup* (1880), 2 All. 777.

⁵ *Gopikabai v. Dattatraya* (1900), 24 Bom. 386, at p. 389; 2 Bom. L. R. 191.

⁶ *Ranmalsangji Bhagwatsangji (Maharana Shri) v. Kundankurur (Bai Shri)* (1902), 26 Bom. 707; 4 Bom. L. R. 531. See *Gopikabai v. Dattatraya* (1900), 24 Bom. 386; *Ramkallee*

Koer v. Court of Wards (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 474.

⁷ *Kandasami Pillai v. Murugammal* (1895), 19 Mad. 6; *Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma* (1884), 9 Bom. 108, at p. 110. See *ante*, pp. 78, 82.

⁸ *Nubo Gopal Roy v. Amrit Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 428; *Gopikabai v. Dattatraya* (1900), 24 Bom. 386; *Venkanna v. Atamma* (1889), 12 Mad. 183; *Vijaya v. Sripathi* (1884), 8 Mad. 94; *Sidlingapa v. Sidava* (1878), 2 Bom. 624, at p. 630; *Ruka Bai v. Ganda Bai* (1878), 1 All. 594.

⁹ In *Ramkallee Koer v. Court of Wards* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 474, it was held that the proper course is to apply for a review of judgment, but it is submitted that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), s. 114, Sched. I., order xlvii rule 1, do not permit such application.

an order for maintenance cannot be cancelled or diminished in proceedings in execution.¹

The rate may be increased if the cost of food has become greater or the profits of the estate of the husband have materially increased.²

Where the circumstances have changed, the Court can alter the amount of maintenance fixed by an arrangement.³

Where the alteration in circumstances had arisen from "the act of God," and not from the fault of the owner, maintenance chargeable on an estate by a will can apparently be reduced.⁴

Execution of
decree.

Where a decree directs the payment of future maintenance from time to time, it can be enforced by execution,⁵ and for the purposes of limitation the decree is as to each year's annuity to be regarded as speaking on the day upon which from that year it became operative.⁶

A decree which merely declares a right of maintenance is not capable of execution.⁷

A decree declaring a right of maintenance out of property which has been transferred, cannot be executed personally against the transferee after the property has passed from him.⁸

Remedy in
Magistrate's
Court.

A Hindu wife can also recover maintenance from her husband under the provisions of Chap. XXXVI. of the Criminal Procedure Code.⁹ The magistrate's order does not interfere with the jurisdiction of a Civil Court.¹⁰

¹ *Ranmalsangji Bhagwatsangji (Maharana Shri) v. Kundankuar (Bai Shri)* (1902), 26 Bom. 307; 4 Bom. L. R. 531.

² *Bangaru Ammal v. Vijayamachi Reddiar* (1899), 22 Mad. 175; *Sreeram Bhuttacharjee v. Puddomokhee Debia* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 152; *Sidlingapa v. Sidava* (1878), 2 Bom. 624, at p. 630.

³ *Rajender Nath Roy v. Putto Soondery Dassee (S. M. Ranee)* (1879), 5 C. L. R. 18.

⁴ See *Grees Chund Roy (Maharajah) v. Sumbhoo Chund Roy* (1835), 5 W. R. P. C. 98.

⁵ *Ashutosh Banerjee v. Lakhimom Debya* (1891), 19 Cal. 139; *Asad Ali Mollah v. Haidar Ali* (1910), 38 Cal. 13.

⁶ *Lakshmi Bai Bapuji Oka v. Madhavav Bapuji Oka* (1887), 12 Bom. 65.

⁷ *Venkanna v. Aitamma* (1889), 12 Mad. 183.

⁸ *Dharam Chand v. Janki* (1883), 5 All. 389.

⁹ Act V. of 1898.

¹⁰ *Deraje Mahinga Naika v. Marati Kaveri* (1907), 30 Mad. 400. A suit will not lie to restrain such proceedings. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER III.

RELATIONSHIP OF PARENT AND CHILD, AND ADOPTION.

THE only children now recognized by the general Hindu law as legitimate, are those who are born during the existence of a lawful marriage between their parents,¹ and also sons who have been adopted according to the *dattaka* form.² What are legitimate children.

"The legal presumption in favour of a child born in his father's house of a mother lodged and apparently treated as a wife, treated as a legitimate child by his father, and whose legitimacy is disputed after the father's death, is one safe and proper to be made, and the opposing case should be put to strict proof."³ Presumption as to legitimacy.

As to customs of legitimising children by subsequent marriage, see *Chuckrodhuj Thakoor v. Beer Chunder Joobraj* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 194; *Chinnammal v. Varadarajulu* (1891), 15 Mad. 307.

Children born out of wedlock, although illegitimate, have rights of maintenance,⁴ and, if they are not members of one of the three regenerate classes, illegitimate sons of Sudras possess rights of inheritance under the Mitakshara law.⁵ Illegitimate children.

In the country subject to the Mithila school of law, a son may be adopted according to the *Kritrima* form.⁶

¹ *Pedda Amani v. Zemindar of Marungapuri* (1874), 1 I. A. 282, at pp. 292, 293; 14 B. L. R. 115, at pp. 122, 123. See Act I. of 1872, s. 112, which under the guise of a rule of evidence has practically the effect of declaring the law. *Tirlok Nath Shukul v. Lachmin Kunwari (Musammat)* (1903), 30 I. A. 152; 25 All. 403; 7 C. W. N. 617; *Narendra Nath Pahari v. Ram Gobind Pahari* (1901), 29 I. A. 17; 29 Cal. 111; 6 C. W. N. 146. Sir G. D. Banerjee ("Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 165, 166) contends that the Hindu law only recognizes as legitimate those who are begotten in wedlock, see "*Manu*," chap. x. para. 166; "*Mitakshara*," chap. i. s. 11, para. 2; "*Vya-*

vahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 9, para. 41; Colebrooke's "*Digest*," vol. iii. p. 160. This is apparently the case, but the system of infant marriage prevents the question arising, except perhaps in the case of widows.

² *Rungama v. Atchama* (1840), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 96; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at p. 59; *Thukoo Bae Bhide v. Ruma Bae Bhide* (1824), 2 Borr. 446, at p. 456.

³ *Ramamani Ammal v. Kulanthai Natchear* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 346, at pp. 365, 367; 17 W. R. C. R. 1, at p. 7. See *Gopalasami Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti* (1903), 27 Mad. 32.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 206, 207.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 382, 383.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 157-160.

Palaka putra.

There is nothing to prevent a Hindu adopting a son, or even a daughter, in the sense that a son can be adopted by an Englishman, i.e. by treating him as a son, and giving or devising property to him, but in that case no rights of inheritance, or of performing religious ceremonies, are created by the so-called adoption. The relationship is purely contractual, and is determinable at the option of either of the contracting parties. A son so taken is called a *palaka putra*.¹

Sons recognized in ancient times.

In ancient times the Hindu law recognized the following descriptions of sons² as legitimate sons, viz. :—

1. *Aurasa*, or legitimate son by a wife.
2. *Kshetraj*, or son born of a wife duly appointed to raise issue for a husband on failure of any begotten by him.³ This was the son begotten under the practice of *niyoga*,⁴ by which a relative was appointed to raise up issue by the wife of a childless husband, or of one deceased without leaving children.⁵
3. *Putrika putra*, or son of an appointed daughter.⁶ In ancient times a man could appoint his daughter to raise up issue to him. The practice is obsolete.⁷ Sastri Golap Chunder Sarkar, without giving any instances of its application, contends⁸ that there is no reason why it should not be now applied.
4. *Kanina*, or son of an unmarried woman.
5. *Gudhaja*, or secretly born son of an adulterous wife.
6. *Pawnarbhava*, or son of a twice married woman. This included not only the son of a woman who had gone through the ceremony of marriage, but also the son of a woman who had connection with a man.

¹ See *Nalmadhub Doss v. Bishumber Doss* (1860), 13 M. I. A. 85; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 27; 12 W. R. P. C. 29; *Kalee Chunder Chowdhry v. Sheeb Chunder* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 281; *Bhimana Gadu v. Tayappa*, Mad. Dec. of 1861, p. 124; 1 Norton, L. C. 83; Steele, 184. The equivalent expression in Southern India is apparently *manasuputra*, see *Abhachari v. Ramachendrayya* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 393, or *abyayamana putrum* (son of affection).

² The order in which the several kinds of sons are placed by various authors varies, but necessarily all concur in giving preference to the *aurasa* son.

³ Wilson's "Glossary," p. 298.

⁴ Lit. appointment, a delegated duty or office, Wilson's "Glossary," p. 380.

⁵ Wilson's "Glossary," p. 380. This class of son apparently existed

in certain places, such as Orissa, by virtue of a local custom. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 181; note to *Sutputtee (Mussumant)* v. *Indranund Jha* (1816), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 173 (2nd ed., 221); Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 102. This custom seems to be now obsolete, see Sarbadikhari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 528.

⁶ See *Nursingh Narain v. Bhutnath Lall*, W. R. 1864, p. 194.

⁷ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Raja) v. Venkata Purushothama Jagannadha Gopala Row Bahadur (Rajah Suramoni)* (1908), 31 Mad. 321; *Rita Kuer (Babu) v. Paran Mal (Babu)* (1916), 1 Patna L. J. 581. See *Jeeb Nath Singh (Thakoor) v. Court of Wards* (1875), 2 I. A. 163; 15 B. L. R. 190; 23 W. R. C. R. 309.

⁸ "Law of Adoption," 2nd ed., p. 166a.

7. *Sahodha*, or son of a pregnant bride.

8. *Nishada*,¹ or son of a member of one of the regenerate castes by a Sudra woman.²

9. *Dattaka*, or son given in adoption.

10. *Kritrima*, or son made, i.e. where a man without parents accepts a proposal that he should be taken in adoption.

11. *Kritaka*, or son bought.³

12. *Apavidha*, or son forsaken by his parents, and taken in adoption.

13. *Svayandattaka*, or son self-given. The only difference between this son and the *Kritrima* son seems to be that in the former case the offer comes from the adoptee, and in the latter case it comes from the adopter.

Of these the only sons that are not recognized by Hindu law are the *Aurasa* son and the *Dattaka* son. According to the Mithila school a *Kritrima* son can be taken in adoption.⁴ Adoption in this form is based upon recent works,⁵ and is not referable to the ancient practice of taking *Kritrima* sons.

ADOPTION ACCORDING TO THE DATTAKA FORM.

An adopted son is a person capable of being adopted,⁶ who is given by a person competent to give,⁷ to a person competent to receive in adoption,⁸ and who has been so given and received in the way prescribed by Hindu law.⁹

The adoption of a son is a matter of religious obligation to a childless Hindu, who has no prospect of procreating male issue,¹⁰ although it may generally happen that adoptions originate "in the ordinary human desire for perpetuation of family properties and names."¹¹ It is said that

¹ Lit. outcast.

² "*Saudra* is the son of a twice-born by a Sudra wife: the names *Nishada* and *Parasava* are applied to such sons of a Kshatriya and a Brahmana respectively; by some to the latter." Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 23.

³ See *Yachereddy Chinna Bassava-pa v. Yachereddy Gowdapa* (1835), 5 W. R. P. C. 114.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 157-160.

⁵ *Post*, p. 158.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 138-149.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 134-137.

⁸ *Post*, pp. 103-134.

⁹ *Post*, pp. 149-155. In *Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand* (1913), 40 I. A. 156; 40 Cal. 879; 17 C. W. N. 855; 15 Bom. L. R. 646, the Privy Council upheld a custom among the Agarwal Banias of Zina that an unequivocal declaration followed by treatment of the person (in that case an orphan

and a married man) as an adopted son is sufficient to constitute a valid adoption.

¹⁰ See *Sootroogun Sutiputt v. Sa-bitra Dye* (1834), 2 Knapp, 287; 5 W. R. P. C. 109; *Rajendro Narain Lahoree v. Saroda Soonduree Dabee* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 548; *Saroda-soondery Dossee (S. M.) v. Tincoury Nundy* (1863), 1 Hyde, 223, at p. 249; *Huradhu Mookurjia v. Muthoranath Mookurjia* (1849), 4 M. I. A. 414, at pp. 425, 426; 7 W. R. P. C. 71; *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 177; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 295.

¹¹ See *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshammamma (Sri Balusu)*. *Radha Mohun v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at p. 135; 22 Mad. 398, at p. 414; 21 All. 460, at p. 477; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 442; 1 Bom. L. R. 226.

originally the motives for adoption were secular, and that subsequently religious and secular motives were mixed.¹ Among some castes the motive is purely secular.²

As to the origin of the practice of adoption, see Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," Lectures I., II. *Arundadi Ammal v. Kupppammal* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 283, at p. 284.

Jains.

Except where custom has varied the law, Jains are governed in matters of adoption by the ordinary rules of Hindu law.³ The *Dattaka* son is the only adopted son recognized by them,⁴ but as they do not accept the Hindu doctrine as to the spiritual efficacy of sons, they are influenced only by secular considerations in adopting.⁵

Motive for adoption.

The motive for the adoption does not affect its validity.⁶

The fact that an adoption is made for the purpose of defeating an alienation will not affect its validity.⁷

As to the motives of a widow for an adoption, see *post*, p. 118.

Custom prohibiting adoption.

A family,⁸ or caste,⁹ custom prohibiting adoption is valid.

The burden of proving such custom lies on the person alleging its existence.¹⁰

Agreement not to adopt.

An agreement not to adopt would not apparently invalidate an adoption made in breach of it, but so far as property the subject of such agreement is concerned, it might bind the parties to it. It would not, under any circumstances, bind any one except the actual parties to it.¹¹

¹ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 25, 42, 113, 142, 143.

² See *Bhala Nahana v. Parbhu Hari* (1877), 2 Bom. 67.

³ *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416, at p. 418; *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 241. See *Rup Chand (Lala) v. Jambu Parshad* (1910), 37 I. A. 93; 32 All. 247; 14 C. W. N. 545; 12 Bom. L. R. 402.

⁴ See *Lakhmi Chand v. Gatto Bai* (1886), 8 All. 319, at p. 321.

⁵ See *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 241, at p. 263.

⁶ See *Rambhai v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630, at p. 635.

⁷ *Ibid.* See *Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal* (1881), 4 Mad. 160, at p. 165.

⁸ *Famindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Das* (1885), 12 I. A. 72; 11 Calc. 463; *Bishnath Singh (Rajah) v. Ram Churn Majumdar*, Ben. S. D. A. 1850, p. 20.

⁹ See *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Mamlal Chunilal (Patel)* (1891), 16 Bom. 470; *Verabhai Ajubhai v. Hiraba (Bai)* (1903), 30 I. A. 234; 27 Bom. 492; 7 C. W. N. 716; 5 Bom. L. R. 134.

¹⁰ *Verabhai Ajubhai v. Hiraba (Bai)* (1903), 30 I. A. 234; 27 Bom. 492; 7 C. W. N. 716; 5 Bom. L. R. 134.

¹¹ *Surya Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao Venkata Mahapati) v. Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao Venkata Mahapati)* (1886), 13 I. A. 97; 9 Mad. 499. Although this case was governed by the Mitakshara law, and under that law the son of one of the parties had acquired a right to the property by birth, the reason given for the decision that the effect of the terms of the arrangement would be to alter the law of descent would apply equally to a case governed by the Bengal school. See also *Rajender Dutt v. Sham Chund Mitter* (1880), 6 Calc. 106.

So far as self-acquired property is concerned, or in cases to which the Bengal school of law is applicable, a father might by a valid gift over, in case of a contemplated adoption by his son, put pressure upon such son to prevent or control his adopting, but the adoption would not be invalidated thereby.¹

The fact that an adoption was made in breach of an agreement to adopt another boy, which was not carried out, does not render the adoption invalid.²

A girl cannot be given or taken in adoption.³

Adoption of girl.

Among the Nambudri Brahmins on the west coast of India, there is in force a practice of giving a daughter in what is called *sarvasva* marriage, in order that the son born of her should be affiliated as the son of the father giving her.⁴ He does not inherit in the family of his father so long as other sons exist.⁵

As to the adoption of daughters by dancing-girls, see *post*, pp. 163, 164.

WHO MAY TAKE IN ADOPTION.

A male Hindu who has not a legitimate⁶ or validly⁷ adopted⁸ son, son's son, or son's son's son in existence and capable of inheriting, may take a son in adoption, unless he be mentally incapable of understanding the nature of the act.⁹

Who may adopt.

¹ See *Hurrooondery (Ranee) v. Kintonauth Roy (Cowar)* (1841), Fultou, 393.

² *Siliamedoo Runga Reddy v. Achumal* (1808), 2 Strange H. L. 115.

³ *Gangabai v. Anant* (1888), 13 Bom. 690; *Nursing Naraia v. Bhutun Loll*, W. R. 1864, p. 191, commenting (at p. 196) on *Nowab Rai v. Bugawuttee Koowar* (1835), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 5 (2nd ed., p. 4); "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 5, para. 1; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 102; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 493. Nanda Pandita ("Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 7, paras. 1, 16, 17, 18-39) argues that daughters can be affiliated, but, as pointed out in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 144, 145, his views have not been accepted by Hindus.

⁴ See *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at pp. 162, 163.

⁵ *Kumaran v. Narayanan* (1886), 9 Mad. 260.

⁶ *Joy Chundro Rase v. Bhyrub Chundro Rase*, Ben. S. D. A. 1849, p. 461; *Rango Balaji v. Mudiyeppa* (1898), 23 Bom. 296, at p. 303;

Venkappa Bapu v. Jivaji Krishna (1900), 25 Bom. 306, at p. 311; 2 Bom. L. R. 1101; "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 1, para. 13; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, para. 6.

⁷ An invalid adoption cannot influence the validity of a subsequent adoption, which would otherwise be legal, Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 189.

⁸ *Rungana v. Atchama* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 102; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at p. 61; *Ramabai v. Raya* (1890), 22 Bom. 482; *Gopee Lall v. Chundraolee Buhoojee (Mussamat Sree)* (1872), I. A. Sup. vol. 131; 11 B. L. R. 391; 19 W. R. C. R. 12; *Mohesh Narain Moonshi v. Taruck Nath Moitra* (1892), 20 I. A. 30; 20 Calc. 487; *Sudanund Mohaputtur v. Bonomallec* (1863), Marsh. 317; 2 Hay, 205.

⁹ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 78; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 200; "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 1, paras. 13, 14; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, para. 6; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 295 *et seq.*

The existence of any other descendant is not a bar to an adoption.¹

Apparently a Hindu who has given his only son in adoption can adopt a son.²

Pregnancy of wife.

It is immaterial whether the adoptive father be hopeless of issue or not. The pregnancy of his wife does not, whether he be, or be not, ignorant of it, prevent a Hindu from adopting,³ and the adoption is not invalidated by the child of which the wife of the adopter is pregnant at the time of the adoption turning out to be a male.⁴

Incapacity of son.

If the son be permanently incapable of performing religious rites by reason of congenital blindness, deafness, dumbness, impotency, lameness, virulent leprosy, insanity, idiocy, or from any other reason, which involves an incapacity to inherit,⁵ he may be treated for this purpose as non-existent.⁶

Where son has renounced worldly affairs:

There is authority that when a son absolutely renounces the world and all property, and enters a religious order, as by becoming a *sannyasi*, ascetic, or *fakir*, his existence is not an impediment to an adoption by his father.⁷

It has been suggested⁸ that this question may be affected by Act XXI. of 1850, but it is submitted that there is not in this case a question of a "forfeiture of rights or property," or impairing or affecting any right of inheritance "by reason of his renouncing, or having been excluded from the communion of any religion, or being deprived of caste."

Loss of caste, etc.

Where a son, natural or adopted, became an outcast, or renounced the Hindu religion, the Hindu law⁹ permitted an

¹ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 66, note.

² See *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshamma (Sri Balusu)*, *Radha Mohun v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 26 L. A. 113, at p. 142; 22 Mad. 398, at p. 421; 21 All. 460, at p. 485; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 447; 1 Bom. L. R. 226.

³ *Nagabhushanam v. Seshammagaru* (1881), 3 Mad. 180; *Daulat Ram v. Ram Lal* (1907), 29 All. 310.

⁴ *Hanmant Ramchandra v. Bhimacharya* (1887), 12 Bom. 105. As to the effect of the birth of a son after an adoption, see *post*, p. 187.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 370-372.

⁶ *Strange's "Hindu Law,"* vol. i. p. 77; *Sarkar's "Law of Adoption,"* p. 196; *Sutherland's "Synopsis,"* p.

212; *W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law,"* vol. i. p. 66, note; *Rattigan on Adoption*, p. 10.

⁷ *Punjab Records*, 1875, p. 144. This does not apply to modern Byrages who are not ascetics, *Teeluk Chunder v. Shama Churn Prokash* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 209; *Jaganath Pal v. Budyamund* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 114; 10 W. R. C. R. 172; *Khodeeram Chatterjee v. Rookhinee Boistobee* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 197.

⁸ *Sarkar's "Law of Adoption,"* p. 196.

⁹ *Sutherland's "Synopsis" (Stokes' edition)*, p. 664; *W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law,"* vol. ii. p. 200, note; *Steele*, 42, 181; *Strange's "Hindu Law,"* vol. i. p. 77.

adoption, but the effect of Act XXI. of 1850 is to prevent the natural or previously adopted son from being ousted from any of his legal rights.¹

When the question as to the validity of such an adoption shall arise, it may be that "the Courts would refuse to recognize an adoption which could confer no civil rights."² Except in the case of an after-born son, to which different considerations apply, the co-existence of a natural son possessing civil rights as such, and an adopted son, does not seem to be in accordance with Hindu law as laid down by the Courts. The difficulty in adjusting the respective rights would lead to great inconvenience, but, on the other hand, it seems hard upon a father that he should be unable to regain the religious benefits, which are lost to him by the conversion, or degradation of his son.

Mr. Mayne³ says "that the question might become of importance on the death of the natural son without issue," but the subsequent death of the son would not render the adoption valid.⁴

It is submitted that where a son has disappeared, and has Missing son. not been heard of for many years, an adoption, if made, is not valid unless, at the time when the adoption is in question, it be proved that such son was dead at the date of the adoption.⁵

An adoption, which is invalid on account of there being a Death of son. living son, is not rendered valid by the death of that son.⁶

It has not been decided whether the assent of a natural or Consent of son. adopted son to a subsequent adoption can validate an adoption during the lifetime of such son.⁷ It is submitted that although

¹ As, for instance, where he is a coparcener in a joint family governed by the Mitakshara law. Also he would not lose a right to succeed to collaterals, even if his father had disinherited him.

² See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 134; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 197.

³ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 134.

⁴ *Post*, note 6.

⁵ See *Rango Balaji v. Mudiyeppa* (1898), 23 Bom. 296, at p. 303. Although ss. 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872) fix rules as to the presumption of death at the time of dispute, there is no presumption as to the time of death, *Dharup Nath v. Gobind Saran* (1886), 8 All. 614, at p. 620. As to the rules of Hindu law with regard to the presumption of death, see *Janmajoy Mazumdar v. Keshab Lal Ghose*

(1868), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 134; *Guru Das Nag v. Matilal Nag* (1870), 6 B. L. R. App. 16; 14 W. R. C. R. 463; *Parmeshwar Rai v. Bisheshwar Singh* (1875), 1 All. 53; *Dharup Nath v. Gobind Saran* (1886), 8 All. 614; *Dhondo Bhikaji v. Ganesh Bhikaji* (1886), 11 Bom. 433; and Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 194, 195.

⁶ *Basoo Camummal v. Basoo Chinnava Venkata*, Mad. S. D. A. 1856, p. 20; Norton L. C., vol. i. p. 78; *Vera-prashya v. Santauraja*, Mad. S. D. A. 1860, p. 168; Norton L. C., vol. i. p. 78. This is disputed in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 190, but it seems clear that an adoption, which was, at the time it was made, invalid, cannot be rendered valid by a subsequent event, see *post*, p. 156.

⁷ "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 1, para. 12, in explanation of the Vedik story

a consenting son may be estopped from disputing the adoption, the status of an adopted son with its legal effects of inheritance, etc., cannot be conferred by such consent.

It is clear that it can only do so when such assent is completely free, and is given with a full knowledge of the circumstances.¹

In the "*Dattaka Mimamsa*,"² it is said that a second son may be adopted³ with the sanction of the existing issue, and in *Rungama v. Atchama*⁴ this seems to have been accepted, although it became unnecessary to decide the question, but the Courts have not in any subsequent case upheld such adoption.

It is submitted that consent to the adoption would not prevent a son from disputing it,⁵ except where his conduct had amounted to an estoppel.⁶ Otherwise it would be difficult to adjust the respective rights of the legitimate and adopted son,⁷ except where an arrangement had been arrived at with regard to them. Sastri G. C. Sarkar⁸ treats the judgment in *Rungama v. Atchama*⁹ as deciding that the consent of the son could render the adoption valid; but it has, it is submitted, no such effect.

Bachelor or
widower.

The fact that a man is a bachelor¹⁰ or a widower¹¹ does not prevent him from taking a son in adoption.

Adoption by
minor.

Provided that he has attained the age of discretion, a minor¹² is not incapacitated, as such, from taking a son in adoption, or giving permission to adopt.¹³

of Sunahseptha Devarata's adoption by Visvamitra, who was already the father of a hundred sons, and whose adoption of another son was ratified by the fifty younger sons. "*Vasistha*," xvii. 33-35. Sarkar's "*Law of Adoption*," pp. 180, 181.

¹ See *Rungama v. Atchama* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at pp. 102, 103; 7 W. R. (P. C.) 57, at pp. 61, 62; *Sudanund Mohapatr v. Bonomallee* (1863), Marsh 317, at pp. 321, 322; 2 Hay, 205.

² S. I, para. 12.

³ See *ante*, p. 103.

⁴ (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at pp. 97, 103; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at pp. 59, 62.

⁵ See *post*, p. 156.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 172, 173.

⁷ See *post*, p. 187.

⁸ "*Law of Adoption*," p. 180.

⁹ (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 103; 7 W. R. (P. C.) 57, at p. 62.

¹⁰ *Gopal Anani v. Narayan Ganesh* (1888), 12 Bom. 329. See *N. Chandrasekharudu v. N. Bramhanna* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 270, and *Gunnappa Desh-*

pandee v. Sunkapa (1839), Bom. Sel. R. 202; *Monemthonath Dey v. Onouthnauth Dey* (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. (N. S.) 24, at p. 43.

¹¹ *Nagappa Udupa v. Subba Sastry* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 367; *N. Chandrasekharudu v. N. Bramhanna* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 270; *Tulshi Ram v. Behari Lal* (1889), 12 All. 328, at p. 352; *Monemthonath Dey v. Ononthnauth Dey* (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. (N. S.) 24, at p. 43; *Gunnappa Deshpandee v. Sunkappa* (1839), Bom. Sel. Rep. 202.

¹² The Indian Majority Act (IX. of 1875) does not affect the capacity to adopt, s. 2.

¹³ *Rajendro Narain Lahoree v. Saroda Soonduree Dabee* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 548, approved of in *Jumona Dassya Chowdhurani v. Bamasoondaras Dassya Chowdhurani* (1876), 3 I. A. 72, at pp. 83, 84; 1 Calc. 289, at pp. 295, 296; 25 W. R. C. R. 235, at p. 239; *Vandhravan Jekisan (Patel) v. Mamlal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565.

There does not appear to be any case in the Reports in which there has been an adoption by a Hindu who has not attained the age of majority according to Hindu law.

The cases on the subject deal with the capacity to give permission to adopt, but the reasons given in those cases would apply as much to the capacity to receive in adoption as to the capacity to give permission to adopt. These cases refer to the "age of discretion," which apparently means the age at which a Hindu is competent to perform religious ceremonies,¹ but that age does not appear to be fixed.

Of the cases which are cited as authorities for the above proposition, in *Jumona Dassya Chowdhrami v. Bamasoonderei Dassya Chowdhrami*,² the person giving the power had attained the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject³; in *Patel Vandraman Jekisan v. Patel Manilal Chunilal*⁴ it was held that permission could be given by a person who was within two months of arriving at the age of majority; and in *Rajendro Narain Lahoree v. Saroda Soonduree Debia*⁵ the report does not specify the age, but the boy had apparently not completed his fifteenth year, as he was described as a minor.

In considering this question it may be remembered that a minor governed by the Mitakshara school would by adoption be acting to his temporal disadvantage, as he would thereby introduce a new coparcener into the family.⁶

It may be that the age depends upon individual capacity, but such a conclusion would, if possible, be avoided, as it would make the title of the adopted son depend upon an uncertain foundation.

Sastri G. C. Sarkar argues that an adoption by a minor is inconsistent with Hindu ideas.⁷ He points out that no case of adoption by a minor has as yet arisen.⁸ It is very unlikely that the question as to an adoption by a minor would arise. His capacity to give a power of adoption may stand on a different footing, as such power would be for his spiritual benefit, and may become necessary when he is on his deathbed.⁹

In a case governed by the Maharashtra school there seems no reason why the authority of the husband should not be implied, whatever was his age at the time of his death,¹⁰ and in a case governed by the Dravida school the authority of the *sapindas* to authorize an adoption would not apparently be affected by the age of the husband at the time of his death.

The Hindu Wills Act¹¹ provides rules for the execution of wills to which the Act is applicable, and in such cases prevents a minor from disposing of his property by will,¹² but as section 3 of the Act declares that nothing

¹ *Rajendro Narain Lahoree v. Saroda Soonduree Debia* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 548.

² (1876), 3 I. A. 72; 1 Cal. 289; 25 W. R. C. R. 235.

³ This case was governed by the Bengal School of Law.

⁴ (1890), 15 Bom. 565, at p. 576.

⁵ (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 548.

⁶ As to the religious advantage, see *Rajendro Narain Lahoree v. Saroda Soonduree Debia* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 548, and *ante*, pp. 101, 102.

⁷ "Law of Adoption," 2nd ed., pp. 207-212.

⁸ P. 212.

⁹ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," 2nd ed., p. 215a.

¹⁰ See *Vandraman Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565, at p. 576.

¹¹ XXI. of 1870.

¹² S. 46 of Act X. of 1865 applied by s. 2 of Act XXI. of 1870 to such Hindu wills as are affected by the latter Act.

therein contained shall affect any law of adoption, the question as to the capacity of a minor to give authority to adopt is apparently untouched by that Act.¹

Non-testamentary permission.

It seems now to be impossible for a minor, who is under eighteen years of age, to execute a valid non-testamentary document conferring an authority to adopt, as a registering officer is required to refuse to register a document executed by a person who appears to him to be a minor.² The Legislature has not provided for the case of a verbal permission given by a minor.

Adoption by two persons.

Two persons, even if they are brothers, cannot take the same person in adoption, either at the same time³ or at different times.⁴

Two co-widows cannot, except perhaps in Western India,⁵ take a boy in adoption so as to put them both into the position of adoptive mother.⁶

Ward of Bengal Court of Wards.

No adoption by a ward of the Bengal Court of Wards, or of the Court of Wards of Behar and Orissa,⁷ and no written or verbal permission to adopt given by any ward is valid without the consent of the Lieutenant-Governor, obtained either previously or subsequently to such adoption, or to the giving of such permission on application made to him through the Court of Wards.⁸

Even if the necessary consent be given, a ward of a Court of Wards cannot adopt or give permission to adopt unless he be otherwise competent to do so.⁹

Madras Court of Wards.

A ward of the Madras Court of Wards cannot adopt or

¹ Sastri G. C. Sarkar is of a different opinion ("Law of Adoption," p. 236), but if his view is correct, it follows, as he points out, "that an authority to adopt given by a minor to be valid must be given in words and not in writing."

² Act XVI. of 1908, s. 35. An opinion to the contrary effect seems to have been given by the Legal Remembrancer of Bengal (see 12 C. W. N. cxxxviii.), but it is submitted that the words of the Act are clear. See s 17.

³ *Rajcoomar Lall v. Bissessur Dyal* (1884), 10 Calc. 688, at pp. 696, 697. W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 77. Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 192, 193. "The Hindu law is . . . silent upon the point and contains no rule one way or the other,"

Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 306.

⁴ *Post*, p. 148.

⁵ *Indar Kunwar (Maharani) v. Jaypal Kunwar (Maharani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 127, at pp. 144, 145; 15 Calc. 725, at pp. 746, 747.

⁶ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 69; 37 Mad. 190, at p. 220; 18 C. W. N. 554, at p. 563; 16 Bom. L. R. 328, at p. 337; *Sarada Prosad Pal v. Rama Pati Pal* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 319, at p. 322.

⁷ Act IX. (B. C.) of 1879, s. 61.

⁸ Act VII. of 1912, s. 5, read with Act IX. (B. C.) of 1879, s. 61.

⁹ For example, he cannot adopt unless he has arrived at the age of discretion, *ante*, pp. 106, 107.

give a written or verbal permission to adopt without the consent of the Court of Wards.¹

No adoption by a ward of the Court of Wards of the Central Provinces, and no written or verbal permission to adopt given by such ward, is valid without the consent of the Chief Commissioner, obtained either previously or subsequently to the adoption, or to the giving of the permission, on application made to him through the Court of Wards.²

Ward of Court of Wards of Central Provinces.

A ward of the Court of Wards of the United Provinces cannot adopt without the consent in writing of the Court of Wards, provided that the Court of Wards shall not withhold its consent if the adoption is not contrary to the personal or special law applicable to the ward, and does not appear likely to cause pecuniary embarrassment to the property, or to lower the influence or respectability of the family in public estimation. This restriction has no application to a proprietor who has applied to have his property placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.³

Ward of Court of Wards of United Provinces.

In the Punjab no ward can, without previous sanction in writing of the Court of Wards, adopt or give permission to adopt.⁴

There is no provision with regard to adoption in the Acts relating to Courts of Wards in Bombay⁵ and Ajmere.⁶

Courts of Wards in Bombay and Ajmere.

It is submitted that, at any rate in the case of Sudras,⁷ a person who is disqualified from inheriting by reason of a personal disability, such as congenital blindness, impotence, or lameness,⁸ can nevertheless take a son in adoption.⁹

Right of person disqualified from inheritance.

Sastri G. C. Sarkar¹⁰ says that Colebrooke's English translation of a passage¹¹ in the "Mitakshara" is the only authority for denying to persons excluded from inheritance the right to adopt, and he gives a translation

¹ Act I. (M. C.) of 1902, s. 34 (c). As to the law before the passing of that Act, see Mad. Reg. V. of 1804, s. 25, which only deals with adoption by a ward. See *Jumona Dassya Chowdhurani v. Bamasoondarai Dassya Chowdhurani* (1876), 3 I. A. 72, at p. 83; 1 Calc. 289, at p. 295; 25 W. R. C. R. 235, at p. 239.

² Act XVII. of 1885, s. 24.

³ Act IV. (U. P.) of 1912, s. 37.

⁴ Act II. (Punjab C.) of 1903, s. 15.

⁵ Act I. (B. C.) of 1905.

⁶ Reg. I. of 1888.

⁷ In their case no religious ceremonies are necessary, *post*, p. 153.

⁸ *Post*, pp. 370-372.

⁹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 135-137; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 202, 203, 419; "Punjab Customary Law," vol. ii. p. 154.

¹⁰ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 202.

¹¹ Chap. ii. s. 10, para. 11.

which has not such effect. The "Dattaka Chandrika" recognizes the right,¹ and the same view was taken by Sutherland.²

Change of
religion and
degradation;

Change of religion, or degradation from caste, does not *per se* interfere with the capacity to take in adoption.³

Where a man not only renounces Hinduism,⁴ but also adopts another system of religion with a personal law attached to it, such as Moham-medanism, he loses a right which is alien to the system adopted by him.⁴

It is difficult to see how a Hindu who has become a Christian can take a dattaka son. The boy would not inherit, as the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865) does not provide for an adopted son. Moreover, the religious elements of the adoption would be wanting. Clearly a twice-born Hindu cannot adopt after becoming a Christian, as he would be incapable of performing the necessary religious ceremonies.

Impurity
arising from
bodily state.

In the case of members of the twice-born classes, a person suffering from virulent leprosy, and possibly one suffering from any other incurable disease,⁵ would apparently be incompetent to take in adoption,⁶ at any rate until he had performed expiation according to the Shastras.⁷ In less serious cases of leprosy, it seems clear that there is no objection to adoption, at any rate after expiation.⁸ In the case of Sudras, leprosy can be no disqualification for taking in adoption.⁹

Ceremonial
impurity.

In the case of Sudras, as no religious ceremonies are necessary,¹⁰ an adoption by a person who is in a state of ceremonial impurity from the death or birth of a relation is not on that account invalid.¹¹

¹ S. 6, paras. 1-2. According to the "Dattaka Chandrika" (s. 6, para. 1), the son has a right of maintenance. This is disputed by G. C. Sarkar, "Law of Adoption," p. 419.

² "Synopsis," 664, 671. See W. Macnaghten, i. p. 66, note.

³ Act XXI. of 1850.

⁴ *Machbai (Bai) v. Hirbai (Bai)* (1911), 35 Bom. 264. See *ante*, p. 23.

⁵ "Dayabhaga," chap. v. paras. 7, 10-13. It would, however, be unlikely that Courts would extend the grounds for exclusion from inheritance beyond the decided cases.

⁶ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 206. In *Bhagaban Ramanuj Das (Mohunt) v. Roghunundun Ramanuj Das (Mohunt)* (1895), 22 I. A. 94, at p. 105, 22 Cal. 843, at p. 858, the Judicial Committee say, "In order to disqualify from making an adoption the leprosy must be of a

virulent form." Their lordships in that case were dealing with an appointment by a mohunt of a chela to succeed him, and not with an adoption in the ordinary sense. In the Courts below it seems to have been assumed that incurable leprosy would prevent such appointment.

⁷ See *Bhoobunessuree Debta v. Gourree Doss Turkopunchanun* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 535; 2 W. Macn. 201, 202. As to the power to delegate the performance of ceremonies, see cases, *post*, p. 155.

⁸ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 102, 202.

⁹ *Sukumari Bewa v. Ananta Malia* (1900), 28 Cal. 168.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 153.

¹¹ *Thangathanni v. Ramu Mudali* (1882), 5 Mad. 358; *Asita Mohon Ghosh Moulik v. Nirode Mohon Ghosh Moulik* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 901.

It is not settled whether among the twice-born classes a person can adopt when he is in a state of impurity arising from the death or birth of a relation,¹ and has not performed the necessary expiation.

This question is not one of great importance, as a person in a state of impurity would be unlikely himself to perform ceremonies which would be of no religious efficacy. He is apparently competent to perform such ceremonies vicariously,² and if they are performed the Court will uphold the adoption.³ There seems no doubt that ceremonial impurity can be removed by expiation. The Courts would probably be disinclined to give effect to a disability which can be cured by expiation.⁴

In *Lakshmi Bai v. Ramchandra* ⁵ it was said, "There is thus admittedly no authoritative Smriti text on the point, and whatever the efficacy of ceremonial strictness may be, the Courts which administer the law in British India must be guided by what is the received practice and custom of the country or the class to which the parties belong."

The fact that the adoptive father is ceremonially impure does not prevent his receiving in adoption, and he can postpone the religious ceremonies until the pollution has been removed.⁶

It has been held that a professed ascetic cannot take in adoption.⁷ Adoption by
ascetic.

Although the Hindu codes did not contemplate an adoption by a person who had renounced the world for the sake of religion, there seems now, having regard to the provisions of Act XXI. of 1850, nothing to prevent a person from emancipating himself from a religious order and taking a son in adoption.⁸

A husband does not require the assent of his wife to his taking a son in adoption. He may adopt in spite of her express Assent of wife
unnecessary.

¹ In *Ramalinga Pillai v. Sadasiva Pillai* (1864), 9 M. I. A. 510; 1 W. R. P. C. 25, it was assumed that a person who at the time of the adoption was impure in consequence of the death of a relative could not adopt. See *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214, where the question was as to the adopting widow's power to adopt. Strange's "Manual," 63, 2nd ed., p. 18.

² Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 213. See *Lakshmi Bai v. Ramchandra* (1896), 22 Bom. 590; *Jamnabai v. Raychand Nahalchand* (1883), 7 Bom. 225; *Vijayarangam v. Lakshman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. R. O. C. 244.

³ *Ravi Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankarsetti v. Lakshmi Bai* (1887), 11 Bom. 381, at p. 395.

⁴ *Post*, p. 372.

⁵ (1896), 22 Bom. 590, at p. 595.

⁶ *Santappayya v. Rangappayya* (1894), 18 Mad. 397, at pp. 398, 399; *Asita Mohon Ghosh Moulik v. Nirode Mohon Ghosh Moulik* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 901. See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," 2nd ed., p. 215b.

⁷ "Punjab Records," 1874, p. 83.

⁸ In *Mhalsabai v. Vithoba Khandappa Gulve* (1862), 7 Bom. H. C. App. xxvi., it was held that there is nothing in the Hindu law books to show that a Vaisya who has undergone the ceremony of *Vibhuti Veda* (a ceremony indicating renunciation of worldly affairs, analogous to "retirement to a forest," in ancient law, Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 201) is incapable of adopting a son.

dissent.¹ A wife may, however, join in an adoption by her husband.

There is said to be a practice in Bengal by which a man adopts a son in conjunction with more than one wife.² One wife only can receive a boy in adoption so as to step into the position of being his adoptive mother.³

Adoption by
woman.

A woman cannot take a child to herself in adoption.⁴

If she goes through the form of doing so, the boy acquires no rights thereby, either in her property or in that of her husband.

A woman can, if she is governed by the Mithila school of law, take to herself a son according to the *Kritrima* form of adoption.⁵

As to adoption of daughters by dancing girls and prostitutes, see *post*, pp. 163, 164.

PERMISSION TO WIFE OR WIDOW TO ADOPT.

Permission to
wife to adopt.

A Hindu, who is capable of taking a son in adoption, can give to his wife power to adopt a son, or sons in succession,⁶ to him, to be exercised either during his lifetime,⁷ or (except he be governed by the Mithila school of law⁸) after his death.⁹

¹ See *Alank Manjari v. Fakir Chand Sarkar* (1834), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 356 (new edition, 418); "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 1, para. 22.

² See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 183, 184.

³ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 69; 37 Mad. 199, at p. 233; 18 C. W. N. 554, at p. 563; 16 Bom. L. R. 328, at p. 337; *Sarada Prosad Pal v. Rama Pati Pal* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 319, at p. 322. See *post*, p. 182.

⁴ *Chowdry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 350; 2 B. L. R. (P. C.) 101; 12 W. R. (P. C.) 1; *Narendra Nath Bairagi v. Dina Nath Das* (1909), 36 Calc. 824. In *Peria Ammani v. Krishnasami* (1892), 16 Mad. 182, at p. 194. Best, J., expressed the opinion that a Jain widow who succeeded absolutely to her husband's property, could adopt a son to herself, but such expression of opinion was unnecessary for the decision of the case. An interesting discussion as to the

capacity of women to adopt is to be found in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 216-226.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 157-159.

⁶ *Sham Chunder v. Narayni Dibeh* (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 209 (new edition, 279). For other instances, see *Jumona Dassya Chowdhrami v. Bamasundari Dassya Chowdhrami* (1876), 3 I. A. 72; 1 Calc. 289; *Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279; 3 W. R. P. C. 15; *Ram Soondur Singh v. Surbanee Dossee* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 121. As to whether in the absence of a special power sons can be adopted in succession, see *post*, p. 129.

⁷ She cannot adopt a son to him during his lifetime without his authority. *Narayan Babaji v. Nana Manohar* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. 153.

⁸ *Post*, p. 126.

⁹ *Chowdhry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 350; 2 B. L. R. (P. C.) 101; 12 W. R. P. C. 1; *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi*

"A man cannot delegate to others, to be exercised after his death, any greater power than he himself possessed in his lifetime."¹

The existence of a son, grandson, or great-grandson, who is not permanently incapacitated from performing religious rites,² does not of itself invalidate a power, but it prevents the exercise of the power, which remains in suspense.³

It is said that when a person is by reason of impurity arising from his bodily state, such as from virulent leprosy, disqualified from adopting,⁴ he can nevertheless give to his widow a permission to adopt.⁵

Under no circumstances can a son be adopted by any one except the man to whom he is adopted, or his widow.⁶

Power to adopt can be given to the wife alone, and to no one else.⁷ The inclusion of other persons in the power vitiates it⁸; but the donor of the power may express his desire that in the exercise of the power the wife should consult any named person,⁹ and he may make the exercise of the power contingent upon the consent of other persons.¹⁰

It is not clear whether a power to two widows to adopt jointly is good,¹¹ but it is possible in Western India.¹²

Narasayya (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 9; 1 Mad. 174, at p. 186; *Mutsaddi Lal v. Kundan Lal* (1906), 33 I. A. 55; 28 All. 377; 8 Bom. L. R. 371; and cases, *post*, pp. 118, 119.

¹ *Gopee Lall v. Chundraalee Bhoojee (Mussamat Sree)* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 131, at p. 133; 11 B. L. R. 391, at p. 394; 19 W. R. C. R. 12, at p. 13.

² *Ante*, p. 104.

³ *Post*, pp. 132, 133.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 110.

⁵ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 206.

⁶ *Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi* (1900), 27 I. A. 128, at p. 134; 27 Calc. 996, at p. 1002; 4 C. W. N. 549, at p. 551; 2 Bom. L. R. 446; *Lakshmi Bai v. Ramchandra* (1896), 22 Bom. 590, at p. 593; *Karsandas Natha v. Ladhavahu* (1887), 12 Bom. 185, at p. 199; *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 241, at p. 257; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 93, 94. More than one widow cannot adopt at the same time, *ante*, p. 108.

⁷ *Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi* (1900), 27 I. A. 128, at p. 134; 27 Calc. 996, at p. 1002; 4 C. W. N. 549, at p. 551; 2 Bom. L. R. 446;

Karsandas Natha v. Ladhavahu (1887), 12 Bom. 185, at p. 199; *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 241.

⁸ *Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi* (1900), 27 I. A. 128; 27 Calc. 996; 4 C. W. N. 549; 2 Bom. L. R. 446.

⁹ See *Surendra Nandan Das v. Sailaja Kant Das Mahapatra* (1891), Calc. 385.

¹⁰ *Beem Churn Sen v. Heeraloll Seal* (1867), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 225. See *Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi* (1900), 27 I. A. 128, at p. 135; 27 Calc. 996, at p. 1002; 4 C. W. N. 549, at p. 551; *Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit (Shri)* (1915), 42 I. A. 135; 39 Bom. 441; 19 C. W. N. 729; 17 Bom. L. R. 527.

¹¹ *Barada Prosad Pal v. Rama Pati Pal* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 319, at p. 322; *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 69; 37 Mad. 199, at p. 223; 18 C. W. N. 554, at p. 563; 16 Bom. L. R. 328, at pp. 337, 338. See *ante*, p. 108.

¹² *Indar Kunwar (Maharani) v. Jaipal Kunwar (Maharani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 127, at pp. 144, 145; 15 Calc. 725, at pp. 746, 747.

Existence of son, etc.

Permission given by person disqualified from adopting.

Adoption only by adoptive father or mother.

Wife alone can be donee of power.

Form of authority.	The authority need not be in any particular form. It may be in writing, or (except in a case to which the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, ¹ applies) it may be oral. ²
Hindu Wills Act.	If the authority is contained in a will to which the Hindu Wills Act ³ applies, such will must be executed in accordance with the formalities required by that Act. ⁴
Stamp.	If the instrument giving the authority is not of a testamentary character, it must, if executed after the 1st January, 1870, be engrossed on a stamped paper of ten rupees, ⁵ and if executed after the 1st of January, 1872, it must be registered. ⁶
Registration.	In cases to which the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, ¹ applies, the power must be in writing, ⁷ but need not be registered. ⁸
Revocation of power.	A power of adoption may be revoked, either expressly or by implication.

An example of a revocation by implication would be where, after giving the power, the man himself takes a son in adoption.⁹

The mere birth of a son would not necessarily imply a revocation, but it might, taken with other circumstances, have such effect.¹⁰

Hindu Wills Act.	Where the power is contained in a will, to which the Hindu Wills Act ¹¹ applies, it cannot "be revoked otherwise than by another will or codicil, or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same and executed in the manner in which an unprivileged will is required to be executed, ¹² or by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his direction, with the intention of revoking the same." ¹³
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¹ I. of 1869.

² *Soondur Koomaree Debia v. Gudadhur Pershad Tewaree* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 54, at p. 64; 4 W. R. P. C. 116, at p. 119; *Mutsaddi Lal v. Kundan Lal* (1906), 33 I. A. 55; 28 All. 377; 8 Bom. L. R. 371.

³ XXI. of 1870.

⁴ S. 50 of Act X. of 1865, applied by Act XXI. of 1870, s. 2, to such wills as are subject to the latter Act.

⁵ By Act II. of 1899, Sched. I., art. 3, an adoption deed, that is to say, any instrument (other than a will) recording an adoption or conferring or purporting to confer an authority to adopt requires a stamp of ten rupees. There are similar provisions in Act I. of 1879, Sched. I., art. 38, and Act XVIII. of 1869, Sched. II., art. 31.

⁶ Act XVI. of 1908, s. 17. As to whether in the absence of registration evidence may be given as to the grant of the power, *quære*, see *Soma-*

sundara Mudaly v. Duraisami Mudahar (1903), 27 Mad. 30.

⁷ S. 22 (8).

⁸ *Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Indar Kunwar (Maharani)* (1888), 16 I. A. 53; 16 Cal. 556.

⁹ See *Goureepershaud Rai v. Jy-mala (Mussumant)* (1814), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 136 (new edition, p. 174).

¹⁰ See *Gungaram Bhaduree v. Ka-sheekaunt Roy* (1813), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 44 (new edition, p. 56).

¹¹ XXI. of 1870.

¹² Act X. of 1865, s. 50, applied by Act XXI. of 1870, s. 2, to such wills as are subject to the latter Act.

¹³ Act X. of 1865, s. 57, applied to Hindu wills by Act XXI. of 1870, s. 2. It cannot be revoked by another and invalid will which neither expressly nor impliedly revokes it; *Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal* (1915), 43 I. A. 20; 39 Mad. 107; 20 C. W. N. 234; 18 Bom. L. R. 372.

Where the power is contained in a will, which is not subject to the Hindu Wills Act, the revocation can be effected by parol.¹

When a power to adopt is given to one of several widows, such widow can adopt without reference to the other widow or widows,² and she alone can exercise the power.³ Several widows.

When power is given to the widows jointly, it cannot be acted upon by one of them singly, even on the death of her co-widow,⁴ except perhaps in Western India.⁵

The question as to whether apart from custom a joint power given to several widows is capable of exercise was discussed but not decided in *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Parthasarathy Appa Row* (1913), 41 I. A. 51; 37 Mad. 199; 18 C. W. N. 554; 16 Bom. L. R. 328. It was pointed out in that case that two women could not bear the same relation as mother to the child.

Where the permission is given to all of the widows severally, the elder widow, and on her refusal the younger widow can adopt.⁶

Where the authority contemplates simultaneous adoptions by the several widows, so that there should be two adopted sons living at the same time, the power is incapable of being exercised at all.⁷

¹ *Pertab Narain Singh (Maharajah) v. Subhao Koer (Maharane)* (1877), 4 I. A. 228; 3 Calc. 626; 1 C. L. R. 113. In that case a verbal authority given by a Hindu testator for the destruction of a will, although the will was not in fact destroyed, was held to constitute a revocation of the will.

² Colebrooke's remarks in *Chelummal v. Munummal* (1803); Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 91.

³ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 149. An authority given to the "*Maharani Sahiba*," to adopt was held to give power to the elder widow alone. *Indar Kunwar (Maharani) v. Jaipal Kunwar (Maharani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 127; 15 Calc. 725.

⁴ See *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur v. Parthasarathy Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Rajah)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51; 37 Mad. 199; 18 C. W. N. 554; 16 Bom. L. R. 328; *Sarada Prosad Pal v. Rama Pati Pal* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 319, at p. 322. Sir F. Macnaghten, "Considerations," p. 171.

⁶ *Indar Kunwar (Maharam) v.*

Jaipal Kunwar (Maharani) (1888), 15 I. A. 127, at pp. 144, 145; 15 Calc. 725, at pp. 746, 747.

⁶ *Rangji Lal Karmakar v. Bijoy Krishna Karmakar* (1912), 39 Calc. 582; 16 C. W. N. 440; *Mondakini Dasi v. Adinath Dey* (1890), 18 Calc. 69. In *Lucknawari Tagore's case*, F. Macnaghten's "Considerations," p. 172, Sircar's "*Vyavastha Darpana*," 2nd ed., 842, the claim of the eldest widow was upheld by the Court. For an instance of a power given to the elder widow to adopt three sons successively and thereafter to the younger widow to adopt, see *Akhoy Chunder Bagchi v. Kallapahar Haji* (1885), 12 I. A. 198; 12 Calc. 406.

⁷ *Surendra Keshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee* (1892), 19 I. A. 108; 19 Calc. 513; *Akhoy Chunder Bagchi v. Kallapahar Haji* (1885), 12 I. A. 198; 12 Calc. 406, but the Court will, if possible, give to the document a construction which will make a lawful adoption possible.

Permission absolute, contingent, conditional, or restricted.

The permission may be absolute, or its exercise may be contingent upon certain events,¹ or may be subject to lawful conditions, or may be subject to restrictions as to the boy to be adopted, or otherwise.

Contingent on consent of others.

The exercise of the power may be contingent upon the consent of persons named by the husband,² and if such consent cannot be obtained the authority cannot be exercised.³

A direction to a wife "to adopt a son with the good advice and opinion of the manager," does not make the adoption contingent on the consent of the manager.⁴

Implied condition expressed.

In some cases the contingency which is expressed is one that is implied by the law, as, for instance, a man gives to his wife a power to adopt in case his son dies under age and unmarried.⁵

Condition as to property.

There is authority that where the power of adoption requires as a condition of its being exercised that particular arrangements should be made with regard to the property, as, for instance, that particular property should be devoted to a charity, effect must be given to such condition.⁶

Failure of disposition.

The failure of a disposition as to property in a will does not necessarily affect a power of adoption.⁷

Failure of contingency.

Where the contingency, upon the happening of which the power is to be exercised, does not occur, the power cannot be exercised.

For instance, A, leaving his wife pregnant, makes a will giving her authority to adopt "in case the son to be born shall die." The widow is delivered of a daughter. The power cannot be exercised.⁸

¹ A condition subsequent, i.e. providing that in a certain event the adoption is to become void, would not affect an adoption which has been made.

² *Beem Churn Sen v. Heeraloll Seal* (1867), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 225. See *Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi* (1900), 27 I. A. 128, at p. 135; 27 Calc. 996, at p. 1002; 4 C. W. N. 549, at p. 551.

³ See *Beem Churn Sen v. Heeraloll Seal* (1867), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 225; *Amirthayyan v. Ketharamayyan* (1890), 14 Mad. 65, at p. 70; *Tarachurn Chatterjee v. Suresh Chunder Mookerji* (1889), 16 I. A. 166, judgment of High Court, at p. 167; *Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi* (1900), 27 I. A. 128, at p. 134; 27 Calc. 996, at p. 1002; 4 C. W. N. 549, at p. 551; 2 Bom. L. R. 446.

⁴ *Surendra Nandan Das v. Sailaja*

Kani Das Mahapatra (1891), 18 Calc. 385.

⁵ *Yellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 9; 1 Mad. 174, at p. 186; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 22. See *Bykant Monee Roy v. Kisto Soonderee Roy* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 392; *Solukhna (Mussumant) v. Ramdolal Pande* (1811), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 324 (new edition, 434).

⁶ *Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 10. As to the power of the adoptive father to restrict the adopted son's rights in ancestral property, see *post*, pp. 184, 185.

⁷ *Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai* (1907), 34 I. A. 107; 31 Bom. 373; 11 C. W. N. 769; 9 Bom. L. R. 646.

⁸ *Mohendreloll Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee* (1864), Coryton, 42. Probably the Court would now give a more liberal construction to a provision of this kind, see *post*, p. 117.

Where the exercise of the power is contingent upon circumstances, which involve an invalid adoption, or is contingent upon illegal, or immoral, or impossible conditions, the power cannot be exercised. Invalid contingency.

In a case where the power was only to be exercised in case of the disagreement of the wife and son, the power was held to be invalid.¹

A permission to adopt must be strictly construed,² but a possible construction which would render the power valid should be preferred.³ If the permission be acted upon it must be strictly followed.⁴ Strict construction.

As to successive adoptions, see *post*, pp. 129, 130.

If the strict exercise of the power would involve an invalid adoption, then no effect can be given to the power, as, for example, where the donor of the power directs the simultaneous adoption of more than one child,⁵ or the adoption of a boy during the lifetime of a living son.⁶

Where the husband has specified the boy to be adopted, or the class out of which a boy is to be adopted,⁷ his direction must be followed. It is not settled whether if a specified boy be unavailable, another boy can be adopted.⁸ Specification of boy.

¹ *Solukhna (Mussummaut) v. Ramdopal Pande* (1811), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 324 (new edition, 434).

² *Mohendrololl Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee* (1864), Coryton, 42. This, and other cases, which lay down the rule that powers of adoption are to be strictly construed are criticized in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 235, where it is advocated that a liberal construction should be given to powers of adoption.

³ See *Akhoy Chunder Bagchi v. Kalapahar Haji* (1885), 12 I. A. 198; 12 Calc. 406; *Ranjit Lal Karmakar v. Bijoy Krishna Karmakar* (1912), 39 Calc. 582; 16 C. W. N. 440.

⁴ *Chowdhry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 350, at p. 356; 12 W. R. P. C. 1, at p. 2, where their lordships say, "Of course such a power must be strictly pursued." (In the report of the same case in 2 B. L. R. (P. C.) 101, at p. 104, the words are reported as, "Of course such authority must be strictly proved.") See *Amrita Lal Dutt v. Surnomoye Dasi* (1900), 27 I. A. 128; 27 Calc. 996; 4 C. W. N.

549; 2 Bom. L. R. 446; *Mutsaddi Lal v. Kundan Lal* (1906), 33 I. A. 55; 28 All. 377; 8 Bom. L. R. 371.

⁵ *Surendra Keshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee* (1892), 19 I. A. 108; 19 Calc. 513. See *Akhoy Chunder Bagchi v. Kalapahar Haji* (1885), 12 I. A. 198; 12 Calc. 406. S. C. in Court below, *Gyanendro Chunder Lahiri v. Kallapahar Hajee* (1882), 9 Calc. 50; 11 C. L. R. 297; *Choundawalee Bahoojee (Gosaeen Sree) v. Girdhareejee* (1868), 3 Agra, 226.

⁶ In this case the adoption cannot be made even after the death of the living son. *Joychundro Raee v. Bhyruchundro Raee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1849, p. 461; *Solukhna (Mussummaut) v. Ramdopal Pande* (1811), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 324 (new edition, 434).

⁷ *Amirthayyan v. Ketharamayyan* (1890), 14 Mad. 65.

⁸ *Mohendrololl Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee* (1864), Coryton, 42, at p. 46; *Amirthayyan v. Ketharamayyan* (1890), 14 Mad. 65. *Contrâ* opinion of Bengal pundits in *Veerapermall Pillay v. Narrain Pillay* (1801), 1 Mad. N. C. 78, at p. 98.

In Bombay an authority to adopt a specified boy would not, at any rate in the case of that boy being unavailable, prevent an adoption of another boy, unless the husband has expressly forbidden the adoption of any other boy.¹ In an old case² a similar rule was applied in Madras, but in a recent case³ a different view was entertained. It is submitted that except in a case governed by the Maharashtra school of law, an authority to adopt a specified boy cannot be exercised with respect to any other boy. The above-named school permits an adoption by the widow without the express consent of her husband,⁴ and will not imply a prohibition to adopt a boy other than the named boy.

Motive of widow.

Where the adoption is otherwise valid, a discussion as to the motive of the widow for adopting is immaterial.⁵

ADOPTION BY WIDOW.

There is a difference of opinion between the schools as to the power of a widow to adopt a son to her husband.

Origin of differences between schools.

The difference of doctrine of the several schools of law arises from the interpretations put by the schools upon a text of *Vasishtha*.⁶ As to this, the Judicial Committee said, in *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy*,⁷ "All the schools accept as authoritative the text of *Vasishtha*, which says, 'Nor let a woman give or accept a son unless with the assent of her lord.' But the *Mithila* school apparently takes this to mean that the assent of the husband must be given at the time of the adoption, and, therefore, that a widow cannot receive a son in adoption, according to

¹ See *Lakshmbai v. Rajaji* (1897), 22 Bom. 996, approving of the following passage in West and Bühler, vol. ii. p. 965, "It is common for a husband authorizing an adoption to specify the child he wishes to be taken. Should that child die, or be refused by his parents, the authority would still be held, at least, in Bombay, to warrant the adoption of another child, unless, indeed, he had said 'such a child and no other.' The presumption is that he desired an adoption, and by specifying the object merely indicated a preference." See *Ramchandra Baji v. Bapu Khandu*, Bom. P. J. 1877, p. 42.

² *Veerapermall Pillay v. Narrain Pillay* (1801), 1 Mad. N. C. 78.

³ *Amirthayyan v. Ketharamayyan* (1890), 14 Mad. 65. See *post*, p. 129.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 124, 125.

⁵ *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row*

(*Rajah*) v. *Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 14; 1 Mad. 174, at pp. 190, 191; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 26; *Ramchandra Bhagavan v. Mulji Nanabhai* (1896), 22 Bom. 558 (a decision of a full bench of the Bombay High Court). The following were previously reported decisions on the same question: *Bhimava v. Sangava* (1896), 22 Bom. 206; *Mahabaleswar Fonda v. Durgabai* (1896), 22 Bom. 199; *Vithoba v. Bapu* (1890), 15 Bom. 110; *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565; *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 114; *Rakhmabai v. Radhabai* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. 181.

⁶ XV. 1-8; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 242.

⁷ (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at pp. 435, 436; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 12; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 21.

the *Dattaka* form, at all. The Bengal school interprets the text as requiring an express permission given by the husband in his lifetime, but capable of taking effect after his death; whilst the *Muyookhu* and *Koosthubha* treatises which govern the *Mahratta* school explain the text away by saying that it applies only to an adoption made in the husband's lifetime, and is not to be taken to restrict the widow's power to do that which the general law prescribes as beneficial to her husband's soul. Thus, upon a careful review of all these writers, it appears that the difference relates rather to what shall be taken to constitute, in cases of necessity, evidence of authority from the husband, rather than to the authority to adopt being independent of the husband."

Under the *Bengal* school of law a widow cannot adopt a Bengal school son without the express permission of her husband.¹

Where a power of adoption is given to two widows successively the elder would have the preference.²

The same rule applies under the *Benares* school of law.³

Benares
school.

It applies even if the deceased husband was a member of a joint undivided family, and his rights had devolved by survivorship upon the other members of the family.⁴

Among the Jains, the right of a childless widow to adopt is generally ^{Jains,} co-extensive with the right which was possessed by her husband, and does not depend upon his authority, either express or implied.⁵

Such right, as being derogatory to the ordinary Hindu law, must be specially proved in each case. It has been affirmed in cases of members of the Saragee Agarwala sect from Meerut,⁶ Aligarh,⁷ Saharunpur,⁸ and

¹ *Solukhna (Mussummut) v. Ramdoolal Pande* (1811), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 324 (new edition, 434); *Tura Munee Dibra (Musst.) v. Demarayun Rai* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 387 (new edition, 516); *Janki Dibeh v. Suda Sheo Rai* (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 197 (new edition, 262); *Kshenkant Goswamee v. Purmanund Goswamee* (1810), 2 W. Macn. 175.

² *Bijoy Krishna Karmakar v. Ranjit Lal Karmakar* (1911), 38 Calc. 694.

³ *Haimun Chull Sing (Raja) v. Ghunsham Sing (Koomar)* (1834), 2 Knapp, 203; 5 W. R. P. C. 69. (The decision in this case was limited to the district of Etawah, but it has been accepted as declaratory of the law of the Benares school.) *Chowdhry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 350; 2 B. L. R. (P. C.) 101; 12 W. R. P. C. 1; *Tulshi Ram v. Behari Lal* (1889), 12 All. 328; *Shumshere Mull (Raja) v. Di-*

traj Konwur (Ranee) (1816), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 169 (new edition, 216); *Jai Ram Dhami v. Musan Dhami* (1830), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 3. See *Parbhu Lal (Lala) v. Mylne* (1887), 14 Calc. 401, at pp. 415, 416.

⁴ See G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 229.

⁵ *Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (Mussumut)* (1878), 5 I. A. 87; 1 All. 688; 2 C. L. R. 193; *Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand* (1908), 30 All. 197. See the latter case as to the right of a senior widow to adopt without the concurrence of the junior widow.

⁶ *Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (Mussumut)* (1878), 5 I. A. 87; 1 All. 688; 2 C. L. R. 193; *Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Das* (1907), 29 All. 495.

⁷ *Lakshmi Chand v. Gatto Bai* (1886), 8 All. 319.

⁸ *Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand* (1908), 30 All. 197.

Arrah,¹ and in a case of the Oswal sect from Moorshedabad,² and also in an old case from Lower Bengal,³ in which it does not appear to what sect the parties belonged. In a case in Madras,⁴ it was held that the custom was not proved.

Dravida
school.

According to the *Dravida* school, a widow can adopt either with her husband's express permission,⁵ or, if there be no express or implied prohibition by him, with the assent of her husband's kindred,⁶ at or about the time of the adoption.⁷

Prohibition by
husband.

"Inasmuch as the authorities in favour of the widow's power to adopt with the assent of her husband's kinsmen proceed in a great measure upon the assumption that his assent to this meritorious act is to be implied whenever he has not forbidden it, so the power cannot be inferred when a prohibition by the husband either has been directly expressed by him, or can be reasonably deduced from his disposition of his property, or the existence of a direct line competent to the full performance of religious duties, or from other circumstances of his family, which afford no plea for a supersession of heirs on the ground of religious obligation to adopt a son in order to complete or fulfil defective religious rites. . . . The same reasons which justify a presumption of authority to adopt in the absence of express permission are powerful to exclude a presumptive prohibition to adopt when on a new and unforeseen occasion the religious duty arises."⁸

Failure of
disposition
implying
prohibition.

The assent may be withdrawn before the adoption.⁹

Power co-
extensive with
that of
husband.

"In Madras it is established . . . that, unless there is some express prohibition by the husband, the widow's power, at

¹ *Harnabh Pershad v. Mandul Dass* (1899), 27 Calc. 379.

² *Manik Chand Golecha v. Jagat Setani Prankumari Bibi* (1889), 17 Calc. 518. It was also held in this case that the adoption of orthodox Hinduism does not affect the right.

³ *Govindnath Ray (Maha Rajah) v. Gulal Chand* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 276 (new edition, 322).

⁴ *Peria Ammani v. Krishnasami* (1892), 16 Mad. 182.

⁵ *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 9; 1 Mad. 174, at p. 186; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at pp. 22, 23; *Raghunadha (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), I. A. 154; 1 Mad. 69; 25 W. R. C. R. 291; *Arundadi Ammal v. Kuppammal* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 283.

⁶ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M.

I. A. 397; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1; 10 W. R. P. C. 17; *Raghunadha (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 191; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 81; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 302; *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1; 1 Mad. 174; 26 W. R. C. R. 21; *Parasara Bhattar v. Rangaraja Bhattar* (1880), 2 Mad. 202; *Arundadi Ammal v. Kuppammal* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 283.

⁷ A consent previously obtained from a deceased *sapinda* is not sufficient: *Mami v. Subbarayar* (1911), 26 Mad. 145.

⁸ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at pp. 443, 445; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at pp. 17, 18, 19; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at pp. 24, 25.

⁹ *Mami v. Subbarayar* (1911), 36 Mad. 145, at p. 147.

least with concurrence of *sapindas* in cases where that is required, is co-extensive with that of the husband.”¹

The power to adopt with the assent of the husband’s kinsmen applies to every case in which a widow might make an adoption under the express authority of her husband.²

Thus she can adopt on the death of a natural son,³ and she can take successive sons in adoption on the death of sons previously adopted, either with the assent of her husband⁴ or of his kinsmen.

Among the *Nambudri Brahmins* in *Malabar* in theory the widow’s power is as under the *Dravida* school, but in its application the husband’s authority is presumed, unless there is an express prohibition, at any rate when the adopting widow is the surviving member of the *illam*.⁵

“Where the husband’s family is . . . undivided, . . . the father of the husband, if alive, might, as the head of the family and the natural guardian of the widow, be competent by his sole assent to authorize an adoption by her.”⁶

Consent of
what kinsmen
sufficient
Joint family.

Where the father is not alive, it was said in the *Ramnad* case⁷ that “the consent of all the brothers, who in default of adoption would take the husband’s share, would probably be required, since it would be unjust to allow the widow to defeat their interest by introducing a new coparcener against their will,” but an adoption with the consent of the manager of the joint family, who is acting *bonâ fide*, would apparently be upheld.⁸

In the latter case, and also probably in the case of a consent by the father, as head of the family, such due consideration of the propriety of the adoption would be necessary,⁹ as is required in the case where the family is separate.¹⁰

¹ *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshamma (Sri Balusu)* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at p. 128; 22 Mad. 398, at p. 408; 3 C. W. N. 427, at pp. 436, 437; 1 Bom. L. R. 226.

² *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 10; 1 Mad. 174, at p. 187; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 23.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Parasara Bhattar v. Rangaraju Bhattar* (1880), 2 Mad. 202, at p. 205.

⁵ *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at p. 179. In this case the widow was the sole surviving member of the *illam*, so the question whether the consent of the

other members was required did not arise (see p. 188).

⁶ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at pp. 441, 442; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at p. 16; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 191; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 81; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 362; Sarkar’s “Law of Adoption,” p. 259.

⁹ See *Karunabdi Ganesa Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar* (1880), 7 I. A. 173, at pp. 177, 178, 179; 2 Mad. 270, at pp. 279, 280, 281.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 122.

“ Even in the case of an undivided family, when a widow of a member thereof makes an adoption without the authority of her husband or the assent of her father-in-law, it cannot be taken to be the settled law that the assent of all the then surviving members of the coparcenary is absolutely necessary.”¹ The consent of kinsmen is required on account of the incapacity of women to act rather than to procure the consent of all whose interests will be defeated by the adoption.²

Where the joint family consists of several branches, it would seem to be sufficient to obtain the consent of the branch to which the husband belonged.³

It is clear that when the family is undivided the requisite authority cannot be sought for outside the family.⁴

Separate.

Where the widow has taken by inheritance the separate estate of her husband, the consent of every kinsman, however remote, is not essential. The consent of the father-in-law would be sufficient.⁵ If the father-in-law be dead, “ there should be such proof of assent on the part of the *sapindas* as should be sufficient to support the inference that the adoption was made by the widow, not from capricious or corrupt motives, or in order to defeat the interest of this or that *sapinda*, but upon a fair consideration, by what may be called a family council, of the expediency of substituting an heir by adoption to the deceased husband.”⁶

¹ See *Venkatakrishnamma v. Annapurnamma* (1899), 23 Mad. 486, at pp. 487, 488.

² *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 442; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at p. 17; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 23; *Narayanasami Naick v. Mangammal* (1905), 28 Mad. 315, at p. 319; *Mami v. Subbarayar* (1911), 36 Mad. 145, at p. 147.

³ Sarkar's “Law of Adoption,” p. 259.

⁴ *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 191; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 81; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 302, approving of *Ramaswami Iyer v. Bhagati Ammal* (1873), 8 Mad. Jur. 58, where it was held by the Sudder Court of Travancore that the assent of certain separate *dayadies* (kinsmen) of the deceased

husband was not sufficient to validate an adoption by a widow to which the husband's undivided brother and the head of the undivided family had not assented.

⁵ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 442; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at pp. 16, 17; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 23.

⁶ *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 14; 1 Mad. 174, at pp. 190, 191; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at pp. 25, 26, explaining *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at pp. 442, 443; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at p. 17; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 23. In the latter case the consent of a majority of the *sapindas* was held sufficient. See *Parasara*

A widow should give to all the *supindas* concerned an opportunity to advise her with regard to making an adoption, or against adopting a particular boy.¹

The omission by the widow to ask the consent of one of two divided brothers of the deceased husband could not be justified by saying that it was known he would refuse. To consult him is essential to the widow's obtaining the mind of the kinsman on the question.²

Where the nearest *sapinda* refuses his consent upon improper grounds, the consent of a remoter *sapinda* will justify an adoption.³

The consent of the *sapindas* must be free, and given solely in the due exercise of the discretion confided to them by the law with a view to the selection of a suitable boy for adoption. Thus a consent given on an untrue representation that the widow had received the permission of her husband is of no effect.⁴

In the *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy*⁵ the Judicial Committee said: "Though gifts to procure assent might be powerful evidence to show no adoption needed, they do not in themselves go to the root of the legality of an adoption," but there is apparently no doubt that a consent obtained only by a money payment and without proper consideration of the propriety of the adoption, would vitiate an adoption.⁶

"There is nothing improper in a *sapinda* proposing to give his assent to a widow adopting his own son, if such son be the nearest *sapinda*, and refusing to give his assent to her adopting a stranger or more distant *sapinda*, if there be no reasonable objection to the adoption of his own

Nature of consent.

Gifts to procure assent.

Bhatlar v. Rangaraja Bhatlar (1880), 2 Mad. 202, at p. 206, in which case the assent of some *sapindas* was held sufficient on its being shown that the consent of the others was refused from interested or improper motives, or without a fair exercise of discretion. See also *Venkatakrishnumma v. Annapurnamma* (1899), 23 Mad. 486, where one *sapinda*, without giving any reason, refused to consent. As to the necessity for a consideration by the *sapindas*, see *Raghunadhu (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at pp. 192, 193; 1 Mad. 69, at pp. 82, 83; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at pp. 302, 303; *Karunabdhī Ganesa Ratnamaiyār v. Gopala Ratnamaiyār* (1880), 7 I. A. 173; 2 Mad. 270. In this case the family was joint.

¹ *Venkamma (Jonnalagadda) v. Subrahmaniam (Jonnalagadda)* (1906), 34 I. A. 22; 30 Mad. 50; 11 C. W. N.

345.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Venkatarama Raju v. Papanma* (1914), 39 Mad. 77.

⁴ *Raghunadhu (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 193; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 82; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at pp. 302, 303; *Karunabdhī Ganesa Ratnamaiyār v. Gopala Ratnamaiyār* (1880), 7 I. A. 173; 2 Mad. 270; *Venkamma (Jonnalagadda) v. Subrahmaniam (Jonnalagadda)* (1906), 34 I. A. 22; 30 Mad. 50; 11 C. W. N. 345; 9 Bom. L. R. 89; S. C. in Court below, *Subrahmanyam v. Venkamma* (1903), 26 Mad. 627. See *Danakoti Ammal v. Balasundara Mudaliar* (1911), 36 Mad. 19.

⁵ (1888), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 443; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at p. 17; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 24.

⁶ *Danakoti Ammal v. Balasundara Mudaliar* (1911), 36 Mad. 19.

son,"¹ or to his stipulating that his own share should not be reduced by the adoption.²

When the majority of the *sapindas* consent, it will be presumed that their assent was given on *bona fide* grounds.³

The assent must be to an adoption of a specified boy, and not to an adoption generally. It must be acted upon within a reasonable time,⁴ and has no operation after the death of the person giving it.⁵

Senior widow.

An adoption by the senior widow with the consent of the *sapindas* is valid without the consent of the junior widow;⁶ but an adoption by the junior widow without the consent of the senior widow is invalid.⁷

Maharashtra school.

According to the *Maharashtra* school a widow can adopt either with her husband's express permission⁸ or without such permission,⁹ if the estate be vested in her¹⁰ and there be no express¹¹ or implied¹² prohibition by him. If the husband was

¹ *Subrahmanyam v. Venkamma* (1903), 26 Mad. 27, at p. 837.

² *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Rangasami Ayyangar* (1907), 30 Mad. 450.

³ *Venkatakrishnamma v. Annapuramma* (1899), 23 Mad. 486, at p. 488.

⁴ See *Suryanarayana v. Venkataramana* (1903), 26 Mad. 681, at p. 685.

⁵ See *Lakshmi Bai v. Vishnu Vasudev Bele* (1905), 29 Bom. 410; 7 Bom. L. R. 436.

⁶ *Narayanasami Naick v. Mangam-mal* (1905), 28 Mad. 315. See *post*, p. 126. As to a joint adoption, see *ante*, p. 115.

⁷ *Venkataappa Nayanim Bahadur (Rajah) v. Damara Renga Rao* (1915), 39 Mad. 772.

⁸ *Dinkar Sitaram Prabhu v. Ganesh Shivram Prabhu* (1879), 6 Bom. 505; G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 228.

⁹ *Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 436; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at p. 12; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 21; *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250; *Ramchandra Bhagavan v. Mulji Nanabhaji* (1896), 22 Bom. 558, at pp. 566, 568; *Amava v. Mahadganda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416, at 418; *Gavdappa v. Girimallappa*

(1894), 19 Bom. 331, at p. 337; *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565; *Ramji v. Ghamau* (1879), 6 Bom. 498; *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 114; *Rakhmabai v. Radhabai* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 181, and earlier cases cited therein; "Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 5, paras. 17, 18.

¹⁰ *Ramji v. Ghamau* (1879), 6 Bom. 498, at pp. 503, 504; *Dinkar Sitaram Prabhu v. Ganesh Shivram Prabhu* (1879), 6 Bom. 505.

¹¹ *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250, at p. 256; *Ramchandra Bhagavan v. Mulji Nanabhaji* (1896), 22 Bom. 558, at p. 566; *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565, at p. 574; *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C. App. i.; *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. (A. C.), 114.

¹² *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250, at p. 256. In *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565, at p. 574, the Court treated an express prohibition as the only qualification to the power of the widow, but it is

undivided in estate¹ she cannot adopt without either his express permission² or the consent of his coparceners.³

Where she has no express authority, the widow derives her power from authority presumed to have been given to her by her husband.⁴ Such authority is implied even when the husband was a minor at the time of his death,⁵ and even where the widow lives apart from her husband.⁶

It has been held that the husband's authority would not be presumed in the case of the adoption of an only son, an act which, although not illegal, was considered sinful,⁷ but apparently that decision would not now be followed,⁸ and it would be held that in the absence of prohibition, her authority is co-extensive with that of her husband.⁹

submitted that the observations of the Judicial Committee in the *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at pp. 443, 445; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at pp. 17, 18, 19; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at pp. 24, 25, *ante*, p. 120, apply equally to a case governed by the *Maharashtra* school. In *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C. App. i., at p. xx., the husband on his death-bed refused to take a son in adoption. This was held to prevent the widow adopting, and in *Dnyanoba v. Radhabai*, Bom. P. J. 1894, p. 22, where the husband had repudiated his wife on account of her misconduct, a prohibition was implied. *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 362. In *Malgaruda Paragarda v. Babaji Dattu* (1912), 37 Bom. 107; 14 Bom. 1121, when the deceased had left all his property to his daughters the Court considered that there was an implied prohibition of adoption.

¹ Whether or not the husband possessed separate property, see *Raghunadha (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at pp. 191, 192; 1 Mad. 69, at pp. 81, 82; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 302.

² *Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai* (1907), 34 I. A. 107; 31 Bom. 373; 11 C. W. N. 769; 9 Bom. L. R. 646; S. C. in Court below (1904), 29 Bom. 51; 6 Bom. L. R. 268.

³ *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416, at p. 418; *Ramji v. Ghamau* (1879), 6 Bom. 498; *Dinkar Sitaram Prabhu v. Ganesh Shivram Prabhu* (1879), 6 Bom. 505.

⁴ *Venkappa Bapu v. Jivaji Krishna* (1900), 25 Bom. 306, at p. 311; 2

Bom. L. R. 1101; *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416, at p. 418; *Ramchandra Bhagavan v. Mulji Nanabhai* (1896), 22 Bom. 558, at p. 567; *Keshav Ramkrishna v. Govind Ganesh* (1884), 9 Bom. 94 at p. 97; *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1866), 12 Bom. H. C. 364; *Rakhmabai v. Radhabai* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 181, at p. 192. In *Lakshmi Bai v. Sarasvati Bai* (1899), 23 Bom. 789, at p. 794; 1 Bom. L. R. 420, Jenkins, C.J., inclined to the opinion that in the Bombay Presidency the widow's right is inherent and not merely delegated. This view is supported by Bombay authorities (see "*Nirnaya Sindhu*" Sri Venkateshwar, ed. p. 229; "Vya-vahara Mayukha (Mandlik)," p. 42; "Samskara Kaustaba," Benares ed., Saka 1783, p. 44), but is scarcely possible having regard to the observations of the Judicial Committee in *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 436; 1 B. L. R. (P. C.) 1, at p. 12; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 21.

⁵ *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chunilal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565.

⁶ *Lakshmi Bai v. Sarasvati Bai* (1899), 23 Bom. 789; 1 Bom. L. R. 420.

⁷ *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364.

⁸ See *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshamma (Balusu)* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at p. 128; 22 Mad. 398, at p. 408; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 437; 1 Bom. L. R. 226, *post*, pp. 145, 146.

⁹ See *Lakshmi Bai v. Sarasvati Bai* (1899), 23 Bom. 789; 1 Bom. L. R. 420.

Undivided family.

As under the Dravida school,¹ an assent given by her father-in-law,² as the head of the family, and as natural guardian of the widow, to an adoption in his lifetime,³ would validate an adoption by the widow of a member of the undivided family. The rules as to the nature and sufficiency of the consent required for the adoption by a widow governed by the Dravida school⁴ apparently apply to the case of adoption in an undivided family governed by the Maharashtra school of law.

Where more than one widow.

Where the family is divided, an elder widow can adopt without the consent of the junior widow;⁵ but not so as to divest property which has vested in the younger widow as heir to a son.⁶ The junior widow cannot adopt without the consent of the senior widow,⁷ unless, perhaps, where the latter be incapacitated, as where she is leading an irregular life.⁸

A joint adoption by the widows seems possible in Western India.⁹

Mithila school.

According to the *Mithila* school, a widow cannot under any circumstances adopt a son to her husband.¹⁰ She can under that school adopt a son to herself in the *Kratrima* form.¹¹

Punjab.

In the Punjab the custom varies in different localities.¹²

Adoption by minor widow.

A minor¹³ widow, acting under an express power given to

¹ *Ante*, pp. 121, 122.

² *Vithoba v. Bapu* (1890), 15 Bom. 110; *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250, at pp. 255, 256. See *Ramji v. Ghamau* (1879), 6 Bom. 498, at p. 505. The observations of the Judicial Committee in *Raghunadha (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 191; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 81; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 302, seem applicable to the Maharashtra school as well as to the Dravida school.

³ *Lakshmi Bai v. Vishnu Vasudev Bele* (1905), 29 Bom. 410; 7 Bom. L. R. 436.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 121, 122.

⁵ *Rakshma Bai v. Radhabai* (1886), 5 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 181, at p. 192; *Ramji v. Ghamau* (1879), 6 Bom. 498, at p. 503.

⁶ See *Lakshmi Bai v. Sarasvatibai* (1899), 23 Bom. 789, at p. 794; 1 Bom. L. R. 420; *Anandibai v. Kashibai* (1904), 28 Bom. 461; 6

Bom. L. R. 464; see *post*, pp. 193, 194.

⁷ *Padajirav v. Ramrav* (1888), 13 Bom. 160.

⁸ Steele, 187, 188.

⁹ *Indar Kunwar (Maharani) v. Jaipal Kunwar (Maharani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 127, at pp. 144, 145; 15 Cal. 725, at pp. 746, 747. See *ante*, p. 115.

¹⁰ "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. I, para. 16; "Vivada Chintamani" (Tagore's translation), pp. 74, 75; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 95, 100. See *Jawram Dhami v. Musan Dhami* (1830), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 3 (new edition, 3), but that was not a *Mithila* case, and therefore was not decided according to the *Mithila* law, although *Mithila* authorities were cited.

¹¹ *Post*, pp. 157-159.

¹² Tupper's "Punjab Customary Law," vol. ii. pp. 154, 178, 205; vol. iii. pp. 78 *et seq.*, 87, 89, 90.

¹³ I.e. who has not attained the age of majority according to Hindu law (*ante*, pp. 46, 47).

her by her husband, can take in adoption,¹ provided, at any rate, she has attained sufficient maturity of understanding to comprehend the nature of the act.² The same rule would apparently also apply to an adoption under the Dravida school with the authority of the *sapindas*,³ and to a case under the Maharashtra school, where similar authority had been given. It is apparently unsettled whether a minor widow can, in a case governed by the Maharashtra school, act upon the implied authority of her husband.⁴

A widow cannot adopt unless she be the widow of the last full owner,⁵ or the estate is vested in her as heir to her son, legitimate or adopted, who has died unmarried, or has left no child or widow surviving him,⁶ or (it is submitted) unless the circumstances be such that the estate will vest in the adopted son on his adoption.⁷

When widow
can adopt.

¹ *Mondakini Dasi v. Adinath Dey* (1890), 18 Calc. 69; *Haradhrun Rai v. Biswanath Rai* (1815), W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 180; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 769. *Contrâ* G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 249. It is there suggested that an adoption by a minor widow is voidable, but it is submitted that, if it be otherwise unobjectionable, it cannot be avoided. The Hindu law does not contemplate a voidable adoption. See *Kovvudi Sattiraju v. Pattamsetti Venkataswami* (1916), 32 Mad. L. J. 119.

² *Mondakini Dasi v. Adinath Dey* (1890), 18 Calc. 69, at p. 72. In this case the widow was 11 or 12 years of age, but, as the boy to be adopted had been designated by her husband, the discretion to be exercised by her was limited. See *Kovvudi Sattiraju v. Pattamsetti Venkataswami* (1916), 32 Mad. L. J. 119, from which it would seem that a widow cannot adopt until she has attained majority under Hindu law. See *ante*, p. 107.

³ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 148.

⁴ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 250.

⁵ *Payapa Akkapa Patel v. Appanna* (1898), 23 Bom. 327, at p. 329; *Gopat Ballerishma Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom.

250; *Vasudeo Vishnu Manohar v. Ramchandra Vinayak Modak* (1896), 22 Bom. 551. As to the application of this principle to coparcenary property, and to an impartible zemindari, see *Madana Mohana v. Purushothama* (1914), 38 Mad. 1105. See also cases, *post*, pp. 130, 131.

⁶ *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1; 1 Mad. 174; 26 W. R. C. R. 21; *Gavdappa v. Grimallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331. *Ravi Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankarsetti v. Lakshmbai* (1897), 11 Bom. 381, at p. 397. See *post*, pp. 130, 131.

⁷ As was the case in *Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Doorga Pershad Mitter* (1865), 3 W. R. M. A. 6, where a Hindu, governed by the Bengal school of law, left his property to a boy to be adopted by the widow of his son, who had predeceased him. In this case the boy took under the will, but the Court treated the adoption as valid, and in *Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Tarachurn Koondu Chowdhry* (1865), Bourke, A. O. C. 48; 3 W. R. M. A. 7, note, which referred to the same adoption, the Court held that the widow took as heir of the son so adopted and thus upheld the adoption. There might also be the case of a woman taking as heir of her son's son.

It was said in a Bombay case ¹ that the mere fact that the adopting widow is not the widow of the last male holder would not make an adoption by her spiritually invalid, ² and in the same case it was held that the defect in the adoption was cured by the assent of the person in whom the estate is vested by inheritance, ³ and that an adoption is validated, where there has been a ratification by conduct or acquiescence. ⁴

A woman in the Bombay Presidency who inherits as widow of a *gotraja sapinda* ⁵ cannot adopt so as to confer upon the adopted son a right to the property so inherited by her. ⁶ There seems to be no reason why she should not validly adopt to her husband.

Where a son who is a coparcener in joint property governed by the Mitakshara school of law, or being governed by either school of law is possessed of separate property, predeceases his father there seems to be no reason why his widow should not take a son in adoption, and, quite apart from the possession of property, why such adoption should not be valid at any rate for spiritual purposes. ⁷

Sastri G. L. Sarkar says in his "Law of Adoption" ⁸—

Competition
between
mother-in-law
and daughter-
in-law.

"If the ancestral estate is vested in the mother-in-law by reason of her son predeceasing his father, it would appear that both the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law are competent to adopt. What has been laid down is that the adoptive father's estate must be vested in the adopting widow, in order that an adoption made by her may be valid. If the daughter-in-law adopts first, then the mother-in-law cannot make an adoption during the life of the son adopted by the daughter-in-law, for the father-in-law cannot under that circumstance be considered as destitute of male issue, there being that grandson by adoption in existence. But if the mother-in-law adopts first, then the daughter-in-law cannot be precluded thereby from making an adoption for the spiritual benefit of her husband who would not be benefited by his mother's adoption. This distinction would apply to all similar cases in all the schools."

Time for
exercise of
power.

In the absence of express direction to the contrary, ⁹ a power

¹ *Payapa v. Appanna* (1898), 23 Bom. 377, followed in *Shidappa v. Ningangauda* (1914), 38 Bom. 724; 16 Bom. L. R. 663.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Quære* as to this, see *post*, pp. 156, 157.

⁴ *Quære* as to this. The invalidity of an adoption cannot, it is submitted, be cured by any subsequent event. It is submitted that the validity of an adoption can only be tested by the state of affairs at the time of the adoption. See *Kovvidi Sattiraju v.*

Pattamsetti Venkataswami (1916), 32 Mad. L. J. 119.

⁵ *Post*, p. 412.

⁶ *Datto Govind Kulkarni v. Pandurang Vinayak* (1908), 32 Bom. 499; 10 Bom. L. R. 692.

⁷ See *Payapa v. Appanna* (1898), 23 Bom. 327; *Shidappa v. Ningangauda* (1914), 38 Bom. 724; 16 Bom. L. R. 663.

⁸ P. 264.

⁹ See *Mutsaddi Lal v. Kundan Lal* (1906), 33 I. A. 55; 28 All. 377; 8 Bom. L. R. 371.

of adoption, whether express or implied,¹ may be exercised at any time, provided it be not exhausted, or be not at an end.²

Adoptions made twelve,³ twenty-two,⁴ twenty-five,⁵ fifty-two,⁶ and even seventy-one⁷ years after the death of the adoptive father have been upheld.

Except, perhaps, in Bengal, a power, which does not expressly or impliedly prohibit successive adoptions, is not exhausted by having been once exercised.⁸

According to the Bengal authorities, such permission is exhausted by having been once exercised;⁹ but in *Kannepalli Suryanarayana v. Pucha Venkata Ramana*,¹⁰ the Judicial Committee in dealing with a Madras case, say that they are unable to attach much weight to *Gournath Chowdhree v. Arnoporna Chowdhraim*,¹¹ and also say, "The more liberal rule had been followed by the High Court of Bombay, as well as in Madras, and was not without support in Bengal (see *Surendra Nandan v. Sarlaja Kant Das Mahapatra*,¹² and the *Ramnad* case¹³)." It is therefore unlikely that, if a Bengal case on this subject were to come before the Judicial Committee, the Bengal authorities would be followed. See *ante*, p. 117.

In the case of an impartible zemindari where the document authorized

¹ F. Macn. 157.

² *Post*, pp. 130, 131.

³ Anon. (1814), 2 Morl. Dig. 18.

⁴ *Bhasker Buchajee v. Narro Rag-hunath* (1826), Bom. Sel. R. 24.

⁵ *Guriowa v. Bhimaji Raghunath* (1884), 9 Bom. 58.

⁶ *Brijbhokunjee Muharaj (Sree) v. Gokoolootsajee Muharaj (Sree)* (1816), 1 Borr. 181 (edition of 1862, p. 217).

⁷ *Raje Vyankatray Anandray Nimbalkar v. Jayavantrav* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 191.

⁸ *Kannepalli Suryanarayana v. Pucha Venkata Ramana* (1906), 33 I. A. 145; 29 Mad. 382; 10 C. W. N. 921; 8 Bom. L. R. 700; S. C. in Court below, *Suryanarayana v. Venkataramana* (1903), 26 Mad. 681. See *Parasara Bhattar v. Rangaraja Bhattar* (1880), 2 Mad. 202; *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 10; 1 Mad. 174, at pp. 186, 187; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 23. Cf. *Dharam Kunwar (Rani) v. Balwant Singh* (1912), 39 I. A. 142; 34 All. 398; 16 C. W. N. 675; 14 Bom. L. R. 485.

⁹ *Purmanand Bhuttycharuj v. Oomakunt Lahoree* (1828), 4 Ben.

Sel. R. 318 (new edition, 404); *Gournath Chowdhree v. Arnoporna Chowdhraim*, Ben. S. D. A. 1852, p. 332; *Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Tarachurn Koondoo Chowdhry* (1865), 1 Bourke (A. O. C.) 48; 3 W. R. M. A. 7, note; *Mohendrololl Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee* (1864), Coryton, 42, at p. 46; F. Macn. 156, 179. Sir W. Macnaghten (vol. i. pp. 86-90) treats the point as disputed. He says that according to the doctrine of the "Dattaka Mimamsa," the second adoption would clearly be illegal; but that Jagannatha holds that it would be valid, the object of the first being defeated.
¹⁰ (1906), 33 I. A. 145; 29 Mad. 382; 10 C. W. N. 921; 8 Bom. L. R. 700.

¹¹ Ben. S. D. A. 1852, p. 332.

¹² (1891), 18 Calc. 385. In that case there had been permission to adopt three sons in succession.

¹³ *Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 443; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at pp. 17, 18; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 24. This was a Madras case.

successive adoptions, it was held that the power could not be exercised where there was a person in existence (widow of a later male owner) who could legally adopt.¹

Termination
of power.

A widow's power to adopt is at an end for all purposes as soon as the estate of her husband is vested in an heir² (other than herself³), of his natural or adopted⁴ son, or of his son's son,⁵ or son's son's son who has inherited to him, and is not revived by the death of such heir, even when on such death she herself succeeds to the property which belonged to her husband, and therefore by adopting, divests no estate but her own.⁶

This rule applies, whether there be an express power given by the husband, or such power be implied,⁷ as in the Maharashtra

¹ *Madana Mohana v. Purushothamu* (1914), 38 Mad. 1105, at p. 1120, per Seshagiri Ayyar, J.

² In *Ramkrishna Ramchandra v. Shamrao Yeshwant* (1902), 26 Bom. 526; 4 Bom. L. R. 315, the son had left a son, and in *Annamah v. Mabbu Bal Reddy* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 108, he had left an adopted son. In the following cases the son had left a widow: *Bhoobun Moyee Debia (Mussumat) v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279, at p. 310; 3 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 18; *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229, at p. 245; 8 Calc. 302, at p. 309; *Tarachurn Chatterji v. Suresh Chunder Mookerji* (1889), 16 I. A. 166; 17 Calc. 122; *Thayammal v. Venkatarama Aiyar* (1887), 14 I. A. 67, at pp. 70, 71; 10 Mad. 205, at p. 209; *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416; *Keshav Ram Krishna v. Govind Ganesh* (1884), 9 Bom. 94; *Manikyamala Bose v. Nanda Kumar Bose* (1906), 33 Calc. 1306; 11 C. W. N. 12; *Amulya Charan Seal v. Kali Das Sen* (1905), 32 Calc. 861.

³ *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1; 1 Mad. 174; 26 W. R. C. R. 21; *Venkappa Bagu v. Juaji Krishna* (1900), 25 Bom. 306, at p. 310; 2 Bom. L. R. 1101; *Gavdappa v. Girmallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331. See *Payapa Akkappa Patel v. Appanna* (1898), 23 Bom. 327, and cases post, p. 193,

notes 5, 6.

⁴ See *Bhoobun Moyee Debia (Mussumat) v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279, at p. 310; 3 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 18; *Manik Chand Golecha v. Jayat Setani Prankumari Bibi* (1889), 17 Calc. 517.

⁵ In *Faizuddin Ali Khan v. Tincouri Saha* (1895), 22 Calc. 505, the son was succeeded by his mother, and in *Drobomoyee Chowdhraïn v. Shama Churn Chowdhry* (1885), 12 Calc. 246, by his grandmother. *Gavdappa v. Girmallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331.

⁶ *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Calc. 302, reversing *Puddo Kumaree Debee v. Juggut Kishore Acharjee* (1879), 5 Calc. 615. (This case also had the effect of overruling *Bykant Monee Roy v. Kistosoonderee Roy* (1867), 7 W. R. 392.) *Thayammal v. Venkatarama Aiyar* (1887), 14 I. A. 67, at pp. 70, 71; 10 Mad. 205, at p. 209; *Ramkrishna Ramchandra v. Shamrao Yeshwant* (1902), 26 Bom. 526; 4 Bom. L. R. 315; *Gavdappa v. Girmallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331; *Krishnarav Trimbal Hasabnis v. Shankarrav Vinayak Hasabnis* (1892), 17 Bom. 164.

⁷ *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416; *Keshav Ram Krishna v. Govind Ganesh* (1884), 9 Bom. 94; *Ramchandra v. Shamrao* (1902), 26 Bom. 526, at p. 528. See *Anandibai v. Kashibai* (1904), 28 Bom. 461; 6 Bom. L. R. 464.

school, or the power be exerciseable with the consent of the *sapindas*.¹

This rule applies only to property vested by inheritance, and does not prevent the divesting of an interest acquired by survivorship in the case of a joint family.²

It is unsettled whether this rule applies in its entirety to an adoption Jains, by a Jain widow, who can adopt without the consent of her husband.³ It has been so applied in Bombay,⁴ but in Calcutta it has been held⁵ that a Jain widow in whom the estate was vested can adopt, although her husband's adopted son had died leaving a son as his heir. Although the decision rested on the distinction between the power of a Jain widow and that of the widow of an ordinary Hindu, the Court seems to have acted on the view of the decision in *Bhootunmoyee's case*,⁶ which was accepted by the Calcutta High Court in *Puddo Kumarce Debec v. Juggut Kishore Acharjee*,⁷ but which was not accepted by the Judicial Committee in the appeal from that decision.⁸

It has been attempted to extend the rule to the case where the son, although he has left no heir, other than the adopting mother, had attained to full age and complete ceremonial capacity,⁹ or had been married,¹⁰ but this extension has not been recognized.¹¹

It may be a question whether the power to adopt would not be at an end when the widow has divested herself of the estate by surrender, or authorized alienation.¹²

It is submitted that in the case of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara law, the power of a widow to adopt extends until partition.¹³

A widow of a deceased coparcener cannot adopt after the

¹ *Thayammal v. Venkataramd. Aiyar* (1887), 14 I. A. 67; 10 Mad. 205.

² See *Madana Mohana v. Purushothama* (1914), 38 Mad. 1105, per Sheshagiri Ayyar, J.

³ *Ante*, pp. 119, 120.

⁴ *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416.

⁵ *Manik Chand Golecha v. Jagat Settani Pran Kumari Bibi* (1889), 17 Calc. 518, at pp. 537, 538.

⁶ *Bhoobun Moyee Debia (Mussamat) v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry* (1885), 10 M. I. A. 277, at p. 310; 3 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 18.

⁷ (1879), 5 Calc. 615.

⁸ *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Words* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Calc. 302.

⁹ See *Ram Soondur Singh v. Surbance Dossee* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 121; *Gavdappa v. Girimallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331, at p. 337; *Amava v. Mahadgauda* (1896), 22 Bom. 416, at p. 421; *Verabhai Ajubhai v. Hiraba (Bai)* (1903), 30 I. A. 234; 27 Bom. 492; 7 C. W. N. 716; 5 Bom. L. R. 534.

¹⁰ *Venkappa Bapu v. Jivaji Krishna* (1900), 25 Bom. 306, see p. 311; 2 Bom. L. R. 1101.

¹¹ Cases in notes 9 and 10 above.
¹² See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 416.

¹³ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 253, 254.

property has vested in a widow or other heir of the last survivor of the coparcenary.¹

Remarriage. A widow by remarriage apparently loses her power to take in adoption.²

Unchaste widow. It is unsettled whether an unchaste widow can adopt.

In *Sayamalal Dutt v. Saudamini Dasi*,³ Norman, J., held that an unchaste widow, who was pregnant by the man with whom she was living in a state of concubinage, and who had not performed any expiation, could not take in adoption. This decision was based upon the alleged necessity for the performance of religious ceremonies, but, as the parties were Sudras, it is clear⁴ that no religious ceremonies were necessary, and it is therefore doubtful whether this decision can be viewed as an authority. Where religious ceremonies are unnecessary (and it is by no means clear that in any case religious ceremonies are requisite in the case of adoption by a widow⁵), there seems to be no other authority prohibiting adoption by an unchaste widow. If she be not actually pregnant, she can remove the bar, if it be one, by expiation.⁶

As a widow adopts, not for her own benefit, but for that of her deceased husband, it may seem hard that her want of chastity should deprive him of the benefits which, according to Hindu ideas, accrue from an adoption.

Ceremonial impurity. The question whether a widow, who is in a state of ceremonial impurity from the death or birth of a relation, and who has not performed the necessary expiation, is competent to adopt, is apparently the same as the question whether a man can under such circumstances adopt.⁷

If she can, as apparently she can, depute a relation to perform such ceremonies, if any, as may be necessary,⁸ there can be no objection to an adoption by her. There is, moreover, a question whether any religious ceremonies are necessary in the case of an adoption by a widow.⁹ If none are necessary, her ceremonial impurity cannot affect the adoption.

Adoption only valid if husband could have adopted.

A widow's power of adoption cannot be exercised unless the

¹ *Adini Suryaprokasa Rao v. Ndamarty Gangaraju* (1909), 33 Mad. 228.

² West and Bühler, p. 999, referred to in *Panchappa v. Sanganbasawa* (1899), 24 Bom. 89, at p. 94; 1 Bom. L. R. 543; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 251, see, however, *Pullabai v. Mahadu* (1908), 33 Bom. 107; 10 Bom. L. R. 1134.

³ (1870), 5 B. L. R. 362.

⁴ *Post*, p. 153.

⁵ *Post*, p. 155.

⁶ See *Thukoo Bae Bhide v. Ruma*

Bae Bhide (1824), 2 Borr. 446, at p. 456.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 110, 111. See *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214; *Ravi Vinayakrav Jagannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmi Bai* (1887), 11 Bom. 381, at p. 395.

⁸ See *Lakshmi Bai v. Ramchandra* (1896), 22 Bom. 590; *Vijayarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. (O. C.) 244; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 213.

⁹ *Post*, p. 155.

circumstances are such as would have justified an adoption by her husband, if alive.¹

Thus she cannot adopt a boy whom her husband could not have adopted, and she cannot adopt so long as a son, son's son, son's son's son of her husband be in existence.² During that time her power of adoption is in suspense.³ In the event of the son, grandson, or great-grandson dying unmarried, or leaving no son or widow behind him, the power, if it still be in existence,⁴ can be exercised.⁵

A widow is under no legal obligation to exercise a power of adoption.⁶ An express direction by the husband cannot be enforced,⁷ even if he directed the adoption of a particular boy.⁸ The widow does not, by the non-exercise of the power, forfeit any of her rights as widow,⁹ or mother.¹⁰

No obligation to adopt.

¹ *Puitu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (Musammat)* (1915), 42 I. A. 155; 37 All. 359; 19 C. W. N. 841; 17 Bom. L. R. 549. See *ante*, p. 103.

² *Gopeelall v. Chundroolee Bukhojee (Musammat Sree)*, (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 131; 11 B. L. R. 391; 19 W. R. C. R. 12.

³ *Gavdappa v. Girimallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331, at p. 337.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 130, 131.

⁵ *Gavdappa v. Girimallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331, at p. 337; *Bykant Moonee Roy v. Kisto Soonderee Roy* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 392. See *Vellanki Venkata Krishnā Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1; 1 Mad. 174; 26 W. R. C. R. 21.

⁶ *Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Musammat)* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 169, at p. 190; *Mutsaadi Lal v. Kundan Lal* (1906), 33 I. A. 55; 28 All. 377; 8 Bom. L. R. 371; *Uma Sunduri Dabee v. Sourobinee Dabee* (1881), 7 Cal. 288; 9 C. L. R. 83; *Pearee Dayee (Musammat) v. Hurbunsee Koorer (Musammat)* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 127; *Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Doorga Pershad Mitter* (1865), 3 W. R. M. A. 6, at p. 7; *Dino Moyee Chowdhraim v. Rehling* (1865), 2 W. R. M. A. 25; *Rajcoomaree (Sreemutty) v. Nobocoomar Mullick* (1856), 1 Boul. 137; *Sev. 641, note*; *Dyamoyee Chowdhraim v. Rasbeharee Singh*, Ben. S. D. A. 1852,

1001, at p. 1013. See *Shamavahoo v. Dwarkadas Vasanji* (1878), 12 Bom. 202.

⁷ See *Uma Sunduri Dabee v. Sourobinee Dabee* (1881), 7 Cal. 288; 9 C. L. R. 83; *Dino Moyee Chowdhraim v. Rehling* (1865), 2 W. R. M. A. 25.

⁸ See *Prasannamayee Dasi v. Kadambini Dasi* (1868), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 85. This question was suggested, but not decided, in *Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Musammat)* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 169, at p. 190, and in *Shamavahoo v. Dwarkadas Vasanji* (1878), 12 Bom. 202, at p. 215.

⁹ *Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Musammat)* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 169, at p. 190; *Raman Ammal v. Subban Annayi* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 399; *Uma Sunduri Dabee v. Sourobinee Dabee* (1881), 7 Cal. 288; 9 C. L. R. 83; *Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal* (1881), 4 Mad. 160; *Prasannamayee Dasi v. Kadambini Dasi* (1868), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 85; *Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Doorga Pershad Mitter* (1865), 3 W. R. M. A. 6, at p. 7; *Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Tarachurn Koondoo Chowdhry* (1865), Bourke, A. O. C. 48; 3 W. R. M. A. 7, note; *Dino Moyee Chowdhraim v. Rehling* (1865), 2 W. R. M. A. 25.

¹⁰ *Deeno Moyee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Tarachurn Koondoo Chowdhry* (1865), Bourke, A. O. C. 48; 3 W. R. M. A. 7, note.

In a case where the husband has power to deal with property by will there is nothing apparently to prevent him from enforcing the exercise of a power of adoption by a gift over of his property to some one other than the widow, in the event of the power not being exercised within a specified time.

Until she actually adopts, a widow can exercise no rights on behalf of the boy, the adoption of whom she is contemplating.¹

Agreement not
to adopt.

It is unsettled whether a covenant by a widow not to adopt is valid.²

Such question might depend upon the nature of the power (if any).³

It is submitted that she could not be restrained from exercising a power, which is given to her, not for her own benefit, but for that of her husband.

CAPACITY TO GIVE IN ADOPTION.

Father.

The natural father⁴ can give in adoption where there is no dissent by the mother, and, even in case of such dissent, the weight of authority is in favour of the father's power to give his son in adoption.

In *Narayanasami v. Kuppusami* (1887), 11 Mad. 43, at p. 47, it is said, "Where there is a competition between the father and mother, the former has a predominant interest or a potential voice."

Mr. Mayne says,⁵ "It is quite settled that the father alone has absolute authority to dispose of his son in adoption, even without the consent of his wife, though her consent is generally sought and obtained." He cites two cases. In one (*Alank Manjari v. Fakir Chand Sarkar* (1834), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 356 (new edition), 418), the question was as to the adoptive mother's consent, which is a different question from the present one. In the other (*Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 199), the question did not arise, but (at p. 202) the Court says, "In the eye of Hindu

¹ *Subudra Chowdrayn (Mussunaut) v. Goluknath Chowdhry* (1843), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 143 (new edition, 166).

² In *Issur Purshotum v. Rutanbai* (1888), 13 Bom. 56, the Court refused to issue an *ad interim* injunction restraining the widow from adopting.

³ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 151.

⁴ An adoptive father cannot give in adoption. See *post*, p. 148.

⁵ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 168. Strange ("Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 81) says, "As in adopting, so in giving in adoption, though the concurrence of parents is desirable, the husband

appears, by the weight of authority, to be independent of the wife, the father of the mother." See "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 4, paras. 10, 11, 13-15, 17 (see also s. 1, paras. 15, 16); s. 5, para. 14, and note, and s. 6, paras. 50, 51; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 9; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 244, 254, 257, 261; "Viramitrodaya," chap. ii. part ii. s. 8 (G. C. Sarkar's translation), p. 115; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, paras. 31, 32. *Contrâ*, see "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 9, note; Sutherland's "Synopsis," note 9 (p. 224); "Vyavahara Mayukha" (Mandlik's edition), p. 50.

law, when a man gives his son in adoption, he would seem to exercise a power, more like the power of an absolute proprietor than of a guardian."

Sastri G. C. Sarkar¹ contends that the abolition of slavery has impliedly destroyed a Hindu father's absolute dominion over his son, and concludes, "The proper view to take, therefore, seems to be that the father alone is incompetent to give when the mother is opposed to it, and that such gift is not void, but voidable only at the instance of the mother."

Nanda Pandita² contends that unless the mother consents, the adoption does not affect the boy's relationship to his maternal relations. It is scarcely likely that this view would now be taken by the Courts.

A mother can, during the father's lifetime, with his consent, Mother. give her son in adoption.³

On the death of the father, or on his being permanently absent from home, or on his entering a religious order, or losing his reason, or otherwise becoming incapable of giving his consent, a mother can give her son in adoption,⁴ provided that the father has neither expressly nor impliedly prohibited her from so doing.⁵

The power to give in adoption is not limited to a season of distress, nor
Circumstances
of parent
immaterial.

¹ "Law of Adoption," pp. 274, 275.

² "Dattaka Mimansa," vi. 50, 51.

³ *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbhai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at pp. 404, 405; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 276.

⁴ *Jogesh Chandra Banerjee v. Nrityakali Debi* (1903), 30 Calc. 965. S. C. sub nom. *Jogesh Chunder Bandyopadhyaya v. Jonabali Bepari*, 7 C. W. N. 871; *Rangubai v. Bhagirathibai* (1877), 2 Bom. 377, at p. 380; *Mhalasabai v. Vithoba Khandappa Gulve* (1862), 7 Bom. H. C. App. xxvi.; *Hurra Soondree Dassee v. Chundermoney Dassee*, Sev. 938; *Arnachellum Pillay v. Iyasawmy Pillay* (1817), 1 Mad. Sel. Dec. 154; 1 Norton, L. C. 90. (In that case the knsmen assented, but such assent was not considered necessary in *Narayanasami v. Kuppusami* (1887), 11 Mad. 43, at p. 47, or in *Gurulingaswami v. Ramalakshamma* (1894), 18 Mad. 53, at p. 58.) "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 9. See "Manu," chap. ix. para. 168. As to Jains, see *Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand* (1908), 30 All. 197; S. C.

on appeal *Rup Chand (Lala) v. Jambu Parshad* (1910), 37 I. A. 93; 32 All. 247; 14 C. W. N. 545; 12 Bom. L. R. 402.

⁵ *Rangubai v. Bhagirathibai* (1877), 2 Bom. 377; *Narayanasami v. Kuppusami* (1886), 11 Mad. 43, at pp. 47, 48. See *Tarini Charan Chowdhry v. Saroda Sundari Das* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 145, at p. 160; 11 W. R. C. R. 468, at p. 476; *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshamma (Sri Balusu)* 1899, 26 I. A. 113, at p. 128; 22 Mad. 398, at p. 408; 3 C. W. N. 427, at pp. 436, 437; 1 Bom. L. R. 226. See S. C. in Court below, *Gurulingaswami v. Ramalakshamma* (1894), 18 Mad. 53, at pp. 58, 59. Sir G. D. Banerjee ("Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 177, 178) says that except in Southern India a mother can only give in adoption with the consent of her husband, and relies on "Manu," chap. ix. para. 168, "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 1, para. 15, and "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, para. 31. See, however, "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, para. 32.

is it affected by the possession of means by the giver.¹ Her right is said to arise from the maternal relation, and not by delegation from her husband.²

No one else
can give.

Under no circumstances can any one other than the father or mother give a boy in adoption.³

A stepmother,⁴ a brother,⁵ and a paternal grandfather,⁶ have no power to give in adoption.

Delegation of
right.

Delegation of
act of giving.

The power to give a son in adoption cannot be delegated to any person ;⁷ but a father or mother may authorize another person to perform the physical act of giving a son in adoption to a named person.⁸

Gift of son by
minor.

It is not settled whether a minor father or mother can give his or her son in adoption.

The Hindu law books do not expressly prohibit a minor from giving a son in adoption.⁹ This is probably for the reason that the event would be unlikely to occur. The question apparently stands upon the same footing as the capacity to take in adoption,¹⁰ and, at any rate, a father who has not attained the age of discretion¹¹ would apparently be incompetent to give his son in adoption. As a Hindu minor¹² cannot make a will, and apparently cannot appoint a testamentary guardian,¹³ it would seem unlikely that he would have power to dispose of a child, in respect of whose custody after his death he could make no provision.

¹ The precepts prohibiting a gift except in time of distress are not rules of law. See "Manu," chap. ix. para. 168; "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 4, paras. 19, 20; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 10.

² *Puttabai v. Mahadu* (1908), 33 Bom. 107; 10 Bom. L. R. 1134; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, paras. 9, 10; "Manu," chap. ix., para. 168; "Yajnavalkya," ii. 130; Mandlik's "Hindu Law," p. 148.

³ *Ibid.* See "Vasistha," xv. ss. 2, 5; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 242; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 168; *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 362, at p. 376; *Vaithilingam Mudali v. Marugavan* (1912), 37 Mad. 529.

⁴ *Papamma v. F. Appa Rau* (1893), 16 Mad. 384.

⁵ *Tara Mune Dibia (Mussummaul) v. Deenarayan Rai* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 387 (2nd edition, 516); *Moothosawmy Naidu v. Lutchmydavum-mah*, Mad. Dec. 1852, p. 96; Norton

L. C. i. 66 (differing from *Veeraper-mall Pillay v. Narrain Pillay* (1801), 1 Mad. N. C. 78, at p. 109); "Vyavastha Darpana," 825.

⁶ *Collector of Surat v. Dhirsingji Vaghbaji* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 235. See *Kenchava v. Ningupa* (1867), 10 Bom. H. C. 265, note.

⁷ *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 241; *Bashettiappa v. Shivlingappa* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 268.

⁸ *Shamsing v. Santabai* (1901), 25 Bom. 551; 3 Bom. L. R. 89; *Jannabai v. Raychand Nahalchand* (1883), 7 Bom. 225; *Vijjarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 257.

⁹ G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 371.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 106, 107.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 107.

¹² That is, a minor within the meaning of the Indian Majority Act (IX. of 1875).

¹³ *Post*, p. 213.

There seems no reason why an adult father could not give to his minor widow power to dispose of his son in adoption.

It has been held that a Hindu father, at any rate if he is not a Brahmin, does not lose his capacity to give his son in adoption by reason of his conversion to Mahomedanism.¹ Abandonment of Hinduism.

In the case referred to the child had remained a Hindu. If the child also had become a Mahomedan, the Hindu law of adoption would have been inapplicable. In spite of the above decision, there is a question whether a father, who has by his conversion adopted a system of law which does not recognize the adoption of sons, can retain a portion of the system which he has repudiated.² Act XXI. of 1850 merely destroys the effect of any law or usage which inflicts a forfeiture of rights or property upon persons changing their religion. In this case the forfeiture, if it can be so described, does not arise from any law or usage. There is, it is submitted, an abandonment of a right, by virtue of the voluntary assumption of other rights which are inconsistent with such right. The above decision is based upon authorities which deal with the right of custody, which is a right known both to the system abandoned and the system adopted.

A father who has become a Brahmo does not lose his right to give his son in adoption.³

Where the father has given permission, a mother who has remarried can give her son in adoption, whether or not she belongs to a caste in which remarriage is customary.⁴ Remarriage of widow.

When the father has not given such permission it is unsettled whether she can give in adoption. In one case⁵ it was said that she has such power and in another case⁶ the power was denied. If a woman could be said to be acting as agent for her husband,⁷ she would undoubtedly lose her power by her remarriage; but the mother's right is said to arise from her maternal relation, and not from any idea of agency.⁸ The texts of Hindu law did not contemplate remarriage. The Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act,⁹ in some cases deprived her of her rights of guardianship, but it does not deprive a widow of any rights except in the matters provided in the Act. As a mother would not lose her right by loss of caste, or, it is submitted, necessarily by a change of religion,¹⁰ it is submitted that she does not lose her right by remarriage.

¹ *Shamsing v. Santabai* (1901), 25 Bom. 551; 3 Bom. L. R. 89.

² See *Jowala Buxh v. Dharum Singh* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 511, at p. 537; *Abraham v. Abraham* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 199, at p. 243; 1 W. R. P. C. 1, at p. 5.

³ *Kusum Kumari Roy v. Salyaranjan Das* (1903), 30 Cal. 199; 7 C. W. N. 784.

⁴ *Pullabai v. Mahadu* (1908), 33 Bom. 107; 10 Bom. L. R. 1134;

Panchappa v. Sangunbasawva (1899), 24 Bom. 89; 1 Bom. L. R. 543.

⁵ *Pullabai v. Mahadu* (1908), 33 Bom. 107; 10 Bom. L. R. 1134.

⁶ *Panchappa v. Sangunbasawva* (1899), 24 Bom. 89; 1 Bom. L. R. 545.

⁷ See "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, para. 31.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 136.

⁹ Act XV. of 1856, s. 3, *post*, pp. 216, 217.

¹⁰ See above.

WHO MAY BE TAKEN IN ADOPTION.

Identity of
class.

The boy must belong to the same primary caste as that of his adoptive father.¹

For instance, a Brahmin cannot adopt a Kshatriya or a Sudra.

The reason for this rule is that the adoptive father could not have married the natural mother, when a virgin, as she belonged to a different class.²

There seems to be nothing to prevent an adoption of a boy belonging to a different subdivision of the Sudra class,³ as the weight of authority is in favour of the legality of a marriage between persons belonging to different subdivisions of that class.⁴

No preferen-
tial right.

No boy has a preferential or any right to be adopted, and there is nothing to prevent the adoption of a stranger, even though there be a near relation qualified for adoption.

The texts which prescribe the preferential adoption of a *sapinda* have not the force of law.⁵

Relationship
of adoptive
father to
natural
mother.

It has been laid down that among the three twice-born classes, no one whose mother, when she was a virgin,⁶ the adoptive father (or the husband of a widow taking a boy in adoption), was by reason of propinquity barred from legally marrying, can be adopted,⁷ but it is submitted that the

¹ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 168; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 9; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. v. s. 5, para. 4; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 2, paras. 22, 23-25; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, paras. 12-16. See G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 165, 357, 358.

² See below and *post*, p. 139.

³ Decision of the Calcutta High Court in Regular Appeals, 274, and 322 of 1886, referred to in G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 165; see also pp. 357, 358, of the same work. See, however, Sutherland's "Synopsis," head. 2, para. 1; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 2, paras. 35, 74-78, s. 3, paras. 1-3. It has been held that a Tilari (an inferior Lingayat) may adopt a boy who is a Kulwadi: *Jukaram v. Babaji* (1899), Bom. L. R. 144.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 38.

⁵ *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoola*

nund Das Mahapatra (1878), 5 I. A. 40; 3 Calo. 587; 2 C. L. R. 51. S. C. in Court below, *Gocoolanund Das v. Wooma Dae* (1875), 15 B. L. R. 405; 23 W. R. C. R. 340; *Dharma Dagu v. Ramkrishna Chimnaji* (1885), 10 Bom. 80; *Babaji Jwaji v. Bhagirthibai* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 70.

⁶ See *Sriramulu v. Ramayya* (1881), 3 Mad. 15.

⁷ *Minaksi v. Ramanada* (1887), 11 Mad. 49 (in this case the prohibition was laid down as a general rule of Hindu law without reference to any distinction between the twice-born classes and Sudras, but the judgment is based upon considerations inapplicable to Sudras); *Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanmani Ganesh Safray* (1879), 3 Bom. 273; *Bhagirthibai v. Radhabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 298; *Jwani Bhai v. Jvu Bhai* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 462. See also judgment

prohibition should be confined to the sister's son, daughter's son, and mother's sister's son.¹

This rule in its present form was first enunciated by Mr. Sutherland in his "Synopsis."² He deduced this rule from a rule which had reference to the obsolete practice of *niyoga*, which, when used in this sense, means the appointment of a kinsman to raise up issue by the wife of a childless husband, or of one deceased without leaving children.³

A text of Saunaka⁴ requires the boy adopted to bear "the reflection of a son." Nanda Pundita⁵ in construing this text, held that the resemblance must consist in "the capability to have sprung from (the adopter) himself, through an appointment (to raise up issue on another's wife), and so forth,⁶ as (in the case) of the son, of a brother, a near or distant kinsman, and so forth."

As the practice of *niyoga* is now obsolete,⁷ the rules by which it was regulated in respect of the person selected for appointment are not, as such, now used for the purpose of testing the capability of the person to be adopted, but in their place the rules as to the prohibited degrees in the case of marriage have been substituted.

The two sets of rules have been held not to conflict,⁸ but they do not appear to completely coincide.⁹ "Prohibited connection in the case of marriage has reference to the relationship in which the couple between whom marriage is proposed stand, irrespective of marriage, and when the girl selected for marriage is a maiden. But prohibited connection in the case of *niyoga* has reference to the relationship between a married woman and the person who is appointed to beget a child upon her. . . . The rules of prohibited connection had a common object in both cases, viz. the prevention of incest.

of Banerjee J., in *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1895), 17 All. 294; *Haran Chunder Banerji v. Hurro Mohun Chuckerbutty* (1880), 6 Calc. 41, at p. 47; 6 C. L. R. 393, at p. 398; *Vyas Chimanlal v. Vyas Ramchandra* (1899), 24 Bom. 473; 2 Bom. L. R. 163.

¹ See *Ramchandra v. Gopal* (1908), 32 Bom. 619; 10 Bom. L. R. 948, *post*, p. 140.

² Stokes' "Hindu Law Books," p. 664. As to the rules of exclusion by reason of propinquity in the case of marriage, see *ante*, pp. 40-44. Where the adopting father has himself been removed from his natural family by adoption this rule would debar him from adopting the son of a woman whom he could not have married before being so removed, and also the son of one whom he could not have married after having been so removed. See *Mad. Dec. of 1858*,

p. 117.

³ Wilson's "Glossary," p. 380.

⁴ "A *rishi* of unquestioned authority."

⁵ "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 5, para. 16.

⁶ "The phrase 'so forth' is explained to refer to a legal marriage having been possible between the adopter and the mother of the boy fixed for adoption." *Sriramulu v. Ramayya* (1881), 3 Mad. 15, at p. 16.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 100.

⁸ *Minakshi v. Ramanada* (1887), 11 Mad. 49, at p. 54. See also *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1895), 17 All. 294, at p. 322. (In the appeal in this case (1899), 26 I. A. 153; 21 All. 412; 3 C. W. N. 454, 1 Bom. L. R. 311, this view was not disturbed.)

⁹ See Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 169.

In the case of marriage, there are three prohibitions,¹ viz.—

(i.) The couple between whom marriage is proposed should not be *sapindas*;

(ii.) They should not be *sagotras*; and

(iii.) There should be no *Viruddha Sanbandha* or contrary relationship, that is, such relationship as would render sexual connection between them incestuous. This contrary relationship is defined as consisting in the couple being so related to each other that by analogy the one is the father or the mother of the other, as, for instance, the daughter of the wife's sister and the sister of the paternal uncle's wife."²

According to the *niyoga* rule, "The relations prohibited for adoption by a man are: the paternal uncle, the maternal uncle, the brother, the four first cousins on paternal and maternal side, the brother-in-law, the sister's son, and the daughter's son."³ Of these the father's brother's son, and the mother's brother's son,⁴ would not be excluded by the marriage rules.

Whatever may have been the origin of the rule prohibiting the adoption of a boy, whose mother the adoptive father could not have married, it has been held in Madras that the Courts cannot now go behind it and test the validity of an adoption by the rules which governed the obsolete system of *niyoga*.⁵

It remains to be seen whether the Judicial Committee will, when it becomes necessary to lay down a general rule on this subject, accept the rule of prohibited degrees in marriage laid down in India, or will accept the *niyoga* rule, enunciated in the "Dattaka Mimansa," or will confine the prohibitions to the three cases which have hitherto been considered by the Committee,⁶ viz. those of the sister's son, daughter's son, and mother's sister's son. These are the only cases specified by the sages Saunaka and Sakala,⁷ from whose texts Nanda Pandita, in the "Dattaka Mimansa," based the *niyoga* test of exclusion.

The Bombay High Court confines the prohibitions to sister's son, daughter's son, and mother's sister's son.⁸ This view is, it is submitted, the preferable one.

The high authority of the "Dattaka Mimansa"⁹ might possibly give

¹ *Ante*, pp. 39-41.

² *Minakshi v. Ramanada* (1887), 11 Mad. 49, at p. 53. Marriage between a Hindu and the daughter of his wife's sister was held to be valid in *Ragavendra Rau v. Jayaram Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 283.

³ G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 322, and see preceding pages.

⁴ See *Virayya v. Hanumanta* (1890), 14 Mad. 459, at p. 461. The mother's brother's son can be adopted in the Bombay Presidency; *Yamnava v. Laxman Bhimrao Kulkarni* (1912), 36 Bom. 533; 14 Bom. L. R. 543.

⁵ See *Virayya v. Hanumanta* (1890), 14 Mad. 459, at p. 461.

⁶ *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh*

(1899), 26 I. A. 153; 21 All. 412; 3 C. W. N. 454; 1 Bom. L. R. 311.

⁷ As to the construction of Sakala's text, see *Walbai v. Heerbai* (1909), 34 Bom. 491, at p. 495; 11 Bom. L. R. 1172.

⁸ *Ramchandra v. Gopal* (1908), 32 Bom. 619; 10 Bom. L. R. 948; *Yamnava v. Laxman Bhimrao* (1912), 36 Bom. 533; 14 Bom. L. R. 543; *Gajanan Balkrishna v. Kashinath Narayan* (1915), 39 Bom. 410; 17 Bom. L. R. 372.

⁹ *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 153, at p. 161; 21 All. 412, at p. 419; 3 C. W. N. 454, at p. 457; 1 Bom. L. R. 311; *Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga*

a preference to the *viyoga* test of exclusion; but with regard to the analogy between the *Dattaka* form of adoption and this obsolete practice the Judicial Committee has said,¹ "as a ground for judicial decision these speculations are inadmissible, though as explanatory arguments to account for an actual practice they may be deserving of attention"

The burden of proving a special custom to the contrary amongst any members of these three classes, prevalent, either in their caste, or in a particular locality, lies upon him who avers the existence of that custom.²

In the following cases, which fall within the above-mentioned rule, adoptions have been held to be invalid.

Instances of application of rule.

(a) Daughter's son.³

Brahmins in the Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Tinnevely districts, by custom, adopt daughter's sons.⁴ There seems to be a similar custom among the Nambudri Brahmins of Malabar,⁵ and it has been held⁶ that in the Southern Mahratta country the prohibition of the adoption of a daughter's son is not universally in force. In the Punjab there is frequently such a custom.⁷

(b) Sister's son.⁸

Sathupathy (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at pp. 435, 437; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at pp. 11, 13; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at pp. 21, 22; *Waman Raghupati Bova v. Krishnaji Kashiraj Bova* (1889), 14 Bom. 249, at p. 259; *Uma Sunker Moitro v. Kali Komul Mozumdar* (1880), 6 Calc. 256, at p. 265; 7 C. L. R. 145, at p. 154; *Rajendro Narain Lahoree v. Saroda Soonduree Dabce* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 548.

¹ *Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 396, at p. 441; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 7, at p. 16; 10 W. R. P. C. 17, at p. 23; *Raghunadha (Sri) v. Brozokshoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 190; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 80; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at pp. 301, 302.

² *Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanmani Ganesh Safray* (1879), 3 Bom. 273, at pp. 296, 297. See *Vayidinada v. Appu* (1885), 9 Mad. 44, at pp. 45, 46; *Minakshi v. Ramanada* (1887), 11 Mad. 49, at p. 55; *Lali v. Murlidhar* (1901), 24 All. 195, at p. 205.

³ *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 153, at p. 160; 21 All. 412, at p. 418; 3 C. W. N. 454, at p. 456; 1 Bom. L. R. 311; *Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanmani Ganesh Safray* (1879), 3 Bom. 273; *Bhagirthibai v. Eadhabai* (1879), 3 Bom.

298; *Jivani Bhai v. Jivu Bhai* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 462, at pp. 467, 468.

⁴ *Vayidinada v. Appu* (1885), 9 Mad. 44.

⁵ See *Vishnu Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath) v. Krishnan Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath)* (1883), 7 Mad. 3.

⁶ *Nani (Bai) v. Chunilal* (1897), 22 Bom. 973, at p. 976.

⁷ See *Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi* (1909), 36 I. A. 103; 36 Calc. 780; 13 C. W. N. 920; 10 Bom. L. R. 833.

⁸ *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 153, at p. 160; 21 All. 412, at p. 418; 3 C. W. N. 454, at p. 456; 1 Bom. L. R. 311; *Lali (Mussammatt) v. Murlidhar* (1906), 33 I. A. 97; 28 All. 488; 10 C. W. N. 730; *Narain Das (Lala) v. Ramanuj Dayal (Lala)* (1897), 25 I. A. 46, at p. 52; 20 All. 209, at p. 217; 2 C. W. N. 193, at p. 195; *Sundar (Mussammatt) v. Parbati (Mussammatt)* (1889), 16 I. A. 186, at p. 193; 12 All. 51, at p. 56. S. C. in Court below, *Parbati v. Sundar* (1885), 8 All. 1; *Rajcoomar Lall v. Bussessur Dyal* (1884), 10 Calc. 688, at p. 693; *Narasammal v. Balaramachari* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 420; *Gopalayyan v. Raghupatayyan* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 250; *Kora Shunko Takoor (Doe dem) v. Munnee (Bebee)* (1815), East's

By custom Brahmins in the Tanjore, Trichinopoly and Tinnevely districts,¹ the Bohra Brahmins of the northern districts of the North-Western Provinces,² and the Nambudri Brahmins of Malabar,³ and Saraswat Brahmins of Kanara⁴ adopt sister's sons. It has also been held that in the Southern Mahratta country the prohibition of the adoption of sister's sons is not universally in force.⁵

It has been held that a sister's daughter's son would be inadmissible for adoption.⁶

Such adoption is permissible in the Telegu and Tamil country where a marriage between a maternal uncle and his niece is allowed.⁷

(c) Mother's sister's son.⁸

(d) The son of the daughter of a *sagotra*.⁹

The father's sister's son can be adopted in the Bombay Presidency.¹⁰
The above rule would exclude him from adoption.

notes, case 20; Morl. Dig. vol. i. p. 18; *Shiblall v. Bishumber*, S. D. A. N. W. P. 1866, p. 25. In *Ramalinga Pillai v. Sadasiva Pillai* (1864), 9 M. I. A. 510; 1 W. R. P. C. 25, the adoption of a sister's son was upheld. The parties were said in the report to be Vaisyas. The question as to the validity of the adoption was raised, but the case was determined on the ground that the title of the respondent was admitted by the appellant's father. In *Jivani Bhai v. Jivani Bhai* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 462, at p. 467, it was asserted that the parties to the case of *Ramalinga Pillai* were clearly Sudras. See also *Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanmant Ganesh Safray* (1879), 3 Bom. 273, at pp. 282, 283. In *Ganpatrav Vireshrur v. Vithoba Khandappa* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 130, the adoption of a sister's son was upheld, but the parties were evidently Sudras (see *Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanmant Ganesh Safray* (1879), 3 Bom. 273, at p. 282). In *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1895), 17 All. 204, at p. 302, it is said that the parties in *Ganpatrav's* case were Vaisyas, but that the Court erred in supposing that the parties in *Ramalinga Pillai's* case were other than Sudras.

¹ *Vayidinada v. Appu* (1885), 9 Mad. 44.

² *Chain Sukh Ram v. Parbati* (1891), 14 All. 53. In an Agra case (*Lali v. Murlidhar* (1901), 24 All. 195, at pp. 197, 205), an unsuccessful attempt was made to prove that a Bohra Brahmin could adopt his sister's son.

³ *Vishnu Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath) v. Krishnan Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath)* (1883), 7 Mad. 3.

⁴ *Manjunath v. Kacribas* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 140.

⁵ *Nani (Bar) v. Chunilal* (1897), 22 Bom. 973, at p. 976.

⁶ *Venkata v. Subhadra* (1884), 7 Mad. 548, at p. 549. As to a half-sister's daughter's son, see *Karunabde Ganesa Ratnamayyar v. Gopala Ratnamayyar* (1889), 7 I. A. 173, at p. 177; 2 Mad. 270, at p. 279.

⁷ *Venkata v. Subhadra* (1884), 7 Mad. 548, at p. 549.

⁸ *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 153; 21 All. 412; 3 C. W. N. 454; *Walbai v. Heerbai* (1909), 34 Bom. 491; 11 Bom. L. R. 1172.

⁹ *Minakshi v. Ramanada* (1887), 11 Mad. 49. See, however, *Ragavendra Rau v. Jayaram Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 283, at p. 289, and *ante*, p. 39.

¹⁰ *Ramkrishna Gopal Joshi v. Chimanaji Vyankatesh* (1913), 15 Bom. L. R. 825.

It seems that the adoptions of the following are prohibited, not by the marriage rule, which is inapplicable, but by express authority, viz. :—

(i.) Brother.¹

In the Deccan the adoption of a younger brother is permitted.²

It has been held in Bombay that a half-brother can be adopted.³ A contrary view has been taken in Madras.⁴ It is submitted that the former view is preferable.

(ii.) Paternal and maternal uncles.⁵

Having regard to the prohibition as to the age⁶ of the adopted son, this case is unlikely to occur except, perhaps, in Western India.⁷

It has been held that the adoptions of the following persons are permissible, except in the case where the natural mother of the boy happens to be a person whom, as a virgin, the adoptive father could not lawfully have married.

(a) Brother's son's son.⁸

(b) Paternal uncle's son.⁹

(c) Paternal uncle's son's son's son.¹⁰

There can equally be no objection to the adoption of a paternal uncle's son's son.¹¹

¹ *Sriramulu v. Ramayya* (1881), 3 Mad. 15, at p. 16. See *Runjeet Sing (Baboo) v. Obhye Narain Singh* (1817), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 245 (2nd edition, 315); "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 5, para. 17. The *nyoga* rule (*ante*, p. 140) excluded brothers and step-brothers.

² See *Huebut Rao Mankur v. Govind Rao Bahwunt Rao Mankur* (1821), 2 Borr. 75, at p. 85; Steele, 44.

³ *Gajanan Balkrishna v. Kashinath Narayan* (1915), 39 Bom. 410; 17 Bom. L. R. 372.

⁴ *Sriramulu v. Ramayya* (1881), 3 Mad. 15, at p. 16.

⁵ *Haran Chunder Banerji v. Hurro Mohun Chuckerbutty* (1880), 6 Calc. 41, at p. 47; 6 C. L. R. 393, at p. 398; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 5, para. 17; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 327; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i p. 67.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 146, 147.

⁷ *Post*, p. 147.

⁸ *Haran Chunder Banerji v. Hurro Mohun Chuckerbutty* (1880), 6 Calc. 41, at p. 48; 6 C. L. R. 393, at p. 400; *Morun Moe Debcah v. Bejoy Kishto Gossamee* (1863), W. R. Sp. No. 121.

⁹ *Virayya v. Hanumantha* (1891), 14 Mad. 459; an unreported decision of the High Court of Bengal referred to in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 340. The paternal uncle's son is excluded by the *nyoga* rule of exclusion (*ante*, p. 140).

¹⁰ *Haran Chunder Banerji v. Hurro Mohun Chuckerbutty* (1880), 6 Calc. 41, at p. 47; 6 C. L. R. 393, at p. 399.

¹¹ In *Venkata v. Subhadra* (1884), 7 Mad. 543, the boy was the son of the paternal uncle's son, but no objection was made to the adoption on this ground. Such adoption is said even to be commendable. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 348.

(d) The son of the mother's father's brother's daughter's daughter.¹

(e) The wife's brother.²

(f) The wife's brother's son.³

(g) The wife's sister's son.⁴

Sudras.

* The rule as to the relationship between the adopting father and the natural mother⁵ has no application to Sudras.⁶

Relationship
of adopting
mother to
natural father.

Relationship between the adopting widow, or the wife of the adopting father, and the natural father of the boy is no impediment to an adoption.⁷

Nanda Pandita held that a woman must not adopt her brother's son,⁸ but his view cannot now be accepted.⁹ His view was accepted in two

¹ *Venkata v. Subhadra* (1884), 7 Mad. 548. In this case, Sastri G. C. Sarkar points out ("Law of Adoption," p. 348) that having regard to the Mitakshara system of computation of degrees, the Court was in error in considering that the adopting father could, under the general Hindu law, have married the natural mother. Such marriage seems to have been permissible by a usage to which the parties were subject.

² *Krishnengar v. Vanamalai Iyengar*, Mad. Dec. of 1856, p. 213; *Runganaigum v. Namesevoya Pillay*, Mad. Dec. of 1857, p. 94; *Ruvee Bhudr v. Roopshunkar Shunkerjee* (1823), 2 Borr. 656.

³ *Sriramulu v. Ramayya* (1881), 3 Mad. 15, at p. 17. See *Nani (Bai) v. Chunilal* (1897), 22 Bom. 973, at p. 979; *Puttu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (Musammatt)* (1915), 42 I. A. 155; 37 All. 359; 19 C. W. N. 841; 17 Bom. L. R. 549.

⁴ *Gunga (Bae) v. Sheeshunkur (Bae)* (1832), Bom. Sel. R. 73, at p. 76.

⁵ *Ante*, pp 138, 139.

⁶ See *Bhagwan Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 153, at p. 160; 21 All. 412, at p. 418; 3 C. W. N. 454, at p. 452. In *Ramalinga Pillai v. Sadasiva Pillai* (1864), 9 M. I. A. 510; 1 W. R. P. C. 95, where the parties were Sudras, an adoption of a sister's son was upheld. The marginal note of the report erroneously de-

scribes the parties as Vaisyas (see *Jwani Bhai v. Jiru Bhar* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. R. 462, at p. 467), but it does not appear whether the Judicial Committee were aware that the parties were Sudras. *Nunkoo Singh v. Purn Dhum Singh* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 356; *Jiwan Lal v. Kallu Mal* (1905), 28 All. 170; *Rajcoomar Lal v. Bissessur Dyal* (1884), 10 Calc. 688, at p. 693; *Vayidinada v. Appu* (1885), 9 Mad. 44, at p. 53; *Chinna Nagayya v. Pedda Nagayya*, (1875), 1 Mad. 62; *Phundo v. Janginath* (1893), 15 All. 327; *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364.

⁷ *Puttu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (Musammatt)* (1915), 42 I. A. 155; 37 All. 359; 19 C. W. N. 841, 17 Bom. L. R. 549; *Jai Singh Pal Singh v. Bijai Pal Singh* (1904), 27 All. 417, differing on this question from *Battas Kuar (Must.) v. Lachman Singh* (1875), 7 N. W. P. 117; *Sriramulu v. Ramayya* (1881), 3 Mad. 15; *Nani (Bai) v. Chunilal* (1897), 22 Bom. 973 (a case from Gujarat). See *Girioua v. Bhumaji Raghunath* (1884), 9 Bom. 58, which was a case from the Southern Mahratta country, where the prohibition of the adoption of a daughter's or sister's son is not universally in force.

⁸ "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 2, paras. 33, 34. See Sutherland's "Synopsis." Stokes' "Hindu Law Books," p. 665.

⁹ See cases in note 7 above.

cases.¹ It is supported by Dr. Jogendronath Bhattacharya, who carries the rule to its logical conclusion, and in the case of an adoption by a woman excludes from adoption the sons of men between whom and her there could be no legal *niyoga* or appointment to raise issue.² This is also the opinion of Sastri Gopal Chundra Sarkar.³

There is no ground for holding that the adoption of a relation is limited to a particular generation.⁴ No restriction as to generation.

In the Punjab no adoption is rendered invalid by any relationship between the adopting and natural parents.⁵ Punjab.

Adoptions of daughter's sons, sister's sons, brother's sons, daughter's and sister's sons, by members of twice-born classes, have been upheld in the Punjab.⁶

Jains are not bound by any restrictions as to the relationship between adopter and adopted.⁷

Among Jains a daughter's son may be adopted.⁸

An adopted son cannot adopt from his adoptive family a boy whom he could not have adopted if he had been a natural son of his adoptive father.⁹ Adoption from adoptive family.

An only son, or any one of several sons, can be adopted.¹⁰ Only son.

¹ *Battas Kuar (Musst.) v. Lachman Singh* (1875), 7 N. W. P. 117; *Dagumbaree Dabee v. Tanamoney Dabee* (1818), Macnaghten's "Considerations," 170; 1 Morley's "Digest," 19. In the latter case Nanda Pandita's rule was extended to an uncle's son.

² "Commentaries on Hindu Law," 2nd ed., 166.

³ "Law of Adoption," p. 332.

⁴ *Haran Chunder Banerji v. Hurro Mohun Chuckerbutty* (1880), 6 Cal. 41, at p. 48; 6 C. L. R. 393, at p. 399. It was there contended that a brother's son's son could not be adopted, although a brother's son could be adopted.

⁵ See cases referred to in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 341, 342; Rattigan's "Digest," 7th ed., 56; *Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi* (1909), 36 I. A. 103; 36 Cal. 780; 13 C. W. N. 920; 10 Bom. L. R. 833.

⁶ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 341, 342.

⁷ Among the Jains adoption is a mere temporal arrangement, and has no spiritual object *Asharff Kunwar v. Rup Chand* (1908), 30 All. 197; S. C. on appeal *Rup Chand (Lala) v. Jambu Parshud* (1910), 37 I. A. 93; 32 All. 247; 14 C. W. N. 545; 12 Bom. L. R. 402; *Bhagvandas Tejmal v. Rajmal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 241, at p. 262.

⁸ *Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (Mussumat)* (1878), 5 I. A. 87; 1 All. 688; 2 C. L. R. 193; *Lakshmi Chand v. Gaito Bai* (1886), 8 All. 319; *Hassan Ali v. Naga Mal* (1876), 1 All. 288.

⁹ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 387.

¹⁰ *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshamma (Sri Balusu)*; *Radha Mohun v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 26 I. A. 113; 22 Mad. 398; 21 All. 460; 3 C. W. N. 427; 1 Bom. L. R. 226; *Vyas Chimanlal v. Vyas Ramchandra* (1899), 24 Bom. 367; 2 Bom. L. R. 163.

A widow can give her only son in adoption.¹

There was for a long time a conflict in the Indian Courts as to whether an only son could be given in adoption,² but in 1899 it was definitely settled that he could be so given. The power to adopt an elder or any one of several sons was settled much earlier.³

Age of boy.
Bengal and
Benares
schools.

According to the Bengal⁴ and Benares⁵ schools, in the case of the three higher classes the adoption must take place before the boy is invested with the sacred thread;⁶ in the case of Sudras it must take place before marriage.⁷

¹ *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 337, at p. 542; 3 Bom. L. R. 73, where it is said, "Now that the recent decisions have established the fact that the gift of an only son is not blamable, the implied effect ceases to be operative, and no restriction can be placed on the widows' power to make a valid gift of an only son." It was not necessary to decide in *Balusu Gurulingaswami's* case whether a widow would have power to give an only son in adoption. In *Somasekhuru Raja v. Subhadramaji* (1882), 6 Bom. 524, following *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364, at p. 396, it was held that an authority by the husband to give in adoption, even as a *dvyamushyayana* (post, pp. 190-193), would not be implied in the case of the adoption of an only son. See also *Debee Dial v. Hur Hor Singh* (1828), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 320 (new edition, 407). The decision in *Krishna v. Paramshri* is supported by the views expressed by the Judicial Committee in *Balusu Gurulingaswami's* case, 26 I. A. at pp. 127, 128; 22 Mad. at pp. 407, 408; 21 All. at pp. 469, 470; 3 C. W. N. at pp. 436, 437; 1 Bom. L. R. 226.

² For a discussion of the earlier cases on this subject, see Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 185-192; and Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 298-306. For a discussion of the texts and the views of the commentators and other authorities, see Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 282-298.

³ See *Seetaram v. Dhunnook Dharee Sahye* (1863), 1 Hay, 260; *Janokee Debea v. Gopaul Acharjea* (1877), 2 Calc. 365; *Jamnabai v. Raychand*

Nahalchand (1883), 7 Bom. 225; *Kashibai v. Tatra* (1883), 7 Bom. 221.

⁴ *Bullabakant Chowdree v. Kishenprea Dassea Chowdrain* (1838), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 219 (2nd ed., 270) (this was a case of Sudras); *Ramkishore Acharj Chowdree v. Bhoobunmoyee Debea Chowdrain*, Ben. S. D. of 1859, 229, at pp. 236, 237, affirmed on review, Ben. S. D. of 1860, vol. i. 485, at p. 490. On appeal this question did not arise (*Bhoobun Moyee Debea v. Ramkishore Acharj Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279; 3 W. R. P. C. 15). See *Kerutnaraen v. Bhobinesree (Mussummaut)* (1806), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 161, note to p. 162 (2nd ed., 213, note to p. 214). See "Dattaka Mimansa," iv. 22; "Dattaka Chandrika," ii. 25, 30 (Sutherland's note), 31. 1 W. Macnaghten, 73, note. This is disputed by G. C. Sarkar ("Law of Adoption," p. 362), who contends that the investiture in the natural family is not a bar to an adoption. As to the effect of an adoption when the ceremony of tonsure has been performed in the natural family, see post, p. 192.

⁵ *Ganga Sahai v. Lekhraj Singh* (1886), 9 All. 253, at p. 328. See *Rup Chand (Lala) v. Jambu Parshad* (1910), 37 I. A. 93; 32 All. 247; 14 C. W. N. 545; 12 Bom. L. R. 402.

⁶ As to the age for such investiture, see Colebrooke, note to "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 4, para. 23; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 104.

⁷ *Bullabakant Chowdree v. Kishenprea Dassea Chowdrain* (1838), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 219 (2nd ed., 270); *Nitradaye (Ranee) v. Bhokanath Doss*, Ben. S. D. A. 1853, p. 553; "Dattaka

An unmarried Sudra, of any age, who is in other respects Sudras. qualified, can be adopted according to all the schools.¹

In the Madras Presidency the same rules apply,² except Madras. that a Brahmin boy of the same *gotra*³ can be adopted after the thread ceremony has been performed, but before marriage.⁴

In Western India there is no objection to the adoption of a Western India. married man even if he has children.⁵

It has been held that a married Sudra of a different *gotra* can be adopted,⁶ and the adoption of a married Brahmin of a different *gotra*, having children at the date of his adoption has been upheld.⁷ When he is of the same *gotra* it follows that there can be no objection.⁸

The rule of Hindu law requiring a difference of age between the adoptive father or mother and the boy,⁹ is apparently merely directory.¹⁰

If a boy, eligible in other respects, upon whom the ceremonies of *chudakarma* (tonsure) and *upanayana* (investiture with the sacred thread) have not been performed in his natural family, can be obtained, he should be preferred, but the fact that such ceremonies have been performed does not invalidate the adoption.¹¹

Difference of age between boy and adopter.

Chandrika," ii. 29, 32; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 91. The adoption of a married *Ahīr* was held invalid in *Jhunka Prasad v. Nathu* (1913), 35 All. 263.

¹ See *Papamma v. V. Appa Rau* (1893), 16 Mad. 384, at pp. 396, 397. in which case the Court considered that the adoption of an unmarried man of over forty years of age would not be invalid on the mere ground of age.

² *Pichuvayyan v. Subbayyan* (1889), 13 Mad. 128; *Chetty Colum Prasanna Vencatachella Reddyar v. Chetty Colum Moodoo Vencatachella Reddyar*, Mad. S. D. A. 1823, p. 406; *Sevagamy Nachiar v. Mooto Vizia Raghoonadha Sutoopathy*, *ibid.* p. 101; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 87-91; cases in vol. ii. at pp. 87, 102, 109, 110; *Sreenivasian v. Sashyummal*, Mad. Dec. of 1859, 118; *Veerapermall Pillay v. Narrain Pillay* (1801), 1 Mad. N. C. 78. See *Vythilinga Muppanar v. Vijayathammal* (1882), 6 Mad. 43. As to Sudras, see *Pappamma v. V. Appa Rau* (1893), 16 Mad. 384, at p. 396.

³ As to the meaning of "*gotra*," see *ante*, p. 39.

⁴ *Viraragava v. Ramalinga* (1883), 9 Mad. 148; *Pichuvayyan v. Subbay-*

yan (1889), 13 Mad. 128. See *P. Venkatesaia v. Venkata Charlu* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 28.

⁵ *Mhalsabai v. Vithoba Khandappa Gulve* (1862), 7 Bom. H. C. App. xxvi. See *Sadashiv Moreshvar Ghate v. Hari Moreshvar Ghate* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 190. As to the effect of the adoption upon the rights of his children, see *post*, pp. 179, 190.

⁶ *Laksmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364. See also *Nathaji Krishnaji v. Hari Jagaji* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. (A. C.), 67.

⁷ *Dharma Dagū v. Ramkrishna Chinnaaji* (1885), 10 Bom. 80. See also *Laksmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364, at pp. 371, 373.

⁸ See *Brijbhokunjee Muharaj (Sree) v. Gokoolotsaojee Muharaj (Sree)* (1816), 1 Borr. 181, at p. 195, where the adoption of a married Brahmin of 45 years of age belonging to the same *gotra* was upheld.

⁹ Steele, pp. 44, 182; V. N. Mandlik, p. 471.

¹⁰ *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250, at p. 257.

¹¹ *Dharma Dagū v. Ramkrishna Chinnaaji* (1885), 10 Bom. 80; *Laksmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364, at p. 370.

Punjab. In the Punjab there is no limit of age, and the performance of the thread ceremony or of marriage in the family does not invalidate the adoption.¹

Jains. Among Jains there is no limit of age,² and a married man may be adopted.³ In a case of Agarwala Jains,⁴ who belong to the twice-born classes, the Privy Council upheld an adoption of a married man, but pointed out that the custom would have to be proved in each case.

Orphan. An orphan, whether he be a minor or an adult, cannot be adopted.⁵

This follows from the rule that only a father or mother can give in adoption.⁶

Boy who has been previously adopted. A boy who has been taken in adoption, cannot be taken again in adoption.⁷

As to a joint adoption by two widows, see *ante*, p. 108.

Personal defects. Where a boy is disqualified by personal defects from inheriting, it is not settled whether he can be adopted. Apparently he cannot.⁸

A defect which would attach to the boy in consequence of a fault on the part of his parents would not operate as a disqualification.⁹

Brahmo. There is no objection to the adoption of the Brahmo son of a Brahmo.¹⁰

¹ In *Makhan v. Nilka*, Punjab Records of 1868, case No. 37, p. 96, the Chief Court upheld the adoption of a man of the age of 30.

² *Govindnath Roy (Maharajah) v. Gulal Chand* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 276 (new edition, 322); *Rithcurn Lalla v. Soojun Mull Lallah*, 9 Mad. Jur. 21, referred to in *Sheo Singh Rai v. Dukho (Mussamat)* (1874), 6 N. W. P. 382, at p. 402.

³ *Manohar Lal v. Banarsi Das* (1907), 29 All. 495.

⁴ *Rup Chand (Lala) v. Jambu Parshad* (1910), 37 I. A. 93; 32 All. 247; 14 C. W. N. 545; 12 Bom. L. R. 402.

⁵ *Shrinivas Sarjerav v. Balwant Venkatesh* (1913), 37 Bom. 513; 15 Bom. L. R. 533; *Vaithalingam Mudali v. Murugavan* (1912), 37 Mad. 529; *Subbaluvammal v. Ammakutti Ammal* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 129; *Balwantrav Bhaskar v. Bayabai* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. O. J. 83; *Bashetiappa v. Shielingappa* (1873),

10 Bom. H. C. 268. As to the custom of the Agarwal Banias of Zira, see *Chiman Lal v. Hari Chand* (1913), 40 I. A. 156; 40 Calc. 879; 17 C. W. N. 885; 15 Bom. L. R. 646.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 136.

⁷ G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 281, 282. See "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 1, para. 30; s. 2, paras. 40-47.

⁸ Sutherland in his "Synopsis"; Stokes' "Hindu Law Books," p. 665, says, "It is an obvious inference that the person selected should be exempt from any disqualification, which might prevent him fulfilling the purpose of the adoption." This is supported by Nanda Pandita, "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 2, para. 62. See, however, Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 349, 350.

⁹ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 350.

¹⁰ *Kusum Kumari Roy v. Satyaranjan Das* (1903), 30 Calc. 999; 7 C. W. N. 784.

The simultaneous adoption of two or more sons is invalid as to all.¹ Simultaneous adoptions.

The practice of simultaneous adoptions of two or more sons seems to have been prevalent in Bengal after 1846, and to have owed its origin to the ingenuity of Hindu lawyers, who attempted thereby to evade the effect of the decision of the Privy Council in *Rungama v. Aitchama*,² in which an adoption during the lifetime of a previously adopted son was declared void.³

It may in some cases be difficult to determine whether the adoptions were simultaneous, and, therefore, both void, or merely successive, in which case the latter only would be void. In *Siddessury Dassee v. Doorgachurn Sett*,⁴ Phear, J., said, "But, moreover, on that occasion, the ceremonies for the two boys were carried on, practically speaking, simultaneously, although possibly the beginnings and endings were not absolutely synchronous. If either boy was adopted, both were adopted, and it would be an outrage to common sense to say otherwise than that they were adopted at one and the same time."

In the case of adoption the test of eligibility of the adopted son for adoption must be the test which would have applied had the adoption been made by the husband himself in his lifetime.⁵

ACT OF ADOPTION.

There must in every case be an actual corporeal gift and acceptance of the boy in adoption,⁶ coupled with an expression of the intention of the one person to give, and of the other to accept, the boy in adoption.⁷ Giving and taking necessary.

¹ *Akhoy Chunder Bagchi v. Kalapukur Haj* (1885), 12 I. A. 198; 12 Calc. 406; S. C. in Court below, *Gyanendro Chunder Lahiri v. Kalla Puhar Hajee* (1882), 9 Calc. 50; 11 C. L. R. 297; *Surendrakeshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee* (1892), 19 I. A. 108; 19 Calc. 513; S. C. in Court below, *Doorgasundari Dossee v. Surendra Keshav Roy* (1886), 12 Calc. 686; *Siddessury Dossee v. Doorga Churn Sett* (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. (N. S.) 22; Bourke, O. C. 360. See also *Monemothonth Dey v. Onontnath Dey* (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. (N. S.) 24.

² (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1; 7 W. R. P. C. 57; ante, p. 103.

³ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 184.

⁴ (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. (N. S.) 22; Bourke, O. C. 360.

⁵ *Puttu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (Musamaut)* (1915), 42 I. A. 155, at p. 160; 37 All. 359, at p. 366; 19 C. W. N. 841, at p. 847; 17 Bom. L. R. 549, at pp. 553, 554.

⁶ *Bireswar Mookerji v. Ardha Chunder Roy Chowdhry* (1892), 19 I. A. 101; 19 Calc. 452; *Shosinath Ghose (Mahashoya) v. Krishna Soondari Das (Srimati)* (1880), 7 I. A. 250; 6 Calc. 381; 7 C. L. R. 313; *V. Singamma v. Vinjamuri Venkatacharlu* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 165; *Veerapermall Pillay v. Narrain Pillay* (1801), 1 Mad. N. C. 78.

⁷ *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214, at pp. 218, 219. See also *Govindayyar v. Dorasami* (1887), 11 Mad. 5, at p. 7, where in referring to *Shosinath Ghose (Mahashoya) v. Krishna Soondari*

A mere gift by a document transferring the boy,¹ or a constructive gift of an absent boy,² or an expression of assent³ or intention⁴ without an actual gift is insufficient.

Writing unnecessary
Adoptions in
Oudh.

A deed or other writing in support of the act of adoption is unnecessary,⁵ but in cases to which the Oudh Estate Act, 1869,⁶ applies, an adoption by a widow must be by a writing executed and attested in manner required in case of a will,⁷ and registered⁸

Invitations,
etc.

Although it is usual to invite relations to the performance of the ceremonies, and, in the case of large landowners, to represent the fact of the adoption to the Government authorities, the absence of such invitation or representation does not vitiate the adoption.⁹ The consent of the ruling authority is not necessary,¹⁰ even in the case of vatandars,¹¹ unless it be a condition of the exercise of a permission to adopt.¹²

As to the custom of the Agarwal Banias of Zira, see *ante*, p. 148.

Dasi (Srimati) (1880), 7 I. A. 250; 6 Calc. 381; 7 C. L. R. 313, the Court said, "the decision is an authority for the proposition that any overt act is not sufficient, but that there must be corporeal delivery of the child by a person competent to give, to a person competent to take, accompanied by the declaration on the one side, 'I give the child in adoption,' and on the other, 'I take the child in adoption.'" *Kenchawa v. Ningupa* (1866), 10 Bom. H. C. 265, note.

¹ See *Shosinath Ghose (Mahashoya) v. Krishna Soondari Dasi (Srimati)* (1880), 7 I. A. 250, at pp. 255, 256; 6 Calc. 381, at pp. 388, 389; 7 C. L. R. 313, at pp. 318, 319; *Sreenarain Mitter v. Kishen Soondory Dassee (Sreemutty)* (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 149; 11 B. L. R. 171; S. C. *sub nomine*, *Nogendro Chundro Mitter v. Kishen Soondery Dossee*, 19 W. R. C. R. 133; S. C. in Court below, *Srinarayan Mitter v. Krishna Sundari Dasi (Srimati)* (1869), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 279; 11 W. R. C. R. 196; *Mandit Koer (Musamat) v. Phool Chand Lal* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 154; *Dhapabai v. Champadal* (1899), 1 Bom. L. R. 842.

² *Suddessory Dossee v. Doorgachurn Sett* (1865), Bourke, O. C. 360; 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 22.

³ *Bashetiappa v. Shivlingappa* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 268, at p. 270; *Kenchawa v. Ningupa* (1867), 10 Bom. H. C. 265, note; *Gourbulub v. Jugernatpersaud Mitter* (1823), F. Macn.

Cons. H. L. 217; 1 Morley's "Digest," 18.

⁴ *Banee Pershad (Baboo) v. Abdool Hye (Moonshee Syud)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 192.

⁵ *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C. App. i., at ii.; *Sootroogun Sutputty v. Sabitra Dye* (1834), 2 Knapp, 287, at p. 290; 5 W. R. P. C. 109.

⁶ I. of 1869.

⁷ Act X. of 1865, s. 50, applied to wills under Act I. of 1869 by s. 10 of the latter Act.

⁸ S. 22 (8). This would apparently not take the place of the corporeal giving and receiving required by Hindu law. See *Bhanya Rabidat Singh v. Indar Kumwar (Maharani)* (1888), 16 I. A. 53, at p. 56; 16 Calc. 556, at p. 561.

⁹ See *Alank Manjari v. Fakir Chand Sarcar* (1834), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 356 (new edition, 418); *Narhar Govind Kulkarni v. Narayan Vitthal* (1877), 1 Bom. 607; *Rangubai v. Bhagirthibai* (1877), 2 Bom. 377; *Ramchandra Vasudev v. Nanaji Timaji* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. (A. C. J.) 26.

¹⁰ *Bhasker Buchajee v. Narro Rugho-nath* (1826), Bom. Sel. R. 24, at p. 29; *Ramchandra Vasudev v. Nanaji Timaji* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. (A. C. J.) 26; *Narhar Govind Kulkarni v. Narayan Vitthal* (1877), 1 Bom. 607.

¹¹ *Balaji v. Datlo* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 762.

¹² *Rangubai v. Bhagirthibai* (1877), 2 Bom. 377.

The person giving in adoption ought not to receive any consideration for the adoption; but it has been held that if he does so the adoption is not void.¹

A contract to pay money in consideration of giving or receiving a son in adoption is illegal and cannot be enforced,² but it does not affect the validity of the adoption, unless it be certain that the adopting father or mother acted from corrupt motives alone.³

As to an arrangement made by a widow to reserve the property of her husband for herself, see *post*, pp. 184, 185.

Where a father gives his son in adoption, he has apparently no power to impose a condition invalidating the adoption on the happening or non-happening of a future event; but in giving to his wife permission to give in adoption, he may subject the exercise of that power to a condition, and unless that condition be substantially fulfilled the gift has no effect.⁴

If the condition be an illegal or immoral one, the gift would be effectual even though the condition be not performed.

It is by no means clear what effect upon the boy's position in his natural family would be caused by an adoption upon a condition which is not fulfilled.

As to conditions with regard to the property made at the time of the adoption, see *post*, pp. 184-186.

As to gifts of property conditional on adoption, see *post*, pp. 204, 205.

The person taking⁵ and the person giving⁶ in adoption must be mentally capable of understanding, and must

Mental capacity of giver and taker.

¹ *Murugappa Chetti v. Nagappa Chetti* (1905), 29 Mad. 161. See *Eshan Kishor Acharjee Chowdhry v. Haris Chandra Chowdhry* (1874), 13 B. L. R. App. 42; 21 W. R. C. R. 381. G. C. Sarkar says ("Law of Adoption," p. 375), "In the majority of cases some sort of valuable consideration is given by the adopter to the natural father for inducing him to give away his son."

² See *Eshan Kishor Acharjee Chowdhry v. Haris Chandra Chowdhry* (1874), 13 B. L. R. App. 42; 21 W. R. C. R. 381; *Mahableshvar Fondha v. Durgabai* (1896), 22 Bom. 199, at p. 206; *Sitaram Pandit (Shri) v. Harihar Pandit (Shri)* (1910), 35 Bom. 169; 12 Bom. L. R. 910.

³ See *Mahableshvar Fondha v. Dur-*

gabai (1896), 22 Bom. 199. Cf. *ante*, p. 102.

⁴ *Rangubai v. Bhagirthibai* (1877), 2 Bom. 377. In this case the previous sanction of Government was the condition required by the natural father.

⁵ *Tayammarul v. Sashachalla Nai-ker* (1865), 10 M. L. A. 429 (see this case as to an adoption by a person *in extremis*); *Bullabakani Chowdree v. Kshenprea Dassee Chowdrain* (1838), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 219 (2nd edition, 270); *Mandit Koer (Mussammatt) v. Phool Chand Lal* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 154, at p. 156.

⁶ *Bireswar Mookerji v. Ardha Chunder Roy Chowdhry* (1892), 19 I. A. 101, at pp. 105, 106; 19 Calc. 452, at p. 461.

understand the significance of the act, otherwise there is no valid gift or acceptance, as the case may be.

There may be a question as to whether the amount of mental capacity which is requisite in the case of a will¹ is necessary for the taking a child in adoption,² as the taking in adoption is a matter of religious necessity.³

Fraud, etc.

It has been held that if an adoption has been brought about by fraud, coercion,⁴ mistake,⁵ misrepresentation,⁶ undue influence,⁷ or otherwise than by the free consent of the persons giving and taking in adoption, it is voidable, and that it can be ratified subsequently if no one's interest is prejudicially affected by such ratification.⁸

It is, however, submitted that in case of such fraud, etc., the adoption is void, and is incapable of ratification. It is submitted that the validity of an adoption must be determined at the time, and cannot depend upon future events.⁹ Otherwise the position of the adopted son and his relation to his natural and to his adoptive family would remain in suspense.¹⁰ In every case the interests of some of the adoptive relations may be prejudicially affected by an adoption. The interests of the natural relations would be affected, but not prejudicially. The question is one of status, not of contract, and is not affected by considerations which are available in cases of contract.

Where the adopter is a young widow, the Court will require clear evidence that, at the time of adoption, she was fully informed of her rights, and of the effect of adoption.¹¹ There may, however, be some relaxation of the strictness of this rule where the husband has directed his wife to adopt.¹²

¹ See Phillips and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 12-15.

² *Banee Pershad (Baboo) v. Abdool Hye (Moonshee Syud)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 192, at p. 195.

³ *Ante*, p. 101.

⁴ *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214, at pp. 220 to 224. See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 205, 431.

⁵ *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C., App. i., at pp. xx, xxi.

⁶ See *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C., App. i., at pp. xx, xxi, xxii.

⁷ *Somasekhara Raja v. Subhadramaji* (1882), 6 Bom. 524. See *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C., App. i., at pp. xx, xxi.

⁸ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rangayya Appa Row (Sri Rajah)* (1905), 29 Mad. 437. The question did not arise on appeal:

Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Parthasarathy Appa Row (1913), 41 I. A. 51; 37 Mad. 199; 18 C. W. N. 554; 16 Bom. L. R. 328.

⁹ See *Kovvidi Sattiraju v. Pattamsetti Venkataswami* (1916), 32 Mad. L. J. 119.

¹⁰ Cf. *post*, p. 156.

¹¹ *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C., App. i., at pp. xx, xxi. See *Tayammaul v. Sashachella Narker* (1865), 10 M. I. A., at p. 433. There have been a number of cases in which it has been held that if it is sought to make a purdahnashin woman responsible for acts which are detrimental to her interests, it must be clearly shown that she knew the effect of such acts, and that no advantage was taken of her: see *post*, p. 511.

¹² *Bayabai v. Bala* (1866), 7 Bom. H. C., App. i., at pp. xx, xxi.

As to allegation and proof of fraud, see *Bul Gangadhar Tilak v. Shri Shrinivas Pandit* (1915), 42 I. A. 135; 39 Bom. 441; 19 C. W. N. 729; 17 Bom. L. R. 527.

Where a person who has attained the age of majority ¹ is adopted, his assent would be essential to the adoption. In other cases no such assent is necessary.²

In the case of Sudras no religious ceremonies are necessary.³

An intentional omission to perform even unnecessary ceremonies, with a view to leave the adoption unfinished,⁴ or a non-performance of contemplated ceremonies in consequence of death, or of some other cause, may be evidence to show that the adoption is incomplete.

Except in the Punjab,⁵ and amongst Jains,⁶ the performance of the *datta homam* ⁷ is apparently necessary in the case of the twice-born classes, where the boy is not of the same *gotra* as the adoptive father.

No ceremonies are necessary in an adoption in the *dryamushyayana* form among the Nambudri Brahmins.⁸

Where the boy is of the same *gotra* as the adoptive father

¹ I.e. the age of majority according to Hindu law, *ante*, pp. 46, 47. As to cases where the adoption of minors is possible, see *ante*, pp. 147, 148.

² Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 280, 281. In Strang's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 88, it is said that "the adopted son must consent," but the authority there given (*Kullean Sing v. Kirpa Sing* (1795), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 9 (2nd ed., p. 11)) was the case of a *Kritrima* adoption, where the consent of the person adopted would always be necessary, *post*, p. 159.

³ *Shosinath Ghose (Mahashoya) v. Krishna Soondari Dasi (Srimati)* (1880), 7 I. A. 250, at p. 255; 6 Calc. 381, at p. 388; 7 C. L. R. 313, at p. 319; *Indromoni Chowdhurani v. Beharilal Mullick* (1879), 7 I. A. 24; 5 Calc. 770; 6 C. L. R. 183. See *Govindayyar v. Dorasami* (1887), 11 Mad. 5, at p. 6; *Thangathanni v. Ramu Mudali* (1882), 5 Mad. 358; *Atmaram v. Madho Rao* (1884), 6 All. 276, at p. 281; *Ravji Vinayakrav Jagannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmbai* (1887), 11 Bom. 381, at pp. 393, 394;

Nittianand Ghose v. Krishna Dyal Ghose (1871), 7 B. L. R. 1; 15 W. R. C. R. 300; *Perkash Chunder Roy v. Dhunmonee Dassca*, Ben. S. D. A. 1853, p. 96.

⁴ *Banee Pershad (Baboo) v. Abdool Hye (Moonshee Syud)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 192, at p. 198; *Valubhai v. Govind Kashinath* (1899), 24 Bom. 218, at pp. 226, 227; 1 Bom. L. R. 770. See *Asita Mohon Ghosh Moulik v. Nirode Mohon Ghosh Moulik* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 901.

⁵ Tupper's "Punjab Customary Law," vol. iii. p. 82.

⁶ *Lakshmi Chand v. Gatto Bai* (1886), 8 All. 319; see *Rup Chand (Lala) v. Jambu Parshad* (1910), 37 I. A. 93; 32 All. 247; 14 C. W. N. 545; 12 Bom. L. R. 402. As to the rites which are usual among Jains, see Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 454.

⁷ Oblations of clarified butter to fire, Wilson's "Glossary."

⁸ *Shankaran v. Kesavan* (1891), 15 Mad. 6. As to this form of adoption, see *post*, pp. 190-193.

as, for instance, where he is a brother's son, no religious ceremonies are necessary.¹

There is not very much direct authority on the question whether the absence of religious ceremonies in any case invalidates an adoption among the twice-born classes. In an old case the Judicial Committee said,² "Although neither written acknowledgments nor the performance of any religious ceremonials are essential to the validity of adoptions;" but it does not appear that the question as to the necessity of religious ceremonies was raised in that case.

In reference to these remarks the Judicial Committee said in a subsequent case,³ "It cannot, however, be considered as more than a *dictum*, since the decision was against the adoption in fact."

In a still later case, where the parties were Sudras, the Judicial Committee said,⁴ "It is perfectly clear that amongst the twice-born classes there would be no such adoption by deed, because certain religious ceremonies, the *datta homam* in particular, are in their case requisite."

Although it has been considered that this expression of opinion decides the question,⁵ "it is doubtful if more was intended than to point out that such religious ceremonies are requisite as part of the purely ceremonial law, not that the validity of an adoption for civil purposes depends on their due observance."⁶ At any rate, so far as the Judicial Committee is concerned, there are only contradictory *dicta* on the subject.

The High Courts have accepted the view that the performance of the *datta homam* is necessary,⁷ but in one case only⁸ has a High Court, so far

¹ *Valubai v. Govind Kashinath* (1899), 24 Bom. 218; 1 Bom. L. R. 770, approved of by the Privy Council in *Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit (Shri)* (1915), 42 I. A. 135; 39 Bom. 441; 19 C. W. N. 729; 17 Bom. L. R. 527; *Govindayyar v. Dorasami* (1887), 11 Mad. 5, preferring on this point *Singamma v. Vinjamuri Venkatacharlu* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 165, to *Venkata v. Subhadra* (1884), 7 Mad. 548; *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214, at p. 219; *Atmaram v. Madho Rao* (1884), 6 All. 276; *Retki v. Lak Pati Pujari* (1914), 20 C. W. N. 19. See *Huebut Rao Mankur v. Govind Rao Buhvant Rao Mankur* (1820), 2 Borr. 75, at pp. 85, 87.

² *Sootroogun Sulputhy v. Sabitra Dhye* (1834), 2 Knapp, 287; 5 W. R. P. C. 109.

³ *Indromoni Chowdhurani v. Beharilal Mullick* (1879), 7 I. A. 24, at p. 36; 5 Cal. 770, at p. 774; 6 C. L. R. 183, at p. 191.

⁴ *Shosinath Ghose (Mohashoya) v. Krishna Soondari Dasi* (1880), 7 I. A. 250, at p. 256; 6 Cal. 381, at pp.

388, 389; 7 C. L. R. 313, at p. 319.

⁵ *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214, at p. 220. The parties in this case were Vaisyas, but as there was no effective giving or taking, the decision of this question was not necessary.

⁶ *Atma Ram v. Madho Rao* (1884), 6 All. 276, at p. 283.

⁷ *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 124, at p. 220; *Venkata v. Subhadra* (1884), 7 Mad. 548; *Govindayyar v. Dorasami* (1887), 11 Mad. 5, at pp. 9, 10; *Chandramala Patta Mahadevi (Sri Sri) v. Mukhtumala Patta Mahadevi (Sri)* (1882), 6 Mad. 20; *Atmaram v. Madho Rao* (1884), 6 All. 276; *Oomrao Singh (Thakoor v. Mehtab Koonwer (Thakooranee))* (1868), 3 Agra H. C. 103A. See *Ravji Vinayakrao Jagannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmi Bai* (1887), 11 Bom. 381, at pp. 393, 394; "Dattaka Mimamsa," v. 36; West and Bühler, 922, 923; Steele, 45.

⁸ *Luchmun Lall v. Mohun Lall Bhaya Gayal* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 179; *post*, p. 155, note 8.

as the writer can ascertain, set aside an adoption on the ground that religious ceremonies had not been performed.

It has been suggested ¹ that adoption by a widow perhaps stands on a different footing, as, "according to the sages, the twice-born females hold the same position as Sudras with respect to the performance of religious ceremonies," but this distinction is not made by the cases which hold that religious ceremonies are necessary in the case of an adoption in one of the regenerate classes. In some of those cases ² the adoption was made by a widow.

The *homa* ceremony may be performed at any time after the actual giving and taking, and it does not seem to be necessary that the father should perform it. Its performance after the death of the natural father,³ or of the adoptive father,⁴ does not invalidate the adoption. When the *homa* is necessary, the adoption is not complete until it is performed.

Although it is usual to perform the *homa* in the dwelling-house of the adopter,⁵ it is immaterial where the ceremony is performed.⁶

There seems to be nothing to prevent the natural and adoptive parents delegating to others the performance of the *homa* ceremony.⁷

Although other religious ceremonies may be usual, it does not appear that the absence of them invalidates an adoption.⁸

¹ Sarkar, "Law of Adoption," p. 381. See "Dattaka Mimamsa," s 1, para. 27; "Vyavahara Mayukha," s. 1, para. 15.

² *Luchmun Lall v. Mohun Lall Bhaya Gayal* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 179; *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214; *Ravji Vinayakrao Jaggannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmi Bai* (1887), 11 Bom. 381; *Atma-ram v. Madho Rao* (1884), 6 All. 276; *Oomrao Singh (Thakoor) v. Mehtab Koonwer (Thakooranee)* (1868), 3 Agra H. C. R. 103A.

³ *Venkata v. Subhadra* (1884), 7 Mad. 549. In this case five years had elapsed. In the interval the natural father died, but the *homa* was performed by one of his sons.

⁴ *Subbarayar v. Subbammal* (1898), 21 Mad. 497; S. C. on appeal (1900), 27 I. A. 162; 24 Mad. 214; 4 C. W. N. 304; 2 Bom. L. R. 982.

⁵ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 382, 383.

⁶ *Oomrao Singh (Thakoor) v. Mehtab Koonwer (Thakooranee)* (1868), 3 Agra H. C. 103A.

⁷ See *Subbarayar v. Subbammal* (1898), 21 Mad. 497; *Lakshmi Bai v. Ramchandra* (1896), 22 Bom. 590. As to the delegation of the giving and receiving, see *ante*, pp. 132, 136.

⁸ In *Luchmun Lall v. Mohun Lall Bhaya Gayal* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 179, the Court held that the performance of the *putresti jag* (sacrifice for male issue) is essential to the validity of an adoption among the three superior castes. G. C. Sarkar ("Law of Adoption," p. 383) suggests that the words "*putresti jag*" were in the judgment in that case by mistake substituted for "*datta homam*," as the *putresti jag* is only necessary when the ceremony of tonsure has been performed in the natural family ("Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 4, paras. 32, 49).

Requirements
of valid
adoption.

Provided the above rules as to the capacity to take in adoption, the capacity to give in adoption, the capacity to be taken in adoption, and as to the act of adoption, are followed, an adoption is valid ; otherwise it is void.¹

Subsequent
event.

The invalidity of an adoption, or of a power to adopt, cannot be cured by a subsequent event.²

Illustrations.

(a) An adoption made during the lifetime of a son is not rendered valid by the death of such son.³

(b) A power to adopt a son as co-heir to a living son cannot be exercised even after the death of the living son.⁴

(c) The death of the son's widow, in whom the property has vested, does not validate an adoption made before her death.⁵

Consent does
not validate
adoption.

Except in so far as the law in certain cases requires the consent of kinsmen for the purpose of validating an adoption,⁶ the consent of the person in whom the estate of the adoptive father is vested, or of the person or persons entitled in reversion, does not validate an adoption which is otherwise invalid.⁷

It has been held in Bombay that where the adoption takes place with the full consent of the person in whom the estate is vested by inheritance, even when such person has only a limited estate such as that of a mother, the adoption is rendered valid, and the estate vested in the adopted son by

¹ See *Ganga Sahai v. Lekhraj Singh* (1886), 9 All. 253, at pp. 296, 297. As to the application of the doctrine *factum valet quod fieri not debuit*, see *ibid.*; *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalaksmamma (Sri Balusu)*; *Radha Mohun v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at p. 144; 22 Mad 398, at p. 423; 21 All. 460, at p. 487; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 448; 1 Bom. L. R. 226; *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at p. 53; 3 Cal. 587, at p. 601; *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 362, at p. 398; *Gopal Narhar Safray v. Hanmant Ganesik Safray* (1879), 3 Bom. 273, at p. 293; *Dharma Dagu v. Ram Krishna Chinnaji* (1885), 10 Bom. 80, at p. 86.

² See *Kovidi Sattiraju v. Pattamsetti*

Venkataswami (1916), 32 Mad. L. J. 119. As to the postponement of the religious ceremonies, see *ante*, p. 155.

³ *Basoo Camumah v. Basoo Chinna Vencatasa*, Mad. S. D. A. 1856, p. 20; *Veraprashyia v. Santauraja*, Mad. S. D. A., 1860, p. 168.

⁴ *Joy Chundro Raee v. Bhyrub Chundro Raee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1849, 461.

⁵ *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Cal. 302.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 120-126.

⁷ *Annammah v. Mabbu Bali Reddy* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 108, at p. 112; *Mohendrololl Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee* (1864), Coryton, 42, at p. 43; *Adivi Surya Prakasa Rao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju* (1909), 33 Mad. 228. See *Anandibai v. Kashibai* (1904), 28 Bom. 461, at p. 465; 6 Bom. L. R. 464.

such consent; ¹ but there is authority to the contrary to be found in decisions of the same Court. ²

It is submitted, that although the consent may have the effect of estopping the person consenting from denying the adoption, ³ and thereby divesting the estate, it cannot otherwise affect the validity of the adoption as for example it cannot affect the inheritance by or to collaterals.

As to the consent of a son to an adoption by his father, see *ante*, pp. 105, 106.

As to consent to the divesting of estates on adoption, see *post*, p. 197.

As to estoppel and acquiescence, see *post*, pp. 172, 173.

An adoption once validly made cannot be cancelled by the natural or adoptive parents, ⁴ or renounced by the adopted son. ⁵

Cancellation or Renunciation.

There is nothing to prevent an adopted son renouncing any interest in property which would come to him as such. ⁶

KRITRIMA FORM OF ADOPTION.

In the district of Mithila, or Tirhoot, ⁷ where it is the prevailing form, ⁸ and in the adjoining districts, ⁹ a form of adoption called the *Kritrima* ¹⁰ is practised, and is recognized by the law.

Adoption in *Kritrima* form.

¹ *Payapa Akkapa Patel v. Appanna* (1898), 23 Bom. 327, at pp. 331, 332; *Siddappa v. Ningangavda* (1914), 38 Bom. 724; 16 Bom. L. R. 663; *Babu Amaji v. Ratnoji Krishnarav* (1895), 21 Bom 319; *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250; *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rukhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 114, at p. 122. From any point of view the consent of a minor is not sufficient to validate an adoption; *Vasudeo Vishnu Manohar v. Ramchandra Vinayak Modak* (1896), 22 Bom. 551.

² See *Dharnidhar (Shri) v. Chinto* (1895), 20 Bom. 250, at p. 258; *Vasudeo Vishnu Manohar v. Ramchandra Vinayak Modak* (1896), 22 Bom. 551, at p. 555; *Bharmawa v. Sangappa* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 628; *Anandibai v. Kashibai* (1904), 28 Bom. 461, at p. 465; 6 Bom. L. R. 464.

³ *Post*, p. 172.

⁴ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 111; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 108; *Sukhbasi Lal v. Guman Singh* (1879), 2 All. 366; *Huebut Rao Mankur v. Govind Rao Bulwant Rao Mankur* (1823), 2 Borr. 75.

⁵ *Mahadu Ganu v. Bayaji Sidu* (1893), 19 Bom. 239; *Ruvvee Bhudr v. Roopshunker Shunkerjee* (1823), 2 Borr. 656, at pp. 665, 671.

⁶ *Post*, p. 188.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 14.

⁸ *Kullean Sing v. Karpa Sing* (1795), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 4 (new edition, 11); *Sutputtee (Mussumant) v. Indranand Jha* (1816), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 173, note to p. 175 (new edition, 221, note to p. 224); Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 276; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 204. There is nothing to prevent a *dattaka* adoption in the Mithila district by a man; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 447; but a widow cannot adopt in that form according to the Mithila school.

⁹ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 448. In a note to *Srinath Serma v. Radhakaunt* (1796), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 15, at p. 16 (new edition, 19, at p. 21), it is said that this form of adoption "is in use in North Behar, and the contiguous districts of Baglipore (Bhaughulpore) and Purnea."

¹⁰ Factitious *Kritrima putra* means the son made, Wilson's "Glossary," p. 297.

This form of adoption is not to be confounded with the adoption of a *Kritrima* son according to the *Smritis* and commentaries. The latter held the same position as a *Dattaka* son, and the ceremonies and conditions were apparently identical in both cases. The *Kritrima* form of adoption which in ancient times prevailed throughout India has long been obsolete.

The modern form of *Kritrima* adoption is based upon recent authorities, and is said to owe its origin to the prohibition¹ of adoption by a widow in the Mithila country.²

Who can
adopt.

Either a man or a woman can adopt in this form, provided he or she has no son,³ grandson, or great grandson in existence.

A wife or widow so adopting does not require the assent of her husband or of his kinsmen.⁴ She cannot adopt a son to her husband in this form, even if she receives his permission.⁵

A husband and wife can adopt jointly, or they may each adopt a separate son under this form.⁶

Who may be
adopted.

Except that he must belong to the same class⁷ as the person adopting him, there is no restriction as to the person to be adopted.⁸

Relationship.

The relationship of the adopter and the adopted does not, it is submitted, affect the validity of the adoption.

In *Purmessur Dutt Jha (Chowdree) v. Hunooman Dutt Roy*,⁹ the adoption of a sister's son by a Brahmin in the *Kritrima* form was upheld, but in an earlier case,¹⁰ the adoption of an elder brother by a younger brother was held invalid.

In *Nunkoo Singh v. Purn Dhun Singh*,¹¹ an adoption of a sister's son in the *Kritrima* form was upheld, but on the ground that the parties did not belong to one of the regenerate classes.

According to the *Dvaita-Parishishta* of Kesaba Misra, a pundit of Mithila, even a father or a brother may be adopted.¹²

¹ *Ante*, p. 126.

² W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 95-100.

³ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 449.

⁴ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 195, 196. *Shibkoeree (Mussamut) v. Joogun Singh* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 155, at p. 157; *Collector of Turhoot v. Huopershad Mohunt* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 500.

⁵ See answers of pundits in *Sreenarain Rai v. Bhya Jha* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 23, at p. 27 (new edition, 29, at pp. 34, 35).

⁶ See *Sreenarain Rai v. Bhya Jha* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 23, at p. 27 (new edition, 29, at p. 34); 1 W. Macn. 101.

⁷ See *ante*, pp. 22, 23, 138.

⁸ *Purmessur Dutt Jha (Chowdree) v. Hunooman Dutt Roy* (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 192 (new edition, 235, at p. 246); 1 Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," pp. 75, 76.

⁹ (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 192 (new edition, p. 235).

¹⁰ *Runjeet Sing (Baboo) v. Obhye Narain Sing (Baboo)* (1817), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 245 (new edition, 315). Sir Wm. Macnaghten points out ("Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 76, n.) that the authorities cited by the law officers in that case had relation to the *Dattaka* form of adoption.

¹¹ (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 356.

¹² *Ooman Dutt v. Kunhia Singh* (1822), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 145, at p. 149 (new edition, 192, at p. 199).

Sir William Macnaghten considers that there is no restriction except as to tribe,¹ but Sastri G. C. Sarkar² contends that the rule as to relationship applicable to an adoption in the *Dattaka* form³ are equally applicable to an adoption in the *Kritrima* form.

The age of the son adopted in this form is immaterial.⁴ Age.

The performance of the initiatory ceremonies in the natural family,⁵ or the marriage,⁶ does not prevent the adoption.

The consent of the adopted son,⁷ and the consent (or at Consent.
any rate the absence of the express dissent) of his parents, if living, is necessary to this form of adoption, when he is a minor.⁸

The relationship being one created by contract, the consent of all the necessary parties must synchronise. An assent given by the son after the death of the adoptive father to an adoption to which the adoptive father assented before his death will not be sufficient.⁹

No ceremonies are necessary,¹⁰ and no particular form is Ceremonies.
required to be observed.

Colebrooke¹¹ cites from "Rudradhara in the *Suddhiviveka*," the following:—

"The form to be observed is this. At an auspicious time, the adopter of a son having bathed, addressing the person to be adopted, who has also bathed, and to whom he has given some acceptable chattel, says, 'Be my son.' He replies, 'I am become thy son.' The giving of some chattel arises merely from custom. It is not necessary to the adoption. The consent of both parties is the only requisite; and a set form of speech is not essential."¹²

¹ *I.e.* caste or class, "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 75, 76.

² "Law of Adoption," p. 339, "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 5, paras. 47-56.

³ *Ante*, pp. 138-144.

⁴ *Shibkoeree (Mussumat) v. Joogun Singh* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 155, at p. 158; *Ooman Dutt v. Kunkia Singh* (1822), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 145 (new edition, 192, at p. 197).

⁵ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 196. "Initiation into the family of the adopter is not practised" in this form of adoption, Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 204.

⁶ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 76.

⁷ *Luchmun Lall v. Mohun Lall Bhaya Gayal* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 179, at p. 180; *Durgopal Singh v.*

Roopun Singh (1839), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 271 (new edition, p. 340); Sutherland's "Synopsis," 673; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 196.

⁸ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," ii. 196.

⁹ *Sutputtee (Mussumat) v. Indranund Jha* (1816), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 137 (new edition, 221).

¹⁰ *Shibkoeree (Mussumat) v. Joogun Singh* (1867), 8 W. R. 155, at p. 158.

¹¹ "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 17, note.

¹² Referred to in *Durgopal Singh v. Roopun Singh* (1839), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 271, at p. 273 (new edition, 340, at p. 342). See *Kullean Sing v. Kirpa Sing* (1795), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 9 (new edition, 11, at p. 12). W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 98.

A *Kritrima* adoption, when once validly made, cannot be revoked.¹

SOME OTHER SPECIAL AND LOCAL FORMS OF ADOPTION.

Gyawals

In the district of Gya there is amongst the Gyawal Brahmins a practice of adoption in a form which is similar to the *Kritrima* form. It is purely contractual, and does not affect the position of the adopted son in his natural family.²

Illatom
adoption.

Among the Reddi caste³ it is customary for a man who has no son⁴ to affiliate a son-in-law by what is called an *Illatom*,⁵ adoption.

This custom prevails in the Bellary, Kurnool, Cuddapah, Nellore, and North and South Arcot districts,⁶ but not among the Kondarazu caste of the Vizagapatam district.⁷ There is no mention of this form of adoption in the Digests, and there are few decided cases on the subject.⁸ It is necessary to determine each case according to the evidence as to the custom, and its effects, which may be brought forward.⁹

It is uncertain whether a man having a son can affiliate a son-in-law in this form of adoption, whether the affiliation is effected by the introduction into the family, or requires for its completion marriage with a daughter, and whether, if the father be dead, the right may be exercised by a surviving paternal grandfather.¹⁰

Effect of
illatom
adoption.

A son-in-law so adopted stands for purposes of inheritance in the place of a son, and in competition with natural born sons,¹¹ or sons adopted in the *Dattaka* form,¹² takes an equal share.

Inheritance.

He does not lose any of his rights of inheritance in his natural family,¹³ nor do the members of his natural family lose their rights of succession to him.¹⁴

¹ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 196.

² See *Luchmun Lal Chowdhry v. Kanhya Lal Mowar* (1894), 22 I. A. 51; 22 Cal. 609; *Luchmun Lal v. Mohun Lal Bhaya Gayal* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 179; *Lachmi Dai Mohuntan (Musst) v. Kissen Lal Pahani Mahaton Gayal* (1906), 11 C. W. N. 147.

³ The principal caste of Telinga cultivators, a caste of Sudras, Wilson's "Glossary," p. 442.

⁴ See *Yachereddy Chinna Bassavapa v. Yachereddy Gowdapa* (1835), 5 W. R. P. C. 114.

⁵ *Illata*, a bride's father having no son, and adopting his son-in-law, Wilson's "Glossary," p. 216.

⁶ *Balarami Reddi (Sivada) v. Pera Reddi (Sivada)* (1883), 6 Mad. 267, at p. 269. See also *Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi* (1881), 4 Mad. 272.

⁷ *Narasimha Razu v. Veerabhadra Razu* (1893), 17 Mad. 287.

⁸ See *Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi* (1881), 4 Mad. 272, at p. 275; *Tayumana Reddi v. Perumal Reddi* (1862), 1 Mad. H. C. 51.

⁹ See *Chinna Obayya v. Sura Reddi* (1897), 21 Mad. 226; *Malla Reddi v. Padmanama* (1893), 17 Mad. 48, at p. 50.

¹⁰ *Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi* (1881), 4 Mad. 272, at pp. 282, 283.

¹¹ *Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi* (1881), 4 Mad. 272, at p. 283. This places him in a better position than a *Dattaka* son, see *post*, pp. 187, 188.

¹² See *Chenchamma v. Subbaya* (1885), 9 Mad. 114, at p. 116.

¹³ *Balarami Reddi (Sivada) v. Pera Reddi (Sivada)* (1883), 6 Mad. 267.

¹⁴ *Ramakristna v. Subbakka* (1889), 12 Mad. 442.

An *illatom* son-in-law can deal with property acquired by him, as such, ^{Disposal.} in the same way as he can deal with any other self-acquired property. His sons have no right therein by virtue of their birth.¹

The property received by the *illatom* son-in-law, as such, passes to his heirs. heirs in the same way as self-acquired property.² The heirs of the adopter have no right in it.

It is uncertain whether a son-in-law so adopted obtains a right to insist upon partition of ancestral property during the father's lifetime.³ He apparently cannot do so, as it has been held that there is no right of survivorship between him and an adopted son living in commensality with him,⁴ and the interest acquired by the *illatom* son-in-law is to be treated as self-acquired property.⁵ Right to partition.
Right of survivorship.

The taking of a son-in-law in *illatom* adoption does not prevent the subsequent adoption of a *Dattaka* son.⁶

In Nair families governed by the *Marumakkathayam* rule of inheritance, ^{Malabar law,} the right (and perhaps duty) to adopt females into the family or *taravad* ^{Marumakkathayam system.} is vested in the *karnavan*, or head of a family, but he cannot, except in the case of custom or where it is essential to the preservation of the *taravad*, adopt without consulting the co-sharers.⁷ It cannot be so essential until the last possible *karnavan* has been reached.

Under the *Aliyasanta* system the last female member of the family cannot adopt a daughter without the consent of her son.⁸

As to the adoption by Nambudri Brahmins following this law, see *Subramanyan v. Paramaswaran* (1887), 11 Mad. 116.

As to the law of adoption in Malabar, see Moore's "Malabar Law and Customs."

In families governed by the *Makkatayam* ⁹ rule of inheritance, there are three systems of adoption.¹⁰ Makkatayam system.

¹ *Challa Papi Reddi v. Challa Koti Reddi* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 25.

² *Chenchamma v. Subbaya* (1885), 9 Mad. 114; *Challa Papi Reddi v. Challa Koti Reddi* (1872), 1 Mad. H. C. 25; *Ramakrishna v. Subbappa* (1889), 12 Mad. 442. See *Malla Reddi v. Padmanama* (1893), 17 Mad. 48, at p. 50.

³ *Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi* (1881), 4 Mad. 272, at p. 283. Like other questions as to the incidents of this form of adoption this question must be determined on evidence of custom, *Chinna Obayya v. Sura Reddi* (1897), 21 Mad. 226.

⁴ *Chenchamma v. Subbaya* (1885), 9 Mad. 114. In *Malla Reddi v. Padmanama* (1893), 17 Mad. 48, the Court on the evidence decided against a claim of survivorship made by a male member of the family against the daughters of the son of an *illatom* son-in-law.

⁵ Above.

⁶ This was done in *Chenchamma v.*

H.L.

Subbaya (1885), 9 Mad. 114, at p. 115.

⁷ *Thiruthipalli Raman Menon v. Vanganattil Palisseri Raman Menon* (1900), 27 I. A. 231; 24 Mad. 73; 4 C. W. N. 810, citing Strange's "Manual," s. 403, which is as follows: "On failure of the sister's progeny, male and female, the head of the family may make adoption. The descent being in the female line, the adoption must be of a female. In view of the probable minority of her offspring at the period when the management may fall in, a male, her brother, may be taken in adoption at the same time with herself, in order to afford provision for the administration of the affairs of the family, and for conduct of the religious rites to be observed therein."

⁸ *Chandu v. Subba* (1889), 13 Mad. 209; *Cotay Hegaday v. Manjoo Kumpty*, Mad. S. D. A. 1859, p. 138.

⁹ Inheritance by the male line, Wilson's "Glossary," p. 587.

¹⁰ "Travancore Census of 1891,"

(a) "In the first, ten hands or five persons take part, viz. the adopting parents,¹ the natural parents, and the boy."

Wigram says that this form is probably almost identical with the ordinary Hindu adoption.² It is called *pattulayyal dattu*.³

(b) Adoption by *Chamatha*, i.e. by burning a piece of sacred grass.⁴

(c) The third form is akin to the *Kritrima* form. It is "commonly adopted by Brahmin widows and Sudras for the purpose of perpetuating the family when it is in danger of becoming extinct. There is no limit as to age or number of persons adopted. The only limit seems to be that the person or persons adopted should be of the same *ramsham* or tribe as the adopter. Among Sudras the adoption should be of one or more females, but it is frequently accompanied by the adoption of a male for the purpose of providing for the future management of the adopter's property. Sometimes a whole family of adults is adopted."⁵

Nambudris.

The practice among Nambudris, that only the eldest marries, necessarily limits the right of adoption to his line.⁶ "But if there is any male relative at all, however distant, then he is not entitled to the right of adopting. The nearest and oldest relative must be made to marry, and thus preserve the family continuity. But if there should be no prospect of his brothers getting issue, and if they should give their consent to the act, then he may have recourse to an adoption, to which the consent of the other relatives is not necessary. If, however, he adopts one of his distant relatives, in that case the consent of all his other relations, however distant, will be necessary."⁷

Among the Nambudri Brahmins,⁸ a widow can adopt or appoint an heir in order to perpetuate her *illam*,⁹ in the absence of *dayadies*,¹⁰ whose relationship is the cause of two or three days' pollution,¹¹ or with their consent.¹² It is usual, but apparently not indispensable in such case, to require the person so adopted or appointed to marry for the purpose of continuing the *illam*.¹³ There is, apparently, no limit of age.¹⁴

There seems also to have been, or to be, a custom that if a Nambudri widow directs a person to marry to raise up issue for her *illam*, the status

p. 686; Wigram's "Malabar Law and Custom," p. 4.

¹ Wigram's "Malabar Law and Custom," p. 4.

² *Ibid.*

³ See *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at p. 174.

⁴ See *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at p. 182. "Travancore Census of 1891," p. 685.

⁵ Wigram's "Malabar Law and Custom," pp. 4, 5.

⁶ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 274.

⁷ "Travancore Census, 1891," p. 685. See Wigram's "Malabar Law and Custom," pp. 13-15. As to the general law of the Nambudris, see *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887),

11 Mad. 157.

⁸ As to Nambudri Brahmins who follow the Marumakkathayam system, see *Subramanyan v. Paramaswaran* (1887), 11 Mad. 116.

⁹ A family.

¹⁰ Kinsmen.

¹¹ *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at p. 188. There is no substantial distinction between the power to make a *Kritrima* adoption (*ante*, pp. 157-160) and the power to appoint an heir, *ibid.*, at p. 174. See also p. 189.

¹² *Keshavan v. Vasudevan* (1884), 7 Mad. 297.

¹³ See *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at p. 189.

¹⁴ *Keshavan v. Vasudevan* (1884), 7 Mad. 297, at p. 290.

of the son in the *illam* for which he is begotten, is that of a son obtained in gift by adoption.¹

It is unsettled whether the Courts will recognize the common practice of dancing-girls and prostitutes to adopt daughters, but except where the child has been taken in such a way as to make her reception punishable by the Criminal law, it is submitted that there is no reason why the Courts should not give effect to such usage.²

In cases of adoption, prior to the coming into force of the Indian Penal Code,³ the Courts in Madras recognized the custom,⁴ but declined to extend it by allowing a plurality of adoptions.⁵ It was also held that no ceremonies were necessary, and that mere recognition was sufficient.⁶ Apparently the adoptive mother cannot adopt if she has a daughter. It is immaterial whether she has a son.⁷

In an old case in Bengal⁸ the Court declined to recognize such adoptions, and in a Bombay case,⁹ the report of which does not show when the adoption took place, but where apparently it had taken place before the coming into force of the Indian Penal Code, the Court, in declining to recognize the adoption, gave reasons which are as applicable to cases before that Act came into force as thereafter.

In a later Bombay case, effect was given to an adoption effected by a dying prostitute for the purpose of providing for the performance of her funeral ceremonies, and the inheritance of her property.¹⁰

In cases where a minor under the age of sixteen years has been sold or otherwise disposed of, or received with intent that she shall be employed or used for the purpose of prostitution (and this generally happens in the cases of so-called adoptions by dancing-girls or prostitutes),¹¹ the disposal or reception of the girl is punishable by the Penal Code,¹² and therefore, as being prohibited by law, no effect can be given to it by the Court.¹³

¹ *Tottakara Alluttar Manakal Narain Nambudripad v. Puvally Manikal Trivikrama Nambudripad*, Mad. S. D. A. 1855, p. 125, referred to in *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at pp. 175, 176.

² See *Manjamma v. Sheshgiri Rao* (1902), 26 Bom. 491, at p. 495; 4 Bom. L. R. 116. See *ante*, p. 31.

³ Act XLV. of 1860, which came into force on the 1st of May, 1861.

⁴ See *Venkatachellum v. Venkataswamy*, Mad. dec. of 1856, p. 65; *Venku v. Mahalinga* (1888), 11 Mad. 393; *Muttukannu v. Paramasami* (1888), 12 Mad. 214; *Chalakonda Alasani v. Chalakonda Ratnachalam* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 56; Steele, 185, 186; Strange's "Manual," paras. 93, 99.

⁵ *Venku v. Mahalinga* (1888), 11 Mad. 393; *Muttukannu v. Paramasami* (1888), 12 Mad. 214.

⁶ *Venkatachellum v. Venkataswamy*,

Mad. dec. of 1856, p. 65.

⁷ Strange's "Manual," para. 99.

⁸ *Hencower Bye (Doe dem) v. Hencower Bye* (1818), 2 Morl. Dig. 133.

⁹ *Mathura Naikin v. Esu Naikin* (1880), 4 Bom. 545, followed in *Hwa Naikin v. Radha Naikin* (1912), 37 Bom. 116; 14 Bom. L. R. 1129. See *Ghasiti v. Nanhi Jan* (1893), 20 I. A. 193, at pp. 201, 202; 21 Cal. 149, at p. 156.

¹⁰ *Manjamma v. Sheshgiri Rao* (1902), 26 Bom. 491, at p. 495; 4 Bom. L. R. 116.

¹¹ See *Mathura Naikin v. Esu Naikin* (1880), 4 Bom. 545, at p. 570.

¹² Act XLV. of 1860, ss. 372, 373. See *Queen-Empress v. Ramanappa* (1889), 12 Mad. 273.

¹³ *Sanjivi v. Jalajakshi* (1899), 21 Mad. 229; *Kamalakshi v. Ramasami Chelti* (1895), 19 Mad. 127; see *Manjamma v. Sheshgiri Rao* (1902), 26 Bom. 491; 4 Bom. L. R. 116.

In *Venku v. Mahalinga*,¹ Muttusami Ayyar, J., said, "We may set aside or decline to enforce a contract or disposition which has for its immediate object the prostitution of a minor during her minority so as to leave her no choice of married life when she is over sixteen years. The policy of the Penal Code, as it seems to me, is not to obliterate altogether the line of distinction between the province of ethics and that of law, but to protect the chastity of minors and to assure to them the freedom of choosing married life when they attain their age, whether they are the natural or adopted daughters of dancing women, and to leave otherwise the incidents of their legal *status* as daughters untouched, whether the parties concerned are dancing women or ordinary Hindus."

Effect was given to an adoption by a prostitute dancing-girl in *Narasanna v. Gangu*.²

DISPUTES AS TO ADOPTION.

Suits in which question of adoption arises.

A question as to the factum or validity of an adoption would arise in a suit or other proceeding in which the alleged adopted son is asserting his title as such, or in a suit brought against him for the purpose of disputing his title as an adopted son, or in a suit to recover property held by him by virtue of such alleged title, or in a suit for the purpose of preventing him from acting as adopted son.³

Who is entitled to dispute adoption.

An alleged adoption may be disputed by any person whose interests are prejudicially affected by it.⁴

Adoption by widow.

A suit to declare the invalidity of an adoption by a widow can only, as a general rule, be brought by the presumptive reversionary heir.⁵ Such a suit may be brought by a more distant reversioner, if those nearer in succession are in collusion with the widow or have precluded themselves from interfering,⁶

¹ (1888), 11 Mad. 393, at p. 402, differed from in *Hira Naikin v. Radha Naikin* (1912), 37 Bom. 116, at p. 120; 14 Bom. L. R. 1129, at p. 1133.

² (1889), 13 Mad. 133.

³ In *Kalova v. Padapa Valad Bhujangrav* (1876), 1 Bom. 248, it was held that a suit would lie to obtain an injunction restraining a person from performing the *Shraddh* or other ceremonies as an adopted son, or assuming the status of such adopted son.

⁴ See Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42, *post*, p. 165; *Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal* (1913), 40 I. A. 213, at p. 221; 40 Calc. 966, at p. 980; 17 C. W. N. 1189,

at p. 1194; 15 Bom. L. R. 867, at p. 875.

⁵ *Thaloorain Sahiba v. Mohun Lall* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 386; 7 W. R. P. C. 25. See Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42, *illus.*, *post*, p. 166, and cases, *post*, note 6.

⁶ *Anund Koer (Rani) v. Court of Wards* (1880), 8 I. A. 14, at pp. 22, 23; 8 Calc. 764, at pp. 772, 773; 8 C. L. R. 381, at pp. 385, 386; *Ramabai v. Rangrav* (1894), 19 Bom. 614; *Bhikaji Apaji v. Jagannath Vitthal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 351; *Brojo Kishoree Dassee v. Sreenath Bose* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 463; *Tarni Charan Chowdhry v. Saroda Sundari Dasi* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 145, at p. 157; 11 W. R. C. R. 468, at p. 470.

or refuse, without sufficient cause, to take steps,¹ or where the next reversioner has only a limited estate,² but not otherwise.³

The nearer reversioner would apparently be a necessary party defendant to a suit brought by a more distant reversioner.⁴

In case of an adoption by the husband the widow or other heir may sue, at any rate after the death of the adoptive father. Adoption by adoptive father.
If the parties are governed by the Mitakshara law the coparceners may apparently sue at any time.

In case of the widow, or other limited heir,⁵ colluding, or being precluded from interfering, the presumptive reversionary heir may sue, and possibly in case such presumptive reversionary heir is also colluding, a more distant reversioner may sue.

Except in a case where he is estopped from so doing,⁶ a suit seeking to declare an alleged adoption to be invalid may be brought by the person making the adoption. Sue by adopter.⁷

A declaratory decree will not be made as of right. Sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act⁸ is as follows :—
Declaratory decree.

“ Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character of right, and the Court may, in its discretion, make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not, in such suit, ask for any further relief. Discretion of Court as to declarations of status or right.”

“ Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.” Bar to such declaration.

¹ *Gurulingaswami v. Ramalakshamma* (1894), 18 Mad 53.

² Cf. *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Cal. 62; 9 C. W. N. 25.

³ See *Anyaba v. Daji* (1895), 20 Bom. 202; *Gyanendro Nath Roy v. Lobongmunjori Dabi* (1882), 11 C. L. R. 198.

⁴ See *Anund Koer (Rani) v. Court of Wards* (1880), 8 I. A. 14, at p. 23; 6 Cal. 764, at p. 772; 8 C. L. R. 381, at pp. 385, 386; *Gurulingaswami v. Ramalakshamma* (1894), 18 Mad. 53, at p. 58; *Ramabai v. Rangrav* (1894), 19 Bom. 614.

⁵ Such as a daughter.

⁶ *Post*, p. 172.

⁷ As, for instance, where the adopter has been induced to adopt by misrepresentation or coercion (*ante*, p. 152).

⁸ I. of 1877. The right to bring a suit to declare an adoption to be invalid independently of a claim to property has been incidentally recognized by the Legislature, see Court Fees Act (VII. of 1870, s. 2, art. 17, cl. 5) and Limitation Acts (IX. of 1871, Sched. II., art. 129; XV. of 1877, Sched. II., art. 118; IX. of 1908, Sched. I., art. 118).

Explanation.—A trustee of property is a person interested to deny a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.

Illustration.

A Hindu widow in possession of property adopts a son to her deceased husband. The person presumptively entitled to possession of the property on her death without a son may, in a suit against the adopted son, obtain a declaration that the adoption was invalid.¹

Suit to determine right to take in adoption.

It is unsettled whether, in exercise of the discretion given to it by the Specific Relief Act,² the Court can determine a right to take in adoption before the adoption has taken place.

The High Court of Bengal has held in an unreported case that a suit will lie for a declaration that a permission set up by a widow is false.³ The same Court decided in a case under the law before the Specific Relief Act came into force that such suit will not lie,⁴ relying on the decision of the Judicial Committee in *Sree Narain Mitter v. Kishen Soondory Dassee (Sreemutty)*,⁵ but in the last-named case the suit was merely to set aside certain deeds of gift and acceptance in adoption, under which the defendant took no interest. It may in many cases be desirable that the question should be determined in order to save the parties expense, to save the boy from the peril of his adoption being declared invalid, and to save the estate from the expense of maintaining the boy if the adoption be declared invalid.⁶ On the other hand, the boy would not be generally bound by the decree, as unless the adoption of a particular boy were contemplated, he could not be made a party to the suit.

It would be difficult to stretch the terms of s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877) to permit a suit of this kind being successful.

Injunction.

There seems to have been no case in which an injunction has been granted to restrain the performance of an adoption,⁷ but provided the application be made in due time, and there be

¹ For an instance of such declaration before the passing of the Specific Relief Act, see *Kotamarti Sitaramayya v. Kotamarti Vandhanamara* (1874), 7 Mad. H. C. 351.

² S. 42, above.

³ *Rajputty Koeri (Mussummat) v. Nripabati (Mussummat)*, A. O. D. 4 of 1887, referred to in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 434.

⁴ *Ran Bahadoor Singh v. Lucho Coowar (Musst.)* (1879), 4 C. L. R. 270. See also *Rajcoomaree Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Nobocomar Mullick*

(1856), Boul. 137; *Pearee Doyee (Mussumat) v. Hurbunsee Koorer (Mussumat)* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 127; *Subudra Chowdrayn (Mussumat) v. Goluknath Chowdhry* (1843), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 143 (new edition, 166).

⁵ (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 149; 11 B. L. R. 171. S. C. *sub nomine*, *Nogendro Chundro Mitro v. Kishen Soondery Dossee (Sreemutty)*, 19 W. R. C. R. 133.

⁶ See *post*, pp. 202–204.

⁷ See *Assur Purshotam v. Ratanbai* (1888), 13 Bom. 56.

no objection on the merits, there seems no reason why a Court should not be justified in issuing such injunction.¹

There is authority that an *interim* injunction will not be granted to restrain the carrying out of an adoption.²

The Courts will not decree specific performance of an agree-
ment to give or take in adoption,³ but the breach of such Specific per-
formance of
agreement. agreement would apparently give a right to damages.⁴

A decision as to the *factum* or validity of an adoption will *Res judicata.* only bind the persons who are parties to such decision and those claiming under them.⁵

Thus a decision in a probate proceeding, upholding a will which prohibited adoption was held to prevent a suit to uphold an adoption, the parties being the same,⁶ but where the parties are different, the decision in the probate proceeding does not operate as *res judicata*, although the question of adoption may have been incidentally decided in such proceeding.⁷

It is unsettled whether a decision as to the fact, or the validity of an adoption in a suit between the alleged adopted son and a person who is, during the lifetime of the widow, the then immediate reversioner, will bind another person who may succeed to the reversion.⁸ The Madras High Court has held that he is bound,⁹ but this is not in accordance with the views of the other High Courts. See *Venkatarayana Pillay v Subbammal* (1915), 42 I. A. 125; 38 Mad. 406; 19 C. W. N. 461; 17 Bom. L. R. 468.

When the question is decided, after the death of the widow, in a suit between the adopted son and the person who would in the absence of the adopter be entitled to the reversion after her death, such decision would bind all persons subsequently interested in the estate as that person represents the reversion.

¹ See Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 54.

² See *Assur Purshotam v. Ratanbai* (1888), 13 Bom. 56; *Atrani (Bar) v. Deep Sing Baria Thakor* (1915), 40 Bom. 86; 17 Bom. L. R. 1097.

³ Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 21b.

⁴ See *Sree Narain Mitter v. Kishen Soodoree Dossee* (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 149, at p. 160; 11 B. L. R. 171, at p. 188.

⁵ See Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), s. 11.

⁶ *Brendon v. Sundarabai* (1913), 38 Bom. 272; 16 Bom. L. R. 161.

⁷ *Dulhin Genda v. Harnandan Prashad Singh* (1916), P. C. 20 C. W. N. 617.

⁸ See *Bhagwanta v. Sukhi* (1899), 22 All. 33; *Chhidru Singh v. Durga Dei* (1900), 22 All. 382. This ques-

tion was left undecided in *Brojo-kshoree Dassee v. Sreenath Bose* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 463, and in *Jumona Dassya Chowdhrami v. Bamasoondar Dassya Chowdhrami* (1876), 3 I. A. 72, at p. 84; 1 Cal. 289, at p. 296; 25 W. R. C. R. 235, at p. 239. The fact that a previous suit by a reversioner has been unsuccessful may be a reason for refusing a mere declaratory decree (see *ante*, pp. 165, 166) at the suit of another reversioner. The idea that a decision in a question of adoption had the effect of a judgment *in rem* was disposed of in *Kanhya Lall v. Radha Churn* (1867), B. L. R. F. B. R. 662; 7 W. R. C. R. 338. The matter is now dealt with by the Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 43.

⁹ *Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perrazu* (1906), 29 Mad. 390.

A decision in a litigation which has been *bonâ fide* instituted and conducted between the alleged adopted son and the widow in whom the property was vested would, in the case where the adoption was alleged to be made by the widow's husband, bind the reversioners. Probably it would also have the same effect where the adoption is said to have been made by the widow,¹ but she denies it.

A decision against one person claiming to be an adopted son would not bind another person claiming under another act of adoption.²

Under the Specific Relief Act,³ a declaration is only binding on the parties to the suit, persons claiming through them respectively, and where any of the parties are trustees, on the persons for whom, if in existence at the date of the declaration, such parties would be trustees. As these expressions do not include the case of a subsequent reversioner, it seems clear that a declaration, or the refusal to grant one, in a suit by one reversioner does not bind another reversioner.

On the death of a presumptive reversioner during the pendency of a suit or appeal by him to declare an adoption invalid, the right of suit or appeal devolves upon a surviving reversioner.⁴

Limitation of
suit to declare
adoption
invalid.

A suit "to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place," must be brought within "six years" from the time "when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff."⁵

This provision is confined to declaratory suits, and does not, it is submitted, alter the limitation for suits for possession of property.⁶

There is a conflict of authority as to whether the effect of this provision is to bar suits for possession of property against a person holding under an alleged adoption which are brought more than six years after the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff, or whether it is confined

¹ See *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1864), 9 M. I. A. 543, at p. 608; 2 W. R. P. C. 31, at p. 37. This was the view of the majority of the Court in *Risal Singh v. Balwant Singh* (1915), 37 All. 496.

² See *Anundmoyee Chowdhooarayan (Mussumath) v. Sheeb Chunder Roy* (1862), 9 M. I. A. 291, at p. 306; 2 W. R. P. C. 19, at p. 21; Marsh, 455, at p. 460.

³ I. of 1877, s. 43.

⁴ *Venkatanarayana Pillay v. Subbammal* (1915), 42 I. A. 125; 38 Mad. 406; 19 C. W. N. 641; 17 Bom. L. R. 468.

⁵ Act IX. of 1908, Sched. I., art. 118. "Plaintiff" includes also any person from or through whom a

plaintiff derives his right to sue," s. 3. *Ayyadōri Pillai v. Solar Ammal* (1901), 24 Mad. 405.

⁶ *Tirbhuvan Bahadur Singh (Thakur) v. Rameshar Baksh Singh (Raja)* (1906), 33 I. A. 156; 28 All. 727; 10 C. W. N. 1065; 8 Bom. L. R. 722; *Muhammad Umar Khan v. Muhammad Niaz-ud-din Khan* (1911), 39 I. A. 19; 16 C. W. N. 458; 14 Bom. L. R. 182; *Velaga Mangamma v. Bandlamudi Veerayya* (1907), 30 Mad. 308. See *Chunni Lal v. Setaram* (1911), 34 All. 8. Limitation would run from the death of the widow who purports to adopt, see *Bhagwat Pershad v. Murari Lal* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 524, post, p. 509.

to cases where a declaration only can be obtained, and there is no present right to substantive relief.¹

The Madras² and Bombay³ High Courts held that it has the former effect, but in Calcutta⁴ and Allahabad⁵ a contrary view has been expressed.

The Madras decision was based upon two judgments of the Judicial Committee⁶ with reference to the construction of Act 129 of the 2nd Schedule of an earlier Limitation Act (IX. of 1871). That article provided a limitation for suits to "set aside an adoption," and was held to be equally applicable to suits seeking a mere declaration that the adoption was invalid, and to suits which sought the possession of property held under colour of an alleged adoption. Although the phraseology of that article differs from that of the article now in force, which in terms contemplates only a declaratory suit,⁷ there are observations of the Judicial Committee which were held to be equally applicable to the present law.⁸ This rule of limitation had no application to a case where the proceeding or document is on its face no obstacle to the title of the heir, as, for instance, where a woman adopts to herself and not to her husband.⁹

The Madras High Court¹⁰ now takes a different view having regard to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of *Tirbhuvan Bahadur*

¹ As where the widow is alive, and the reversioner seeks to have it declared that the adoption made by her is not valid. See Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42, *ante*, pp. 165, 166. This question was raised, but not determined, in *Luchmun Lal Chowdhry v. Kanhya Lal Mowar* (1894), 22 I. A. 51; 22 Calc. 609.

² *Parvathi Ammal v. Saminatha Gurukul* (1896), 20 Mad. 40. Cf. *Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal* (1902), 26 Mad. 291.

³ *Shrinivas Sarjerav v. Balwant Venkatesh* (1913), 37 Bom. 513; 15 Bom. L. R. 533; *Shrinivas Murar v. Hanmant Chavdo Deshapande* (1899), 24 Bom. 260, overruling *Harilal Pranlal v. Bai Rewa* (1895), 21 Bom. 376; *Fannyamma v. Manjaya Hebbur* (1895), 21 Bom. 159, and *Padajirav v. Ramrav* (1888), 13 Bom. 160, which last case was decided under Art. 119 of the Schedule (*post*, p. 170); *Ramchandra Vinayak Kulkarni v. Narayan Babaji* (1903), 27 Bom. 614; *Barot Naran v. Barot Jesang* (1900), 25 Bom. 26.

⁴ *Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh* (1899), 27 Calc. 242, at pp. 253-255; 4 C. W. N. 405, at pp. 411-413; *Parbhu Lal (Lala) v. Mylne* (1887), 14 Calc. 401; *Baikanta*

Chandra Roy Chowdhury v. Kali Charan Roy Chowdhury (1904), 9 C. W. N. 222. Cf. *Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh* (1897), 25 Calc. 354.

⁵ *Lali v. Murlidhar* (1901), 24 All. 195; *Nathu Singh v. Gulab Singh* (1895), 17 All. 167; *Basdeo v. Gopal* (1886), 8 All. 644; *Ganga Sahai v. Lekhraj Singh* (1886), 9 All. 253, at pp. 267-269. *Contrà Inda v. Jhangira*, All. Weekly Notes, 1890, p. 241.

⁶ *Jagadamba Chowdhram v. Dakhina Mohun* (1886), 13 I. A. 84; 13 Calc. 308; *Mohesh Narain Moonshee v. Taruck Nath Moitra* (1892), 20 I. A. 30; 20 Calc. 487.

⁷ Cf. Art. 119, which also speaks of a suit for a declaration, but apparently contemplates substantive relief on the ground of the plaintiff's rights being interfered with.

⁸ *Jagadamba Chowdhram v. Dakhina Mohun* (1886), 13 I. A. 84, at p. 95; 13 Calc. 308, at pp. 320, 321.

⁹ *Raj Bahadur Singh v. Achumbi Lal* (1879), 6 I. A. 110; 6 C. L. R. 12; *Luchmun Lal Chowdhry v. Kanhya Lal Mowar* (1894), 22 I. A. 15; 22 Calc. 609.

¹⁰ *Velaga Mangamma v. Bandlamudi Veerayya* (1907), 30 Mad. 108.

Singh (Thakur) v. Rameshar Baksh Singh (Raja),¹ but the Bombay High Court maintains its original view.²

If the right of the nearest reversioner for the time being to contest an adoption by the widow is allowed to become barred by limitation as against him, this will not bar the similar rights of the subsequent reversioners.³

Adverse
possession.

The right to bring such suit would be barred where the person claiming under an alleged adoption has held the property for more than twelve years adversely to the widow of his adoptive father⁴ or to the plaintiff.

Limitation of
suit to declare
adoption
valid.

A suit "to obtain a declaration that an adoption is valid" must be brought within "six years" from the time "when the rights of the adopted son, as such,⁵ are interfered with."⁶

It has been held by the High Courts of Bengal⁷ and the North-West Provinces⁸ that this article does not prevent a suit for possession by a person claiming as an adopted son, even though it be brought more than six years after his rights have been interfered with. This view is, it is submitted, correct.⁹ A different view has been accepted in Bombay.¹⁰ In Madras the High Court has differed on this question.¹¹ The section clearly does not bar a suit in which the plaintiff claims to succeed independently of the alleged adoption.¹²

Adverse
possession.

Where time has begun to run before the adoption as in the case of the widow being dispossessed, the adopted son may be barred by adverse possession,¹³ but in a suit claiming property alienated by the widow before the adoption, time does not begin to run before the adoption.¹⁴

Election.

Where a person, entitled to dispute an adoption, is benefited in the same character by a will, or other disposition of

¹ (1906), 33 I. A. 156; 28 All 727; 10 C. W. N. 1065; 8 Bom. L. R. 722.

² *Shrinivas Sarjerav v. Balwant Venkatesh* (1913), 37 Bom. 513; 15 Bom. L. R. 583.

³ *Bhagwanta v. Sukhi* (1899), 22 All. 33. Cf. *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Cal. 62; 9 C. W. N. 25. See *ante*, p. 168.

⁴ Act IX. of 1908, Sched. I., art. 144; *Ghandarap Singh v. Lachman Singh* (1888), 10 All. 485.

⁵ See *Gangabai v. Tarabai* (1902), 26 Bom. 720.

⁶ Act IX. of 1908, Sched. I., art. 119.

⁷ *Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh* (1897), 25 Cal. 354.

⁸ *Lali v. Murlidhar* (1901), 24 All. 195; (S. C. on appeal) (1901)

33 I. A. 97; 28 All. 488; 10 C. W. N. 130; 8 Bom. L. R. 402; *Chandania v. Saligram* (1903), 26 All. 40.

⁹ See *ante*, pp. 168, 169.

¹⁰ See *Shrinivas Murar v. Hanmant Chavdo Deshapande* (1899), 24 Bom. 260, differing from *Padaajirav v. Ramrav* (1888), 13 Bom. 160; *Lazmana v. Ramappa* (1907), 32 Bom. 7; 9 Bom. L. R. 1054; *Shrinivas Sarjerav v. Balwant Venkatesh* (1915), 37 Bom. 513; 15 Bom. L. R. 583.

¹¹ *Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal* (1902), 26 Mad. 291.

¹² See *Gangabai v. Tarabai* (1902), 26 Bom. 720.

¹³ *Gobind Chandra Sarma Mazoomdar v. Anand Mohan Sarma Mazoomdar* (1869), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 313.

¹⁴ *Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath* (1894), 19 Bom. 809.

property, which benefits the person adopted, he must elect whether to take under the will, or other disposition, or against it.

"A principle not peculiar to English law, but common to all law, which is based on the rules of justice, namely . . . that a party shall not, at the same time, affirm and disaffirm the same transaction—affirm it as far as it is for his benefit, and disaffirm it as far as it is to his prejudice."¹

A person, whose title depends upon an adoption, must, in a contest between him and the person who would succeed in the absence of such adoption, prove the fact of the adoption,² the performance of the ceremonies³ (if any) which may be necessary,⁴ and such facts as are necessary to establish its validity.⁵ If the adoption was by a widow, who could not adopt without permission, he must prove the fact of such permission having been given.⁶

The burden of proving the adoption is on the person alleging

Burden of proof.

¹ *Rungma v. Atchama* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 103; 7 W. R. (P. C.), 57, at p. 62. See Act X. of 1865, ss. 167–177, applied to certain Hindu wills by Act XXI. of 1870, s. 2.

² See Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), ss. 101–103; *Sootroogun Sutputty v. Sabitra Dye* (1834), 2 Knapp, 287; 5 W. R. P. C. 109; *Chowdry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 350, at pp. 356, 357; 2 B. L. R. (P. C.), 101, at p. 104; 12 W. R. P. C. 1, at pp. 2, 3; *Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal* (1908), 36 I. A. 9; 31 All. 116; 13 C. W. N. 370; 11 Bom. L. R. 196; *Lal Kunwar (Musammat) v. Chiranjil Lal* (1909), 37 I. A. 1; 14 C. W. N. 285; 12 Bom. L. R. 244; *Ramprotab Misser v. Abhilak Misser* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 170, at p. 174; *Hur Dyal Nag v. Roy Krishto Bhoomick* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 107; *Tarini Charan Chowdhry v. Saroda Sundari Dasi* (1869), 3 B. L. R. (A. C.) 145, at pp. 158, 159; 11 W. R. C. R. 468, at p. 474; *Bissessur Chuckerbutty v. Ram Joy Mojomdar* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 326, at p. 328; *Roopmonjooree Chowdrance v. Ramlall Surcar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 145, at p. 147; *Kenchawa v. Ningupa* (1867), 10 Bom. H. C. 265, note.

³ *Oomrao Singh (Thakoor) v. Mehtab*

Koonwer (Thakoorancee) (1868), 3 Agra, 103A.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 149, 153–155.

⁵ *Oomrao Singh (Thakoor) v. Mehtab Koonwer (Thakoorancee)* (1868), 3 Agra, 103A. In *Rango Balaji v. Mudieyppa* (1898), 23 Bom. 296, at p. 303, it was held that the person setting up an adoption was required to establish the death of the natural son of his adoptive father at the time of the adoption.

⁶ *Chowdry Pudum Singh v. Koer Oodey Singh* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 350, at p. 356; 2 B. L. R. (P. C.) 101, at p. 104; 12 W. R. (P. C.), 1, at pp. 2, 3; *Ilar Shankar Partal Singh v. Lal Raghuraj Singh* (1907), 34 I. A. 125; 29 All. 519; 11 C. W. N. 841; *Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal* (1908), 36 I. A. 9; 31 All. 116; 13 C. W. N. 370; 11 Bom. L. R. 196; *Hur Dyal Nag v. Roy Krishto Bhoomick* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 107; *Tarini Charan Chowdhry v. Saroda Sundari Dasi* (1869), 3 B. L. R. (A. C.) 145, at pp. 158, 159; 11 W. R. C. R. 468, at p. 474; *Kripa Moyee Debia v. Goluck Chunder Roy* (1865), 4 W. R. C. R. 78; *Roopmonjooree Chowdrance v. Ramlall Surcar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 145, at p. 147; *Oomrao Singh (Thakoor) v. Mehtab Koonwer (Thakoorancee)* (1868), 3 Agra, 103A.

it, in the unusual case of the adoption being denied by the person alleged to be adopted.¹

Where the plaintiff claims property as heir, and is unable to establish his relationship, it is unnecessary for the defendant to prove his adoption.²

In certain summary proceedings a *de facto* adoption might be acted upon until set aside in a properly constituted suit.³

Where the fact of the adoption was admitted, and it was alleged that the natural father had lost his right to give in adoption, it was held the burden of proving such loss is upon the persons alleging it.⁴

There is authority that in a suit which merely seeks to declare an alleged adoption to be invalid the burden of proof is upon the person seeking to obtain such declaration,⁵ but there is also authority to the contrary.⁶ It is submitted that the latter view is correct.

Estoppel.

A person, who is otherwise entitled to dispute an adoption, may be estopped from disputing it, although the same adoption may be liable to be disputed by other persons who are not so estopped. Estoppel operates merely as a personal disqualification, and does not otherwise affect the validity of the adoption.⁷

Evidence Act,
s. 115.

The Indian Evidence Act,⁸ s. 115, enacted as follows :—

“Where one person has, by his declaration, act, or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true, and to act upon such belief,⁹ neither he nor his representative¹⁰ shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.”

¹ *Chandra Kunwar (Rani) v. Narpat Singh (Chaudhri)* (1906), 34 I. A. 27; 29 All. 184; 11 C. W. N. 321; *Har Shankar Partab Singh v. Lal Raghuraj Singh* (1907), 34 I. A. 125; 29 All. 519; 11 C. W. N. 841.

² *Kalishore Dutt Gupta Mozumdar v. Bhusan Chunder* (1890), 18 Calc. 201.

³ See *Nunkoo Singh v. Purm Dhun Singh* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 356, which was a case under the Certificate Act (XXVII. of 1860). See *Ramprotab Misser v. Abhilak Misser* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 170, at p. 173.

⁴ *Kusum Kumari Roy v. Satya Ranjan Das* (1903), 30 Calc. 999; 7 C. W. N. 784.

⁵ *Asharfi Kunwar v. Rup Chand*

(1908), 30 All. 197; *Brojo Kishore Dassee v. Sreenath Bose* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 463, at p. 467; *Gooroo Prosunno Singh v. Nil Madhub Singh* (1873), 21 W. R. C. R. 84. See *ante*, pp. 165, 166.

⁶ *Rajagopala Reddy v. Nattu Govinda Reddy* (1910), 34 Mad. 329.

⁷ See *Parvatibayamma v. Ramakrishna Rau* (1894), 18 Mad. 145, at p. 146.

⁸ Act I. of 1872.

⁹ *Yashvant Puttu Shenvi v. Radhabai* (1889), 14 Bom. 312.

¹⁰ This would not include an auction purchaser at a sale of property belonging to the person estopped: *Parbhu Lal (Lala) v. Mylne* (1887), 14 Calc. 401.

For instance, a widow representing to the natural father that she had a power to adopt, and thereby inducing him to give his son in adoption, would be estopped from thereafter denying the power.¹

Allowing the thread ceremony and marriage to be performed in the adoptive family, and otherwise allowing the youth to act as an adopted son, would amount to an estoppel.²

Active participation in the adoption may also operate as an estoppel.³

A person may be so estopped, although he was acting in good faith, Good faith, or without a full knowledge of the circumstances, or was under a mistake or misapprehension.⁴

The person taking in adoption would generally, in the absence of fraud or coercion, be estopped from denying the adoption,⁵ but where there has been no mis-statement,⁶ or conduct equivalent thereto, or where the mis-statement has not been acted upon,⁷ there can be no estoppel.

A person is not estopped from denying an adoption merely because he had previously secured succession to properties by setting up that adoption, when it appears that his claim as adopted son was not opposed by the person as against whom he is said to be estopped.⁸

The acts of a Hindu female, who "is acting without the guidance of a disinterested adviser, cannot prejudice her."⁹

The misrepresentation to operate as an estoppel must apparently be Matters of law. of a matter of fact. An erroneous expression of opinion that an adoption was valid in law could not apparently lead to an estoppel, nor could a person be estopped from asserting the state of the law.¹⁰

¹ *Kannammal v. Virasami* (1892), 15 Mad. 486; *Dharam Kunwar (Rani) v. Balwant Singh* (1912), 39 I. A. 142; 34 All. 398; 16 C. W. N. 675; 14 Bom. L. R. 485.

² *Santappayya v. Rangappayya* (1894), 18 Mad. 397; *Dharam Kunwar (Rani) v. Balwant Singh* (1912), 39 I. A. 142; 34 All. 398; 16 C. W. N. 675; 14 Bom. L. R. 485; S. C. in Court below (1908), 30 All. 549.

³ *Sadashiv Moreswar Ghate v. Hari Moreswar Ghate* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 190; *Vyas Chhmanlal v. Vyas Ramchandra* (1899), 24 Bom. 473, at p. 481; 2 Bom. L. R. 163; *Chintu v. Dhondu*, 11 Bom. H. C. 192, note.

⁴ *Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha* (1892), 19 I. A. 203, at p. 215; 20 Calc. 296, at p. 310, overruling *Ganga Sahai v. Hira Singh* (1880), 2 All. 809, and *Vishnu Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath) v. Krishnan Nambudri (Eranjoli Illath)* (1883), 7 Mad. 3.

⁵ See *Dharam Kunwar (Rani) v. Balwant Singh* (1912), 39 I. A. 142; 34 All. 398; 16 C. W. N. 675; 14 Bom. L. R. 485; *Ravi Vinayakrav Jagannath Shankarsetti v. Lakshmi Bai*

(1887), 11 Bom. 381, at p. 396; *Sukhbasi Lal v. Guman Singh* (1879), 2 All. 366; *Chintu v. Dhondu* (1873), 11 Bom. H. C. p. 192, note; *Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 199

⁶ See *Surendrakeshav Roy v. Door-gasundari Dassee* (1892), 19 I. A. 108, at p. 128; 19 Calc. 513, at p. 532; *Tayammaul v. Sashachalla Nar-ker* (1865), 10 M. L. A. 429, at pp. 433, 434.

⁷ See *Kuverji v. Babai* (1890), 19 Bom. 374; *Parvatibayamma v. Ramakrishna Rau* (1894), 18 Mad. 145, at p. 149.

⁸ *Har Shankar Partab Singh v. Lal Raghuraj Singh* (1907), 34 I. A. 125; 29 All. 519; 11 C. W. N. 841.

⁹ *Tayammaul v. Sashachalla Nar-ker* (1865), 10 M. L. A. 429, at p. 433. See ante, p. 152, note 10.

¹⁰ See *Gopee Lall v. Chundraloe Buhoojee (Mussamat Sree)* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 131, at p. 133; 11 B. L. R. 391, at p. 395; 19 W. R. C. R. 12, at p. 13; *Kuverji v. Babai* (1890), 19 Bom. 374, at pp. 390, 391. See *Rajnarayan Bose v. Universal Life Assurance Company* (1881), 7 Calc. 594.

In *Parvatibayamma v. Ramakrishna Rau*,¹ it was laid down on the authority of *Gopalayyan v. Raghupatiayyan*,² that "the claimant has to show that by a course of conduct long continued on the part of the family which has purported to affiliate him, his situation in his original family has been altered so that it would be impossible to restore him to it." This limitation to the doctrine of estoppel is not, it is submitted, justified by the terms of sec. 115 of the Evidence Act. There seems to have been no estoppel in that case, as the representation, if made, was neither believed nor acted upon.

Acquiescence. Mere acquiescence, even presence at the adoption, does not create an estoppel,³ and cannot alter rights unless the acquiescence extends to the period provided by the law of limitation.⁴

Mode of proof. The fact of the adoption, and of the power (if any), and of the circumstances necessary to establish the validity of the adoption, must be proved in the same way as any other fact. There are no special rules of evidence applicable.

The Court must carefully and strictly examine the evidence as to the completion of the act of adoption, and as to the facts which are necessary to validate it.⁵

Acquiescence by the person entitled to dispute an adoption, or by other members of the family, is some evidence of the fact of the adoption. Its value as such must depend upon the circumstances. Where it has arisen from an imperfect knowledge of the facts it can be of no value.⁶

A statement as to the existence of the power by the person alleged to have given it is evidence in support of it.⁷

As to statements by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, when these statements relate to the existence of relationship by adoption, see the Indian Evidence Act I. of 1872, sec. 32 (5), (6).

¹ (1894), 18 Mad. 145, at p. 148 (see also pp. 151, 152).

² (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 250.

³ *Gurulingaswami v. Ramalakshamma* (1894); 18 Mad. 53, at p. 60; *Papamma v. Appa Rau* (1893), 16 Mad. 384, at p. 391; *Vasihilangam Mudali v. Murugaian* (1912), 37 Mad. 529.¹

⁴ See *Uda Begam v. Imam-ud-din* (1875), 1 All. 82; *Taruck Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Hurro Sunkur Sandyal* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 267; *Rajan v. Basuva Chelli* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 428; *Ram Rau v. Raja Rau* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 114; *Peidamuthulaty v. N. Timma Reddy* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 270.

⁵ *Imriti Konnur v. Roop Narain Singh* (1880), 6 C. L. R. 76, at p.

823; *Kenchawa v. Ningupa* (1867), 10 Bom. H. C. 265, note. See *Roop-monojoree Chowdranee v. Ramlall Sircar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 145; *Sootroogun Sutpathy v. Sabitra Dye* (1835), 2 Knapp, 287; 5 W. R. P. C. 109; *Huradhun Mookurja v. Muthoranath Mookurja* (1849), 4 M. I. A. 414, at p. 425; 7 W. R. P. C. 71; *Dwakar v. Chandanlal* (1916), 44 Calc. 201; 21 C. W. N. 314; 18 Bom. L. R. 992.

⁶ See *Rungama v. Atchama* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 103; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at p. 62. See Act I. of 1872, s. 50.

⁷ Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), ss. 21, 32 (5), *Kiehen Sunkur Dutt v. Moha Mya Dossee*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 210.

A statement amounting to an admission by the person alleged to have been adopted will be evidence against him requiring explanation.¹

An ancient report of a *panchayet* as to the pedigree of a family has been held to establish an adoption which was not then disputed.²

A tradition in a *wajib-ul-arz* has been acted upon by the Judicial Committee.³

"It may be desirable carefully to examine cases of possible fraud, yet . . . instruments which are proved by all the attesting witnesses, and against which there is no evidence on the other side, ought not to be set aside and treated as nothing, on a mere suspicion of perjury and forgery."⁴

After such a lapse of time as makes it impossible, or difficult, to obtain direct evidence of the adoption, or of the performance of the necessary ceremonies, or of the giving of the necessary permission, evidence of recognition by the adoptive parents, or by other members of the family, or of treatment as an adopted son by permitting him to perform the family worship, or to share in the inheritance, or otherwise, may be sufficient to establish an adoption, or, at any rate, to render slight evidence sufficient,⁵ and in any case will, it is submitted, be admissible in support of the adoption,⁶

¹ See *Chandra Kunwar (Rani) v. Narpat Singh (Chaudhri)* (1906), 34 I. A. 27; 29 All. 184; 11 C. W. N. 320; 9 Bom. L. R. 267.

² *Ajabsing v. Nanabhau Valad Dhansing Raul* (1898), 26 I. A. 48; 3 C. W. N. 130.

³ *Achal Ram (Lal) v. Kazim Husam Khan (Raja)* (1905), 32 I. A. 113; 27 All. 271; 9 C. W. N. 477.

⁴ *Kahchandra Chowdhry v. Shab-chandra Bhaduri* (1870), 6 B. L. R. 501, at p. 508; 15 W. R. P. C. 12, at p. 14. See *Chundernath Roy (Rajah) v. Gobindnath Roy (Kooar)* (1872), 11 B. L. R. 86, at p. 98; 18 W. R. 221, at pp. 222, 223.

⁵ See *Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi (Mussamat)* (1909), 36 I. A. 103; 36 Calc. 780; 13 C. W. N. 920; 11 Bom. L. R. 833; *Rajendro Nath Holdar v. Jogendro Nath Banerjee* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 67, at pp. 76, 77; 7 B. L. R. 216, at pp. 227, 228; 15 W. R. P. C. 41, at pp. 44, 45; *Rungama v. Atchama* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 105; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at p. 62; *Vyas Chimanlal v. Vyas Ramchandra* (1899), 24 Bom. 473; 2 Bom. L. R. 163; *Ramalinga Pillai v. Sadasiva Pillai* (1864), 9 M. I. A. 510, at p. 519; 1 W. R. P. C. 25, at p. 26; *Anandray Sivaji v. Ganesh Eshwant Bokil* (1863), 7 Bom. H. C. App. xxxiii. (distinguished in *Vaithilingam Mudali v. Murugaian*

(1912), 37 Mad. 529); *Sabo Bewa v. Nahagun Marti* (1869), 2 B. L. R. App. 51; 11 W. R. C. R. 380; *Nittanand Ghose v. Krishna Dyal Ghose* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 1; 15 W. R. C. R. 300; *Perkash Chunder Roy v. Dhunmonnee Dassea*, Ben. S. D. of 1853, p. 96; *Hur Dyal Nag v. Roy Krishio Bhoomick* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 107; *Herasutollah (Chowdhry) v. Brojo Soondur Roy* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 77, at p. 80; *Tincourie Chatterjee v. Denonath Banerjee*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 155; *Roopmonjoore Chowdranee v. Ramlall Sircar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 145; *Mohendro Lall Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee* (1864), Coryton, 42, at p. 46.

⁶ See Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 50. In that section "it will be noted that the words 'by blood marriage and adoption' have not been inserted after the word 'relationship' by Act XVIII. of 1872, as in the case of s. 32, cls. (5) and (6). Illustration (a) refers to the case of marriage, but relationship is not mentioned," Ameer Ali and Woodroffe's "Law of Evidence," 1st ed., p. 360. This would seem to show that the conduct of relations would not be admissible as evidence in the case of adoption, but the Indian Courts have undoubtedly been in the habit of admitting such

but such evidence cannot establish an adoption which is in law invalid.¹

A person who asks the Court to presume that an adoption did take place, must establish an initial probability that the adoption was likely to have been validly made and that the conduct of the parties cognizant of the facts had been at least consistent with such an hypothesis.²

Probabilities.

Where there is conflicting evidence upon the fact of an adoption, much must depend upon the probabilities of the case to be collected from the admitted or proved facts, but such probabilities do not take the place of evidence.

Aged adopter.

The fact that the person alleged to have adopted was childless, and advanced in years, and had despaired of having male issue; ³ or the fact that he was anxious to deliver himself from *Put*,⁴ gives rise to a probability that he wished to adopt.

Solitude as to future state.

The fact that the alleged adoptive father or mother was at enmity with the reversioner might also render an adoption probable.⁵

Enmity with heir.

The religious duty to adopt a son, which is said to be incumbent upon every childless Hindu,⁶ is also a circumstance to be taken into consideration,⁷ but by itself it has not much force, having regard "to the fact that childless Hindus die daily without having fulfilled this obligation, or made provision for its fulfilment after their death."⁸

Religious duty.

On the other hand, the absence of notices to relations and of ceremonials may be evidence against the probability of the fact of adoption. In

evidence. With two exceptions (*Hur Dyal Nañ v. Roy Krishto Bhoomick* and *Vyas Chinanlal v. Vyas Ramchandra*), the decisions on p. 175, note 5, were given before the passing of the Indian Evidence Act.

¹ See, however, *Bhagwat Pershad v. Murari Lal* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 524, in which case the Court applied the rule of *id factum rulet quod fieri non debuit*, while ignoring the construction of that rule in *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshmunma (Sri Balusu)* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at p. 144; 22 Mad. 398, at p. 423; 21 All. 460, at p. 487; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 448, 1 Bom. L. R. 226 (*ante*, p. 156).

² *Har Shankar Partab Singh v. Lal Raghuraj Singh* (1907), 34 I. A. 125; 29 All. 519; 11 C. W. N. 841.

³ *Huradhun Mookurjia v. Muthoranath Mookurjia* (1849), 4 M. I. A. 414, at p. 425; 7 W. R. P. C. 71; *Puktu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (Musamat)* (1915), 42 I. A. 155; 37 All. 359; 19 C. W. N. 841; 17 Bom. L. R. 549. See *Roopmonjoree Chowdranee v. Ramlall Sircar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 144, at p. 150; *Bistooprea Palmohadea (Rance) v. Basodeb Dull Bewartee*

Putnak (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 232, at p. 235.

⁴ *Huradhun Mookurjia v. Muthoranath Mookurjia* (1849), 4 M. I. A. 414, at pp. 425, 426; 7 W. R. P. C. 71.

⁵ *Soondur Koomuree Debbeca v. Gudadhar Pershad Tewarce* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 54, at pp. 64, 67; 4 W. R. P. C. 116, at pp. 119, 120; *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 177; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 295.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 101, 102.

⁷ See *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 177; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 295; *Roopmonjoree Chowdranee v. Ramlall Sircar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 145, at pp. 150, 151; *Saradasoondery Dossee (S. M.) v. Tincowry Nundy* (1863), 1 Hyde, 223, at p. 249.

⁸ *Nilmadhub Doss v. Bishumber Doss* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 85, at p. 100; 3 B. L. R. (P. C.) 27, at p. 32; 12 W. R. P. C. 29, at p. 31. See *Gurulingaswami (Sri Balusu) v. Ramalakshmanma (Sri Balusu)*; *Radhamohun v. Hardai Bibi* (1899), 26 I. A. 113, at p. 135; 23 Mad. 398, at p. 414; 21 All. 460, at p. 477; 3 C. W. N. 427, at p. 442; 1 Bom. L. R. 226.

Sootroogun Sutputty v. Sabitra Dye,¹ the Judicial Committee say, "But although neither written acknowledgments, nor the performance of any religious ceremonies, are essential to the validity of adoptions, such acknowledgments are usually given, and such ceremonies observed, and notices given of the times when adoptions are to take place, in all families of distinction, as those of zemindars or opulent Brahmins, that wherever these have been omitted, it behoves the Court to regard with extreme suspicion the proof offered in support of an adoption. I would say, that in no case should the rights of wives and daughters be transferred to strangers, or more remote relations, unless the proof of adoption by which that transfer is effected be proved by evidence free from all suspicion of fraud, and so consistent and probable as to give no occasion for doubt of its truth."²

The youth,³ or vigour,⁴ of the alleged adopting father, and the consequent probability of male issue, may also be a circumstance rendering the adoption improbable.

"In considering the validity of" powers to adopt, "it is of great importance, in the first place, to ascertain the position of the parties at the time when the instruments are alleged to have come into existence, and the motives which may have led to the execution of them."⁵

A permission to give in adoption may be presumed,⁶ but no such presumption may be made with reference to a permission to take in adoption.⁷

It has been held⁸ that "when the Court is satisfied that the authority to adopt really was given, it will require comparatively slight proof of the performance of the ceremonies by which the adoption is completed. But the Court will not presume that permission was given merely because it is shown that the usual ceremonies were duly performed."

There may be a presumption that a widow does not adopt while in a condition of ceremonial impurity.⁹

¹ (1835), 2 Knapp, 287, at p. 290; 5 W. R. P. C. 109. See also *Ony Kadarun v. Aroonachella*, Mad. dec. 1857, p. 93; *Bistoooprea Patmohadea (Ranee) v. Basooddeh Dull Bewartee Patnaik* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 232.

² Cited with approval in *Divakar v. Chandanlal* (1916), 44 Calc. 201; 21 C. W. N. 314; 18 Bom. L. R. 992.

³ *Sootroogun Sutputty v. Sabitra Dye* (1835), 2 Knapp, 287; 5 W. R. P. C. 109.

⁴ In *Saradasoondery Dossee (S. M.) v. Tincoury Nundy* (1863), 1 Hyde, 223, at p. 250, the Court said, "We agree . . . that a Hindu does not adopt in his lifetime, unless he is prepared to acknowledge that he has lost the power of procreation; for, if his wife is sterile, he may marry another wife, and is enjoined to do so after

the lapse of a certain time."

⁵ *Soondur Koomaree Debbeca v. Gudadhur Pershad Tewarree* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 54, at p. 64; 4 W. R. P. C. 116, at p. 119.

⁶ "Dattaka Chandrika," s.1, para. 32.

⁷ *Tarini Charan Chowdhry v. Saroda Sundari Dasi* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 145; 11 W. R. C. R. 468.

⁸ *Radhamadhub Gossain v. Radhabulub Gossain* (1862), 1 Hay, 311; 2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 5. See also *Mohendro Lal Mookerjee v. Rookiney Dabee* (1864), Coryton, 42, at pp. 45, 46, where a similar observation was made, "When many years have passed and the person whose adoption is questioned has always been recognized as a son."

⁹ See *Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti* (1889), 13 Mad. 214, at p. 222.

CHAPTER IV.

PARENT AND CHILD (*continued*).

RESULTS OF DATTAKA ADOPTION.

Adoption operates as affiliation.

ADOPTION in the *Dattaka* form completely transfers the boy from the family of his natural father to that of his adoptive father, and, except as specially provided by the law,¹ he acquires, as from the date of the adoption,² all the rights, privileges, duties, and obligations of a son born to his adoptive father.³

The expressions "father" and "son" in Acts of the Legislatures include in the case of Hindus adoptive fathers and adopted sons.⁴

¹ These special provisions are to be found in the "*Dattaka Mimansa*" and the "*Dattaka Chandrika*," and relate to the effect of the birth of a legitimate son after the adoption (see *post*, pp. 187, 188), and to the restrictions placed upon an adopted son with regard to marriage and adoption in his natural family (see *ante*, pp. 44, 45, and *post*, p. 201).

² *Harek Chand Babu v. Bejoy Chand Mahatab* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 795, at p. 798; *Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath* (1894), 19 Bom. 809, at p. 814; *Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630, at p. 637; *Sudanund Mohapattur v. Soorjo Monce Dhee* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 455; S. C. (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 436 (on appeal in this case this question did not arise, *Soorjomonee Dayce v. Suddanund Mohapattur*, I. A. Sup. Vol. 212; 12 B. L. R. 304; 20 W. R. C. R. 377; 9 Mad. Jur. 466); *Narain Mal v. Koor Narain Mytee* (1879), 5 Calc. 251.

³ *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229, at p. 246; 8 Calc. 302, at p. 311; S. C. in Court below, *Paddo Kumaree Debee v. Juggnakishore Acharjee* (1879), 5 Calc. 615; *Nagindas Bhugwandas v.*

Bachoo Hurkissondus (1915), 43 I. A. 56; 40 Bom. 270; 20 C. W. N. 702; 18 Bom. L. R. 172; *Joykishore Chowdhry v. Panchoo Baboo* (1879), 4 C. L. R. 538; *Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra* (1883), 10 I. A. 138, at p. 149; 10 Calc. 232, at p. 237; 13 C. L. R. 379, at p. 381; S. C. in Court below, 6 Calc. 256, and 7 C. L. R. 145; *Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630, at p. 637; *Teenconree Chatterjee v. Denonath Bancrjee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 49; *Juggurnath Suhare (Maharajah) v. Mukhun Koonwur (Musst.)* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 24.

⁴ See the several General Clauses Acts: X. of 1897, s. 3 (18), (53); I. (B. C.) of 1899, s. 3 (42); I. (Bo. C.) of 1904, s. 3 (18), (45); I. (E. B. and A.) of 1909, s. 5 (24), (58); I. (Burm. C.) of 1898, s. 2 (22), (59); I. (Mad. C.) of 1891, s. 3 (30); I. (Punj. C.) of 1898, s. 2 (18), (54); I. (U. P.) of 1904, s. 4 (5), (42). Also see Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 6; Agra Tenancy Act, II. (U. P.) of 1901, s. 22; *Lala v. Nahar Singh* (1912), 34 All. 658; *Thamman Singh v. Dal Singh* (1914), 37 All. 7.

The expression "son" in a will includes an adopted son.¹

When a married man having a son, is taken in adoption, the son does not acquire the *gotra* and a right of succession to the property of the family into which his father is adopted.²

When an adoption has been made by a widow, the rights of the adopted son do not date back to the death of his adoptive father.³

An adoption *pendente lite* has the same effect as a birth *pendente lite*.⁴

As to an adopted son's impurity on deaths and births, and as to his competency to perform *Śraddha* rites,⁵ see Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 388.

The right of guardianship of an adopted son passes by the adoption from the natural parents to the adoptive parents.⁶ Right of guardianship.

A son adopted by a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara school of law acquires the same rights in coparcenary property on adoption⁷ as would be possessed on birth by a natural son born to his adoptive father.⁸ Rights of survivorship.

Except where a son is born to his adoptive father subsequent to the adoption,⁹ an adopted son inherits to his adoptive father,¹⁰ Inheritance *ex parte paternā*.

¹ *Yethirajulu Naidu v. Mukuntha Naidu* (1905), 28 Mad 363.

² *Kalgavda Tavanappa v. Somappa Tamangavda* (1909), 33 Bom. 669; 11 Bom. L. R. 797.

³ *Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal* (1881), 4 Mad 160. See *Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Mussamut)* (1858), 7 M. L. A. 169, at p. 184; *Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 10, at p. 16; *Narain Mal v. Kooer Narain Mytee* (1879), 5 Cal. 251; *Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath* (1894), 19 Bom. 809, at p. 814; cases collected in Morley's "Digest," vol. iii. 186.

⁴ *Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630, at p. 637.

⁵ See "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 6, para. 50; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, para. 25; s. 3, para. 17.

⁶ *Sree Narain Miller v. Kishensoondory Dassee (Sreemutty)* (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 149, at p. 163; 11 B. L. R. 171, at p. 191; S. C. *sub nomine Nogendro Ohundro Mitro v. Kishensoondory Dossee (Sreemutty)*, 19 W.

R. C. R. 133, at p. 139; *Lakshmi Bai v. Shridhar Vasudev Takle* (1878), 3 Bom. 1. As to rights of guardianship, see *ante*, pp. 46-49, and *post*, pp. 213, 214.

⁷ See *Rungama v. Atchama* (1846), 4 M. L. A. 1, at p. 103; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at p. 67; *Sudanund Mohapattur v. Bonomallee* (1863), Marsh. 317; 2 Hay, 205; *Sudanund Mohapattur v. Soorjo Monee Debee* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 455; S. C. after remand (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 436. On appeal this question did not arise, *Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanund Mohapattur* (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 212; 12 B. L. R. 304; 20 W. R. C. R. 377; 8 Mad. Jur. 466.

⁸ See *post*, pp. 225, 226; *Heera Singh v. Buryar Singh* (1866), 1 Agra, 256; *Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630, at p. 637.

⁹ See *post*, pp. 187, 188.

¹⁰ *Raje Vyankatray Anandray Nimbalkar v. Jayavantrav* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 191.

and to the relations, whether lineal or collateral, of his adoptive father to the same extent as he would have inherited if he had been born as a son to his adoptive father.¹

As to the divesting of estates on adoption, see *post*, pp. 193–199.

The right of the adopted son and of his heirs to inherit to the following relations by adoption has been established :—

1. Paternal grandfather.²
2. Paternal uncle.³
3. First cousin of his father.⁴
4. First cousin of his grandfather.⁵
5. Father's brother's son.⁶
6. Father's daughter's son.⁷
7. Father's third cousin.⁸
8. The adopted son of the son of the brother of the man to whom the father of the claimant was adopted.⁹

Rights on
attaining
possession.

Where an adopted son ousts his adoptive father's widow, who has taken possession in ignorance of the adoption, he is entitled to receive such rents and profits which have been received, or might with due diligence have been received, between the death of his adoptive father and his getting possession, credit being given for the maintenance of the widow, funeral expenses, and all such expenditure as she might properly have made as widow, subject to any question as to limitation.¹⁰

Conversely the relations of the adoptive father will inherit

¹ *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Calc. 302; S. C. in Court below, *Puddo Kumaree Debee v. Juggutkishore Acharjee* (1879), 5 Calo. 615; *Joykishore Chowdhry v. Panchoo Baboo* (1879), 4 C. L. R. 538; *Sumbhoochunder Chowdry v. Naraini Debia* (1835), 2 Knapp, 55; 5 W. R. P. C. 100; *Lakhmi Chand v. Gatto Bai* (1886), 8 All. 319; *Mokundo Lal Roy v. Bykunt Nath Roy* (1880), 6 Calc. 289; 7 C. L. R. 478; *Dinonath Mukerjee v. Gopal Churn Mukerjee* (1881), 9 C. L. R. 379; 8 C. L. R. 57; *Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moyee Debia* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 423; *Rajé Vyankatray Anandray Nimbalkar v. Jayavantrav* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 191; *Gourhurree Kubraj v. Rutnasuree Debia (Mussummut)* (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 203 (new edition, 250); *Gooroopershad Bose v. Rashbehary Bose*, Ben. S. D. A. 1880, p. 411.

² *Gourbullub v. Juggernath Persaud Mitter* (1824), Sir F. Macnaghten's "Considerations," p. 5.

³ In *Sumbhoochunder Chowdry v. Naraini Debia* (1835), 3 Knapp, 55; 5 W. R. P. C. 100; it was held that the adopted son of the brother of the whole blood was entitled to inherit in preference to the son of a brother of the half-blood. *Kishennath Roy v. Hureegobind Roy*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 18.

⁴ *Dinonath Mukerjee v. Gopal Churn Mukerjee* (1881), 6 C. L. R. 379; 8 C. L. R. 57.

⁵ *Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moyee Debia* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 423.

⁶ *Lokenath Roy v. Shamasconduree*, Ben. S. D. A. 1858, p. 1863.

⁷ *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Calc. 302.

⁸ *Mokundo Lal Roy v. Bykunt Nath Roy* (1880), 6 Calc. 289; 7 C. L. R. 478.

⁹ *Gourhurree Kubraj v. Rutnasuree Debia (Mussummut)* (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 203 (new edition, 350).

¹⁰ See *Dalel Kunwar v. Ambika Partap Singh* (1903), 25 All. 266.

to the adopted son in the same way as if he had been a son born to his adoptive father.

An hereditary title or honour passes to an adopted son, and Title. his descendants, in the same way as to a legitimate son, or his descendants.

Where the adoption is by a husband alone,¹ or in association with his wife, or one of his wives, or where it has been made to him by his wife with his concurrence, or after his death, the son inherits to the wife,² and to her relations,³ in the same way as if he had been a son born to such wife. Inheritance *ex parte materna*

The right of the adopted son to inherit to the brother,⁴ and father,⁵ of the adoptive mother has been upheld.

Sir G. D. Banerjee⁶ doubts whether in a Mitakshara case an adopted son will inherit his adoptive mother's mother's *stridhan* as he would thereby be preferred to the son of the deceased (*post*, p. 449), but he admits that there is no authority on the subject.

The adoptive mother⁷ and her relatives⁸ inherit to the adopted son in the same way as if she had been his natural mother.

Where an adoption is made by a husband in conjunction with one only of several wives, or after his death by one of

¹ See *Sham Kuar v. Gaya Din* (1876), 1 All. 255, at p. 257; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 1, para. 22.

² *Teencoursee Chatterjee v. Denonath Banerjee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 49; *Raje Vyankatray Anandray Nimbalkar v. Jayavantrav* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 191. *Contrâ* 2 Bom. S. A. R. 178, cited in "Norton's Leading Cases," I. 101.

³ *Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra* (1883), 10 I. A. 138; 10 Cal. 232; 13 C. L. R. 379. This decision in effect overruled *Morun Moece Debeah v. Bejoy Kishito Gossamee* (1863), W. R. Sp. No. 121 (so far as this question is concerned), and *Chinnaramakristina Ayyar v. Minatchi Ammal* (1873), 7 Mad. H. C. 245. *Sham Kuar v. Gaya Din* (1876), 1 All. 255; *Surjokant Nundi v. Mohesh Chunder Dutt* (1882), 9 Cal. 70; *Radha Prasad Mullick v. Ranee Mani Dassee* (1906), 33 Cal. 947; 10 C. W. N. 695 (reversed on another point

(1908), 35 I. A. 118; 35 Cal. 896; 12 C. W. N. 729; 10 Bom. L. R. 604).

⁴ *Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra* (1883), 10 I. A. 138; 10 Cal. 232; 13 C. L. R. 379.

⁵ *Sham Kuar v. Gaya Din* (1876), 1 All. 255; *Surjokant Nundi v. Mohesh Chunder Dutt* (1882), 9 Cal. 70.

⁶ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 364, 365, 428.

⁷ *Anandi v. Hari Suba Pas* (1909), 33 Bom. 404; 11 Bom. L. R. 641. See *Ramasawami Aiyar v. Venkataramaiah* (1879), 6 I. A. 196; 2 Mad. 91; *Annapurni Nachiar v. Forbes* (1899), 26 I. A. 246; 23 Mad. 1; 3 C. W. N. 730; *Jatindra Nath Chaudhuri (Rai) v. Amrita Lal Bagchi* (1900), 5 C. W. N. 20; *Lakshmi Chand v. Gatto Bai* (1886), 8 All. 319.

⁸ *Gungapersad Roy v. Brijessuree Chowdhraim*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 1091.

several wives, the adopted son¹ inherits only to that wife and her relations, his relationship to the other wives being that of a step-son.

It is unsettled whether, when in Bengal a man adopts in conjunction with more than one wife,² or where two or more widows adopt in Western India jointly,³ the adopted son inherits to all the widows so adopting and their relatives. As pointed out in *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy Appa Row Bahadur (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 69; 37 Mad. 199, at p. 220; 18 C. W. N. 554, at p. 563; 16 Bom. L. R. 328, at p. 337, the difficulty in supposing that he inherits to all the widows is very great. This seems to show that except perhaps in Western India no such joint exercise of the power is possible (*ante*, p. 115).

The mere concurrence by a widow in an adoption by her co-widow would not, it is submitted, confer upon the adopted son any rights of inheritance to her or her relations.

Although it is unsettled it seems that when a husband adopts in spite of his wife's express dissent, the son does not inherit to her or to her relations.⁴

Adopted son
of disqualified
man.

A son adopted by a man who is disqualified from inheritance by reason of a personal disability, such as congenital blindness, impotence, or lameness,⁵ cannot acquire greater rights than his adoptive father, and therefore cannot inherit to any one from whom the adoptive father was disqualified from inheriting.⁶

There is, it is submitted, nothing to prevent his inheritance from his adoptive father⁷ and from his adoptive mother and her relations. According to the "*Dattaka Chandrika*,"⁸ he is entitled to maintenance.

Descendants of
adopted
son.

The descendants of an adopted son born after adoption have the same rights of inheritance as the descendants of a legitimately begotten son.⁹

As to the case of an adoption of a married man having a son, see *post*, p. 190.

¹ *Annapurni Nachiar v. Forbes* (1899), 26 I. A. 246; 23 Mad. 1; 3 C. W. N. 730; S. C. in Court below, (1895), 18 Mad. 277; *Kasheeshuree Debia v. Greeschunder Lahoree*, W. R. 1864, p. 71.

² See *ante*, p. 112.

³ See *ante*, pp. 115, 126.

⁴ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," 2nd ed., pp. 215, 419-419f.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 109, and *post*, pp. 370-373.

⁶ "*Mitakshara*," chap. ii. s. x. para. 10; "*Dattaka Chandrika*," s. vi. para. 1; "*Daya-Bhaga*," chap. v. s. 19; Mayne's "*Hindu Law*," 8th

ed., p. 136; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 202, 203, 419. As to the right of a natural son, see *post*, p. 373.

⁷ Sutherland's "Synopsis," Stokes' "Hindu Law Books," pp. 664, 671.

⁸ Sec. vi. para. 1. This is disputed in Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 419.

⁹ *Kishennath Roy v. Hurreegobind Roy*, Ben. S. D. A. of 1859, p. 18; *Gourhurree Kubraj v. Ruitnasuree Debia (Mussummut)* (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 203 (new edition, 250)

An adopted son does not, as such, acquire any rights greater than those of a begotten son.¹

The adoption of a son does not interfere with the powers of the adoptive father to dispose of² the property over which he has a power of disposition.³

Rights no greater than those of son born.

Adoption does not alter father's powers over property.

An adoptive father can defeat the rights of inheritance of his adopted son,⁴ whether the property held by him be partible or impartible.⁵ He can, in giving a power of adoption, require as a condition of the exercise of the power that the estate of his widow should not be interfered with,⁶ and might apparently impose such other conditions as are not inconsistent with the provisions of the law of gifts and wills.⁷

In cases governed by the Hindu Wills Act, adoption, or the giving of a power of adoption, does not operate as a revocation of a will.⁸

Adoption does not revoke will.

There is some authority that in other cases a Hindu has no power to completely disinherit his adoptive son, and that a will making no provision for adopted sons would be invalidated by a power given subsequently,⁹ but it is submitted that there is no reason why an adoption should have greater effect than the birth of a son in revoking a will. Where the will purports to deal with property, over which the adopting father ceased to have a power of disposition on the birth or adoption of a son, it would

¹ *Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao) v. Court of Wards* (1899), 26 I. A. 83; 22 Mad. 383; 3 C. W. N. 415; 1 Bom. L. R. 277; *Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279, at pp. 310, 311; 3 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 18.

² By will, gift, or transfer.

³ See *Bhupendra Krishna Ghose v. Amarendra Nath Dey* (1915), 43 I. A. 12; 43 Cal. 432; 20 C. W. N. 169; 18 Bom. L. R. 347.

⁴ *Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja) v. Court of Wards* (1899), 26 I. A. 83, at p. 89; 22 Mad. 383, at p. 390; 3 C. W. N. 415, at p. 421; 1 Bom. L. R. 277; *Rungama v. Atchama* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 103; 7 W. R. 57, at p. 62; *Surendra Nath Ghose v. Kala Chand Banerjee* (1907), 12 C. W. N. 668; *Purshotam Shama Shenvi v. Vasudev Krishna Shenvi* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. (O. C.) 196; *Sudamund Mohapattur v. Bonomallee* (1863), *Marsh*, 317; 2 *Hay*, 205.

⁵ *Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao) v. Court of Wards* (1899), 26 I. A. 83; 22 Mad. 383; 3 C. W. N. 415; *Sartaj Kuari (Rani) v. Deoraj Kuari (Rani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 51; 10 All 272.

⁶ See *Bepin Behari Bundopadhyaya v. Brojonath Mookhopadhyaya* (1882), 8 Cal. 357; *Rudhamonee Debea v. Jadubnarain Roy*, Ben. S. D. A. of 1855, p. 139; *Prosunnomoyee (Ranee) v. Ramsoonder Sein*, Ben. S. D. A. of 1859, p. 162.

⁷ See *Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 10; *ante*, pp. 114, 116.

⁸ Act XXI. of 1870, s. 2, read with Act X. of 1865, s. 57.

⁹ See *futwah* of pundits in *Naga-lutchmee Ummal v. Gopoo Nadaraja Chetty* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 309, at p. 320, referred to by Couch, C. J., in *Vinayak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 224, at p. 230.

be ineffectual to deal with the property ¹ except where assent to the provisions of the will was a condition of the adoption.²

Arrangement
restraining
disposition.

Effect would apparently be given to an arrangement made at the time of the adoption stipulating that the adoptive father should not exercise his powers of disposition or undertaking to settle property on the boy. Such arrangement can be enforced at the instance of the adopted son.³

Coparcenary
property.

In cases governed by the Mitakshara law, the adoptive father has no power to destroy the adopted son's right of survivorship in coparcenary property.⁴

Illustration.

A made a will disposing of his ancestral property with regard to which he was the sole coparcener, and authorized his widow to adopt a son in a certain event. In a subsequent will he did not revoke this authority, but disposed of the property inconsistently with the first will. The later will was set aside, on the ground that the testator had no power of disposition, he having ceased to be sole coparcener.⁵

Arrangement
limiting
interest in
ancestral
property.

When, after attaining the age of majority, an adopted son ratifies an arrangement made between his natural father and the person adopting him limiting the interest in coparcenary property which he would acquire by adoption, he is bound by the arrangement.⁶ It is unsettled whether, in the absence of such ratification, he can be bound by such arrangement, but it is submitted that if the arrangement be a fair one, and does not unduly interfere with the rights of the adopted son, effect

¹ As the will must be taken to speak from the death of the testator, at which time he would have no disposing power.

² See *Vinayak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 224.

³ See *Surendrakeshav Roy v. Door-gasundari Dasee* (1892), 19 I. A. 108, at p. 132; 19 Calc. 513, at p. 536; *Bhala Nahana v. Parbhu Hari* (1877), 2 Bom. 67.

⁴ *Ganapati Aiyyan v. Savithri Am-mal* (1897), 21 Mad. 10, at pp. 14, 15; *Rathnam v. Sivasubramania* (1892), 16 Mad. 353; *Villa Butten v. Yamenamma* (1874), 8 Mad. H. C. 6. See Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 3; Probate and Administration Act (V. of 1881), s. 4; *Lakshman Dada Nark v. Ramchandra Dada Nark*

(1880), 7 I. A. 181; 5 Bom. 48; 7 C. L. R. 320; *Chatturbhoj Meghji v. Dharamsi Naranji* (1884), 9 Bom. 438; *Lakshmi Shankar v. Vajinath* (1881), 6 Bom. 24; *Adjoodia Gir v. Kashee Gv* (1872), 4 N. W. P. H. C. 31; *Buldeo Singh (Rajah) v. Koonver Mahabeer Singh* (1866), 1 Agra, H. C. 155; *Narottam Jaggiwan v. Nar-sandas Harikisandas* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. (A. C. J.) 6; *Gangubai v. Ramanna* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. (A. C. J.) 66.

⁵ *Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Sub-bammal* (1915), 43 I. A. 20; 39 Mad. 107; 20 C. W. N. 234; 17 Bom. L. R. 468.

⁶ See *Ramasawmi Aiyyan v. Ven-cataramaiyan* (1879), 6 I. A. 196; 2 Mad. 91; *Kashibai v. Tatyia* (1916), 40 Bom. 668; 18 Bom. L. R. 740.

will be given to it, at any rate when the arrangement is made with the adoptive father or is authorized by him.¹

As the adoptive father is competent to exclude his adopted son by his will, there can be no objection to his making any arrangement as to the devolution of property over which he has a power of disposition, either at the time of adoption or thereafter.²

The Madras High Court has upheld dispositions of ancestral property by the adopting father with the consent of the natural father for the purpose of providing for the maintenance of the wife of the adopting father.³

In another case⁴ the Bombay High Court held that when the adopted son and the person who gave him in adoption were fully cognizant of the disposition of the property made by the testator, and with the knowledge of such disposition, the natural father consented to the adoption taking place, and when the disposition and the adoption might, under the circumstances, be regarded as one transaction, the disposition, though contained in a will, could not be repudiated by the adopted son. "The principle underlying the decision is that the disposition was one which it was competent to the testator to make prior to the adoption, and that its acceptance being presumably a condition subject to which the adoption was made, it made no difference that the disposition was testamentary."⁵

The Madras High Court upheld an arrangement between the natural father and the adopting mother, where provision was made for the enjoyment of a portion of the property by the mother in the case of her disagreement with the adopted son,⁶ but the Bombay High Court has refused⁷ to uphold an arrangement whereby the mother could dispose of immovable property, and in another case the same Court declined to give effect to an agreement whereby the adoptive mother retained her rights as a widow during her lifetime.⁸

Where by the arrangement property is given to a daughter⁹ or brother of the adoptive mother,¹⁰ the adopted son is not bound by it.

In *Ramasawmi Aiyar v Vencataramaiyan*,¹¹ the Judicial Committee said, "How far the natural father can by agreement before the adoption renounce all or part of his son's rights, is a question not altogether unattended with difficulty; although the case of *Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh*

¹ See *Pirsab v. Gurappa* (1913), 38 Bom. 227, at pp. 234-236; 16 Bom. L. R. 111, at pp. 116, 117.

² *Bhupendra Krishna Ghose v. Amarendra Nath Dey* (1915), 43 I. A. 12; 43 Calc. 432; 20 C. W. N. 169; 18 Bom. L. R. 347. See *Asita Mohon Ghose Moulik v. Nrode Mohon Ghose Moulik* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 901.

³ *Lakshmi v. Subramanya* (1889), 12 Mad. 490; *Narayanadasami v. Ramasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 172. See *Basava v. Lingangaruda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428.

⁴ *Vinayak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 224.

⁵ *Lakshmi v. Subramanya* (1889),

12 Mad. 490, at pp. 492, 493. See *Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 10.

⁶ *Visalakshi Ammal v. Sivuramien* (1904), 27 Mad. 577.

⁷ *Venkappa v. Fakirgowda* (1906), 8 Bom. L. R. 346.

⁸ *Purshottam v. Rakhmabai* (1913), 16 Bom. L. R. 57.

⁹ *Vyasacharya v. Venkubas* (1912), 37 Bom. 251; 14 Bom. L. R. 1109.

¹⁰ *Venkappa v. Fakirgowda* (1906), 18 Bom. L. R. 346.

¹¹ (1879), 6 I. A. 196, at p. 208; 2 Mad. 91, at p. 101. See *Lakshmana Rao v. Lakshmi Ammal* (1881), 4 Mad. 160, at p. 163.

v. *Janaki* ¹ certainly decides that an agreement on the part of the father that his son's interest shall be postponed to the life interest of the widow is valid and binding." In *Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Indar Kunwar (Maharani)* ² the Judicial Committee said, "It is difficult to understand how a declaration by Guman Singh (the natural father) on an agreement by him, if it was an agreement, could prejudice or affect the rights of his son, which would only arise when his parental control and authority determined."

It is submitted that the determination of this question depends upon the nature of the particular arrangement. It is scarcely necessary to speculate as to what would happen if the natural father assented to a disposition of the whole of the ancestral property away from the son, as such a case is not likely to occur. If such case did occur, the Courts would probably hold that the natural father acted in excess of his powers, and that his son was not bound by it; but in dealing with a less extreme case, effect might well be given to a fair arrangement, in which the son distinctly benefits by the adoption. Where the adoptive father is separate from his kinsmen, and has, therefore, a power of disposing by will even of ancestral property, if he has no son, it must be remembered that he is by any such arrangement only doing what it was competent for him to do in the absence of an adoption.

As to a condition contained in the permission to adopt, see *ante*, pp. 116, 117.

There is authority that where there is an express power of adoption given by the husband, the widow cannot originate conditions. If she does so, the adoption would be valid, and the conditions would be ineffectual.³

Effect would be given to an arrangement which had been ratified by the boy after attaining majority.⁴

In Bombay it has been held that a widow can, at the time of the adoption, make a fair arrangement for the protection of her interest in the estate during her lifetime.⁵ The cases in which this conclusion has been arrived at were not cases in which express power was given by the husband, but cases where the widow exercised the power given to her by the system of Hindu law prevalent in Western India.⁶

When a widow obtains a reservation of rights by such an arrangement, she possesses therein only the ordinary rights of a Hindu widow.⁷

¹ (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 199. See *Pirsab v. Gurappa Basappa* (1913), 38 Bom. 227; 16 Bom. L. R. 111.

² (1888), 16 I. A. 53, at p. 59; 16 Calc. 556, at p. 564.

³ *Jagannadha v. Papamma* (1892), 16 Mad. 400. In *Solukhna (Mussumaut) v. Ramdolal Pande* (1811), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 324 (new edition, 434), the pundits considered that an instrument under which the widow remained in possession was inoperative. G. C. Sarker ("Law of Adoption," p. 408) considered that the

widow can make conditions.

⁴ See *Kali Das v. Brijai Shankar* (1891), 13 All. 391.

⁵ *Ravji Vinayakrav Jagannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmbai* (1887), 11 Bom. 381, at pp. 401, 402; *Radhabai v. Ganesh Tatya Gholap* (1878), 3 Bom. 7, at p. 8; *Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 199.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 124-126.

⁷ *Antaji v. Dattaji* (1893), 19 Bom. 36.

A widow would apparently have no power to arrange with the natural father to obtain for herself an interest in property which had not been vested in her, as, for instance, in property which, on her husband's death, passed by survivorship to other members of the family, and which is divested by the adoption.¹

In the case of the twice-born classes where, after an adoption,² a son is born to the adoptive father, the adopted son loses all rights to the performance of religious ceremonies, and his rights of inheritance are reduced—
Son born after adoption.

(a) If he be governed by the Bengal school, to one-half of the share of a lawfully begotten son.³

(b) If he be governed by the Benares school, to one-third of the share of a lawfully begotten son.⁴

The "Dattaka Mimansa" (sec. 5, par. 40) gives the adopted son a fourth share.

(c) If he be governed by the schools prevailing in Southern India⁵ and Bombay,⁶ to one-fourth of the share of a lawfully begotten son.

In a case of partition of joint family property governed by the Mitakshara law the adopted son, or his son, son's son, or son's son's son, and the after-born son, or his son, son's son, or son's son's son, share in similar proportions.

In a competition, either in a case of inheritance or in a case of partition between an adopted son, and a relation other than

¹ *Post*, p. 198.

² Where the son is born before the adoption then the adoption is invalid, *ante*, p. 103.

³ "Dayabhaga," x. 9; "Dattaka Chandrika," v. 16-17; Sir F. Macnaghten's "Considerations on Hindu Law," 137; 1 W. Macn. 70; 2 W. Macn. 184; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 398. Consequently, if there be one begotten son the adopted son takes one-third of the whole, if there be two he takes one-fifth, and so on.

⁴ Sir F. Macnaghten's "Considerations on Hindu Law," 137; 1 W. Macn. 70; 2 W. Macn. 184; "Mitakshara," i. 11, 24, 25; "Dattaka Mimansa," x. 1; v. 40. See, however, *Raghubarund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss* (1878), 4 Cal. 425; 3 C. L. R.

534, which was governed by the Mitakshara law and apparently by the Benares school. The Court there considered that an adopted son takes half the share of a begotten son.

⁵ *Ayyavu Muppanar v. Niladatchi Ammal* (1862), 1 Mad. H. C. 45.

⁶ *Giriapa v. Ningapa* (1892), 17 Bom. 100. In the earlier cases the Bombay High Court considered that the share was one-third of the share of a natural-born son; *Hanmant Ramchandra v. Bhimacharya* (1887), 12 Bom. 105; *Rukhab v. Chumal Ambushet* (1891), 16 Bom. 347. In *Giriapa v. Ningapa* the Court did not refer to these earlier decisions. See "Vyavahara Mayukha," p. 60, Mandlik's edition. As to *Garbhari Gosavis*, see *Balgur v. Dhondgir* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 114.

a son, son's son, or son's son's son, the adopted son, etc., receives the same share as he would have taken if he had been a lawfully begotten son.¹

Sudras.

This rule has no application to Sudras. In their case lawfully begotten and adopted sons take equally.²

Shewaitship.

A right to inherit the management of debutter property is governed by the same principles as the inheritance of other property.³

In the case of inheritance to *stridhan* property an adopted stepson takes equally with a natural-born stepson.⁴

The birth of a lawfully begotten son would not apparently affect the incapacity of the adopted son to marry in, or adopt from, his adoptive family.

Jains.

The Jain law in this matter coincides with the ordinary Hindu law.⁵

Impartible property.

In the case of impartible property the afterborn son succeeds to the exclusion of the adopted son.⁶

Renunciation or waiver of rights.

An adopted son can renounce his interest in property which becomes vested in him by virtue of his adoption, or may waive any of his rights therein.⁷

On such renunciation the person who would take in default of adoption would succeed to the property.⁸

¹ *Nagindas Bhugwandas v. Bachoo Hurkissondas* (1915), 43 I. A. 56; 40 Bom. 270; 20 C. W. N. 702; 18 Bom. L. R. 172; *Gangadhar Bogla v. Hira Lal Bogla* (1916), 43 Calc. 944; 20 C. W. N. 489 (inheritance to the *stridhan* of a stepmother).

² *Raja v. Subbaraya* (1883), 7 Mad. 253, at p. 254; *Asita Mohon Ghose Moulik v. Nirode Mohon Ghose Moulik* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 901; *Bramanund Mahanty v. Chowdhry Krishna Churn Patnaik* (1882), unreported case referred to in G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 403. The rule was apparently unknown to Sir F. Macnaghten, who, in dealing with a case of Sudras (*Gopee Mohun Deb v. Raja Rajkrishna*, "Considerations on Hindu Law," 233), expressed the opinion that the adopted son was entitled to one-third of the estate. In *Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss* (1878), 4 Calc. 25; 3 C. L. R. 534 (*ante*, p. 187, note 4), the parties were Sudras. See "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 5, paras. 29-32; "Vyavastha Darpana," pp. 913-915 (this is a digest of the Hindu law current in Bengal);

"Vyavastha Chandrika" (a digest of Hindu law current in all the Provinces of India, except Bengal proper), vol. i. p. 169; Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 402, 403; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. 70, note; Strange's "Hindu Law," p. 99.

³ *Asita Mohon Ghose Moulik v. Nirode Mohon Ghose Moulik* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 901.

⁴ *Gungadhar Bogla (Kumar) v. Hira Lal Bogla (Kumar)* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 489.

⁵ *Rukhab v. Chumal Ambushet* (1891), 16 Bom. 347.

⁶ *Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik* (1894), 17 Mad. 422, at p. 435; S. C. affirmed on appeal, *Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik v. Ramasami Kamaya Naik* (1899), 26 I. A. 55; 22 Mad. 515; 1 Bom. L. R. 850.

⁷ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 183, 184. He cannot renounce his status as an adopted son, *ante*, p. 157.

⁸ *Mahadu Ganu v. Bayaji* (1893), 19 Bom. 239; *Ruvee Bhadr v. Roopshunker Shunkerjee* (1829), 2 Borr. 656, at pp. 605, 671.

There is nothing to prevent an adopted son making over his rights in the property, or in a portion thereof, to his adoptive mother or to any one else after he has attained majority.¹

Except when he has been adopted as a *dvyamushyayana*,² an adopted son loses by his adoption all rights as the son of his natural father and mother.³

Exclusion from rights in natural family.

He cannot inherit to the members of his natural family,⁴ except he has such right as the son of his adoptive father,⁵ and they cannot inherit to him.⁶

It may happen that he loses the right to succeed to his natural mother and her relatives, and does not acquire a new mother, or maternal relatives for spiritual or temporal purposes, as where the adoption is by a bachelor, or a widower,⁷ or perhaps where the adoption is made in spite of the express dissent of the wife of the adoptive father.⁸

An adopted son on adoption ceases to be liable for the debts⁹ or other obligations for which he would have been liable as a member of his natural family.

In parts of the Punjab the rights of the adopted son in his natural Punjab family take effect if his natural father dies without leaving legitimate sons.¹⁰

It has been held that according to the Bengal school adoption does not divest any property which has vested in the adopted son by inheritance, gift, or any form of self-acquisition previous to the adoption.¹¹

Property vested before adoption.

¹ *Tara Mune Dibia (Mussummaut) v. Dev Narayan Rai* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 387 (2nd ed., 516); 2 Maon, pp. 183, 184. See *Bhugobutty Dayee (Mussumut) v. Chowdhry Bholanath Thakoor* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 63; *Mahadu Ganu v. Bayaji* (1893), 19 Bom. 239.

² *Post*, pp. 190, 191.

³ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 142; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 6, paras. 6-8; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 2, paras. 18-20; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11, para. 32; "V. Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 5, para. 21.

⁴ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. 1. p. 69

⁵ For an instance of this, see *Annammah v. Mabbu Bali Reddy* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 108, where the natural father took as heir to the son whom he had given in adoption.

⁶ *Duttanarain Sing v. Ajeet Sing* (1799), 1 Ben. Sel. R. (new edition, 26); *Muthayya Rajagopala Thevar v.*

Minakshi Sundara Nachiar (1901), 25 Mad. 394; *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Kuppan Ayyangar* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 180; *Gunga Persad Roy v. Brijessuree Chowdhraim*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 1091.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 106.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 111, 112, 182.

⁹ *Pranvullabh v. Deokristin* (1824), Bom. Sel. R. 4; *Kasheepershad v. Bunsedhur*, 4 N. W. P. (S. D.) 343.

¹⁰ "Punjab Customary Law," in p. 83; "Punjab Cust.," 81.

¹¹ *Behari Lal Laha v. Kailas Chunder Laha* (1896), 1 C. W. N. 121. As, for instance, where he has acquired property by the will of a natural relation, or by succession to a maternal grandfather, or it may be even by inheritance from his natural father, as was the case in *Papamma v. V. Appa Rau* (1893), 16 Mad. 384, although the question as to whether it was divested did not arise in that case.

The Madras High Court¹ has held that under the Mitakshara property vested solely and absolutely in the adopted son is not divested; but in the case of inherited property a different view has been taken in Bombay.² In the second edition of his "Law of Adoption" pp. 419A to 419C, Sastri (G. C. Sarkar) expressed the opinion that adoption operates as a civil death in the natural family, and that property inherited is thereby divested. This was the view accepted in Bombay. A different view was taken by Sastri G. C. Sarkar in the first edition of his work (pp. 389, 390). The question depends upon the construction of the text of *Manu* (142), Max Muller's translation, p. 355. "An adopted son shall never take the family (name) and the estate of his natural father; the funeral cake follows the family (name) and the estate, the funeral offerings of him who gives (his son in adoption) leave (as far as that son is concerned)." The case in question can scarcely come within *Manu's* text as *Manu* would not have contemplated an only son being given in adoption. It is submitted that the case is governed by what is the ordinary rule of Hindu law, viz. that property once vested by inheritance cannot be divested.

He would lose such rights as he might have had in coparcenary property as a member of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara school of law.³ When the property had been partitioned and a share had vested in him by virtue of the partition, it has been held that he would retain his rights in it in spite of the adoption, and where the family property had vested in him as the only surviving member of a joint family, it would not be divested by his adoption.⁴

When a married Hindu, having a son, is taken in adoption, the son does not, like his father, lose the *gotra* and rights of inheritance in the family of his birth.⁵

Dvyamushyayana.

A boy can be adopted, so as to retain his relationship to his natural father, while acquiring the relationship of a son to his adoptive father. He is then said to be *Dvyamushyayana*⁶ (or son of two fathers).

A boy adopted in Mithila by the *Kritrma* form of adoption is also treated as the son of two fathers.⁷

¹ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rangayya Appa Row (Sri Rajah)* (1905), 29 Mad. 437. On appeal in this case the question did not arise, 41 I. A. 51; 37 Mad. 199; 17 C. W. N. 124; 15 Bom. L. R. 1010.

² *Dattatraya v. Govind* (1916), 40 Bom. 429; 18 Bom. L. R. 258. See 19 Bom. L. R. Journal, 1.

³ *Ante*, p. 179.

⁴ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rangayya Appa Row (Sri Rajah)* (1905), 29 Mad. 437; differed from in *Dattatraya v. Govind*

(1916), 40 Bom. 429; 18 Bom. L. R. 258.

⁵ *Kalgavda Tavanappa v. Somappa Tumangavda* (1909), 33 Bom. 669; 11 Bom. L. R. 797.

⁶ Literally two persons. See Sutherland's "Synopsis," head fifth. The practice of adopting a son as *dvyamushyayana* seems to have originated from the obsolete practice of *niyoga*. The *dvyamushyayana* son, treated of in the "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 10, is the son begotten in accordance with that practice.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 157, 158.

Where there is an understanding, or a previous stipulation between the giver and the receiver in adoption, that the boy should belong to both of them, the boy is said to be *nitya dvyamushyayana* ¹ (*i.e.* perpetual or absolute son of two fathers).

This arrangement can be made by a widow taking in adoption.²

Adoption of only son.

The authorities show that where an only son has been adopted by a united brother of his father it is presumed that there was an arrangement that he was to be *dvyamushyayana*.³ It does not seem to be very clear whether this rule applies only to the adoption of an only son of a brother, or whether it is applicable to all only sons.⁴ It applies to adoption by widows of brothers.⁵

As it has now been held that an only son can be adopted in the *Dattaka* form,⁶ the only advantage in adopting a boy as a *dvyamushyayana* is that the boy is not removed entirely from his natural family; but a boy so adopted could not secure the salvation of the person adopting as

¹ See *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at pp. 50, 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58. Opinions of pundits in *Haimun Chull Sing (Raja) v. Gunsheam Sing (Koomer)* (1834), 2 Knapp, 203, at pp. 206-288; *Joymoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Sbo-soondry Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1837), Fulton, 75; *Shumshere Mull (Raja) v. Dilraj Konwur* (1816), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 189 (2nd ed., 216); 2 W. Macn. 192, 193; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 86; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. 192; "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 6, para. 48; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 2, para. 24.

² *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 537; 3 Bom. L. R. 73.

³ *Basava v. Lingangauda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at p. 454; *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at pp. 50, 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58. *Contrâ Lazmispatirao v. Venkatesh* (1916), 41 Bom. 315; 19 Bom. L. R. 23. See opinions of pundits in *Haimun Chull Sing (Raja) v. Gunsheam Sing (Koomer)* (1834), 2 Knapp, 203, at pp. 206-208; *Nilmadhub Doss v. Bishumber Doss* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 85, at pp. 100, 101; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 27, at p. 32; 12 W. R. P. C. 29, at p. 31.

⁴ Mr. Mayne, in his "Hindu Law" (8th ed., p. 231), applies this rule only to the son of a brother. See also *Gocoolanund Dass v. Wooma*

Dase (1875), 15 B. L. R. 405, at pp. 415, 416; 23 W. R. C. R. 340, at p. 341; S. C. on appeal, *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at pp. 50, 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58. Sastri G. C. Sarkar ("Law of Adoption," p. 377) says, "It may no doubt be contended from what Nanda Pandita says in one passage that the gift of an only son is limited to the case of brothers. But in the very next passage ('Dattaka Mimansa,' ii. 39) he explains the principle of the adoption of an only son, which is applicable to all cases. And this general position is supported by what is said in the 'Mitakshara' with respect to the analogous case of a son produced by a man other than the brother on another man's wife. The 'Dattaka Chandrika,' however, does not appear to limit the *dvyamushyayana* adoption of an only son to the case of adoption by a paternal uncle only, but intimates it to be applicable to all cases" ("Dattaka Chandrika," ii. 28; iii. 17; v. 33). See also *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 537, at p. 542; 3 Bom. L. R. 73.

⁵ See *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 537; 3 Bom. L. R. 73. It was not in that case necessary to raise any presumption, as the adoption was proved to have been in the *dvyamushyayana* form.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 145.

effectually as a *Dattaka* son.¹ The adoption of a boy as a *dvymushyayana* under these circumstances seems to have arisen from a desire to reconcile the prohibition against the adoption of an only son with the recommendation to adopt the son of a brother. There is no necessity to evade a prohibition which has now been held to have no legal force.

In some parts of India a *nitya dvymushyayana* seems to be quite obsolete.² It is obsolete on the east coast, but is said to be the ordinary form of adoption recognized in Malabar and amongst the Nambudri Brahmins.³ The practice has been held by the Bombay High Court to exist among Lingayets, whether the brothers are divided or joint.⁴

It is said to be not at all unusual in the southern districts of the Bombay Presidency,⁵ and it has been recognized by the Judicial Committee in two cases from Bengal,⁶ and by the Allahabad High Court in a case from Bareilly.⁷

Anitya dvya-
mushyayana.

When from a different *gotra* (family) a boy was adopted after he has been initiated into the ceremony of tonsure in the *gotra* of his natural father, and was invested with the sacred thread in the *gotra* of his adoptive father, as the rites of initiation have been performed by both fathers, he was termed *anitya dvymushyayana*⁸ (i.e. temporary son of two fathers). The *anitya dvymushyayana* is unknown to modern Hindu law.⁹

Inheritance in
case of *dvya-*
mushyayana.

The forms and conditions of *dvymushyayana* adoption are the same as in other cases, where the adoption is in the *Dattaka* form.¹⁰ The boy adopted inherits both in the family in which he was born and in the family of his adopter.¹¹

The issue of the *anitya dvymushyayana* seem to have reverted to their father's natural family.¹² As in the case of a *nitya dvymushyayana*

¹ *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolamund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at p. 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58; *Basava v. Lingangauda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at pp. 454, 456; *Chenava v. Basangauda* (1895), 21 Bom. 105, at pp. 108, 109.

² Strange's "Manual," 2nd ed., para. 94; V. N. Mandlik, p. 506; Mad. Dec. of 1859, p. 81; *Basava v. Lingangauda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at pp. 454, 455.

³ *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at pp. 167, 179.

⁴ *Chenava v. Basangauda* (1895), 21 Bom. 105.

⁵ Steele's "Law and Custom," 45, 47, 183, 384; *Basava v. Lingangauda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at pp. 466, 467; *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 537, at p. 543; 3 Bom. L. R. 73.

⁶ *Nilmadhub Doss v. Bishumber Doss* (1869), 13 M. L. A. 85, at pp. 100, 101; 12 W. R. P. C. 29, at p. 31;

Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolamund Das Mahapatra (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at pp. 50, 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58.

⁷ *Behari Lal v. Shib Lal* (1904), 26 All. 472.

⁸ See *Shumshere Mull (Raja) v. Dalraj Konwur (Ranee)* (1816), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 189; 2nd ed. 216, at p. 221.

⁹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 231.

¹⁰ *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 537, at p. 542; 3 Bom. L. R. 73. See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 376.

¹¹ See "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 5, para 25.

¹² W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 71, referred to in *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolamund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at p. 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58. See "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 6, paras. 41-44; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 122, 123.

effectually as a *Dattaka* son.¹ The adoption of a boy as a *dvyamushyayana* under these circumstances seems to have arisen from a desire to reconcile the prohibition against the adoption of an only son with the recommendation to adopt the son of a brother. There is no necessity to evade a prohibition which has now been held to have no legal force.

In some parts of India a *nitya dvyamushyayana* seems to be quite obsolete.² It is obsolete on the east coast, but is said to be the ordinary form of adoption recognized in Malabar and amongst the Nambudri Brahmins.³ The practice has been held by the Bombay High Court to exist among Lingayets, whether the brothers are divided or joint.⁴

It is said to be not at all unusual in the southern districts of the Bombay Presidency,⁵ and it has been recognized by the Judicial Committee in two cases from Bengal,⁶ and by the Allahabad High Court in a case from Bareilly.⁷

Anitya dvyamushyayana.

When from a different *gotra* (family) a boy was adopted after he has been initiated into the ceremony of tonsure in the *gotra* of his natural father, and was invested with the sacred thread in the *gotra* of his adoptive father, as the rites of initiation have been performed by both fathers, he was termed *anitya dvyamushyayana* ⁸ (i.e. temporary son of two fathers). The *anitya dvyamushyayana* is unknown to modern Hindu law.⁹

The forms and conditions of *dvyamushyayana* adoption are the same as in other cases, where the adoption is in the *Dattaka* form.¹⁰ The boy adopted inherits both in the family in which he was born and in the family of his adopter.¹¹

Inheritance in case of *dvyamushyayana*.

The issue of the *anitya dvyamushyayana* seem to have reverted to their father's natural family.¹² As in the case of a *nitya dvyamushyayana*

¹ *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at p. 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58; *Basava v. Lingangauda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at pp. 454, 456; *Chenava v. Basangauda* (1895), 21 Bom. 105, at pp. 108, 109.

² Strange's "Manual," 2nd ed., para. 94; V. N. Mandlik, p. 506; Mad Dec of 1859, p. 81; *Basava v. Lingangauda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at pp. 454, 455.

³ *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at pp. 167, 179.

⁴ *Chenava v. Basangauda* (1895), 21 Bom. 105.

⁵ Steele's "Law and Custom," 45, 47, 183, 384; *Basava v. Lingangauda* (1894), 19 Bom. 428, at pp. 466, 467; *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 537, at p. 543; 3 Bom. L. R. 73.

⁶ *Nilmadhub Doss v. Bishumber Doss* (1869), 13 M. L. A. 85, at pp. 100, 101; 12 W. R. P. C. 29, at p. 31;

Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at pp. 50, 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58.

⁷ *Behari Lal v. Shri Lal* (1904), 26 All. 472.

⁸ See *Shumshere Mull (Raja) v. Dilraj Konwur (Ranee)* (1816), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 189; 2nd ed., 216, at p. 221.

⁹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 231.

¹⁰ *Krishna v. Paramshri* (1901), 25 Bom. 537, at p. 542; 3 Bom. L. R. 73. See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 376.

¹¹ See "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 5, para. 25.

¹² W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 71, referred to in *Uma Deyi (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40, at p. 51; 3 Calc. 587, at p. 598; 2 C. L. R. 51, at p. 58. See "Dattaka Mimamsa," s. 6, paras. 41-44; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 122, 123.

the adoption is complete, it is submitted that the issue inherit in the adoptive family, and in that family only.¹

Failing near heirs, the natural mother² and other natural relations will inherit to a man adopted in this form.

Sastri G. C. Sarkar ("Law of Adoption," 2nd ed., p. 383) says, "A difficult question arises when such a son dies, after inheriting property from both adoptive and natural fathers. It is reasonable that both the mothers should inherit the respective shares of the property inherited by the son from their respective husbands."

If a son is born to the natural father, the *dvayamushyayana* ^{After-born son.} son takes half of what the after-born son takes. If a son is born to his adoptive father, he takes half of an adopted son's share.³

The "Mayukha" says,⁴ "If both have legitimate sons, he offers an oblation to neither, but takes a quarter of the share allotted to a legitimate son of his adoptive father."

Adoption by a widow vests in the adopted son (as the ^{Vesting and divesting of estate.} heir of her husband) the estate vested in her as widow,⁵ or as mother of a deceased son,⁶ or vested in her co-widow,⁷ as

¹ See Sutherland's "Synopsis of Law of Adoption," head v.; R. Sarvadhikari's "Law of Inheritance," p. 533. Sastri G. C. Sarkar says ("Law of Adoption," p. 376) that the descendants continue to belong to both the *gotras* or families.

² See *Behari Lal v. Shib Lal* (1904), 26 All 472.

³ G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 403; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 5, paras. 33, 34. As to what is such share, see *ante*, p. 187.

⁴ IV. 5, para. 35. See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 232.

⁵ See *Mondakini Dasi v. Adinath Dey* (1890), 18 Calc. 69; *Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Mussamut)* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 169, at p. 185; *Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal* (1881), 4 Mad. 160, at p. 164; *Sreeramulu v. Kristamma* (1902), 26 Mad. 143, at p. 152; *Collector of Bareilly v. Nuraen Day (Musst.)* (1868), 3 Agra, 349. It does not affect her *stridhan* property.

⁶ *Jainendra Nath Choudhuri (Rai) v. Amrita Lal Bagchi* (1900), 5 C. W. N. 30; *Ranjit Vinayakrav Jaggannath*

Shankarsetti v. Lakshmi Bai (1887), 11 Bom. 381, at p. 397; *Jamnabai v. Raychand Nahalchand* (1883), 7 Bom. 225; *Lakshmi Chand v. Gatto Bai* (1886), 8 All. 319. See *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 9; 1 Mad. 174, at p. 186; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 23; *Ramasawmi Aiyah v. Venkataramanyan* (1879), 6 I. A. 196, at p. 208; 2 Mad. 91, at p. 101; *Bykanti Monee Roy v. Kisto Soonderee Roy* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 392. A contrary opinion was expressed in *Gobindo Nath Roy v. Ram Kanay Chowdhry* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 183, and *Puddo Kumaree Debee v. Juggut Kishore Acharjee* (1875), 5 Calc. 615, in the former of which cases the question did not directly arise, and in the latter the decision was set aside by the Judicial Committee upon another ground (*Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Calc. 302). See G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 411.

⁷ *Mondakini Dasi v. Adinath Dey*

widow,¹ subject to a right of maintenance;² but, with these exceptions, it does not divest any estate of inheritance which has been taken by a person, as heir of a male holder other than the person to whom the adoption was made.³

This proposition applies only to cases governed by the Bengal school of law, and to property which has passed by inheritance under the Mitakshara system. It has no application to coparcenary property held by the members of a joint family under the Mitakshara school, as to which, see *post*, p. 198.

Illustrations.

(i.) A, governed by the Bengal school of law, dies, leaving a son B, and a widow C, and having given to C a power to adopt a son in case of failure of male issue. B dies, leaving a widow D. C adopts E. E cannot oust D.⁴

(ii.) A, the owner of an impartible zemindari, dies, leaving a son B, and a widow C. B dies unmarried. C validly adopts D. D can oust C.⁵

(iii.) A, a separated Hindu, governed by the Mitakshara law, dies, leaving a widow B, and a son C by another wife. C dies unmarried, and thereupon B adopts D. D cannot oust the heir of C who had succeeded on C's death.⁶

(iv.) A, governed by the Bengal school of law, dies, leaving a widow B,

(1890), 18 Calc. 69; *Rakhmabai v. Radhabai* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. 118, at p. 192; *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250, *Amava v. Mahadganda*, 22 Bom. 416; *Ramji v. Ghamau* (1879), 6 Bom. 498.

¹ Where the estate is vested in the co-widow as heir to her son it cannot be so divested; *Faizuddin Ali Khan v. Tincowri Saha* (1895), 22 Calc. 565; *Anandibai v. Kashibai* (1904), 28 Bom. 461.

² *Dhurm Das Pandey v. Shama-soondri Dibiah* (1843), 3 M. I. A. 229, at p. 243; 6 W. R. P. C. 43, at p. 45.

³ *Bhubaneswari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri* (1885), 12 I. A. 137; 12 Calc. 18; S. C. in Court below, *Nilkomul Lahuri v. Jotendro Mohun Lahuri* (1881), 7 Calc. 178; 8 C. L. R. 401; *Kally Prosonno Ghose v. Gocool Chunder Mitter* (1877), 2 Calc. 295; *Dhurm Das Pandey v. Shama Soondri Dibiah (Mussumat)* (1843), 3 M. I. A. 229; 6 W. R. P. C. 43; *Gopal Balkrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250; *Vasu-*

deo Vishnu Manohar v. Ramchandra Vinayak Modak (1896), 22 Bom. 551; *Dharmidhar (Shri) v. Chinto* (1895), 20 Bom. 250; *Gavdappa v. Girmallappa* (1894), 19 Bom. 331; *Chandra v. Gojarabai* (1890), 14 Bom. 463; *Annammah v. Mabbu Bali Reddy* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 108; *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 114; estate of grandmother, *Drobomoyee Chowdhraïn v. Shama Churn Chowdhry* (1885), 12 Calc. 246; estate of mother, *Anandibai v. Kashibai* (1904), 28 Bom. 461; 6 Bom. L. R. 464; estate of daughter, *Lakshmibai v. Vishnu Vasudev Bele* (1905), 29 Bom. 410; 7 Bom. L. R. 436, and cases below, notes 1-3, and *post*, p. 195, notes 4-9.

⁴ *Bhoobun Moyee Debia (Mussumat) v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279; 3 W. R. P. C. 15.

⁵ *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Naisayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1; 1 Mad. 174.

⁶ *Annammah v. Mabbu Bali Reddy* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 108.

and a son C by another wife, and a mother D. C dies unmarried, and thereupon B adopts E. E cannot oust D who had succeeded on C's death.¹

(v.) A, governed by the Bombay law, dies, leaving a widow B, and an undivided son C. C dies, leaving a widow D and a son E, who subsequently dies. On E's death, B adopts F. F cannot oust D.²

(vi.) A and his sons B and C were members of an undivided family, governed by the Bombay law. B died, leaving a widow D; then A died. On A's death, C became the last surviving member of the coparcenary. C died, leaving a widow E. After C's death, D, having express authority to adopt, adopted F. F cannot oust E.³

(vii.) A dies, leaving three widows and B the wife of a son who had predeceased him. B adopts C. C cannot oust the widows.⁴

(viii.) A and B were undivided brothers, governed by the Mitakshara school. A dies, leaving a widow C. B dies, leaving a widow D. C adopts E. E cannot oust D.⁵

(ix.) A, governed by the Bengal school, dies, leaving a widow B, and a daughter C, and a brother's son D. C dies, then D dies, having given to his widow E a power of adoption. Then B dies. Afterwards E adopts F. F has no right to the property.⁶

(x.) A, governed by the Mitakshara, dies, leaving two widows B and C, and a son D by B. He authorized C to adopt a son in the event of D dying unmarried. D died unmarried. C adopted a son E, to which adoption B was not a party. E cannot oust B who succeeded as heir to her son.⁷

(xi.) A, governed by the Bengal school, dies, leaving a widow B, and two brothers C and D. C dies, leaving a son E. D dies, leaving a widow F, and having given her a power of adoption. After B's death, F adopts G. G cannot compel E to give him half the property.⁸

As to *watan* property, see *Bhimabai v. Tayappa Murarrao* (1913), 37 Bom. 598; 15 Bom. L. R. 783.

In *Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das*,⁹ Peacock, C.J.,

¹ *Drobomoyee Chowdhraia v. Shama Churn Chowdhry* (1885), 12 Calc. 246.

² *Keshav Ramkrishna v. Govind Ganesh* (1884), 9 Bom. 94.

³ *Chandra v. Gojarabai* (1890), 14 Bom. 463. If D had adopted before C's death F would have been entitled to share with C, *idem*, at p. 466, on the authority of *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154; 1 Mad. 69; 25 W. R. C. R. 291.

⁴ *Dharnidhar (Shri) v. Chinto* (1895), 20 Bom. 250.

⁵ *Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju* (1909), 33 Mad. 229. See *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhma-bai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 114.

⁶ *Kallyprosonno Ghose v. Gocool*

Chunder Mitter (1877), 2 Calc. 295. If the adoption had taken place during the lifetime of B, F would have succeeded, but on B's death the property must have vested in the then heir of A.

⁷ *Fazuddin Ali Khan v. Tincowri Saha* (1895), 22 Calc. 565.

⁸ If the adoption had taken place in the lifetime of C then G would have been entitled to share with E; *Bhubaneswari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri* (1885), 12 I. A. 137; 12 Calc. 18; S. C. in Court below, *Nilkomul Lahuri v. Jotrendo Mohun Lahuri* (1881), 7 Calc. 178; 8 C. L. R. 401.

⁹ (1869), 2 B. L. R. (F. B.) 103, at p. 111; 11 W. R. (A. O. J.) 11, at p. 13.

said, "There is no case in which an estate vested by inheritance can be divested by the adoption of a son by a widow after her husband's death."

Although the judgment proceeded on the circumstance that the person in whom the estate was vested had assented to the adoption, it is said in *Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji Krishnarav*,¹ "For the purposes of inheritance the adoption may be considered as relating back to the death of the adoptive father divesting all estates which have during the intermediate period become vested, as it were, conditionally in another." This is, it is submitted, put too broadly. In the same case² the Court, in referring to *Sri Raghunada v. Sri Brozo Kishoro*,³ says that "the person whose estate was there divested was a male full owner," but in the case cited the parties were members of a joint undivided family, governed by the Mitakshara law, and the person whose estate was divested had not obtained it by inheritance, but by survivorship.⁴

In *Surendra Nandan Das v. Sailaja Kant Das*,⁵ expressions are used which would seem to apply to an estate of inheritance, but the Court was there dealing with a case where there had been a succession by survivorship in a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law.

So far as the estate of the donor of a power of adoption is concerned, the only persons whose rights of inheritance are superior to those of his widow are his son, grandson, and great-grandson, during the lifetime of any one of whom no adoption can take place, and an heir of one of such persons, in whom the estate has been vested after his death. When the estate has vested in such heir the power is at an end,⁶ and no estate is divested by an attempted exercise of the power.⁷

Invalid
adoption.

Where the power is at an end,⁸ or from any other reason the adoption is invalid, the adoption does not even divest the interest of the woman who purports to adopt.⁹

Will.

Where the widow takes as devisee under a will her interest is not, in the absence of a provision to that effect, divested by an adoption.¹⁰

¹ (1895), 21 Bom. 319, at p. 325.

² At p. 324.

³ (1876), 2 I. A. 154; 1 Mad. 69; 25 W. R. C. R. 291.

⁴ See *post*, p. 198.

⁵ (1891), 18 Calc. 385, at pp. 395, 396.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 130, 131.

⁷ *Bhoobun Moyee Debia (Mussumat) v. Ramkushore Acharj Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279, at pp. 311, 312; 3 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 18; *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Calc. 302; *Thayammal v. Venkatarama Aiyar* (1887), 14 I. A. 67; 10 Mad.

205; *Drobomoyee Chowdhraim v. Shama Churn Chowdhry* (1885), 12 Calc. 296; *Annamah v. Mabbu Bali Reddy* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 108; *Keshav Ramkrishna v. Govind Ganesh* (1884), 9 Bom. 94.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 130, 131.

⁹ *Krishnarav Trimbak Hasabnis v. Shankarrav Vinayak Hasabnis* (1892), 17 Bom. 164.

¹⁰ *Bepin Behari Bundopadhyaya v. Brojo Nath Mookhopadhyaya* (1882), 8 Calc. 357. See *Sarat Chandra Mullick v. Kanai Lal Chunder* (1903), 8 C. W. N. 266, at p. 270.

Where there is a provision in a will that the estate of the devisee should be divested on an adoption, and that the adopted son should take the property, such provision might be effectual.¹

The interest of the widow as executrix is not divested by an adoption.²

It is submitted that an estate cannot be divested by the mere consent of the person in whom it is vested.³ Consent to divesting.

It is submitted that this question depends upon the question whether consent can validate an adoption which is otherwise invalid.⁴ If it has not such effect, then the divesting of an estate would, it seems, not be effected by the act of adoption, but only in the way provided by law for the transfer of property.⁵

Even if consent can operate to divest an estate a distinction might well be made between the cases in which the person so consenting is a full owner, and those in which the estate is vested in a qualified owner; in which latter cases the rights of the reversioners could scarcely be prejudiced by the consent.⁶

Even if the then immediate reversioners should also consent, it is by no means clear that the rights of the persons who should become entitled on the succession opening out would be affected.⁷

Where the consent is necessary for the purpose of validating the adoption, as in Madras,⁸ or Bombay,⁹ effect would be given to it. This question stands on a different footing.

¹ See *Luckinarrain Tagore's* case; Sir F. Macnaghten's "Considerations on Hindu Law," p. 168; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 842, referred to in *Bhoobun Moyee Debia (Mussumat) v. Ramkishore Acharjee* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279, at p. 312; 3 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 19.

² *Bhupendra Krishna Ghose v. Amarendra Nath Dey* (1915), 43 I. A. 12; 43 Cal. 432; 20 C. W. N. 169; 18 Bom. L. R. 347.

³ The decision in *Annamah v. Mabbu Bali Reddy* (1875), 8 Mad. 108, at p. 112, where the estate was vested in the natural father, is expressed on this subject. See *Dharnidhar (Shri) v. Chinto* (1895), 20 Bom. 250, at p. 258; *Vasudeo Vishnu Manohar v. Ramchandra Vinayak Modak* (1896), 22 Bom. 551, at p. 555. In Bombay a different view was expressed in *Payapa Akkapa Patel v. Appanna*, 23 Bom. 327, at pp. 331, 332; *Gopal Balakrishna Kenjale v. Vishnu Raghunath Kenjale* (1898), 23 Bom. 250;

Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji Krishnarav (1895), 21 Bom. 319, and *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 114, at p. 122; *Bhimappa v. Basava* (1905), 29 Bom. 400; 7 Bom. L. R. 405.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 156, 157.¹

⁵ See Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 123.

⁶ This distinction was not made in the Bombay cases (above, note 3), which held that an estate could be divested by consent. In *Payapa Akkapa Patel v. Appanna* (1898), 23 Bom. 327; *Shudappa v. Ninganganda* (1914), 38 Bom. 724; 14 Bom. L. R. 663; and in *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 114, the estate was vested in a female having a widow's estate.

⁷ See *Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh* (1901), 29 I. A. 1; 24 All 94; 6 C. W. N. 169, at p. 174.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 120, 121.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 126.

Impartible
estate.

The rule prohibiting the divesting of estates applies to impartible estates, the succession to which depends upon inheritance.¹

Fraud.

The rule is not affected by the circumstance that the adoption has been delayed by fraud, even when the fraud has been practised by a person who has thereby procured the vesting of the estate in him.²

Maintenance
of widow.

A widow whose estate is divested is entitled to maintenance from the property.³

Persons taking
after widow.

An adoption prevents the succession of persons who would otherwise take the estate after the widow whose estate is divested.⁴

Divesting of
rights acquired
by survivor-
ship.

By adoption to a deceased member of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara law a person acquires such interest in the joint family property as he would have acquired if he had been natural born.⁵

Illustration.

A and B, brothers, formed a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law. A died without male issue, leaving his wife, C, pregnant. Then B made a will directing his wife D to adopt a son, then B died. The next day C gave birth to a son E. Then D adopted F. F became entitled to share the property with E.⁶

Adoption would not, however, divest estates which had passed by inheritance from those who had acquired rights by survivorship.⁷

Impartible
estate.

In the case of an impartible estate, the succession to which is in a

¹ See *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1; 1 Mad. 174; *post*, chap. xvii.

² *Bhubaneswari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahuri* (1885), 12 I. A. 137; 12 Cal. 18; S. C. in Court below, *Nilkomul Lahuri v. Jotendro Mohun Lahuri* (1881), 7 Cal. 178; 8 C. L. R. 401.

³ *Jamnabai v. Raychand Nahalchand* (1883), 7 Bom. 225; *Rakhmabai v. Radhabai* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. 181, at p. 193. As to the maintenance of a widow, see *ante*, pp. 78, 79.

⁴ As, for instance, a daughter, or daughter's son. *Ramkishan Surkeyl v. Srimuttee Dibia (Mussummaut)* (1824), 3 Ben. Sol. R. 367 (new edition, 489).

⁵ See *Karunabdkhi Ganesa Ratnamaiyar v. Gopala Ratnamaiyar* (1880),

7 I. A. 173, at p. 179; 2 Mad. 270, at p. 281; *Sreeramulu v. Kristamma* (1902), 26 Mad. 143, at p. 152; *Surendra Nandan Das v. Sailaja Kant Das Mahapatra* (1891), 18 Cal. 385; *Chandra v. Gojarabai* (1890), 14 Bom. 463, at p. 467; *Vithoba v. Bapu* (1890), 15 Bom. 110, at p. 129; *Bachoo Harkisondas v. Mankorebai* (1904), 29 Bom. 51; 6 Bom. L. R. 268; affirmed on appeal (1907), 34 I. A. 107; 31 Bom. 373; 11 C. W. N. 769; 9 Bom. L. R. 646.

⁶ *Bachoo Harkisondas v. Mankorebai* (1909), 34 I. A. 107; 31 Bom. 373; 11 C. W. N. 769; 9 Bom. L. R. 646.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 193, 194. See *Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 114; *Chandra v. Gojarabai* (1890), 11 Bom. 463.

joint family governed by Mitakshara law, the estate of a person to whom a right has accrued by survivorship may be divested by an adoption to the holder whose rights have so survived.¹

An adopted son is not bound by unauthorized alienations² made, or acts of waste committed by, the widow adopting him, at the time when the property was vested in her,³ or after the adoption,⁴ or by the manager of the estate.

Power to
dispute acts of
widow.

Thus an alienation made by the widow, even before the adoption, can be set aside at the instance of the adopted son, unless it be made under such circumstances as would bind the reversioners.⁵ The Madras High Court⁶ has held that even in the case where the transaction be not such as would have bound the reversioners, the alienee is entitled to retain possession during the lifetime or widowhood of the widow, as in the absence of an adoption she was competent to deal with her own personal interest,⁷ and the rights of the adopted son do not date before the adoption.⁸ There is an unreported decision of the Bombay High Court to the same effect,⁹ but other decisions of that Court have clearly held that the adopted

¹ See *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishore (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154; 1 Mad. 69; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, where the estate of an undivided half-brother, who had succeeded to an impartible zemindary, was divested. This case was misunderstood by the Calcutta High Court in *Kally Prosonno Ghose v. Gocool Chunder Mitter* (1877), 2 Calc. 295, at p. 309; see *Surendra Nandan Das v. Sailaja Kant Das Mahapatra* (1891), 18 Calc. 385, at p. 395.

² As to her powers, see *post*, chap. xv.

³ *Kishenmune (Ranee) v. Oodwunt Singh (Rajah)* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 220 (new edition, 304); *Sreenath Roy v. Ruttunmalla Chowdhraim*, Ben. S. D. A. of 1859, 421; *Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Mussamut)* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 169, at p. 180; *Madura (Collector of) v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 397, at p. 443; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 17; 10 W. R. (P. C.) 17, at p. 24; *Lakshman v. Radhabai* (1887), 11 Bom. 609; *Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath* (1894), 19 Bom. 809, at p. 815; *Natraji Krishnaji v. Hari Jagaji* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 67; *Ramakrishna v. Tripurabai* (1908), 33 Bom. 88; 10

Bom. L. R. 1029; S. C. *Ramakrishna Kuppaswami v. Tripurabai* (1911), 13 Bom. L. R. 940.

⁴ *Ambika Parlap Singh v. Dwarka Prasad* (1907), 30 All. 95; *Antaji v. Dattaji* (1893), 19 Bom. 36; *Doorga Soonduree v. Goureepersaud*, Ben. S. D. A. of 1856, p. 170.

⁵ Cases above, notes 3 and 4.

⁶ *Sreeramulu v. Krustamma* (1902), 26 Mad. 143. See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 417, 418.

⁷ *Sahodra (Mussummat Bebea) v. Roy Jung Bahadoor* (1881), 8 I. A. 210; 8 Calc. 224; *Gobindmani Dasi v. Shamlal Bysak* (1864), B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 48; W. R. 1864, C. R. 165; *Periya Gaundan v. Tirumala Gaundan* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 206; *Bhagavatamma v. Pampanna Gaud* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 393; *Kamavadhani Venkata Subbairya v. Joysa Narasingappa* (1866); 3 Mad. H. C. 116; *Ramchandra Mankeshwar v. Bhimrav Ravji* (1877), 1 Bom. 577; *Melgwappa v. Shivappa* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 270; *Mayaram Bhairam v. Motiram Govindram* (1886), 2 Bom. H. C. A. C. 313; *Prag Das v. Hari Kishn* (1877), 1 All. 503.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 178, 179.

⁹ *Bhaudixit v. Ishwardixit*, S. A. No. 146 of 1905.

son can avoid the whole transaction.¹ It is submitted that this latter view is correct.

As to the limitation for a suit to set aside an alienation, see *Amrita Lal Bagchi v. Jatindra Nath Chowdhry* (1904), 32 Calc. 165.

It is submitted that the same right to question the acts of the adoptive mother applies where she has succeeded to the estate as mother of a previously adopted son or of a natural born son. In *Gobindo Nath Roy v. Ram Kanay Chowdhry*,² it was held that the adopted son could not question an alienation made by the widow when she held the estate as mother, and that case was cited with approval in *Kally Prosonno Ghose v. Gocool Chunder Mitter*,³ and in *Lakshman v. Radhabai*,⁴ but in neither of such two cases did this particular question arise. Mr. Mayne⁵ says, as to the first-named decision, "The decision was given without any inquiry as to the propriety of the alienation, and was rested on the authority of *Chundrabulle's* case."⁶ It does not seem to have occurred to the Court that a mother had no more than a limited estate, which, upon the authority of the case cited, was divested by the adoption. The son then came in for all rights which had not been lawfully disposed of, or barred, during the continuance of that estate."

It is doubtful whether a widow can, when adopting, stipulate that her management of the property shall not be inquired into. Apparently she would have no such power.⁷

Assent of
reversioners.

If at any time before the adoption all the then immediate reversioners assented to the alienation or act of waste, it cannot be questioned by the adopted son.⁸

The adopted son is bound by all acts of the widow within her authority.

A decree against a Hindu widow as representing her husband's estate binds her minor adopted son, and after the adoption an appeal, being for his benefit, must be considered as prosecuted on his behalf, even though he is not made a party thereto.⁹

An adopted son is not entitled to any account of the rents or profits of the estate rightfully received before his adoption by the widow or other person whose estate is divested by his adoption.¹⁰

Alienation by
father under
Mitakshara
law.

In the case of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara

¹ *Ramakrishna v. Tripurabai* (1908), 33 Bom. 88; 10 Bom. L. R. 1029; *Lakshman v. Radhabai* (1887), 11 Bom. 609; *Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath* (1894), 19 Bom. 809.

² (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 183.

³ (1877), 2 Calc. 295, at pp. 307, 308.

⁴ (1887), 11 Bom. 609, at p. 615.

⁵ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 263.

⁶ (1865), 10 M. I. A. 279; 3 W. R. P. C. 15.

⁷ See *ante*, pp. 186, 187.

⁸ *Rajkrishna Roy v. Kishoree Mohun Mojomondar* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 14. *Post*, pp. 486, 487.

⁹ *Hari Saran Moitra v. Bhubaneswari Debi* (1888), 15 I. A. 195; 16 Calc. 40.

¹⁰ See *ante*, p. 178.

law, an adopted son is bound by an alienation made by his adoptive father, or by any other manager of the family, to the same extent as a natural son is bound.¹

He cannot dispute an alienation made by the adoptive father before his adoption,² or any alienation of the separate property of such father.

In cases governed by the Bengal school of law, an adopted Bengal school. son cannot dispute alienations of property, whether ancestral or self-acquired, made by his adoptive father.³

Where the adoption divests the estate of a male holder,⁴ Alienations by male owner. the adopted son cannot question his alienations to the extent of ousting a *bond fide* holder for value, nor can he require an account of rents and profits.⁵

He might, perhaps, where the proceeds of the alienation had been earmarked, or not spent, require the alienor to account for such proceeds.

Adoption does not sever the tie of blood which exists between Marriage and adoption in natural family. the adopted son and the members of his natural family. He cannot, therefore, marry in his natural family within the prohibited degrees,⁶ nor can he take in adoption therefrom a boy whom he could not have adopted if he had himself remained in that family.⁷

A *Kritrima* adoption does not transfer the subject of it Effect of Kritrima adoption. from his natural family. It gives him, in addition to his rights in that family,⁸ rights of inheritance to the person (man or woman) actually adopting him,⁹ and to no one else.¹⁰

¹ See *Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630, at p. 635. As to the right of a natural son, see *post*, p. 283 *et seq.* As to whether the father can by an arrangement made at the time of the adoption preclude the son from disputing his acts with regard to the property, see *ante*, pp. 184–186.

² *Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630.

³ *Ante*, p. 178.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 194–196.

⁵ See *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at pp. 193, 194; 1 Mad. 69, at pp. 83, 84; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 303.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 44, 45.

⁷ *E.g.* he cannot adopt his own natural brother; *Mootia Moodelly v.*

Uppen, Mad. S. D. 1858, p. 117; Norton, L. C. i. 66, referred to in *Narasammal v. Balaramacharlu* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 420, at p. 426, note a.

⁸ *Deepoo (Mussumaut) v. Goureesunker* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 307 (new edition, 410); *Srinath Serma v. Radhakauri* (1796), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 15, note to p. 16 (new edition, 19, note to p. 21).

⁹ *Durgopal Singh v. Roopun Singh* (1839), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 271 (new edition, 340); *Deepoo (Mussumaut) v. Goureesunker* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 307 (new edition, 410).

¹⁰ *Shib Koeree (Mussumaut) v. Joo-gun Singh* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 154; *Sreenarain Rai v. Bhya Jha* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 23, at p. 27 (new edition, 29, at p. 34); *Collector of*

His sons acquire no right of inheritance to his adoptive father.¹

If a husband and wife jointly adopt he inherits to both. If the husband adopts one son and the wife another, the sons inherit and offer oblations to each respectively.²

This kind of adoption is purely contractual. There is no fiction of a new birth into the adoptive family. The son adopted "does not lose his claim to his own family, nor assume the surname of his adoptive father; he merely performs obsequies and takes the inheritance."³

He may perform the obsequies of his natural father or mother,⁴ and also those of his adopters. He would apparently be in the same position as to rights of survivorship in ancestral property in his adoptive family as a natural-born son would be.⁵

EFFECTS OF INVALID ADOPTION.

Effect of
invalid
adoption.

Where there has been an adoption in form, but such adoption is for any reason invalid, the adopted son does not acquire any rights, as such, in the family of the person purporting to adopt him, except so far as he may be entitled to maintenance.⁶

Decrees against him, and acts by him, would not bind the estate.

The following are the cases of an invalid adoption:—

- (i.) Where there is in existence a son begotten or adopted.⁷
- (ii.) Simultaneous adoption of more than one son.⁸
- (iii.) Adoption of the same boy by two persons.⁹
- (iv.) Adoption by a woman without authority.¹⁰
- (v.) Adoption of a boy of a different primary caste.¹¹
- (vi.) Adoption of a boy within the prohibited decrees.¹²
- (vii.) Adoption of a boy where the performance of initiatory ceremonies or marriage before adoption makes the adoption invalid.¹³

Right of
maintenance.

It is unsettled whether, on the adoption being set aside, the boy can revert to his natural family, and whether he has any right of maintenance in his adoptive family.

Tirhoot v. Huopershad Mohunt (1867),
7 W. R. C. R. 500.

¹ *Juswant Singh (Baboo) v. Doolee Chund* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 255. They would, of course, possess the ordinary rights of inheritance to property which was vested in their father.

² See answers of pundits in *Sreenarain Rai v. Bhya Jha* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 23, at p. 27 (new edition, 29, at p. 34); W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 101.

³ Colbrooke's "Digest," vol. i. p. 276, n.; 1 W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," p. 76.

⁴ See *Purmessur Dutt Jha (Chowdree v. Hunooman Dutt Roy)* (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 192 (new edition, 235, at p. 240).

⁵ See Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 451.

⁶ *Ranjit Singh (Raja) v. Ram Chandra Mookerjee* (1899), 4 C. W. N. 415.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 103, 104.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 149.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 148.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 118, 119.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 138.

¹² *Ante*, pp. 138–144.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 146, 147.

In Bengal, if not throughout India, it would seem that a member of one of the regenerate classes who has been invested with the sacred thread in his new family, or a Sudra who has undergone the ceremony of marriage in his new family, cannot revert to his natural family, but he would apparently be entitled so to revert before the happening of those events, and would acquire no rights of maintenance in the new family,¹ at any rate if there had not been a valid giving and receiving.² Where the above-mentioned ceremonies have been performed, or where there is a valid giving and receiving, but the adoption is invalid on account of some personal defect, such as the fact that the boy belonged to a different class from that of his adoptive father, there is authority that he would acquire a right of maintenance.³

It has been held in Madras that where the adoption was invalid on the ground of want of authority to take, there is no right of maintenance,⁴ and that decision has been followed in Bombay.⁵

The difficulty in determining the rights of a person whose adoption is invalid arises from the absence of direct authority on the question as to when (if at all) he can revert to his natural family. An invalid adoption does not *per se* destroy the adopter's rights in his natural family.⁶

Where he can so revert, and loses nothing by the infructuous adoption, no hardship occurs. On the other hand, where he cannot so revert, as when he has been fixed by religious ceremonies in the family of the adopter,⁷ or, perhaps, wherever there has been an actual giving and receiving by persons competent to give and receive,⁸ it is right that he should, if possible,

¹ See *Rajcoomaree Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Nobocoomar Mullick* (1856), 1 Boulnois, 137; 2 Sevestre, 641, note, in which the Court considered that where there has been no power to take in adoption, the performance of the ceremonies will not prevent a return to the natural family. As to this case, G. C. Sarkar said ("Law of Adoption," p. 424), "We have already seen that the performance of the initiatory ceremonies upon a person in the name of a *gotra* is considered to have the effect of irrevocably fixing his position in that *gotra*, hence a person upon whom these ceremonies have been performed in the name of the adoptive family cannot return to his own, notwithstanding the adoption may be invalid (*Rupee Bhadr v. Roopshunker* (1823), 2 Borrodale, 656). It is difficult to see why that rule would not govern the case of an adoption that was made by an unauthorized widow; for the ceremonies in such a case also must be performed in the name of her husband's *gotra*."

² See *Bawani Sankara Pandit v.*

Ambabay Ammal (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 363; *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 362, at p. 397.

³ See *Bawani Sankara Pandit v. Ambabay Ammal* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 363, at p. 367; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 82, 83. In Strange's "Manual," para. 119, a right of maintenance is asserted in every case of an invalid adoption. "Dattaka Chandrika," chap. i. ss. 14, 15; G. C. Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," pp. 420-423.

⁴ *Bawani Sankara Pandit v. Ambabay Ammal* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 363, followed in *Vaithilingam Mudali v. Murugaian* (1912), 37 Mad. 529.

⁵ *Lakshmappa v. Ramava* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 364, at p. 397, followed in *Dalpatsinghji v. Raisinghji* (1915), 39 Bom. 528; 17 Bom. L. R. 566.

⁶ *Vaithilingam Mudali v. Murugaian* (1912), 37 Mad. 529.

⁷ *Rajcoomaree Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Nobocoomar Mullick* (1856), 1 Boul. 137; Sevestre, 64, note.

⁸ Sarkar's "Law of Adoption," p. 421.

receive some compensation for the loss of inheritance in both families. His maintenance is the proper measure of compensation.

But where there is a gift of a boy to a person incompetent to receive, or by a person incompetent to give, the difficulty is the greater. If blame for the invalidity of the adoption can be attached to the adoptive father, as where he has omitted to satisfy himself as to the competency of the donor, or where he has given a power, which is in law invalid, it seems right that his estate should bear the burden of the maintenance. If the reversioner has delayed in challenging the adoption, it may also be equitable to require the estate to bear the burden of maintenance. Where there has been no such delay, and no blame can be attached to the adoptive father, it seems hard upon the reversioner that his interest should be affected by a charge which owes its origin to an unauthorized act. It is impossible to lay down any exact rule for adjusting these equities. The right might properly depend upon the circumstances of each case.

Descendants.

A right of maintenance would apparently not extend to the descendants of the person invalidly adopted.¹ The only texts which provide for the maintenance of persons invalidly adopted, except with regard to those belonging to a class different from that of the adopted father,² only contemplate the expenses of the marriage being provided.³

Arrangement.

In some cases a boy whose adoption is invalid can take advantage of an arrangement made at the time of his adoption, or thereafter.

In *Rungama v. Atchama* ⁴ the father had divided an ancestral property between a validly adopted son and a son whose adoption was subsequently held to be invalid at the instance of the son who had been validly adopted. The latter was required to compensate the former out of separate property belonging to the father.

In *Surendra Keshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee*,⁵ an arrangement affecting the rights of two boys who were adopted simultaneously by two widows was enforced against such widows.

Gift to person erroneously described as adopted.

The invalidity of an adoption would not invalidate a gift by will or otherwise to a person erroneously described as an adopted son,⁶

¹ In *Bawani Sankara Pandit v. Ambabay Ammal* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 363, at p. 367, the question was suggested, but not decided.

² "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 1, paras. 14, 15.

³ "Dattaka Mimansa," s. 5, paras. 45, 46; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 2, para. 17; ss. 6, 3.

⁴ (1846), 4 M. I. A. 1, at p. 103; 7 W. R. P. C. 57, at p. 62.

⁵ (1892), 19 I. A. 108; 19 Calc. 108.

⁶ *Bireswar Mookerji v. Ardha Chunder Roy Chowdhry* (1892), 19

I. A. 101; 19 Calc. 452; *Jwani Bhai v. Jivu Bhai* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 462; *Lali v. Murlidhar* (1901), 24 All. 195; S. C. on appeal (1906), 33 I. A. 97; 28 All. 488; 10 C. W. N. 130; 8 Bom. L. R. 402; *Lalta Prasad v. Satig Ram* (1908), 31 All. 5; *Murari Lal v. Kundan Lal* (1909), *ibid* 339. In *Hira Naikin v. Radha Naikin* (1912), 37 Bom. 116; 14 Bom. L. R. 1129, a similar rule was applied to the will of a *naikin* (professional prostitute) in favour of her adopted daughter.

unless it appear that the validity of the adoption was a condition of,¹ or the motive for,² the gift.

A gift or bequest to a described person with a direction that he should be adopted as a son to the donor or testator takes effect, even in the absence of such adoption,³ unless it appears that the adoption was a condition of the gift.⁴ If it be reasonably clear that the testator would not have made the gift had it not been for the supposed existence of the character of an adopted son, the Court will construe the mention of the character as imposing a condition precedent to the gift.⁵

Where there is a bequest or gift to an unascertained person to be adopted hereafter by the widow of the testator, only a person whose adoption is valid in law can take, even if a valid adoption be inconsistent with the conditions of the gift.⁶

¹ See cases below, note 4. *Manjamma v. Sheshgiri Rao* (1902), 26 Bom. 491, at p. 496; 4 Bom. L. R. 116.

² *Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajeswar Das* (1884), 12 I. A. 72; 11 Calc. 463; *Lal (Mussummat) v. Murlidhar* (1906), 33 I. A. 97; 28 All. 488; 10 C. W. N. 130; 8 Bom. L. R. 402; *Vandrayan Jekisan (Patel) v. Manilal Chhunikal (Patel)* (1890), 15 Bom. 565, at p. 573; *Siddesory Dossee v. Doorgachurn Sett* (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 22; Bourke (O. C.), 360.

³ *Nidhoomoni Debya v. Saroda Pershad Mookerjee* (1876), 3 I. A. 253; 26 W. R. C. R. 91; *Subbarayer v. Subbammal* (1900), 27 I. A. 162; 24 Mad. 214; 4 C. W. N. 304; 2 Bom. L. R. 982. In *Monemothonanith Dey v. Ononinanth Dey* (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 24, there was an actual adoption of two designated persons in accordance with an invalid power. The gift was upheld.

⁴ *Karamsi Madhowji v. Karsandas Natha* (1896), 20 Bom. 718; S. C. on

appeal (1898), 23 Bom. 271; *Abbu v. Kuppammal* (1892), 16 Mad. 355; *Shamavahoo v. Dvarkadas Vasanji* (1878), 12 Bom. 202; *Abhai Charan Ghose v. Dasmoni Das (S. M.)* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 623, differing on the construction of the same will from *Doss-money Dossee v. Prosonomoye Dossee* (1866), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 18; *Manjamma v. Sheshgiri Rao* (1902), 26 Bom. 491, at p. 496; 4 Bom. L. R. 116; *Probodh Lal Kundu v. Harish Chandra Dey* (1904), 9 C. W. N. 309. See Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), ss. 113-123, applied to certain Hindu wills by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870).

⁵ *Siddesory Dossee v. Doorgachurn Sett* (1865), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 22; Bourke (O. C.), 360.

⁶ See *Surendra Keshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee* (1892), 19 I. A. 108; 19 Calc. 513; S. C. in Court below (1886), 12 Calc. 686, where the bequest was to two boys to be simultaneously adopted as sons to the testator.

CHAPTER V.

PARENT AND CHILD (*continued*).

DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF FATHER.

Maintenance.

Maintenance
of children.

It is the duty of a Hindu father to maintain his minor sons¹ and unmarried daughters, provided they are not interested in property sufficient for their support, or are not otherwise capable of maintaining themselves.²

It is his duty to provide the marriage expenses of his daughters, and to cause his son to be educated in accordance with his station in life.

There is no obligation to maintain an adult son,³ except, perhaps, when he is suffering from a disease which prevents him from maintaining himself.⁴

With the exception of a case in Bengal, where it was held that a suit would lie by the mother of an illegitimate child against the putative father for the maintenance of the child,⁵ and of a case in Madras where a decree was given at the instance of an illegitimate son,⁶ the Reports do not show any successful cases of proceedings in Civil Courts against a father for the maintenance of his child. It may be doubtful whether the

¹ Whether natural born, or adopted.

² "Manu," chap. ix. para. 108; chap. xi. paras. 9, 10; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. pp. 112, 113; vol. iii. p. 5; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 67.

³ *Ammakannu v. Appu* (1887), 11 Mad. 91; *Premchand Peparah v. Hulashchand Peparah* (1869), 4 B. L. R. App. 23; 12 W. R. C. R. 494; *Ramchandra Sakham Vagh v. Sakham Gopal Vagh* (1877), 2 Bom. 346, at p. 350.

⁴ See *Premchand Peparah v. Hulashchand Peparah*, 4 B. L. R. App. 23; 12 W. R. C. R. 494.

⁵ *Ghana Kanta Mohanta v. Gereji*

(1904), 32 Calc. 479. In that decision the learned judges relied upon *Run Murdun Syn (Chuoturya) v. Sahub Purkulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18; 4 W. R. P. C. 132, which was a suit claiming maintenance out of a deceased father's estate. The judges go on to say, "But apart from the Hindu law, we should think that, upon general principles, the defendant, having begotten the child, is bound to provide for its maintenance, if that is necessary." It is submitted that there are no grounds for this general proposition.

⁶ *Kuppa v. Singaravelu* (1885), 8 Mad. 325.

duty can be enforced in a Civil Court,¹ but it is submitted that if an illegitimate son can enforce such right, legitimate sons are equally entitled.

It is clear that even if there be a right to maintenance, separate maintenance can only be awarded under very special circumstances.²

On the death of the father the maintenance of unmarried daughters, and the expenses of their marriage, must be provided out of his property.³

Although on her marriage a daughter ceases to belong to her father's family,⁴ and must first look to her husband⁵ and his family⁶ for her maintenance, there is a moral duty to maintain a married daughter who is without means, and who is unable to obtain support from her husband, or after his death from his family. This duty is not enforceable during the father's lifetime, and it has been held that it is not enforceable against his property after his death.⁷

Where a son or other heir is excluded from inheritance on account of disability, he is entitled to maintenance for himself and his family out of the property which he would have inherited.⁸

A father may be compelled, by proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code,⁹ to maintain his legitimate or illegitimate child, of whatever age he or she may be, who is unable to maintain himself or herself.

As to the rights of children to maintenance out of coparcenary property, see *post*, pp. 234, 235, 271.

A Hindu is bound to provide for the maintenance of his minor¹⁰ illegitimate sons¹¹ by Hindu mothers.¹²

¹ K. K. Bhattacharya ("Law of the Joint Hindu Family," pp. 282, 283) repudiates, however, any distinction between a moral and a legal obligation, except in the Bengal school.

² See *Shavatri (Ilata) v. Narayanan Nambudiri (Ilata)* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 372.

³ See *Mangal (Bai) v. Rukhmini (Bai)* (1898), 23 Bom. 291; *Tulsha v. Gopal Rai* (1884), 6 All. 632; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. chap. ii. case 10; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 370.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 60.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 76.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 78, 79.

⁷ *Mangal (Bai) v. Rukhmini (Bai)*

(1898), 23 Bom. 291. See, however, *Mokhada Dasse v. Nundo Lall Haldar* (1901), 28 Calc. 278, at p. 288; 5 C. W. N. 297, at p. 300 Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. chap. ii. case 10.

⁸ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, para. 5; "Dayabhaga," chap. v. paras. 11, 14-16; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. v. paras. 10-14, 20.

⁹ Act V. of 1898, chap. xxxvi.

¹⁰ *Nilmoney Singh Deo v. Baneshur* (1878), 4 Calc. 91.

¹¹ *Ghana Kanta Mohanta v. Gereli* (1904), 32 Calc. 479 (see *ante*, p. 206); *Kuppa v. Singaravela* (1885), 8 Mad. 325.

¹² There is no text of Hindu Law under which an illegitimate son of a Hindu by a woman who is not a

Married daughter.

Persons excluded from inheritance.

Proceedings in Criminal Court.

Illegitimate sons.

After his death his illegitimate sons are entitled to maintenance out of his estate, or out of property in which he was a coparcener,¹ whether impartible or not,² if he was a member of one of the regenerate classes.³ If he was a Sudra they are only so entitled in case they are not entitled to inherit,⁴ or to a share on partition.

Under the Bengal school of law, this right against the father ceases on the sons attaining majority,⁵ but it is submitted that after the father's death there is a right against his property, even if they are adults.⁶ Under the Mitakshara school, they continue entitled to maintenance out of coparcenary property,⁷ whether impartible or not, and also out of self-acquired property which was owned by the father; but the right does not descend to their children.⁸

Obedience a
condition.

It has been said by the Allahabad High Court in a case⁹ governed by the Mitakshara school of law, "Obedience to the head of the family, not the age of the illegitimate descendant, or his capacity to earn his own

Hindu can claim maintenance, and in none of the reported cases has maintenance ever been awarded to an illegitimate son who was not a Hindu by birth; *Lingappa Goundan v. Esudasan* (1903), 27 Mad. 13, at p. 15. See *Addoyto Churn Doss v. Woojan Beebee* (1879), 4 C. L. R. 154.

¹ *Roshan Singh v. Balwant Singh* (1899), 27 I. A. 51; 22 All. 191; 4 C. W. N. 353; 2 Bom. L. R. 529.

² *Run Murdun Syn (Chuotorya) v. Sahub Purhulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18; 4 W. R. P. C. 132; *Muttusawmy Jagavera Yettappa Naicker v. Vencataswara Yettaya* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 203; 2 B. L. R. P. C. 15; 11 W. R. P. C. 6; S. C. on remand, *Coomara Yettala Naikar v. Venkateswara Yettia* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 405; *Pandaiya Telaver v. Puli Telaver* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 478, at p. 482.

³ *Run Murdun Syn (Chuotorya) v. Sahub Purhulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18; 4 W. R. P. C. 132; *Parichat (Rajah) v. Zalim Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 159; 3 Calo. 214.

⁴ *Run Murdun Syn (Chuotorya) v. Sahub Purhulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18; 4 W. R. P. C. 132; *Inderun*

Valungyypooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talaver (1869), 13 M. I. A. 141, at p. 159; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 4; 12 W. R. P. C. 41, at p. 43; *Muttusawmy Jagavera Yettappa Naicker v. Vencataswara Yettaya* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 203; 2 B. L. R. P. C. 15; 11 W. R. P. C. 6.

⁵ *Nilmoney Singh Deo v. Baneshur* (1878), 4 Calo. 91.

⁶ See "Dayabhaga," chap. ix. para. 28.

⁷ *Hargobind Kuari v. Dharam Singh* (1884), 6 All. 329; *Pershad Singh v. Muhesree (Ranee)* (1821), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 132 (new edition, 176); *Rahi v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1876), 1 Bom. 97; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 12, para. 3; "Dayabhaga," chap. ix. para. 28; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, para. 30. These texts are founded on a passage of "Vrihaspati," which confines the right to the case where there is no other offspring.

⁸ *Roshan Singh v. Balwant Singh* (1899), 27 I. A. 51; 22 All. 191; 4 C. W. N. 253; 2 Bom. L. R. 529; S. C. in Court below (1896), 8 All. 253.

⁹ *Hargobind Kuari v. Dharam Singh* (1884), 6 All. 329, at p. 335.

livelihood, is the test by which, under Hindu law, the continuance of the right to receive maintenance must be decided. Till the illegitimate sons reach full age, this test cannot be applied, but thereafter it cannot be ignored. What constitutes docility or disobedience, in the sense of the texts, is a question the answer of which is not easy; but we think that the true answer is indicated in a *Vaivastha*, translated as No. 2, Book I. chapter vi. section 2, of Messrs. West and Bühler's collection (ed. 1878, p. 276), and we think that, on attaining full age, the respondents must, as a condition of receiving maintenance from the estate of Mauji Lal (the father), render to the head of the family such reasonable service as is ordinarily rendered by cadets of a family in that station of life to which the parties belong."

"The Court would presume the natural son qualified to receive maintenance, unless the opposite party could show what, in the contemplation of the law, is a legal disqualification." ¹

The right of maintenance is not affected by the child being the result of a casual connection,² or by the connection between the parents being adulterous.³

The maintenance of an illegitimate son may, like the maintenance of other persons entitled thereto,⁴ be secured on the property out of which he is entitled to be maintained.⁵

In a Madras case ⁶ it was said, "In determining the rate of maintenance, Amount of an illegitimate member of a family, who is not entitled to inherit, can be maintenance. allowed only a compassionate rate of maintenance, and he cannot claim maintenance on the same principles and on the same scales as disqualified heirs and females who have become members of the family by marriage. In fixing, however, the compassionate rate of maintenance for the plaintiff, regard, no doubt, should be had to the interest of his deceased father in the joint family property and the position of his mother's family."

The right of an illegitimate daughter to maintenance under the Hindu law has been denied.⁷ Illegitimate daughter.

A Hindu is morally, although not legally, bound to maintain the widow of his son, even "if he has no fund with the disposal of which his son, if alive, could interfere, and if he has inherited nothing from his son, and has not had his rights in any property enlarged by his son's death." ⁸ Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law.

¹ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 71.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 89.

² See *Muthusamy Jagavira Yellapa Naikar v. Venkatasubha Yettha* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 293; S. C. on appeal (1868), 12 M. I. A. 203 (see p. 220); 2 B. L. R. P. C. 15 (see p. 20); 11 W. R. P. C. 6 (see p. 9).

⁵ *Ananthaya v. Vishnu* (1893), 17 Mad. 100.

⁶ *Gopalasami Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti* (1903), 27 Mad. 32, at pp. 36, 37.

⁷ *Parvati v. Ganpatrao Balal* (1893), 18 Bom. 177, at p. 183. It was not necessary to decide the point in that case.

³ *Viraramulhi Udayan v. Singaravelu* (1877), 1 Mad. 306; *Rahi v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97; *Subramania Mudali v. Valu* (1910), 34 Mad. 68.

⁸ *Meenakshi Ammal v. Rama Ayyar* (1912), 37 Mad. 396; *Janki v. Nand Ram* (1888), 11 All. 194, at pp.

Where her husband had been a coparcener, she is entitled to be maintained out of the coparcenary property¹ although she may have lived apart from him.²

The fact that the father-in-law had sold coparcenary property to pay his debts does not render him liable for his daughter-in-law's maintenance.³

After his death, the persons who inherit his property, or whose interest in property is enlarged by his death, are legally bound to maintain his daughter-in-law, if chaste,⁴ out of the property which they have so inherited, or in which their interest has been enlarged, whether the property be coparcenary or self-acquired.⁵

There is a difference of opinion as to whether this right is independent of any provisions made in the will of the father-in-law.⁶

198-200; *Ammakannu v. Appu* (1887), 11 Mad. 91; *Kalu v. Kashibai* (1882), 7 Bom. 127; *Ganga Bai v. Sitaram* (1876), 1 All. 170; *Khetramani Dasi v. Kashinath Das* (1868), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 15; S. C. *Kasheenath Das v. Khetur Monee Dossee*, 9 W. R. C. R. 413, differing from *Koodee Monee Debea v. Tarra-chand Chuckerbutty* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 134; S. C. on appeal *Khetur Monee Dossee v. Kasheenath Doss* (1868), 10 W. R. F. B. 89; *Rujjomoney Dossee v. Shibchunder Mullick* (1864), 2 Hyde, 103; *Yamunabai v. Manubai* (1899), 23 Bom. 608, at p. 609; 1 Bom. L. R. 95; *Adhibai v. Cursandas Nathu* (1886), 11 Bom. 199, at p. 207; *Hema Kooree (Mussamut) v. Ajoodhya Persad* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 474. In *Chandrabhagabai v. Kashinath* (1866), 2 Bom. H. C. 323, the father-in-law was held liable for his daughter-in-law's maintenance, but that decision was differed from in *Savitribai v. Luzimibai* (1878), 2 Bom. 573, at pp. 583, 584. See *Debur Ramnath Roy Chowdhry v. Arnee Kally Debia (Sreemutty)* W. R. 1864, C. R. 177.

¹ *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 521, see *post*, pp. 234, 235, 271.

² *Surampalli Bangaramma v. Surampalli Brambaze* (1908), 31 Mad. 338.

³ *Ganga Bai v. Sitaram* (1876), 1 All. 170, at p. 177.

⁴ *Koodee Monee Dabee v. Tarra*

Chand Chuckerbutty (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 134.

⁵ *Siddessury Dasee v. Janardan Sarkar* (1902), 29 Calc. 557; 6 C. W. N. 530; *Janki v. Nandram* (1888), 11 All. 194; *Kamini Dasee v. Chandrapole Mundle* (1889), 17 Calc. 373; *Yamunabai v. Manubar* (1899), 23 Bom. 608; 1 Bom. L. R. 95; *Koodee Monee Dabee v. Tarra Chand Chuckerbutty* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 134. See *Rangammal v. Echammal* (1898), 22 Mad. 305, at p. 307; *Devi Persad v. Gunwanti Koer* (1895), 22 Calc. 410, at p. 417; *Adhibai v. Cursandas Nathu* (1886), 11 Bom. 199; *Surampalli Bangaramma v. Surampalli Brambaze* (1908), 31 Mad. 338; *Rujjomoney Dossee v. Shibchunder Mullick* (1864), 2 Hyde, 103, at pp. 104, 105; Jolly's "History of the Hindu Law," pp. 134, 135; West and Buhler, 3rd ed., pp. 245-252. *Contrâ Ammakannu v. Appu* (1887), 11 Mad. 91; *Komulmuni Dasee v. Bodhnarain Mujmoadar* (1823), 2 Macn. H. L. 119; "Smriti Chandrika" (Krishnasawmi Iyer's translation), chap. xi s. 1, para. 34; Mitakshara on Subtraction of Gift, cited Strange's "Manual," para. 209.

⁶ *Parvati (Bai) v. Tarwadi Dolartram* (1900), 25 Bom. 263; 2 Bom. L. R. 894. *Rangammal v. Echammal* (1898), 22 Mad. 305, at p. 307, denies the right of the daughter-in-law. Such right is asserted by *In the goods of Gobinda Chandra Babajee* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 1141.

It is submitted that the father-in-law can deal with his separate property by will independently of any claim by his daughter-in-law.

The daughter-in-law does not lose her right by declining to reside in her father-in-law's house.¹

In a Bengal case ² maintenance was allotted by an implied contract to a Son-in-law. son-in-law, who had lived in his father-in-law's house.

Where the property of the father is impartible, and subject to the law of primogeniture, sons, even if adult, and capable of earning subsistence, are entitled to maintenance where the Mitakshara school of law applies.³ They are also so entitled after his death, as against their brother or the person in possession,⁴ whether, it is submitted, they are governed by the Bengal or the Mitakshara school. Their descendants have no such right.⁵

Grandsons have not, as such, any right to be maintained by their grandfather,⁶ but apparently they have a right to be maintained out of his property if unable to maintain themselves, and granddaughters must be so maintained until marriage.⁷

The marriage expenses of a granddaughter have been held to be properly payable out of her deceased grandfather's estate.⁸

A Hindu is bound to support his father and mother if they are in want. After his death his property is liable for their maintenance.⁹

In a case where the father had murdered his own father and was

¹ *Siddessury Dassee v. Janardan Sarkar* (1903), 29 Calc. 557; 6 C. W. N. 530. See *ante*, p. 81.

² *Govind Rani Dasi v. Radha Ballabh Das* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 205.

³ *Hinmatsing Becharsing v. Ganpatsing* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 94; *Ramchandra Sakham Vagh v. Sakham Gopal Vagh* (1877), 2 Bom. 346.

⁴ *Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagaadda) v. Durga Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagaadda)* (1900), 27 I. A. 151; 24 Mad. 147; 5 C. W. N. 74; 2 Bom. L. R. 945. As to maintenance from *saranjams*, see *Madhavav Manohar v. Atmaram Keshav* (1890), 15 Bom. 519.

⁵ See *Nilmoney Sing Deo v. Hingoo Lall Singh Deo* (1879), 5 Calc. 256. As to a grant in lieu of maintenance see *Raja Jee Bahadur Garu (Raja) v.*

Parthasaradhi Appa Row (1902), 30 I. A. 14; 26 Mad. 202; 8 C. W. N. 105.

⁶ *Kalu v. Kashibai* (1882), 7 Bom. 127; *Mannahim Dasi v. Balak Chandra Pandit* (1871), 8 B. L. R. 22; 15 W. R. C. R. 498.

⁷ See *Chumun Lall v. Gunput Lall (Lalla)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52.

⁸ *Ramcoomar Mitter v. Ichamoyi Dasi* (1880), 6 Calc. 36; 6 C. L. R. 429.

⁹ *Subbarayana v. Subbakka* (1884), 8 Mad. 236; Strange's "Manual," para. 209; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 113-115; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 375; "Manu," chap. viii. para. 389; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 83, 90.

therefore excluded from inheritance,¹ his son was held to be liable for his maintenance.²

A stepson is not obliged to maintain his stepmother out of his self-acquired property,³ but he must maintain her out of family property.

A grandmother and sister (until marriage, and after marriage if destitute⁴) are also to be maintained out of the property of a Hindu after his death.⁵

A mother does not apparently lose her right to maintenance by unchastity,⁶ except in Bengal.⁷

It is also the right and duty of a Hindu to perform the funeral ceremonies and other ceremonies in commemoration of his father and mother,⁸ grandparents, and great-grandparents.⁹

Duty of heir. An heir is legally bound to provide out of the estate which descends to him maintenance for such persons as the person from whom he inherits was legally or morally bound to support.¹⁰

"The obligation of an heir to provide out of the estate, which descends to him, maintenance for certain persons whom the ancestor was legally or morally bound to maintain, is a legal as well as a moral obligation, for the estate is inherited subject to the obligation of providing such maintenance."¹¹

There is a difficulty in determining whether the person claiming maintenance is one whom the late proprietor was morally bound to maintain.¹² The texts lay down generally that he who inherits a person's property is bound to maintain those whom that person was himself bound to maintain,

¹ *Post*, p. 373.

² *Nilmadhab Mitter v. Jotindra Nath Mitter* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 341.

³ *Daya (Bai) v. Natha Govindlal* (1885), 9 Bom. 279.

⁴ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 83. See, however, *Mangal (Bai) v. Rukhmini (Bai)* (1898), 23 Bom. 291.

⁵ Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 370.

⁶ See *Valu v. Ganga* (1882), 7 Bom 84, at p. 90.

⁷ Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 371, note.

⁸ *Sundarji Damji v. Dukhbai* (1904), 29 Bom. 316; 6 Bom. L. R. 1052; *Vrijbhukandas v. Parvati (Bai)* (1907), 32 Bom. 20; 9 Bom. L. R. 1187.

⁹ *Sundarji Damji v. Dukhbai* (1904), 29 Bom. 316; 6 Bom. L. R. 1052.

¹⁰ *Khetramani Dasi v. Kashinath*

Das (1868), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 15, at p. 34; 9 W. R. C. R. 413, at p. 422. See *Mokhada Dassee v. Nundo Lal Uldar* (1901), 28 Calc. 278, at p. 288; 5 C. W. N. 297, at p. 300. *Janki v. Nand Ram* (1888), 11 All. 194, at p. 201; *Rujjomonoy Dossee v. Shubchunder Mullick* (1864), 2 Hyde, 103. This applies to Khojas, *Rashid Kurnuli v. Sherbanoo* (1904), 29 Bom. 85.

¹¹ *Khetramani Dasi v. Kashinath Das* (1868), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 15, at p. 38; 9 W. R. C. R. 413, at p. 422. See *Tarunginee Dossee v. Chowdhry Dwarkanath Mussant* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 196.

¹² *Kamini Dassee v. Chandra Pole Mundle* (1889), 17 Calc. 373, at p. 377. See Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 370; G. C. Sarkar's "Hindu Law," p. 238.

including the persons disqualified from inheritance and those dependent on them.¹

As to when maintenance is a complete charge upon property, see the cases relating to the maintenance of a widow, *ante*, pp. 89-98.

As to the fixing of the amount of maintenance, see *ante*, pp. 86, 87.

Guardianship.

A Hindu father is recognized as the legal guardian of all his male, and of his female unmarried, minor legitimate children,² and is as such entitled to the custody of their persons and property. Right of guardianship.

The adoptive father acquires the same right, even as against the natural father.³

An adult ⁴ Hindu father can, by word or writing, nominate a guardian for his children after his death, and he is unrestricted in the choice of such guardian. He may exclude even the mother from the guardianship.⁵ Testamentary guardian.

He cannot during his lifetime substitute another person to be guardian in his place.⁶

Although the right of the father to the guardianship of his children

¹ *Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvathbai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 69, at p. 77; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, para. 30; s. 9, para. 22; s. 11, paras. 1, 3, 9, 12; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 1, paras. 7, 12, 13, 20, 21; s. 10, paras. 5, 15. The Rishi texts on the subject are collected in R. C. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," pp. 66-68.

² *Mokoond Lal Singh v. Nobodip Chunder Singha* (1898), 25 Calc. 881, at p. 884; 2 C. W. N. 379, at p. 381; *In the matter of Prankrishna Surma* (1882), 8 Calc. 969; S. C. Parameshwari *Surma v. Empress*, 11 C. L. R. 6; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. ed. 1829, chap. vii. p. 103; *In the matter of Himnauth Bose* (1862), 1 Hyde, 111. See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 19.

³ *Sree Narain Mitter v. Kishensoondery Dassee (Sreemutty)* (1893), I. A. Sup. Vol. 149, at p. 163; 11 B.

L. R. 171, at p. 191; S. C. *Nogendro Chundro Mitter v. Kishensoondery Dossee (Sreemutty)*, 19 W. R. C. R. 133, at p. 139; *Laksmibhai v. Shridhar Vasudev Takle* (1878), 3 Bom. 1.

⁴ By not incorporating s. 47 of the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865) in the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), the Legislature has apparently indicated its opinion that the privilege enjoyed by adult Hindu fathers should not be extended to fathers who are themselves minors.

⁵ *Pirthee Lal Jha (Soobah) v. Doorga Lal Jha (Soobah)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 73, at p. 75. See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 6; *Budhlal Manji v. Murarji Premji* (1907), 31 Bom. 413; 9 Bom. L. R. 553; *Mahabaleshwar v. Ramchandra* (1913), 15 Bom. L. R. 882.

⁶ *Besant v. Narayaniah* (1914), 41 I. A. 314; 38 Mad. 807; 18 C. W. N. 1089; 16 Bom. L. R. 625.

has been recognized by the legislature, it is one which is given to him for the benefit of his children, and should he at any time show himself unfit to be guardian the Court will place the custody of his children in a more suitable person.¹

Ample provision is made in the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, for the purpose of protecting the persons and property of infants, and although the Court will have regard to the principle that it is generally for the benefit of infants that they should remain in the custody of their parents, and will also have regard to the personal law of the infant in question, the Courts will, in appointing a guardian, consider only the physical, moral, and religious welfare of the infant.²

Right of
mother,

On the death of the father, or in his absence,³ or in case of his having lost the right of guardianship, and in the absence of a valid appointment by him, the mother is entitled to the guardianship of her minor children.⁴

It has been held that under the Mithila law, the mother is entitled to the guardianship even during the lifetime of the father.⁵

Illegitimate
children,

A mother would ordinarily be entitled to the guardianship of her illegitimate child, and the father would against the mother have no right of guardianship.⁶

Appointment
of guardian by
Court.

A parent is liable to be superseded by the appointment of a guardian under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, but the Court cannot make such appointment when the father is alive, unless he is unfit to be guardian.⁷

¹ See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 19.

² See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 17; *Mokoond Lal Singh v. Nobodip Chunder Singha* (1898), 25 Cal. 881; 2 C. W. N. 379; *Bhikuo Koer (Musst.) v. Chamela Koer (Musst.)* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 191; *Pollard v. Rouse* (1910), 33 Mad. 288; *Tota Ram v. Ram Charan* (1910), 33 All. 222; *Re Gulbai* (1907), 32 Bom. 50.

³ See *Modhoosoodun Mookerjee v. Jadub Chunder Banerjee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 194.

⁴ *Pirthee Lal Jha (Soobah) v. Doorga Lal Jha (Soobah)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 73, at p. 75; *Ram Dhun Doss v. Ram Ruttun Dutt* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 425, at p. 426; *S. Namascavayam Pillay v. Annamai Ummal* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 339, at p. 343; *Kooldeep Narain v. Rajbunsee Kowur* (1847), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 395 (2nd

edition, p. 467); *Kaulesra v. Jora Kasauandan* (1905), 28 All. 233; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," ed. 1829, vol. i. chap. vii. p. 103; and vol. ii. chap. vii. case iv. p. 205.

⁵ *Jussoda Koer v. Nettya Lall (Lallah)* (1879), 5 Cal. 43. There does not seem to be any other authority to the same effect. In *Pirthee Lal Jha (Soobah) v. Doorga Lal Jha (Soobah)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 74, where the parties were governed by the Mithila school, a testamentary guardian, who was appointed by the father, was preferred to the mother.

⁶ *In the matter of Saithri* (1891), 16 Bom. 307, at p. 317; *Venkamma v. Savitramma* (1888), 12 Mad. 67, at p. 68; *King v. Nagapen* (1814), 2 Mad. N. C. 91.

⁷ Act VIII. of 1890, s. 19.

Failing the father and mother, the Hindu law prescribed a succession to the right of guardianship. The elder brother, the elder half-brother, the paternal relations, and failing them the maternal kinsmen were preferred in order of priority; ¹ but their right was not, as in the case of the father or mother, an absolute one. ² In appointing a guardian a Court will be guided to some extent by this order of succession, ³ but it would not give the same effect to the claims of these relatives as it would to the claim of a father or mother.

As to the guardianship of a female minor after marriage, see *ante*, p. 66.

If the minor is a member of a joint Hindu family, the manager of the family is entitled to the management of the joint property; ⁴ but if the family be a divided one, the mother is, failing the father, entitled to the custody of the minor's property; ⁵ and even if the family be joint, she would apparently be so entitled, so far as the minor's separate property, if any, is concerned. Where the mother is manager of her minor child's property, her position necessarily requires her to seek the advice of her husband's relations, ⁶ and she would often strengthen her position by so doing, but the law cannot compel her to seek, or to act under, their advice, if she wishes to take the whole responsibility upon herself.

A father may lose his right to the guardianship of his children by a persistent course of ill-treatment, by conduct tending to their corruption, or by acting in a way injurious to their morals or interest. ⁷ He may lose the right by waiver, as where he has permitted another person to maintain and educate them, and it would be detrimental to their interests to alter the mode of their maintenance in course of their education, ⁸ but except in

¹ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 103, 104; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 71.

² *Kristo Kissor Neoghy v. Kadermoye Dossee* (1878), 2 C. L. R. 583. See *Bhikuo Koer (Musst.) v. Chamela Koer (Musst.)* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 191; *Thayammal v. Kuppanna Koundan* (1914), 38 Mad. 1125.

³ See Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 71; Act VIII. of 1890, s. 17 *Lachmi Narain v. Balaram Sabai* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 190.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 270, 271.

⁵ Sir E. H. East's Notes, Morley's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 50; West and Bühler, 2nd ed., p. 88. In *Motee Singh*

v. Dooluth Singh, N.-W. P. S. D. A., 13th April, 1844, it was held that an elder brother, if not separated, could act as guardian.

⁶ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," ed. 1829, vol. i. chap. vii. p. 103; and see Sir E. H. East's Notes, Morley's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 50.

⁷ See Act VIII. of 1890, s. 19 (b).

⁸ *Mokoond Lal Singh v. Nobodip Chunder Singha* (1898), 25 Calc. 881; 2 C. W. N. 379; *In the matter of Joshi Assam* (1895), 23 Calc. 290. See *Modhoosoodun Mookerjee v. Jadub Chunder Banerjee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 194.

that event he can revoke any arrangement which he has made as to their custody or education.¹

A mother may also for similar reasons lose her right.²

Change of religion.

It is submitted that a father or mother does not lose his or her right by a change of religion.³

Loss of caste.

Under the Hindu law loss of caste apparently involved a loss of the right of guardianship of the person and property of minors;⁴ but since the passing of Act XXI. of 1850, such right of guardianship ceased to be affected by loss of caste.⁵ Where, however, the appointment of a guardian is made by a Court, the fact that the person proposed is out of caste would be a matter for consideration.⁶

Recluse.

Under the Hindu law a father or other guardian might lose his right by permanently emigrating, becoming a recluse or entering a religious order.⁷

Hindu widows.

Hindu widows do not on remarriage *ipso facto* lose their right of guardianship of their children,⁸ but, if neither the widow nor any other person has been expressly constituted by the will or testamentary disposition of the husband the guardian of his children, the father, or paternal grandfather, or the mother or paternal grandmother, or any male relative, of the husband can apply to the highest Court having original jurisdiction in civil cases in the place where the husband was domiciled at

¹ *Besant v. Narayaniah* (1914), 41 I. A. 314; 38 Mad. 807; 18 C. W. N. 1089; 16 Bom. L. R. 625.

² *Venkamma v. Savitramma* (1888), 12 Mad. 67; *In the matter of Sathri* (1891), 16 Bom. 307.

³ Act XXI. of 1850; *Muchoo v. Arzoon Sahoo* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 235; *Queen v. Bezoni*, Perry's Oriental Cases, p. 91. It has been doubted whether Act XXI of 1850 affects guardianship, but the Punjab Chief Court (*In the matter of Gul Mahomed*) has held that a right of guardianship is a right within the meaning of Act XXI. of 1850. See *Kanahi Ram v. Biddya Ram* (1878), 1 All. 549; *Kaulesra v. Jorai Kasundhan* (1905), 28 All. 233; *Shamsing v. Santabai* (1901), 25 Bom. 551, at p. 555; 3 Bom. L. R. 89; *Puillabai v. Mahadu* (1908), 33 Bom. 107; 10 Bom. L. R. 1134.

⁴ See Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 160.

⁵ *Muchoo v. Arzoon Sahoo* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 235, above, note 3; *Kanahi Ram v. Biddya Ram* (1878), 1 All. 549; *Kaulesra v. Jorai Kasundhan* (1905), 28 All. 233.

⁶ *Fuggoo Daye v. Ranah Daye* (1865), 4 W. R. M. A. 3.

⁷ See *In the matter of Ishwar Chunder Surma*, Ben. S. D. A. 1850, p. 471. Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 185; Sutherland's "Synopsis of the Law of Adoption," 2nd head.

⁸ *Ganga Pershad Sahu v. Jhalo* (1911), 38 Calc. 862; 15 C. W. N. 579. Act XV. of 1856, s. 5. This Act has been declared to be in force throughout British India, except as regards the Scheduled Districts (Act XV. of 1874, s. 3), and in the Santhal Pargunnahs (Reg. III. of 1872, s. 3, as amended by Reg. III. of 1886). As to the Scheduled Districts to which it has been applied, see General Acts, 1854-66, 4th ed., p. 121.

the time of his death for the appointment of a guardian,¹ and the Court may, if it should think fit, appoint such guardian who, when appointed, shall be entitled to have the care and custody of such children during their minority in the place of their mother, and in making such appointment the Court must be guided, as far as may be, by the laws and rules in force touching the guardianship of children who have neither father nor mother.²

When the children have not property of their own sufficient for their support and proper education whilst minors, the appointment can only be made with the consent of the mother, unless the proposed guardian gives security for the support and proper education of the children whilst minors.³

A father or other person entitled to the custody of an infant can recover Remedies. such custody by suit.⁴

When the child is within the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, he can apply for relief under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.⁵

Sec. 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890,⁶ gives the District Courts power to arrest a ward and deliver him into the custody of his guardian.

Where the child is confined under such circumstances that the confinement amounts to an offence, sec. 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code⁷ is applicable, and sec. 552 of the same code deals with the case of a female child under fourteen years of age, who has been detained for an unlawful purpose.

The powers of a guardian (*de facto* or *de jure*) to alienate the property of his ward are the same as those of a manager of a joint family acting for a minor coparcener, see *post*, pp. 285 *et seq.*

¹ Act XV. of 1856, s. 3. The application may be made under that Act, or under the Guardians and Wards Act (VIII. of 1890). In the latter case the conditions necessary for an application under Act VIII. of 1890 would apply. Act XV. of 1856 has in this matter no application to women who, by the rules of their caste, are capable of contracting a second valid marriage. In *Kishen v. Enayet Hossain*, S. D. A. N.-W. P., 25th June, 1861, it was held that a woman of the Aheer caste does not by remarriage forfeit her rights to act as guardian of her son by her first marriage.

² Act XV. of 1856, s. 3. See *Khusali v. Rani*, 4 All. 195.

³ Act XV. of 1856, s. 3.

⁴ *Sharifa v. Munekhan* (1901), 25 Bom. 574; 2 Bom. L. R. 617; *Balmakund v. Janki* (1881), 3 All. 403; *Achrathal Jekisandas v. Chimanlal Parbhudas* (1916), 40 Bom. 600; 18 Bom. L. R. 582. See, however, *Sham Lal v. Bindo* (1904), 26 All. 594. The guardian would bring the suit in his own name. For recent examples of suits of this kind, see *Krishna v. Reade* (1885), 9 Mad. 31; *S. C. Reade v. Krishna* (1886), 9 Mad. 391; *Venkamma v. Savitramma* (1888), 12 Mad. 67; *Abasi v. Dunne* (1878), 1 All. 598.

⁵ Act V. of 1898.

⁶ Act VIII. of 1890.

⁷ Act V. of 1898.

CHAPTER VI.

THE JOINT FAMILY AND ITS PROPERTY.

Of what the
family con-
sists.

AMONG Hindus a family is not ordinarily composed only of parents and their unmarried children, although that type of family is sometimes to be found. The family would generally be composed of a man, his wife, or wives, his unmarried children, his married sons and their wives and children, and, in cases where they are not maintained by their husband's family, his widowed daughters.¹

A family of this type, although in many respects complete in itself, may be a component part of a larger family. This larger family consists of all the descendants in the male line from a common ancestor, and their wives, sons, and unmarried daughters.²

Whether the family be of the larger or smaller type, the members would ordinarily live together, being maintained from the common purse, and performing jointly the ceremonies required by their religion.

A family so living together is called by English lawyers a joint Hindu family, and in its ordinary condition the members of it are said to be joint in food, worship, and estate.

"The fundamental principle of the Hindu joint family is the tie of sapindaship.³ Without that it is impossible to form a joint family."⁴

Rights of
members.

The rights of the individual members in the property belonging to the family vary, in accordance with the school of law to which the family belongs.⁵

If the family be governed by the Bengal school of law, sons

¹ See *ante*, p. 207, and *post*, pp. 234, 235.

² See Intro. to "Study of Hinduism," by Guru Prosad Sen, pp. 87-90.

³ See *post*, p. 379.

⁴ *Karsandas Dharamsey v. Gangabai* (1908), 32 Bom. 479, at p. 493; 10 Bom. L. R. 184. K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law Relating to the Joint Hindu Family," pp. 38, 39, 137.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 20.

partition, the separating or dividing members form new families, to which the joint family system applies.¹

The joint family may also come to an end by the death of the last surviving coparcener, in which case, in default of his disposing of the property, his heir takes by inheritance.

“By the nature of the case the joint family must commence, and also must end, when it does end, in an individual who holds the property in a separate condition. If this individual dies without becoming the root of a joint family, the Mitakshara law gives an *interim* enjoyment of the property to his female representatives, when there are any, and then transfers it to a collateral heir as the origin of a new joint family.”²

The joint family system undoubtedly owes its origin to the patriarchal system. As time advanced the exclusive rights of the father became modified in favour of the sons, who asserted rights to an interest in the property, but continued to live together with unity of possession of the family property.

As to the origin of the joint family system, and as to the similarities between it and other ancient systems of law, see Sir Henry Maine's “Ancient Law,” pp. 123–161; Mayne's “Hindu Law,” 8th ed., chap. vii.; Krishna Kamal Bhattacharya's “Law Relating to the Joint Hindu Family,” Lectures I. and II.; Jogendranath Bhattacharya's “Commentaries on the Hindu Law,” 2nd ed., pp. 216–218.

Burden of proof as to family or property being joint.

In a suit which involves a question as to whether a family was joint or separate, or whether a particular property belonged to a joint family, or was the separate acquisition of an individual member of the family,³ the burden of proof would depend upon the allegations in the pleadings or at the hearing, and would, as in other cases, lie on the person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.⁴

This burden of proof would be shifted by the following presumptions :—

Presumption of union.

Every Hindu family is presumed to be joint in food, worship, and estate. The property belonging to the family is presumed to be joint and undivided, the burden of proving a separation being upon the person alleging it.⁵

As to the presumption with regard to property in the name of a coparcener, see *post*, pp. 254.

¹ *Bata Krishna Naik v. Chintamani Naik* (1885), 12 Cal. 262.

² *Ram Narain Singh (Rajah) v. Pertum Singh* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 397; at p. 404; 20 W. R. C. R. 189, at p. 192. See *Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathannu* (1895), 19 Mad. 70; *Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh* (1889), 17 Cal. 33, at p. 36. See *post*, pp. 241, 242.

³ See *post*, pp. 248–254.

⁴ Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 102. See *Bholanath Mahita v. Ajoodhia Persad Sookul* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 336; 20 W. R. C. R. 65.

⁵ *Rewun Persad v. Radha Beeby (Mussumat)* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 137, at p. 168; *Narayunty Lutchmeedavamah v. Vengama Naidoo* (1861),

This presumption is merely a presumption as to the continuance of a juridical relationship,¹ combined with a presumption as to the ordinary practice of Hindu families.² It applies as much to the case of a father and son, governed by the Mitakshara law, as to the case of brothers and other coparceners.³ It takes the place of evidence, and may be displaced by evidence of a state of things inconsistent with such presumption.⁴

It is not necessary, for the preservation of the joint nature of family property, that the members of the family should live in commensality; they may dwell and mess apart, and yet remain joint in property.⁵

The presumption that the family is joint would be weakened, if not rebutted, by evidence of separate trading funds, and property, and independent dealing with such property,⁶ although the family may have been joint in food.⁷

Separation in dwelling and food.

Separate dealings.

9 M. I. A. 66, at p. 92; 1 W. R. P. C. 30, at p. 32; *Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beorchunder Thakoor* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 523, at p. 540; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 13, at p. 17; 12 W. R. P. C. 21, at p. 23; *Cheetha (Mussamut) v. Miheen Lall (Baboo)* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 369; *Prit Koer v. Mahadeo Pershad Singh* (1894), 21 I. A. 134, at p. 135; 22 Calc. 85, at p. 89; *Bhugobutty Misrain v. Domun Misser* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 365; *Taruck Chunder Poddar v. Jodeshur Chunder Koondoo* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 193; 19 W. R. C. R. 178; *Shib Pershad Chuckerbutty v. Gunga Monee Debee* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 291; *Cassumbhoy Ahmedbhoy v. Ahmedbhoy Hubibhoy* (1887), 12 Bom. 280, at p. 309; *Bilash Koonwar (Mussamut) v. Bhawanee Buksh Narain (Baboo)*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 1; *Bissumbhur Sircar v. Soorodhunoy Dossee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 21; *Treelochun Roy v. Rajkishen Roy* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 214; *Beer Narain Sircar v. Teen Cowree Nundee* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 316.

¹ Cf. Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), ss. 109, 114, illustration (d).

² Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 114.

³ *Kallianji v. Bezoni* (1908), 32 Bom. 512; 10 Bom. L. R. 754.

⁴ See *Bholanath Mahita v. Ajoodhia Persad Sookul* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 336; 20 W. R. C. R. 65.

⁵ *Ganesh Dutt Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Jewach Thakoorain (Mussummat)* (1903), 31 I. A. 10; 31 Calc. 262; 8 C. W. N. 146; 6 Bom. L. R. 1; *Rewun Persad v. Radha Beeby (Mussummat)* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 137, at p. 168; 7 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 37; *Nursing Das (Rai) v. Narain Das (Rai)* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 217, at p. 235; *Banee Madhub Mookerjee v. Bhuggobutty Churn Banerjee* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 270; *Hurish Chunder Mookerjee v. Mokhoda Debia* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 564; *Sherajooddeen Ahmed (Shashk) v. Horel Singh* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 116; *Parbutty Coomar v. Sudabut Persad* (1865), 2 Hay, 315; *Gour Lall Singh v. Mohesh Narain Ghose* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 484; *Pearee Monee Bibee v. Madhub Singh* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 93; *Belas Koer (Mussamut) v. Bhowanee Buksh (Baboo)* (1863), Marsh, 641; S. C. on review, W. R. 1864, C. R. 1; *Vurdjengar v. Alagasingyengar* (1807), *Strange's "Hindu Law,"* vol. ii. p. 371.

⁶ *Bodh Sing Doodhooria v. Gunesch Chunder Sen* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 317; 19 W. R. C. R. 356. See *Murari Vithoji v. Mukund Shwaji Naik Golatkar* (1890), 15 Bom. 201; *Makhun Lall Dutt v. Ram Lall Shaw* (1898), 3 C. W. N. 134; *Peary Lall v. Bhawoot Koer* (1862), W. R. Sp. No. 18; *Uday Chand Biswas v. Panchoo Ram Biswas* (1882), 11 C. L. R. 514.

⁷ See *Bodh Sing Doodhooria v.*

Some holdings in severalty. The circumstance that certain parcels are held in severalty does not rebut the presumption as regards the rest of the joint estate.¹

Disruption of unity. Where it is admitted or proved that a disruption of the unity of the joint family has taken place, this presumption has no application.²

When one coparcener separates from the others there is no presumption that the remaining members continue united. In that case an agreement to remain united or to reunite must be proved like any other fact :³ but where a share is allotted to more than one person the presumption will be that such persons remain joint.⁴

No presumption as to time of separation. When it is admitted or proved that the members of the family were not in a complete state of union at the time of the institution of the suit, there is no presumption as to the family being joint at a particular time,⁵ or as to when the separation took place, but it lies upon the plaintiff to prove such a case as would entitle him to the relief which he seeks.⁶

When partial partition is admitted or proved the presumption is that there has been an entire partition both with reference to interest and properties.⁷

There is authority under the Bengal school of law that when one coparcener separates from the others who remain joint, such others are to be treated as reunited,⁸ but it is submitted that such separation in no way affects the status *inter se* of the coparceners who remain joint.⁹

Ganesh Chunder Sen (1878), 12 B. L. R. 317, at p. 326; 19 W. R. C. R. 356, at p. 357; *Gujendar Narain (Rai) v. Harihar Narain (Rai)* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 687.

¹ *Sreeram Ghose v. Sreenath Dutt Chowdhry* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 451.

² *Radha Churn Dass v. Kripa Sindhu Dass* (1879), 5 Calc. 474; 4 C. L. R. 428; *Bannoo v. Kashee Ram* (1877), 3 Calc. 315; *Vaidyanatha Aiyar v. Aiyasamy Aiyar* (1908), 32 Mad. 191; *Badul Singh v. Chutterdhare Singh* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 558; *Nomungowda v. Bhurmungowda* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C. 43.

³ *Balabhar Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai* (1903), 30 I. A. 130; 30 Calc. 725; 7 C. W. N. 642; 5 Bom. L. R. 469; *Rudha Churn Dass v. Kripa Sindhu Dass* (1879), 5 Calc. 474; 4 C. L. R. 428; *Kulada Proshad Panday v. Haripoda Chatterjee* (1912), 40 Calc. 407; 17 C. W. N. 102 (a case where one of the family had become a Christian); *Babaji Akoba v. Duttu Lazman* (1912), 37 Bom. 64; 14 Bom. L. R. 923. See, however, *Upendranarain Myti v. Gopernath Bera* (1883), 9 Calc. 817; 12 C. L. R. 356. It was held in

Ranganatha Rao v. Narayanasami Naicker (1900), 31 Mad. 482, that there is no presumption of a general division among all the members of a coparcenary from the fact that one of its members has separated.

⁴ See *Durga Dei v. Balmakund* (1906), 29 All. 93.

⁵ *Obhoy Churn Ghose v. Gobind Chunder Dey* (1882), 9 Calc. 237, at p. 243.

⁶ *Ram Ghulam Singh v. Ram Behari Singh* (1895), 18 All. 90.

⁷ *Vaidyanatha Aiyar v. Aiyasami Aiyar* (1908), 32 Mad. 191, at p. 195; *Anandibai v. Harisuba Pai* (1911), 35 Bom. 293; 13 Bom. L. R. 287, see *post*, pp. 340, 343, 344.

⁸ *Jaudub Chunder Ghose v. Benod-bharry Ghose* (1862), 1 Hyde, 214; *Petambur Dutt v. Hurish Chunder Dutt* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 200. See *Kesabram Mahapatrar v. Nandkishor Mahapatrar* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 7. As to reunion, see *post*, pp. 359, 360.¹

⁹ See *Upendranarain Myti v. Gopernath Bera* (1883), 9 Calc. 817; 12 C. L. R. 356; *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at pp. 156, 157. *Post*, p. 344.

"The strength of the presumption necessarily varies in every case. The presumption of union is stronger in the case of brothers than in the case of cousins, and the farther you go from the founder of the family, the presumption becomes weaker and weaker."¹

In practice a family does not continue joint for many generations. It has been said² that "in no case . . . will it be found that the diluted degree of blood relationship amongst the members of the complex family group extends beyond the fourth degree." Another writer says, "I doubt whether at this day there is a single undivided Hindu family throughout India, in which persons related to one another by a common ancestor beyond the seventh degree are to be found living together, or holding property in common."³ The seventh degree, which is the limit of sapindaship,⁴ seems always to have been the limit.⁵

The presumption as to union applies to new families formed from the separation of members of an old family.⁶

The property belonging to a joint family is hereinafter called the coparcenary property.

The expression used in the Mitakshara is translated as "ancestral property,"⁷ i.e. property transmitted in the direct male line from a common ancestor; but having regard to the fact that under the decisions⁸ all property held by the members of a Mitakshara family, as such, is ordinarily coparcenary property, and that in every case it cannot properly be described as "ancestral," it is, I think, more convenient to use the term "coparcenary."

WHO ARE COPARCENERS.

The members of the family who are entitled to an interest in the property of the family are hereinafter called coparceners.

Under the Bengal school the coparceners consist of the persons, whether male or female, entitled to shares in the coparcenary property by inheritance, transfer, or a will, or by

¹ *Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vitthal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 444, at p. 468. Mr. Ellis' remarks, Strange's "Hindu Law," ii. 347.

² Introduction to "Study of Hinduism," by G. P. Sen, p. 89.

³ K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law Relating to the Joint Hindu Family," p. 137.

⁴ See *post*, p. 379.

⁵ K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law

Relating to the Joint Hindu Family," pp. 136-138.

⁶ *Bata Krishna Naik v. Chintamani Naik* (1885), 12 Cal. 262.

⁷ *Pitrarjit*, as distinguished from *Swarjit*, self-acquired.

⁸ *Post*, pp. 238, 239. See *Karsondas Dharamsey v. Gangabai* (1908), 32 Bom. 479; 10 Bom. L. R. 184; *Haridas Lalji v. Narotam Raghavji* (1912), 14 Bom. L. R. 237.

virtue of some other mode of acquisition.¹ These shares are defined.²

There is under that school no right of survivorship. On the death of a coparcener his share passes by inheritance or by will. A son, therefore, cannot, as such,³ as under the Mitakshara law, be a coparcener with his father.⁴

Power of
dispositiⁿ.

Under the Bengal school of law a Hindu may, without any restriction, dispose of his property⁵ (although it may be an undivided share),⁶ whether ancestral or self-acquired, by sale, mortgage, gift, or will, whether in favour of strangers or in favour of some of his own issue or relations, to the exclusion of others.⁷

This applies also to property,⁸ the succession to which is governed by the law of primogeniture.⁹

The sons do not acquire any right in their father's property except under his will or as his heirs.¹⁰

In *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundhoo Mullick* (1857),¹¹ the Supreme Court of Bengal laid down the following propositions with regard to joint property governed by the Bengal school of law :—

1. "Each of the co-sharers has a right to call for a partition,¹² but until

¹ As, for instance, when the property has been acquired by the joint exertions of the members of the family, or where persons who are not coparceners have been treated as such by the real coparceners; cf. *Girhi Rani Misrani v. Chandra Lal Kanth* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 62.

² *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundoo Mullick* (1857), 6 M. I. A. 526, at p. 533; 4 W. R. P. C. 114, at p. 115; *Rajkishore Lahoory v. Gobind Chunder Lahoory* (1875), 1 Cal. 27; 24 W. R. C. R. 234; 4 I. A. 153; see *Shro Soondary v. Purthee Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 147.

³ There might be a case of a son taking by a transfer or a will a share in property in which his father is also a sharer.

⁴ See *Bejoy Krishna Ghosh v. Ashutosh Ghosh* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 396.

⁵ The property is not coparcenary property, but is on the same footing as self-acquired property.

⁶ *Post*, p. 299.

⁷ *Ramkishore Acharj Chowdree v. Bhobunmoyee Debea Chowdrain*,

Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 229, at pp. 250, 251; *Bhobunmoyee Debea Chowdrain v. Ramkishore Acharj Chowdree* Ben. S. D. A. 1860, p. 485, at p. 489; *Kumla Kaunt Chukerbutty v. Gooroo Gorind Chowdree* (1829), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 322 (2nd ed. 410); Certificate of judges of Bengal Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, set out in 6 Ben. Sel. R. at p. 73 (2nd ed., p. 85); *Tarnee Churn v. Dasee Dasee (Mussummaut)* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 397 (2nd ed., p. 530); *Debendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry v. Brojendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry* (1890), 17 Cal. 886; *Shamachurn Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana,"* 2nd ed., 552 et seq.

⁸ *Uddoy Additya Deb v. Jadublal Additya Deb* (1879), 5 Cal. 113; 4 C. L. R. 181; S. C. on appeal (1881), 8 I. A. 248; 8 Cal. 199. *Narain Khootia v. Lokenath Khootia* (1881), 7 Cal. 461; 9 C. L. R. 243.

⁹ *Post*, pp. 264, 265.

¹⁰ See *Dharmadas Kundu v. Amulya Dhan Kundu* (1906), 10 C. W. N. 765.

¹¹ 6 M. I. A. 526, at p. 539.

¹² "Dayabhaga," chap. iii. s. 1, para. 16.

such partition takes place . . . the whole remains common stock; the co-sharers being equally interested in every part of it.

2. "On the death of an original co-sharer his heirs stand in his place and succeed to his rights as they stood at his death; his rights may also, in his lifetime, pass to strangers, either by alienation, or, as is the case of creditors, by operation of law;¹ . . . but in all cases those who come in, in the place of the original co-sharer, by inheritance, assignment, or operation of law, can take only his rights as they stand, including, of course, the right to call for a partition.

3. "Whatever increment is made to the common stock, whilst the estate continues joint, falls into and becomes part of that stock."

Under the Mitakshara law a male Hindu acquires by birth or adoption a vested interest in all coparcenary property² (whether ancestral or not,³ and whether acquired before or after his birth⁴ or adoption,⁵ as the case may be), held by his father, or father's father, or father's father's father, at the time of his birth⁶ or adoption, as the case may be, as members of a joint family even during their lifetime.⁷

Coparceners according to the Mitakshara.

Those persons who by birth or adoption so acquire an interest in the coparcenary property are coparceners.⁸ A person can

¹ *Post*, pp. 299-301.

² He does not by birth acquire an interest in a mere right of suit, or in an equitable right to procure an alteration in a grant: *Ujagar Singh (Chaudhri) v. Priam Singh (Chaudhri)* (1881), 8 I. A. 190; 4 All. 120. He acquires an interest in *debutter* property; *Ram Chandra Panda v. Ram Krishna Mahapatra* (1906), 33 Calc. 507.

³ *Karsondas Dharamsey v. Gungabai* (1908), 32 Bom. 479; 10 Bom. L. R. 184; see, however, *Jamna Prasad v. Ram Partap* (1907), 29 All. 667.

⁴ *Ramanna v. Venkata* (1888), 11 Mad. 246; *Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Sir Mangaldas Nakhubhoy* (1886), 10 Bom. 528, at p. 581; *Isree Pershad Singh v. Nasib Kooer* (1884), 10 Calc. 1017, at p. 1021; *contrâ* per Mitter, J., *Gunga Prasad v. Ajudhya Pershad* (1881), 8 Calc. 131, at p. 134; *S. C. Gunga Pershad v. Sheodyal Singh*, 9 C. L. R. 417, at p. 420.

⁵ *Sudanund Mohapatra v. Soorjo Monee Dayee* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 436.

⁶ He acquires no interest in property which had ceased to belong to the family at the time of his birth; *Lachmi*

Narain Prasad v. Kishan Kishore Chand (1915), 38 All. 126.

⁷ *Suraj Bunsil Koer v. Sheo Prashad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at pp. 99, 100; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 164; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 232; *Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Persad* (1867), B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 731; 8 W. R. C. R. 15; 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 216; *Sudarshanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at p. 155; *Karuppar Nachiar v. Sankaranaryana Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300, at p. 313; *Subbayya v. Surayya* (1887), 10 Mad. 251, at p. 254; *Sartaj Kuari (Rani) v. Deoraj Kuari (Ram)* (1888), 15 I. A. 51, at p. 61; 10 All. 272, at pp. 284, 285; *Ram Narayan Singh (Rajah) v. Pertum Singh* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 397, at pp. 401, 402; 20 W. R. C. R. 189, at p. 190; *Goor Surun Doss v. Ram Surun Bhukul* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 54; *Sudanund Mohapatra v. Soorjo Monee Dayee* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 436.

⁸ They have, individually, no proprietary right until partition, which is treated by the Mitakshara as one of the sources of such right. See *Chuckun Lall Singh v. Poran Chunder Singh* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 483.

also become a coparcener by the death of an ancestor whose existence excludes him from the coparcenership.¹

All the coparceners are male descendants in the male line of the acquirer of the property.²

It is also said to be possible that a person can become a coparcener by treatment as such by the coparceners.³

Where property is acquired jointly by members of a family they are all coparceners therein.⁴

The interest that a son acquires is equal to that of his father. He does not acquire his title through his father, but separately and independently of his father.⁵ He has no independent dominion over the property.⁶

The distance in degree from the founder of the family does not affect the right of coparcenership,⁷ but the coparceners are limited to the head of each stock, and his sons, son's sons, and son's son's sons.⁸

Thus the body of coparceners cannot include any individual together with a male descendant of his other than his son, grandson, or great-grandson, or, in other words, no man can be a coparcener if his great-great-grandfather is also a coparcener.

If either his father, grandfather, or great-grandfather survive his great-great-grandfather, then he steps into the coparcenary on the death of the great-great-grandfather. If they all predecease his great-great-grandfather, he does not take, but the interest survives to the collaterals, if any. If there is no coparcener, then the heir of the great-great-grandfather takes by inheritance.

In *Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vitthal* ⁹ (1873), Nanabhay Haridas, J., said, "The rule which I deduce from the authority on the subject is not that a partition cannot be demanded by one more than four degrees removed from the acquirer or original owner of the property, sought to be divided, but that it cannot be demanded by one more than four degrees

¹ Below.

² Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 323.

³ *Girhi Rani Misrani v. Chandra Lal Kanth* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 62.

⁴ *Post*, p. 239.

⁵ *Sundar Lal v. Chhitar Mal* (1906), 29 All. 1.

⁶ *Baldeo Das v. Sham Lal* (1875), 1 All. 77; *Beer Kishore Suhye Singh (Baboo) v. Hur Bullub Narain Singh (Baboo)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 502.

⁷ *Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vitthal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 444; *Yenumala Gavuridevamma Garu (Sri*

Rajah) v. Yenumala Ramandora Garu (Sri Rajah) (1870), 6 Mad. H. C. 93; *Girwurdharee Sing (Baboo) v. Kulahul Sing* (1825), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 9 (new edition, 12).

⁸ See *Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vitthal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 444, at p. 449; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 323.

⁹ 10 Bom. H. C. Rep. 444, at p. 465. As to the application of this principle to an impartible estate, see *Yenumala Gavuridevamma Garu (Sri Rajah) v. Yenumala Ramandora Garu (Sri Rajah)* (1870), 6 Mad. H. C. 93.

removed from the last owner, however remote he may be from the original owner thereof."

This is the only case in which a male member of a Mitakshara family who is free from defects which operate as grounds for exclusion from partition,¹ is not a coparcener. As he is not a *sapinda* of his great-great-grandfather, he does not on his death, in that case, become a coparcener.

An illegitimate son of a member of one of the three regenerate classes acquires no rights as coparcener in coparcenary property.² Illegitimate son

According to the Mitakshara school, an illegitimate son of a Sudra can inherit³ and be a coparcener, if he be not the result of adulterous⁴ or incestuous intercourse.⁵

An illegitimate son of a Sudra does not acquire an interest by birth, and therefore cannot claim partition against his father, or against his father's coparceners,⁶ other than the sons of his father, or dispute his father's dealings with the coparcenary property,⁷ but his father can permit him to have a share of the coparcenary property,⁸ equal to that of a legitimate son.⁹

On the death of his father he becomes a coparcener with the legitimate sons, and on their deaths takes by survivorship.¹⁰

¹ *Post*, pp. 228, 229.

² *Roshan Singh v. Balwant Singh* (1899), 27 I. A. 51, at p. 56; 22 All. 191, at p. 197; 2 Bom. L. R. 529; *Ran Murdun Syn (Chhoturya) v. Sahub Purhulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18; 4 W. R. P. C. 132. As to his right of maintenance, see *ante*, pp. 207, 208.

³ *Rahi v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97; *Sadu v. Baiza* (1878), 4 Bom. 37; *Sarasuti v. Mannu* (1879), 2 All. 134; *Hargobind Kuari v. Dharam Singh* (1884), 6 All. 329; *Krishnayyan v. Muttusami* (1883), 7 Mad. 407; *N. Krishnamma v. N. Papa* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 234; *Brindavana v. Radhamani* (1888), 12 Mad. 72, at p. 86. See *Inderun Valungyooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandra Talaver* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 141, at p. 159; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 4; 12 W. R. P. C. 41, at p. 43; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 179; "Yajnavalkya," chap. ii. para. 135; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. xii.

⁴ *Rahi v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97; *Vencatachella Chetty v. Parvatham* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 134; *Dalip v. Ganpat* (1886),

8 All. 387.

⁵ *Datti Parisi Nayudu v. Datti Bangaru Nayudu* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 204. The right is not subject to a further condition that a marriage could have taken place between the father and the mother according to the custom of the caste to which the mother belonged: *Soundararajan v. Arunachalam Chetty* (1915), 39 Mad. 136.

⁶ *Krishnayyan v. Muttusami* (1883), 7 Mad. 407.

⁷ *Ram Saran Garain v. Tekchand Garain* (1900), 28 Calc. 194.

⁸ *Ram Saran Garain v. Tekchand Garain* (1900), 28 Calc. 194, at p. 203; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 12; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, para. 32; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 143.

⁹ *Karuppannan Chetti v. Bulokam Chetti* (1899), 23 Mad. 16.

¹⁰ *Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra (Raja) v. Nityanund Mansingh* (1890), 17 I. A. 128; 18 Calc. 151. S. C. in Court below (1885), 11 Calc. 702; *Sadu v. Baiza* (1878), 4 Bom. 37, at pp. 44, 45.

He can bring a suit against them for partition,¹ and his sons are entitled to share with the sons of legitimate sons.²

In case of a partition between the illegitimate sons and legitimate sons, the former are each entitled only to half a share of one of the latter.³

As he does not represent his father he has no right as against the undivided brothers of his father or against the sons of such brothers.⁴

He is thus only by right a coparcener when there are legitimate sons, and the father has died separated from his brothers.⁵

An illegitimate son who cannot inherit, or be a coparcener, is entitled to maintenance out of the property in which his father was a coparcener.⁶ This right can be enforced against impartible property.⁷

As to his right of inheritance, see *post*, pp. 382-385, 423.

Under the Mitakshara law, a woman cannot become a coparcener⁸ with male coparceners.⁹

There is nothing to prevent a female member of the family acquiring a right by adverse possession.¹⁰

Exclusion
from copar-
cenership.

Under all the schools of law, those who by Hindu law are incapacitated by physical infirmity from inheriting, are also incapacitated from taking as coparceners, or from taking a share on a partition, but if they would otherwise be coparceners they are entitled to maintenance¹¹ for themselves and for the persons whom they are legally or morally bound to support,¹²

¹ *Thangam Pillai v. Suppa Pillai* (1888), 12 Mad. 401.

² *Fakirappa v. Fakirappa* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 809.

³ *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1887), 10 Mad. 334, at p. 344; *Chellammal v. Ranganaiham Pillai* (1910), 34 Mad. 277; *Vencataram v. Vencata Lutchemee Ummal* (1817), 2 Str. N. C. 127, at p. 137; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 11; "Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, para. 32; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 143.

⁴ *Krishnayyan v. Muttusami* (1883), 7 Mad. 407; *Ranoji v. Kandoji* (1885), 8 Mad. 567; *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1887), 10 Mad. 334, at p. 346; *Gopalasami Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti* (1903), 27 Mad. 32.

⁵ See *Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan* (1901), 25 Mad. 519, at pp. 521, 522.

⁶ "Dayabhaga," chap. ix. para. 28; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 12, para. 3. See *ante*, p. 208.

⁷ *Run Murdun Syn (Chuoturya) v. Sahub Purhulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18; 4 W. R. P. C. 132; *Muttusawmy Jagavera Yettappa Naicker v. Vencataswara Yettaya* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 203; 2 B. L. R. (P. C.) 15; 11 W. R. P. C. 6, *ante*, p. 208.

⁸ *Punna Bhee v. Radhakissen Das* (1903), 31 Calc. 476.

⁹ As to the cases where women hold jointly, see *post*, pp. 327, 328.

¹⁰ *Sham Koer v. Dah Koer* (1902), 29 I. A. 132; 29 Calc. 664; 6 C. W. N. 657; 4 Bom. L. R. 547.

¹¹ *Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Laljee Suhye (Lalla)* (1881), 8 Calc. 149; 9 C. L. R. 457; *Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut* (1882), 8 Calc. 919; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 11; "Dayabhaga," chap. v.; "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. iii.; *post*, p. 271.

¹² *Ante*, pp. 206-212.

and on a partition of the coparcenary property provision should be made for such maintenance.

As to the grounds of exclusion from inheritance, see *post*, pp. 368-374.

A physical defect, which although not congenital excludes from inheritance, will, if it develops before separation or partition, exclude from the coparcenary.

This is the view taken by the Bengal High Court,¹ and is based upon the *Mitakshara*.² The Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary view,³ on the ground that the right vests on birth. It bases its decision upon a case of inheritance,⁴ which stands upon a different footing. It is, it is submitted, clear that the view of the former Court is correct.

An excluded person who is cured of his malady after partition is apparently entitled to a share.⁵

This is an exception to the ordinary rule of Hindu law that an estate once vested cannot be divested.

A disqualification arising subsequent to separation does not exclude.⁶

It is apparently competent to the other coparceners to waive the objection of disqualification.⁷

There is nothing to prevent a disqualified person from acquiring property by gift,⁸ or otherwise than by inheritance or partition.⁹

Would a coparcener who had murdered his coparcener be entitled on partition to anything more than the share to which he was entitled before such murder? It is submitted that he would not. Cf. *post*, p. 373.

The burden of proof is upon the person seeking to prove the disability.¹⁰

¹ *Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Laljee Sahye* (1881), 8 Calc. 149; 9 C. L. R. 457; *Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut* (1882), 8 Calc. 919.

² Chap. ii. s. 10, paras. 6, 9.

³ *Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar* (1905), 28 All. 247.

⁴ *Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash* (1883), 5 All. 509.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, para. 7; "Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 11, para. 2; "Viramitrodaya," chap. viii. ver. 4; Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," pp. 396, 397, 411-414. See, however, Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed. p. 675.

⁶ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, para. 6. See *Shamachurn Audhicaree Byrager v. Roop Doss Byrager* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 68.

⁷ See *Muddun Gopal Lal (Lala*

v. Khikhinda Koer (Mussumat) (1890), 18 I. A. 9; 18 Calc. 341.

⁸ See *Ganga Sahai v. Hira Singh* (1880), 2 All. 809.

⁹ *Court of Wards v. Kupulman Sing* (1873), 10 B. L. R. 364; 19 W. R. C. R. 164.

¹⁰ *Helan Dasi v. Durga Das*, 1 C. L. J. 323; *Futrick Chunder Chatterjee v. Juggut Mohinee Dabee* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 348; *Chunder Monsee Debia v. Kristo Chunder Mojomdar* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 375; *Issur Chunder Sein v. Ranee Dossee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 125; *Nullit Chunder Goocho v. Bugola Soonduree Dossee* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 249. Cf. *Bhagaban Ramanuj Das (Mohunt) v. Raghunundun Ramanuj Das (Mohunt)* (1895), 22 I. A. 94; 22 Calc. 843.

The effect of exclusion from participation in the rights of the other members of the family is the same as if the person excluded were dead.¹

So where the property of the coparcenary becomes vested in a single member, it is not divested by the birth of a son to the person who is disqualified,² but where it has not so vested the son by birth becomes a coparcener.³

Renunciation
of interest.

In Madras and Bombay a coparcener, governed by the Mitakshara law, may renounce his interest in the coparcenary property either in favour of the body of coparceners, or in favour of one or more individual coparceners,⁴ but in Bengal and the United Provinces he cannot renounce such interest without the consent of the whole body of coparceners.⁵ He can only renounce such interest with the acquiescence of the other members on his being given some trifle out of the family property.⁶

By renouncing his interest, he does not affect the rights of his sons.⁷

RIGHTS OF COPARCENERS.

Rights of
coparceners.

I. Subject to any power the manager may have to make arrangements for the enjoyment of the property,⁸ each coparcener is entitled to joint possession of the coparcenary property with the other coparceners, and to the full enjoyment thereof.

¹ See Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," pp. 420-423; *Bapuji Lakshman v. Pandurang* (1882), 6 Bom. 616; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, para. 9; "Viramitrodaya," chap. viii. s. 6; "Vivada Chintamani" (Tagore's translation), p. 244; "Dayabhaga," chap. v. para. 19; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. v. para. 32; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 11, para. 11.

² *Bapuji Lakshman v. Pandurang* (1882), 6 Bom. 616.

³ *Krishna v. Sami* (1885), 9 Mad. 64. As to the conflict between this case and *Bapuji Lakshman v. Pandurang* (1882), 6 Bom. 616, see Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 842-844.

⁴ *Peddaya v. Ramalingam* (1888), 11 Mad. 406.

⁵ See *Chandar Kishore v. Dampat Kishore* (1894), 16 All. 369. See *post*, p. 302. An arrangement by which the widow of a coparcener was allowed to retain his share was upheld in *Dal Chund v. Soonder (Mussumat)* (1867), 2 Agra, 173.

⁶ *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad 149, at p. 156; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 2, paras. 11, 12; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 207.

⁷ *Shivajirao Madhavrao v. Vasant Rao Madhavrao* (1908), 33 Bom. 267; 10 Bom. L. R. 778.

⁸ *Post*, p. 278.

Although he cannot sue for a share, he is entitled¹ to enforce his right to joint possession by a suit,² and is not necessarily forced to sue for partition.³

In a case governed by the Bengal school of law, the Judicial Committee said,⁴ "If there be two or more tenants in common, and one (A) be in actual occupation of part of the estate, and is engaged in cultivating that part in a proper course of cultivation, as if it were his separate property, and another tenant in common (B) attempts to come upon the said part for the purpose of carrying on operations there inconsistent with the course of cultivation in which A is engaged, and the profitable use by him of the said part, and A resists and prevents such entry, not in denial of B's title, but simply with the object of protecting himself in the profitable enjoyment of the land, such conduct on the part of A would not entitle B to a decree for joint possession. . . . In India, a large proportion of the land, including many very large estates, is held in undivided shares, and if one shareholder can restrain another from cultivating a portion of the estate in a proper and husbandlike manner, the whole estate may, by means of cross injunctions, have to remain altogether without cultivation until all the shareholders can agree upon a mode of cultivation to be adopted, or until a partition by metes and bounds can be effected—a work which in ordinary course, in large estates, would probably occupy a period including many seasons. In such a case, in a climate like that of India, land which has been brought into cultivation would probably become waste or jungle, and greatly deteriorated in value. In Bengal the courts of justice, in cases where no specific rule exists,⁵ are to act according to justice, equity, and good conscience, and if in a case of shareholders holding lands in common, it should be found that one shareholder is in the act of cultivating a portion of the lands which is not being actually used by another, it would scarcely be consistent with the rule above indicated to restrain him from proceeding with his work, or to allow any other shareholder to appropriate to himself the fruits of the other's labour or capital."

The mere fact of sole occupation by one coparcener does not necessarily constitute an ouster of other coparceners, nor does it entitle the latter to a decree for joint possession. Ouster means "dispossession" of one co-sharer by another where a hostile title is set up by the latter and when the occupation of the latter is not consistent with joint ownership.⁶

¹ See *Hulodhur Sein v. Gooroodoss Roy* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 126, and cases, *post*, p. 267, note 5; *Surendra Narain Sinha v. Hari Mohan Misser* (1906), 33 Calc. 1201; *Stalkartt v. Gopal Panday* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 197; 20 W. R. C. R. 58; *Nundun Lall v. Lloyd* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 74.

² *Laluchand v. Girjappa* (1895), 20 Bom. 469.

³ See *Kumud Lal Ray v. Jogendra*

Mohon Ray (1914), 18 C. W. N. 609.

⁴ *Watson and Company v. Ram Chand Dutt* (1890), 17 I. A. 110, at pp. 120, 121; 18 Calc. 10, at pp. 21, 22.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 4.

⁶ *Basanta Kumari Dassya (Sreemutty) v. Mohesh Chandra Shaha* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 328; *Israil v. Shamser Rahman* (1913), 41 Calc. 436.

Building, etc.
without
consent.

The Court can prevent a coparcener altering the nature of the property without the consent of the other coparceners, as by building on it, or otherwise interfering with the joint enjoyment.¹ Whether it will do so depends upon the nature of the case. It will not do so in the absence of a substantial injury,² and perhaps also in case he took no reasonable steps in time to prevent the erection.³

By arrangement between the parties, or at the discretion of the manager,⁴ portions may be occupied as a matter of convenience by individual coparceners. Where the coparceners permit one of their number to occupy a particular portion of the property and to improve it, they cannot oust him,⁵ but property does not cease to be joint merely because it is used so as to produce more to one of the owners who has incurred expenditure or risk for that purpose.⁶

Mr. R. C. Mitra, in his "Law of Joint Property and Partition in British India" (2nd ed.), pp. 231, 232, well says, "The Reports teem with cases of individual co-sharers erecting for their exclusive use *pucca* houses on portions of joint land, and the question oftentimes raised is whether such buildings ought not to be demolished. Now, if one of a number of co-sharers intending to appropriate to his own use his share of the joint land should, without partition, take up a portion of such land and build a *pucca* house for his

¹ *Soshu Bhusan Ghose v. Gonesh Chunder Ghose* (1902), 29 Calc. 500; *Jankce Singh v. Bukhoonec Singh*, Ben. S. D. A. 1856, p. 761; *Indurdeonarain Singh (Baboo) v. Toolseonarain Singh*, Ben. S. D. A. 1857, p. 765; *Guru Das Dhar v. Bijaya Gobinda Baral* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 108; 10 W. R. C. R. 171; *Sheopersad Singh v. Leela Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 188; 20 W. R. C. R. 160; *Najju Khan v. Imiaz-ud-din* (1895), 18 All. 115; *Rajendro Lall Gossami v. Shama Churn Lahori* (1879), 5 Calc. 188; 4 C. L. R. 417; *Shadi v. Anup Singh* (1889), 12 All. 436. *Contrà Dwarkanath Bhooyea v. Gopeenath Bhooyea* (1871), 12 B. L. R. 189, note; 16 W. R. C. R. 10; *Crowdee v. Bhekdhari Sing* (1871), 8 B. L. R. App. 45; 16 W. R. C. R. 41; *Chunder Kant Chowdhry v. Nund Lall Chowdhry* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 277. See *Paras Ram v. Sherjit* (1887), 9 All. 661. The encroaching coparcener cannot be prosecuted for criminal trespass: *Emperor v. Ram Sarup* (1914), 36 All. 474.

² *Biswambhar Lal (Lala) v. Raja-*

ram (1869), 3 B. L. R. App. 67; 16 W. R. C. R. 140, note; *Brahmanoy Chowdhurain (Srimati) v. Gopi Mohan Roy Chowdhury* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 188; *Joy Chunder Rukhit v. Bippro Churn Rukhit* (1886), 14 Calc. 236; *Nocury Lall Chuckerbutty v. Bindabun Chunder Chuckerbutty* (1882), 8 Calc. 708; i.e. when the co-sharers cannot be adequately compensated except by removal of the building: Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," 2nd ed., p. 233.

³ *Nowry Lall Chuckerbutty v. Bindabun Chunder Chuckerbutty* (1887), 8 Calc. 708.

⁴ *Post*, p. 278.

⁵ See *Collector of 24 Pergunnahs v. Deb Nath Roy Chowdhry* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 222; *Jotee Roy v. Bheechuck Meah* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 288.

⁶ *Lucmeswar Singh Bahadoor (Maharajah Sir) v. Manowar Hossein (Sheik)* (1891), 19 I. A. 48, at p. 57; 19 Calc. 253, at p. 264. See R. C. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," 2nd ed., pp. 230, 231.

own habitation, he should not be treated as a trespasser. So also if a sharer seeing one of his co-sharers erect a house on a piece of joint land stand by and make no objection, a Court of Equity will presume his acquiescence to the erection of the building. From these two fundamental principles it follows that if the land covered by the building does not exceed appreciably the area that would represent such co-sharer's portion, and, further, if the objecting co-sharers do not object to the erection of the buildings in proper time, a Court of Equity will not favour the claim. But if in the case where the sharer makes his own selection the objection of the other co-sharers is made at or before the commencement of the building operations, a Court of Equity will favour the objectors, unless the portion taken up approximately represents the proper share of such co-sharer."¹ (See that work as to the authorities which establish this proposition.)

In the absence of an express agreement no claim for rent can be made against a coparcener occupying coparcenary property.²

A coparcener cannot, without the consent of the other coparceners, appropriate a share of the proceeds of family property for the purpose of an investment for himself.³

An individual member of a Mitakshara family cannot sue for a share of the coparcenary property,⁴ but he can sue to be put in possession jointly with his coparceners.⁵

There is also authority that he may sue a trespasser alone.⁶ At any rate, he may do so if he joins his coparceners as parties.

According to all the schools a coparcener is not entitled to sue for a declaration as to the amount of his share,⁷ or to sue his coparceners for a portion of the property held by them.⁸ His remedy is by partition.⁹

The possession of coparcenary property by one coparcener

¹ See *Shadi v. Anup Singh* (1889), 12 All. 436.

² *Gobind Chunder Ghose v. Ram Coomar Dey* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 393. See *Alladinee Dossee (Sreenutty) v. Sreenath Chunder Bose* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 258.

³ See *Bona Kooree (Mussamut) v. Boolee Singh (Baboo)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 182.

⁴ *Rajaram Tewari v. Lachman Prasad* (1869), 4 B. L. R. A. C. 118; 12 W. R. C. R. 478; *Phoolbas Koorer v. Juggessur Sahoy (Lalla)* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 48; *Chyet Narain Singh v. Bunwaree Singh* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 395; *Jugoo Lall Oopadhya v. Manoochur Lall Oopadhya* (1872), 19 W. R. C. R. 43.

⁵ *Naranbhai Vaghjibai v. Ramchod Premchand* (1901), 26 Bom. 141;

3 Bom. L. R. 598; *Ramchundra Kashipatkar v. Damodar Trimbak Patkar* (1895), 20 Bom. 467. As to parties to suits, see *post*, pp. 267, 268.

⁶ See *Radha Proshad Wasti v. Esuf* (1881), 7 Calc. 414; 9 C. L. R. 76; *Dursun Singh v. Durbijoy Singh*, 9 C. L. J. 623. As to a suit by a manager, see *Muhammad Sadik v. Khedan Lal* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 154, and *post*, pp. 267, 278, 279.

⁷ *Raol Gorain v. Teza Gorain* (1870), 4 B. L. R. App. 90.

⁸ *Trimbak Dixit v. Narayan Dixit* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 69; *Rutton Monee Dutt v. Brojomohun Dutt* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 333; *Gobind Chunder Ghose v. Ramcoomar Dey* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 393.

⁹ See *post*, Chap. IX.

enures for the benefit of all the coparceners, so limitation does not begin to run against a coparcener until he has been excluded from possession.¹

Limitation.

A suit by a person excluded from joint family property to enforce a right to share therein must be brought within twelve years from the time when the exclusion becomes known to the plaintiff.²

If he does not bring a suit within that time, the exclusion bars his right to relief.³

Where it is admitted or proved that the plaintiff was a member of a joint family, the burden of proving his exclusion, and his knowledge of such exclusion, for the period which would bar his right, lies upon the person asserting such exclusion.⁴

Adverse possession.

It is competent to a coparcener resisting a claim to property, which he is holding separately and which is alleged to be joint, to prove that he has acquired a right by adverse possession for twelve years.⁵ But as the possession of one member of a joint family is the possession of all,⁶ he cannot so acquire such rights unless he proves that the right has been claimed or openly asserted by other members of the family, and denied by him at least twelve years before suit.⁷

Similarly, a person entitled to property as his separate acquisition may lose his right in consequence of the family having held possession adverse to his exclusive right for a period of twelve years.⁸

Contribution.

When a coparcener applies his own funds for the purpose of paying off a debt due by the family, he may be entitled to contribution.⁹

II. A coparcener is entitled to receive from the coparcenary

¹ See cases, below, note 6.

² Act IX. of 1908, Sched. I, art. 127. See *Sellam v. Chinammal* (1901), 24 Mad. 441, and cases cited in U. N. Mitra's "Law of Limitation," in the notes to the above article.

³ *Babaji Akoba v. Dattu Laxman* (1912), 37 Bom. 64; 14 Bom. L. R. 923.

⁴ *Jvanbhat v. Anubhat* (1896), 22 Bom. 259; *Krishnabai v. Khangowda* (1893), 18 Bom. 197, at p. 202; *Dinkar Sadashiv v. Bhikaji Sadashiv* (1887), 11 Bom. 365; *Hari v. Maruti* (1882), 6 Bom. 741; *Malkappa v. Mudkappa* (1912), 37 Bom. 84; 14 Bom. L. R. 931.

⁵ *Bainee Singh v. Bhurth Singh* (1866), 1 Agra, 162; *Runjeet Singh v. Madud Ali* (1868), 3 Agra, 222. See *Bhana Govind Guravi v. Vilhoji Ladoji Guravi* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. A. C. 170; *Parbati v. Musaffar Ali Khan* (1912), 34 All. 289; 16 C. W. N. 1913; 14 Bom. L. R. 480.

⁶ *Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baladeo Das* (1907), 35 Cal. 961; 12 C. W. N. 127; *Asud Ali Khan (Sheskh) v. Akbar Ali Khan* (1877), 1 C. L. R. 364; *Yusaf Ali Khan v. Chubbee Singh* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 122; *Malkappa v. Mudkappa* (1912), 37 Bom. 84; 14 Bom. L. R. 931; *Ahmad Raza Khan v. Ram Lal* (1914), 37 All. 203. This has, of course, no application after a separation; *Vandyanatha Aiyar v. Aiyasamy Aiyar* (1908), 32 Mad. 191.

⁷ *Shurfunnissa Bibee Chowdhraïn v. Kylash Chunder Gungopadhyaya* (1875), 25 W. R. C. R. 53; *Rakhaldas Bundopadhyaya v. Indru Monee Debi* (1877), 1 C. L. R. 155; *Shamrao (Bhaiji) v. Hajimiya Mahamad* (1911), 14 Bom. L. R. 314. See *Lokenath Singh v. Dhakeshwar Prosad Narayan Singh* (1914), 20 C. W. N. 51.

⁸ *Post*, p. 246.

⁹ See Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 69. R. C. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," 2nd ed., chap. vi.

property maintenance for himself, his wife, and his children,¹ and for such persons as he is legally or morally bound to support,² and provision for all usual and proper religious observances which should be performed by himself and such persons,³ also provision for the education of his sons, and for the marriage expenses of his daughters,⁴ or of other female dependents of his family.

As to the amount of maintenance, see *ante*, p. 87.

As to the maintenance of such persons after the death of the coparcener, see *post*, p. 271.

All ancestral property is, while it remains undisposed of and unpartitioned, charged with the maintenance of all persons who are entitled to maintenance therefrom⁵ in the same sense that the maintenance of a widow is charged upon the estate of her husband.⁶

As to maintenance from a *tarwad*, see *Maradevi v. Pammakka* (1911), 36 Mad. 203; *Kunchi v. Ammu* (1912), *ibid.*, 591; *Muthu Amma v. Gopadan* (1912), *ibid.*, 593.

As to maintenance from the property of a *tavazhi*, see *Naku Amma v. Raghava Menon* (1912), 38 Mad. 79.

III. A coparcener is entitled to receive such information as he may require as to the management of the property,⁷ and to be consulted in matters of great importance thereto, such as the sale or mortgage of the property, or of any portion thereof.

¹ *Ayyavu Muppanar v. Niladatchi Ammal* (1862), 1 Mad. H. C. 45; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 108; "Narada Smriti," chap. ix. paras. 26-28; Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," pp. 280, 281. It has been held (12 Bom. H. C. 96, note) that a coparcener who can sue for partition cannot sue for maintenance, but it is submitted that there is no reason why he should be forced to such a proceeding. As to daughters, see *Mankoonwur v. Bhugoo* (1822), 2 Borr. 139, at p. 144; *ante*, p. 207. As to sisters, see "Yajnavalkya," bk. ii. chap. v. para. 124a.

² *Ante*, pp. 206-212. "Narada Smriti," chap. xiii. paras. 26-28, 33; K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," p. 293; R. C. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," 2nd ed., pp. 57-59.

³ "The indispensable duties alluded to in the 'Mitakshara,' are undoubtedly the annual *sradhs*, the ceremony of investiture with sacred thread

among the three superior castes, the marriage of the minor girls of the family, where such marriage must be celebrated before the girls arrive at the age of puberty (see *ante*, p. 33), and other religious ceremonies enjoined by the sacred writings, necessary to be performed at stated times and the non-performance of which would be a cause of sin, or forfeiture of caste, or would lower the position of the family," K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," p. 277.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 52, 53. See *Vaikuntam Ammangar v. Kallapiran Ayyangar* (1900), 23 Mad. 512.

⁵ *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. H. C. 63. As to impartible property, see *Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda) v. Durga Prosada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda)* (1900), 27 I. A. 151; 24 Mad. 147; 5 C. W. N. 74; 2 Bom. L. R. 945.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 89-93.

⁷ See *post*, chap. vii.

IV. A coparcener is entitled to sue to impeach and to restrain the acts of the manager or of other coparceners which are in excess of their powers.¹

V. Except that under the Mitakshara school of law there can be no partition directly between grandfather and grandson while the father is alive, or between great-grandfather and great-grandson when the father or grandfather is alive, every adult coparcener is entitled to obtain a partition of the property when he desires to be separated from the coparcenary.²

This right exists as long as there is a joint tenancy.³

As to minors, see *post*, pp. 328, 329.

Where father
is manager.

"The rights of the coparceners in . . . an undivided Hindu family governed by the law of the Mitakshara, which consists of a father and his sons, do not differ from those of the coparceners in a like family, which consists of undivided brethren, except so far as they are affected by the peculiar obligation of paying their father's debts, which the Hindu law imposes upon sons,⁴ and the fact that the father is in all cases naturally, and, in the case of infant sons, necessarily, the manager of the joint family estate."⁵

Effect of death
of coparcener.

On the death of a coparcener, subject to the Mitakshara school of law, his interest in the coparcenary property⁶ does not pass by inheritance. It lapses, or, as it is generally put, his rights pass by survivorship to the other coparceners,⁷ subject

¹ *Post*, p. 304. See *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at p. 101; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 165; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 233; *Anant Ramrav v. Gopal Balvant* (1894), 19 Bom. 269; *Ganpat v. Annaji* (1898), 23 Bom. 144; *Ramchandra Kashi Patkar v. Damodhar Trimbak Patkar* (1895), 20 Bom. 467; *Gopee Kishen Gossain v. Hem Chunder Gossain* (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 322, at p. 323.

² *Post*, chap. viii. He is not entitled to sue only for a declaration of his right to a share, or to claim otherwise than in a partition suit property held by the family as joint, *ante*, p. 233.

³ *Bisheshwar Das v. Ram Prasad* (1906), 28 All. 627.

⁴ *Post*, chap. viii.

⁵ *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at pp. 100,

101; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 165; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 233. See *Subbayya v. Surayya* (1887), 10 Mad. 251, at p. 254. *Post*, p. 269.

⁶ Whether ancestral or not, *Gobardhan Saku v. Bulkhan Mahton* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 195.

⁷ *Rajnarain Singh v. Heeralal* (1878), 5 Calc. 142; *Bhimul Doss v. Choonee Lall* (1877), 2 Calc. 379; *Debi Parshad v. Thakur Dial* (1875), 1 All. 105; *Jankubai v. Shrinivas Ganesh* (1913), 38 Bom. 120; 15 Bom. L. R. 853. To the exclusion of the widow, *Parbati Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani) v. Jagads Chunder Dhabal* (1902), 29 I. A. 82, at p. 96; 29 Calc. 433, at p. 452; 6 C. W. N. 490, at p. 494; 4 Bom. L. R. 365; or other heir, see *Bhimul Doss v. Choonee Lall* (1877), 2 Calc. 377; *Debi Parshad*

to the rule that where he leaves male issue they represent his rights to a partition.¹ His death also has the effect of introducing into the coparcenary one who is excluded by the rule which limits the coparcenary to four generations.²

This process continues until partition.³

According to the principles of Hindu law, there is coparcenaryship between the different members of a united family, and survivorship following upon it. There is community of interest and unity of possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any one of them the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased's lifetime a common interest and a common possession.⁴

The right to partition determines the right to take by survivorship.⁵

This principle of survivorship applies also to a *tarwad*.⁶

Where there is no coparcener, property, which would otherwise be coparcenary, passes by inheritance to the heirs of the deceased.⁷ There is no inheritance while there is a surviving coparcener, however remotely connected with the deceased.⁸

In a case governed by the Bengal school of law the interest of the coparcener passes on his death by will or inheritance.⁹

Where there is a joint family business the death of a member of the family does not *per se* dissolve the business.¹⁰

v. *Thakur Dial* (1875), 1 All. 105; *Sadabart Prasad Sahu v. Foolbask Koer* (1869), 3 B. L. R. F. B. 31; 12 W. R. F. B. 1; S. C. *Sadabart Pershad Sahoo v. Lotf Ali Khan* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 339; *Benec Pershad v. Mohaboodhy (Mussamut)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 292; *Mooniah (Mussamut) v. Teeknoo (Mussamut)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 440; *Ratan Dabee v. Modhoooodun Mohapator* (1878), 2 C. L. R. 328. The enlarged share is subject to the same incidents as the original share: *Gungoomull v. Bunsedhur* (1869), 1 N. W. P. H. C. 170. The Curators Act (XIX. of 1841) has no application: *Sato Koer v. Gopal Sahu* (1907), 34 Calc. 929; 12 C. W. N. 65.

¹ *Post*, p. 327. See *Manjunatha v. Narayana* (1882), 5 Mad. 302.

² *Ante*, pp. 225, 226.

³ *Rajnarin Singh v. Heeralall* (1878), 5 Calc. 142.

⁴ *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. L. A. 543, at

p. 615; 2 W. R. P. C. 31, at pp. 39, 40.

⁵ *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikana) v. Venkataramanayyamma (Raja Chelikana)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156, at p. 165; 25 Mad. 678, at p. 687; 7 C. W. N. 1, at p. 8; 4 Bom. L. R. 657. See *Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ramchund Dutt* (1896), 23 I. A. 37, at p. 44; 23 Calc. 670, at p. 679.

⁶ *Ummanga v. Appadorai Patter* (1910), 34 Mad. 387.

⁷ *Post*, p. 298.

⁸ *Ram Narain Singh (Rajah) v. Pertum Singh* (1875), 11 B. L. R. 397, at p. 404; 20 W. R. C. R. 189, at p. 191; *Ratan Dabee v. Modhoooodun Mohapator* (1878), 2 C. L. R. 328.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 224, 225.

¹⁰ *Samalbhair Nathubhar v. Someshvar* (1880), 5 Bom. 38, at p. 40; *In the matter of Haroon Mahomed* (1890), 14 Bom. 189, at p. 194. As to the death of the manager, see *post*, pp. 275, 276.

Under Mitakshara shares not defined.

Under the Mitakshara school, the shares of coparceners are not defined until there be a separation, or the members of the family agree among themselves with regard to particular property that it shall henceforth be the subject of ownership in defined shares.¹

The removal of coparceners by death, and the accession of new coparceners by birth, is continually affecting the interest of the coparceners to the extent that it increases or diminishes the share, which, if there were a partition, would be allotted to them respectively, but until separation no coparcener has a greater interest in the coparcenary property than any one of the other coparceners.

In the well-known case of *Appoier v. Rama Subba Aiyar* (1866),² Lord Westbury said, "According to the true notion of an undivided family in Hindu law, no individual member of that family, whilst it remains undivided, can predicate of the joint and undivided property, that he, that particular member, has a certain definite share. No individual member of an undivided family could go to the place of the receipt of rent and claim to take from the collector or receiver of the rents a certain definite share. The proceeds of undivided property must be brought, according to the theory of an undivided family, to the common chest or purse, and then dealt with according to the modes of enjoyment by the members of an undivided family."³

A coparcener in a Mitakshara family has no specific property in the coparcenary property, but only an interest which may ripen into specific property on a partition.⁴

COPARCENARY PROPERTY.

Coparcenary property consists of—

(a) All property⁵ in which the members of a joint family have a common interest and a common possession, and therefore a right to partition.⁶

Nature of coparcenary property.

¹ *Post*, chap. ix.

² 11 M. I. A. 75, at pp. 89-90; 8 W. R. P. C. 1.

³ As to the right to joint possession, see *ante*, pp. 230, 231.

⁴ *Subramanya Pandya Chokla Talaver v. Siva Subramanya Pillai* (1894), 17 Mad. 316, at p. 327.

⁵ This includes an occupancy holding: *Mahabir Singh v. Bhagwanth* (1916), 38 All. 325.

⁶ *Katama Natchiar v. Shivagunga*

(*Rajah of*) (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543, at p. 615; 2 W. R. P. C. 1, at pp. 39, 40; *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1862), 29 I. A. 156, at p. 164; 25 Mad. 678, at p. 687; 7 C. W. N. 1, at p. 8; 4 Bom. L. R. 657; *Karsandas Dharamsey v. Gangadhar* (1908), 22 Bom. 479; 10 Bom. L. R. 184. See *Shamnarin v. Court of Wards* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 197.

"The principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu law, Property held except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family." ¹ *I.e.* in other cases the co-holders hold as tenants in common, jointly. as, for instance, in the case of a transfer to one member of a coparcenary and the widow of another member. ²

Thus property acquired by a transfer to the members of the Joint transfer. family jointly belongs to the coparcenary. ³

Where property has been acquired jointly in business or otherwise by their joint labour by the members of a joint family, even without resort to the family funds, ⁴ it is to be presumed to be the property of the family as such, ⁵ but this presumption may be rebutted by proof that there was only an ordinary partnership, that is to say, a partnership which was the creature of contract, and not of birth and relationship, in which case the members would be entitled to share in accordance with their shares in the partnership, and there would be no rights of survivorship, or other incidents of coparcenary property. ⁶

The presumption does not apply when the business is carried on by some only of the members of the family without any aid from the family funds. ⁷

Mr. Mayne contends that in the case of property acquired by the joint exertions of the members of the family, but without any aid from the family funds, the sons would acquire no interest by birth. ⁸ "If the

¹ *Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt* (1896), 23 I. A. 37, at p. 44; 23 Calc. 670, at p. 679; *Gopi v. Jaldhara (Musammal)* (1910), 33 All. 41. As to a joint bequest, see Phillips and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 55, 56.

² *Veeraraghava Reddi v. Kota Reddi* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 465.

³ *Radhabai v. Nanarav* (1879), 3 Bom. 151. Cf. Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 45.

⁴ See *Rampershad Tewarry v. Sheo-churn Doss* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 490, at p. 506; *Shamnarain v. Court of Wards* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 197, and cases note 6 below. See Colbrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 386; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4, para. 15; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 215. See, however, *Chatturbhoj Meghji v. Dharamsi Naranji* (1884), 9 Bom. 438, at pp. 445, 446. As to property acquired with the aid of family

funds, see *post*, pp. 246, 247.

⁵ *Gopaldasami Chetti v. Arunachalam Chetti* (1903), 27 Mad. 32; *Haridas Lalji v. Narotam* (1912), 14 Bom. L. R. 237, and cases below, note 6.

⁶ See *Rampershad Tewarry v. Sheo-churn Doss* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 490, at p. 506; *Chatturbhoj Meghji v. Dharamsi Naranji* (1884), 9 Bom. 438, at p. 445; *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at p. 156; *Ram Narain Nursing Doss v. Ram Chunder Jankee Loll* (1890), 18 Calc. 86. For an instance of a partnership between members of a joint family and a stranger, see *Anant Ram v. Channu Lal* (1903), 25 All. 378.

⁷ *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149.

⁸ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 355. See also *Chatturbhoj Meghji v. Dharamsi Naranji* (1884), 9 Bom. 438, at pp. 445, 446.

joint acquirers intended to hold the property so acquired as co-owners, and not as joint family property in the Mitakshara sense of the expression, this view would be perfectly sound. But if, as supposed, the property was acquired by all the members of the undivided family, by their joint labour, it would, in the absence of any indication of intention to the contrary, be owned by them as joint family property, and in that case their male issue, who, by their birth, become members of such undivided family, necessarily acquire a right by birth in such property."¹

"It is clear that where a Hindu father starting upon nothing begins to earn money for himself, it does not necessarily follow because he may have infant children whom he feeds and clothes and houses, that he intends, or they expect, that his individual earnings should become a common fund, and so have all the legal incidents of joint family property. As the children grow up, particularly when they are associated with the father in his business, it becomes more and more difficult to define with any accuracy the point at which and the conditions under which accumulations of one kind become accumulations of the other."²

Gift or devise
to joint
family.

It has been held that in the case of a gift or a devise to the members of a joint family, the property would not be held as coparcenary property,³ but there is nothing to prevent a gift or devise to a joint family.⁴ It is submitted that property given or devised to all the members of a joint family would in the absence of the expression of a contrary intention be coparcenary.⁵

It has been suggested⁶ that the view submitted above might be inconsistent with the Tagore case,⁷ inasmuch as unborn persons might on birth obtain rights in the coparcenary. Recent decisions as to a gift to a class,⁸ and the provisions of the Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916 (*post*, pp. 536-539), negative this suggestion.

¹ *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at pp. 155, 156.

² *Haridas Lalji v. Narotam* (1911), 14 Bom. L. R. 237, at p. 243.

³ *Kishori Dubain v. Mundra Dubain* (1911), 33 All. 665; *Divali (Bai) v. Bechardas (Patel)* (1902), 26 Bom. 445; 4 Bom. L. R. 102.

⁴ *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at pp. 154, 155.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 238, note 6; p. 239, note 1; *Radhabai v. Nanarav* (1879), 3 Bom. 151. See *Yethirajulu Naidu v. Mukunthulu Naidu* (1905), 28 Mad. 363, at p. 369; *Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee* (1892), 16 Mad. 201.

⁶ *Divali (Bai) v. Bechardas (Patel)* (1902), 26 Bom. 445, at p. 448; 4

Bom. L. R. 102; *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at pp. 154, 155.

⁷ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47; 9 B. L. R. 377; 18 W. R. C. R. 359.

⁸ *Bhagabati Barmanya v. Kali Charan Singh* (1911), 38 I. A. 54; 38 Calc. 468; 15 C. W. N. 393; 13 Bom. L. R. 375; S. C. in Court below (1905), 32 Calc. 992; 9 C. W. N. 749; *Radha Prasad Mallick v. Ranimoni Dasi* (1910), 38 Calc. 188; reversed on another point (1908), 35 I. A. 118; 35 Calc. 896; 12 C. W. N. 729; 10 Bom. L. R. 604; *Bishen Chand (Rai) v. Asmaida Koer* (1883), 11 I. A. 164; 6 All. 560; *Ram Lall Sett v. Kanailal Sett* (1886), 12 Calc. 663; *Advocate-*

Whether property, which may have been ancestral, but has been acquired by virtue of a compromise or arrangement, belongs to the coparcenary depends upon the nature of the arrangement.¹

Property inherited from the maternal grandfather by two or more grandsons (by the same daughter) living as members of a joint family,² and holding the same jointly, is, in a case governed by the Mitakshara law, on a similar footing.

It is submitted that where the grandsons are by different daughters the property would not be coparcenary, as they belong to different families.³

A Full Bench of the Madras High Court has declined to extend this principle to property inherited from a woman by her sons as heirs of her *stridhan*⁴ or to property inherited by sister's sons, and expressed their inability to apply it "to cases other than those in which the inheritance devolves from a paternal or maternal male ancestor on his lineal descendants whether as 'unobstructed,' or as 'obstructed heritage.'"⁵ They point out that whereas the class of daughters' sons is incapable of being added to after the vesting, the class of sister's sons could be added to after the vesting by the birth of others.⁶

It is submitted that the principles enunciated by the Privy Council⁷ apply only to property held by the sons of one sister jointly.

(b) In cases governed by the Mitakshara school of law, all property, whether movable or immovable,⁸ and however originally acquired,⁹ which is inherited by what is called "unobstructed heritage,"¹⁰ i.e. which is inherited from a

General v. Karmali Rahimbar (1903), 20 Bom. 133. See Phillips and Trevelyan's "Law of Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 33, 34.

¹ *Mahabir Kower v. Jubha Sing* (1871), 8 B. L. R. 38; 16 W. R. C. R. 221.

² *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayyamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156, at pp. 164, 165; 25 Mad. 678, at p. 687; 7 C. W. N. 1, at p. 8; 4 Bom. L. R. 657; overruling *Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh* (1889), 17 Calo. 33, and *Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni* (1895), 19 Mad. 70; *Vythinaatha Ayyar v. Yegga Narayana Ayyar* (1903), 27 Mad. 382. As to the case where a single grandson by daughter inherits, see *post*, pp. 242, 243.

³ *Vythinaatha Ayyar v. Yegga Narayana Ayyar* (1903), 27 Mad. 382, at p. 385.

⁴ The same view was taken in *Parson (Bai) v. Somli (Bai)* (1912),

36 Bom. 424; 14 Bom. L. R. 400.

⁵ *Karuppai Nachiar v. Sankaranarayana Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300, at p. 314.

⁶ *Ibid.*, at p. 309.

⁷ *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayyamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156, 25 Mad. 678; 7 C. W. N. 1; 4 Bom. L. R. 657.

⁸ *Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Sir Mangaldas Nathubhoy* (1886), 10 Bom. 528, at pp. 570-574. This includes a right of occupancy, *Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh* (1884), 6 All. 234.

⁹ *Chatturbhooj Meghji v. Dharamsi Narani* (1884), 9 Bom. 438, at p. 450; *Hardar Narain v. Haruck Dhari Singh* (1882), 12 C. L. R. 104.

¹⁰ *Apratibandha Daya* (inheritance not liable to be obstructed) as distinguished from *Sapratibandha Daya* (inheritance liable to be obstructed, *post*, p. 253). The distinction between

natural or adopted ¹ father, father's father, or father's father's father, is coparcenary property ² as regards the issue of the person so inheriting it.³

"In the 'Mitakshara,' chap. i. s. 1, v. 3, heritage is said to be 'of two sorts, unobstructed, or liable to obstruction. The wealth of the father or paternal grandfather becomes the property of his sons or of his grandsons in right of their being his sons or grandsons, and that is an inheritance not liable to obstruction. But property devolves on parents (or uncles), brothers, and the rest upon the demise of the owner, if there be no male issue; and thus the actual existence of a son and the survival of the owner are impediments to the succession; and, on their ceasing, the property devolves on the successor in right of his being uncle or brother. This is an inheritance subject to obstruction.'"⁴

Property inherited after the death of a widow to whom it was assigned in lieu of maintenance is on the same footing.⁵

It is only the descendants of the person so inheriting, who acquire an interest in the property. Collateral relations who happen to be joint with such person acquire no such interest.⁶

Allotted to
widow for
maintenance
Collateral
relations.

Inheritance
from maternal
grandfather.

It is unsettled whether property inherited from the maternal grandfather by a single grandson ⁷ is also coparcenary property.

The Madras decisions hold that property inherited by a daughter's son

the two forms of heritage is the same as the distinction between inheritance by an heir at law, and inheritance by an heir presumptive. In the latter case there is a possibility of a nearer heir being born. In the former case there is no such possibility.

¹ This has no application to property inherited by a person adopted according to the *ulatom* system (*ante*, p. 160); *Challa Papi Reddi v. Challa Koti Reddi* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 25. See *Ramakristna v. Subbakka* (1889), 12 Mad. 442.

² *Nund Coomarr Lall (Baboo) v. Razeeoddeen Hossein* (1872), 10 B. L. R. 183; 18 W. R. C. R. 477; *Nallatambi Chetti (Rayadur) v. Mukunda Chetti (Rayadur)* (1868), 3 Mad. H. C. 455; *Jawahar Singh v. Guyan Singh* (1868), 3 Agra, H. C. 78; *Jugmo-handas Mangaldas v. Sir Mangaldas Nathubhoy* (1886), 10 Bom. 528; *Gunga Prosad v. Ajudhia Pershad Singh* (1881), 8 Calc. 131, at p. 134; 9 C. L. R. 417, at pp. 421, 422. See also *Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh* (1889), 17 Calc. 33 (overruled

by the Judicial Committee on another point, *ante*, p. 241); *Ramnarrain Singh (Rajah) v. Pertum Singh* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 397, at p. 401; 20 W. R. C. R. 189, at p. 190; *Janki v. Nandram* (1888), 11 All. 194. See J. C. Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 375, 376; "Viramitrodaya," G. C. Sarkar's translation, p. 72.

³ *Gurumurthi Reddi v. Gurammal* (1908), 32 Mad. 86, at p. 88. It is otherwise as regards other persons, see *Janki v. Nandram* (1888), 11 All. 194, at p. 198.

⁴ *Nund Coomarr Lall (Baboo) v. Razeeoddeen Hossein* (1872), 10 B. L. R. 183, at p. 191; 18 W. R. C. R. 477, at p. 479; *Debi Parshad v. Thakur Dial* (1875), 1 All. 105, at p. 112.

⁵ *Beni Parshad v. Puran Chand* (1895), 23 Calc. 262, at p. 273.

⁶ See *Gopal Dutt Pandey v. Gopal-lal Misser*, Ben. S. D. A., 1859, p. 1314; *Janki v. Nandram* (1888), 11 All. 194, at p. 198.

⁷ As to where there are several grandsons, see *ante*, p. 241,

is coparcenary.¹ The Bengal and Allahabad High Courts have entertained a different view,² and there is no reported decision in Bombay on the subject.³

The Judicial Committee has held that such property is not "self-acquired."⁴ This expression may, however, not have been used in a technical sense.⁵ In a more recent case⁶ the Judicial Committee said, "Unless the lands came to Dhanna Singh by descent from a lineal male ancestor in the male line, . . . they are not deemed ancestral in Hindu Law."

Another decision of the Judicial Committee dealt with the rights of daughter's sons, living jointly,⁷ but that case is distinguishable.⁸

See "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 1, paras. 3, 5, 21, 27, 33; s. 5, paras. 2, 3, 5, 9, 11. According to Mr. H. T. Colebrooke's translation of the "Mitakshara" separate property means "that which has been acquired by the coparcener himself without any detriment to the goods of his father or mother."⁹

Mr. J. C. Ghose ("Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 375) points out that Mr. Colebrooke's translation of chap. i. s. 1, para. 27, of the "Mitakshara," in which he says that "it is a settled point that property in the paternal or ancestral estate is by birth," is erroneous, the words really being "paternal or grandpaternal." It is submitted that according to the better view property inherited from a maternal grandfather is not coparcenary except in the case of grandsons who are living in coparcenary.¹⁰

¹ *Vythnatha Ayyar v. Yegga Narayana Ayyar* (1903), 27 Mad. 382; *Rangammal v. Echammal* (1898), 22 Mad. 305; *Karuppai Nachiar v. Sankaranarayanan Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300, at pp. 313, 314; *Muttayan Chetti v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinna Tambiar* (1879), 3 Mad. 370 (this question did not arise on appeal in this case (1882), 9 I. A. 128; 6 Mad 1; 12 C. L. R. 169); *Sivaganga Zemindar v. Lakshmana* (1885), 9 Mad. 188, at p. 190. These last two cases were doubted in *Venkataramanayamma Garu (Sri Raja Chelikani) v. Appa Rau Bahadur Garu* (1897), 20 Mad. 207, at p. 219, which was reversed on a different point by the Judicial Committee; see *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156; 25 Mad. 678; 7 C. W. N. 1; 4 Bom. L. R. 657.

² *Jasoda Koer v. Sheopershad Singh* (1889), 17 Calc. 33, at p. 38 (differed from on another point in *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156; 25 Mad. 678; 4 Bom. L. R. 657; *Jamna Prasad v. Ram Partap* (1907), 29 All. 667.

³ See *Nanabhai Ganpatrav Dhair-*

yavan v. Achraibai (1886), 12 Bom. 122, at p. 134.

⁴ *Muttayan Chettiar v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnatambiar* (1882), 9 I. A. 128, at p. 143; 6 Mad. 1, at p. 16; 12 C. L. R. 169, at p. 182. In the Court below, the High Court held (*Muttayan Chetti v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinna Tambiar*, 3 Mad. 370, at p. 375) that the sons could not interfere with their father's action with regard to it, but there is, it is submitted, no reason for this distinction.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 248, 249

⁶ *Atar Singh v. Thakar Singh* (1908), 35 I. A. 206, at p. 211; 35 Calc. 1039, at p. 1045; 12 C. W. N. 1049, at p. 1052; 10 Bom. L. R. 790.

⁷ *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156; 25 Mad. 678; 4 Bom. L. R. 657.

⁸ *Jamna Prasad v. Ram Partap* (1907), 29 All. 667.

⁹ Chap. i. s. 4, para. 2. The words "or mother" having been interpolated by the "Mitakshara" in the text of "Yajnavalkya" (bk. ii. v. 118); see R. C. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," 2nd ed., p. 43.

¹⁰ See *ante*, p. 241.

Shares
allotted on
partition.

(c) In cases governed by the Mitakshara school of law, the share of coparcenary property allotted to any member on partition becomes coparcenary property as regards his issue,¹ whether such issue were or were not born at the time of partition.²

As to the rights of a surviving member of a coparcenary, see *post*, p. 298.

The circumstance that the person to whom the property is allotted discharges it from encumbrances does not alter its nature.³ If the person to whom the property has been allotted has no issue, it passes to his heir.⁴

Gift or devise
by father.

(d) Self-acquired property, given or devised by a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara school of law to a son is, according to the High Courts of Bengal and Madras, in the absence of any contrary intention appearing from the gift or will,⁵ to be taken to be coparcenary property, so far as the issue of that son are concerned.⁶ The Bombay and Allahabad High Courts repudiate such presumption.⁷

Where coparcenary property purports to be given or devised to a son or other coparcener its character would be obviously unchanged,⁸ even where such gift or devise is permissible.⁹

¹ *Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaia Lal* (1907), 34 I. A. 65; 29 All. 244; 11 C. W. N. 417; 9 Bom. L. R. 597; *Chaiturbhoj Meghji v. Dharamsi Naranji* (1884), 9 Bom. 438; *Adurmoni Deyi v. Chowdhry Sib Narain Kur* (1877), 3 Calc. 1; *Muddun Gopal Thakoor v. Ram Buksh Pandey* (1863), 6 W. R. C. R. 71; *Lakshmi Bai v. Ganpat Moroba* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. O. C. J. 129; *Mewa Koonwer (Ranee) v. Oudh Beharee Lall (Lalla)* (1867), 2 Agra, 311. See *Khandubai v. Pirbhay* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 76.

² In *Adurmoni Deyi v. Chowdhry Sib Narain Kur* (1877), 3 Calc. 1, the son was not born at the time of the partition.

³ *Visalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150.

⁴ See *Bejai Bahadur Singh v. Bhupindar Bahadur Singh* (1895), 22 I. A. 139; 17 All. 456.

⁵ In *Lakshmi Bai v. Ganpat Moroba* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. O. C. 128, the property was given to the grandsons in severalty.

⁶ *Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachan-*

dra Tevar (1901), 24 Mad. 429; *Muddun Gopal Thakoor v. Ram Buksh Pandey* (1863), 6 W. R. C. R. 71; *Hazari Mall Babu v. Abannath Adhurjya* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 280. See *Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 50.

⁷ See *Nanabhai Ganpatrav Dhairayavan v. Achratbai* (1886), 12 Bom. 122, at pp. 131, 132. (As in this case the devise was to the sons jointly the property was coparcenary, *ante*, p. 240.) *Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Sir Mangaldas Nathubhoy* (1886), 10 Bom. 528; *Parsotam Rao Tania v. Janki Bai* (1907), 29 All. 354.

⁸ See *Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 50, at p. 55; *Hardai Narain v. Haruck Dhari Singh* (1882), 12 C. L. R. 104; *Nanomi Babuasin (Mussamut) v. Modun Mohun* (judgment of High Court, 1882), 13 I. A. 1, at pp. 5, 6; 13 Calc. 21.

⁹ See *Lakshman Dada Nark v. Ramchandra Dada Nark* (1876), 1 Bom. 561, at p. 563; affirmed on appeal (1880), 7 I. A. 181; 5 Bom. 48; 7 C. L. R. 320.

(e) The joint property of reunited coparceners.¹

Reunion.

(f) Property which was originally the separate² property of an individual member of a joint family, but has been treated by him as coparcenary property, belongs to the coparcenary.³ Property treated as coparcenary.

As, for instance, where the head of the family kept one account of his ancestral and self-acquired property.⁴ When the funds are once intermixed they cannot be separated.⁵

Where the members of a family put their separate earnings into the joint stock, the proceeds of such earnings are to be presumed to be joint.⁶ The treatment must be such as to show unmistakably an intention to throw the property into the common stock. Where it is plain that no gift can have been intended, none can be inferred.⁷

A mere grant of a portion of self-acquired property for the maintenance of a son would not make the property coparcenary.⁸

¹ *Jasoda Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh* (1889), 17 Cal. 33, at p. 38; *Narasimha Chariu (Samudrala Varaha) v. Venkata Singaramma (Samudrala)* (1909), 33 Mad. 165. As to reunion, see *post*, pp. 359, 360.

² *Post*, pp. 248 *et seq.*

³ *Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar* (1909), 34 Mad. 470; *Gopalsami v. Chinnusami* (1884), 7 Mad. 458; *Krishnaji Mahadev Mahajan v. Moro Mahadev Mahajan* (1890), 15 Bom. 32, at p. 39; *Sudarshanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at p. 154; *Tottempudi Venkataratnam v. Tottempudi Seshamma* (1903), 27 Mad. 228. See *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelakani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelakani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156, at p. 166; 25 Mad. 678, at p. 688; 7 C. W. N. 1, at pp. 9, 10; 4 Bom. L. R. 657; *Shankar Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh* (1888), 16 I. A. 71; 16 Cal. 397; *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259; 26 W. R. O. R. 55; *Hardeo Bux (Thakoor) v. Jawahir Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 178; 3 Cal. 522; S. C. (1879), 6 I. A. 161; *Rampershad Tewarry v. Sheo Churn Doss* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 490, at pp. 505, 506; *Birajun Koer v. Luchmi*

Narain Mahata (1884), 10 Cal. 392, at p. 398; *Tribhovandas v. Smith* (1896), 21 Bom. 349; S. C. in Court below (1895), 20 Bom. 316; *Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar* (1901), 24 Mad. 429; *Himmat Bahadur v. Bhawani Kunwar* (1908), 30 All. 352. See *Gobardhan Sahu v. Bulkhan Mahton* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 195. As to Government grants, see *post*, pp. 251, 252.

⁴ *Indur Sahai (Munshi) v. Shiam Bahadur (Kunwar)* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 509; 15 Bom. L. R. 2118

⁵ *Haridas v. Velji* (1913), 15 Bom. L. R. 584.

⁶ *Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaia Lal* (1907), 34 I. A. 65; 29 All. 244; 11 C. W. N. 417; 9 Bom. L. R. 597; *Chabildas Lalubhai v. Ramdas Chabildas* (1909), 11 Bom. L. R. 606; *Gobardhan Sahu v. Bulkhan Mahton* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 195.

⁷ *Tajmulali (Moulvi Syed) v. Jaga Mohan Das* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 529; *Haridas Lalji v. Narotam* (1911), 14 Bom. L. R. 237, *ante*, p. 240.

⁸ See *Muddun Gopal Lal (Lala) v. Khikinda Koer (Mussumat)* (1890), 18 I. A. 9, at p. 21; 18 Cal. 341, at p. 348; *Timmannacharya v. Balacharya* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 257.

Right by
prescription.

The right to claim property as separate may be barred by the operation of the law of Limitation.¹

Accretions
and acqui-
sitions.

(g) Accretions to coparcenary property. Property acquired out of the income or with the aid² or on the credit³ of coparcenary property, whether movable or immovable,⁴ the income of such property,⁵ the proceeds of sale of such property, and property purchased out of such proceeds,⁶ or from movable property belonging to the family,⁷ are coparcenary property.

Form of
transfer.

The form of the transfer⁸ or the fact that the property was purchased or settled in the name of a particular member of the family⁹ is immaterial.¹⁰

Slight or
indirect aid.

Where the acquirer has received merely trifling aid from the family property¹¹ or where the family property was only indirectly instrumental in bringing about the acquisition,¹² the

¹ See *Vasudeva Padhi Khadanga Garu v. Maguni Devan Bakshi Mahapatra Garu* (1901), 28 I. A. 81; 24 Mad. 387; 5 C. W. N. 545; 3 Bom. L. R. 303.

² *Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaia Lal* (1907), 34 I. A. 65; 29 All. 244; 11 C. W. N. 417; 9 Bom. L. R. 597; *Umrithnath Chowdhry v. Goureenath Chowdhry* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 542; 15 W. R. P. C. 10; *Isree Pershad Singh v. Nasib Koor* (1884), 10 Calc. 1017; *Subbayya v. Surayya* (1887), 10 Mad. 251 (a case of waste land brought under cultivation); *Ajodhya Purshad v. Mahadeo Purshad* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 221; *Kristnappa Chetty v. Ramasawmy Iyer* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 25; *Ramasheshaiya Panday v. Bhagavat Panday* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 5; *Booniadi Lall (Buksee) v. Dewkee Nundun Lall (Buksee)* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 223; *Kalee Sunkar Bhadooree v. Eshan Chunder Bhadooree* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 528; *Bona Koor* (*Mussamut*) *v. Boolee Singh (Baboo)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 182; *Shudanund Mohapatr v. Bonomalee Doss Mohapatr* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 256; *Purtab Bahadur Sing v. Tilukharee Sing* (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 179 (new edition, 236).

³ *Sheopersad Sing v. Kullunder Sing* (1893), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 76 (new ed. 101).

⁴ *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad*

(1872), 4 N. W. P. 63, at p. 71.

⁵ *Ramanna v. Venkata* (1888), 11 Mad. 246.

⁶ *Krishnasani Ayyangar v. Rajagopala Ayyangar* (1894), 18 Mad. 73, at p. 83. See *Shamnarain Singh v. Rughooburdial* (1877), 3 Calc. 508; 1 C. L. R. 343.

⁷ See *Shamnarain Singh v. Rughooburdial* (1877), 3 Calc. 508, at p. 510; 1 C. L. R. 343, at p. 345.

⁸ See *In the goods of Pokurmull Augurwallah* (1896), 23 Calc. 980; 1 C. W. N. 31.

⁹ *Umrithnath Chowdhry v. Goureenath Chowdhry* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 542, at p. 547; 6 B. L. R. 232, at p. 241; 15 W. R. P. C. 10, at p. 11; *Bodh Sing Doodhooia v. Gunes Chunder Sen* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 317; 19 W. R. C. R. 356.

¹⁰ See *post*, pp. 254, 255.

¹¹ See *Rampershad Tewarry v. Sheo Churn Doss* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 490, at p. 505; *Ahmedbhoy Hubabbhoy v. Cassumbhoy Ahmedbhoy* (1889), 13 Bom. 534, at p. 545.

¹² *Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Sir Mangaldas Nathubhoy* (1886), 10 Bom. 528, at pp. 558, 559; *Jadumani Dasi (Srimati) v. Gangadhar Seal*, Boul. 600; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 525; *Gooroo Churn v. Gooluckmoney* (1843), Fulton, 165, at p. 181; *Meenatchee v. Chedumbra*, Mad. Dec. of 1853, p. 61.

acquirer is entitled to treat the acquisition as separate (see *post*, pp. 248, 249).

"It seems agreed that maintenance in the family, during the period of separate acquisition, though it contribute to the end, is not alone sufficient to affect it with a joint character, the expenditure for the purpose being incidental."¹

It has been held that property acquired by a coparcener while drawing an income from coparcenary property is joint.²

As to property purchased from money acquired by the exercise of a profession, see *post*, p. 250.

Where with comparatively small aid from the coparcenary property the separate acquisition of a distinct property is made by an individual member by his own labour or capital, the acquirer, according to the Bengal authorities, is entitled to a double share on partition,³ no such share being given in case of the common stock being only improved or augmented.⁴

It has been suggested⁵ that the extra share allotted to the acquirer may be treated by him as self-acquired.

Whether this limitation will be accepted by the Judicial Committee or will be adopted in the other Provinces may be open to question.

Mr. Mayne⁶ says that the text of *Vasishta*,⁷ on which it is founded, "probably applied originally to self-acquisition properly so called, and that it cut down the rights of a self-acquirer, instead of enlarging the rights of one who has made use of common property. The *Smṛiti Chandrika*

¹ Strange's "Hindu Law," i. 214

² *Ramesharya Panday v. Bhagavat Panday* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 5. See *post*, p. 250.

³ *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 61, at p. 64; *Sree Narain Berah v. Gooro Pershad Berah* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 219; *Lal Chand Shaw v. Swarnamoye Das* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 1133; *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundoo Mullick* (judgment of Supreme Court, 1855), 6 M. I. A. 526, at p. 539; *Golab Chand v. Goluk Monee Dossee* (1843), Fulton, 165; *Jadumani v. Gangadhar Seal*, Boul. 600; "Vyavastha Darpana" (2nd ed.), 521; *Gudadhur Serma v. Ajodharam Chowdry* (1794), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 8 (new ed. 7); *Koshul Chukurwutty v. Radhanath Chukurwutty* (1811), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 336 (new ed. 448); *Purab Bahadur Sing v. Fulukharee*

Sing (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 179 (new ed. 236); *Kripa Sindhu Patjoshi v. Kanhaya Acharya* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 335 (new ed. 393); "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4, para. 29; "Dayabhaga," chap. ii. para. 41; chap. vi. s. 1, paras. 14, 28. See *ante*, p. 246.

⁴ "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4, paras. 30, 31.

⁵ *Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law,"* 2nd ed., p. 228. It cannot be said to have been acquired without detriment to the paternal estate: *ante*, p. 243.

⁶ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 367, 368.

⁷ "And if one of the brothers has gained something by his own effort, he shall receive a double share," "Vasishta," xvii. 51; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4, para. 29; "Dayabhaga," chap. vi. s. 1, paras. 27-29.

and Madhaviya both restrict the text to the gains of learning, when considered to be partible in consequence of the education from which they sprung having been imparted at the expense of the family.¹ The general principles laid down by Vijnanesvara seem to exclude the idea that any special and exclusive benefit can be obtained to any co-heir by a use of the family property.² Mr. W. Macnaghten states that under Benares law no such benefit can be obtained, whatever may have been the personal exertions of any individuals, but that the rule did not exist in Bengal.³

As the "Mitakshara" (chap. i. s. 5, para. 29) also accepts Vasishtha's text the same rule as that applied in Bengal would apparently apply to all cases governed by the "Mitakshara."

Under the Bengal school of law, where the father and son are living together as a joint family, the father takes a double share in acquisitions made by a son; if they have been made by the use of joint funds the father and the acquirer take two shares each, and the rest of the brothers one share each; but if made without the use of joint funds the acquisitions are divided half and half between the father and the son. A father claiming a share of property acquired by his son is not bound to allow the son any share of the ancestral property in his hands.⁴

This rule has no application when the son has separated from his father.⁵

Coparcenary
as regards
some copar-
ceners only.

Property may be coparcenary as regards some members of a joint family, while other members of the family, although coparceners in the family property, have no share therein.⁶ Thus, if a coparcener dies leaving separate property, such property becomes the coparcenary property of his descendants, but his collateral coparceners have no interest therein.⁷

Endowed
property.

The coparcenary may also be trustees of property devoted to religious or pious uses.⁸ This class of property is incapable of partition.⁹

SEPARATE PROPERTY.

Separate
property.

It is competent to a member of a joint family to acquire property for himself independently of his coparceners. Such

¹ "Smriti Chandrika," chap. vii. para. 9, and see *fatwah* in 2 William Macnaghten, 167.

² "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4, paras. 1-6.

³ 1 Wm Macnaghten, 52; 2 Wm. Macn. 7 n. 158, 160 n., 162 n.

⁴ *Wooma Soonduree Dossee v. Dwarka Nath Roy* (1868), 11 W. R. C. R. 72; *Dharma Das Kundu v. Amulyadhan Kundu* (1906), 33 Calc. 1119, at p. 1126; 10 C. W. N. 765. In the latter case reliance was placed on the case of *Sreenarain Berah v. Gooro Pershad Berah* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 219, but the question of the

father's right did not arise in that case. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 163, 164; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., pp. 447-456; "Dayabhaga," chap. ii. para. 71.

⁵ See *Anund Mohun Paul Chowdhury v. Shamsoondery (Sreemutty)*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 352.

⁶ See *Shamnarain v. Court of Wards* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 197.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 242.

⁸ See *Ramchandra Panda v. Ram Krishna Mahapatra* (1906), 33 Calc. 507.

⁹ See *post*, pp. 342, 343.

separate acquisitions can be dealt with at the pleasure of the acquirer.¹ In default of a will they pass to the heir of the acquirer,² who will, in cases under the Mitakshara law, if he be a son, take them as coparcenary property.³

This applies to Nambudri Brahmins.⁴

As to separate property of a member of a *tarwad*, see *Krishnan Nair v. Damodaran Nair* (1912), 38 Mad. 48, distinguishing *Gorindan Nair v. Sankaran Nair* (1909), 32 Mad. 351, and overruling *Ammanga v. Uppalorai Patter* (1911), 34 Mad. 387.

As to the power of a father to divide his self-acquired property unequally amongst his sons, see *post*, p. 338.

Property acquired in the following ways is the absolute property of the acquirer. Other members of the family have no interest therein.⁵

(a) Property acquired by an individual member of the joint family by his own exertions,⁶ or from his separate capital, or on his own credit,⁷ without any help from, or detriment to, the

Separate acquisitions.

¹ *Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Sir Mangaldas Nathubhoy* (1886), 10 Bom. 528, at pp. 578, 580; *Muddun Gopal Thakoor v. Ram Buksh Pandey* (1863), 6 W. R. C. R. 71; *Sital v. Madho* (1877), 1 All. 394; *Narottam Jagjwan v. Narsandas Harikisandas* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. A. C. J 6; *Purshotam Shama Shenvi v. Vasudev Krishna Shenvi* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 196; *Bishen Perkash Narain Singh (Raja) v. Bawa Misser* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 430; 20 W. R. C. R. 137; S. C. in Court below, 10 W. R. C. R. 287; *Nana Narain Rao v. Huree Punth Bhao* (1862), 9 M. I. A. 96; Marsh. 436; *Nagalingam Pillai v. Ramachandra Tevar* (1901), 24 Mad. 429; *Rameshwar Prosad v. Lachmi Prosad Singh* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 688; *Gunnaiyan v. Kamakchi Ayyar* (1902), 26 Mad. 339, at p. 353; *Subbayya v. Surayya* (1887), 10 Mad. 251; *Gangabai v. Vamanaji* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. (2nd ed.) 301. See *Hanmantappa v. Jivubai* (1900), 24 Bom. 547; 2 Bom. L. R. 478.

² *Katama Natchiar v. The Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543, at p. 613; 9 W. R. P. C. 31, at p. 39; *Balwant Singh (Rao) v. Kishori (Rani)* (1898), 25 I. A. 54; 20 All. 267; 2

C. W. N. 273.

³ *Chatturbhooj Meghji v. Dharamsi Narainji* (1884), 9 Bom. 438, at p. 450; *Ram Narain Singh (Rajah) v. Pertum Singh* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 397, at p. 404; 20 W. R. C. R. 189, at p. 191. *Ante*, pp. 241, 242.

⁴ *Vishnu Nambudri v. Akkamma* (1910), 34 Mad. 496

⁵ See *Yamunabai v. Manubai* (1899), 23 Bom. 608, at p. 611; 1 Bom. L. R. 95. As to the Bengal school, see *ante*, p. 224.

⁶ *Tottempudi Venkataratnam v. Tottempudi Seshamma* (1903), 27 Mad. 228; *Somasundara Mudaliar v. Ganga Bissen Sonu* (1904), 28 Mad. 386 (income derived from Government service). This would not include exertions as manager, *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 61, at p. 64. As to earnings by a prostitute, see *Chandrasekara v. Secretary of State* (1890), 14 Mad. 163; *Boologam v. Swornam* (1881), 4 Mad. 330.

⁷ *Nursingh Dass (Rai) v. Narain Dass (Rai)* (1871), 3 N. W. P. H. C. 217, at p. 235. As to a policy of insurance, see *Rajamma v. Ramakrishnayya* (1905), 29 Mad. 121.

coparcenary property,¹ although he may have been maintained out of the proceeds of the family property.²

Property may be acquired by members of a joint family acting as partners without aid from the family property.³

(b) Property acquired as "gains of science,"⁴ i.e. by the practice of a (learned) profession or occupation, where the property of the family has not been used for acquiring such property, or in the special education, which was necessary for the purpose of practising such profession.⁵

A mere general education or maintenance, even during the time of the acquisition,⁶ at the expense of the family, would not, apparently, make the profits of the profession coparcenary property,⁷ but a special education for the particular profession would stand upon a different footing.

The "gains of science" enumerated in the "Dayabhaya" (chap. vi, s. 2, paras. 2-12, are as follows:—

1. Prize for the solution of a difficulty.
2. Fee for instructing a pupil.

¹ *Tottempudi Venkataratnam v. Tottempudi Seshamma* (1903), 27 Mad. 228; *Soobuns Lal v. Hurbuns Lal* (1805), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 91 (new ed. 121); *Purtab Bahaudur Sing v. Tilukdharee Sing* (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 179 (new ed. 236); *Koul Nath Singh v. Jagrup Singh* (1830), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 12 (new ed. 14).

² See *Chabildas Lallubhai v. Ramdas Chabildas* (1909), 11 Bom. L. R. 606.

³ See *Joharmal Ladhoooram v. Chetram Harising* (1914), 39 Bom. 715; 17 Bom. L. R. 293. See ante, p. 239.

⁴ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 206; "Narada Smriti," chap. ix. para. 6. The word which was translated by Colebrooke as "gains of science" is said to be literally "learning money," and to have meant money acquired by the teaching of the Vedas, K. K. Bhattacharya's "Joint Hindu Family," pp. 661-667.

⁵ See cases in note 6 below.

⁶ Strange's "Hindu Law," i. 214, 215; "Dayabhaga," chap. vi. s. 1, paras. 44-50. See *Durvasula Gangadharudu v. Durvasula Narasammah* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 47, at p. 49; *Chalakonda Alasani v. Chalakonda Ratnachalam* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 56, at

p. 76; *Chellaperoomall v. Verraperoomall*, 4 Mad. Jur. 54, 240, referred to in Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 361.

⁷ *Durga Dat Joshi v. Ganesh Dat Joshi* (1910), 32 All. 305 (earnings as astrologer); *Laksman Mayaram v. Jamnabai* (1882), 6 Bom. 225 (earnings in Government employment); *Krishnaji Mahadev Mahajan v. Moro Mahadev Mahajan* (1890), 15 Bom. 32 (earning as Karkun [agent in financial or revenue collections]); *Dhunookdharee Lall v. Gunput Lall* (1808), 11 B. L. R. 201 note; 10 W. R. C. R. 122; *Valloo Chetty (Pauliem) v. Sooryah Chetty (Pauliem)* (1877), 4 I. A. 109, at pp. 117, 118; 1 Mad. 252, at pp. 261, 262; *Lachmin Kuar v. Debi Prasad* (1897), 20 All. 435 (a case of money earned as a commissariat officer); *Boologam v. Swornam* (1881), 4 Mad. 330 (where it was attempted to treat the earnings of a dancing-girl as joint property); *Manchha (Bai) v. Narotam Das*, (1868), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 1 (earnings as vakil); see *Durvasula Gangadharudu v. Durvasula Narasammah* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 47; *Avayambal v. Kamalambal*, 19 M. L. J. 65.

3. Fee for officiating at religious rites.
4. Solving a question relating to science.
5. Deciding a litigated question.
6. Reward for the display of science.
7. Prize gained in a disputation.
8. Prize for reading.
9. Gain of a skilled artist.
10. Stake won by skill in play.

(c) Gifts on marriage¹ or on other occasions,² and bequests, Gifts and bequests.

The payment of the marriage expenses out of coparcenary property does not render the marriage gifts joint property.³

As to *babuana* grants of ancestral property, see *post*, p. 268.

As to gifts and bequests to a son in cases governed by the Mitakshara school of law, see *ante*, p. 244.

As to gifts and bequests to the joint family, see *ante*, p. 240.

(d) Grants of property made by Government,⁴ whether to a stranger or to a kinsman of a former owner of the land, unless it appears from the grant that it was to enure for the benefit of the family,⁵ or where the grantee has constituted himself a Grants by Government.

¹ *Adhar Chandra Chatterjee v. Nobin Chandra Chatterjee* (1907), 12 C. W. N. 103; *Beharee Lall Roy v. Lall Chunder Roy* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 307.

² See "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4, para. 2. "Manu" (chap. ix. para. 206) includes gifts presented as a mark of respect to a guest; "Narada" (chap. xiii. paras. 6, 7) includes gifts by father and mother. *Krishnaswami Naidu v. Seethalakshmi Ammal* (1915), 39 Mad. 1029 (gift for maintenance).

³ *Sheo Gobind v. Sham Narain Singh* (1875), 7 N. W. P. 75.

⁴ *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543, at p. 610; 2 W. R. P. C. 31, at p. 38; *Beer Pertab Sahee (Baboo) v. Rajender Pertab Sahee (Maharajah)* (1867), 12 M. I. A. 1, at p. 34; 9 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 21. See *Raja Jee Bahadur Garu (Raja) v. Parthasaradhi Appu Row* (1902), 30 I. A. 14; 26 Mad. 202; 8 C. W. N. 105. See *Sookraj Koovar (Mussumat Thukrain) v. Government* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 112; *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259; 26 W. R. C. R. 55; *Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v.*

Janki Koer (Ranee) (1877), 5 I. A. 1; *Shere Bahadur Singh (Thakur) v. Dariao Kuar (Thakurain)* (1877), 3 Calc. 645. See *Jaganatha v. Ramabhadra* (1888), 11 Mad. 380; *Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer (Muharami)* (1902), 29 I. A. 178, at p. 193; 29 Calc. 828, at p. 851; 7 C. W. N. 57, at p. 72; 4 Bom. L. R. 604. As to a sale by Government of property which had been claimed as an escheat, see *Mallan v. Purushothama* (1889), 12 Mad. 287. As to the enfranchisement of an inam, see *Gunnaiyan v. Kamakchi Ayyar* (1902), 26 Mad. 339, and cases there cited; *Subbaraya Mudali v. Kamu Chetti* (1899), 23 Mad. 47.

⁵ *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259; 26 W. R. C. R. 55; *Govind Rao (Sri Mahant) v. Sita Ram Kesho* (1898), 25 I. A. 195; 21 All. 53; 2 C. W. N. 681. As where the grant merely operated as an ascertainment of the claim for revenue, and a release of the reversionary right of the Crown, *Narayana v. Chengalamma* (1886), 10 Mad. 1. See *Radhabai v. Nanarav* (1879), 3 Bom. 151.

trustee for the family,¹ or where there has been a family arrangement,² or apparently where a family custom has treated them as joint.³

The quality of the estate in regard to its descendibility would not, *prima facie*, be altered by the grant.⁴

It was held in *Bajinath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bal Singh* (1916), 38 All. 590, that where an impartible estate is lost to a certain family and on the representation of a member of that family the Government makes a grant in his favour without any special term or condition, the property is joint family property in the hands of the member of the family to whom the grant is made.

Recovery of
lost property.

(e) Coparcenary property which had been lost to the family,⁵ otherwise than by voluntary and valid alienation,⁶ but recovered by an individual member without the aid of the family property⁷ from a stranger holding adversely to the family.⁸

There must have been an express or implied abandonment of their rights by the coparceners, and the coparceners must have been in a position to sue.⁹

Where the property recovered under these conditions consists of land,¹⁰ the recoverer, except perhaps he be the father,

¹ See *Hardeo Bux (Thakoor) v. Jawahir Singh (Thakoor)* (1877), 4 I. A. 178; 3 Calc. 522; 6 I. A. 161; *Sookraj Koovar (Musumal Thukrain) v. Government* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 112; *Shere Bahadur Singh (Thakur) v. Dariao Kuar (Thakurain)* (1877), 3 Calc. 645; *Ramanund Koer (Thakurain) v. Raghunath Koer (Thakurain)* (1881), 9 I. A. 41; 8 Calc. 769.

² See *Kedar Nath (Maharaj) v. Ratan Singh (Thakur)* (1910), 37 I. A. 161; 32 All. 415; 14 C. W. N. 985; 12 Bom. L. R. 656.

³ See *Madharav Manohar v. Atmaram Keshav* (1890), 15 Bom. 519.

⁴ See *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rangayya Appa Row (Sri Rajah)* (1905), 29 Mad. 437.

⁵ This does not apply to a case where the property was held by a person claiming to be a member of the family, *Bissessur Chuckerbutty v. Seetul Chunder Chuckerbutty* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 69; S. C. 8 W. R. C. R. 13.

⁶ *Bajaba v. Trimbak Vishvanath*

(1909), 34 Bom. 106; 11 Bom. L. R. 1122.

⁷ "Yajnavalkya," bk. ii. v. 119; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 5, para. 11; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 209; *Bolakee Sahoo v. Court of Wards* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 34; *Naraganti Achammagaru v. Venkatachalapati Nayani-varu* (1881), 4 Mad. 250, at p. 259.

⁸ *Naraganti Achammagaru v. Venkatachalapati Nayani-varu* (1881), 4 Mad. 250, at p. 259.

⁹ *Ibid.*; *Visalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastry* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150; *Jugmohandas Mangaldas v. Sir Mangaldas Nathubhoy* (1886), 10 Bom. 528, at p. 551; *Shamnarain Singh v. Rughooburdyal* (1877), 3 Calc. 508, at p. 511; 1 C. L. R. 343, at pp. 345, 346. See also *Bissessur Chuckerbutty v. Seetul Chunder Chuckerbutty* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 69; S. C. (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 13.

¹⁰ K. K. Bhattacharya ("Law Relating to the Joint Hindu Family," p. 661) considers that this distinction only applies to arable land.

is not entitled to the property absolutely, but he is entitled on partition to take one-fourth share as a reward for the recovery, and he has to share the remainder with his brethren.¹

Where the recoverer is the father, the Mitakshara would apparently give him the whole of the property,² but the authorities of the Bengal school make no distinction between a recovery by the father or one by another coparcener.³

The redemption of property is not a recovery within the meaning of this rule.⁴

The use of family money for the purpose of recovering such property does not necessarily make it joint.⁵

(f) In a case governed by the Mitakshara school of law, property inherited by obstructed inheritance (*Sapratibandha*),⁶ i.e. from some person other than a natural or adopted father, father's father, or father's father's father.⁷

Property inherited by a single son from his mother would apparently not be coparcenary property, but the question is by no means clear.

As to property inherited by several sons, see *ante*, pp. 238-241.

As pointed out by Mr. J. C. Ghose,⁸ according to the *Smritis* it is only in property derived from a paternal grandfather that the sons have

¹ "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4, para. 3; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 365; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. iv. s. 2, para. 9. See *Naraganti Achammagaru v. Venkatachalapati Nayanivaru* (1881), 4 Mad. 250, at p. 259. Where the property is impartible, the recoverer would apparently be entitled to a reward. *Ibid.*, pp. 259, 260.

² Chap. i. s. 5, para. 11.

³ "Dayabhaga," chap. vi. s. 2, paras. 36-39; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. iv. s. 2, paras. 7, 8; William Macnaghten, vol. i. 52; vol. ii. 157. In *Bolakee Sahoo v. Court of Wards* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 34, the right of the father to the whole was maintained, but the question as to his being entitled only to an extra share does not seem to have been raised.

⁴ *Visalatchi Ammal v. Annasamy Sastri* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 150.

⁵ *Bachcho Kuwar v. Dharam Das*

(1906), 28 All. 347.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 241, note 10.

⁷ *Atar Singh v. Thakar Singh* (1908), 25 I. A. 206; 35 Calc. 1039; 12 C. W. N. 1049; 10 Bom. L. R. 790; *Gurumurthi Reddi v. Gurammal* (1908), 32 Mad. 88; *Timannacharya v. Balacharya* (1903), 4 Bom. L. R. 457; *Nund Coomar Lall (Baboo) v. Razeeddeen Hossein* (1872), 10 B. L. R. 183; 18 W. R. C. R. 477; *Nallatambi Chetti (Rayadur) v. Mukunda Chetti (Rayadur)* (1868), 3 Mad. H. C. 455; *Saminadha Pillai v. Thangathanni* (1895), 19 Mad. 70; *Lochun Singh v. Nemdharee Singh* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 170; *Pitām Singh v. Ujagar Singh* (1878), 1 All. 651; *Jawahir Singh v. Guyan Singh* (1868), 3 Agra H. C. 78. See Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 375, 376.

⁸ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 375, see "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 4; and *Karuppai Nachiar v. Sankanarayam Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300, at p. 307.

equal rights with the father, but according to Mr. Colebrooke, the Mitakshara includes as coparcenary property everything obtained to the detriment of the mother's estate.¹

In *Karuppai Nachiar v. Sankaranarayan Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300, the Madras High Court, and in *Parson (Bar) v. Somli (Bar)* (1912), 36 Bom. 424; 14 Bom. L. R. 400, the Bombay High Court, held that sons inheriting from a mother took as tenants in common, but this is, it is submitted, not in accordance with the views of the Judicial Committee in *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)*, 29 I. A. 156; 25 Mad. 678; 7 C. W. N. 1; 4 Bom. L. R. 657, *ante*, pp. 238, 239.

As to property inherited from a maternal grandfather, see *ante*, pp. 241, 242.

Under the Bengal school, inherited property, from whomsoever it be inherited, is the separate property of a male heir.

Accretions
and proceeds.

(g) Accretions to separate property of any kind and savings therefrom, and property purchased with the income thereof, or from the proceeds thereof.²

Burden of
proof that
property
separate.

A member of a joint family claiming property as separate must show of what the separate property consists,³ and that it was his separate acquisition.⁴

As to the presumption with regard to the family being joint, see *ante*, pp. 220-223.

Property in
name of
coparcener.

Property⁵ purchased, either at a private sale or at a sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court,⁶ or held by or in the name of, or settled with⁷ a coparcener in a family which is joint in estate,⁸ is, if held in a manner not inconsistent with the property being joint, presumed, apart from special circumstances, to have belonged to the coparcenary at the time of its acquisition.⁹

¹ See *ante*, I. 243.

² See *Boonidra Lall (Bukshree) v. Dewkee Nundun Lall (Bukshree)* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 223.

³ *Gane Bhive Parab v. Kane Bhive* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 169.

⁴ *Bipro Prosad Mytee v. Kenae Doyee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 165; S. C. on remand, 5 W. R. C. R. 82.

⁵ This includes money due on a bond, *Kalee Sunkur Bhadooree v. Eshan Chunder Bhadooree* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 528.

⁶ *Hari Singh v. Sher Sing* (1909), 31 All. 282.

⁷ *Huro Soonduree Debia v. Doorga Doss Bhattacharjee* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 265.

⁸ They may have separated in food or worship, *ante*, p. 221.

⁹ *Dhurm Das Pandey v. Shama-soondri Dibiah* (1843), 3 M. I. A. 229, at p. 240; 6 W. R. P. C. 43, at p. 44; *Prankishen Paul Chowdhry v. Mothooramohun Paul Chowdhry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 403; 5 W. R. P. C. 11; *Bissessur Lall Sahoo v. Luchmessur Singh (Maharajah)* (1879), 6 I. A. 233, at p. 236; 5 C. L. R. 477, at p. 479; *Cheetha (Mussumat) v. Miheen Lal (Baboo)* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 369; *Luziman Row Sadasow v. Mullar Row Bajee* (1831), 2 Knapp. 60; 5 W. R. P. C. 67; *Parbati Dasi v. Baikuntha Nath De (Raja)* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 428; 16 Bom. L. R. 101;

There is no similar presumption in the case of property purchased by or in the name of dependent members of the family, who have no vested interest in the joint family, as, for instance, a son-in-law living in the house,¹ a wife,² under the Bengal school of law a son when the father is alive,³ or a female member of the family;⁴ but where the property had been purchased by the managing members in such name the presumption might arise.⁵

“In the case of an ordinary Hindu family who are living together, or have their entire property in common, the presumption is that all that any one member of the family is found in possession of belongs to the common stock. That is the ordinary presumption, and the onus of establishing the contrary is thrown on the member of the family who disputes it.”⁶

“The fact of the Hindu family is enough to put the purchaser upon

Kanhia Lal v. Debi Das (1899), 22 All. 141; *Yanumula Venkayama (Stree Rajah) v. Yanumula Boochia Vankondora (Stree Rajah)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 333; 13 W. R. P. C. 4; *Bodh Sing Doodhooia v. Gunesh Chunder Sen* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 317, at p. 327; 19 W. R. C. R. 356, at p. 357; *Pramnath Choudhry v. Kashinath Roy Chowdhry*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 169; *Ramphul Singh v. Degnarain Singh* (1881), 8 Calc. 517; 10 C. L. R. 489; *Jugodumba Debra v. Rohince Debia* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 422; *Heera Lal Roy v. Bidyadhar Roy* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 343; *Cassumbhoy Ah-medbhoy v. Ahmedbhoy Hubibhoy* (1887), 12 Bom. 280, at p. 309; *Annundo Mohun Roy v. Lamb* (1862), Marsh. 169; 1 Hay, 374; *Hait Singh v. Dabee Singh* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 308; *Nursingh Dass (Rai) v. Narain Dass (Rai)* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 217; S. C. on appeal (1876), 26 W. R. C. R. 17; *Gopeekrsh Gosain v. Gungapersaud Gosain* (1854), 6 M. I. A. 53; *Subbayya v. Surayya* (1887), 10 Mad. 251; *Subbayya v. Chellamma* (1886), 9 Mad. 477 (where waste lands were brought under cultivation); *Gopee Lal v. Bhugwan Doss (Mohunt)* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 7; *Narayan Deshpande v. Anaji Deshpande* (1880), 5 Bom. 130; *Nilmoney Bhooia v. Gunga Narain Shahur Roy* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 334. See *Balaram Bhaskarji v. Ramchandra Bhaskarji* (1898), 22 Bom. 922; *Shib Pershad Chuckerbutty*

v. Gunga Monee Debee (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 291; *Decla Singh v. Toofanee Singh* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 306; *Beharee Lal (Lalla) v. Modho Pershad (Lalla)* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 69.

¹ *Dossee Monee Dossee v. Ram Chand Mohur* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 249.

² *Chowdrani v. Tariny Kanth Lahiri Chowdry* (1882), 8 Calc. 545. This decision was reversed on the facts, *Dharani Kanu Lahiri v. Kristokumari Chowdhurani* (1886), 13 I. A. 70; 13 Calc. 181. See *Bindoo Bashinee Debec v. Pearce Mohun Bosc* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 312.

³ *Sarada Prosad Ray v. Mahananda Ray* (1904), 31 Calc. 448.

⁴ *Narayana v. Krishna* (1884), 8 Map. 214.

⁵ See *Chand Hurree Maitee v. Norendro Narain Roy (Rajah)* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 231. The purchase was made by the managing member in the name of the family priest.

⁶ *Bannoo v. Kashee Ram* (1877), 3 Calc. 315, at p. 317; *Sudanund Mohapattur v. Soorjo Monee Dayee* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 436. This presumption applies also to the case where the property has passed by sale into the hands of third parties and has been redeemed by private purchase by a coparcener; *Gooroo Pershad Roy v. Debee Pershad Tewarce* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 58.

Proof of
nucleus.

inquiry, and if he deals with a single member without obtaining proof that the property is separate property he does so at his own risk."¹

There has been some conflict as to whether it is necessary for the person claiming the property as joint to prove that there was a nucleus of family property from which the property in question might have been acquired, or whether mere proof that the acquirer was at the time of the acquisition a member of a Hindu family is not sufficient.² Mr. Mayne³ seeks to reconcile these decisions by pointing out how the burden of proof varies in accordance with the nature of the claim to separate property.

In a recent case the Allahabad High Court⁴ has laid down that in Mitakshara cases proof of nucleus is necessary, but that none is necessary in cases governed by the Dayabhaga. The judges relied on the decision in *Sauwla Prasad Ray v. Mahananda Ray* (1904), 31 Cal. 448, but in that case, which was governed by the Bengal school, the property was acquired during the lifetime of the father, and therefore there was no presumption that the property was joint.⁵

It is obvious that there may be joint property without a pre-existing nucleus.⁶

It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a rule which will suit the circumstances of each case, but every weight must be given to the practice of sharing property in common as members of a joint family which prevails among Hindus. It rarely happens that a case depends upon the mere necessity to prove the existence of a nucleus of family property.

When it is proved that there was family property, the fruits of which were capable of providing for the acquisition of the property in question,

¹ *Shibsoondery Dossee v. Rakhall Doss Sirkar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 38.

² The following cases assert that it is unnecessary to prove a nucleus: *Taruck Chunder Poddar v. Jodeshur Chunder Koondoo* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 193; 19 W. R. C. R. 178; *Gobind Chunder Mookerjee v. Doorgapersad Baboo* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 337; 22 W. R. C. R. 248; *Shushee Mohun Pal Chowdhry v. Aukhil Chunder Banerjee* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 232; *Vedaralli v. Narayana* (1877), 2 Mad. 19; *Tara Churn Mookerjee v. Joynarain Mookerjee* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 226. In the following cases a different view was entertained: *Dwarkaprasad v. Jamnadas* (1910), 13 Bom. L. R. 133; *Bholanath Mahtia v. Ajoodhia Persad Sookul* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 336; 20 W. R. C. R. 65; *Denonath Shaw v. Hurrlynarain Shaw* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 349; *Kristo Chunder Kurmoker v. Rughoonath Kurmoker* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 352, note; *Hurish Chunder Doss v. Gourree Pershad Chatterjee* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 162; *Khilut Chunder Ghose v. Koonj Lall*

Dhur (1868), 11 B. L. R. 194, note; 10 W. R. C. R. 333; *Radhika Prasad Dey v. Dharma Dasi Debi (Mussumat)* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 124; 11 W. R. C. R. 499. See *Pran Kristo Mojomondar v. Bhageerutee Goophtia (Sreemutty)* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 158; *Chundro Tara Deba v. Bakesh Ali* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 305; *Hurish Chunder Mookerjee v. Mokhoda Debia* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 564; *Sudanund Mohapatrur v. Soorjo Monee Dayee* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 436, at p. 438.

³ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 373, 374.

⁴ *Govind Chandra Das v. Radha Kristo Das* (1909), 31 All. 477. See also *Ram Kishen Das v. Tunda Mal* (1911), 33 All. 677.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 218, 219.

⁶ See *Karsondas Dharamsey v. Gangabai* (1908), 32 Bom. 479; 10 Bom. L. R. 184; *Laldas Narandas v. Motibai* (1908), 10 Bom. L. R. 175; *Haridas Lalji v. Narotham* (1911), 14 Bom. L. R. 237; *ante*, pp. 238 et seq.

it is clear that the burden is upon the person who alleges that the property was a separate acquisition.¹

The absence of a nucleus may be a factor of considerable importance for the purpose of determining a question as to whether property was a separate acquisition.²

The fact that the property had increased during a long period to a considerable value from a small nucleus of family property is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that it was all family property.³

The doctrine of nucleus has no application to Khojas.⁴

The purchase of property in the name of one coparcener, or the use of his name in documents relating to the property,⁵ or the carrying on of law suits by him alone,⁶ or an entry of his name in revenue records,⁷ does not by itself show that the acquisition was separate, or that there had been a separation, particularly where that member is the managing member of the family ;⁸ but where a purchaser from such member has been misled, the family may, in some cases, be estopped from claiming the property as joint,⁹ and in conjunction with other evidence of separation, or of separate acquisition, such evidence may be of importance.¹⁰

The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the

Use of name
of individual
member.

Rebuttal of
presumption.

¹ *Lal Bahadur v. Kanhaia Lal* (1907), 34 I. A. 65; 29 All. 244; 11 C. W. N. 417; 9 Bom. L. R. 597; *Anand Rao Gunputrao v. Vasantrao Madhav Rao* (1907), 34 Mad. 262, note; 11 C. W. N. 478; 9 Bom. L. R. 595. See *Tara Churn Mookerjee v. Joy-narain Mookerjee* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 226.

² *Bhagubai v. Tukaram* (1905), 7 Bom. L. R. 169.

³ *Tottempudi Venkataratnam v. Tottempudi Seshamma* (1903), 27 Mad. 228.

⁴ *Jan Mahomed v. Datu Jaffar* (1913), 38 Bom. 449; 15 Bom. L. R. 1044.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 254. *Dhurum Das Pandey v. Shama Soondri Dibiah* (1843), 3 M. I. A. 229, at p. 240; 6 W. R. P. C. 43, at p. 44; *Parbati Dasi v. Baikuntha Nath De (Raja)* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 428; 16 Bom. L. R. 101; *Janokee Dassee v. Kisto Komul Singh* (1862), Marsh. 1; *Deela Singh v. Toofanee Singh* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 306; *Beharee Lal (Lalla) v. Modho Pershad (Lalla)* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 69; *Runjeet Singh v. Madud Ali* (1868),

3 Agra, 222; *Shibosoondery Dossee v. Rakhall Doss Sirkar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 38; *Mun Mohinee Dabee v. Soodamonee Dabee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 31. See *Umrihnath Chowdhry v. Goureenath Chowdhry* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 542; 6 B. L. R. 232; 15 W. R. P. C. 10; *Vedavalli v. Narayana* (1877), 2 Mad. 19; *Kundan Lal v. Shankar Lal* (1913), 35 All. 564.

⁶ *Deela Singh v. Toofanee Singh* (1865), 1 W. R. C. R. 306.

⁷ *Jussoondah v. Ajodhia Pershad* (1867), 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 261. See *Rewa Prasad Sukal v. Deo Dutt Ram Sukal* (1899), 27 I. A. 39; 2 Calc. 515; 4 C. W. N. 582.

⁸ *Kishen Komul Singh v. Janokee Dossee* (1862), W. R. Sp. No. 3; 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 23.

⁹ See *Gour Chunder Biswas v. Greesh Chunder Biswas* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 120, at p. 122.

¹⁰ See *Bholanath Mahta v. Ajoodhia Persad Sookul* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 336; 20 W. R. C. R. 65; *Pearry Lal v. Bhawoot Koer* (1862), W. R. Sp. No. 18.

property has been self-acquired from separate funds, without the aid of the coparcenary property, and that the property is held separately,¹ or by proof of separation before the acquisition, or by proof that at the time of acquisition there was no family property out of which it could have been acquired,² or by proof of separation after the purchase, and exclusive possession of the property thereafter,³ or by proof of the assent of coparceners to the property being treated as separate.⁴

Evidence as to the source of the purchase-money is generally the most satisfactory mode of proof, but it is not indispensable.⁵

Where it is admitted or proved that property in dispute was not originally coparcenary property,⁶ or was not acquired by use of coparcenary funds,⁷ or that a partition has already taken place,⁸ the burden lies upon the person alleging the property to be joint.

Originally a
separate
acquisition.

Where property was in its origin a separate acquisition of an individual member of the family, the burden of proving that it has become joint property, *i.e.* that its character has been changed by treatment,⁹ is on the person making the assertion.¹⁰

Possession of
property.

There is no presumption that a family possesses any particular property,¹¹ or any property at all.¹² A person who claims a

¹ *Lokenath Surma v. Ooma Moyee Dabee* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 107.

² See *Gunga Dhur Chatterjee v. Soorjo Nath Chatterjee* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 446.

³ *Bholanath Mahta v. Ajoodhia Persad Sookul* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 336; 20 W. R. C. R. 65.

⁴ See *Kallhanji v. Bconji*, 32 Bom. 512; 10 Bom. L. R. 754.

⁵ See *Dhurm Das Pandey v. Shama Soondri Dibiah* (Mussumat) (1843), 3 M. I. A. 229; 6 W. R. P. C. 43; *Dhunookdharce Lall v. Gunput Lall* (1868), 11 B. L. R. 201, note; 10 W. R. C. R. 122; *Bholanath Mahta v. Ajoodhia Persad Sookul* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 336; 20 W. R. C. R. 85.

⁶ See *Atar Singh v. Thakar Singh* (1908), 35 I. A. 206; 35 Cal. 1039; 12 C. W. N. 1049; 10 Bom. L. R. 790.

⁷ *Narayan Babaji v. Nana Manohar* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 153, at pp. 176, 177.

⁸ *Ram Ghulam Singh v. Ram Behari Singh* (1895), 18 All. 90; *Narayan Babaji v. Nana Manohar* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 153, at pp. 176, 177; *Ram Gobind Koond v. Hossein Ali (Moulvie Syud)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 90; *Vinayak Narsinh v. Dalto Gorind* (1900), 25 Bom. 367; *Prem Chund Dan v. Darimba Debia* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 238.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 245.

¹⁰ See *Venkataramanayamma Garu (Sri Raja Chelikani) v. Appa Rau Bahadur Garu* (1897), 20 Mad. 207, at p. 220. This decision was set aside on appeal (1902), 29 I. A. 156; 25 Mad. 678; 7 C. W. N. 1, but this dictum as to the burden of proof was untouched by the decision of the Judicial Committee.

¹¹ See *Obhoy Churn Ghose v. Gobind Chunder Dey* (1882), 9 Cal. 237.

¹² *Tooleseydas Ludha v. Premji Tricunddas* (1888), 13 Bom. 61, at p. 66;

share in property as belonging to a joint family, of which he is admitted or has been proved to be a member, must prove either that the property was held or acquired by the members of the family as such,¹ or that the person in whose possession it is is a member of the family.²

He may, of course, rebut evidence of self-acquisition by evidence as to the source of the acquisition, or by other evidence tending to show that the property was joint.

There is in India a considerable quantity of immovable property which, although partible by nature, is by custom or by the terms of a grant by the Government, impartible, in the sense that it always descends to a single heir, and is not coparcenary property. Impartible property.

In Bengal, Behar, and Orissa,³ except in the Jungle Mehals of Midnapore, and other districts where local customs⁴ prevail,⁵ impartible zemindaries are not recognized. This rule does not apply to a principality (*Raj*).⁶

"The nature of the estate and the existence or otherwise of a special family custom are questions of fact to be determined on the evidence available in each case." ⁷ The burden of proof is upon the person alleging impartibility.⁸

Ramkishan Das v. Tunda Mal (1911), 33 All. 677. See *Nanabhai Ganpatrav Dharyavan v. Achratbai* (1886), 12 Bom. 122, at p. 131.

¹ See *Balaram Bhaskarji v. Ramchandra Bhaskarji* (1898), 22 Bom. 922, at p. 931; *Obhoy Churn Ghose v. Gobind Chunder Dey* (1882), 9 Calc. 237.

² Cases, ante, p. 255, note 6, and p. 257, note 5. A different view was entertained in *Shiu Golam Sing v. Baran Sing* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 164, at p. 167, where it was said, "He must, at least, show that the defendants whom he sues constitute a joint family, and that the property in question, became joint property when acquired, or that at some period since its acquisition, it has been enjoyed jointly by that family."

³ Ben. Reg. XI. of 1793.

⁴ Local custom does not include a family custom, see *Deedar Hossein (Rajah) v. Zahoor-on Nissa (Ranee)* (1841), 2 M. I. A. 441.

⁵ Ben. Reg. X. of 1810.

⁶ See *Beer Pertab Sahe (Baboo) v. Jender Pertab Sahee (Maharajah)* (187), 12 M. I. A. 1; 9 W. R. P. C. 37. *Gunesh Dutt Singh (Baboo) v. Moheshur Singh (Maharaja)* (1855), 6 M. I. A. 164.

⁷ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 61; 37 Mad. 199, at p. 210; 17 C. W. N. 1221, at p. 1224; 15 Bom. L. R. 1010, at p. 1014; *Mallikarjuna (Srimantu Raja Yarlagaadda) v. Yarlagaadda Durga (Srimantu Raja)* (1890), 17 I. A. 134; 13 Mad. 406; *Kachi Kaliyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar* (1905), 32 I. A. 261, at p. 269; 28 Mad. 508, at p. 515; 10 C. W. N. 95, at p. 106; 7 Bom. L. R. 907; *Durga Charan Mahto v. Raghunath Mahto* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 55.

⁸ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 61; 37 Mad. 199, at p. 209; 17 C. W. N. 1221, at p. 1224; 15 Bom. L. R. 1010,

Raj, palayam. In most cases such property is annexed to a *Raj*, or principality,¹ or to a *Palayam*, or to some other hereditary office; but a custom of descent according to the law of primogeniture may exist by *koláchár* or family custom, although the estate may not be a *raj* or *palayam*.²

A private individual cannot create an impartible estate,³ or provide that it should always descend to a single heir.⁴

The following are instances where the custom of impartibility in the sense of the property being held by a single individual is to be found:—

Raj.

(a) Zemindaries, especially in the Madras Presidency, partaking of the nature of a *Raj* or sovereignty.⁵

Palayam.

(b) Palayams (tracts of country governed by a Poligar or petty chieftain as a principality or *Raj*)⁶ in the Madras Presidency.⁷

An estate which is neither a *Raj* nor a *Palayam* may also by family custom be impartible.⁸

Grants by Government.

(c) *Saranjams*⁹ or *Jaghirs*.¹⁰ Although *Saranjams* are *primâ facie* impartible, they may be originally partible, or become so by family usage.¹¹

at p. 1014; *Durga Charan Mahto v. Raghunath Mahto* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 55.

¹ A *Raj* "in its very nature excludes the idea of division" in the sense of partition among the sons: *Guruch Dutt Singh v. Moheshur Singh (Maharajah)* (1855), 6 M. I. A. 164, at p. 187.

² *Chintamun Singh (Chowdhry) v. Nowlukho Konwari (Mussamut)* (1875), 2 I. A. 263; 1 Calc. 153; *Urjun Sing (Rawut) v. Ghunsiam Sing (Rawut)* (1851), 5 M. I. A. 1. See *Shyamanand Das Mohapatrajee Ramakanta Das Mohapatra* (1904), 32 Calc. 6 (reversed on the facts on appeal, *Rama Kanta Das Mahapatra v. Shamanand Das (Chowdhury)* (1909), 36 I. A. 49; 36 Calc. 590; 13 C. W. N. 581; 11 Bom. L. R. 53); As to evidence of the custom of primogeniture, see *Mohesh Chunder Dhal v. Satrugan Dhal* (1902), 29 I. A. 62; 29 Calc. 343; 6 C. W. N. 459; 4 Bom. L. R. 372; *Rama Kanta Das Mahapatra v. Shamanand Das (Chowdhury)* (1909), 36 I. A. 49; 36 Calc. 590; 13 C. W. N. 581; 11 Bom. L. R. 530; *Balvadr Samant Singh (Chowdhury) v. Bimbahur Roy* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 509; ante, p. 32.

³ *Pirojshah v. Manibhai* (1911), 36 Bom. 53; 13 Bom. L. R. 963; *Rameshwar Prosad Singh v. Lachmi Prosad Singh* (1903), 31 Calc. 111; 7 C. W. N. 688; see post, pp. 533, 534.

⁴ Post, p. 532.

⁵ See *Gavuridevamma Garu (Sri*

Rajah Yenumala) v. Ramandora Garu (Sri Rajah Yenumala) (1870), 6 Mad. H. C. 93, at p. 105. See cases in Norton L. C. pp. 478-480.

⁶ See Wilson's "Glossary," p. 391.

⁷ *Kachi Kaliyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar* (1905), 22 I. A. 261; 28 Mad. 508; 10 C. W. N. 95; *Naraguntty Lutchmeedaramah v. Vengama Naidoo* (1861), 9 M. I. A. 66; 1 W. R. P. C. 30.

⁸ *Chintamun Singh (Chowdhry) v. Nowlukho Konwari (Mussamut)* (1875), 2 I. A. 263; 1 Calc. 153; *Shyamanand Das Mohapatra v. Rama Kanta Das Mohapatra* (1904), 32 Calc. 6; *Urjun Sing (Rawut) v. Ghunsiam Sing (Rawut)* (1851), 5 M. I. A. 169.

⁹ Grants generally of Revenue made by Maratha sovereigns, see Wilson's "Glossary," p. 465. *Narayan Jagannath Dikshit v. Vasudeo Vishnu Dikshit* (1890), 15 Bom. 247; *Ramchandra Mantri v. Venkatrao* (1882), 6 Bom. 598.

¹⁰ Grants by the Sovereign, see *Raghojirao Saheb (Shrimant Raje Bahadur) v. Lakhmanrao Saheb (Shrimant Raje Bahadur)* (1912), 39 I. A. 202; 36 Bom. 639; 16 C. W. N. 1058, 14 Bom. L. R. 1226; *Nilmoni Singh (Rajah) v. Bakranath Singh* (1882), 9 I. A. 104; 9 Calc. 187; see ante, p. 251.

¹¹ *Madhavav Manohar v. Atmaram Keshav* (1890), 15 Bom. 519. See *Gopal Hari v. Ramakant* (1896), 21 Bom. 458, at p. 460.

Grants by Government, at any rate in the Southern Mahratta country, in the absence of any provision in the grant, or any custom would follow the ordinary rule of ancestral property,¹ especially where they are granted for the maintenance of the family.² Sanads in common form under Mad. Reg. XXV. of 1802 do not alter the partibility of the property.³ There is no presumption that grants to the holder of an office are impartible.⁴

Grants of *jaghirs* are *primâ facie* for life, but may be made heritable by appropriate words.⁵

As to the descent of jaghirs in the Punjab, see Act IV. (Punj. C.) of 1900.

It has been held that land held as appertaining to the office of *desai*, *Desai*, who was formerly the officer employed in the Mahratta country in superintending the collection of the Government revenues and other duties, is *primâ facie* partible.⁶

There is similar authority with regard to the office of *deshpande*, an *Deshpande*. hereditary revenue accountant of a district or a certain number of villages,⁷ *Deshmukh*. and to the office of *deshmukh*, who is a district Revenue officer.⁸

On partition, however, the right of the officer to allowances for the performance of the duties of his office must be reserved.⁹

A mere arrangement for the convenient performance of the services of the officer is on a different footing from a custom.¹⁰

Where the services have been abolished, a family custom might still render the property impartible.¹¹

The terms of the grant might, of course, create impartibility.¹²

The office of *Pattam*, an office of dignity in a family governed by the *Pattam*. Aliya Satana law, is impartible.¹³

(d) Service tenures, such as the *ghatwal*¹⁴ tenures in Manbhoom and Service tenures.

¹ *Bodhrao Hunmont v. Nursing Rao* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 426; *Panchanadayyan v. Nilakandayyan* (1883), 7 Mad. 191.

² *Visvanadha Naick v. Bungaroo Teromala Naick*, Mad. Dec of 1851, 74. See cases in Norton's L. C. pp. 279, 478.

³ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy Appa Row (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 61; 57 Mad. 199, at p. 209; 17 C. W. N. 1221; 15 Bom. L. R. 1010; *Mallikarjuna (Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda) v. Yarlagadda Durga (Srimantu Raja)* (1890), 17 I. A. 134; 13 Mad. 406.

⁴ *Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar* (1909), 34 Mad. 470.

⁵ *Ram Saran Lall v. Ram Narayan Singh* (1914), 42 Calc. 305.

⁶ *Adrishappa v. Gurushdappa* (1880), 7 I. A. 162; 4 Bom. 494; *Shidhojirav v. Naikojirav* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 228.

⁷ *Ramrao Trimbak Deshpande v. Yeshvantrao Madhavrao Deshpande*

(1885), 10 Bom. 327. In this case the custom of impartibility was established. See Steele, p. 229.

⁸ *Gopalav v. Trimbakrav* (1886), 10 Bom. 598. In that case also the custom of impartibility was established.

⁹ *Adrishappa v. Gurushdappa* (1880), 7 I. A. 162; 4 Bom. 494. See Bom. Act III. of 1874, s. 8.

¹⁰ See *Gopalrav v. Trimbakrav* (1886), 10 Bom. 598.

¹¹ *Radhabai v. Anantrav Bhagvant Deshpande* (1885), 9 Bom. 198; *Ramrao Trimbak Deshpande v. Yeshvantrao Madhavrao Deshpande* (1885), 10 Bom. 327.

¹² See *Gopal Hari v. Ramakant* (1896), 21 Bom. 458, at p. 462.

¹³ *Timmappa Heggade v. Mahalinga Heggade* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 28.

¹⁴ "Lands granted either rent free or at a low rate of assessment to public ferrymen or to officers guarding passes in the hills. In Birbhum the lands were granted at a fixed rate of assessment in perpetuity to the holders and their descendants, as

Bheerbhoom,¹ *diguari* tenures,² and those attached to village offices in Madras.³

Hereditary offices.

"Hereditary offices, whether religious or secular, are treated by the Hindu law writers as naturally indivisible; but modern custom, whether or not it be strictly in accordance with ancient law, has sanctioned such partition as can be had of such property, by means of a performance of the duties of the office, and the enjoyment of the emoluments by the different coparceners in rotation."⁴

Discontin-
uance.

There seems to be no reason why a family custom of impartibility should not be discontinued.⁵

Savings from
impartible
estates.

The question whether property purchased from the income of an impartible estate governed by the Mitakshara school of law, and the savings from the income of such estate, form part of the estate or are the separate property of the owner is a question of intention to incorporate the acquisitions with the original estate.⁶

Burden of
proof.

It would seem that the burden of showing that the acquisitions had been incorporated in the original estate lies upon the person alleging that fact.⁷

long as the revenue is paid, although apparently no longer connected with the performance of any particular duty.—Reg. XXIX, 1814." Wilson's "Glossary," p. 173. See Baden Powell's "Land Systems of British India," vol. i. pp. 532, 582-587.

¹ *Lalanund Sing Bahadoor (Raja) v. The Bengal Government* (1855), 6 M. L. A. 101, at p. 125; 1 W. R. P. C. 20; *Hurkall Singh v. Jorawun Singh* (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 169 (new edition, 204). See *Nilmoni Singh (Rajah) v. Bakranath Singh* (1882), 9 I. A. 104; 9 Calc. 187; *Doorga Pershad Singh (Tikaut) v. Doorga Kooeree (Teketnee)* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 154.

² *Durya Prasad Singh (Raja Sri Sri) v. Brujanath Bose* (1912), 39 I. A. 133; 39 Calc. 696; 16 C. W. N. 482; 14 Bom. L. R. 445.

³ *Alymalummaul v. Vencatoovien*, 2 Mad. Dec. 85, referred to in Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed. 651; *Bada v. Hussu Bhai* (1883), 7 Mad. 236.

⁴ *Mancharam v. Pranshankar* (1882), 6 Bom. 298, at p. 299. As to priestly earnings, see Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family," pp. 459-463; *Khedroo Ojha v. Deo Ranees Koomar (Mussamut)* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 222; *Becharam Banerjee v. Thakoomonee Debia (Sree*

muttee) (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 114.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 30.

⁶ *Janki Pershad Singh v. Dwarka Pershad Singh* (1913), 40 I. A. 170, at p. 181; 35 All. 391, at p. 401; 17 C. W. N. 1029, at p. 1039; 15 Bom. L. R. 853, at p. 862; *Parbati Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani) v. Jagadis Chunder Dhabal* (1902), 29 I. A. 82, at p. 98; 29 Calc. 433, at p. 453; 6 C. W. N. 490, at p. 495; 4 Bom. L. R. 365; *Sarabjit Partap Bahadur Sahi v. Indarjit Partap Bahadur Sahi* (1904), 27 All. 203, at p. 252. As to the private property of a Sovereign Prince, see *Secretary of State v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba* (1859), 7 M. L. A. 476, at p. 537; 4 W. R. P. C. 42, at p. 45; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 329, 330.

⁷ *Jagadamba Kuwari (Rani) v. Wazir N. Singh (Thakur)* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 239; *Janki Pershad Singh v. Dwarka Pershad Singh* (1913), 40 I. A. 170, at p. 181; 35 All. 391, at p. 401; 17 C. W. N. 1029, at p. 1039; 15 Bom. L. R. 853, at p. 862; *Parbati Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani) v. Jagadis Chunder Dhabal* (1902), 29 I. A. 82, at p. 98; 29 Calc. 433, at p. 453; 6 C. W. N. 490, at p. 495; 4 Bom. L. R. 365; *Rajeswara Gajapaty Naraina Deo Maharajulungaru (Sri Sri Sri Rajah)*

(e) Grants made out of the revenues of an impartible estate for the maintenance of the junior members of the family and their direct male line (called in some parts of India *babuana* grants,¹ and in the case of grants to women on marriage *sohag* grants.²) On the death of the last heir of the grantee these revert to the estate.

As to a *babuana* grant for the benefit of a junior member of the family and his direct male line, see *Ramchandra Marwari v. Mudeswar Singh* (1906), 33 Calc. 1158; 10 C. W. N. 979; *Durgadut Singh v. Rameswar Singh* (1909), 36 I. A. 176; 36 Calc. 943; 13 C. W. N. 1013; 11 Bom. L. R. 901; *Laliteswar Singh v. Bhaveswar Singh* (1908), 35 Calc. 823; 12 C. W. N. 958; *Ekradeswar Singh v. Janeshwari Babuasin* (1914), 41 I. A. 275; 42 Calc. 582; 18 C. W. N. 1249; 17 Bom. L. R. 18. According to *Hazari Mall Babu v. Abaninath Adhurya* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 280, at p. 287, in the case of property being carved out of an impartible estate for the maintenance of a son and his descendants "the view may be maintained that it has all the incidents of ancestral property."

Except that it may be liable for the maintenance of the younger members of the family,³ an impartible estate itself cannot be regarded as coparcenary property, inasmuch as by the custom of the family, it is held by a single individual.⁴

It is the exclusive property of the owner, subject to any custom restricting his powers of alienation, and no other member of the family has any joint interest in it.⁵

It was formerly considered that coparcenary property would include property which by custom is held and enjoyed by a single member of the family, but in which there was a right of survivorship.⁶

In a recent case in Bombay,⁷ Jenkins, C.J., said this: "No doubt

v. Virapratapah Rudra Gajapaty Naraina Deo Maharajulunguru (Sri Sri Sri) (1869), 5 Mad. H. C. 31, at p. 41; *Kotta Ramasmi Chetti v. Bangari Seshama Nayanivaru* (1881), 3 Mad. 145, at p. 150. A different view was expressed in *Sarabjit Partap Bahadur Sahi v. Indarjit Partap Bahadur Sahi* (1904), 27 All. 203, at p. 252; *Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik* (1893), 17 Mad. 422, at p. 444. Cf. *post*, pp. 474, 475.

¹ *Durgadut Singh v. Rameswar Singh Bahadur (Maharajah Sir)* (1909), 36 I. A. 176; 36 Calc. 943; 13 C. W. N. 1013; 11 Bom. L. R. 901. As to the alienation of such grants, see *ibid*.

² *Ekradeswar Singh v. Janeshwari Babuasin* (1914), 41 I. A. 275; 42 Calc. 582; 18 C. W. N. 1249; 17 Bom. L. R. 18.

³ *Laliteswar Singh v. Rameswar*

Singh (1909), 36 Calc. 481, at p. 483; 13 C. W. N. 838, at p. 841; see *Gur Pershad Singh v. Dhani Rai* (1910), 38 Calc. 182; 15 C. W. N. 49. This liability arises from the relationship of the individual to the holder, and not on account of any coparcenary interest: *Rama Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rajah of Pittapur* (1915), 39 Mad. 396.

⁴ See *Tara Kumari (Thakurani) v. Chaturbhuj Narayan Singh* (1915), 42 I. A. 192; 42 Calc. 1179; 19 C. W. N. 1119; 17 Bom. L. R. 1012. It was held otherwise in *Bawani Ghulam v. Deo Raj Kuari* (1883), 5 All. 542; but see below.

⁵ *Zamindar of Karvetnagar v. Dossji Varu (Sree Mahant)* (1909), 32 Mad. 429.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 260, 261.

⁷ *Bachoo v. Mankorebai* (1904), 29 Bom. 51, at p. 57; 6 Bom. L. R. 268; S. C. on appeal, *Bachoo Harkisondas*

the property claimed in *Raghunadha's* case¹ was impartible, but at one time it was the common notion that even in impartible property all the male members of a joint family were coparceners subject to the qualification that the enjoyment was by one member of the family alone, and it was considered, rightly or wrongly, that there was warrant for this view in a number of decisions of the Privy Council, and notably *Naragunt v. Vengama*,² *Shivagunga* case,³ the *Tipperah* case,⁴ *Stree Rajah Yanumula Venkayamah v. Stree Rajah Yanumula Boochia Vankondara*,⁵ *Chowdhry Chintamun Singh v. Mussamut Nowhucko Konwari*.⁶ I mention these cases as to all of them Sir James Colville, who delivered the judgment in *Raghunadha's* case, was a party; and if it was his view that the impartible zemindari belonged to the whole family, then the decision in *Raghunadha's* case would seem to have proceeded on circumstances very closely resembling those with which we are now dealing. But whatever may have been the opinion that prevailed at that time, it has now been definitely decided by the Privy Council in *Rani Sartaj Kuari v. Rani Devraj Kuari*,⁷ and in *Sri Raja Rao Venkata Surya v. Court of Wards*,⁸ that in impartible properties there is no coparcenary, so that in the light of these latter decisions it cannot be said that the conditions in *Raghunadha's* case were in all respects identical with those now under consideration.⁹

No question of separation in estate⁹ can arise in the case of an impartible Raj; as there is nothing upon which such separation can operate.¹⁰

According to the Madras High Court the successor to an impartible estate governed by the Mitakshara law cannot recover debts due to his predecessor without a certificate under Act VII. of 1889.¹¹ According to the Calcutta High Court he does not require a certificate.¹² It is submitted that the latter view is correct.

As to inheritance to impartible property, see *post*, Chap. XVII.

Alienation.

The holder of an impartible estate can, in the absence of a

v. Mankorebai (1907), 34 I. A. 107; 31 Bom. 373; 11 C. W. N. 769; 9 Bom. L. R. 646; see also *Rajah of Kalahasti v. Achigadu* (1905), 30 Mad. 454, differing from *Nachiappa Chettiar v. Chinnayasami Navcker* (1906), 29 Mad. 459, and from *Kali Krishna Sarkar v. Raghunath Deb* (1903), 31 Calc. 224; *Rama Row (Sri Rajah) v. Rajah of Pittapur* (1915), 39 Mad. 396. In *Baynath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh* (1916), 38 All. 590, it was considered that the impartible property was joint family property. *Zamindar of Karvetnagar v. Doseji Varu (Sree Mahant)* (1909), 32 Mad. 429; *Ram Das Marwari v. Braja Behari Singh (Tekait)* (1902), 6 C. W. N. 879

¹ *Raghunada (Sri) v. Brozo Kishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154; 1 Mad. 69.

² (1861), 9 M. I. A. 66, at p. 86;

1 W. R. P. C. 30.

³ (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543, at p. 589; 2 W. R. P. C. 31.

⁴ (1869), 12 M. I. A. 523, at p. 540; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 13.

⁵ (1870), 13 M. I. A. 333, at p. 339; 13 W. R. P. C. 21.

⁶ (1875), 2 I. A. 263, at pp. 269, 270; 1 Calc. 153.

⁷ (1888), 15 I. A. 51; 10 All. 272.

⁸ (1899), 26 I. A. 83; 22 Mad. 383; 3 C. W. N. 415; 1 Bom. L. R. 777.

⁹ *Post*, p. 325.

¹⁰ *Laliteshwar Singh v. Rameshwar Singh* (1909), 36 Calc. 481; 14 C. W. N. 49.

¹¹ *Rajah of Kalahasti v. Achigadu* (1905), 30 Mad. 454.

¹² *Gur Pershad Singh v. Dhani Rai* (1910), 38 Calc. 182; 15 C. W. N. 49.

custom rendering it inalienable,¹ dispose thereof by will or transfer *inter vivos*, whether he be governed by the Mitakshara² or by the Bengal³ school of law.

Where a gift or bequest is made out of such property to a son the son in a case governed by the Mitakshara law takes the subject of the gift or bequests as ancestral or coparcenary property.⁴

As to the alienation of a *babuana* grant, see *Durgadut Singh v. Rameshwar Singh Bahadur (Maharajah)* (1909), 36 I. A. 176; 36 Calc. 943; 13 C. W. N. 1013; 11 Bom. L. R. 901.

A sale which took place at a time when the accepted interpretation of the law was that an impartible estate was inalienable was construed with reference to the law as it then stood.⁵

When the estate is inalienable, the holder can sell or charge it,⁶ in case of such a necessity as would justify the manager of an infant heir in a sale or charge.⁷

Madras Acts II. of 1902, II. of 1903, II. of 1904,⁸ and VI. of 1909, have rendered the holders of nearly all the impartible estates in the Madras Presidency incapable of alienating or binding by their debts the estate except under circumstances which would entitle the managing member of a joint Hindu family, not being the father or grandfather of the other coparceners, to make an alienation of the joint property, or incur a debt, binding on the shares of the other coparceners independently of their consent.

Impartible property which has been sold does not retain its character of impartibility.

¹ *Sivasubramania Naicker v. Krishnammal* (1894), 18 Mad. 287.

² *Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao) v. Court of Wards* (1899), 26 I. A. 83; 22 Mad. 383; 3 C. W. N. 415; 1 Bom. L. R. 277; *Sartaj Kuari (Rani) v. Deoraj Kuari (Rani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 51; 10 All. 272; *Tara Kumari (Thakurani) v. Chaturbhuj Narayan Singh* (1915), 42 I. A. 192; 42 Calc. 1179; 19 C. W. N. 1119; 17 Bom. L. R. 1012; *Venkata Narasimha Naidu v. Bhashyakarl Naidu* (1899), 22 Mad. 538, upheld on appeal (1902), 29 I. A. 76; 25 Mad. 367; 6 C. W. N. 641; 4 Bom. L. R. 543; *Ram Das Marwari v. Braja Behari Singh (Tekait)* (1902), 6 C. W. N. 879; *Beresford v. Ramasubba* (1889), 13 Mad. 197; *Rup Singh v. Purbhu Narain Singh* (1898), 20 All.

537; *Kapilnauth Sahai Deo (Thakoor) v. The Government* (1874), 13 B. L. R. 445, at pp. 458-460; 22 W. R. C. R. 17, at pp. 20, 21

³ *Udaya Aditya Deb (Rajah) v. Jadub Lal Aditya Deb* (1881), 8 I. A. 248; 8 Calc. 199. S. C. in Court below, 5 Calc. 113; 4 C. L. R. 181; *Narain Khootia v. Lokenath Khootia* (1881), 7 Calc. 461; 9 C. L. R. 243.

⁴ *Hazari Mull Babu v. Abaninath Adhurjya* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 280.

⁵ *Abdul Aziz Khan Sahib v. Appayasami Naicker* (1903), 31 I. A. 1; 27 Mad. 131; 8 C. W. N. 186.

⁶ *Gopal Prosad Bhakat v. Raghunath Deb* (1904), 32 Calc. 158; 9 C. W. N. 330.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 288-290.

⁸ Sec. 4.

CHAPTER VII.

MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY OF JOINT FAMILY.

Application
proceeds of
coparcenary
property.

“ THE proceeds of undivided property must be brought, according to the theory of an undivided family, to the common chest or purse, and there dealt with according to the mode of enjoyment by the members of an undivided family.” ¹

This principle was laid down in a case governed by the Mitakshara school of law, but it would apply also to a joint family governed by the Bengal school of law, it being remembered that in the latter case sons have not during their father's lifetime any interest in the family chest or purse.

Payments on
behalf of
family.

Although a coparcener is not entitled ordinarily to credit for moneys paid by him out of his own funds for the benefit of the family on the improvement of the estate,² he is entitled to such credit where it is clear that he reserved his right to such credit, as where he paid the money to save the coparcenary estate from sale for arrears of Government revenue.³

All copar-
ceners to be
parties to
transactions.

Except where in a coparcenary governed by the Mitakshara the father has power to act independently of his sons,⁴ each coparcener must either himself, or by a manager having power in that behalf, be a party to every transaction relating to the coparcenary property.⁵

No coparcener, unless he be the manager, has power to enhance rent or eject tenants at his pleasure.⁶

It has been held ⁷ that in the absence of fraud payment to one of several joint proprietors is a payment to all. This would, it is submitted, depend upon the circumstances. Where there is a manager a tenant would rarely

¹ *Appovier v. Rama Subba Ayyan* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 75, at p. 90; 8 W. R. P. C. 1.

² *Muttusvami Gaundan v. Subbiram-anya Gaundan* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 309.

³ *Vizianagram (Rajah of) v. Setrucherla Somasekharadas (Rajah)* (1903), 26 Mad. 686.

⁴ *Viz.* in alienating for the purpose of paying antecedent debts, *post*, chap. viii.

⁵ See *Sangappa v. Sahebanna* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. 141; *Ghunshyam Singh v. Runjeet Singh* (1865), 4 W. R., Act X. R. 39.

⁶ *Balaji Baikaji Pinge v. Gopal* (1878), 3 Bom. 23. See cases *post*, p. 268, note 5, and p. 268, note 6.

⁷ *Ibrahim Tharagan (Sheik) v. Rama Ayyar* (1911), 35 Mad. 685; *Oodit Narain Singh v. Hudson* (1865), 2 W. R., Act X. R. 15.

be entitled to pay to any other coparcener. Under some circumstances a debtor might get a discharge by payment to one coparcener,¹ but it would ordinarily be safer for him to require a receipt from the manager or from the whole body of coparceners.

Except that the manager of a joint family business can enforce at law the ordinary business contracts which he is entitled to make or discharge in his own name without making his coparceners parties to the suit,² and that where credit is given to an individual member he can sue alone,³ and that a manager of a family can sue for trespass on the family waste lands,⁴ all the coparceners should be parties to a suit or execution proceedings relating to the coparcenary property,⁵ or to a trade or business belonging to the family,⁶ even if it be founded on a transaction which was validly entered into by the manager,⁷ but a decree made at the instance of, or against, the father⁸ or other manager, as representing the family,⁹ without any objection being made as to want of parties, binds the other coparceners.¹⁰

¹ See *Gurushantappa v. Chanmalappa* (1899), 24 Bom. 123.

² *Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh* (1911), 38 I. A. 45; 33 All. 272; 15 C. W. N. 321; 13 Bom. L. R. 359, differing from *Alagappa Chetti v. Velun Chetti* (1894), 18 Mad. 33; *Lalji v. Keshouji* (1912), 37 Bom. 340; 14 Bom. L. R. 840; *Gopal Das v. Budri Naih* (1904), 27 All. 361; *Durga Prasad v. Damodar Das* (1909), 32 All. 183.

³ *Bando Subrao Jumnis v. Janbu Tappappa Adake* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 801.

⁴ *Muhammad Sadik v. Khedan Lall* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 154.

⁵ See Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), order i. rules 1, 3, 4; Act XIV. of 1882, ss. 26, 28. *Guruvayya Goudi v. Datatraya Anant* (1903), 28 Bom. 11; *Vadilal Lallubhai v. Shah Khushal Dalpatram* (1902), 27 Bom. 157; *Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Rani Singh* (1900), 22 All. 307; *Balkrishna Sakharum v. Moro Krishna Dabholkar* (1896), 21 Bom. 154; *Banarsi Das v. Maharani Kuar* (1882), 5 All. 27; *Phoolbas Koonwur (Mussumat) v. Juggeshur Sahoy* (1876), 3 I. A. 7, at p. 26; 1 Cal. 226, at pp. 243, 244; 25 W. R. C. R.

285, at p. 289; *Rajaram Tewari v. Lachman Prasad* (1869), 4 B. L. R. A. C. 118; 12 W. R. C. R. 478; *Gopal v. Macnaghten* (1881), 7 Calc. 751; *Unnoda Persad Roy v. Erskine* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 370; 21 W. R. C. R. 68; *Nailhuni Mahton v. Manraj Mahton* (1876), 2 Calc. 149; *Shro Churn Narain Singh v. Chukraree Pershad Narain Singh* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 436; *Nundun Lall v. Lloyd* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 74; *Arunachala Pillai v. Vythialinga Mudaliyar* (1882), 6 Mad 27; *Hari Gopal v. Gokaldas Kushabashet* (1887), 12 Bom. 158; *Naranji v. Moti* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1126.

⁶ *Jugal Kishore v. Hulasi Ram* (1886), 8 All. 264; *Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo* (1881), 6 Calc. 815; 8 C. L. R. 457. See *Vadilal Lallubhai v. Shah Khushal Dalpatram* (1902), 27 Bom. 157; *Anant Ram v. Channu Lal* (1903), 25 All. 378.

⁷ *Jas Ram v. Sher Singh* (1902), 25 All. 162. As to mortgages by the father, see *post*, pp. 308, 309.

⁸ See Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), order i. r. 13.

⁹ *Girwar Narain Mahton v. Makbunessa* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 468.

¹⁰ *Post*, pp. 278-282;

It has been held in Madras¹ that the decision of the Privy Council in *Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh*² entitles the manager to sue alone, but it is submitted that the Judicial Committee did not lay down any such general rule.

It has also been held in Allahabad³ that a manager can sue even on a mortgage⁴ on behalf of the family.

One coparcener cannot sue alone to eject a tenant,⁵ and cannot sue alone for enhancement of rent,⁶ or for his share of the rent,⁷ unless by an express or implied arrangement between the coparceners and the tenant he collects his share separately.⁸ He cannot sue alone for a debt.⁹

In *Ramayya v. Venkataratnam*,¹⁰ where a suit was brought by a manager as representative of the family, the Court considered that the omission to make the coparcener a party was a mere formal error.

When a coparcener declines to be a plaintiff,¹¹ or where he is acting in

¹ *Ibrahim Tharagan (Sheik) v. Rama Aiyar* (1911), 35 Mad. 685.

² (1911), 38 I. A. 45; 33 All. 272; 15 C. W. N. 321; 13 Bom. L. R. 359.

³ *Hori Lal v. Munman Kunwar* (1912), 34 All. 549; *Madan Lal v. Kishan Singh* (1912), *Ibid.* 572.

⁴ *Post*, p. 281.

⁵ *Reasut Hossein v. Chorwar Singh* (1881), 7 Calc. 470; 9 C. L. R. 260; *Sri Chand v. Nimchand Sahu* (1870), 5 B. L. R. App. 25; 13 W. R. C. R. 337; *Krishnarav Jahagirdar v. Govind Trimbak* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 85.

⁶ *Jatindra Nath Chowdhri (Roy) v. Prasanna Kumar Banerji* (1910), 38 I. A. 1; 38 Calc. 270; 15 C. W. N. 74; 13 Bom. L. R. 1; *Jogendro Chunder Ghose v. Nobin Chunder Chottopadhyaya* (1882), 8 Calc. 353; *Balkrishna Sakharan v. Moro Krishna Dabholkar* (1896), 21 Bom. 154. As to a suit by a registered zemindar under Act VIII. (M. C.) of 1865, see *Ayyappa v. Venkata Krishnamarazu* (1892), 15 Mad. 484.

⁷ *Bhyrub Mundul v. Gungaram Bonnerjee* (1872), 12 B. L. R. 290, note; 17 W. R. C. R. 408; *Hurkishor Das Bhooya v. Joogul Kishor Saha Roy* (1871), 12 B. L. R. 293, note; 16 W. R. C. R. 281; *Annodu Churn Roy v. Kally Coomar Roy* (1878), 4 Calc. 89; 2 C. L. R. 464.

⁸ *Guni Mahomed v. Doorga Proshad Myse* (1878), 4 Calc. 96; 2 C. L. R. 370; *Gunga Narayan Das v. Saroda Mohan Roy* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C.

230; 12 W. R. C. R. 30; *Lootfulhuck v. Gopee Churn Mojomdar* (1880), 5 Calc. 941; 6 C. L. R. 402; *Doorga Churn Surma v. Jampa Dassee* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 289; 21 W. R. C. R. 46; *Rakhal Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Mahtab Khan* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 221; *Dinobundhoo Chowdhry v. Dinonath Mookerjee* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 168; *Shamraih Singh v. Kishan Prasad* (1907), 29 All. 311; *Kashinath Chinnaji v. Chinnaji Sadashiv* (1906), 30 Bom. 477; 8 Bom. L. R. 268; *Haradkun Gossamee v. Ram Newaz Missry* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 414; *Salehoomissa Khatoon v. Mohesh Chunder Roy* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 452; *Sree Misser v. Crowdy* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 243.

⁹ *Shivjiram v. Vishnu* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 121.

¹⁰ (1893), 17 Mad. 122, at pp. 126, 127.

¹¹ *Rajaram Tewari v. Lachman Prasad* (1869), 4 B. L. R. A. C. 118; 12 W. R. C. R. 478; *Dwarkanath Mitter v. Tara Prosunna Roy* (1889), 17 Calc. 160; *Kali Chandra Singh v. Rajkishore Bhuddro* (1885), 11 Calc. 615; *Kattusheri Pishareth Kanna Pisharody v. Vallotil Manakel Narayanan Somayajypad* (1881), 3 Mad. 234; *Parameswaran v. Shangaran* (1891), 14 Mad. 489; *Juggodumba Dossee v. Haran Chunder Dutt* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 108; *Gokool Pershad v. Etwaree Makto* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 138.

collusion with the tenant¹ or other person sued, he may be joined as a defendant.²

If the suit be barred against some of them, the whole suit fails.³

As to the effect of a decree in a suit by or against a manager, see *ante*, p. 267, and *post*, pp. 278, 279.

It has been held that where one of the family has entered into a contract in his own name he can enforce it alone.⁴

Where he has been put in possession of a portion of the property by the others, he may be able to sue alone in respect of it.⁵

A coparcener can sue for damages for an act by which he is individually damaged.⁶

MANAGER.

The property of a joint family is ordinarily managed by one Manager of the coparceners who is entitled to possession of the family property as such manager.⁷ The father, if living, of a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law would be the manager.⁸ In other cases, the eldest male member of the family would ordinarily, but not necessarily, be selected.⁹

When the coparceners cannot agree as to the selection of a manager, a partition seems to be the only practical remedy.

The manager is called the "*Karta*."

As to the management of a religious or charitable endowment, see *post*, pp. 556-559.

¹ *Jadu Dass v. Sutherland* (1878), 4 Calc. 556; 3 C. L. R. 223; *Doorga Churn Surma v. Jampa Dassee* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 289; 21 W. R. C. R. 46. See, however, *Jadoo Shat v. Kadumbinee Dassee* (1881), 7 Calc. 150.

² *Pramada Nath Roy (Raja) v. Ramani Kanta Roy (Raja)* (1907), 35 I. A. 73; 35 Calc. 331; 12 C. W. N. 249; 10 Bom. L. R. 66.

³ *Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan* (1883), 7 Bom. 217; *Shamrathi Singh v. Kishan Prasad* (1907), 29 All. 311; *Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo* (1881), 6 Calc. 815; 8 C. L. R. 457; *contrá Labhu Ram v. Kaneshi Ram* (1905), 76 P. L. R. Cf. *Ramdayal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo* (1887), 14 Calc. 791.

⁴ *Bungsee Singh v. Soodisht Lall* (1881), 7 Calc. 739; 10 C. L. R. 263;

see *ante*, p. 267, note 2.

⁵ *Amir Singh v. Moazzum Ali Khan* (1875), 7 N. W. P. 58.

⁶ *Gopee Kishen Gossain v. Ryland* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 279. As, for instance, a claim for mesne profits, *Chundee Chowdhry v. Macnaghten* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 386.

⁷ *Bhaskari Kasavarayudu v. Bhaskaram Chalapatirayudu* (1908), 31 Mad. 318.

⁸ See *Surja Prosad (Lala) v. Golab Chand* (1900), 27 Calc. 724, at p. 743; 4 C. W. N. 701, at p. 711; *Gajindra Narain (Rai) v. Harihar Narain (Rai)* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 687.

⁹ See K. K. Bhattacharya's "Joint Hindu Family," pp. 209, 223. As to the disqualification of a father or other manager, see *ibid.*, pp. 220, 221.

Where there is only one adult member of the family, the Court will recognize an appointment of a manager by him to take effect after his death.¹

The manager is not an ordinary agent of the family.² He is thus described by Mr. Cowell³: "When, therefore, we come to define the relation of each member, especially of the managing member, to the joint family and the joint estate, we are brought into contact with a relationship which has no counterpart in English law. Neither the term 'partner,' nor 'principal,' nor 'agent,' nor even 'coparcener,' will strictly apply. He is, in fact, a sort of representative owner, his independent rights being limited on all sides by the correlative rights of others, and burdened with a liability, coextensive with his ownership, to provide for the maintenance of the family."

In dealing with the same question, the Judicial Committee said,⁴ "The relation of such persons is not that of principal, or agent, or of partners; it is much more like that of trustee and cestui que trust."

Guardianship
of share in
joint family
property.

The manager is the *de facto* guardian of the interests of minor coparceners in the coparcenary property.⁵

"A guardian of the property of an infant cannot properly be appointed in respect of the infant's interest in the property of an undivided Mitakshara family . . . on the plain ground that the interest of a member of such a family is not individual property at all, and that therefore a guardian, if appointed, would have nothing to do with the family property."⁶ These observations of the Judicial Committee would apparently apply also to

¹ *Mahableshvar v. Ramchandra* (1913), 38 Bom. 94; 15 Bom. L. R. 882; *Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 209; 2 B. L. R. P. C. 57; 12 W. R. P. C. 47.

² *Muhammad Askari v. Radhe Ram Singh* (1900), 22 All. 307, at pp. 317, 320; *Kandasami Asari v. Somaskandala Ela Nedhi* (1910), 35 Mad. 177.

³ "Tagore Law Lectures," 1870, p. 108.

⁴ *Annamalai Chetty v. Murugasa Chetty* (1903), 30 I. A. 220, at p. 228; 26 Mad. 544, at p. 553; 7 C. W. N. 754, at p. 785; 5 Bom. L. R. 494. See *Chuckun Lall Singh v. Poran Chunder Singh* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 483.

⁵ As to his powers of sale, see *post*,

pp. 283 *et seq.*

⁶ *Gharib-ul-lah v. Khalak Singh* (1903), 30 I. A. 165, at p. 170; 25 All. 407, at p. 416; 7 C. W. N. 681; 5 Bom. L. R. 478, at p. 687; *Bindaji Laxuman Triputikar v. Mathurabai* (1905), 30 Bom. 152. See *Bandhu Prasad v. Dhiraji Kuar* (1898), 20 All. 400; *Virupakshappa v. Nilgungava* (1894), 19 Bom. 309; *Shum Kuar v. Mohanunda Sahoy* (1891), 19 Calc. 301; *Jhabbu Singh v. Ganga Bishan* (1895), 17 All. 529. In *Doorga Persad v. Kesho Persad Singh* (1882), 9 I. A. 27; 8 Calc. 656, it was taken for granted that a certificate under Act XL of 1858 could be given to a co-sharer. Cf. Act IV. of 1892, s. 2; Act I. (M. C.) of 1902, s. 17.

the appointment of a guardian by a High Court.¹ This principle does not apply when all the coparceners are minors and a guardian of the property is appointed of the whole number, but the order should reserve liberty to any minor on attaining majority to apply for removal of the guardian or restriction of his power.²

Where the minor has separate property there would be no objection to the appointment of a guardian,³ and in any case a guardian of his person can be appointed.⁴

When the members of the family have represented that a member other than the manager is entitled to act as such, they are bound by his acts as much as if he had been *de jure* manager.⁵

Representation of authority.

The duty of the father or other manager is to manage the property of the joint family for the benefit of such family as a whole;⁶ to realize the income of the family property, pay the debts,⁷ and other outgoings connected with the management, and expend the residue for the benefit of the family and its members. He must provide for the maintenance, education, marriages, *sradhs*, and other usual religious expenses of the coparceners,⁸ and of such members of their family as they are, or were when alive, legally or morally bound to maintain,⁹ including their illegitimate sons when not coparceners,¹⁰ and also of persons disqualified from inheritance and their families.¹¹

Duty of manager.

¹ In *In re Manilal Hurgovan* (1900), 25 Bom. 353, the High Court of Bombay, under its general jurisdiction, and apart from the Guardians and Wards Act, appointed a guardian of the interest of a minor in property held by a family governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. In doing so the Court said (at p. 357), "But in coming to this conclusion we desire to add that it is a power to be exercised with the greatest caution. We make the appointment in this case because the person applying to be appointed the guardian is also the manager of the family to which the minor belongs, and thus we do not introduce into the family any element of possible disturbance. I can hardly imagine a case in which it would be right to grant such an appointment unless the applicant were the manager, and it is expressly upon this ground that we make the appointment in this case." See also *Jairam Luxmon* (1892), 16 Bom. 634; *Jaganmatti Ramji* (1893), 19 Bom. 96.

² *Bindaji Laxuman Tripurkar v. Mathurabai* (1905), 30 Bom. 152.

³ See *Bandhu Prasad v. Dhrarji Kuar* (1898), 20 All. 400.

⁴ *Virupakshappa v. Nilgangava* (1894), 19 Bom. 309.

⁵ See *Mudit Narayan Singh v. Ranglal Singh* (1902), 29 Calc. 797; *Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar* (1900), 23 Mad. 597. Act I of 1872, s. 115.

⁶ See *Bhowani Proshad Shahu v. Juggernath Shahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 309.

⁷ Where he cannot pay the debts out of income, he may have to alienate the property, see *post*, pp. 283 *et seq.*

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 234, 235.

⁹ As to widows, see *ante*, p. 89. As to the marriage of daughters, see *Vaikuntam Annamangar v. Kallapuram Ayyangar* (1900), 23 Mad. 512.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 227, 228.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 228, 229. "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, paras. 12-14; "Dayabhaga," chap. v. paras. 10, 11; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv.

In expending money for the benefit of an individual member or his family, he need not take into account the share which such member would be entitled to on a partition.¹

Provided he administers the property for the benefit of the family the manager is not bound to economize or save.²

Discretion of
manager.

Where the discretion of the managing member is exercised *bono fide* and for the benefit of the estate, and the family have the benefit, such discretion should not be narrowly scrutinized.³

Account by
manager.

In a suit for partition a coparcener can, it is submitted, require the manager to furnish an account of his dealings with the coparcenary property for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the property to be partitioned, although he has no right to claim relief in respect of past inequality in the enjoyment of the property.

This right was affirmed in *Damodardas Maneklal v. Uttamram Maneklal* (1892), 17 Bom. 271; and in *Parmeshwar Dube v. Gobind Dube* (1915), 43 Cal. 459; 20 C. W. N. 25; but in *Bhowani Proshad Shahu v. Juggernath Shahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 309; *Balakrishna Iyer v. Muthusami Iyer* (1908), 32 Mad. 271, and *Narayan v. Rajaram* (1903), 28 Bom. 201, it was held that such right did not exist except in case of fraud or misrepresentation.

It is difficult to see how in the absence of such an account there can be a complete enquiry as to what the family property consists of at the time of the partition.

In the case of a partition between members who have been in possession of different portions there may be no such right to an account.⁴

Although he does not seek for partition, a coparcener, who does not himself take part in the management of the property, may at any time by suit require the manager to account for his dealings with the family property,⁵ but he is not entitled, while he remains undivided, to require any particular share of the profits to be made over to him.⁶

s. 11, para. 10; "Dattaka Chandrika," s. 6, para. 2; K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Hindu Family," p. 295. A list of the persons entitled under the Rishi texts to maintenance, is to be found in R. C. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," pp. 66-68.

¹ See K. K. Bhattacharya, "Law of the Joint Hindu Family," p. 193.

² *Bhowani Proshad Shahu v. Juggernath Shahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 309.

³ *Ratnam v. Govindarajulu* (1877), 2 Mad. 339, at p. 341.

⁴ *Konerav v. Gurav* (1881), 5 Bom. 589, as explained in *Damodardas Maneklal v. Uttamram Maneklal* (1892), 17 Bom. 271, at pp. 278, 279.

⁵ *Abhaychandra Roy Chowdhry v. Pyari Mohan Guho* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 347; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 75; *Nowlase Kooree (Mussamat) v. Lalljee Modi* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 202.

⁶ See *Shudanund Mohapattur v. Bonomalee Doss Mohapattur* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 256, at p. 259; *Ganpat*

The cost of taking such account would probably not be on the same footing as the costs of an account, which is ancillary to partition. The Court would probably, unless default appeared in the manager's accounts, or unless the manager had declined to render any information to his coparceners, or where the person seeking the account was in possession of complete information as to the accounts, require the coparcener asking for an account to pay the costs. Where the account is ancillary to the partition, the costs would ordinarily be borne in proportion to the shares.

In furnishing such account, whether in a suit for partition or not, the managing member of a joint family is entitled to credit for all sums of money *bond fide* spent by him for the benefit of the joint family. He must be debited with all sums which he has actually misappropriated, or which he has spent for purposes other than those in which the joint family was interested.¹

"What that account should be, so as to discharge him from his liability to account as manager, and what objections the other members can take to it, must . . . depend on the conduct of the manager and the other members, the nature of the property, and the circumstances of the family, and cannot be satisfactorily stated in definite terms."²

"Of course no member of a joint Hindu family is liable to his coparceners for anything which might have been actually consumed by him in consequence of his having a larger family to support, or of his being subject to greater expenses than the others; but this is simply because all such expenses are justly considered to be the legitimate expenses of the whole family. Thus, for instance, one member of a joint Hindu family may have a larger number of daughters to marry than the others. The marriage of each of those daughters to a suitable bridegroom is an obligation incumbent upon the whole family so long as it continues to be joint, and the expenses incurred on account of such marriage must be necessarily borne by all the members without any reference whatever to respective interests in the family estate."³

It is competent to the members of the family to make a special Arrangement as to management.

v. Annaji (1898), 23 Bom. 144; *Chuckun Lall Singh v. Poran Chunder Singh* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 483, as explained in *Abhaychandra Roy Chowdhry v. Pyari Mohan Guho* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 347, at pp. 354-356; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 75, at p. 79; *Nowlaseo Kooeree (Mussamut) v. Lalljee Modi* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 202.

¹ *Abhaychandra Roy Chowdhry v. Pyari Mohan Guho* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 347, at p. 349; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 75; *Parmeshwar Dube v. Gobind Dube* (1915), 43 Cal. 459; 20 C. W. N. 1.

² *Damodardas Manehlal v. Uttam-*

ram Manehlal (1892), 17 Bom. 271, at p. 279.

³ *Abhaychandra Roy Chowdhry v. Pyari Mohan Guho* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 347, at p. 349; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 75. See *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundoo Mullick* (1857), 6 M. I. A 526, at p. 540. See *Ranganmani Dasi (S. M.) v. Kasinath Dutt* (1868), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 1, at p. 4, differed from on another point in *Abhaychandra Roy Chowdhry v. Pyari Mohan Guho* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 347; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 75.

arrangement as to the accountability of the manager,¹ or as to the way in which the family is to be managed.

Separate
account of
expenditure.

By arrangement a manager may keep a separate account of expenditure on behalf of a particular member of the family, and on a partition such member may become liable for the amount appearing due on such account.²

A coparcener is not, except under special circumstances, entitled to ask for an account of a portion of the property only. Where a trading business forms a part of the assets of the joint family, one member cannot sue for an account of past profits and losses, apart from the accounts of the joint family.³

Powers of
manager.

The manager represents the family in transactions with outsiders.⁴ He has the ordinary powers incident to the due management of the property;⁵ as, for instance, he can receive payments and give receipts, and can execute decrees on behalf of the family;⁶ but he can act only with the assent, express or implied, of the body of coparceners.⁷

In a partition the manager of a branch of the family is entitled to represent the other members of that branch.⁸

Family
business.

Where a portion of the family assets consists of a trade or other business, the manager, or other member of the family in charge of the business, has all the powers which are usually exercised by a person carrying on such business, and can bind the members of the family personally by debts properly incurred for the purposes of the business.⁹ He can make contracts, give

¹ *Ramabhadra (Rajah Setrucherla) v. Virabhadra Suryanarayana (Rajah Setrucherla)* (1899), 26 I. A. 167; 22 Mad 470; 3 C. W. N. 533; 1 Bom. L. R. 388. See *Shankar Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh* (1888), 16 I. A. 71; 16 Calc. 397.

² *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundoo Mullick* (1857), 6 M. I. A. 526, at p. 540.

³ See *Samalbhair Nathubhai v. Sameshvar* (1880), 5 Bom. 38, at p. 40.

⁴ See *Vithu Dhondi v. Babaji* (1908), 32 Bom. 375; 10 Bom. L. R. 505; *Hori Lal v. Munman Kunwar* (1912), 34 All. 549, at p. 554.

⁵ See *Kotta Ramasami Chetti v. Bangari Seshama Nayanvaru* (1881), 3 Mad. 145, at p. 150; *Golapdi Meah v. Purno Chandra Dutta* (1917), 21 C. W. H. 774.

⁶ *Achhabbar Singh v. Ram Sarup Sahu* (1913), 35 All. 380.

⁷ *Chimnaji Govind Godbole v. Dhanekar Dhonev Godbole* (1886), 11 Bom. 320, at p. 324.

⁸ *Brijraj Singh v. Shcodan Singh* (1913), 40 I. A. 161, at p. 167; 35 All. 337, at p. 346; 17 C. W. N. 949, at p. 954; 15 Bom. L. R. 652, at p. 658.

⁹ *Ramlal Thakursidas v. Lakshminchand Muniram* (1861), 1 Bom. H. C. App. 1; *Samalbhair Nathubhai v. Sameshvar* (1880), 5 Bom. 38; *Sakrabhar Nathubhai v. Maganlal Mulchand* (1901), 26 Bom. 206; *Bemola Dossee v. Mohun Dossee* (1880), 5 Calc. 792; 6 C. L. R. 34; *Johurra Bibee v. Sree Gopal Misser* (1876), 1 Calc. 470; *Prem Chand Bauthra v. Radhica Lal Roy* (1877), 1 Shome, 1; *Joykisto Cowar v. Nityanund Nundy* (1878), 3 Calc. 738; 2 C. L. R. 440; *Baldeo Sonar v. Mobarak Ali* (1902), 29 Calc. 583; 6 C. W. N. 370; *Sheo Pershad Singh v. Raj Kumar Lal* (1892), 20

receipts, and compromise, or discharge claims ordinarily incidental to the business.¹

As to the rights of the Official Assignee when the manager becomes insolvent, see *Grey v. Walker* (1913), 48 Calc. 523.

Minor members are only liable to the extent of the assets of the business,² i.e. property which has been used by the family for the purposes of the trade, or which has been acquired out of the profits thereof.³

Some of the decisions make the interest of the minor in the whole family property liable,⁴ but the above limitation of liability is, it is submitted, correct.⁵

"A trade like other personal property is descendible amongst Hindus, but it does not follow that a Hindu infant, who by birth or inheritance becomes entitled to an interest in a joint family business, becomes at the same time a member of the trading partnership which carries on the business. He can only become a member of the partnership by a consentient act on the part of himself and the partners."⁶

The manager cannot start a new business so as to bind minor coparceners,⁷ or adult coparceners who do not consent.

The fact that all the coparceners are partners in the business must, if disputed, be proved.⁸

Where the business is carried on by the manager on behalf of the family in partnership with a stranger, the death of the manager dissolves the

Calc. 453; *Morrison v. Verschoyle* (1901), 6 C. W. N. 429, at p. 458; *Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 725. In the matter of *Haroon Mahomed* (1890), 14 Bom. 189; *Nunna Sethi v. Chidaraboyina* (1902), 26 Mad. 214; *Gokal Kastur v. Amarchand* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1289. See *Joharmal Ladhoooram v. Chetram Hari Singh* (1914), 39 Bom. 715; 17 Bom. L. R. 293.

¹ *Kishen Parshad v. Har Narain Singh* (1911), 38 I. A. 45, at p. 51; 33 All. 272, at p. 276; 15 C. W. N. 321, at p. 326; 13 Bom. L. R. 359, at p. 365; *Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay* (1909), 34 Bom. 72; 11 Bom. L. R. 255.

² *Sanka Krishnamurthy v. Bank of Burma* (1911), 35 Mad. 692.

³ See *Johurra Bibee v. Sree Gopal Misser* (1876), 1 Calc. 470; *Bishambhar Nath v. Sheo Narain* (1906), 29 All. 166; *Bishambhar Nath v. Fateh Lal* (1906), 29 All. 176; *Joy-*

kisto Cowar v. Nityanund Nundy (1878), 3 Calc. 738; 2 C. L. R. 440; *Gokal Kastur v. Amarchand* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1289.

⁴ See *Bishambhar Nath v. Sheo Narain* (1906), 29 All. 166; *Gopal Kastur v. Amarchand* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1289.

⁵ See *Joykisto Cowar v. Nityanund Nundy* (1878), 3 Calc. 738; 2 C. L. R. 440.

⁶ *Lutchman Chetty v. Siva Prokasa Modeliar* (1899), 26 Calc. 349, at p. 354; 3 C. W. N. 190, at pp. 192, 193; *Anant Ram v. Channu Lal* (1903), 25 All. 378; *Lalji Nensey v. Keshowji Punja* (1912), 37 Bom. 340; 14 Bom. L. R. 840.

⁷ See *Makhun Lal Dutt v. Ramlall Shaw* (1898), 3 C. W. N. 134; *Morrison v. Verschoyle* (1901), 6 C. W. N. 429, at p. 458.

⁸ *Vadilal Lalubhai v. Shah Khushal Dalpatram* (1902), 27 Bom. 157; see *Baldeodas v. Manekchand* (1901), 3 Bom. L. R. 144.

partnership,¹ but where the coparceners alone are members of the partnership, the death of a member does not dissolve the partnership.²

Debts.

Where the manager has contracted debts for a proper joint family purpose, the coparcenary property is liable.³ The members of the family are liable to the extent of family property which has come to their hands, and if the manager or any other member of the family pays more than his share he can require the others to contribute.⁴

There is no presumption that the action of a manager in contracting debts, etc., is on behalf of the joint family,⁵ or that it is within his authority.⁶

Promissory notes.

It has been held that where the manager borrows money in his own name on promissory notes for the purpose of a joint family business, or to meet a joint family necessity, the creditor can recover the money from all the members of the family, although they were not all parties to the notes.⁷ It is submitted that no one but a party to a promissory note can be held liable thereunder,⁸ although the family may be liable for the debt. Where the note is given in the name of the firm, the partners are liable.⁹

Election by creditor.

Where the manager contracts a debt which is binding not only on the persons executing the contract but on the other members of the joint family to which he belongs, the creditor may elect to treat the debt as a personal debt, and sue the manager personally, or he may sue him as representative of the family,¹⁰ or he may sue the whole family.

¹ *Sokkanadha Vannimundar v. Sokkanadha Vannimundar* (1904), 28 Mad. 344; followed in *Ramanathan Chetty v. Yegappa Chetty* (1915), 30 Mad. L. J. 241.

² *Raghumall v. Luchmondas* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 708.

³ *Dwarka Nath Chowdhury v. Bungshi Chandra Saha* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 879.

⁴ See *Bimala Devi (Srimati) v. Tarasundari Devi (Srimati)* (1870), 6 B. L. R. App. 101; 14 W. R. C. R. 480; *Aghore Nath Mukhopadhyaya v. Grish Chunder Mukhopadhyaya* (1892), 20 Calc. 18; *Baldeo Sonar v. Mubarak Ali* (1902), 29 Calc. 583; 6 C. W. N. 370.

⁵ *Soiru Padmanabh Rangappa v. Narayanrao* (1893), 18 Bom. 520; *Krishna Ramaya Naik v. Vasudev Venkatesh Pai* (1896), 21 Bom. 808, at p. 815; *Sunkur Pershad v. Goury Pershad* (1879), 5 Calc. 321.

⁶ See *Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 725; *Ganpat Rai v. Munni Lal* (1911), 34 All. 135.

⁷ *Barsab Chandra De v. Ramdhon Dhor* (1906), 11 C. W. N. 139; *Krishna Chettiar v. Nagamani Ammal* (1914), 39 Mad. 915. See also *Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 725; *Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar* (1900), 23 Mad. 597.

⁸ See per Davies, J., in *Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar* (1900), 23 Mad. 597, at p. 601; *Thaith Ottahil Kutte Ammu v. Puroshotam Doss* (1911), 1 Mad. W. N. 45.

⁹ *Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay* (1909), 34 Bom. 72; 11 Bom. L. R. 255.

¹⁰ *Jumona Persad Singh v. Dignarain Singh* (1883), 10 Calc. 1; 13 C. L. R. 74.

In the first case he can only realize his debt from the share of the manager ;¹ in the latter cases he can recover it from the family property.²

Although a manager may have power to deal with the coparcenary property,³ he has no power to bind the other members of the family personally,⁴ except in the proper management of a family business.⁵

In the Bombay Presidency there is an express enactment protecting members of joint Hindu families from personal liability for family debts incurred while they were unborn, or before they attained the age of twenty-one years. They are liable after that age for such debts to the extent of family property come to their hands and not duly applied by them.⁶

In the absence of fraud or collusion, the manager can bind the estate by a compromise,⁷ or by a reference to arbitration.⁸

Where he has been appointed guardian of a minor for the suit, his powers are controlled by the Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), O. xxxii., r. 7.⁹

He can pay interest on a debt, or can acknowledge one, so as to extend the period of limitation,¹⁰ but he has no power to pay or revive by acknowledgment a debt which is barred by limitation, except as against himself.¹¹

¹ See *post*, p. 283.

² See *post*, p. 280.

³ *Post*, pp. 283 *et seq.*

⁴ *Chalamayya v. Varadayya* (1898), 22 Mad. 166; *Ranjit Sing v. Amulya Prosad Ghose* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 923; cf. *Wagehela Rajsanji v. Masludin (Shekh)* (1887), 14 I. A. 89; 11 Bom. 551; *Indur Chunder Singh v. Radhakishore Ghose* (1892), 19 I. A. 90; 19 Calc. 507; *Ranmal Singji (Maharana Shri) v. Vadilal Vakhatchand* (1894), 20 Bom. 61; *Surendra Nath Sarkar v. Atul Chandra Roy* (1907), 34 Calc. 892; *Bhawul Sahu v. Baij Nath Pertab Narain Singh* (1907), 12 C. W. N. 256; *Gajindra Narain (Rai) v. Harihar Narain (Rai)* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 687. As to minors in Bombay, see Act VII. (Bo. C.) of 1866, s. 5.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 274, 275.

⁶ Act VII. (Bo. C.) of 1866, s. 5.

⁷ *Pitam Singh v. Ujagar Singh* (1878), 1 All. 651; *Ram Kuber Pande v. Ram Dasi* (1913), 35 All. 428. As

to a family arrangement made by the father, see *Ramdas v. Chabilidas* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 621.

⁸ *Jagan Nath v. Mannu Lal* (1894), 16 All. 231; *Balaji v. Nana* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 95.

⁹ *Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row* (1913), 40 I. A. 132; 36 Mad. 295; 17 C. W. N. 765; 15 Bom. L. R. 626.

¹⁰ *Bhasker Talya Shet v. Vijalal Nathu* (1892), 17 Bom. 512; *Chinnaya Nayudu v. Gurunatham Chetti* (1881), 5 Mad. 169; *Kumarasami Nadan v. Pala Nagappa Chetti* (1878), 1 Mad. 385; *Sarada Charan Chakravarti v. Durgaram De Sinha* (1910), 37 Calc. 461; 14 C. W. N. 741; *Har Prosad Das v. Harhar Prosad Singh (Bakshi)* (1915), 19 C. W. N. 860. As to the power of a father to bind his son, see *Narayanasami Chetti v. Samidas Mudali* (1883), 6 Mad. 293.

¹¹ *Dalip Singh v. Kundan Lal* (1913), 35 All. 207; *Chinnaya Nayudu v. Gurunatham Chetti* (1881), 5 Mad. 169; *Dinkar v. Appaji* (1894), 20

Fraud.

A coparcener is entitled to have a contract made by the manager without authority or in fraud of the family rescinded.¹

Arrangements.

A manager has power to make all necessary arrangements as to the mode of enjoyment of the joint property by the coparceners, as to their commensality, and as to their religious duties and observances.²

Where a son had taken possession of a portion of the coparcenary property against the will of his father, who was the manager, he was ejected.³

Decree against manager.

The members of a family are all bound by a decree obtained *bonâ fide* against the father, or other manager, as such manager,⁴ for a debt duly incurred in the management of the property,⁵ whether it were or were not charged upon the family property, and by a sale of the family property in pursuance of such decree, or in a suit brought against the manager of a joint family business in respect of such business,⁶ or in any suit brought in respect of the family property,⁷ although they were not parties to the suit.⁸ When they are of age and acquiesce

Bom. 155; *Sobhanadri Appa Rau v. Sriramulu* (1893), 17 Mad. 221; *Gopalnarain Mozoomdar v. Muddomuttu Gupte* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 21.

¹ *Ravji Janardan Sarangpani v. Gangadharbhai* (1897), 4 Bom. 29.

² *Raghunadha (Sri) v. Brozokishoro (Sri)* (1876), 3 I. A. 154, at p. 191; 1 Mad. 69, at p. 81; 25 W. R. C. R. 291, at p. 302. See *Romesh Chunder Bhuttacharjee v. Soorjo Coomar Bhuttacharjee* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 90.

³ *Baldeo Das v. Sham Lal* (1875), 1 All. 77. This was put upon the ground that the son had no independent dominion.

⁴ In *Madhusudan v. Bhau* (1912), 15 Bom. L. R. 36, and in *Laxman v. Vinayak* (1915), 40 Bom. 329; 18 Bom. L. R. 52, it was suggested that there is a distinction between the case of the family being represented by the father, and the case where it is represented by another manager, and that in the latter case the other members of the family are not bound by the decree.

⁵ *Hanmanta v. Gopal* (1909), 11 Bom. L. R. 1145.

⁶ *Baldeo Sonar v. Mobarak Ali* (1902), 29 Calc. 583; 6 C. W. N. 370; *Sheo Pershad Singh v. Raj Kumar Lal* (1892), 20 Calc. 453; *Phulchand v. Lachmichand* (1882), 4 All. 486; see *ante*, p. 267.

⁷ As, for instance, a decree charging the family property with maintenance, *Minakshi v. Chinnappa Udayan* (1901), 24 Mad. 689.

⁸ *Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar* (1914), 41 I. A. 216; 36 All. 383; 18 C. W. N. 968; 16 Bom. L. R. 810, affirming *Jaddo Kunwar v. Sheo Shankar Ram* (1910), 33 All. 71; *Kunjan Chetti v. Sidda Pillai* (1898), 22 Mad. 461; *Jogendra Deb Roy Kut v. Funindro Deb Roy Kut* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 367, at p. 376; 11 B. L. R. 244, at p. 249; 17 W. R. C. R. 104, at p. 106; *Khizarajmal v. Daim* (1904), 32 I. A. 23, at p. 35; 32 Calc. 296, at p. 314; 9 C. W. N. 201, at p. 215; 7 Bom. L. R. 1; *Hari Vithal v. Jairam Vithal* (1890), 14 Bom. 597 (doubted in *Madhusudan v. Bhau* (1912), 15

in the conduct of the suit by their father, or other manager, the coparceners would the more clearly be bound by the decree.¹

If a manager, as such² (with the acquiescence, express or implied, of the adult members of the family), brings a suit on behalf of the family, and no objection be made by the defendant, a decree can be made; but a defendant may insist that the other members of the family be brought on the record,³ unless the suit be brought in respect of a contract made by the managers of a family business, and all the persons who contracted with him are parties to the suit.⁴

In *Kashinath Chimnaji v. Chimnaji Sadashiv*,⁵ Scott, J., sitting on the Original side of the Bombay High Court, said, "As a matter of practice suits are not filed in this Court⁶ by managers representing their infant coparceners; the practice is to join all parties interested, but it would seem that even if in the face of the plaint there was an allegation of a sole plaintiff that he sued as manager on behalf of a coparcenary, the minor coparcener would not be bound by proceedings, unless by judicial sale under the decree rights had been created in third parties, and no prejudice were shown to the absent minors."

It has been held that where all the adult members of a joint family appear on the record it is a legitimate presumption that they are acting as managers on behalf of themselves and of the minor members of the family who are not joined in the suit.⁷

Bom. L. R. 36); *Doulut Ram v. Mehr Chand* (1887), 14 I. A. 187; 15 Calc. 70; *Bissessur Lall Sahoo v. Luchmessur Singh (Maharajah)* (1879), 6 I. A. 233; 5 C. L. R. 477; *Baldeo Sonar v. Mobarak Ali* (1902), 29 Calc. 583; 6 C. W. N. 370; *Ram Sevak Das v. Raghubar Rai* (1880), 3 All. 72; *Jeo Lal Singh v. Gunga Pershad* (1884), 10 Calc. 996; *Sakharam v. Devji* (1898), 23 Bom. 372; *Bhana v. Chindhu* (1896), 21 Bom. 616; *Krishnama v. Perumal* (1885), 8 Mad. 388; *Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant* (1883), 7 Bom. 467; *Gajindar Narain (Rai) v. Haribai Narain (Rai)* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 687; *Magniram v. Tukaram* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 197. See *Subramanyayyan v. Subramaniyayyan* (1882), 5 Mad. 125; *Laxman v. Vinayak* (1915), 40 Bom. 329; 18 Bom. L. R. 52.

¹ See *Kunjan Chetti v. Sidda Pillai* (1899), 22 Mad. 461; *Madhusudan v. Bhanu* (1912), 15 Bom. L. R. 36.

² *Girwar Narain Mahon v. Mak-*

bunessa (Mussammatt) (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 468.

³ See *Guruvayya Gouda v. Dattatraya Anant*, 28 Bom. 11; *Thakurmani Singh v. Dar Rani Koeri* (1906), 33 Calc. 1079; *Angamuthu Pillai v. Kolundavelu Pillai* (1899), 23 Mad. 190; *Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant* (1883), 7 Bom. 467; *ante*, p. 267. See, however, *Vithu Dhondi v. Babaji* (1908), 32 Bom. 375; 10 Bom. L. R. 505.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 267.

⁵ (1906), 30 Bom. 477, at p. 486; 8 Bom. L. R. 268. See, however, *Bissessur Lall Sahoo v. Luchmessur Singh (Maharajah)* (1879), 6 I. A. 233, at p. 237; 5 C. L. R. 477, at p. 480, and cases *ante*, p. 278, note 8.

⁶ The practice is the same on the Original side of the Bengal High Court.

⁷ *Krishna Jiva Tewari v. Bishnath Kahwar* (1912), 34 All. 615; *Hori Lal v. Manman Kunwar* (1912), *Ibid.* 549; *Nathu Lal v. Lala* (1912), *Ibid.* 572.

As to parties to suits, see *ante*, p. 267.

All members of a family are bound by decrees in suits brought by the manager of a joint family business as such, even though they are not parties to the suit;¹ but in a suit brought by such manager the defendant may insist upon all the members of the family who are members of the partnership being brought upon the record,² except where the suit is brought upon a contract made by the manager in his own name.³

Minor members of the family who have not by a consentient act become members of the partnership are not necessary parties to the suit.⁴

Suit on mortgage.

There is a conflict of decisions as to whether, in a suit on a mortgage instituted under the Transfer of Property Act,⁵ any but the actual parties are bound.

The decisions deal with mortgages created by the father of a Mitakshara family,⁶ but they are equally applicable to a mortgage by any other manager. The cases before the passing of that Act determined that sons who were joint with their father⁷ were liable if the suit was brought against their father as representing the family, *i.e.* himself and his sons.⁸

In each case it was a question whether the decree was intended to bind the family, and whether in execution their interests passed by the sale.⁹ It did not follow from the mere fact that the interest purporting to be sold was the right title and interest of the father that the entire interest which he had authority to deal with did not pass.¹⁰

¹ *Baldeo Sonar v. Mobarak Ali Khan* (1902), 29 Calc. 583; 6 C. W. N. 370; *ante*, p. 267. See *Sundar Lal v. Chhitar Mal* (1906), 29 All. 1, where it was held that the dismissal of a suit for redemption brought by the father did not bar the sons.

² *Shamrathi Singh v. Kishan Prasad* (1907), 29 All. 311. See *Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti* (1894), 18 Mad. 33; *Lutchmanen Chetty v. Sivaprokasa Modeliar* (1899), 26 Calc. 349; 3 C. W. N. 190; *ante*, p. 267.

³ *Ante*, p. 267.

⁴ *Lutchmanen Chetty v. Sivaprokasa Modeliar* (1899), 26 Calc. 349; 3 C. W. N. 190.

⁵ IV. of 1882.

⁶ *Post*, p. 281.

⁷ See *Trimbak Balkrishna v. Narayan Damodhar Dabholkar* (1884), 8 Bom. 481.

⁸ *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayangar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1; S. C. (1885), 9 Mad. 343; *Srinivasa Nayudu v. Yelaya Nayudu* (1882), 5 Mad. 251; *Sadashiv Dinkar Joshi v. Dinkar Narayan Joshi* (1882), 6 Bom. 520; *Studd v. Brij Nundum Pershad Singh* (1881), 9 C. L. R. 350;

Sundraraja Ayyangar v. Jaganada Pillai (1881), 4 Mad. 111; *Doulut Ram v. Mehr Chand* (1887), 14 I. A. 187; 15 Calc. 70; *Deva Singh v. Rai Manohar* (1880), 2 All. 746; *Ram Sevak Das v. Raghubar Rai* (1880), 3 All. 72; *Gayadin v. Raj Bansi Kuar* (1880), 3 All. 191; *Ram Narain Lal v. Bhawani Prasad* (1881), 3 All. 443; *Parsidh Narain Singh v. Hunoman Sahai* (1881), 11 C. L. R. 263.

⁹ See *Pemraj Chandra Bhau v. Savalya Gajaba* (1890), 15 Bom. 293; *Doulut Ram v. Mehr Chand* (1887), 14 I. A. 187; 15 Calc. 70; *Ram Narain Lal v. Bhawani Prasad* (1881), 3 All. 443.

¹⁰ See *post*, pp. 319, 320. *Mahabir Pershad (Rai Babu) v. Markunda Nath Sahai (Rai)* (1889), 17 I. A. 11, at p. 16; S. C. *nomine Mahabir Pershad v. Moheswar Nath Sahai*, 17 Calc. 584, at p. 589; *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussumat)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15 Calc. 717; *Trimbak Balkrishna v. Narayan Damodar Dabholkar* (1884), 8 Bom. 481, at p. 486; *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayangar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1, at p. 15; *Hardai Narain v. Haruck Dhari Singh* (1882), 12 C. L.

If, however, the decree from the form of the suit, the character of the debt recovered by it and its terms was to be interpreted as a decree against the father alone and personal to himself, and all that was put up and sold thereunder in execution was his right and interest in the joint ancestral estate, then the auction purchaser acquired no more than that right and interest, i.e. the right to demand partition.¹

Where the mortgage charged the whole interests, the form of mortgage decree now adopted by the Indian Courts would be sufficient to cause a sale of all of such interest.²

Section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act enacted as follows :

Suits for Foreclosure, Sale, or Redemption.

"Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 437,³ all persons having an interest in the property comprised in a mortgage must be joined as parties to any suit under this chapter relating to such mortgage: Provided that the plaintiff has notice of such interest."

Where there is no such notice the manager can be taken as representing the others.⁴

The Bengal High Court⁵ has held that, where the plaintiff had notice of their existence,⁶ the sons can sue to set aside a decree to which they are not parties. In the Allahabad High Court earlier decisions,⁷ and the latest decision⁸ differ from the Bengal view, but there is a decision to the contrary.⁹ The Allahabad Court has declined to extend the principle of the Bengal decisions to cases where the property has been sold to a purchaser other than the judgment creditor.¹⁰ The result of the Bengal view would be that a new suit against the sons is necessary, and in such new suit the debt can be recovered by sale of the coparcenary property.¹¹

R. 104; *Sadashiv Dinkar Joshi v. Dinkar Narayan Joshi* (1882), 6 Bom. 520; *Gnanammal v. Muthusami* (1889), 13 Mad. 47. In *Nanhak Joti v. Jaimangal Chaubey* (1880), 3 All. 294, the sale was expressly limited to the father's interest. See cases, *post*, p. 319, notes 6, 7.

¹ *Basa Mal v. Mahuraj Singh* (1886), 8 All. 205; *Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh* (1887), 14 I. A. 77; 14 Calc. 572.

² See Act V. of 1908, Sched. I, App. D. 4.

³ That section dealt with suits concerning property vested in a trustee, executor, or administrator, and has therefore no application to the present question.

⁴ *Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar* (1914), 41 I. A. 216; 36 All. 383; 18 C. W. N. 968; 16 Bom. L. R. 810; *Balki Mahapatra v. Brojobasi Panda* (1912), 16 C. W. N. 1019; *Ram Taran Goswami v. Rameswar Maha* (1907), 11 C. W. N. 1078.

⁵ *Suraj Prosad (Lala) v. Golab Chund* (1901), 28 Calc. 517; 5 C. W. N. 640; reversing decision of Ghose, J. (1900), 27 Calc. 724; 4 C. W. N. 701.

⁶ The burden of proving this is upon the sons: *Ram Nath Rai v. Lachman Rai* (1899), 21 All. 193.

⁷ See cases referred to in *Bulwant Singh v. Aman Singh* (1910), 33 All. 7.

⁸ *Bulwant Singh v. Aman Singh* (1910), 33 All. 7.

⁹ *Ram Prasad v. Man Mohun* (1908), 30 All. 257.

¹⁰ *Debi Singh v. Jiu Ram* (1902), 25 All. 214; *Lal Singh v. Pulandar Singh* (1905), 28 All. 182.

¹¹ *Dharam Singh v. Angal Lal* (1899), 21 All. 301; *Lachhman Das v. Dattu* (1900), 22 All. 394. See *Ram Singh v. Sobha Ram* (1907), 29 All. 544. In *Suraj Prosad (Lala) v. Golab Chand* (1901), 28 Calc. 517; 5 C. W. N. 640; and *Kanhaila Lal v. Raj Bahadur* (1902), 24 All. 211, the son in the suit brought by him had an

The Madras¹ and Bombay² High Courts consider that the law in this respect was not altered by the Transfer of Property Act.

A decree on a mortgage is equally binding when the manager happens to have been appointed as guardian by the Court, but has obtained no sanction from the Court.³

An appeal by the manager as representative of the family is on the same footing as a suit brought by him.⁴

When a suit on a mortgage or other contract has been brought against the manager, it has been held that there is nothing to prevent another suit against the other members of the family on the same cause of action.⁵

The present law on the subject is to be found in Schedule I., Order XXXIV., rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908) which is as follows :—

“ Subject to the provisions of this Code, all persons having an interest either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage.”

This does not completely clear up the difficulties created by the decisions under section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act,⁶ but it is submitted that, as all the coparceners have an interest in the right of redemption, they should be made parties.⁷

The Allahabad High Court,⁸ and the Patna High Court,⁹ have, however, in cases to which Act V. of 1908 applies, held that a suit on a mortgage by or against the manager binds the other members of the family.

The Calcutta High Court has declined to follow the Allahabad case, and holds that all the coparceners must be parties.¹⁰

Vesting order. A coparcener is not bound by a vesting order made under the Insolvency law, unless he was himself declared an insolvent.¹¹

opportunity of contesting the mortgage, so the Court declined to give him any remedy, except a right to redeem.

¹ *Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar* (1898), 21 Mad. 222; *Palani Goundan v. Rangayya Goundan* (1898), 22 Mad 207

² *Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 354; 12 Bom. L. R. 219; *Chimn v. Sada* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 811; *Tatyarao v. Puttapa* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 940.

³ *Ram Avtar Singh v. Nursing Narain Singh*, 3 C. L. J. 12. See *Gharib-ul-lah v. Khalak Singh* (1903), 30 L. A. 165; 25 All. 407; 7 C. W. N. 681; 5 Bom. L. R. 478. Cf. *post*, p. 287.

⁴ See *Jadadhari Lal v. Rughoobeer Persad* (1888), 9 Cal. 508; 12 C. L. R. 255.

⁵ *Muhammad Askeri v. Radhe Ram Singh* (1900), 22 All. 307.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 281, 282.

⁷ See *Biswanath Pershad Mahta v. Jagdip Narain Singh* (1912), 40 Cal. 342, at p. 354.

⁸ *Hori Lal v. Munman Kunwar* (1912), 34 All. 549 (a case of sons being represented by their father); *Madan Lal v. Kishan Singh* (1912), *Ibid.* 572 (Do); *Ram Kuber Pande v. Ram Dasi* (1913), 35 All. 428 (Do); *Krishna Jiva Tewari v. Bishnath Kalwar* (1912), 34 All. 615 (a case of a minor brother being represented by his brothers.)

⁹ *Raghunandan Singh v. Parmeshur Dyal Singh* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 306.

¹⁰ *Debi Prosad Sahi v. Dharamjit Narayan Singh* (1914), 41 Cal. 727.

¹¹ See *Nunna Setti v. Chidaraboyina* (1902), 26 Mad. 214.

A decree, even for a joint family debt, in a suit by or against the manager alone, and not as representing the family, does not bind his coparceners,¹ and cannot be executed against the coparcenary property.² If a sale takes place in execution of such decree the interest of the defendant alone passes thereby.³

ALIENATION AND CHARGE.

Where all the coparceners are adults they can together effect a valid sale or charge of the coparcenary property.⁴ A sale or charge can also be made by the adult coparceners, and the manager acting on behalf of the minor coparceners in case of necessity.⁵

A manager can alienate or charge the family property with the express or implied consent of all the then existing adult coparceners, so as to bind them.⁶

It has been held that ratification is merely evidence of necessity,⁷ but it is submitted that ratification is equivalent to consent,⁸ whether there be necessity or not.

It is unsettled whether a manager can, even in the case of necessity,⁹ alienate the family estate, so far as adult coparceners are concerned, without their assent, either express or implied.

¹ See *Sundar Lal v. Chhitar Mal* (1906), 29 All. 1; *S. C. Ibid.*, p. 215.

² *Dwarka Nath Chowdhury v. Bungshi Chandra Saha* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 879.

³ *Armugam Pillai v. Sabapathi Padiachi* (1882), 5 Mad. 12; *Subramaniyayyan v. Subramaniyayyan* (1882), 5 Mad. 125; *Vararagavamma v. Sanundrala* (1885), 8 Mad. 208; followed in *Abilak Roy v. Rubbi Roy* (1885), 11 Calc. 293; *Guruvappa v. Thimma* (1887), 10 Mad. 316; *Maruti Narayan v. Lilachand* (1882), 6 Bom. 564; *Kisansing Jivansing Pardesi v. Moreshwar Vishnu Joshi* (1882), 7 Bom. 91; *Dasaradhi Ravulo v. Joddumoni Ravulo* (1882), 5 Mad. 193; *Babaji v. Dhuri* (1884), 9 Bom. 305. See *post*, pp. 319, 320.

⁴ *Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 90, at p. 94; 20 W. R. C. R. 192, at p. 194.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 285 *et seq.*

⁶ *Gharibullah v. Khalak Singh*

(1903), 30 I. A. 165, at p. 169; 25 All. 407, at p. 415; 7 C. W. N. 681, at p. 687; 5 Bom. L. R. 478; *Miller v. Runga Nath Moulick* (1885), 12 Calc. 389; *Burask Chuttur Singh v. Greedharee Singh* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 337; *Chhotiram v. Narayandas* (1887), 11 Bom. 605; see *post*, p. 306; *Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nidhi* (1910), 35 Mad. 177, at p. 181.

⁷ *Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nidhi* (1910), 35 Mad. 177.

⁸ *Gangabai v. Vamanaji A. Datar* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 301. Acquiescence shown by receiving the benefit of the purchase-money, with knowledge of the facts, amounts to a ratification, *Modhoo Dyal Singh v. Kolbur Singh* (1868), B. L. R. F. B. R. 1018, at p. 1020; 9 W. R. C. R. 511; *White v. Bishto Chunder Bose* (1863), 2 Hay, 567. See *post*, p. 306.

⁹ As to what amounts to necessity, see *post*, pp. 288-290.

The decisions are in conflict.¹ The texts of the Mitakshara² upon which the law on the subject is based do not extend to such a case.

It is submitted that in case of necessity³ the consent may be presumed,⁴ but that where there is an express dissent, of which the purchaser had notice, or which he had means of knowing, there can be no valid sale or charge.

As to the powers of a father in a family governed by the Mitakshara law, to sell or charge the property to pay his debts, see *post*, pp. 308, 309.

Where the parties intend that all the coparceners should execute the transfer, the document does not take effect by reason only that the managing member has signed it, and that there is a recital of necessity.⁵

Where there is neither consent nor necessity, a manager other than the father cannot alienate the family property by sale, mortgage, gift, permanent lease,⁶ or otherwise.

Gift by father.

Under the Mitakshara law, a father can make a gift of a small portion of the movable coparcenary property for pious purposes, or as a gift of affection, i.e. to a child or other near relative.⁷ He may devote a portion of the family property to a dowry for a daughter,⁸ and can also devote a small portion of

¹ In *Phul Chand v. Man Singh* (1882), 4 All. 309; *Bishambhur Nark v. Sudasheeb Mohapatrer* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 96, and *Juggurnath Khootia v. Doobo Misser* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 80, the power was affirmed. See also *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayyengar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1, at p. 18; *Sadabart Prasad Sahu v. Footbush Koer* (1869), 3 B. L. R. F. B. R. 31, at p. 45; 12 W. R. F. B. R. 1, at p. 8; *Bunsee Lall v. Aoladh Ahsan (Shaikh)* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 552. See "Dayabhaga," chap. ii. para. 26; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 348. It was held in *Deotaree Mahapatrer v. Damoodhur Mahapatrer*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 1643, that the principles of *Hunooman Persaud Pandey's* case (*post*, p. 286) govern all cases of alienation by persons holding limited estates. *Contrà Muthoora Koonwaree v. Bootun Singh* (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 30; *Miller v. Runga Nath Moulick* (1885), 12 Calc. 389, at p. 399. See *Upooroo Tewary v. Bandhjee Suhoy* (1881), 6 Calc. 749, at p. 753; 6 C. L. R. 192, at p. 196; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 20.

² Chap. i. s. 1, paras. 28, 29.

³ *Post*, pp. 288-290

⁴ See *Miller v. Runga Nath Moulick* (1885), 12 Calc. 389, at p. 399; *Chhotiram v. Narayandas* (1887), 11 Bom. 605; K. K. Bhattacharya's "Joint Hindu Family," pp. 487, 488.

⁵ *Sivasami Chetti v. Sevugan Chetti* (1901), 25 Mad. 389.

⁶ *Ram Ratan v. Lachman Das* (1908), 30 All. 460; *Sheikh Chand v. Hiralal* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 114; *Narayan v. Political Agent Sawantwadi* (1905), 7 Bom. L. R. 172; *Sataram Pandit (Shri) v. Harihar Pandit (Shri)* (1910), 12 Bom. L. R. 910; *Brojomohun Ghose v. Luchman Singh Thakoor*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 83; *Oahud Bukesh (Cazee) v. Bindoo Bashinee Dossee* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 298.

⁷ *Bachoo Harkisondas v. Mankorebai* (1904), 29 Bom. 51; 6 Bom. L. R. 268, affirmed on appeal (1907), 34 I. A. 107; 31 Bom. 373; 11 C. W. N. 769; 9 Bom. L. R. 646; *Kamakshi Ammal v. Chakrapany Chettiar* (1907), 30 Mad. 452. See *Hanmantapa v. Jivubai* (1900), 24 Bom. 547; 2 Bom. L. R. 478.

⁸ *Kudutamma v. Narasimhacharya-lu* (1907), 17 Mad. L. J. 528, referred to in *Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 994, at p. 999;

the immovable property to pious purposes,¹ but not for any other purpose.² He cannot do so by will.³

There is some authority that, even under the Mitakshara law, a father has complete power of disposition over ancestral movables,⁴ but it is submitted that he has no greater power over movables than he has over immovable property,⁵ except so far as may be necessary from the nature of the property.

With these exceptions, and except so far as he has power to alienate the property for payment of his debts,⁶ the powers of the father over coparcenary property are not in law greater than those of any other manager.⁷

The father cannot give family property to one son in preference to the others.⁸

Having regard to his position, greater deference will necessarily be paid to his wishes than in the case of any other manager.⁹

In case of necessity,¹⁰ the father or other manager¹¹ can

Sundaramayya v. Sitamma (1911), 35 Mad. 628; *Narayana v. Ramalinga* (1915), 39 Mad. 587. See *Sivananjan Perumal Sethurayar v. Muttu Ramalinga Sethurayar* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 75.

¹ See *Raghunath Prasad v. Gobind Prasad* (1885), 8 All. 76; *Gopal Chand Pande v. Kunwar Singh (Babu)* (1830), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 24 (new edition, 29). "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 1, para. 28.

² *Rayakkal v. Subbanna* (1892), 16 Mad. 84; *Baba v. Timma* (1883), 7 Mad. 357; *Ganga Bisheshar v. Pirthi Pal* (1880), 2 All. 635; *Rottala Runganatham Chetty v. Pulicat Ramasami Chetti* (1903), 27 Mad. 162; *Bala v. Balaji* (1897), 22 Bom. 825; *Pratabnarayan Das v. Court of Wards* (1869), 3 B. L. R. (A. J.) 21; 11 W. R. C. R. 343.

³ *Rathnam v. Sivasubramania* (1892), 16 Mad. 353.

⁴ See *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvaiyyangar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1, at p. 47; *Nallatambi Chetti (Rayadur) v. Mukunda Chetti (Rayadur)* (1868), 3 Mad. H. C. 455, at p. 456; *Shib Dayee v. Doorga Pershad* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 63, at p. 70. "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 1, paras. 21, 24.

⁵ See *Lakshman Dada Naik v.*

Ramchandra Dada Naik (1880), 7 I. A. 181; 5 Bom. 48; 7 C. L. R. 320; S. C. in Court below (1876), 1 Bom. 561.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 308, 309.

⁷ *Suraj Bunsri Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at pp. 100, 101; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 165; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 233; *Chinnaya v. Perumal* (1889), 13 Mad. 51; *Palanivelappa Kaundan v. Mannaru Naikan* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 416; *Shudanund Mohapattur v. Bonomalee Doss Mohapattur* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 256, at p. 261; *Ningareddi v. Lakshmanaya* (1901), 26 Bom. 163, at p. 166; 3 Bom. L. R. 647. An agreement amounting *pro tanto* to an alienation without consideration was set aside in *Bala v. Balaji* (1897), 22 Bom. 825.

⁸ *Nand Ram v. Mangal Sen* (1909), 31 All. 359.

⁹ See R. C. Mitra's "Law of Joint Property," 2nd ed., pp. 73, 74.

¹⁰ *Post*, pp. 288-290.

¹¹ The fact of his acting as manager is sufficient, although he may not be strictly entitled so to act. *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (Mussamut Babooee)* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at p. 413; 18 W. R. C. R. note to p. 81. See also *Gunga Pershad v. Phool Singh* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 106; 10 B. L. R., note to p. 388;

bind the interest of a minor coparcener by a sale or charge.¹ Apparently he can in such case also bind the interest of an adult coparcener who does not dissent.²

This principle was laid down in the leading case of *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (Mussamat Babooee)*³ with regard to the manager for an infant heir. It has been applied to the managers of joint families acting on behalf of infant coparceners,⁴ to widows and daughters inheriting property from their husbands and fathers,⁵ to women inheriting as widows of *gotraja sapindas*,⁶ to the managers of religious endowments,⁷ to managers on behalf of lunatics,⁸ and to the holders of impartible estates, which are inalienable by custom.⁹

Benefit
apart from
necessity.

In that case it was said that the power "can only be exercised rightly in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate." Of the large number of cases in which the principles contained in *Hunooman Persaud Panday's*¹⁰ case have been applied, there is not, so far as the writer is aware, any one in which a sale or charge has been justified by benefit apart from necessity, except the recent case of *Krishna Chandra Chowdury v. Ratan Ram Pal* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 645, and the case of *Ratnam v. Govindarajulu*,¹¹ where the money was originally raised for, amongst other purposes, enlarging the family dwelling-house, but in that case, as the debt in question was raised for the purpose of paying an antecedent debt, the question as to the original loan did not really arise (see *post*, p. 238). Apart from necessity, it is not easy to say what is for the benefit of the estate.¹² It is clearly not intended that this

Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri (1896), 24 Calc. 77.

¹ *Ram Charan v. Mihin Lal* (1914), 36 All 158. No distinction can be drawn between the power to charge and the power to sell. The need which would justify the exercise of the one power would justify the exercise of the other. *Mohanund Mondul v. Nafur Mondul* (1899), 26 Calc. 820; 3 C. W. N. 770.

² *Ante*, p. 284.

³ (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393; 18 W. R. C. R. note to p. 81.

⁴ *Soorendro Pershad Dobey v. Nundun Misser* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 196; *Tandavaraya Mudali v. Valli Ammal* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 398; *Deotaree Mahapatray v. Damoodhur Mahapatray*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 1643.

⁵ *Kameswar Pershad (Baboo) v. Run Bahadoor Singh* (1880), 8 I. A. 8; 6 Calc. 843; 8 C. L. R. 361; *Amarnath Sah (Lala) v. Achan Kuar (Rani)* (1892), 19 I. A. 196; 14 All. 420; *Maheshwar Baksh Singh v. Ratan Singh* (1896), 23 I. A. 57; 23 Calc. 766.

⁶ *Post*, p. 468.

⁷ *Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri* (1896), 24 Calc. 77; *Doorganath Roy (Koonwur) v. Ram Chunder Sen* (1876), 4 I. A. 52, at p. 63; 2 Calc. 341, at p. 351.

⁸ *Gourcenath v. Collector of Monghyr* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 5.

⁹ *Gopal Prosad Bhakat v. Raghunath Deb* (1904), 32 Calc. 158; 9 C. W. N. 330. As to polygars, see *Kotta Ramasami Chetti v. Bangari Seshama Nayanvaru* (1881), 3 Mad. 145. As to the powers of the karnavan of a tarwad, see *Kallyani v. Narayana* (1885), 9 Mad. 266; *Kanna Pisharodi v. Kombi Achen* (1885), 8 Mad. 381; *Elayachandaidathal Kombi Achen v. Kenatumkora Lakshmi Amma* (1882), 5 Mad. 201. As to the alienation of impartible estates which are not inalienable by custom, see *ante*, pp. 264, 265.

¹⁰ 6 M. I. A., at p. 423; 18 W. R. note to p. 81.

¹¹ (1877), 2 Mad. 339.

¹² See *Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasi-kamany Pandara* (1917), 44 I. A. 147; 21 C. W. N. 729; 19 Bom. L. R. 587,

power should authorize a sale or charge for the purpose only of increasing the immediate income of the estate.¹

In *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh*² the Judicial Committee said the authority of the manager to alienate the property would be implied "if it can be shown that the alienation was made for legitimate family purposes," but there is nothing in the case to show that they intended that expression to extend beyond a case of necessity.

When the manager of a joint family is acting under the authority of a Court, as when he has been appointed a guardian under Act VIII. of 1890,³ or is acting as administrator under the Probate and Administration Act,⁴ or as guardian for a suit,⁵ his powers are limited by the provisions of the Acts under the authority of which he has received an appointment; but as in the case of a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law a guardian cannot be appointed of the interest of a minor in coparcenary property,⁶ where such appointment has been made it will not interfere with his powers as manager under Hindu Law.⁷

"Where, in the particular instance, the charge is one that a prudent owner would make in order to benefit the estate, the *bond fide* lender is not affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate. The actual pressure on the state, the danger to be averted, or the benefit to be conferred upon it in the particular instance, is the thing to be regarded. But, of course, if that danger arises, or has arisen, from any misconduct to which the lender is or has been a party, he cannot take advantage of his own wrong to support a charge in his own favour against the heir, grounded on a necessity which his wrong has helped

Matters to be regarded.

¹ See *Radha Pershad Singh v. Talook Raj Koer (Mussamut)* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 38; *Kaihur Singh v. Roop Singh* (1871), 3 N. W. P. H. C. 4.

² (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at p. 101; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 165; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 233. See *Biswanath Pershad Mahla v. Jagdip Narain Singh* (1912), 40 Calc. 342, at p. 350. This was a case of a mortgage by a father for necessary purposes.

³ See *Shurrut Chunder v. Rajkissen Mookerjee* (1875), 15 B. L. R. 350; 24 W. R. C. R. 46. In *Tejpal v. Ganga* (1902), 25 All. 59, following *Girraj Baksh v. Hamid Ali (Kazi)* (1886), 9 All. 340 (a case under Act XL of 1858), it was held that there being no sanction, the guardian was relegated to the powers he would have had, if he had not been appointed by the Court. The High Court of

Bengal has taken a different view in *Bhupendro Narayan Dutt v. Nemye Chand Mondul* (1888), 15 Calc. 627, at p. 636, and *Shurrut Chunder v. Rajkissen Mookerjee* (1875), 15 B. L. R. 350; 24 W. R. C. R. 46; and it is submitted that the express terms of Act VIII. of 1890, s. 29, make this question clear. See *Sinaya Pillai v. Munisami* (1899), 22 Mad. 289; *Anpurnabai v. Durgapa Mahalapa Naik* (1894), 20 Bom. 150.

⁴ See *Ranjit Singh v. Amullya Prosad Ghose* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 923.

⁵ *Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row* (1913), 40 I. A. 132; 37 Mad. 295; 17 C. W. N. 765; 15 Bom. L. R. 626.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 270.

⁷ *Gharbullah v. Khalak Singh* (1903), 30 I. A. 165; 26 All. 407; 7 C. W. N. 681; 5 Bom. L. R. 478; *Ram Avtar Singh v. Nursing Narayan Singh*, 3 C. L. J. 12.

to cause. Therefore, the lender . . . unless he is shown to have acted *malâ fide*, will not be affected, though it be shown that with better management the estate might have been kept free from debt.”¹

What
amounts to
necessity.

All circumstances of pressure which render the raising of money necessary for the protection or preservation of the estate, or for the personal well-being of the coparceners, would support a sale or charge.

Baboo K. K. Bhattacharya, in his “Law of the Joint Hindu Family,”² says, “Legal necessity is of various forms. All the indispensable religious ceremonies, the sacraments, such as marriage and the investiture with the sacred thread, the obsequies, the cremation, the periodical oblations to the manes, the ceremonies customary in the family, the subsistence of the family, the education of the younger members, the payment of the ancestral debts, the giving of presents at particular seasons and on special occasions to the relatives, these and a thousand other causes of expenditure are constantly cropping up in a fairly prosperous Hindu joint family. All these are, in the strict sense of the word, lawful necessities.”

The following are proper objects for the raising of money :—

(a) The payment of Government revenue or of other debts which are payable out of the estate.³

The debts of the father or other person through whom the property has been acquired by inheritance, will, or gift, must be paid, provided they are such as to bind the estate,⁴ and therefore the payment of them constitutes a sufficient necessity for sale or mortgage,⁵ although no suit may have been instituted for the purpose of recovering them.⁶ Where there is a decree the necessity is the more pressing.⁷

¹ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonwerez (Mussamut Babooee)* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at p. 423; 18 W. R. C. R., note to p. 81.

² Page 488

³ Macnaghten's “Hindu Law,” vol. ii. chap. xi case 2, p. 293 *Gooroo-persaud Jena v. Muddunmohun Soor*, Ben. S. D. A. Rep., 1856, p. 980; *Bishambur Nark v. Sudasheeb Mohapatra* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 96; *Srimohan Jha v. Brijbehary Misser* (1909), 36 Calc. 753 As to the debts of an ancestral business, see *Sakrabai Nathubai v. Maganlal Mulchand* (1901), 26 Bom. 206; 3 Bom. L. R. 738.

⁴ Debts barred by limitation do not justify an alienation by the manager, *Melgirappa v. Shivappa*

(1869), 6 Bom. H. C. 270; *Dinkar v. Appaji* (1894), 20 Bom. 155. See *Chinnaya Nayudu v. Gurunatham Chetti* (1882), 5 Mad. 169. As to the power of a widow to pay debts barred by limitation, see *post*, p. 482.

⁵ See Macnaghten's “Hindu Law,” vol. ii. chap. xi. case 6. Act VII. (Bo. C.) of 1866, s. 5. *Gurput Lall (Lalla) v. Toorun Koonwar (Mussamut)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52; *Soorjoo Pershad v. Krishan Pertab (Rajah)* (1869), 1 N. W. P. H. C. Rep. 46.

⁶ *Kaihur Singh v. Roop Singh* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 5.

⁷ See *Purmessur Ojha v. Goolbee (Mussamut)* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 446; *Sheoraj Koor v. Nuckchedes Lall* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 72.

According to Hindu law, the payment of a father's debts, even in his lifetime, is a pious duty on the part of a son,¹ provided that they have not been incurred for illegal or immoral purposes. In the case of a family governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, the discharge of such debt is therefore such a necessary purpose as to give validity to a sale or mortgage of ancestral property by the father,² or after his death,³ by the manager, whether the sons be minors or adults, provided that the debt has not been incurred for illegal or immoral purposes.

The satisfaction of a decree for pre-emption in a suit by the father has been held to justify a mortgage.⁴ The recovery of property which had been sold for arrears of road cess, has been held not to justify a mortgage.⁵

(b) The maintenance of the coparceners and of the persons whom they are legally or morally bound to maintain.⁶

(c) The reasonable marriage expenses⁷ of the male⁸ and female⁹ members of the family.

The Allahabad High Court, while holding that a first marriage may be necessary, declines to extend the rule in every case to a second marriage.¹⁰

In a case governed by the Bengal law the sale of a share would, it is submitted, be justified. It is submitted that under both schools the sale of separate property would be justified.¹¹

(d) The performance of an indispensable religious duty,¹² such as the initiatory ceremony of a member of the family,¹³

¹ See *post*, pp. 308, 309.

² See *post*, pp. 308, 309.

³ *Luchmun Dass v. Guridhur Chowdhry* (1880), 5 Calc. 855; 6 C. L. R. 473; *Gunga Prosad v. Ajudhia Pershad* (1881), 8 Calc. 131; S. C. *Gunga Pershad v. Sheodyal Singh*, 9 C. L. R. 417.

⁴ *Nathu v. Kundan Lall* (1910), 33 All. 242.

⁵ *Srimohan Jha v. Brijbehary Misser* (1909), 36 Calc. 753.

⁶ *Makundi v. Sarabsukh* (1884), 6 All. 417, at p. 421; *Bishambur Naik v. Sudasheeb Mohapatter* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 96. As to the right to maintenance, see *ante*, pp. 234, 235, 271.

⁷ This includes money paid for the bride in an *asura* marriage; *Bhagirathi v. Jokhu Ram Upadhia* (1910), 32 All. 575; see *ante*, pp. 51, 52.

⁸ *Kameswari Sasri v. Veerachari* (1910), 34 Mad. 422; *Gopala Krishnam*

v. Venkatanarasa (1912), 37 Mad. 273, overruling *Govindarazulu Narasimham v. Devarabholla Venkatanarasayya* (1903), 27 Mad. 206; *Sundrabai v. Shivmorayana* (1907), 32 Bom. 81; 9 Bom. L. R. 1366; *Narayana v. Ramalinga* (1915), 39 Mad. 587.

⁹ *Preaj Nurain v. Ajodhyapurshad* (1848), 7 Ben. Sol. Rep. 513 (2nd ed., 602); *Gunput Lall (Lalla) v. Toorun Koonwar (Mussamut)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52.

¹⁰ *Bhagirathi v. Jokhu Ram Upadhia* (1910), 32 All. 575.

¹¹ *Juggessur Sircar v. Nilambur Biswas* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 217. See *Makundi v. Sarabsukh* (1884), 6 All. 417, at p. 420; *Bhoorun Koer (Mussamut) v. Sahebzaadee* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 149.

¹² As to pilgrimages, see *Mutteeram Kowar v. Gopaul Sahoo* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 416.

¹³ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii, chap. xi, case 6, p. 296.

the funeral ceremonies¹ or *sradh* of a member of the family or of the widow of a member,² or a debt incurred on account of such expenditure.³

(e) Necessary legal expenses for the purpose of preserving or recovering or defending the estate,⁴ or of defending a member of the family.⁵

Recital of necessity.

The instrument effecting a sale or creating a charge need not contain any recital of necessity,⁶ but it is always better to insert such recital therein.

Discretion of manager.

In determining whether a sale or mortgage for a family necessity is justifiable, a reasonable latitude must be allowed for the exercise of the manager's judgment, especially in the case of a father or of a manager of a trading family, though this must not be extended so far as to free the persons dealing with him from the need of all precautions where a minor has an interest in the property.⁷

Manager may sell to repay money borrowed on personal credit.

The circumstance that to meet the necessities of his ward the manager has pledged his personal credit, does not disentitle him to charge or sell the property,⁸ but he can only charge or sell it for the purpose of paying money which the minor was under an obligation to pay.⁹

Purchaser or mortgagee bound to inquire as to necessity.

A person lending money on the security of coparcenary property, or of the property of a minor, or buying that property, is bound to exercise due care and attention in seeing that there was a legal necessity for the loan,¹⁰ and must satisfy himself as

¹ *Gunput Lall (Lalla) v. Toorun Koonwar (Mussamut)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52; *Nathuram v. Shoma Chhagan* (1890), 14 Bom. 562.

² *Sukeenath Banoo v. Huro Churn Buruj* (1886), 6 W. R. C. R. 34; *Gunput Lall (Lalla) v. Toorun Koonwar (Mussamut)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52; *Srimohun Jha v. Brijbehary Misser* (1909), 36 Cal. 753. See Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. II. chap. xi. case 6, p. 296 (1818); *Sadashiv Bhaskar Joshi v. Dhakubai* (1880), 5 Bom. 450.

³ *Gunput Lall (Lalla) v. Toorun Koonwar (Mussamut)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52.

⁴ *Gunga Pershad v. Phool Singh* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 106; 10 B. L. R., notes to p. 368; see *Karimuddin (Munshi) v. Gobind Krishna Narain*

(*Kunwar*) (1909), 36 I. A. 138; 31 All. 497; 13 C. W. N. 1117; 11 Bom. L. R. 911.

⁵ *Beni Ram v. Man Singh* (1911), 34 All. 4. See, however, *Naihu Ras v. Dindayal Rai* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 166.

⁶ *Woomesh Chunder Sircar v. Digumburee Dossee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 154.

⁷ *Babaji Mahadaji v. Krishnaji Devji* (1878), 2 Bom. 666; *Ratnam v. Govindarajulu* (1877), 2 Mad. 339, at p. 341.

⁸ *Succaram Morarji v. Kalidas Kalkhanji* (1894), 18 Bom. 631, at p. 635.

⁹ *Ranmalsingji (Maharana Shri) v. Vadilal Vakhatchand* (1894), 20 Bom. 61.

¹⁰ *Gour Pershad Narain v. Sheo Pershad Ram* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R.

well as he can,¹ and as an honest man,² with reference to the parties with whom he is dealing, that the manager is acting in the particular instance for the benefit of the estate,³ and that circumstances of necessity had occurred which, under the Hindu law, would justify the sale of the property,⁴ or a charge upon it at the rate of interest arranged for in the particular instance.⁵

In the case of a long series of borrowings it is not always possible to prove exactly the purpose for which any particular item was borrowed. Current account. "It will . . . be sufficient for the creditor to show that the family was in chronic need of money for the current outgoings of the family life or its trade necessities, and that the moneys were advanced on the representation of the manager that they were needed for such objects."⁶

Where the necessity arises from the pressure of a judgment debt, the person dealing with the manager is entitled to treat the judgment as *prima facie* proof of necessity."⁷

Where the manager is authorized by the Court to sell or pledge under secs. 28 or 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act,⁸ or sec. 90 of the Probate and Administration Act,⁹ or under the powers possessed by the High Courts, a *bond fide* purchaser or mortgagee need not investigate behind the order of authority.¹⁰

103; *Loof Hossein (Syud) v. Dursun Lall Sahoo* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 424; *Gane Bhive Parab v. Kane Bhive* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 169; *Mandil Dass v. Megh Narain Dubey* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 39.

¹ *Muthoor Doss v. Kanoo Beharee Singh* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 287; *Dahbai v. Gopibai* (1902), 26 Bom. 433; 4 Bom. L. R. 105.

² *Looloo Singh v. Rajendur Laha* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 364; *Runnoo Pandey v. Buksh Ali* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 2. See Act IV. of 1882, s. 38; *Jamsetji N. Tata v. Kashinath Jivan Manglia* (1901), 26 Bom 326; 3 Bom. L. R. 898.

³ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (Mussamut Babooee)* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393; 18 W. R. C. R., note to p. 81; *Bunseedhur (Lalla) v. Bindeseree Dutt Singh (Koonwur)* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 454, at p. 471; 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 165; *Trimbuck Anunt v. Gopallshet* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C. (2nd ed.) 27.

⁴ *Kasheenaath Bose v. Chunder Mohun Nundee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1858,

p. 1791; *Nourruthun Koer (Mussamut) v. Gouree Dutt Singh (Baboo)* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 193.

⁵ See *Hurronath Roy Bahadoor (Rajah) v. Rundhir Singh* (1890), 18 I. A. 1; 18 Calc. 311.

⁶ *Krishna Ramaya Nark v. Vasudev Venkatesh Pai* (1896), 21 Bom. 808, at p. 815.

⁷ See *Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall* (1874), 1 I. A. 321, at p. 334; 14 B. L. R. 187, at p. 199; 22 W. R. C. R. 56; *Bhowna (Mussamut) v. Roop Kishore* (1873), 5 N. W. P. H. C. Rep. 89; *Sheoraj Koer v. Nuckchedee Lall* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 72. See, however, *Loof Hossein (Syud) v. Dursun Lall Sahoo* (1874), 23 W. R. C. R. 424.

⁸ VIII. of 1890.

⁹ V. of 1881.

¹⁰ *Gungapershad Sahu v. Maharani Bibi* (1884), 12 I. A. 47, at p. 50; 11 Calc. 379, at pp. 383, 384; *Sikher Chund v. Dulputty Singh* (1879), 5 Calc. 363, at p. 381; *S. C. sub nomine Rajah Lall v. Delputty Singh*, 5 C. L. R. 374, at p. 401.

Effect of
inquiry.

If the person dealing with the manager does make the above inquiries and acts honestly, the real existence of an alleged sufficient, and reasonably credited, necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of his charge;¹ and, under such circumstances, he is not bound to see to the application of the purchase-money.²

"It is obvious that money to be secured on any estate is likely to be obtained on easier terms than a loan which rests on mere personal security; and that, therefore, the mere creation of a charge securing a proper debt cannot be viewed as improvident management. The purposes for which a loan is wanted are often future as regards the actual application, and a lender can rarely have, unless he enters on the management, the means of controlling and rightly directing the actual application."³

This principle is to be found in sec. 38 of the Transfer of Property Act,⁴ which is as follows:—

"Where any person, authorized only under circumstances in their nature variable to dispose of immovable property, transfers such property for consideration, alleging the existence of such circumstances, they shall as between the transferee on the one part and the transferor and other persons (if any) affected by the transfer on the other part, be deemed to have existed, if the transferee, after using reasonable care to ascertain the existence of such circumstances, has acted in good faith.

Illustration.

A, a Hindu widow, whose husband has left collateral heirs, alleging that the property held by her as such is insufficient for her maintenance, agrees, for purposes neither religious nor charitable, to sell a field, part of such property, to B. B satisfies himself by reasonable inquiry that the income of the property is insufficient for A's maintenance, and that the sale of the field is necessary, and, acting in good faith, buys the field from A. As between B on the one part and A and the collateral heirs on the other part, a necessity for the sale shall be deemed to have existed."

¹ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree* (Mussamut Bahoe) (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at p. 424; 18 W. R. C. R., note to p. 81. See also *Tajooddeen Hossein* (Sheikh) v. *Bhuguanlol Sahoo*, Ben. S. D. A. 1860, p. 33; *Mahabeer Pershad Singh v. Dumreram Opadhya*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 166; *Trimbuck Anunt v. Gopallshet* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C. A. C. (2nd ed.) 27.

² *Radha Kishore Mookerjee v. Mirtoonjoy Gow* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 23; *Sukeenath Bamoo v. Huro Churn Buruj* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 34; *Mahabeer Pershad Sing v. Dumreram*

Opadhya, W. R. 1864, C. R. 166; *Gomain Sircar v. Prannath Goopto* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 14; *Kandhia Lal v. Muna Bibi* (1897), 20 All. 135; *Gane Bhive Parab v. Kane Bhive* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 169; *Ghansham Singh v. Badiya Lal* (1902), 24 All. 547.

³ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree* (Mussamut Bahoe) (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at p. 424; 18 W. R. C. R., note to p. 81.

⁴ Act IV. of 1882. See *Jamsetji N. Tata v. Kashinath Jivan Manglia* (1901), 26 Bom. 326, at p. 336; 3 Bom. L. R. 898.

The existence of a necessity and of sufficient pressure on the estate is all that the lender need inquire about.¹ He need not inquire into its causes,² or what is the exact amount required to be borrowed.³ Where the lender knows, or by ordinary diligence might have known, that there are funds available and sufficient for paying off the debt, the sale would be invalid.⁴ He must be entirely on his guard. He must see whether the family with which he is dealing be divided or undivided; and if the latter, at his peril he must see that the transaction be one by which the coparceners will be concluded.⁵

The fact that the adult members support the manager in the transaction may justify the person advancing the money in giving additional credit to the representations of the manager.⁶

Where the transaction has been unimpeached for some years, a purchaser from the original vendee would not be expected to make minute inquiries.⁷

Where it is sought to enforce or support a sale or mortgage by a manager, the purchaser or mortgagee must prove that the transaction was entered into in good faith;⁸ that he advanced in consideration of the sale or mortgage a sum of money which was reasonable with reference to the value of the property;⁹ that the money was raised or applied¹⁰ for the

¹ *Sheoraj Kooer v. Nuckchedee Lall* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 72.

² *Mahabir Kower v. Jubha Singh* (1871), 8 B. L. R. 38; 16 W. R. C. R. 221; *Luchmeedhur Singh (Baboo) v. Ekbal Ali* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 75.

³ *Nuffer Chunder Banerjee v. Gud-dadhur Mundle* (1865), 4 W. R. C. R. 122; *Ghansham Singh v. Badiya Lal* (1902), 24 All. 547. "If a larger portion than is required is sold, it must be shown by the purchaser that the money required to pay off the claim could not be raised otherwise than by the course adopted." *Luchmeedhur Singh (Baboo) v. Ekbal Ali* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 75, at pp. 77, 78.

⁴ *Kaleenarain Roy Chowdhry v. Ram Coomar Chand*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 99. See *Gomain Sircar v. Prannath Goopto* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 14; *Ravaneswar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh* (1911), 38 Calc. 721; upheld on appeal (1915), 43 Calc. 417.

He need not inquire whether the debt could have been met from other sources: *Ajeay Ram v. Girdharee* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 110. See *Damoodur Mohapattur v. Birjo Mohapattur* Ben. S. D. A. 1858, p. 802.

⁵ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 200; *Dalpatsing v. Nanabhai* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. (2nd ed.) 306.

⁶ *Balvant Santaram v. Babaji* (1884), 8 Bom. 602, at p. 609.

⁷ *Surub Narain Chowdhry v. Shew Gobind Pandey* (1873), 11 B. L. R. App. 29.

⁸ *Roopnarain Sing v. Gugadhur Pershad Narain* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 297; *Tandavaraya Mudali v. Valli Ammal* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 398.

⁹ See *Saravana Tevan v. Muttayi Ammal* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. Rep. 371.

¹⁰ *Muthoora Doss v. Kanoo Beharee Singh* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 287, and cases ante, pp. 290, 291, and post, p. 294.

relief of a recognized necessity,¹ or that proper inquiries were made by him with respect to the existence of a necessity justifying the sale, and that the result of such inquiries was such as to satisfy him as an honest man of the existence of such necessity.²

As to a suit for specific performance see *Gurusami Sastrial v. Ganapathia Pillai* (1882), 5 Mad. 337.

In *Hunooman Persaud Panday's case*³ their Lordships of the Privy Council said, "Next as to the consideration for the bond. The argument for the appellant in the reply, if correct, would indeed reduce the matter for consideration to a very short point; for, according to that argument, if the *factum* of a deed of charge by a manager for an infant be established, and the fact of the advance be proved, the presumption of law is, *prima facie*, to support the charge, and the onus of disproving it rests on the heir. For this position a decision, or rather a *dictum*, of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut at Agra in the case of *Omed Rai v. Heeralall*⁴ was quoted and relied upon. But the *dictum* there, though general, must be read in connection with the facts of that case. It might be a correct course to adopt with reference to suits of that particular character, which was one where the sons of a living father were, with his suspected collusion, attempting, in a suit against a creditor, to get rid of the charge on an ancestral estate created by the father, on the ground of the alleged misconduct of the father in extravagant waste of the estate. Now, it is to be observed that a lender of money may reasonably be expected to prove the circumstances connected with his own particular loan, but cannot reasonably be expected to know, or to come prepared with proof, of the antecedent economy and good conduct of the owner of an ancestral estate; whilst the antecedents of their father's career would be more likely to be in

¹ *Debi Dayal Sahoo v. Bhan Pertap Singh* (1903), 31 Cal. 433, at p. 455; 8 C. W. N. 408, at p. 419; *Jamna v. Nain Sukh* (1887), 9 All. 493; *Vadali Rama Kristnama v. Manda Appaiya* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 407; *Amarnath Sah (Lala) v. Achan Kuar (Rani)* (1892), 19 I. A. 196; 14 All. 420; *Bunseedhur (Lalla) v. Bindeseree Dutt Singh* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 454; 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 165. The necessity cannot be inferred from the habits and general character of the vendor: *Mittrajit Sing v. Raghubansi Sing* (1871), 8 B. L. R. App. 5.

² *Amarnath Sah (Lala) v. Achan Kuar (Rani)* (1892), 19 I. A. 196; 14 All. 420; *Kameswar Pershad (Baboo) v. Run Bahadoor Singh* (1880), 8 I. A. 8; 6 Cal. 843; 8 C. L. R. 361; *Pootunder Singh v. Ram Pershad* (1867), 2 Agra H. C. Reps. 147; *Kasheerath Bose v.*

Chunder Mohun Nundee, Ben. S. D. A. 1858, p. 1791; *Bheknarain Singh v. Januk Singh* (1877), 2 Cal. 438; *Jamna v. Nain Sukh* (1887), 9 All. 493; *Kumola Pershad Narain Singh v. Nokh Lall Sahoo* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 30; *Sheo Pershad Ram v. Thakoor Pershad* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 103; *Trimbuck Anunt v. Gopallshet* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C., 2nd ed., 27; *Bhoorun Koer (Mussamut) v. Sahebzaadee* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 149; *Soorendro Pershad Dobe v. Nundun Misser* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 196; *Lal Singh v. Deo Narain Singh* (1886), 8 All. 279.

³ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (Mussamut Babooee)* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at pp. 418, 419; 18 W. R. C. R. note to p. 81.

⁴ 6 S. D. A. N. W. P. 618.

the knowledge of the sons, members of the same family, than of a stranger ; consequently, this *dictum* may perhaps be supported on the general principle that the allegation, and proof of facts, presumably in his better knowledge, is to be looked for from the party who possesses that better knowledge,¹ as well as on the obvious ground in such suits of the danger of collusion between father and sons in fraud of the creditor of the former. But this case is of a description wholly different, and the *dictum* does not profess to be a general one, nor is it so to be regarded. Their Lordships think that the question on whom does the *onus* of proof lie in such suits as the present is one not capable of a general and inflexible answer. The presumption proper to be made will vary with circumstances, and must be regulated by, and dependent on, them.² Thus, where the mortgagee himself, with whom the transaction took place, is setting up a charge in his favour made by one, whose title to alienate he necessarily knew to be limited and qualified, he may be reasonably expected to allege and prove facts presumably better known to him than to the infant heir, namely those facts which embody the representations made to him of the alleged needs of the estate, and the motives influencing his immediate loan."

Where a length of time has elapsed since the transaction, the vendee or person claiming through him cannot be expected to furnish the same amount of proof as in a recent transaction.³

The representations made by the manager at the time of the loan or alienation are evidence in favour of the person making the advance.

In *Hunooman Persaud Panday's case*⁴ the following will be found: "It is to be observed that the representations by the manager accompanying the loan as part of the *res gestæ* and as the contemporaneous declarations of an agent, though not actually selected by the principal, have been held to be evidence against the heir ; and as their Lordships are informed that such *primâ facie* proof has been generally required in the Supreme Court of Calcutta between the lender and the heir ; where the lender is enforcing his security against the heir, they think it reasonable and right that it should be required. A case in the time of Sir Edward Hyde East, reported in his decisions in the second volume of Morley's 'Digest,' seems to be the foundation of this practice (see also the case of *Broun v. Ram Kunaee Dutt*).⁵ It is obvious, however, that it might be unreasonable to require such proof from one not an original party after a lapse of time and enjoyment, and apparent acquiescence ; consequently, if, as is the case here as to part of the charge, it be created by substitution of a new security for an older one, when the consideration of the older one was an

¹ See also the Indian Evidence Act I. of 1872, s. 106, which provides that "when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."

² See *Kaihur Singh v. Roop Singh* (1871), 3 N. W. P. H. C. 4.

³ See *Chowdhry Herasutollah v. Brojo Soondur Roy* (1872), 18 W. R.

C. R. 77; *Murugesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara* (1917), 44 I. A. 98; 40 Mad. 402; 21 C. W. N. 761; 19 Bom. L. R. 456.

⁴ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (Mussamut) Babooee* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at pp. 419, 420; 18 W. R. C. R., note to p. 81.

⁵ Ben. S. D. A. 1853, p. 883.

old precedent debt of an ancestor not previously questioned, a presumption of the kind contended for by the appellant would be reasonable." ¹

Recital of
necessity.

A recital of the necessity does not by itself establish necessity.² It "is clear evidence of the representation,³ and if the circumstances are such as to justify a reasonable belief that an inquiry would have confirmed its truth, then when proof of actual inquiry has become impossible, the recital, coupled with such circumstances, would be sufficient evidence to support the deed." ⁴

Adequacy of
price.

In determining the question of the validity of a sale, adequacy of price is often an important point to be considered,⁵ though inadequacy of price is not necessarily conclusive proof of *mala fides*.⁶ The mere fact that the manager or guardian might at the time of the sale have been able to make some more advantageous arrangement for the estate would not nullify a sale to a *bona fide* purchaser for value.⁷

Fraud.

Evidence of the *bona fides* of the transaction would of course be subject to be rebutted by evidence that the purchaser had acted *mala fide*, or in collusion with the manager to the injury of the family.⁸ If there be any fraud in proceedings to enforce a charge, which was free from fraud, such proceedings may be set aside.⁹

¹ See *Tasowwar Ali (Syud) v. Koonj Beharee Lal* (1869), 3 N. W. P. H. C. 8.

² *Burj Lal (Lala) v. Inda Kunwar (Musammat)* (1914), (P. C.) 36 All. 187; 18 C. W. N. 652; 16 Bom. L. R. 352; *Ajudhia v. Ram Sumer Misir* (1909), 31 All. 454; *Sunker Lall v. Juddoobuns Suhaye* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 285. See *Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 209; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 57; 12 W. R. P. C. 47; *Makundi v. Sarabsukh* (1884), 6 All. 417; *Gunga-gobind Bose v. Dhunnee (Sreemutty)* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 59.

³ See *Sikher Chund v. Dulputty Singh* (1879), 5 Calc. 363, at p. 375; 5 C. L. R. 374, at p. 387.

⁴ *Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Acharjya Chowdhuri* (1916), 43 I. A. 249; 44 Calc. 186; 21 C. W. N. 225; 18 Bom. L. R. 368.

⁵ *Dagdu v. Kamble* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 343, at pp. 360, 361; *Khet-*

ermonee Dassee v. Kishenmohun Mitter (1863), Marsh. 313; 2 Hay, 196; *Kumola Pershad Narain Singh (Baboo) v. Nokh Lall Sahoo* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 30.

⁶ *Kumola Pershad Narain Singh (Baboo) v. Nokh Lall Sahoo* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 30, at p. 33.

⁷ *Kool Chunder Surmah v. Ramjoy Surmona* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 8.

⁸ *Bunseedhur (Lalla) v. Bindeseree Dutt Singh* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 454, at pp. 471, 472; 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 165.

⁹ As to the rights of a purchaser at an execution-sale without notice of the fraud, see *Khetermonee Dassee v. Kishenmohun Mitter* (1863), Marsh. 313; 2 Hay, 196. The question whether the sale should be set aside must be determined by the Court in accordance with the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience: *Abdul Haye v. Nawab Raj* (1868), B. L. R., F. B. R. 911; 9 W. R. C. R. 196.

When the purchaser or lender is unable to prove necessity for the raising of the whole of the money, or he is unable to prove that he was satisfied as to the necessity for the raising of the whole sum, he is entitled to a charge on the property for the amount which it was necessary to raise, or which after reasonable inquiries was shown to him to be necessary to raise.¹ In any case he would be entitled to a charge for what is actually applied for the benefit of the family.²

Where necessity has been proved for the raising of all the money except a small portion, the Court may, where the father is the manager, treat such small portion as a debt of the father binding the sons (*post*, Chap. VIII.).³

In the case of his obtaining such charge, a creditor, who has acted fairly, would ordinarily be entitled to interest at the contract rate.⁴

Where the interest is at a rate exceeding the rate at which the manager would have been able to borrow under the circumstances, the Court will reduce the interest to such lower rate, as the rate of interest is a question to which the lender ought to have applied his mind when inquiring as to the necessity.⁵ In other words, the lender must show that there was necessity to borrow at the particular rate of interest.⁶

Foreclosure proceedings, or a purchase at a sale held under a decree in a suit on the mortgage, would not relieve a mortgagee from the burden of proving the *bona fides* of the transaction, or place him in any better position with regard to the family,⁷ although a *bond fide* purchaser without notice at a sale held in execution of a decree in a suit which was properly constituted might not be bound to inquire into the propriety of the loan which formed the basis of the decree.⁸

As to the duty of a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree, see *post*, p. 320.

¹ *Doorganath Roy (Konwur) v. Ramchunder Sen* (1875), 4 I. A. 52; 2 Cal. 311; *Deputy-Commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh* (1907), 34 I. A. 72; 29 All. 331; 11 C. W. N. 474; 9 Bom. L. R. 591.

² *Mulhoora Doss v. Kanoo Beharee Singh* (1876), 21 W. R. C. R. 287. See *Hasmal Rai (Koer) v. Sunder Das* (1885), 11 Cal. 396; *Bunseedhur (Lalla) v. Bindeseree Dutt Singh* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 454; 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 165; *Paran Chandra Pal v. Karunamayee Dasi* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 90; 15 W. R. C. R. 268.

³ *Biswanath Pershad Mahta v.*

Jagdeep Narain Singh (1912), 40 Cal. 343; 17 C. W. N. 1025, note.

⁴ See *Bunseedhur (Lalla) v. Bindeseree Dutt Singh* (1866), 10 M. I. A. 454; 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 165.

⁵ See *Hurronath Roy Bahadoor (Rajah) v. Runderhir Singh* (1890), 18 I. A. 1; 18 Cal. 311.

⁶ *Nand Ram v. Bhupal Singh* (1911), 34 All. 126.

⁷ *Purmanund v. Orumbah Koer (Musst.)*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 143; *Buzrung Sahoy Singh v. Maulora Chowdhraim (Mussamut)* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 119.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 296.

Charge for a portion of advance.

Burden of proof not altered by foreclosure proceedings or decree.

Even if the alienation by the manager is unauthorized, his own interest will be bound in cases where the sale of a share of coparcenary property is allowable, but specific performance of an agreement to sell will not be granted in such case.¹

Acts of co-
parcener not
manager.

Except where, under the Mitakshara law, the father can alienate or charge the coparcenary property,² no individual coparcener, other than the manager, is entitled, without the consent of all the members, to deal with the joint family property.³

There may be circumstances where the acts of a member of the family, who is not the manager, can be treated as binding the family, on the ground that there was an express or implied agency,⁴ as where money is borrowed for family purposes,⁵ but minor coparceners are not bound by the act of a person who is neither a *de jure* nor a *de facto* manager.⁶

In one case⁷ the acquiescence by the guardian in the act of a person who had not authority to bind the minor was held to bind the minor.

As to who may contest an alienation, see *ante*, p. 236, and *post*, pp. 304, 305.

It has been held that where a coparcener represented to the mortgagee that he had power to charge the property, he was bound to make good his representation by suing for partition.⁸ On such partition the mortgage would attach to the share allotted to the mortgagor.⁹

Power of
surviving
coparcener.

When there are no existing coparceners, the surviving coparcener is, under the Mitakshara law, entitled to dispose of ancestral property as if it were his separate acquisition;¹⁰ but a gift by will will take no effect against a son who was in his

¹ *Nagiah v. Venkatarama Sastrula* (1912), 38 Mad. 387, disagreeing with *Kosuri Ramaraju v. Ivalury Ramalingam* (1902), 26 Mad. 74, and *Srinivasa Reddi v. Sivarama Reddi* (1909), 32 Mad. 320; *Subba v. Venkatrami* (1914), 38 Mad. 1187. *Naro v. Paragowda* (1916), 41 Bom. 347; 19 Bom. L. R. 69; Act I. of 1877 (Specific Relief), s. 15. See *Poraka Subbarami Reddi v. Vadlamuddi Seshachalam* (1909), 33 Mad. 359.

² *Post*, pp. 308, 309.

³ *Guruvappa v. Thimma* (1887), 10 Mad. 316; *Rajbubh Bhooyar v. Buneta De (Mussumaut)* (1801), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 44 (2nd ed. 59); *Prannath Das v. Calishunkar Ghosal* (1801), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 45 (2nd ed. 60). As to the duty of the purchaser, see *Shibsoondery Dossee v. Rakhall Doss Sirkar* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 38.

⁴ See *Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar* (1900), 23 Mad. 597; *Vithu*

Dhondi v. Babaji (1908), 32 Bom. 375.

⁵ *Buldeo Ram Tewaree v. Somesur Panray* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 490.

⁶ *Balwant Singh (Raja) v. Clancy* (1912), 39 I. A. 109; 34 All. 296; 16 C. W. N. 577; 14 Bom. L. R. 422.

⁷ *Mahableshvar Krishnappa v. Ramchandra Mangesh* (1913), 38 Bom. 94; 15 Bom. L. R. 882.

⁸ *Ram Sunder Das (Mahanth) v. Barhamdeo Narayan Thakur* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 552; *Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 90; 20 W. R. C. R. 192.

⁹ *Ibid*.

¹⁰ *Nagalutchmee Ummal v. Gopoo Nadaraja Chetty* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 309; *Vallinayagam Pillai v. Pachche* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 326; *Narottam Jagjivan v. Narsandas Harikisandas* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. A. C. 6; *Adjoodhia Gir v. Kashee Gir* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 31; See *ante*, p. 220. As to the power to deal with separate

mother's womb at the time of the death of his father,¹ or is subsequently adopted by his widow,² or was before his death adopted by the widow of a previously deceased coparcener.³

ALIENATION OF AN UNDIVIDED SHARE.

A Hindu governed by the Bengal school of Hindu law can deal with his undivided share of joint family property either by act *inter vivos* or by will, in the same way as he can deal with his separate property.⁴ On his death intestate his undivided share passes to his heir.

Alienation of undivided share Bengal school.

His share may be sold in execution of a decree.

The purchaser has been held entitled to be put into possession of the share bought by him,⁵ but not in such a way as to interfere with the family.

In one case⁶ when he applied for possession, a share was allotted to him in severalty. This had the same effect as if he had brought a partition suit.

According to the Mitakshara law, except where the debtor is the father, or paternal grandfather of a coparcener, whose rights are enlarged by his death, a creditor of a coparcener, who has not obtained a judgment and has not attached the debtor's interest⁷ before the death of his debtor,⁸ has no right to recover his debt from the coparcenary property.⁹

Mitakshara School.

acquisitions, see *ante*, pp. 248, 249. The last surviving member of a Madras *tarwad* can dispose of the *tarwad* property by will, *Alami v. Komu* (1888), 12 Mad. 126.

¹ *Minakshi v. Virappa* (1884), 8 Mad. 89; *Hanmant Ramchandra v. Bhimacharya* (1887), 12 Bom. 105; *Vrandavandas Ramdas v. Yamunabhai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 229.

² *Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Sab-bannal* (1915), 43 I. A. 20; 39 Mad. 107; 20 C. W. N. 234; 17 Bom. L. R. 468, *ante*, p. 184.

³ *Chandra v. Gojarabai* (1890), 14 Bom. 463, at p. 466.

⁴ *Ram Debul Lall v. Mutterjeet Singh* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 420; *Anund Chund Rai v. Kishen Mohun Bunoja* (1905), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 115 (new edition, 152); *Ramkunhaee Rai v. Bung Chund Bunhoojea* (1820), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 17 (new edition, 22); *Kounla Kant Ghosal v. Ram Huree*

Nund Gramee (1827), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 196 (new edition, 247).

⁵ *Rajanikunth Biswas v. Ram Nath Neogy* (1883), 10 Calc. 244.

⁶ *Bijoy Keshub Roy Bahadoor (Koonwar) v. Shama Soonduree Dossee* (1865), 2 W. R. M. A. 30. See *Kesubnath Ghose v. Hurgorind Bose*, Ben. S. D. A., 1853, p. 768; *Rantonoo Chatterjee v. Ishurchunder Neogee*, Ben. S. D. A., 1857, p. 1585.

⁷ This does not include an attachment before judgment: *Ramanayya v. Rangappayya* (1893), 17 Mad. 144.

⁸ *Bithal Das v. Nand Kishore* (1900), 23 All. 106; *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at pp. 108, 109; 5 Calc. 148, at pp. 173, 174; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 241; *Bailur Krishna Rau v. Lakshmana Shanbhogue* (1881), 4 Mad. 302; *Balkishen (Rai) v. Sitaram (Rai)* (1885), 7 All. 731.

⁹ *Bithal Das v. Nand Kishore*

If it were otherwise, the right of survivorship¹ would be ineffectual.

Sale in
execution.

He can obtain a sale of the undivided interest of his debtor in the property of the coparcenary in execution of a decree,² if during the lifetime of the debtor there has been an attachment and order for sale.³

A provisional release from attachment does not affect his right.⁴

The purchaser at such sale is not entitled to sue for possession,⁵ but is entitled to ascertain his share by such partition as the judgment debtor might have compelled before the alienation of his share took place.⁶

If he has obtained possession he is not liable to be turned out, but the coparceners are entitled to joint possession with him.⁷

(1900), 23 All. 106; *Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji* (1875), 11 Bom. H. C. 76; *Narsinbhat v. Chenapa* (1877), 2 Bom. 479; *Balbadhar v. Bisheshar* (1886), 8 All. 495; *Jagannath Prasad v. Sitaram* (1888), 11 All. 302; *Sadabart Prasad Sahu v. Foolbush Koer* (1869), 3 B. L. R. F. B. 31, at p. 35; 12 W. R. F. B. 1, at p. 3.

¹ Ante, pp. 236, 237.

² *Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 247; 3 Calc. 198; *Suraj Bunsai Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88; 5 Calc. 148; 4 C. L. R. 226; *Hurdey Narain Sahu (Baboo) v. Rooder Perkash Misser (Pundit Baboo)* (1883), 11 I. A. 26; 10 Calc. 626; *Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan (Syud) v. Rughoonath Pershad* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 40, at p. 50; *Jumoonu Persad Singh v. Dignarun Singh* (1883), 10 Calc. 1; 13 C. L. R. 74; *Jalidar Singh v. Ram Lal* (1878), 4 Calc. 723; *Narain Dass (Rai) v. Nounit Lal* (1879), 4 Calc. 809; 4 C. L. R. 67; *Collector of Monghyr v. Hurdai Narain Shahai* (1879), 5 Calc. 425; 5 C. L. R. 112; *Vasudev Bhat v. Venkatesh Sanbhav* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 139; *Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji* (1875), 11 Bom. H. C. 76; *Virasvami Gramini v. Ayyasami Gramini* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 471; *Goor Surun Dass v. Ram Surun Bhukul* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 54.

³ *Suraj Bunsai Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at p. 109;

5 Calc. 148, at p. 174; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 241; *Balkishen (Rai) v. Sita Ram (Rai)* (1885), 7 All. 731; *Parikh Girdarlal v. Thakor Fatehsing* (1899), 2 Bom. L. R. 32. In *Bithal Das v. Nand Kishore* (1900), 23 All. 106, the mere attachment seems to have been held sufficient to create a charge, but it is doubtful whether it has such effect, see *Soobhul Chunder Paul v. Nitye Churn Bysack* (1880), 6 Cal. 663.

⁴ *Ram Chandra Marwari v. Mude-shwar Singh* (1906), 33 Calc. 1158; 10 C. W. N. 979.

⁵ *Kallapa v. Venkatesh Vinayak* (1878), 2 Bom. 676; *Palani Konan v. Masa Konan* (1896), 20 Mad. 243.

⁶ *Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 247; 3 Calc. 198; *Hurdey Narain Sahu (Baboo) v. Rooder Perkash Misser* (1883), 11 I. A. 26; 10 Calc. 626; *Jalidar Singh v. Ram Lal* (1878), 4 Calc. 723; *Sumrun Thakur v. Chundermun Misser* (1879), 5 C. L. R. 26; 3 C. L. R. 282; *Pandurang Anandray v. Bhaskar Shadashiv* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 72; *Lall Jha (Baboo) v. Juma Buksh (Shcikh)* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 116; *Maruti Narayan v. Lila Chand* (1882), 6 Bom. 564; post, p. 331.

⁷ *Mahabalaya v. Timaya* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 138; *Babaji Lakshman v. Vasudev Vinayak* (1876), 1 Bom. 95; *Kallapa v. Venkatesh Vinayak* (1878), 2 Bom. 676; *Hari Premji (Patil) v. Hakamchand* (1884), 10 Bom. 363.

The interest of a coparcener can, in case of his absconding, be attached under section 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V. of 1898).¹

The question whether a member of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara school of law can alienate or charge his interest in the coparcenary property, must be determined according to the Province in which the case arises. Alienation.

It is settled law in Madras² and Bombay³ that a purchaser for value⁴ acquires the interest of his vendor, that is a right to partition, and a right on partition to the share to which his vendor would have been entitled,⁵ but without partition he cannot acquire a right to any specific property⁶ or to a specific share. He is not entitled to possession,⁷ his right in that respect being the same as the right of a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree.⁸

The Judicial Committee has recognized this to be the law applicable in Madras and Bombay.⁹

It has been said that the purchaser becomes "a sort of tenant in common with the coparceners, admissible as such to his distributive share upon a purchaser. Position of

¹ *Secretary of State v. Rangasamy Ayyangar* (1916), 39 Mad. 831.

² *Virasvami Gramini v. Ayyasvami Gramini* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 471; *Peddammuthulaty v. N. Tamma Reddy* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 270; *Palanivelappu Kaundan v. Mannaru Naikan* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 416; *Kotta Ramasami Chetti v. Bangari Seshamu Nayanivaru* (1881), 3 Mad. 145, at p. 167; *Aiyiyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyiyagari Ramayya* (1902), 25 Mad. 690.

³ *Tukaram Ambaldas v. Ramchandra* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 247; *Vasudev Bhat v. Venkatesh Sanbhav* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 139; *Fakirapa v. Chanapa* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 162. For a case of an assignment to a coparcener, see *Shivajirao v. Vasantrao* (1908), 33 Bom. 267; 10 Bom. L. R. 778.

⁴ In the case of a sale for inadequate consideration, the purchaser is entitled to a charge for the amount paid. *Bottala Bunganathan Chetty v. Pulicat Ramasami Chetti* (1903), 27 Mad. 162.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 299. As to a share governed by the Aliyasantana law, see *Byari v. Puttanna* (1890), 14 Mad. 38. As to a right of worship, see *post*, pp. 573, 574.

⁶ *Venkatachella Pillay v. Chinnaiya Mudahar* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 166; *Villa Butten v. Yamenamma* (1874), 8 Mad. H. C. 6.

⁷ Act IV. of 1882, s. 44. See *Bhiku v. Putlu* (1906), 8 Bom. L. R. 99; *Girija Kanta Chakrabarty v. Mohm Chandra Acharjya* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 675; *Kota Balabadra Patro v. Khetra Doss* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 275.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 299.

⁹ *Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik* (1880), 7 I. A. 181, at p. 195; 5 Bom. 48, at p. 62; *Balagobind Das v. Narain Lal* (1893), 20 I. A. 116, at p. 125; 15 All. 339, at p. 351; *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at pp. 101, 102; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 166; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 234.

partition taking place";¹ but he has a mere equity to partition,² and is not entitled to mesne profits.³

He has no right to a share in any specific property, although such share may have been transferred to him.⁴

As to his right to partition, see *post*, p. 331.

It has been held in Bombay that the position of the purchaser is not improved by the death of other coparceners before partition. He stands in no better position than his alienor, and, consequently, like the latter, is liable to have his share diminished before partition by the birth of other coparceners, if he stands by and does not insist upon an immediate partition.⁵ It has been held in Madras that he takes on partition such share as the alienor had at the time of the alienation.⁶

An agreement in restraint of the alienation of an undivided share is valid,⁷ but it will not, if it is submitted, bind a purchaser, at any rate where he has received no notice of the agreement.⁸ It does not affect a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree.⁹

In Bengal¹⁰ and in the United Provinces¹¹ a coparcener has no power to alienate by sale or mortgage his undivided share¹² to a stranger or to a coparcener for his own benefit¹³ without the consent of his coparceners. This view has been accepted by the Judicial Committee.¹⁴

¹ *Vasudeo Bhat v. Venkatesh* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 139, at p. 147.

² *Manjaya v. Shanmuga* (1913), 38 Mad. 684.

³ *Maharajah of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu* (1914), 39 Mad. 265.

⁴ *Manjaya v. Shanmuga* (1913), 38 Mad. 684.

⁵ *Gurlingapa v. Nandapa* (1896), 21 Bom. 797.

⁶ *Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimutha Chetti* (1911), 35 Mad. 47, differing from *Rungusami v. Krishnayyan* (1891), 14 Mad. 408.

⁷ *Lachmi Chand v. Tori Lal* (1878), 1 All. 618.

⁸ *Cf. Kanna Pisharodi v. Kombi Achen* (1885), 8 Mad. 381.

⁹ *Cf. Golak Nath Roy Chowdhry v. Mathura Nath Roy Chowdhry* (1891), 20 Cal. 273.

¹⁰ *Jwala Prasad v. Protap Udainath Sahi Deo (Maharajah)* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 497; *C. W. N.* [1917, Pat.] 27; *Sadabart Prasad Sahu v. Foolbush Koer* (1899), 3 B. L. R. F. B. R. 31; 12 W. R. F. B. 1; and cases there cited: *Nathu Lal Chowdhry v. Chadi Sahi* (1869), 4 B. L. R. A. C. 15; 12 W. R. C. R. 447; *Mahabeer Persad v.*

Rumyad Singh (1873), 12 B. L. R. 90; 20 W. R. C. R. 192; *Bunsee Lal v. Aoladh Ahsan (Shaikh)* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 552; *Chunder Coomar v. Hurbuns Sahai* (1888), 16 Cal. 137. As to a lease, see *Ram Debul Lal v. Mitterjeet Singh* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 420.

¹¹ *Kali Shankar v. Nawab Singh* (1909), 31 All. 507; *Jaynarain Singh v. Roshun Singh*, 2 S. D. A. N. W. P. (1860), 162; *Goor Pershad v. Sheodeen* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 137; *Chamauli Kuur v. Ram Prasad* (1879), 2 All. 267; *Rama Nand Singh v. Gobind Singh* (1883), 5 All. 384; *Chandar Kishore v. Dampat Kishore* (1894), 16 All. 369; *Bhagirathi Misr v. Sheobhik* (1898), 20 All. 325. See *Amolak Ram v. Chandan Singh* (1902), 24 All. 483.

¹² He can do so when they are so far separate, that each collects his quota of rent separately, *Kalika Sahoy v. Gouree Sunkur* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 287.

¹³ It has been held that he can alienate it for the benefit of the family, *Juggurnath Khoota v. Doobo Misser* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 80.

¹⁴ *Balgebind Das v. Narain Lal*

The alienation of his share by one member would imply his consent to the alienation of their shares by the other members.¹

The alienation will not be set aside at the instance of the alienor or persons claiming through him except upon the terms of refunding the amount paid with interest.² Equity on setting aside alienation.

Where a coparcener has mortgaged or sold his undivided share of specified coparcenary property (where such mortgage or sale is permissible), and the property has on partition been allotted to another member, the mortgagee or purchaser is entitled to a charge upon other property allotted on the partition to the person dealing with him,³ as the co-sharer to whom it is allotted takes the property free of the incumbrance.⁴ Mortgage of undivided share.

This rule has no application to a transaction entered into with the general body of coparceners.⁵

Before partition, the mortgagee is entitled to a declaration that he has a charge on the interest of the mortgagors.⁶

It has been held in Bengal that, while declaring the mortgage of an undivided share to be void, the Court may direct that the joint property be held in specified shares, and may attach the lien of the mortgage to the share allotted to the mortgagor.⁷ A similar order was made in the case of a sale.⁸ These decisions, it is submitted, practically have the effect of validating a mortgage or sale of a share.⁹

The power to dispose by gift or will of an interest in coparcenary property whether movable or immovable¹⁰ in a case subject to the Mitakshara law is disallowed by all the High Courts.¹¹ Gift or devise.

As a right of survivorship accrues to the other coparceners on the

(1893), 20 I. A. 116, at p. 125; 15 All. 339, at p. 351; *Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh* (1890), 17 I. A. 194; 18 Calc. 157.

¹ *Ganraj Dubey v. Sheozore Singh* (1880), 2 All. 898.

² *Jamuna Parshad v. Ganga Pershad Singh* (1892), 19 Calc. 401.

³ See *Byjnath Lall v. Ramooddeen Chowdhry* (1873), 1 I. A. 106; 21 W. R. C. R. 233; *Hemchunder Ghose v. Thakomoni Debi* (1893), 20 Calc. 533; *Amolak Ram v. Chandan Singh* (1902), 24 All. 483.

⁴ *Nagendra Mohan Roy v. Pyari Mohan Saha* (1915), 43 Calc. 103.

⁵ *Sundar Lal v. Brij Lal* (1913), 35 All. 543.

⁶ *Doddappa v. Somappa* (1906), 8 Bom. L. R. 550.

⁷ *Ram Soonder Das (Mohanth) v.*

Nathuni Singh (1911), 15 C. W. N. 748; *Ram Sunder Das (Mahanth) v. Barhamdeo Narayan Thakur* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 552; *Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 90; 20 W. R. C. R. 192.

⁸ *Bunwari Lal v. Daya Sunder Misser* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 815.

⁹ See ante, p. 302. Cf. *Kali Shankar v. Nawab Singh* (1909), 31 All. 507.

¹⁰ *Parvatibai v. Bhagwant* (1915), 39 Bom. 593; 17 Bom. L. R. 646.

¹¹ *Baba v. Timma* (1883), 7 Mad. 357; *Ponnusami v. Thatha* (1884), 9 Mad. 273; *Ramanna v. Venkata* (1888), 11 Mad. 246; *Rottala Ranganatham Chetty v. Pulicat Ramasami Chetti* (1903), 27 Mad. 162; *Gopal Lal v. Mahadeo Prasad* (1901), 6 C. W. N. 651; *Sitaram Pandit (Shri) v. Harihar Pandit (Shri)* (1910), 35

death of a coparcener,¹ it follows that there can be no right to dispose of any interest in the coparcenary property by will.²

A distinction has been made between a gift to a stranger and a gift to a coparcener,³ but it is submitted that no such distinction is admissible.

As to the power of the last surviving coparcener, see *ante*, pp. 298, 299.

A local custom, whereby a coparcener or his wife could in the absence of male issue give his share to his daughter or daughter's son has been recognized.⁴

SETTING ASIDE ALIENATION.

Who may
contest
alienation.

An alienation of coparcenary property, or of any interest therein, by a father or other manager, or by a coparcener or stranger, may be contested by the son or any coparcener who was born,⁵ conceived,⁶ or adopted⁷ at the time of the completion of the alienation,⁸ or before an effective ratification of the alienation by the whole of the family,⁹ and is entitled to a share on partition.

Bom. 109; *Gangubai v. Ramanna* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. (A. C. J.) 66; *Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji* (1875), 11 Bom. H. C. 76; *Vrandavandas Ramdas v. Yamunabai* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 229; *Kalu v. Barsu* (1894), 19 Bom. 803. See *Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik* (1880), 7 I. A. 181, at p. 195; 5 Bom. 48, at p. 62; 7 C. L. R. 320, at p. 329. As to the power of a father to make a gift of coparcenary property, see *ante*, pp. 284, 285.

¹ *Ante*, pp. 236, 237.

² *Tottempudi Venkataratnam v. Tottempudi Seshamma* (1903), 27 Mad. 228; *Rathnam v. Sivasubramania* (1892), 16 Mad. 353; *Villa Butten v. Yamenamma* (1874), 8 Mad. H. C. 6; *Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik* (1880), 7 I. A. 181; 5 Bom. 48; 7 C. L. R. 320; *Harilal Bapuji v. Mani (Bai)* (1905), 29 Bom. 351; 7 Bom. L. R. 255; *Chatturbhooj Meghji v. Dharamsi Narani* (1884), 9 Bom. 438; *Lakshmi Shankar v. Vajinath* (1881), 6 Bom. 24; *Adjoodhna Gir v. Kashee Gir* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 31; *Buldeo Singh (Rajah) v. Mahabeer Singh* (1866), 1 Agra H. C. 155; *Minakshi v. Virappa* (1884), 8 Mad. 89; Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 3.

³ *Jotaram v. Ramkrishna* (1902), 27 Bom. 31, at pp. 40, 41; 4 Bom. L. R. 754.

⁴ *Nandi Singh v. Sita Ram* (1888), 16 I. A. 44; 16 Calc. 677.

⁵ *Girdharee Lal v. Kantoo Lal* (1874), 1 I. A. 321; 14 B. L. R. 187; 22 W. R. C. R. 56; *Bholanath Khetry v. Kartick Kissen Das Khetry* (1907), 34 Calc. 372; 11 C. W. N. 462; *Chuttan Lal v. Kallu* (1910), 33 All. 283; *Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Persad* (1867), B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 731, at p. 741; 8 W. R. C. R. 15, at p. 21; *Aghori Ramasary Sing v. Cochrane* (1870), 5 B. L. R. App. 14.

⁶ *Madho Singh v. Hurmut Ally* (1868), 3 Agra, 432; *Jado Singh v. Rane (Mussumat)* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 113. See, however, *Goura Chowdhraim (Mussumat) v. Chummun Chowdhry*, W. R. (1864), C. R. 340. Cf. *Yekeyamian v. Agniawarian* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 307.

⁷ See *Sudanund Mohapattur v. Soorjo Monee Dayee* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 436; *Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay* (1881), 5 Bom. 630; as to an adopted son setting aside an alienation by the widow adopting him, see *ante*, pp. 199, 200.

⁸ See *Ponnambula Pillai v. Sundarapayyar* (1897), 20 Mad. 354; *Narain Das v. Har Dayal* (1913), 35 All. 571.

⁹ *Hazari Mall Babu v. Abaninath Adhurjya* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 280; *Hurodoot Narain Singh v. Beer Narain Singh* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 480.

A coparcener who was born after an invalid alienation is also entitled to have it set aside,¹ so far as it was invalid at the time of the alienation,² and affected an interest which was vested in him by birth.

A person disqualified from inheritance cannot sue, although he may have a right of maintenance.³

It has been held that an invalid alienation made without the consent of existing sons can be set aside at the instance of a son who was not born at the time of the alienation, but it is clear that an alienation which by consent or otherwise was binding upon all the coparceners in existence at the time cannot be contested by a person who is born subsequently.⁴

In a family governed by the Mitakshara law a suit to set aside an alienation cannot on the death of the plaintiff be continued by his heir, as his right lapses.⁵ Under the Bengal school the right would pass to the heir.

Death of person entitled to contest alienation.

The person entitled to contest an alienation may sue to set aside the alienation, or if it has not taken place may sue for an injunction.⁶ Where he cannot obtain substantive relief he can sue for a declaratory decree.⁷

In a case governed by the Bengal school of law a coparcener can sue to set aside an alienation, so far only as it affects his share of the coparcenary property.

How alienation is to be set aside.

Under the Mitakshara school, in the case of an invalid alienation in the Bombay or Madras Presidencies by a coparcener, the coparcener aggrieved may be entitled to have it set aside except so far as the share of the alienor is concerned,⁸ but where the alienation is valid in part only it may be equitable to distribute the valid portion of the consideration over the whole property.⁹ In Bengal or the United Provinces he is

¹ *Hurodoot Narain Singh v. Beer Narain Singh* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 480; *Tulshi Ram v. Babu* (1911), 33 All. 654; *Jwala Prasad v. Protap Udaynath Sahi Deo (Maharajah)* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 497; C. W. N. [1917 Pat.] 27.

² See *Naro v. Paragowda* (1916), 41 Bom. 347; 19 Bom. L. R. 69.

³ *Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut* (1882), 8 Cal. 919; *Ram Sahye Bhuklut v. Laljee Sahye (Lalla)*, 8 Cal. 149; 9 C. L. R. 487. See *Naro v. Paragowda* (1916), 19 Bom. L. R. 69.

⁴ See *Bholanath Khettry v. Kartick Kissen Das Khettry* (1907), 34 Cal. 372; 11 C. W. N. 462; *Muthuraman Chetti v. Ettappasami* (1899), 22 Mad. 372, at p. 375; *Ramasamayyan v.*

Virasami Ayyan (1898), 21 Mad. 222.

⁵ *Padarath Singh v. Raja Ram* (1882), 4 All. 235.

⁶ *Knath Narain Singh v. Prem Lal Paurey* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 102; *Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Persad* (1867), B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 731; 8 W. R. C. R. 15; *Reloo Raj Pandey v. Laljee Pandey* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 399.

⁷ As to declaratory decrees, see Act I. of 1877, s. 42; *Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tever* (1875), 2 L. A. 169; 15 B. L. R. 83; 23 W. R. C. R. 314.

⁸ See *Marappa Gaundan v. Rangasami Gaundan* (1899), 23 Mad. 89; *Naro v. Paragowda* (1916), 19 Bom. L. R. 69.

⁹ *Vadivelam Pillai v. Natesam Pillai* (1912), 37 Mad. 435.

entitled to have the whole alienation set aside, subject to such equities as may be applicable.¹

This distinction arises because a sale of an undivided interest is permissible in the two former Presidencies.²

It has been held that a son is not entitled, during the father's lifetime, to eject the purchaser because the father sells without authority.³ He may bring a suit for partition, or may be entitled to a decree for possession⁴ on such terms as may be equitable, as, for instance, that the purchaser be entitled to a charge for the money paid by him,⁵ or be entitled to sue for partition.⁶

In a case where the father had made over a share to a stranger, the Judicial Committee held that it was not necessary for the sons to sue for partition.⁷

Consent of
coparcener.

The consent of an adult coparcener or his acquiescence, at any rate where it amounts to an estoppel, prevents him from disputing an alienation made by a father or other manager.⁸ The ratification of the alienation by him will also, it is submitted, have the same effect.⁹

Limitation
of suit.

A suit brought by a Hindu governed by the law of the Mitakshara to set aside his father's alienation¹⁰ of ancestral property must be brought within twelve years from the time when the alienee takes possession of the property.¹¹

Compensation.

When the coparcener seeking to set aside the alienation, or the family has benefited by the alienation, it may be equitable

¹ *Haunman Dutt Roy v. Kishen Kishor Narayan Sing (Baboo)*, 8 B. L. R. 358; 15 W. R. F. B. 6. See *post*, pp 306, 307.

² *Ante*, p. 301.

³ *Baboo Ram v. Gajadhar Singh* (1867), Agra H. C. F. B. R. 86; *Pursun Sahoo v. Ramdeen Lall*, S. D. A. R. N. W. P., 1852, p. 365; *Chutter Dharee Lal v. Bikaoo Lal*, Ben. S. D. A., 1850, p. 282.

⁴ *Haunman Dutt Roy v. Kishen Kishor Narayan Sing (Baboo)* (1870), 8 B. L. R. 358; 15 W. R. F. B. 6.

⁵ *Post*, p. 307.

⁶ *Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Nurain Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 247; 3 Calc. 198; 1 C. L. R. 49; *Hurdey Narain Sahu (Baboo) v. Rooder Perkash Misser (Pundit Baboo)* (1883), 11 I. A. 26; 10 Calc. 626.

⁷ *Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramchappal* (1913), 40 I. A. 213; 40 Calc. 966; 17 C. W. N. 1189; 15 Bom. L. R. 887.

⁸ See *Miller v. Bunga Nath Moulick* (1885), 12 Calc. 389; Act I, of 1872,

s. 115. The mere absence of objection does not amount to acquiescence, see *Kamakshi Ammal v. Chakrapany Chettiar* (1907), 30 Mad. 452. See *ante*, p. 283.

⁹ See *Modhoo Dyal Singh v. Kolbur Singh* (1868), B. L. R. F. B. R. 1018, at p. 1020; 9 W. R. C. R. 511, at p. 512; *Gangabai v. Vamanaji A. Datar* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. (2nd ed.) 301. As to ratification of the manager or guardian's acts after the ward has attained majority, see *Chetty Colum Comara Vencatachella Reddyer v. Rungasamy Streemunth Jyengar Bahadoor (Rajah)* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 319; *Prosonno Kumar Bural v. Sajudoor Rahman (Chowdree)*, Ben. S. D. A., 1853, p. 525; *Ramaswami Aryan v. Venkataramayyan* (1879), 6 I. A. 196; 2 Mad. 91. See *ante*, p. 283.

¹⁰ This does not include a sale in execution of a decree: *Issuri Dutt Singh v. Ibrahim* (1881), 8 Calc. 653.

¹¹ Act IX. of 1908 (Limitation), Sched. I, art. 126, *Maheswar Dutt*

to compensate the purchaser or mortgagee,¹ but there is no equity entitling him to a refund of purchase-money in respect of a share, which is not bound by the purchase.²

The alienee may be required to pay mesne profits from the date of the repudiation.³

As to a sale or mortgage by the father, see *post*, p. 315.

As to a sale of an undivided share, see *ante*, pp. 301-303.

Where the purchaser has, to the knowledge of those interested in setting aside the sale, and without their protest,⁴ or without their knowledge, if he believed in good faith that he had an absolute title,⁵ laid out sums for the improvement or benefit of the property, they may be required to compensate him. Improvements.

The amount of compensation depends upon whether the improvement has enhanced the market value of the property.⁶

The burden is upon the alienee to show that the money has been applied to family purposes; or that the person seeking to set aside the alienation has benefited thereby.⁷

There is authority that when the alienation is invalid on account of the absence of necessity the manager is liable in damages to the purchaser.⁸

v. *Kishun Singh* (1907), 34 Cal. 184; 11 C. W. N. 294; *Sheo Narain Ray v. Mokshoda Das Mittra* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 1022. As to the case where he was a minor at the time of the sale, see *Mahabeshwar v. Ramchandra* (1913), 38 Bom. 94; 15 Bom. L. R. 582. See *Bunwari Lal v. Daya Sunker Misser* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 815; *Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchman Persad* (1867), B. L. R. F. B. R. 731; 8 W. R. C. R. 15; *Munbasi Koer v. Nowrutton Koer* (1881), 8 C. L. R. 428; *Beer Pershad v. Doorga Pershad*, W. R. 1864, p. 215; *Seetul Pershad Singh (Baboo) v. Gour Dyal Singh (Baboo)* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 283 (an alienation by a grandfather); *Beer Kishore Sukhye Singh (Baboo) v. Hur Bullub Narain Singh (Baboo)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 502; *Aghori Ramasarg Sing v. Cochran* (1870), 5 B. L. R. App. 14; *Balwantrao v. Ramkrishna* (1901), 3 Bom. L. R. 682.

¹ See *Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh* (1890), 17 I. A. 194, at pp. 198, 199; 18 Cal. 157, at pp. 163, 164; *Hanuman Dutt Roy v. Kishen Kishor Narayan Sing (Baboo)* (1870), 8 B. L. R. 358; 15 W. R. F. B. 6; *Surruh Narain Chowdhry v. Shew*

Gobind Pandey (1873), 11 B. L. R. App. 29; *Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 90; 20 W. R. C. R. 192. See, however, *Marappa Gaundan v. Rangasami Gaundan* (1899), 23 Mad. 89.

² *Virabhadra Gowdu v. Gurusventkata Charlu* (1898), 22 Mad. 312. See *Svaganga Zamindar v. Lakshmana* (1885), 9 Mad. 188, at pp. 200, 201.

³ *Bhirgu Nath Chaube v. Narsingh Tiwari* (1916), 39 All. 61.

⁴ *Dattaji Sakharam Rajadhiksh v. Kalba Yese Parabhu* (1896), 21 Bom. 749.

⁵ Act IV. of 1882 (Transfer of Property), s. 51; see *Abhoy Churn Ghose v. Attarmani Dassee* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 931.

⁶ *Kidar Nath v. Mathu Mal* (1913), 40 Cal. 555; 17 C. W. N. 797; 15 Bom. L. R. 467.

⁷ *Modhoo Dyal Singh v. Kolbur Singh* (1868), B. L. R. F. B. R. 1018; 9 W. R. C. R. 511, differing from *Muddun Gopal Thakoor v. Ram Buksh Pandey* (1863), 6 W. R. C. R. 71; *Hanuman Dutt Roy v. Kishen Kishor Narayan Sing (Baboo)* (1870), 8 B. L. R. 358; 15 W. R. F. B. R. 6.

⁸ *Adikesavan Naidu v. Gurumathu Chetti* (1916), 40 Mad. 338,

CHAPTER VIII.

THE DEBTS OF A FATHER UNDER THE MITAKSHARA LAW.

Duty of son
to pay debts
of father.

THE Hindu law imposes upon a son, and grandson, the duty of paying the debts of his father, and paternal grandfather,¹ from whom he has not separated,² provided that they have not been incurred for immoral or illegal purposes,³ or are barred by the law of limitation.⁴

As according to Hindu ideas a man and his three male paternal ancestors are the same person in different bodies, there would be a similar liability to pay the debts of a great-grandfather,⁵ but by a special rule of limitation the liability does not extend beyond the grandson.⁶

There is no such duty under the Malabar law.⁷

“By the Hindu law, the freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the father's debt has respect to the nature of the debt, and not to the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by the creator of the debt.”⁸ Although under the Mitakshara system of law, the father takes no greater interest than his son in coparcenary property he can pay his personal debts out of the income of such property,⁹ and can bind his sons and grandsons,¹⁰ whether they be minors or adults,¹¹ by a

¹ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. i. pp. 267, 334; "Narada Smṛiti," chap. iii. paras. 4, 6.

² *Fakir Chand v. Daya Ram* (1902), 25 All. 67.

³ Colebrooke's "Digest," pp. 300, 305, 309, 311.

⁴ *Subramania Aiyar v. Gopala Aiyar* (1909), 33 Mad. 308; *Naro v. Paragowda* (1916), 41 Bom. 347; 19 Bom. L. R. 69.

⁵ See note to Edition of "Narada Smṛiti" in Sacred Books of the East, vol. xxxiii. pp. 43, 44.

⁶ See Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 417, 418.

⁷ *Kunhu Kutti Ammah v. Mallapratu* (1913), 38 Mad. 527.

⁸ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree* (*Mussumat Babo-*

oce) (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at p. 421; 10 W. R. C. R., note to p. 81; *Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lal* (1874), 1 I. A. 321, at p. 331; 14 B. L. R. 187, at p. 197; 22 W. R. C. R. 56, at p. 58.

⁹ This follows from his power to charge and sell.

¹⁰ It does not bind any one else, as, for instance, a nephew; *Gangulu v. Ancha Bapula* (1881), 4 Mad. 73; *Ram Ratan v. Lachman Das* (1908), 30 All. 460.

¹¹ *Phul Chand v. Man Singh* (1882), 4 All. 309; *Baso Kooer v. Hurry Doss* (1882), 9 Calc. 495, at p. 501; 12 C. L. R. 292, at p. 297; *Bhagat Mal Sahu v. Abdul Karim (Sk)* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 297; 1 Pat. L. J. 86; *Nathuni Sahu v. Baijnath Prasad* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 212.

charge or alienation of the coparcenary estate, or of any portion thereof, for the purpose of paying such of his debts,¹ which he has incurred before the date of such charge or alienation,² provided that such debts have not been incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose or consideration.³

This applies to the alienation of a *babuana* grant.⁴ Sons are bound whether they consent or not.⁵

As to the custom of agriculturists in the Panjab, see *Kirpal Singh v. Balwant Singh* (1912), 40 Calc. 288; 17 C. W. N. 302; 15 Bom. L. R. 1912.

“When the father alienates the property he exercises the power of alienation which the sons would have exercised in discharge of their pious duty which they owed to him; he is

¹ This does not apparently include a claim to damages, see *Pareman Das v. Bhattu Mahton* (1897), 24 Calc. 672.

² *Venkaturamanya Pantulu v. Venkataramana Doss Pantulu* (1905), 29 Mad. 200; *Chandradeo Singh v. Mata Prasad* (1909), 31 All. 176; *Kali Shankar v. Nawab Singh* (1909), *ibid.* 507; *Sutaram Pandit (Shri) v. Harihar Pandit (Shri)* (1910), 35 Bom. 169; 12 Bom. L. R. 910; *Khakhlul Rahman v. Gobind Pershad* (1892), 20 Calc. 328; *Kishun Pershad Chowdhry v. Tipan Pershad Singh* (1907), 34 Calc. 735; 11 C. W. N. 613; *Surja Prasad v. Golab Chand* (1900), 27 Calc. 762; *Laljee Sahoy v. Fakeer Chand* (1880), 6 Calc. 135; 7 C. L. R. 97; *Luchmun Dass v. Girdhur Chowdhry* (1880), 5 Calc. 855; 6 C. L. R. 470. This will include a prior debt due by the father to the person to whom he mortgaged or conveyed family property: *Badri Prasad v. Madan Lal* (1893), 15 All. 75, at p. 80. It includes money due on account of property purchased: *Kapildeo v. Thakur Prasad* (1913), 36 All. 17. It does not include a liability as surety, *Hira Lal Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldar* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 9.

³ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree* (*Mussamut Babooee*) (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at p. 421; 18 W. R. C. R. 81, note; *Ramphul Singh v. Degnarain Singh* (1881), 8 Calc. 617; 10 C. L. R. 489; *Trimbak Balkrishna v. Narayan Damodar Dabholkar* (1884), 8 Bom. 481;

Muddun Gopal Lall v. Gowrunbutty (*Mussamut*) (1875), 15 B. L. R. 264; 23 W. R. C. R. 365; *Adurmoni Deyi v. Sib Narain Ku* (*Chowdhry*) (1877), 3 Calc. 1; *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayyengar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1; S. C. 9 Mad. 343; *Gangulu v. Ancha Bapulu* (1881), 4 Mad. 73; *Lakshman Ram Chandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 498; *Kastur Bhavani v. Appa* (1876), 5 Bom. 621; *Sadashiv Dinkar Joshi v. Dinkur Narayan Joshi* (1882), 6 Bom. 520; *Mahomad Ally v. Jehangir* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 59; *Ramchandra v. Fakirappa* (1900), *ibid.* 450; *Darsu Pandey v. Bikarmajit Lal* (1880), 3 All. 125; *Hasmat Rai (Koer) v. Sunder Das* (1885), 11 Calc. 396; *Gunga Pershad v. Sheodyal Singh* (1879), 5 C. L. R. 224, differing from *Bheknarain Singh v. Januk Singh* (1877), 2 Calc. 438; *Yenamandra Sitaramasami v. Midatana Sanyasi* (1883), 6 Mad. 400; *Pran Krishna Tewary v. Jadu Nath Trivedy* (1898), 2 C. W. N. 603; *Hardai Narain v. Haruck Dhari Singh* (1882), 12 C. L. R. 104; *Narayan Charya v. Narso Krishna* (1876), 1 Bom. 262; *Wajed Hossein (Shah) v. Nanku Singh (Baboo)*, 25 W. R. C. R. 311.

⁴ *Durgadut Singh v. Rameshwar Singh Bahadur* (*Maharajah Sir*) (1909), 36 I. A. 176; 36 Calc. 943; 13 C. W. N. 1013; 11 Bom. L. R. 901.

⁵ *Phul Chand v. Man Singh* (1882), 4 All. 309.

virtually alienating the property for them and on their behalf in discharge of their duty in accordance with the power given to him by Hindu law." So the father cannot alienate so as to bind the interest of a son, whose interest in the property has been attached in execution of a decree.¹

A creditor or alienee, claiming under such charge or alienation, would have to prove that the antecedent debt existed, or that after due inquiries he, in good faith, believed that it existed.²

As to a suit for specific performance of an agreement by a father to sell family property, see *Srinivasa Reddi v. Sivarama Reddi* (1908), 32 Mad. 320; *Nagiah v. Venkatarama Sastrulu* (1912), 37 Mad. 387, differing from *Kosuri Ramaraju v. Ivalury Ramalingam* (1903), 26 Mad. 74.

The creditor or alienee need not prove necessity, or inquiries as to necessity,³ but if he does so his case will be stronger.

A purchaser in execution of a decree need not prove any inquiry.⁴

The burden is then shifted upon the son to prove that the particular debt was contracted for an illegal or immoral purpose, and that the purchaser had notice, or upon reasonable inquiry might have discovered, that it was so contracted.⁵ He can put forward such defence even where the money had been borrowed from a third party to pay off such debt.⁶

¹ *Subraya v. Nagappa* (1908), 33 Bom. 264; 10 Bom. L. R. 1206.

² *Subramanya v. Sadasiva* (1884), 8 Mad. 75. See *Gurusami Sastrial v. Ganapathia Pillai* (1882), 5 Mad. 337; *Yenamandra Sitaramasami v. Midatana Sanyasi* (1883), 6 Mad. 400; *Chinnaya v. Perumal* (1889), 13 Mad. 51; *Jamsetji N. Tata v. Kashinath* (1901), 26 Bom. 326, at p. 336; 3 Bom. L. R. 898; *Bhowna (Mussumat) v. Roop Kishore* (1873), 5 N. W. P. H. C. 89; *Muhuraj Singh v. Baluani Singh* (1906), 28 All. 508, at p. 541. Act IV. of 1882, s. 38, ante, p. 292.

³ *Babu Singh v. Bihari Lal* (1908), 30 All. 156; see *Debi Dat v. Jadu Rai* (1902), 24 All. 459; *Mahuraj Singh v. Baluani Singh* (1906), 28 All. 508; affirmed on appeal, *Baluani Singh (Raja) v. Clancey* (1912), 39 I. A. 109; 34 All. 296; 16 C. W. N. 577; 14 Bom. L. R. 122.

⁴ *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussumat)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15

Calc. 717.

⁵ *Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall* (1874), 1 I. A. 321; 14 B. L. R. 187; 22 W. R. C. R. 56; *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at p. 106; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 171; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 238; *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami* (1892), 16 Mad. 99; *Bhowna (Mussumat) v. Roop Kishore* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 89; *Joharmal v. Eknath* (1899), 24 Bom. 343; 1 Bom. L. R. 839; *Matadin v. Gayadin* (1909), 31 All. 599; *Yenamandra Sitaramasami v. Midatana Sanyasi* (1883), 6 Mad. 400. See *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussumat)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15 Calc. 717; *Kooldeep Koer (Mussumat) v. Runjeet Singh* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 231; *Ram Sahoy Singh v. Mohabeer Pershad* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 185.

⁶ *Maharaj Singh v. Balwant Singh* (1906), 28 All. 508; affirmed on appeal, *Balwant Singh (Raja) v. Clancey* (1912), 39 I. A. 109; 34 All. 292; 16 C. W. N. 577; 14 Bom. L. R. 122.

The exception as to sums for which the father is liable as surety applies apparently to cases of security for appearance, for keeping the peace, or for good behaviour.¹ Where the father was surety for a debt, the liability of his son has been declared in several cases,² but it has been held that the liability only occurs when the father received some consideration for being surety.³

Crime or
fraud.

If the debt was on account of a criminal offence or fraud, or was one which the father as a decent and respectable man ought not to have incurred, or, to use another translation of the expression, "*Aryaharika*," a debt incurred for a cause repugnant to good morals,⁴ was the origin of the debt, the sons would not be obliged to recognize it; for instance, a decree for the value of property obtained by theft, a decree for money, or for the value of property misappropriated.⁵ This would not apply to a case of money being merely wrongfully retained,⁶ or not accounted for,⁷ or to a decree for mesne profits obtained against the father by a person whom the father wrongfully kept out of possession of immovable property,⁸ or to a decree for damages for interference with a watercourse,⁹ or to costs of litigation payable by him,¹⁰ and unconnected with a criminal offence.¹¹ The fact that the father, as a Government servant, was forbidden to engage in trade does not make debts incurred in trade illegal.¹²

247, 300, 303, 307, 311; "Narada Smṛiti," chap. iii. para. 11.

¹ Colbrook, "Digest," vol. i. pp. 246, 247.

² *Chettikulam Venkatchala Reddiar v. Chettikulam Kumara Venkatchala Reddiar* (1905), 28 Mad. 377; *Benares (Maharajah of) v. Ramkumar Misir* (1904), 26 All. 611; *Tukarambhai v. Gangaram Mulchand Gujar* (1898), 23 Bom. 454; *Sitaramayya v. Venkatramanna* (1888), 11 Mad. 373; *Rasik Lal Mandal v. Singheswar Rai* (1912), 39 Calc. 843; 16 C. W. N. 1103; *Kameswarama v. Venkata Subba Row* (1914), 38 Mad. 1120. See *Hira Lal Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldar* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 9.

³ *Narayan v. Venkatacharya Balakrishnacharyu* (1904), 28 Bom. 408; 6 Bom. L. R. 434. It is submitted that in this matter there is no difference between the case of a son and that of a grandson.

⁴ *Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanadham Chetty* (1912), 37 Mad. 458. The expression is discussed in *Ramkrishna v. Narayan* (1915), 40 Bom. 126; 17 Bom. L. R. 955.

⁵ *Pareman Das v. Bhattu Mahton* (1897), 24 Calc. 672.

⁶ *Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh* (1884), 6 All. 234. See *Chandra Sen*

v. Ganga Ram (1880), 2 All. 899; *Mr. Dowell and Co. v. Ragaya Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 71; *Jankumar v. Gauri Nath* (1906), 28 All. 718, at p. 720, where it was held that a promissory note given to satisfy a claim for money misappropriated did not create an illegal or immoral debt.

⁷ *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami* (1892), 16 Mad. 99; *Kanamar Venkappayya v. Krishna Churiya* (1907), 31 Mad. 161.

⁸ *Gurunatham Chetty v. Raghavelu Chetty* (1908), 31 Mad. 472.

⁹ *Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad* (1911), 39 Calc. 862; 16 C. W. N. 519; *contrà Durbur Khachar v. Khachar Hursur* (1908), 32 Bom. 348; 10 Bom. L. R. 297, which was dissented from in *Venugopala Naidu v. Ramunadhan Chetty* (1912), 37 Mad. 458.

¹⁰ *Peary Lal Sinha v. Chandicharan Sinha* (1906), 11 C. W. N. 163.

¹¹ *Paryag Sahu v. Kasi Sahu* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 659. Money borrowed to defend a suit for defamation has been held to be a binding debt, *Sumer Singh v. Liladhar* (1911), 33 All. 472.

¹² *Ramkrishna v. Narayan* (1915), 40 Bom. 126; 17 Bom. L. R. 955.

Fines need not be paid out of the family property "Neither sins nor the expiation of them are hereditary."¹

The son's and grandson's liability extends also to the payment of interest,² the amount of interest being determinable by the law of the place. Where the rule of *damdapat*³ is not in force, that rule cannot be put in force.⁴

This power which is given to the father cannot be exercised by any other member of the family even in the father's absence.⁵ Power limited to father.

It has been held that when the father is insolvent, the official assignee has the same power as the father.⁶

Except for the purpose of discharging such antecedent debt, or in case of a valid necessity,⁷ a father has no power to alienate or charge the coparcenary property,⁸ and a sale or mortgage, which has no such justification, can be set aside.⁹

Where a mortgage is given in respect of a debt not antecedent to the transaction,¹⁰ and not incurred for necessary purposes,¹¹ the Bengal High Court has treated it as a secured debt against the father's interest,¹² but according to the Allahabad High Mortgage for other debt.

¹ A Bengal case referred to in *Nhane v. Hureeram Dhoolubh* (1814), 1 Borr. 84, at p. 90.

² See *post*, p. 322.

³ The rule of Hindu law forbidding the recovering of interest at any one time in excess of the amount of principal. *Ante*, p. 8.

⁴ *Pran Krishna Tewary v. Jadu Nath Trivedy* (1898), 2 C. W. N. 603.

⁵ *Hari Premji (Patel) v. Hakamchand* (1884), 10 Bom. 363.

⁶ *Fakirchand Motichand v. Motichand Hurruckchand* (1883), 7 Bom. 438; *Rangayya Chetti v. Thanikachalla Mudali* (1895), 19 Mad. 74. In the former case it was further held that the official assignee can deal with the estate after the death of the father. It is submitted that this is not good law.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 285, 286.

⁸ *Narain Prasad v. Sarnam Singh* (1917), 44 I. A. 163; *Chinnaya v. Perumal* (1889), 13 Mad. 51.

⁹ See *Ram Dayal v. Ajudhia Prasad* (1906), 28 All. 328; *Beer Kishore Suhye Singh (Baboo) v. Hur Bullub Narain Singh (Baboo)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 502; *Chandra Deo Singh v. Mata Prasad* (1909), 31 All. 176.

¹⁰ See *Luchmun Dass v. Giridhar Chowdhry* (1880), 5 Calc. 855; 6 C. L.

R. 473; *Laljee Sahoy v. Fakcer Chand* (1880), 6 Calc. 135, at p. 138; 7 C. L. R. 97, at p. 100; *Gunga Prasad v. Ajudhia Pershad* (1881), 8 Calc. 131; 9 C. L. R. 417; *Khalilul Rahman v. Gobind Pershad* (1892), 20 Calc. 328; *Debi Dat v. Jadu Rai* (1902), 24 All. 459, differing from *Jamna v. Nain Sukh* (1887), 9 All. 493; *Sami Ayyangar v. Ponnammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 28; *Hanuman Kamat v. Dowlat Mundar* (1884), 10 Calc. 528; *Kishun Pershad Chowdhry v. Tipan Pershad Singh* (1907), 34 Calc. 735; 11 C. W. N. 613, dissenting from *Maheswar Dutt Tewari v. Kishun Singh* (1907), 34 Calc. 184; 11 C. W. N. 294, in which latter case it was held, it is submitted erroneously, that the sons were bound by a mortgage not in respect of a debt, which was antecedent to the transaction. The decisions relied upon in the latter case were in cases relating to sales in execution of decrees, and therefore stand upon a different footing. As to impartible estates, see *Veera Soorappa Nayani v. Errappa Naidu* (1906), 29 Mad. 484.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 285, 286.

¹² *Kishun Pershad Chowdhry v. Tipan Pershad Singh* (1907), 34 Calc. 735; 11 C. W. N. 613; *Khalilul*

Court it cannot be so treated.¹ The view of the latter Court has been accepted by the Judicial Committee.²

As a mortgage of an undivided share is permissible in Bombay and Madras,³ in those Presidencies the debt might, it is submitted, be treated as a secured debt against the father's interest.

While the father is alive the interest of the sons in the coparcenary property is not liable on account of an alienation by the father which was incurred neither for necessity nor in respect of an antecedent debt. They may be liable for his debts after his death,⁴ but in that case the limitation applicable to an unsecured debt would apply.⁵

So (except so far as questions of limitation are concerned, and except in cases where the property had been dealt with before suit) there was, according to recent decisions, generally no substantial difference between the remedy on a mortgage which is based on an antecedent debt and a mortgage given in consideration of a payment at the time,⁶ but the law on this subject has now been clearly settled by the Judicial Committee in *Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh* (1917), 44 I. A. 126; 21 C. W. N. 698; 19 Bom. L. R. 498.

Rahman v. Gobind Pershad (1892), 20 Calc. 328, at p. 327; *Biswanath Pershad Mahta v. Jagdip Narain Singh* (1912), 40 Calc. 342, at p. 353; 17 C. W. N. 1025 note. The proper form of decree is a mortgage decree against the share of the father, and if that share be insufficient to pay the debt, interest, and costs, then for the balance by sale of the son's interest in the coparcenary property so far as necessary: *Krishna Prasad (Babu) v. Rampershad Singh (Babu)* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 508.

¹ *Chandra Deo Singh v. Mata Prasad* (1909), 31 All. 176; *Kali Shunkar v. Nawab Singh* (1909), 31 All. 507; *Muhammad Muzamil-ullah Khan v. Mithu Lal* (1911), 33 All. 783.

² *Narain Prasad v. Sarnam Singh* (1917), 44 I. A. 163; *Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh* (1917), 44 I. A. 126; 21 C. W. N. 698; 19 Bom. L. R. 498.

³ *Ante*, p. 301.

⁴ See *Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh* (1917), 44 I. A. 126; 21 C. W. N. 698; 19 Bom. L. R. 498; *Jogi Das v. Ganga Ram* (P. C.) (1917), 21 C. W. N. 957. For older cases see *Dattatraya v. Vishnu* (1911), 36 Bom. 68; 13 Bom. L. R. 1161; *Chintamanrav v. Kashinath* (1899), 41 Bom.

320, and cases below, note 5.

⁵ *Brijnandan Singh v. Bidya Prasad Singh* (1915), 42 Calc. 1068; *S. C. Bidya Prasad v. Bhupnaram Singh*, 19 C. W. N. 849, overruling *Maheshwar Dutt Tewari v. Kishen Singh* (1907), 34 Calc. 184; 11 C. W. N. 294; *Biswanath Prasad Mahta v. Jagdip Narain Singh* (1912), 40 Calc. 342; 17 C. W. N. 1025; and *Sheo Narain Ray v. Mokshoda Das Mittra* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 122; *Surja Prasad v. Golab Chand* (1900), 27 Calc. 762, differed from in *Maheshwar Dutt Tewari v. Kishun Singh* (1907), 34 Calc. 184; 11 C. W. N. 294, see *ante*, p. 313, note 10; *Hira Lal Marwari v. Chandrabali Haldar* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 9. See *Ran Singh v. Sobha Ram* (1907), 29 All. 544. As to limitation, see *ante*, p. 306, and *post*, p. 322.

⁶ See *Chidambara Mudaliar v. Koothaperumal* (1903), 27 Mad. 326, at p. 328. In this case it was said, "on principle it is difficult to make any distinction between a mortgage given for an antecedent debt and a mortgage given for a debt then incurred, for in either case the debt is binding upon the son and the enforcement of the security exonerates the son from the burden of the

The limitation for a suit on a mortgage by the father is twelve years from the time when the money becomes due.¹

It is now settled law that where the debt was not antecedent to the mortgage, the creditor had no rights against the coparcenary property except in case of necessity.²

Where there is a sale by the father, not on account of an antecedent debt, it has been held that the sons cannot, unless the money was obtained for illegal or immoral purposes, set it aside without refunding the amount of the purchase-money, as the purchase-money would be a debt which they would be liable to pay,³ but it is submitted that there is no such liability.⁴

The question as to whether the mortgage or transfer passed the whole property, or only the father's interest therein, depends upon what the parties contracted about.⁵

Question whether alienation passed property.

This may be determined not only by the terms of the document, but also by the surrounding circumstances. The burden is upon the person claiming under the mortgage or sale.⁶

As to whether sons can be bound by a decree enforcing a mortgage on coparcenary property made by their father, and passed in a suit to which they are not parties, see *ante*, pp. 280-282.

Whether sons bound if not parties to suit.

Where the sons are not parties to the suit, they are entitled to have an opportunity, either in a fresh suit or in proceedings for execution of the decree,⁷ of raising such questions and of asserting such rights as they could have raised and asserted if they had been made parties.

Rights of sons when not parties.

They can dispute the *factum* of the debt, or they can show that the debt was incurred for illegal or immoral purposes,⁸ or that it does not bind them otherwise.

father's debt." See *Gunga Pershad v. Sheolal Singh* (1881), 9 C. L. R. 417; judgment of Banerji, J., in *Chandra-deo Singh v. Mata Prasad* (1909), 31 All. 176, at p. 216.

15; 12 W. R. C. R. 447.

¹ Act IX. of 1908, sec. I. art. 132; *Sheo Narain Ray v. Mokshoda Das Mitra* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 122.

⁴ See *Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh* (1917), 44 I. A. 126; 21 C. W. N. 698; 19 Bom. L. R. 498.

² *Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh* (1917), 44 I. A. 126; 21 C. W. N. 698; 19 Bom. L. R. 498; *Hanuman Kamat v. Doulat Mundar* (1884), 10 Calc. 528; *Lal Singh v. Deonarain Singh* (1886), 8 All. 279; *Arunachala Chetti v. Muni-sami Mudali* (1883), 7 Mad. 39.

⁵ See *Simbhunath Panday v. Holab Singh* (1887), 14 I. A. 77, at p. 83; 14 Calc. 572, at p. 579.

⁶ *Narayanrao Damodar v. Balkrishna Mahadeo*, Bom. P. J., 1881, p. 293.

³ *Hasmat Rai (Koer) v. Sunder Das* (1885), 11 Calc. 396. See *post*, pp. 321, 322, and *Nuthu Lal Chowdhry v. Chadi Saki* (1869), 4 B. L. R. A. C.

⁷ See *Umaheswara v. Singapurmal* (1883), 8 Mad. 376; *Chander Pershad v. Sham Koer* (1905), 33 Calc. 676. It has been held that the son cannot raise the question in the same suit where he has been made a party to the suit as representing his father: *Hira Lal Sahu v. Parmeshur Rai* (1899), 21 All. 356.

⁸ *Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan*

They can get a right to redeem,¹ but a suit for redemption does not lie simply on the ground that they have not been made parties.² A son born after a decree for sale would have no right of redemption.³

"Independently of the " Transfer of Property Act (or of the Civil Procedure Code), " the position of a purchaser, who in a sale in execution of a decree against the father bought the entirety of the estate, is the same as regards the son, whether the decree was a mortgage decree or a decree for money. In either case, all that the son can claim is that not having been a party to the sale of the proceedings which led up to it, he should have an opportunity of showing that there was in reality no such debt as to justify the sale."⁴

A son who was not joint with the father at the time of the suit would be entitled to redeem.⁵

The son does not lose his right to redeem, where the mortgagee obtains only a money decree and attaches the mortgaged property.⁶

Where the son has been a party to the suit he could not, of course, raise in another suit any question as to the validity of the mortgage or sale.

When the sons are not parties to the suit against their father, the creditor may institute another suit against them.⁷

The interests of the sons pass in a sale of coparcenary property in execution of a decree against their father,⁸ except only—

1. When their interests are not sold.¹⁰

When in
terests of sons
pass by sale
in execution.

(1910), 34 Bom. 354; 12 Bom. L. R. 219; *Matu Din v. Gaya Din* (1909), 31 All. 599; *Indar Pal v. Imperial Bank* (1915), 37 All. 214.

¹ See *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappurayyengar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1, at p. 69; *Trimbak Balkrishna v. Narayan Damodar Dubholkar* (1884), 8 Bom. 481, at p. 488; *Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar* (1898), 21 Mad. 222; *Bulkesen Lal v. Chowdhuri Tapesur Singh* (1911), 17 C. W. N. 219.

² *Lal Singh v. Palundur Singh* (1905), 28 All. 182; *Debi Singh v. Jiu Ram* (1902), 25 All. 214; *Kehri Singh v. Churni Lal* (1911), 33 All. 436.

³ *Muthuraman Chetti v. Ettupasami* (1899), 22 Mad. 372; *ante*, pp. 304, 305, 311.

⁴ *Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar* (1898), 21 Mad. 222, at p. 224; *Kunkali Beari v. Keshava Shanbaga* (1887), 11 Mad. 64, at p. 76. *Karan Singh v. Bhup Singh* (1904), 27 All. 16. See *post*, p. 317.

⁵ See *Trimbak Balkrishna v. Narayan Damodar Dubholkar* (1884), 8 Bom. 481.

⁶ *Sardar Singh v. Ratan Lal* (1914), 36 All. 516.

⁷ See *Ran Singh v. Sobha Ram* (1907), 29 All. 544; *Dharam Singh v. Angan Lal* (1899), 21 All. 301; *Aribudra v. Dorasami* (1888), 11 Mad. 413.

⁸ *Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall* (1874), 1 I. A. 321; 14 B. L. R. 187; 22 W. R. C. R. 56; *Nanomi Babuasin (Mussumut) v. Modun Mohun* (1885), 13 I. A. 1; 13 Calc. 21; *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koor (Mussumut)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15 Calc. 717; *Meenakshi Naidu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramaya Kounden* (1888), 16 I. A. 1; 12 Mad. 142; *Cooverji Hirji v. Dewsey Bhoja* (1893), 17 Bom. 718; *Ramphul Singh v. Degnarain Singh*, 8 Calc. 617; 10 C. L. R. 489; *Beni Parshad v. Puran Chand* (1895), 23 Calc. 262, at p. 274; *Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh* (1884), 6 All. 234; *Gonesh Pandey v. Dabee Doyal Singh* (1879), 5 C. L. R. 36.

⁹ *Matu Din v. Gaya Din* (1909), 31 All. 599.

¹⁰ See *post*, pp. 319, 320.

2. When the sons prove that the debt was contracted for an illegal or immoral purpose,¹ and the execution creditor purchases, or, if a stranger purchases, and has notice of, or upon inquiry could have ascertained, the illegal or immoral character of the debt upon which the decree was based.²

They could also dispute the fact of the debt.³

A decree for a mere money debt of the father,⁴ not illegal or immoral, and whether incurred for family purposes or not, may be enforced in his lifetime by an execution sale of the entire coparcenary estate,⁵ and is binding on the sons, whether they were or were not parties to the suit.⁶ They are, however, entitled in case they were not parties to contest the fact or the binding nature of the debt in another suit,⁷ or by a claim under the Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), Sched. I., Order XXI. r. 57.⁸

¹ See *ante*, pp. 309-312.

² See *Joharmal v. Eknath* (1899), 24 Bom. 343; 1 Bom. L. R. 839; *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami* (1892), 16 Mad. 99; *ante*, pp. 309-312.

³ See *Nanomi Babuasin (Mussumat) v. Modun Mohun* (1885), 13 I. A. 1, at p. 18; 13 Calc. 21, at p. 36; *ante*, p. 315.

⁴ This includes a decree for the unsatisfied balance of a mortgage debt, *Hari Ram v. Bishnath Singh* (1900), 22 All. 408.

⁵ *Meenakshi Naidu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramaya Kounden* (1888), 16 I. A. 1; 12 Mad. 142; *Khalilul Rahman v. Gobind Pershad* (1892), 20 Calc. 328; *Sheo Proshad v. Jung Bahadoor* (1882), 9 Calc. 389; 12 C. L. R. 494; *Narayana Charya v. Narso Krishna* (1876), 1 Bom. 262; *Luchman Dass v. Giridhar Chowdhry* (1880), 5 Calc. 855; 6 C. L. R. 473; *Bhowna (Mussumat) v. Roop Kishore* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 89.

⁶ *Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall* (1874), 1 I. A. 321, at p. 331; 14 B. L. R. 187, at p. 199; 22 W. R. C. R. 56, at p. 59. The facts of this case are to be found in *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayyangar* (1885), 9 Mad. 343, at pp. 345-349; *Nanomi Babuasin v. Modun Mohun* (1885), 13 I. A. 1; 13 Calc. 21; *Suryj Bunsai Koer v.*

Sheo Proshad Singh (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at p. 106; 5 Calc. 148, at p. 171; 5 C. L. R. 226, at p. 238; *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussumat)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15 Calc. 717; *Meenakshi Naidu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramaya Kounden* (1888), 16 I. A. 1; 12 Mad. 142; *Karan Singh v. Bhup Singh* (1904), 27 All. 16; *Mathura Prasad v. Ramchandra Rao* (1902), 25 All. 57; *Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda* (1899), 23 Mad. 292; *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami* (1892), 16 Mad. 99; *Kunhali Beari v. Keshava Shanbaga* (1887), 11 Mad. 64; *Ramanadan v. Rajagopala* (1889), 12 Mad. 309; *Ramdui Sing v. Mahender Prasad* (1882), 9 Calc. 452; 12 C. L. R. 47; *Dattatraya v. Vishnu* (1911), 36 Bom. 68; 13 Bom. L. R. 1161. See *Shiam Lal v. Ganeshi Lal* (1905), 28 All. 288, where the suit had been dismissed as against the son.

⁷ See *Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan* (1898), 22 Mad. 49; *Gopalasami Pillai v. Chokatingam Pillai* (1881), 4 Mad. 320; *Devji v. Sambhu* (1899), 24 Bom. 135; *Jagabhar Lalubhai v. Vijbhukandas Jagjivandas* (1886), 11 Bom. 37; *Karan Singh v. Bhup Singh* (1904), 27 All. 16.

⁸ *Shivram v. Sakharam* (1908), 33 Bom. 39; 10 Bom. L. R. 39; *Umed*

In two cases the Allahabad High Court ¹ considered that where no sale had taken place, the sons could contest the decree on the sole ground that they were not parties to it, but in a latter case the same Court held that there is no ground for such distinction.²

Irregularity
in sale.

The son's rights do not pass when in contravention of sec. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act ³ the mortgagee has attached the property in execution of a money decree,⁴ or the sale is otherwise irregular.

Execution of
decree after
death of
father.

A creditor can, after the death of the father, execute the decree against coparcenary property in the hands of the sons.⁵

The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, on this subject are as follows :—

Legal repre-
sentative.

“Sec. 50. (1) Where a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased.

“(2) Where the decree is executed against such legal representative he shall be liable only to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to his hands and has not been duly disposed of ; and, for the purpose of ascertaining such liability, the Court executing the decree may, of its own motion or on the application of the decree-holder, compel the said representative to produce such accounts as it thinks fit.

Enforcement
of decree
against legal
representa-
tive.

“Sec. 52. (1) Where the decree is passed against a party as the legal representative of a deceased person, and the decree be for money to be paid out of the property of the deceased, it may be executed by the attachment and sale of any such property :

“(2) Where no such property remains in the possession of the judgment-debtor, and he fails to satisfy the Court that he has duly applied such property of the deceased as is proved to have come into his possession, the decree may be executed against the judgment-debtor to the extent of the property not duly applied by him, in the same manner as if the decree had been against him personally.

Liability of
ancestral
property.

“Sec. 53. For the purposes of sec. 50 and sec. 52, property in the hands of a son or other descendant which is liable under Hindu law for the payment of the debt of a deceased ancestor, in respect of which a decree has been passed, shall be deemed to be property of the deceased which has come to the hands of the son or other descendant as his legal representative.” ⁶

As the law stood before the 1st January, 1909, where the property had been attached in the father's lifetime the creditor could proceed ; ⁷ but where

Hathising v. Goman Bhargi (1895), 20 Bom. 385, at p. 389 ; *Ram Dayal v. Durga Singh* (1890), 12 All. 209. See *Venkataramayyan v. Venkatasubramania Dikshatar* (1878), 1 Mad. 358.

¹ *Ram Dayal v. Durga Singh* (1890), 12 All. 209 ; *Jagraj Sanga v. Ajudha Prasad* (1886), 9 All. 142.

² *Karan Singh v. Bhup Singh* (1904), 27 All. 16.

³ Act IV. of 1882,

⁴ *Muthuraman Chellu v. Ettapasami* (1899), 22 Mad. 372.

⁵ Act V. of 1908 (Civil Procedure), s. 53.

⁶ *Sankar Nath Pundit v. Madan Mohan Das* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 298.

⁷ *Peary Lal Sinha v. Chandi Charan Sinha* (1906), 11 C. W. N. 163 ; *Beni Pershad v. Parbati Koer* (1892), 20 Cal. 895.

there was no such attachment, a new suit was necessary according to the High Courts of Madras and Allahabad, and according to some of the Bengal decisions.¹ It was held in Bombay,² and by the majority of a Full Bench in Bengal,³ that the decree could be executed against the sons.

The carrying out of a mortgage decree stood upon the same footing.⁴

If the coparcenary property has been charged by the decree, proceedings in execution could be taken against the sons after the death of the father.⁵

The question whether the sale in execution of a decree against the father passed the whole interest of the family, or only the father's undivided interest, depends upon the terms of the proceedings in execution. The Court will look at the substance of the proceedings to see what was intended to be sold, and what the purchaser could reasonably think he was buying.⁶ It is a mixed question of law and fact.⁷

When sons' interests pass by sale.

¹ *Lachmi Narain v. Kunji Lal* (1894), 16 All. 449; *Jagannath Prasad v. Sitaram* (1888), 11 All. 302; *Kali Charan v. Jewat* (1905), 28 All. 51; *Zamindar of Karvetnagar v. Trustee of Tirumelai* (1909), 32 Mad. 429; *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami* (1892), 16 Mad. 99; *Ariabudra v. Dorasami* (1888), 11 Mad. 413; *Venkatarama v. Senthivelu* (1890), 13 Mad. 265; *Karnataka Hanumantha v. Andukuri Hanumayya* (1882), 5 Mad. 232; *Juga Lal Chaudhuri v. Audh Behari Prasad Singh* (1900), 6 C. W. N. 223; *Suraj Prasad (Lala) v. Golab Chund* (1901), 28 Calc. 517; *Kali Krishna Sankar v. Raghunath Deb* (1903), 31 Calc. 224.

² *Govind Krishna Gujar v. Sakharan Naraya* (1904), 28 Bom. 383; 6 Bom. L. R. 344; *Umed Hathising v. Goman Bhaiji* (1895), 20 Bom. 385.

³ *Amar Chandra Kundu v. Sebak Chand Chowdhury* (1907), 34 Calc. 642; 11 C. W. N. 593.

⁴ *Beni Pershad v. Parbati Koer* (1892), 20 Calc. 895.

⁵ *Sivagiri Zamindar v. Tiruvengada* (1884), 7 Mad. 339; *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayyengar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1.

⁶ *Pettachi Chettiar v. Sangili Veera Pandra* (1887), 14 I. A. 84, at p. 85; 10 Mad. 241, at p. 248; *Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh* (1887), 14 I. A. 77, at p. 83; 14 Calc. 572, at p. 579; *Abdul Aziz Khan Sahib v. Appayasami Naicker* (1903), 31 I. A. 1; 27 Mad. 131; 8 C. W. N. 180; *Sripat Singh v. Tagore* (1916), 44 I. A.

1; 21 C. W. N. 442. See *Umbica Prosad Tewary v. Ramschay Lal* (1881), 8 Calc. 898; 10 C. L. R. 505; (1881), 8 Calc. 10 C. L. R. 505; *Kagal Ganpaya v. Manjappa* (1888), 12 Bom. 691; *Hitendra Singh v. Rameshwar Singh* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 42.

⁷ In the following cases it was held that the interest of the father only passed by the sale: *Deendyal Lal v. Jagdeep Narain Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 247; 3 Calc. 198; 1 C. L. R. 49; *Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh* (1887), 14 I. A. 77; 14 Calc. 572; *Hurday Narain Sahu (Baboo) v. Rooder Perkash Misser (Pundit Baboo)* (1883), 11 I. A. 26; 10 Calc. 626; *Ram Sahai v. Kewal Singh* (1887), 9 All. 672; *Pettachi Chettiar v. Sangili Veera Pandra Chinnathambiar* (1887), 14 I. A. 84; 10 Mad. 241; *Bhikaji Ramchandra Oke v. Yashwantrav Shripat Khopkar* (1884), 8 Bom. 489; *Maruti Sakharam v. Babaji* (1890), 15 Bom. 87; *Beni Pershad v. Purnan Chand* (1895), 23 Calc. 262; *Bika Singh v. Lachman Singh* (1880), 2 All. 800; *Chandra Sen v. Ganga Ram* (1880), 2 All. 899; *Bhagwat Dassa v. Gouri Kunwar* (1880), 7 C. L. R. 218; *Collector of Monghyr v. Hurdai Narain Shahai* (1879), 5 Calc. 425; 5 C. L. R. 112. In the following cases it was held that the interests of the sons passed by the sale: *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussumat)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15 Calc. 717; *Meenakshi Naidu v. Immudi Kanaka Ramaya*

Where interests have been expressly excluded they would of course not pass.¹

It is the duty of the judgment creditor to see that the orders of attachment and sale, or the sale certificate, clearly indicate the sale of all the interests in the property over which the judgment debtor had control.

Burden of proof.

There is some conflict as to whether there is any presumption that the whole interest passed,² or whether there is a presumption that the interest of the father only passed.³ It is submitted that if there is any burden of proof one way or the other, it is upon the person supporting the sale.⁴

Duty of purchaser.

"The purchaser under the execution. . ." is "not bound to go further back than to see that there was a decree against" the father, "that the property was property liable to satisfy the decree, if the decree had been properly given against" him, "and having inquired into that, and having *bonâ fide* purchased the estate under the execution and *bonâ fide* paid a valuable consideration for the property, the" sons "are not entitled to come in and to set aside all that has been done under the decree and execution, and recover back the estate from the" purchaser.⁵

"If his debt was of a nature to support a sale of the entirety," the father "might legally have sold it without suit, or the creditor might legally procure a sale of it by suit. All the sons can claim is, that, not being parties to the sale or execution proceedings, they ought not to be barred from bringing the fact or the nature of the debt in a suit of their own. Assuming they have such a right, it will avail them nothing unless they can prove that the debt was not such as to justify the sale. If the expressions by which the estate is conveyed to the purchaser are susceptible of application either to the entirety or to the father's coparcenary interest alone, . . . the absence of the sons from the proceedings may be one material consideration. But if the fact be that the purchaser has bargained and paid for the

Kounden (1888), 16 I. A. 1; 12 Mad. 142; *Mahabir Pershad (Rai Babu) v. Markunda Nath Sahas (Rai)* (1889), 17 I. A. 11; 17 Cal. 584; *Sripat Singh v. Tagore* (1916), 44 I. A. 1; 21 C. W. N. 442; *Cooverji Hirji v. Dewsey Bhoja* (1893), 17 Bom. 718; *Veera Soorappa Nayani v. Errappa Naidu* (1906), 29 Mad. 484; *Kunhal Beari v. Keshava Shanbaga* (1887), 11 Mad. 64; *Sakharamshet v. Sitaramshet* (1886), 11 Bom. 42; *Sadashiv Dinkar Joshi v. Dinkarnarayan Joshi* (1882), 6 Bom. 529. As to a sale under a mortgage decree, see *ante*, pp. 280-282.

¹ *Timmappa v. Narsinha Timaya* (1913), 37 Bom. 631; 15 Bom. L. R. 794.

² See *Muhammad Husain v. Dipchand* (1892), 14 All. 191; *Pem Singh v. Partab Singh* (1892), 14 All. 179; *Beni Madho v. Basdeo Patak* (1890), 12 All. 99.

³ *Maruti Sakham v. Babaji* (1890), 15 Bom. 87; *Manohar v. Balvant* (1901), 3 Bom. L. R. 97.

⁴ See *Haza Hira v. Bhajji Madan Isabji*, Bom. P. J. 1875, p. 97.

⁵ *Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall* (1874), 1 I. A. 321, at p. 334; 14 B. L. R. 187, at p. 200; 22 W. R. C. R. 56, at p. 59. In *Mahabir Prasad v. Basdeo Singh* (1884), 6 All. 234, the Court considered that a statement in the plaint amounted to notice. See *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussamat)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15 Cal. 317; *Siva Sankara Mudali v. Parvati Anni* (1881), 4 Mad. 96; *Luchmi Dai Koori v. Asman Sing* (1876), 2 Cal. 213; 25 W. R. C. R. 421; *Anooragee Koorer (Mussamat) v. Bhugobutty Koorer* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 148; *Budree Lall v. Kantee Lall* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 260. Cf. *Abdool Kureem (Shaikh) v. Jaun Ali (Syed)* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 55.

entirety, he may clearly defend his title to it upon any ground which would have justified a sale if the sons had been brought in to oppose the execution proceedings."¹

A decree may be obtained against the sons during the life-time of their father so as to bind the coparcenary property, provided that the money was not raised for an illegal or immoral purpose.² Decree against sons.

Although the coparcenary property may not be liable, the father remains personally liable for a debt, and his share may be sold in execution of a decree.³ Personal liability of father.

In cases where it is competent for a coparcener to sell his share of the coparcenary property,⁴ the father's share would be bound by the sale even when the sons are not bound, but specific performance of an agreement to sell will not be granted.⁵

The debts of a father, or paternal grandfather, even when not charged upon the estate, must be paid by the son, or grandson, out of the property of the coparcenary in which the debtor was a coparcener, provided such debts have not been incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose.⁶ Simple contract debts of father.

This does not include an agreement to pay a sum of money in perpetuity.⁷

¹ *Nanomi Babuasin (Mussamat) v. Modun Mohun* (1885), 13 I. A. 1, at p. 18; 13 Calc. 21, at p. 36. See *Bhagbut Pershad v. Girja Koer (Mussamat)* (1888), 15 I. A. 99; 15 Calc. 317.

² See *Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan* (1898), 22 Mad. 49; *Ramphul Singh v. Degnarain Singh* (1881), 8 Calc. 517; 10 C. L. R. 489.

³ *Biswanath Pershad Mahta v. Jagdip Narain Singh* (1912), 40 Calc. 342, at p. 353; 17 C. W. N. 1025, note. As to the rights of a mortgagee after the father's share has been sold, see *Jaleshar Rai v. Anrut Rai* (1913), 35 All. 302.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 301, 302.

⁵ *Nagiah v. Venkatarama Sastrulu* (1912), 37 Mad. 387, differing from *Kosuri Ramaraju v. Ivalury Ramalingam* (1903), 26 Mad. 74, and *Srinivasa Reddi v. Sivarama Reddi* (1909), 32 Mad. 320; Act I. of 1877 (Specific Relief), s. 15. See *Poraka Subbarami*

Reddi v. Vadlamudi Seshachalam Chetty (1910), 33 Mad. 359.

⁶ *Muddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lall* (1874), 1 I. A. 321; 14 B. L. R. 187; 22 W. R. C. R. 56; *Luchmun Dass v. Guridhur Chowdhry* (1880), 5 Calc. 855; 6 C. L. R. 473; *Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Chettiar* (1903), 27 Mad. 243; *Udaram Sularam v. Ranu Panduji* (1875), 11 Bom. H. C. 76, at pp. 83, 84; *Bhagirathi v. Anantha Charia* (1893), 17 Mad. 268; *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuwayangar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1; *Sheo Proshad v. Jung Bahadoor* (1882), 9 Calc. 389; 12 C. L. R. 494; *Velliyammal v. Katha Chetti* (1882), 5 Mad. 61; *Narayana-sami Chetti v. Samidas Mudali* (1883), 6 Mad. 293. This applies equally to an impartible estate: *Muttayan Chettiar v. Sangili Vira Pandia Chinna-tambiar* (1882), 9 I. A. 128; 6 Mad. 1; *Veera Soorappa Nayam v. Errappa Naidu* (1906), 29 Mad. 484.

⁷ *Balkrishna v. Janardana* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 642.

Interest.

The liability to pay a debt involves a liability to pay interest.¹

Liability of son during father's lifetime.

Even during the lifetime of the father the son is liable to the extent of the coparcenary property, or of property of his father which comes into his hands; as, for instance, when the father has abandoned worldly affairs,² or has been absent for such a time as will raise a presumption as to his death.³

Limitation of suit.

The limitation for a suit against the son for a debt of his father is as provided by Article 120 of Schedule I. of the Limitation Act,⁴ i.e. six years from the time when the cause of action arose.⁵

It has been held that the right of the creditor to sue the sons accrues during the father's lifetime, and that there is not a new cause of action on his death.⁶

As to the limitation for a suit to set aside an alienation by the father, see *ante*, p. 306.

Debt not a charge on property.
Effect of alienation.

A simple contract debt even of a father is not a charge upon the coparcenary property, or upon his separate property. When the son or heir has alienated the property, the creditor cannot claim his debt against the alienee, except where the alienation has been, to the knowledge of the alienee, made in order to avoid the debt, or with the intention of avoiding it, in which case the remedy of the creditor is against the son or heir personally.⁷

¹ *Lachman Das v. Khunnu Lal* (1896), 19 All. 26. See *Saundananappa v. Shrivasa* (1907), 31 Bom. 354; *ante*, p. 313.

² See Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. i. p. 266.

³ An absence of twenty years was fixed by Vishnu (Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. i. p. 266); but the presumptions as to death now applicable are to be found in ss. 107, 108, of the "Indian Evidence Act" (I. of 1872).

⁴ IX. of 1908. *Hiralal Marwari v. Chundrabai Haldar* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 9.

⁵ *Maharaj Sing v. Balwant Singh* (1906), 28 All. 508, at p. 516; affirmed on appeal, *Balwant Singh (Raja) v. Clancy* (1912), 39 I. A. 109; 39 All. 296; 16 C. W. N. 577; 14 Bom. L. R. 423; *Brijnandan Singh v. Bidya Prasad Singh* (1915), 42 Calc. 1068; *S. C. Bidhya Prasad v. Bhupnarin Singh*, 19 C. W. N. 849; *Narsingh Misa v. Lajji Misa* (1901), 23 All. 206; *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami* (1892),

16 Mad. 99; *Ramayya v. Venkataratnam* (1893), 17 Mad. 122.

⁶ *Mallesam Naidu v. Jugala Panda* (1899), 23 Mad. 292. See *Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan* (1898), 22 Mad. 49; *Natasayyan v. Ponnusami* (1892), 16 Mad. 99.

⁷ *Zuburdust Khan v. Indurmun* (1867), Agra High Court Full Bench Reports, ed. 1903, p. 71; ed. 1874, p. 55; *Unnopurna Dass v. Gunga Narain Paul* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 294; *Jamiyatram Ramchandra v. Parbhudas Hathi* (1872), 9 Bom. H. C. 116; *Gnanabhai v. C. Srinivasa Pillai* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 84; *Greender Chunder Ghose v. Mackintosh* (1879), 4 Calc. 897; 4 C. L. R. 193; cf. Act IV. of 1882 (Transfer of Property), s. 128. The right of a creditor against an alienee or devisee of the heir would apparently be no greater than his right against the alienee or devisee of his debtor, see *Bishen Chand (Rai) v. Asmaidu Koer (Mussumat)* (1883), 11 I. A. 164; 6 All. 560.

The debts of the father cannot be recovered from the separate property of a son, even where such property has been the subject of a *bond fide* gift to the son by the father. They can only be recovered from the coparcenary property, or from property which was acquired by his sons on his death as his representatives.¹

A son is not liable for debts incurred after his separation from his father.²

In the Bombay Presidency it is expressly provided³ that an heir is only liable for the debts of a deceased ancestor to the extent of assets received

A creditor cannot enforce the payment of the debt of the father⁴ against property which has been allotted on partition to the son, unless the partition was effected for the purpose of avoiding the father's debts.⁵

As under the Bengal school of law sons do not acquire any interest by birth in ancestral property, a father can obviously charge his share in the coparcenary property for the payment of any of his debts, however incurred,⁶ and after his death the payment of his debts can be enforced against the property, whether joint or separate, belonging to him at the time of his decease.

Apart from the obligation of a son or grandson to pay the debts of his father or grandfather out of coparcenary property, the Hindu law, like other systems of law, requires the person who succeeds to the property of another as heir or devisee, to

Remedy
limited to
assets.

Liability after
partition.

Bengal school.

Obligation to
pay debts out
of assets in-
herited, etc.

¹ *Dyamonee Debea v. Brindabun Chunder Banerjee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1856, p. 97; *Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvayangar* (1881), 4 Mad. 1, at pp. 9, 21, 45; *Keval Bhagvan Gujar v. Ganpati Narayan* (1883), 8 Bom. 220; *Girdharlal Krishnavalabh v. Shiv (Bai)* (1884), 8 Bom. 309; *Omuthoonnissa (Mussamut) v. Puresmun Narain Singh* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 202; *Sakharam Ramchandra Dikshit v. Govind Vaman Dikshit* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 361; *Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduraj* (1875), 11 Bom. H. C. 76; *Lallu Bhagvan v. Tribhuvan Motiram* (1889), 13 Bom. 653; *Nathuni Sahu v. Baijnath Prasad* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 212. See *Dheraj Mahatab Chand Bahadoor (Maharajah) v. Huro Mohun Acharjee*, W. R. (1864), M. R. 1;

Jummal Ali v. Tirbhee Lall Dass (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 41; *Sangili Virapandia Chinnathambiar v. Alwar Ayyangar* (1881), 3 Mad. 42. Act VII. (Bo. C.) of 1866.

² *Kulada Prasad Pandey v. Haripada Chatterjee* (1912), 40 Calc. 407; 17 C. W. N. 102.

³ Act VII. (Bo. C. of 1866), s. 2.

⁴ This would not apply to a debt or a contract before partition entered into by the father as manager of the family: *Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetti* (1901), 24 Mad. 555; *Kameswarama v. Venkata Subba Row* (1914), 38 Mad. 1120.

⁵ *Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar* (1899), 22 Mad. 519.

⁶ See ante, p. 299.

pay the legal debts of such other person, whatever may be the purpose of such debts, to the extent of the assets received by him.¹ There is no obligation upon any other coparcener, who has acquired rights by survivorship to pay the debts of the deceased coparcener.²

Debts can be recovered from the person who has wrongfully come into possession of the property of the deceased debtor.³

This would not apply to lands held on a tenure, which rendered it not transferable or saleable in execution of a decree.⁴

Impartible
property.

The question as to whether the debts of the holder of an impartible estate must be paid by his successor is not quite settled. It is clear that they are so payable in a case governed by the Bengal school of law, or in a case governed by the Mitakshara school where the property has passed to a female heir, or to a separated kinsman, or where it has passed to a son or son's son, and it was not incurred for illegal or immoral purposes; also in any case where it was incurred for the necessities of the property. The question remains whether in a case governed by the Mitakshara law a son or son's son is bound to pay the debt, although it was incurred for an immoral or illegal purpose, and whether an undivided collateral successor is bound to pay although it was not incurred for a necessary purpose. The Courts have differed on this question.⁵ It is submitted that as the property is not coparcenary,⁶ the son or other heir is bound to pay out of the property any legal debt irrespective of its origin or purpose.⁷

¹ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," n. p. 284; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. i. 270; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. v. s. 4, para. 17; "Dayabhaga," chap. i. para. 47; "Narada Smṛiti," chap. iii. para. 22; cf. Act. V. of 1881, ss. 101-105.

² As to the sale of a share, see *Kotta Ramasami Chetti v. Bangari Seshama Nayanivaru* (1881), 3 Mad. 145, at p. 167. As to impartible property, see *Nachiappa Chettiar v. Chinnayasami Naicker* (1906), 29 Mad. 453; *Zamindar of Karimnagar v. Trustee of Turumalai* (1909), 32 Mad. 429; *Rajah of Kalahasti v. Achigadu* (1905), 30 Mad. 454.

³ See *Magnluri Garudiah v. Narayana Rungiah* (1881), 3 Mad. 359; *Kanakamma v. Venkataratnam* (1884), 7 Mad. 586; *Prosunno Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Kristo Chytunno Pal* (1878), 4 Calc. 342; 3 C. L. R. 154; *Surbomungola Debee v. Mohendronath Nath* (1874), 4 Calc. 508; *Khitish Chandra Acharjya Chowdhury v. Radhika Mohun Roy* (1907), 35 Calc. 276; 12 C. W. N. 237.

⁴ See *Nilmoni Singh (Rajah) v.*

Bakranath Singh (1882), 9 I. A. 104; *Jagjivandas Javerdas v. Indad Ali* (1882), 6 Bom. 211; *Muppidi Papaya v. Ramana* (1883), 7 Mad. 85; *Anundo Rai v. Kali Prosad Singh* (1884), 10 Calc. 677; S. C. on appeal, *Kali Pershad Singh (Tekait) v. Anund Roy* (1887), 15 I. A. 19; 15 Calc. 471; *Appaji Bapuji v. Keshav Shamrav* (1890), 15 Bom. 13. As to the liability of a person who intermeddles with the assets, see *Khitish Chandra Acharjya Chowdhury v. Radhika Mohan Roy* (1907), 35 Calc. 276; 12 C. W. N. 237.

⁵ In *Rajah of Kalahasti v. Achigadu* (1905), 30 Mad. 454, and *Ram Das Marwari v. Braja Behari Singh (Tekait)* (1902), 6 C. W. N. 879, the son was held to be bound by the debt. A different view was adopted in *Nachiappa Chettiar v. Chinnayasami Naicker* (1906), 29 Mad. 499, and *Kali Krishna Sarkar v. Raghunath Deb* (1903), 31 Calc. 224.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 263, 264.

⁷ *Shyam Lal Singh v. Bijay N. Kunda Bahadur (Raja)* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 136. *Ante*, p. 323.

CHAPTER IX.

PARTITION.

PARTITION is the process by which the members of a joint family become separate, and cease to be coparceners.¹ What is partition.

Under the Mitakshara school separation may be effected either by a partition of the title, *i.e.* by an ascertainment of the shares of the coparceners, and by a separation of such shares in interest, the coparceners thereafter holding as tenants in common, or by a partition of the property by metes and bounds.

According to the Dayabhaga school it consists of a division of the property by metes and bounds between the coparceners in accordance with their shares.

WHO IS ENTITLED TO PARTITION.

“The ordinary rule is that if persons are entitled beneficially to shares in an estate, they may have a partition.”² Who is entitled to partition.

As to the rights of tenure holders, see *Bhagwat Sahai v. Bepin Behari Mitter* (1910), 37 I. A. 198; 37 Calc. 918; 14 C. W. N. 962; 12 Bom. L. R. 997; *Salimullah v. Probhat Chandra Sen* (1916), 43 Calc. 118; *Ram Lochi Koeri v. Collingridge* (1907), 11 C. W. N. 397.

Except in Bombay³ an agreement for consideration⁴ not to partition coparcenary property binds the actual parties thereto,⁵ but it does not bind their representatives, or, unless there be an agreement not to assign, their assignees.⁶ Agreement not to partition.

¹ Cunningham's "Hindu Law," p. 136. As to the mode by which such separation is effected, see *post*, pp. 343 *et seq.*

² *Shankar Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh* (1888), 16 I. A. 71, at p. 75; 16 Calc. 397, at p. 405. See *Secretary of State v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba* (1859), 7 M. I. A. 476, at p. 537; 4 W. R. P. C. 42, at p. 45. This applies equally to widows, *Sellam v. Chinnammal* (1901), 24 Mad. 441.

³ *Ramlanga Khanapure v. Virupakshi Khanapure* (1883), 7 Bom. 538.

⁴ *Srimohan Thakur v. Macgregor* (1901), 28 Calc. 769, at p. 786; *Radhanath Mookerjee v. Tarrucknath Mookerjee* (1878), 3 C. W. N. 126.

⁵ *Ramdhone Ghose v. Anund Chunder Ghose* (1865), 2 Hyde, 93; *Rajender Dutt v. Sham Chund Mitter* (1880), 6 Calc. 106; *Krishnendra Nath Sarkar v. Debendra Nath Sarkar* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 793, explaining *Srimohan Thakur v. Macgregor* (1901), 28 Calc. 769, at p. 786, and *Radhanath Mookerjee v. Tarrucknath Mookerjee* (1875), 3 C. W. N. 126. See *Sūbaraya Tawker v. Rajaram Tawker* (1901), 25 Mad. 585.

⁶ *Anath Nath Dey v. Mackintosh* (1871), 8 B. L. R. 60; *Anand Chandra Ghose v. Pran Kisto Dutt* (1869), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 14; 11 W. R. O. C. 19; *Pirojshah v. Manibhai* (1911), 36 Bom. 53; 13 Bom. L. R. 963.

Condition
is will.

A direction in a will prohibiting partition has no effect, as it is a condition repugnant to the gift.¹ Similarly, the owner of property cannot by mere contract during his life prevent his heirs from partitioning property after his death.²

By custom or by the terms of a grant from Government property may be impartible.³

Except in the case of a suit by a minor,⁴ the Court has no discretion to refuse partition.⁵ Each coparcener is at liberty to elect to separate from the joint family, but he cannot force a separation among the others against their will.⁶

Bengal school.

Under the Bengal school of law, every adult coparcener, male or female,⁷ is entitled to enforce partition of the coparcenary property.

Mitakshara
school.

Except that there can be no partition directly between grandfather and grandson while the father is alive,⁸ or between great-grandfather and great-grandson when the father or grandfather is alive, every adult coparcener is, under the Mitakshara school of law, entitled to enforce partition.

"According to the Mitakshara law, all the male descendants of the common ancestor have an interest in the property, and any of them may demand partition, unless excluded by some disability. The descendants of the common ancestor may live together for generations; and when partition is to take place, all that is necessary is to ascertain their mutual relationship."⁹

"The property in the paternal or ancestral estate acquired by birth

¹ *Mokoondo Lall Shaw v. Gonesh Chunder Shaw* (1875), 1 Calc. 104; *Raikshori Dasi v. Debendranath Sircar* (1887), 15 I. A. 37; 15 Calc. 409. Act X. of 1865 (Succession), s. 125, applied to certain Hindu wills under the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870) by s. 2 of the latter Act.

² *Rajender Dutt v. Shan Chund Mitter* (1880), 6 Calc. 106.

³ See *Vinayak v. Gopal* (1903), 30 I. A. 77; 27 Bom. 353; 7 C. W. N. 409; 5 Bom. L. R. 408.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 328, 329.

⁵ *Sellam v. Chinnammal* (1901), 24 Mad. 441, at p. 443; *Lade v. Sadashiva* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 35.

⁶ *Manjanatha v. Narayana* (1882), 5 Mad. 362, at p. 367. As to the presumption of a general partition, see *ante*, p. 222.

⁷ *Durga Nath Pramanick v. Chintamani Dassi* (1903), 31 Calc. 214; 8

C. W. N. 11. As to the case of a childless widow, who is entitled to a very small share, see *post*, p. 328, note 7.

⁸ *Bishen Chand (Rai) v. Asmaida Koer (Mussumat)* (1884), 11 I. A. 164, at p. 179; 6 All. 560, at p. 574; "Mitakshara," chap. i. sec. 5, para. 3. A different view was adopted in *Jogul Kishore v. Shib Saha* (1883), 5 All. 430; see *Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Rajji Kulkarni* (1891), 16 Bom. 29. Although the grandson may be unable to enforce partition he is a coparcener. Apparently if his interest be sold (see *ante*, p. 300), the purchaser could not enforce partition (see *post*, p. 331), and might have to run the risk of waiting until the death of the father before suing for partition.

⁹ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed. p. 322.

under the Mitakshara law is . . . so connected with the right to a partition that it does not exist where there is no right to it." ¹

Under the Mitakshara law,² a son ³ is entitled to partition of the coparcenary estate, whether movable or immovable,⁴ as against his father.⁵ On his father's death, but not until then, he is entitled to partition as against his father's father.⁶ On the death of his father and his father's father he has a similar right against his father's father's father.⁷

Right of son, grandson, and great-grand-son.

On the death of his father he represents his father's right to claim partition against his father's father.⁸

Even when his father and grandfather are both alive, a suit for partition may be brought by a coparcener, if they allow the property to be wasted and his interest to be imperilled.⁹

Where two or more women hold property jointly as in the cases of widows or daughters succeeding as heirs, although one of them may not be absolutely entitled to enforce a partition, she is entitled to partition if they cannot hold the property peaceably,¹⁰ but such partition does not affect the right of

Partition between women.

¹ *Sartaj Kuari (Rani) v. Deoraj Kuari (Rani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 51, at p. 64; 10 All. 272, at p. 287.

² This question cannot arise under the Bengal school, *ante*, pp. 223, 224.

³ As to illegitimate sons, see *ante*, pp. 227, 228.

⁴ *Jugmohandas Manguldas v. Mangaldas Nathubhoy (Sir)* (1886), 10 Bom. 528.

⁵ *Suraj Bunsu Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh* (1879), 6 I. A. 88, at p. 100; 5 Cal. 148, at p. 165; 4 C. L. R. 226, at p. 233; *Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni* (1891), 16 Bom. 29, at pp. 32, 33; *Raja Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Persad* (1867), B. L. R. F. B. 731, at p. 738; 8 W. R. C. R. 15, at p. 20; *Laljeet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 373; 20 W. R. C. R. 336; *Subba Ayyar v. Ganasa Ayyar* (1895), 18 Mad. 179; *Kaliparshad v. Ramcharan* (1876), 1 All. 159; *Cassumbhoy Ahmedbhoy v. Ahmedbhoy Hubibhoy* (1887), 12 Bom. 280 (a case of Khoja Mahomedans). It was held by a majority of the full bench in *Apaji Narhar Kulkarni v. Ramchandra Ravji Kulkarni* (1891), 16 Bom. 29, that although a son can sue his father alone,

a son cannot in the lifetime of his father sue his father and uncles for partition (see also *Jivabhai v. Vaddal* (1905), 7 Bom. L. R. 232), but the Madras High Court has dissented from this view, *Subba Ayyar v. Ganasa Ayyar* (1895), 18 Mad. 179, see also Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 324, 325. It is submitted that the view of the dissenting Judge (Telang, J.) in the Bombay case was correct.

⁶ *Nagalinga Mudali v. Subbiramana Mudali* (1862), 1 Mad. H. C. 77.

⁷ This follows from the fact that the great-grandson acquires a right by birth, *ante*, p. 225.

⁸ "Mitakshara," chap. i. sec. 5, para. 1.

⁹ *Rameshwar Prosad Singh v. Lachmi Prosad Singh* (1903), 31 Cal. 111; 7 C. W. N. 688.

¹⁰ *Nilamani Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi) v. Radhamani Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi)* (1877), 4 I. A. 212, at p. 221; 1 Mad. 290, at p. 300; 1 C. L. R. 97, at pp. 104, 105; *Chhittar Kunwar v. Gaura Kunwar* (1911), 34 All. 189; *Sundar (Mussamat) v. Parbati (Mussamat)* (1889), 10 I. A. 186; 12 All. 51, and cases

survivorship of the co-widow or sister,¹ and must be effected in such a way as not to prejudice the reversionary heirs.²

This case frequently occurs under the Bengal school of law. Under the Mitakshara school it could only occur with regard to the separate acquisitions of the husband or father,³ or in the case where the husband or father died without leaving any coparcener surviving him, or perhaps in a case where a share is allotted to wives on a partition.⁴

Where a widow or daughter is entitled to a partition a purchaser of her share is also entitled to partition.⁵

Where a Hindu widow is entitled to partition, and there is a reasonable apprehension that she will waste the movable property allotted to her share, sufficient provision should be made in the final decree for partition, for the prevention of such waste, to safeguard the interests of the reversioners.⁶

It has been held that in a suit for partition by a widow the Court has a discretion.⁷

Minor co-
parcener.

Where a coparcener is a minor, and his interests are likely to be prejudiced by the property remaining joint, as, for instance, where his coparceners are wasting the property, or setting up rights adverse to him, or decline to provide for his maintenance, or it be otherwise for his interest that there should be a partition, a suit⁸ for a partition can be brought on his behalf,⁹ even against

below, note 1. *Ariyaputri v. Alamelu* (1888), 11 Mad. 304; *Durga Dat v. Gita* (1911), 33 All. 443; *contrâ Kathaperumal v. Venkabal* (1880), 2 Mad. 194; *Sellam v. Chinnammal* (1901), 24 Mad. 441; *Jijoyamba Bayi Sahiba* (H. H. M.) v. *Kamakshi Bayi Sahiba* (H. H. M.) (1868), 3 Mad. H. C. 424.

¹ *Nilamani Patta Maha Devi Garu* (Sri Gajapathi) v. *Radhamani Patta Maha Devi Garu* (Sri Gajapathi) (1877), 4 I. A. 212; 1 Mad. 290; 1 C. L. R. 97; *Dal Koer* (Musst.) v. *Panbas Koer* (Musst.) (1904), 8 C. W. N. 658; *Rindnamma v. Venkatarammappa* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 268; *Padmanani Dasi* (Srimati) v. *Jagadamba Dasi* (Srimati) (1871), 6 B. L. R. 134; *Hari Narayan Jog v. Vitai* (1907), 31 Bom. 560; 9 Bom. L. R. 1049.

² *Dal Koer* (Musst.) v. *Panbas Koer* (Musst.) (1904), 8 C. W. N. 658; *Janokinath Mukhopadhyaya v. Mothuranath Mukhopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 580; 12 C. L. R. 215.

³ *Jhanna Kuar v. Chain Sulh* (1881), 3 All. 400.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 331, 332.

⁵ *Janokinath Mukhopadhyaya v. Mothuranath Mukhopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 580; 12 C. L. R. 215.

⁶ *Durga Nath Pramanik v. Chintamani Dassi* (1903), 31 Calc. 214; 8 C. W. N. 11. See *Janokinath Mukhopadhyaya v. Mothuranath Mukhopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 580; 12 C. L. R. 215.

⁷ *Mohadeay Koor v. Haruknarain* (1882), 9 Calc. 244, at p. 250. See also cases, above, note 1. It was said in *Soudaminy Dossee v. Jogesh Chunder Dutt* (1877), 2 Calc. 262, at p. 271, that the Court would probably refuse partition by metes and bounds to a childless widow who was entitled to a very small share.

⁸ I.e. either a suit in a Civil Court, or a proceeding in a Revenue Court.

⁹ *Damoodur Misser v. Senabuttu Misra* (1882), 8 Calc. 537; 10 C. L. R. 402; *Mahadev Balwant v. Lakshman Balwant* (1894), 19 Bom. 99; *Thangam Pillai v. Suppa Pillai* (1888), 12 Mad. 401; *Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 94; *Alimelammal v.*

his father.¹ If there be no such special circumstances, such suit cannot be instituted on his behalf.²

The same principle would apply to reviving on behalf of a minor a suit for partition instituted by his father,³ provided it be clear that the omission to continue the suit does not prejudice the minor's rights to the property.

It is not ordinarily in the interests of a minor member of a joint Hindu family, or of any other minor joint-owner, that his share should be separated. *Primâ facie*, a partition is not for a minor's benefit, because, ordinarily speaking, the family estate is better managed, and yields a greater ratio of profit in union than when split up and distributed among the several parceners, and moreover, by partition, a minor member of a Mitakshara family would lose the benefit of survivorship.⁴ There is also the danger of the minor's property being wasted by the costs of litigation.

Such special circumstances, as would render a suit for partition necessary in the interest of the minor, would justify a guardian in arranging a partition,⁵ or submitting it to arbitration.⁶

Where an adult co-sharer insists upon partition the guardian cannot resist it, but must do his best in the interests of the minor.⁷

A partition by arbitration,⁸ or by arrangement,⁹ or by the Collector,¹⁰ is binding on a minor, and can be enforced by him,¹¹ provided that he be not injuriously affected thereby, that it

Arunachellam Pillai (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 69; *Lekhraj Koorer (Mussamut) v. Dyal Singh (Sirdar)* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 497.

¹ *Bholanath v. Ghasi Ram* (1907), 29 All. 373.

² *Damoodur Misser v. Senabutti Misra* (1882), 8 Calc. 537; 10 C. L. R. 401; *Alimelammal v. Arunachellam Pillai* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 69; *Svamiyar Pillai v. Chokkalin-gam Pillai* (1862), 1 Mad. H. C. 105. If the suit be not for the benefit of the minor, the Court will refuse to decree partition: *Bachoo Hurkisson-das v. Mankorebai* (1907), 34 I. A. 107; 31 Bom. 373; 11 C. W. N. 769; 9 Bom. L. R. 646.

³ *Parvathi v. Manjayakarantha* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 193.

⁴ *Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi* (1861), 3 Mad. H. C. Rep. 94; Maonsgheten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. chap. i. s. 1, case 10; Mayne's

"Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 661, 662.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 328. See *Parbati (Mussamut) v. Naunihal Singh (Chaudhri)* (1909), 36 I. A. 71; 31 All. 412; 13 C. W. N. 983; 11 Bom. L. R. 878. West and Buhler, 2nd ed., p. 303.

⁶ *Jagan Nath v. Mannu Lal* (1894), 16 All. 231.

⁷ See *Nallappa Reddi v. Balammal* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 182.

⁸ *Ramnarain Poramanick v. Sreenmully Dossee* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 281.

⁹ *Deo Bunsee Koorer (Mussamut) v. Dwarkanath* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 273; *S. C. Deowanti v. Dwarkanath*, 8 B. L. R. 363, note; *Daya Shankar v. Hub Lal* (1914), 37 All. 105.

¹⁰ *Hari Prasad Jha (Baboo) v. Muddan Mohan Thakur* (1872), 8 B. L. R., Ap. 72; 17 W. R. C. R. 217.

¹¹ *Awadh Sarju Prasad Singh v. Sita Ram Singh* (1906), 29 All. 37.

be fair, that he be duly represented,¹ and that the person representing him in such proceedings act *bonâ fide* and with a due regard to his interest.²

"There is no doubt that a valid agreement for partition may be made during the minority of one or more of the coparceners. That seems to follow from the admitted right of one coparcener to claim a partition, and if an agreement for partition could not be made binding on minors, a partition could hardly ever take place. No doubt, if the partition were unfair or prejudicial to the minor's interests, he might, on attaining his majority, by proper proceedings set it aside so far as regards himself."³

Effect of birth
of son after
partition.

When a son is born to the father of a Mitakshara family, after there has been a partition between him and his sons, the afterborn son is not entitled to a redistribution,⁴ unless he was conceived at the time of the partition,⁵ but he is to the exclusion of his separated brethren entitled as a coparcener to the share allotted to his father, and to succeed as heir to his father.⁶

It has been held that where the father has reserved no share for himself on the partition, an afterborn son is entitled to a share.⁷

In a case governed by the Bengal school, a posthumous son would be entitled to reopen a partition made by his brothers after his father's death and before his birth.⁸

Absent co-
parceners.

As to the effect of a partition on the rights of coparceners

¹ *Lal Bahadur Singh v. Sisupal Singh* (1892), 14 All. 498; *Krishnabai v. Khangowda* (1893), 18 Bom. 197; *Daya Shankar v. Hub Lal* (1914), 37 All. 105.

² *Kalee Sunkur Sannyal v. Denendro Nath Sannyal* (1874), 23 W. R. C. R. 68; *Chanvirapa v. Danara* (1894), 19 Bom. 593; *Nallapa Reddi v. Balammal* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 182. As to cases governed by Malabar law, see *Arayalprath Kunhi Pocker v. Kunthilath Ahmad Kuli* (1905), 29 Mad. 62.

³ *Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu* (1903), 30 I. A. 139, at p. 150; 30 Cal. 738, at p. 752; 7 C. W. N. 578, at p. 580; 5 Bom. L. R. 461. As to the limitation for such suits, see *Lal Bahadur Singh v. Sisupal Singh* (1892), 14 All. 498; *Krishnabai v. Khangowda* (1893), 18 Bom. 197; *Chanvirapa v. Danara* (1894), 19 Bom. 593.

⁴ *Yekeyamian v. Agnisvarian* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 307; *Shivajirao v. Vasantrao* (1908), 33 Bom. 267; 10 Bom. L. R. 778; *Gunpat v. Gopalrao* (1898), 1 Bom. L. R. 123.

⁵ *Minalshi v. Virappa* (1884), 8 Mad. 89.

⁶ See *Naval Singh v. Bhagwan Singh* (1882), 4 All. 427; *Gunpat v. Gopalrao* (1898), 1 Bom. L. R. 123. Where one son has separated, the afterborn son is entitled to share with the father and the united sons, but has no right to a share of the property allotted to the separated son, *Gunpat Venkatesh Deshpande v. Gopalrao Venkatesh Deshpande* (1899), 23 Bom. 636.

⁷ See *Chengama Nayudu v. Munisamy Nayudu* (1896), 20 Mad. 75; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 47.

⁸ "Dayabhaga," chap. vii. para. 10.

who are absent, Sir Thomas Strange¹ says as follows: "Upon the same footing, in this respect, with minors are *absentees*, residing in a foreign country,² whose consent, at the time, not being attainable, partition may proceed without it, the law enjoining the preservation of their respective shares, till the one arrive at majority, and the other returns; and this is the case of the latter to the extent of the *seventh* in descent, the right of parceners remaining at home, being lost by dispossession beyond the *fourth*."³

This would, of course, be subject to the law for the limitation of suits.⁴

The purchaser of the share of a coparcener, either at an execution sale⁵ or by a voluntary transfer, where such transfer is valid,⁶ has the same right of partition as the coparcener whose share was purchased by him, and is entitled to have a separate portion allotted to him,⁷ but he may be compelled to sell to a coparcener a share of a dwelling-house purchased by him.⁸

Purchaser of share.

As to a suit by a transferee for partition, see *post*, p. 354.

RIGHTS OF WIFE AND WIDOW.

Under the Mitakshara school of law, except in Southern India, on a partition of coparcenary property by a father and his son or sons (or purchasers of their shares⁹), the wife of the

Rights of wife on partition.

¹ "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 206, 207.

² The rules as to what is a foreign country (Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 29), such as difference of language, the intervention of a mountain or great river, countries being accounted distant whence intelligence is not received in ten nights, would probably be disregarded in view of modern means of communication.

³ "Dayabhaga," chap. viii.; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 440, 448; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ix.; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 327, 390.

⁴ See Act IX. of 1908, Sched. I., Arts. 127, 144.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 300.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 301, 302.

⁷ *Bejin Behari Moduck v. Lall Mohun Chatteropadhyay* (1885), 12 Calo.

209; *Janoki Nath Mukhopadhyay v. Mohuranath Mukhopadhyay* (1883), 9 Calo. 580; 12 C. L. R. 215 (a suit by a purchaser from one of two widows); *Alamelu v. Rangasami* (1884), 7 Mad. 588; *Pandurang Anandray v. Bhaskar Shadashiv* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 72; *Lall Jha (Baboo) v. Juma Buksh (Shaikh)* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 116; *Lochun Singh v. Nemdharee Singh* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 170; *Rughoonath Panjoh v. Luckhun Chunder Dullal Chowdhry* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 23; *Anand Chandra Ghose v. Prankisto Dutt* (1869), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 14. As to his share on partition, see *ante*, pp. 301, 302.

⁸ Act IV. of 1893, s. 4, *post*, p. 357.

⁹ *Sumrun Thakoor v. Chundermun Misser* (1881), 8 Calo. 17; 9 C. L. R. 415.

father is entitled to have allotted to her for her separate enjoyment a share equal to a son's share,¹ in order to provide for her maintenance.²

Mr. Mayne³ stated that in Southern India the practice of allotting shares to wives is obsolete. Having regard to old authorities of the Dravida school it was not settled whether the father retained for them the shares which are assigned to his wives, or whether, as in the case of the Benares, Bombay, and Mithila schools, the shares should be made over to the wives themselves.⁴

Bengal school. As under the law of the Bengal school a father is entitled to the absolute disposal of his property, whether ancestral or self-acquired,⁵ this question cannot arise. In the rare case of a father partitioning his property amongst his sons, it is said that "his sonless wives are each entitled to a share equal to that of a son, or to half⁶ of such share, according as they are unprovided, or provided, with *stridhana*."⁷

If the wife has previously had separate property given to her by her husband or father-in-law, she takes so much as with such separate property would amount to a share equal to that of one of the sons.⁸

¹ *Danoodur Misser v. Senabuttu Misra* (1882), 8 Calc. 537; 10 C. L. R. 401; *Dular Koeri v. Dwarkanath Misser* (1904), 32 Calc. 234; 9 C. W. N. 270; *Sumrun Thakoor v. Chundermun Misser* (1881), 8 Calc. 17; 9 C. L. R. 415; *Mahabcer Persad v. Ramyad Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 90, at p. 99; 20 W. R. (C. R.) 192, at p. 196; *Laljet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 373; 20 W. R. (C. R.) 337; *Pursud Narain Singh v. Hunooman Sahay* (1880), 5 Calc. 845, at p. 854; 5 C. L. R. 576, at p. 585. In each of the above cases the partition was at the instance of a son, but it is submitted that the same principle would apply when the partition was at the instance of the father, see "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 7, paras. 1, 2. See "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv, paras. 4, 5, 11; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ii. s. 1, para. 39; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), pp. 230, 231; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 12. This includes a stepmother of the sons. Maonaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 50.

² *Laljet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh*

(1873), 12 B. L. R. 363, at p. 383; 20 W. R. (C. R.) 337, at p. 340; *Jairam Nathu v. Nathu Shamji* (1906), 31 Bom. 54; 8 Bom. L. R. 632. Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 189. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 2nd ed., p. 141. See, however, *Dular Koeri v. Dwarkanath Misser* (1904), 32 Calc. 234, at p. 242; 9 C. W. N. 270, at p. 276.

³ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 664; *Meenatchee v. Chedumbra Chetty*, Mad. dec. of 1853, 61.

⁴ See "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ii. s. 1, 39; "Parasara Madhavya-Dayavibhaga" (Burnell's translation), p. 8; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 189.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 224.

⁶ See, however, Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 20-25.

⁷ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 2nd ed., pp. 140, 141, 142; "Dayabhaga," chap. iii. s. 2, paras. 31, 32; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. vi. paras. 22-28; "Dayatattwa," chap. ii. paras. 13-18.

⁸ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, para. 5. *Jairam Nathu v. Nathu Shamji* (1906), 31 Bom. 54; 8 Bom.

Except in Southern India, where, it is said, the practice is ^{Mother's share on partition.} obsolete,¹ a widow is, on a partition of coparcenary property² (but not on a mere severance of interest³) between her sons (or purchasers of their shares),⁴ entitled to a share equal to that of one of her sons in lieu of maintenance.⁵

The Calcutta High Court allows her a son's share on a partition between her sons and grandsons,⁶ but the Allahabad High Court denies such right.⁷

In Madras a mother is, according to the "Smriti Chandrika," entitled on partition between her sons to have allotted to her a portion sufficient for her maintenance, but not exceeding the share of one of her sons.⁸

Except under the Bengal school,⁹ a sonless widow is entitled

L. R. 632. See *Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 90, at p. 99; 20 W. R. C. R. 192, at p. 196.

¹ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 664, 665, 866.

² She is not entitled to such right in property which has been acquired by the sons without any aid from the estate of their ancestors.

³ *Beti Kunwar v. Janki Kunwar* (1910), 33 All. 118.

⁴ *Amrita Lall Mitter v. Manick Lall Mullick* (1900), 27 Calc. 551; 4 C. W. N. 764; *Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Fulkumari Dassi* (1899), 27 Calc. 77; 4 C. W. N. 254.

⁵ *Ganesh Dutt Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Jewach Thakoorain (Mussummat)* (1903), 31 I. A. 10, at p. 15; 31 Calc. 262, at p. 271; 8 C. W. N. 146, at p. 150; 6 Bom. L. R. 1; *Hemangini Dasi (Srimati) v. Kedarnath Kudu Chowdhry* (1889), 16 I. A. 115; 16 Calc. 758; *Toril Bhoosun Bonnerjee v. Taraprosanno Bonnerjee* (1879), 4 Calc. 756; *Pursid Narain Sing v. Hunooman Sahay* (1880), 5 Calc. 845; 5 C. L. R. 576; *Kashori Mohun Ghose v. Monimohun Ghose* (1885), 12 Calc. 165; *Iraee Pershad Singh v. Nasib Koer* (1884), 10 Calc. 1017; *Bilaso v. Dina Nath* (1880), 3 All. 88; *Jodoonath Dey Sircar v. Brojonath Dey* (1874), 12 B. L. R. 385; *Jugomohan Haldar v. Sarodamoyee Dossee* (1877), 3 Calc. 149; *Damodardas Maneklal v. Uttamram Maneklal* (1892), 17 Bom.

271; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satayabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 504; *Beeby v. Kshatish Chandra Acharya Chaudhuri* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 631; *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 61. In *Thukoo Bae Bhude v. Ruma Bae Bhude* (1824), 2 Borr. 446, at p. 454, the pundits declared that the mother had a right to a share, although there was only one son. See also cases in West and Bühler, 2nd ed., pp. 391, 392.

⁶ *Badri Roy v. Bhugwat Narain Dobey* (1882), 8 Calc. 649; 11 C. L. R. 186; *Purna Chandra Chakravarti v. Sarojini Debi* (1904), 31 Calc. 1065; 8 C. W. N. 763; *Sibbosondery Dabra v. Bussomutty Dabia* (1881), 7 Calc. 191; *Prawnkissen Mitter v. Muttysonderly* (1841), Fulton, 389.

⁷ *Radha Kishen Man v. Bachhaman* (1880), 3 All. 118; *Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad* (1912), 34 All. 505.

⁸ Chap. iv. paras. 12-17. This is in accordance with the practice in Madras: Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 665. *Mari v. Chinammal* (1884), 8 Mad. 107, at p. 123; *Venkatammal v. Andiyappa Chetti* (1882), 6 Mad. 130; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 309. See Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 50.

⁹ *Damoodur Misser v. Senabutti Misrain* (1882), 8 Calc. 537, at p. 542; 10 C. L. R. 401, at p. 405.

to a share on a partition between her stepsons.¹ A step-grandmother is similarly entitled in case of a partition between the sons of her stepson.² Under the Bengal school when a partition is made between sons of different mothers, each mother is entitled to a share equal to that of each of her sons.³

In a partition between sons by different wives the respective mothers are only entitled to share equally with their own sons the aggregate of the shares which an equal division among the brothers allots to those sons, or, in other words, the property must be first divided into as many shares as there are sons. Each widow then shares equally with each of her sons the portion allotted to her sons.⁴

In a Bombay case⁵ where there was a partition between a son and his stepmother and her three sons, the stepmother was given one-fifth. According to the above rule, she would have been entitled to a three-sixteenth share.

This right of the mother has been held only to apply to the case of a general partition, and not to a case where there has been only a partition of an item of the property at the instance of a stranger.⁶

It has also been held that this right only comes into operation when the partition is completed.⁷

Under the Bengal law a husband can by will, either expressly⁸ or by a bequest to other persons,⁹ deprive his wife of a share on partition.

A mere direction to divide the estate among the sons in accordance with the *shastras* does not exclude the widow's right to a share.¹⁰

Right of
grandmother.

On a partition between her son's sons, a widow is entitled to a share equal to that of a son's son.¹¹

¹ *Damoodur Misser v. Senabutty Misra* (1882), 8 Calc. 537; 10 C. L. R. 401 (a Mithila case); *Laljeet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 373; 20 W. R. C. R. 337; *Thakur Proshad (Chowdhry) v. Bhagbati*, 1 C. L. J. 142; *Har Narain v. Bishambhar Nath* (1915), 38 All. 83.

² *Vithal v. Prahlad* (1915), 39 Bom. 373; 17 Bom. L. R. 361.

³ *Hemangini Dasi (Srimati) v. Kedar Nath Kudu Chowdhry* (1889), 10 I. A. 115; 16 Calc. 758. See *Torit Bhoosun Bonnerjee v. Taraproseno Bonnerjee* (1879), 4 Calc. 756.

⁴ *Kristobhabiney Dossee v. Ashutosh Basu Mullick* (1886), 13 Calc. 39; *Cally Churn Mullick v. Janova Dossee* (1886), 1 Ind. Jur. 284.

⁵ *Damodardas Maneklal v. Uttam-*

ram Maneklal (1892), 17 Bom. 271.

⁶ *Barahi Debi v. Debkamini Debi* (1892), 20 Calc. 682.

⁷ *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. 61; explained in *Tej Pratap Singh v. Champa Kalee Koer* (1885), 12 Calc. 96.

⁸ *Debendra Coomarr Roy Chowdhry v. Brojendra Coomarr Roy Chowdhry* (1890), 17 Calc. 886, following *Bhoobunmoyee Debea Chowdhraim v. Ramkissore Acharj Chowdhry*, Ben. S. D. A. 1860, p. 485.

⁹ *Poorendra Nath Sen v. Hemangini Dasi* (1908), 36 Calc. 75; 12 C. W. N. 1002. As to her right of maintenance in such case, see *ante*, pp. 78, 79.

¹⁰ *Kishori Mohun Ghose v. Moni Mohun Ghose* (1885), 12 Calc. 165.

¹¹ *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun*

On a partition between son's sons and great-grandsons, she is entitled to the share of a son's son.¹

When the partition is between grandsons by different sons, the share of the grandmother is to be ascertained by giving her such a share as she would take if each of the grandsons took equally. Thus if there be nine grandsons she will get one-tenth, and so on. The share which the grandsons themselves take depends upon the number in each stock, and upon whether their own mothers are alive.

The right of a widow to a share on a partition between her great-grand-sons is not expressly recognized by the Hindu law.² The right would, it is submitted, be admissible upon grounds similar to those which confer a right upon a mother and grand-mother.³ Great-grand-mother.

In fixing the amount of her share, the widow must be debited with the value of any gift or legacy which she may have received from her husband.⁴ Gift by husband.

Apparently, as in the case of allotting maintenance, her separate property must be taken into account,⁵ but the fact that she has inherited a share from one of her sons does not deprive her of her right to a share on partition.⁶

In the absence of an express arrangement, a wife or widow has only a restricted interest in the property allotted to her on such partition, whether she be governed by the Bengal ⁷

Neoghy (1888), 15 Calc. 292, at p. 306; *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 61; "Dayabhaga," chap. iii. s. 2, para. 32; "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. vii. paras. 4, 6; "Dayatattwa," chap. ii. para. 19; F. Macnaghten, 39, 41, 52, 54; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed. pp. 493-498. *Contrâ Puddum Mookhee Dossee v. Rayee Monee Dossee* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 409; S. C. on review, *Rayee Monee Dossee v. Puddum Mookhee Dossee* (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 66, which was a case on the same footing as a partition between sons. See *Purna Chandra Chakravarti v. Sarojini Debi* (1904), 31 Calc. 1065, at p. 1076; 8 C. W. N. 763, at p. 771.

¹ *Purna Chandra Chakravarti v. Sarojini Debi* (1904), 31 Calc. 1065; 8 C. W. N. 763. F. Macnaghten, 52.

² Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 27. F. Macnaghten, pp. 28, 51;

doubted by Wilson, Works, v. 25.

³ See Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., pp. 497, 498.

⁴ *Kishori Mohun Ghose v. Monimohun Ghose* (1885), 12 Calc. 165; *Judoonath Dey Sircar v. Brojonath Dey Sircar* (1874), 12 B. L. R. 385. "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 2, para. 9; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, para. 18.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 86. See "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, para. 18.

⁶ *Jugomohan Haldar v. Saradamoyee Dassee* (1877), 3 Calc. 149; *Poorendra Nath Sen v. Hemangini Dasi* (1908), 36 Calc. 75; 12 C. W. N. 1002.

⁷ *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhobhun Mohun Neoghy* (1888), 15 Calc. 292; *Hriday Kant Bhattacharjee v. Behari Lal Mookerjee* (1906), 11 C. W. N. 239; *Tripura Sundari Debi v. Dakshina Mohun Roy* (1906), 11 C. W. N. 698.

or by the Mitakshara school.¹ It does not pass to her *stridhan* heirs,² and she cannot dispose of it by will.³

On her death it goes back, it is submitted, to the sons and grandsons from whose share it was deducted.⁴ This question was not decided in *Debi Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh*.⁵ It depends upon whether the property is given to the woman in lieu of inheritance or in lieu of maintenance.⁶ It is submitted that it is given to her in lieu of maintenance.⁷ It was suggested in *Dinesh Chandra Roy Chowdhury v. Biraj Kaminy Dasee* (1911), 39 Calc. 87, at p. 100; 15 C. W. N. 945, at p. 952, that the right arises from a proprietary right.

Effect of sale
on right.

Although a right to maintenance is not a complete charge upon the property,⁸ a right to a share in lieu of maintenance is not affected by a sale of an undivided share, whether before⁹ or during the pendency of a partition suit.¹⁰

It has been held that the loss of a right of maintenance would involve the loss of the right to a share on partition.¹¹

It is, it is submitted, clear that when the share had been allotted, want of chastity would not divest the right.¹²

Enforcement
of right.

A wife or widow cannot, until there has been a partition or separation, enforce her right to a share,¹³ even if by arrangement a share of the profits has been assigned to her for her maintenance,¹⁴ or her name be recorded as a co-sharer,¹⁵ and

¹ *Debi Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh* (1912), 39 I. A. 121; 34 All. 234; 16 C. W. N. 409; 14 Bom. L. R. 220, reversing *Debi Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh* (1909), 32 All. 253; *Chiddu v. Naubat* (1901), 24 All. 67; *Sri Pal Rai v. Surajbali* (1901), 24 All. 82.

² Cases *ante*, p. 335, note 7, and above, note 1.

³ *Hriday Kant Bhattacharjee v. Behu Lal Mookerjee* (1906), 11 C. W. N. 89.

⁴ See cases *ante*, p. 335, note 7, and above, note 1.

⁵ (1912), 39 I. A. 121; 34 All. 234; 16 C. W. N. 409; 14 Bom. L. R. 220. Their Lordships there said that it went back "to the estate from which it was taken."

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ See *Beely v. Kshitish Chandra Acharya* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 631, and other cases *ante*, p. 333, note 5.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 89.

⁹ *Bilaso v. Dinanath* (1880), 3 All.

88; *Amrita Lal Mitter v. Manick Lal Mullick* (1900), 27 Calc. 551; 4 C. W. N. 764. See *Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 247, at p. 256; 3 Calc. 198, at p. 209.

¹⁰ *Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Ful-kumari Dassi* (1899), 27 Calc. 77; S. C. sub nomine *Jogendra Chunder Ghose v. Ganendra Nath Sircar*, 4 C. W. N. 254; *ante*, p. 93.

¹¹ *Sellam v. Chinnamal* (1901), 24 Mad. 441. See *ante*, p. 82.

¹² See *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Koltany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115; 5 Calc. 776; 6 C. L. R. 322.

¹³ *Sunder Bahu v. Monohur Lal Upadhyaya* (1881), 10 C. L. R. 79, at p. 80; *Beely v. Kshitish Chandra Acharya* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 631; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. pp. 188, 189; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 27, 422-427.

¹⁴ *Bhoop Singh v. Phool Kower (Mussumat)* (1867), 2 Agra, 368.

¹⁵ *Pema v. Jas Kunwar* (1913), 35 All. 527; *Kailashi Kunwar v. Badri Prasad* (1913), *Ibid.* 548.

until partition she has no alienable interest.¹ When there has been a partition, or a separation, she may sue for her share.² She is a necessary party to a suit by a son against her husband,³ or to a suit between her sons, for partition; but the omission to reserve a share for the mother does not render the partition invalid.⁴ She may acquiesce in such omission.⁵

A woman, who is not a coparcener, is not entitled to a share except on such partition as is above mentioned.⁶ No other right on partition.

Although some of the ancient writers gave her the right to a one-fourth share,⁷ a sister is not entitled to a share on a partition.⁸ As she is entitled to her maintenance until marriage, and to her marriage expenses out of the family property,⁹ provision therefor should be made at the time of the partition.

ALLOTMENT OF SHARES.

"To effect a partition in a case governed by the Dayabhaga it is necessary to know the dates of birth and death of predeceased members. But in a Mitakshara family the surviving members remain in possession of the whole property, as if the predeceased members never existed."¹⁰

On a partition shares are allotted in accordance with the following rules. Shares on partition.

There is nothing in law to prevent an arrangement upon a different footing,¹¹ so far as the interests of adult coparceners are concerned, but an arrangement between the parties to a partition that the shares should be inalienable, and should revert to the original coparceners, cannot be upheld.¹²

¹ *Judoonath Tewaree v. Bushonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 61.

² *Ram Joshi v. Laxmibai* (1864), 1 Bom. H. C. 189, and cases *ante*, p. 333, note 5.

³ *Laljeet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 373, at p. 383; 20 W. R. C. R. 336, at p. 340.

⁴ *Ganesh Dutt Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Jewach Thakoorain (Mussumat)* (1903), 31 I. A. 10, at p. 15; 31 Calc. 262, at p. 271; 8 C. W. N. 146, at p. 150; 6 Bom. L. R. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 61.

⁷ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 118; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 7, paras. 5-10; "Dayabhaga," chap. iii. s. 2, paras. 38, 39; "Smriti Chandrika,"

chap. iv. paras. 32-34; "Vivada Chintamani" (Tagore's translation), p. 248; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 93, 94.

⁸ See *Damoodur Misser v. Senabuttu Misrain* (1882), 8 Calc. 537, at p. 541; 10 C. L. R. 401, at p. 404; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 50.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 52, 53, 235, 271.

¹⁰ Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 322.

¹¹ See *Ram Nirunjun Singh v. Prayag Singh* (1881), 8 Calc. 138; 10 C. L. R. 66; *Kanti Chandra Mukerji v. Ali-i-Nabi* (1911), 33 All. 414.

¹² *K. Venkatrammanna v. K. Brammanna Sastrulu* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 345. As to an agreement not to partition, see *ante*, p. 325.

Between
father and
sons,

Under the Mitakshara school of law, in a partition between a father and his sons, each of the sons takes a share equal to that of the father.¹

Unequal
division by
father.

Although under the Mitakshara a father is entitled to dispose of his self-acquired property,² and under the Bengal school he is entitled to dispose of all his property, whether ancestral or self-acquired, it does not seem settled upon the authorities whether in the former case he can divide his self-acquired property, or in the latter case any of his property, in unequal shares between his sons.³

Some of the text writers ⁴ prohibited such inequality of division, except under special circumstances.

Mr. Mayne ⁵ summed up the authorities in the following words: "The result would be that a father under Mitakshara law, in dealing with his self-acquired property, or any other property in which his sons take no interest by birth, and a father under Bengal law, in dealing with any property, may distribute it as he likes. If he conforms to the rules of partition, the transaction will be valid by mutual agreement, without actual apportionment followed by possession; but if he does not conform to those rules, then he must deliver the share to each of the sharers, so as to make a valid gift to each."

As to the Bengal school, Dr. Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya,⁶ said: "As the father can undoubtedly make a gift of ancestral property, even in favour of a stranger, there can be no doubt that the father can make an unequal partition of such property among his sons, though by doing so against the rules of the Shastras he incurs sin;" and R. C. Mitra ⁷ says: "It has been held that the injunctions against an unequal distribution by the father are mere moral precepts which no Court of law would enforce. A father bent upon making an unequal distribution may do so in more ways than one."

Father
represents
his sons.

As a general rule at a partition, each member of the family is presumed to represent not only himself but also his sons, and the sons take their share through their father, as being included in the share allotted them.⁸

¹ "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 5, para. 5. *Ante*, p. 226.

² *Ante*, pp. 248, 249.

³ See *ante*, p. 224.

⁴ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. pp. 540, 541; "Vyavahara Nirnaya," Burnell's translation, p. 8; "Daya-bhaga," chap. ii. paras. 15-20, 50, 86; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 194; Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 147. "The Daya-bhaga" makes a distinction between ancestral and self-acquired property, so does

the "Daya-Krama Sangraha" (chap. vi. paras. 8-16). The "Mitakshara" seems to allow an unequal partition, chap. i. s. 2, paras. 6, 13, 14. See also "Smṛti Chandrika," chap. ii. s. 1, paras. 17 to 24.

⁵ 8th ed., p. 685.

⁶ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 361.

⁷ "Law of Joint Property and Partition," p. 320.

⁸ *Umed v. Khalsabai* (1909), 11 Bom. L. R. 396.

It is open to the son to contest the partition on ground of fraud, or that the share allotted did not properly represent the share to which the father's heir was entitled.¹

According to all the schools, on a partition brothers take equal shares.²

Between brothers, or their sons, etc.

Under the Mitakshara school, the share of a brother who has died is represented by his sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons.³

Shares of deceased brothers.


Under the Bengal school, the share of a brother, who is dead, is taken by his heir,⁴ devisee, or assignee.

As between different branches of a family, division must be *per stirpes*, i.e. according to the stocks,⁵ and as between the sons of the same father, it must be *per capita*,⁶ i.e. according to the number of sons.

Different branches.

This rule "is designed to ensure equality of partition in cases of vested interests held in coparcenary, and to carry out in those cases the principles that those who have capacity to confer equal spiritual benefits on the common ancestor ought to take equal shares."⁷

Illustration. (Mitakshara School.)



¹ *Umed v. Khalsabai* (1909), 11 Bom. L. R. 396.

² *Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik* (1876), 1 Bom. 561; *Bhyroochund Rai v. Russoomunee* (1799), 1 Ben. Sel. Rep. 28 (new edition, 36); *Neelkaunt Rai v. Munee Chowdraen* (1802), *ibid.* 58 (new edition, 77); *Talwair Singh v. Puhlwan Singh* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. Rep. 301 (new edition, 402); "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 2, para. 6; chap. i. s. 3, paras. 1-7; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ii. s. 2, para. 2; s. 3, paras. 16-24; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, paras. 8-11, 17; "Dayabhaga," chap. iii. s. 2, para. 27; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. vii. para. 13; "Viramitrodaya," chap. ii. part 1 ss. 11, 14. As to a usage to the contrary, see *Sheo*

Buksh v. Futeh Singh (1818), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 265 (new edition, 340); Wm. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 16.

³ *Bhimul Doss v. Choonee Lall* (1877), 2 Calc. 379; *Duljeet Singh v. Sheemunook Singh* (1802), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 59 (2nd ed., 79).

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 223, 224.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 5, para. 2; *Rajnarain Singh v. Heeralal* (1878), 5 Calc. 142.

⁶ "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 3, paras. 1-7. See *Debi Parshad v. Thakur Dial* (1875), 1 All. 105, overruling *Madho Singh v. Bindessery Roy* (1868), 3 Agra H. C. 101.

⁷ *Manjanatha Shanabhaga v. Narayana Shanabhaga* (1882), 5 Mad. 362, at p. 364.

The family having descended from two brothers, one half-share must be allotted to each branch. As to B's branch, D and his sons, D₁, D₂, and D₃, are each entitled to $\frac{1}{4}$ of $\frac{1}{2}$, i.e. $\frac{1}{8}$. As to C's branch, each of the sub-branches composed of C's sons, E, F, and G, with their sons respectively, will be entitled to $\frac{1}{3}$ of $\frac{1}{2}$, i.e. $\frac{1}{6}$, so E and E₁ will each get $\frac{1}{2}$ of $\frac{1}{6}$, i.e. $\frac{1}{12}$, F, F₁, and F₂ will each get $\frac{1}{3}$ of $\frac{1}{6}$, i.e. $\frac{1}{18}$, G, G₁, G₂, G₃, and G₄ will each get $\frac{1}{5}$ of $\frac{1}{6}$, i.e. $\frac{1}{30}$. This illustration will apply to the Bengal school except that under that school the sons do not take during the lifetime of their fathers.

**Partial
partition.**

This rule is laid down with reference to cases in which all the coparceners desire partition at the same time. Where there is a partition by some only of the coparceners, and subsequently there is a partition between the coparceners who had remained united after the first partition, it has been held ¹ that the allotment of shares of the second partition must have regard to the state of the family before the first partition, with such variations as may have arisen in consequence of the death of coparceners or the birth of new coparceners; but according to a different, and, it is submitted, better view ² the state of the family at the time of the second partition can alone be considered.

As to the Jhala Girasias of Limri in Kattiawar, see *Prithisingji v. Umedsingji* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 98.

As to the Chudasama Girasias of Kharad in the Dhanduka Taluka, see *Malubhai v. Sursangji* (1905), 7 Bom. L. R. 821.

**Sons by
different
mothers.**

Except where there is a family usage to the contrary, sons by different mothers take equally.³

When daughters' sons,⁴ or *gotraja sapindas*⁵ other than descendants, succeed as heirs, they take on partition *per capita*.

As to the rights of purchasers, or mortgagees of shares, see *ante*, p. 331.

There is nothing to prevent adult coparceners making any arrangement as to the division, or as to the devolution of the shares,⁶ provided that they do not thereby alter the inheritance,⁷ or offend against the rule as to perpetuity.⁸

¹ See *Manjanatha Shanabhaga v. Narayana Shanabhaga* (1882), 5 Mad. 362.

² *Pranjivandas v. Ichharam* (1915), 39 Bom. 734; 17 Bom. L. R. 712.

³ See *Subramanya Pandya Chokka Talavar v. Siva Subramanya Pillai* (1894), 17 Mad. 316, at p. 327; *Sumrun Singh v. Khadum Singh* (1814), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 116 (2nd ed., 147); Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 576.

⁴ *Ramdhun Sein v. Kishen Kanth*

Sein (1821), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 100 (2nd ed., 133).

⁵ *Nagesh v. Gururao* (1892), 17 Bom. 303, at p. 305.

⁶ See *Kanti Chandra Mukerji v. Ali-i-Nabi* (1911), 33 All. 414; *Ram Nirunjun Singh v. Prayag Singh* (1881), 8 Calo. 138; 10 C. L. R. 66; *Mulhuran Chaitar v. Ponnusamy Udayar* (1915), 29 Mad. L. J. 214.

⁷ *Post*, p. 502.

⁸ *Post*, p. 525.

SUBJECT OF PARTITION.

The coparcenary property,¹ movable or immovable, is alone the subject of partition.

Property which has been proved to have, by ancient and invariable custom,² always descended to one individual, and to have been enjoyed by him alone, and not to have been divided,³ is not coparcenary property,⁴ and is therefore not partible.

As to proof of such impartibility, see *post*, p. 515.

A coparcener is entitled to insist that all the family property, which is capable of partition, shall be divided.

Leasehold property, including property held on a lease from Government, can be partitioned.⁵

Land in the possession of tenants can be partitioned, either by metes and bounds, or by a division of the rent.

A coparcener⁷ or purchaser⁸ is entitled to insist that the family dwelling-house be partitioned; but a purchaser may be required to sell his share therein to a coparcener.⁹

He has a similar right with regard to a compound hitherto held in common, and such right is not affected by the fact that there is a public right of way over such compound.¹⁰

"The principle . . . of partition is that if a property can be partitioned without destroying the intrinsic value of the

¹ *Ante*, pp. 238-247.

² See *ante*, pp. 27-29. *Koernarain Roy (Raja) v. Dhorindhur Roy*, Ben. S. D. A. 1858, p. 1132.

³ *Durriao Sing (Thakur) v. Davi Sing (Thakur)* (1873), 1 I. A. 1; 13 B. L. R. 165; *Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanananiha Perumal Sethurayer* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 1; 12 B. L. R. 396; 14 M. I. A. 570; 17 W. R. C. R. 553; *Adrishappa v. Gurushidappa* (1880), 7 I. A. 162; 4 Bom. 494; *Kachi Kaliyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar* (1905), 32 I. A. 261; 28 Mad. 508; 10 C. W. N. 95. S. C. in Court below (1901), 24 Mad. 562. See *ante*, pp. 259-262.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 263, 264.

⁵ *Dattatraya Vishal v. Mahadaji*

Parashram (1891), 16 Bom. 528. As to the case where an occupancy holding is an item of coparcenary property, see *Dwarka v. Sheo Dulare* (1914), 36 All. 461.

⁶ See *Uppala Raghava Charlu v. Uppala Ramanuja Charlu* (1902), 26 Mad. 78. As to partition between a coparcener and the ijaradar of another coparcener, see *Ram Lochi Koeri v. Collingridge* (1907), 11 C. W. N. 397.

⁷ *Hullothur Mookerjee v. Ramnauth Mookerjee* (1862), Marsh. 35.

⁸ *Jhubboo Lall Sahoo v. Khoob Lall* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 294.

⁹ Act IV. of 1893 (Partition), s. 4, *post*, p. 357.

¹⁰ *Ram Pershad Narain Tewaree v. Court of Wards* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 152.

whole property, or of the shares, such partition ought to be made. If, on the contrary, no partition can be made without destroying the intrinsic value, then a money compensation should be given instead of the share which would fall to 'a coparcener' by partition."¹

Property in
its nature
indivisible.

Where property is in its nature indivisible, as, for instance, in the case of animals, furniture, etc., it can be allotted to individual coparceners, corresponding or equivalent parcels of the property being allotted to other coparceners, or the value being made up in money.

Where it is impossible or inequitable to allot a specific item to an individual, as where it consists of a right of way, a passage, a well, a bridge, it may be necessary that the item of property should continue to be jointly enjoyed by the several coparceners.²

There is a presumption that a passage remained undivided at the time of the partition.³

In some cases it may be necessary to sell the property and adjust the proceeds in the distribution.⁴

Places of
worship, etc.

Places of worship and sacrifice,⁵ and property dedicated to an idol or to other pious uses, cannot be physically partitioned.⁶

Where merely a charge is created for religious purposes, the property can be alienated or partitioned subject to the charge.⁷

Apart from a dedication, the use to which property has been put, as, for instance, when it has been used as a *poojah dalan*, does not render it impartible, but the Court may, if the circumstances make it equitable, permit that portion to be

¹ *Ashanullah v. Kali Kinkur Kur* (1884), 10 Calc. 675. This was a suit by a purchaser, but the principle applies to any case. See *Strange's "Hindu Law,"* vol. ii. p. 329.

² See *Govind Annaji Bodhani v. Trimbak Govind Dhaneshwar* (1910), 36 Bom. 275; 12 Bom. L. R. 363.

³ *Nakubhai Dhirajram v. Hansgarvi (Bai)* (1912), 36 Bom. 379; 14 Bom. L. R. 418.

⁴ See Act IV. of 1893 (Partition), s. 2, *post*, pp. 356, 357.

⁵ *Anund Moyee Chowdhraim v.*

Boykantnath Roy (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 193.

⁶ "Gautama Institutes," xxviii. 46; "Sacred Books of the East," vol. ii. p. 306; "Dayabhaga," chap. vi. s. 2, para. 26 *Rajender Dutt v. Sham Chund Mitter* (1880), 6 Calc. 106. See Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Hindu Family," pp. 450, 451.

⁷ *Sonatun Bysack v. Juggutsaondree Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1859), 8 M. I. A. 66; *Ram Coomar Paul v. Jogender Nath Paul* (1878), 4 Calc. 56; 2 C. L. R. 310. *Post*, p. 549.

allotted to a single sharer, and require him to pay owelty of partition (a sum of money as compensation), or to account for its value in the partition.¹

As to partition of the worship or of the management, see *post*, p. 575.

HOW SEPARATION AND PARTITION CAN BE EFFECTED.

Under the Mitakshara school of law, a father can effect a partition between his sons with or without their consent.²

Apart from the special powers given to a father by the Mitakshara law, the union of the coparceners in a joint family can be dissolved by any arrangement, express or implied, by which the coparceners alter, or intend to alter, their title as coparceners into a title either as tenants in common or as owners of separate shares, or by any change in the status of the coparceners, which is inconsistent with their being members of a joint family,³ or by a decree of a competent Court,⁴ or by the Revenue authorities.⁵

All the coparceners should be parties to a separation or partition by arrangement,⁶ the guardian of minor coparceners acting on their behalf.⁷

By arrangement, the separation or partition may be partial as regards the persons separating, some of the coparceners electing to remain joint, their status *inter se* being unaffected by the separation.⁸

¹ See *Rajcoomaree Dossee v. Gopal Chunder Bose* (1878), 3 Calc. 514.

² *Kandasami v. Doraisami Ayyar* (1880), 2 Mad. 317; *Murugaya Maniyakaran v. Palaniyandi Maniyakaran* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 147. "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 2, para. 2.

³ A mere change in the mode of holding the property is not conclusive, *post*, pp. 349, 350.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 350-353.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 358, 359.

⁶ As to the parties to a suit, see *post*, p. 352.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 329.

⁸ See *Rewun Persad v. Radha Beeby (Mussumat)* (1846), 4 M. L. A. 137, at p. 168; 7 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 37; *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Nara-*

simhulu Maistri (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at pp. 156, 157; *Kandasami v. Doraisami Ayyar* (1880), 2 Mad. 317, at p. 324; *Radha Churn Dass v. Krupa Sindhv Dass* (1879), 5 Calc. 474; 4 C. L. R. 428; *Gavrishankar Parabhuram v. Atmaram Rajaram* (1893), 18 Bom. 611; *Anandibai v. Hari Suba Pai* (1911), 35 Bom. 293; 13 Bom. L. R. 287; *Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baladeo Das* (1907), 35 Calc. 961; 12 C. W. N. 127; *Upendranarain Myti v. Gopee Nath Bera* (1883), 9 Calc. 817; 12 C. R. 356. Their relation to those who have separated is as divided members of a family, see *Marjanatha Shanabhaga v. Narayana Shanabhaga* (1882), 5 Mad. 362; *Kedar Nath (Maharaj) v. Ratan Singh*

Coparceners may also by agreement arrange that a portion only of the property should be divided, the remainder remaining joint.¹ They can afterwards partition the remainder of the property.²

The fact that there had been a partition of any kind would ordinarily raise a presumption that the coparceners had separated in estate and interest,³ but such presumption is liable to be rebutted.⁴

For an arrangement providing for a future repartition, see *Duri Bhagavantulu v. Tadeipatri Veeravadhanulu* (1909), 33 Mad. 246.

"Though there can be no compulsory partial partition either in respect of the joint property belonging to the family, or in respect of the persons constituting the undivided family,⁵ yet by mutual agreement of parties the partition can be partial either in respect of the property or of the persons constituting the family. And according to usage and custom the remaining members of an undivided family from which one or more alone have become divided, continue as an undivided family in its normal state and not as members, who after partition have been reunited."⁶

Accident,
mistake,
fraud.

Where, from accident, mistake, or fraud, a portion of the coparcenary property is not included in a partition, such portion must be divided amongst the persons who took under the partition.⁷ In other cases a partition is final, and cannot be contested in a subsequent suit.⁸

Where, after the partition, it appears that property allotted

(*Thakur*) (1910), 37 I. A. 161; 22 All. 415; 14 C. W. N. 985; 12 Bom. L. R. 656. As to the presumption that the remainder of the family is joint, see *ante*, p. 222.

¹ *Muthusami Mudaliar v. Nallakulantha Mudaliar* (1894), 18 Mad. 418; *Hoolas Koonwer (Mussumat) v. Man Singh* (1868), 3 Agra, 37; *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at p. 157; *Ajodhya Purshad v. Mahadeo Purshad* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 221.

² *Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baladeo Das* (1907), 35 Cal. 961; 12 C. W. N. 127. See *Shamasoodery Dasse v. Kartick Churn Mittra* (1865), Bourke O. C. 326.

³ *Vaidyanatha Aiyar v. Aiyasami Aiyar* (1908), 32 Mad. 191; *Rangasami Naidu v. Sundarajubu Naidu* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 472; see *ante*, p. 222.

⁴ See *Timmi Reddy v. Achamma* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 325.

⁵ *Post*, p. 353.

⁶ *Hoolas Koonwer (Mussumat) v. Man Singh* (1868), 3 Agra, 37; *Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu Maistri* (1901), 25 Mad. 149, at p. 157. See *Peddaiya v. Ramalingam* (1888), 11 Mad. 406.

⁷ See *Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baladeo Das* (1907), 35 Cal. 961; 12 C. W. N. 127; *Bhowani Proshad Shahu v. Juggernath Shahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 309; *Lachman Singh v. Sanwal Singh* (1878), 1 All. 543; *Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vithal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 444, at pp. 451, 469; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 9, para. 1; "Dayabhaga," chap. xiii. paras. 1-3; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 6, para. 3.

⁸ See *Bharaji Thakur v. Jharula Dass* (1914), (P. C.) 18 C. W. N. 1029.

to one of the coparceners did not belong to the coparcenary,¹ or that a valid charge existed thereon,² the coparcener to whom such property was allotted can insist upon the partition being reopened, or, at any rate, can claim compensation from the other parties to the partition.

A partition in title, i.e. a separation in estate, can be effected, although there be no partition by metes and bounds.³

Partition by metes and bounds unnecessary.

A separation in estate has no application to impartible property, as there is nothing upon which such separation can operate.⁴

The effect of this separation is to exclude rights of survivorship according to Mitakshara law, and to make the parties tenants in common as to the property.⁵

There may be a separation of the members of the family and at the same time an arrangement for the sake of convenience that the property, or a portion of it,⁶ should remain joint, but be held in defined shares. In that case the rights of the separating coparceners *inter se* are those of ordinary tenants in common, and are free from the incidents applicable to a joint family.⁷

¹ *Maruti v. Rama* (1895), 21 Bom. 333.

² *Lakshman v. Gopal* (1898), 23 Bom. 385.

³ *Parbati (Musammatt) v. Nannihal Singh (Chaudhri)* (1909), 36 I. A. 71; 31 All. 412; 13 C. W. N. 983; 11 Bom. L. R. 878; *Raghubir Singh v. Moti Kunwar* (1912), 35 All. 41; 17 C. W. N. 453; 15 Bom. L. R. 426; *Balkishen Das v. Ramnarain Sahu* (1903), 30 I. A. 139, at p. 148; 30 Cal. 738, at p. 751; 7 C. W. N. 578, at p. 589; 5 Bom. L. R. 461; *Appovier v. Rama Subba Ayyan* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 75; 8 W. R. P. C. 1; *Radhika Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi) v. Nilamani Patta Maha Devi Garu (Sri Gajapathi)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 497; 6 B. L. R. 202; 14 W. R. P. C. 33; *Doorga Pershad (Baboo) v. Kundun Koowar (Mussumat)* (1873), 1 I. A. 55; 13 B. L. R. 235; 21 W. R. C. R. 214; *Jusoda Koonwur (Mussumat) v. Gourie Byjonath Sokae Singh* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 139; *Sreepershad (Lalla) v. Akoonjoo Koonwar (Mussumat)* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 488; *Mohabeer Pershad (Lalla) v. Kundun Koowar (Mussumat)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 116; *Badaruth*

Tewary v. Jagurnath Dass (1869), 1 N. W. P. 75; *Jeonee (Mussumat) v. Dhurum Koor* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 108; *Sobha Koorree (Mussumat) v. Hurdey Narain Mohajun* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 97.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 264.

⁵ *Cf. ante*, p. 219.

⁶ *Patni Mal (Rajah) v. Manohar Lal (Ray)* (1834), 5 Bom. Sol. R. 349 (2nd ed., 410).

⁷ *Appovier v. Rama Subba Ayyan* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 75; 8 W. R. P. C. 1; *Narayan Ayyar v. Lakshmi Ammal* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 289; *Venkata Gopalla Narasimha Row Bahadoor (Rajah Suraneni) v. Lakshma Venkama Row (Rajah Suraneni)* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 113; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 41; 12 W. R. P. C. 40; S. C. in Court below, (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 40. See *Rewun Persad v. Radha Beeby (Mussumat)* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 137, at p. 168; 7 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 37; *Ramabhadra (Rajah Setrucherla) v. Virabhadra Suryanarayana (Rajah Setrucherla)* (1899), 26 I. A. 167; 22 Mad. 470; 3 C. W. N. 533; 1 Bom. L. R. 388; *Muhesh Doobey v. Kishun Doobey* (1869), 1 N. W. P. 42.

There would, in the absence of a valid agreement,¹ be a right to enforce a partition of such property by metes and bounds subsequently.²

Any instrument whereby co-owners of any property divide any property in severalty is an instrument of partition.³

A separation or a partition can be effected without an instrument in writing.⁴

Question is
one of
intention.

"The true test of partition of property, according to Hindu law, is the intention of the family to become separate owners."⁵

The question is one of intention merely, viz. whether the intention of the parties, to be inferred from the instruments which they have executed and the acts they have done, was to effect a division such as to alter the status of the family.⁶

Agreement to
separate.

An agreement between the coparceners to hold and enjoy the property in severalty operates as a separation in estate, although there may have been no actual partition by metes and bounds,⁷ and although the separate possession and enjoyment be postponed until the agreement be fully carried into effect.⁸

"When the members of an undivided family agree among themselves

¹ As to an agreement not to partition, see *ante*, p. 325.

² *Lade v. Sadashiva* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 35. See *Subbaraya Tauker v. Rajaram Tauker* (1901), 25 Mad 585.

³ *In re Govind Pandurang Kamat* (1910), 35 Bom. 75; 12 Bom. L. R. 936.

⁴ *Reurun Persad v. Radha Beeby (Mussumat)* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 137, at p. 168; 7 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 37; *Budha Mal v. Bhagwan Das* (1890), 18 Calc. 302; *Latchumammal v. Gangammal* (1910), 34 Mad 72. By Act II. of 1884, effect was given to unregistered partition deeds which had been executed in the Madras Presidency.

⁵ *Ram Pershad Singh v. Lakhpati Koer* (1902), 30 I. A. 1, at p. 10; 30 Calc. 23, at p. 253; 7 C. W. N. 162, at p. 168; 5 Bom. L. R. 103.

⁶ *Doorga Pershad (Baboo) v. Kundun Koonwar (Mussumat)* (1873), 1 I. A. 55, at p. 68; 13 B. L. R. 235, at p. 239; 21 W. R. C. R. 214, at p. 215; *Balkishen Das v. Ram*

Narain Sahu (1903), 30 I. A. 139, at p. 147; 30 Calc. 738, at p. 750; 7 C. W. N. 578, at p. 588.

⁷ *Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyar* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 75, at p. 90; 8 W. R. P. C. 1; *Balkishen Das v. Ramnarain Sahu* (1903), 30 I. A. 136; 30 Calc. 738; 7 C. W. N. 578; 5 Bom. L. R. 461; *Raghubir Singh v. Moti Kunwar* (1912), 35 All. 41; 17 C. W. N. 453; 15 Bom. L. R. 426; *Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh* (1913), 40 I. A. 161; 35 All. 337; 17 C. W. N. 949; 15 Bom. L. R. 652; *Venkata Gopalla Narasimha Roy Bahadoor (Raja Suraneni) v. Lakshama Venkama Row (Raju Suraneni)* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 113; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 41; 12 W. R. P. C. 40; *Doorga Pershad (Baboo) v. Kundun Kowar (Mussumat)*, 1 I. A. 55; 13 B. L. R. 235; 21 W. R. C. R. 214; *Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh* (1890), 17 I. A. 194; 18 Calc. 157.

⁸ *Tej Pratap Singh v. Champa Kalee Koer* (1885), 12 Calc. 96, at p. 103.

with regard to particular property, that it shall thenceforth be the subject of ownership, in certain defined shares,¹ then the character of undivided property and joint enjoyment is taken from the subject-matter so agreed to be dealt with; and in the estate each member has thenceforth a definite and certain share, which he may claim the right to receive and to enjoy in severalty, although the property itself has not been actually severed and divided."²

An arrangement by which property was allotted to a younger brother for his maintenance does not alter the course of descent of the property.³

The legal construction of the agreement cannot be controlled or altered by the subsequent conduct of the parties,⁴ except where there has been in law a valid reunion.⁵

It has been held that where there is no indication of an intention to presently appropriate and enjoy in a manner inconsistent with the ordinary state of enjoyment of an undivided family, an agreement to divide without more is of itself insufficient to effect a separation.⁶

A separation between members of a joint Hindu family followed by a partition between them of the ancestral property, which would not put an end to their coparcenary rights, is unknown to the law.⁷

The fact that in documents executed by the coparceners, such as petitions to the Revenue or other authorities, or under the Land Registration Act,⁸ there is a definition of an interest in the joint estate, in terms of a fraction of the whole, without any indication of an intention to divide interests and liabilities, is insufficient to constitute a legal dissolution of a joint family,

Mere agree-
ment to
divide.

Definition in
petitions, etc.

¹ A mere definement of shares is not sufficient, see cases, *post*, p. 348, note 1, and pp. 348-350.

² *Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyyan* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 75, at p. 90; 8 W. R. P. C. I. See *Hurdwar Singh v. Luchmun Singh* (1868), 3 Agra, 41; *Ananta Balacharya v. Damodhar Makund* (1888), 13 Bom. 25; *Parso-tam Rao Tantia v. Janki Bai* (1907), 29 All. 354; *Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh* (1890), 17 I. A. 194; 18 Cal. 157; *Budha Mal v. Bhagwan Das* (1890), 18 Cal. 302; *Shibnarain Bose v. Ram Nidhee Bose* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 87; *Kulponath Doss v. Mewah Lal* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 302; *Deo Bunsee Koer (Mussamut) v. Dwarkanath* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 273; *S. C. Deowanti Kumcar (Mussa-*

mut) v. Dwarkanath, 8 B. L. R. 363, note (a case of the separation of two branches of a family).

³ *Rajya Lakshmi Devi Garu (Sri Raja Viravara Thodramal) v. Surya Narayana Dhatrazu Bahadur Garu (Sri Raja Viravara Thodramal)* (1897), 24 I. A. 118; 20 Mad. 256.

⁴ *Balkishen Das v. Ramnarain Sahu* (1903), 30 I. A. 139; 30 Cal. 738; 7 C. W. N. 578; 5 Bom. L. R. 461.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 359, 360.

⁶ *Babaji Parshram v. Kashubai* (1879), 4 Bom. 157.

⁷ *Ekradeswar Singh v. Jameshwari Babuasin* (1914), 41 I. A. 235, at p. 283; 42 Cal. 582, at p. 599; 18 C. W. N. 1249, at pp. 1255, 1256; 17 Bom. L. R. 18, at p. 26.

⁸ Act VII. (B. C.) of 1876.

although it is evidence of a separation.¹ Separation may be inferred from definement of shares, followed by entries of separate interests in the Revenue records.²

Sale of share. When a co-sharer sells his rights in the family property to another coparcener, such sale amounts to a separation, so far as the vendor is concerned.³

Act or declaration by one coparcener. An unequivocal act or a definite and clear declaration by a coparcener, showing his intention to hold his share separately, may effect a separation.⁴

This being so, the mere filing of a suit for partition would operate to effect a separation.⁵

As to the effect of a decree for partition, see *post*, pp. 350, 351.

It is submitted that a mere expression of intention is not sufficient, but action of some kind in furtherance of such intention is required in order to effect a separation. An agreement is not necessary, as a coparcener is entitled as of right to effect a separation.⁶

Loss of share by limitation. A loss by a co-sharer of his rights by operation of the law of limitation amounts to a separation of that co-sharer, so far as the family property is concerned.⁷

Bengal school. As under the Bengal school each coparcener has a defined share the distinction between separation and partition by metes and bounds has not

¹ *In the matter of Phuljhari Koer (Mussamat)* (1872), 8 B. L. R. 385; 17 W. R. C. R. 102; *Muktakasi Debi v. Ubabati* (1870), 8 B. L. R. 396, note; 14 W. R. C. R. 31; *Ambika Dat v. Sakhamani Kuar* (1877), 1 All. 437; *Hoolash Koer v. Kassee Proshad* (1881), 7 Cal. 369.

² *Ram Lal v. Debi Dai* (1888), 10 All. 490; see *post*, p. 349.

³ *Balkrishna Trimbak Tendulkar v. Savitribai* (1878), 3 Bom. 54. See *Appa Pillai v. Runga Pillai* (1882), 6 Mad. 71, as to an arrangement without consideration.

⁴ *Suraj Narain v. Ikkal Narain* (1912), 40 I. A. 40; 35 All. 80; 17 C. W. N. 333; 15 Bom. L. R. 456; *Gurja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundraj* (1916), 43 I. A. 151; 43 Cal. 1031; 20 C. W. N. 1085; 18 Bom. L. R. 621; *Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh* (1916), 38 All. 590, at p. 611; *Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhuchurn Doss* (1878), 4 Cal. 425; 3 C. L. R. 534; *Bulakee Lal v. Indurputtee Kowar (Mussamat)* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 41; *Vato Koer*

(Mussamat) v. Rowshun Singh (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 82; *Sudaburt Pershad Sahoo v. Lotf Ali Khan* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 339, at pp. 345, 346; *Joynarain Giri v. Goluck Chunder Mytee* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 355. The appeal from this last decision was decided on another ground, 5 I. A. 228; 4 Cal. 434. See *Phoolbas Koer (Musst.) v. Juggessur Sahoy (Lalla)* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 48; *Debee Pershad v. Phool Koeree* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 510.

⁵ *Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundraj* (1916), 43 I. A. 151; 20 C. W. N. 1085; *Kawal Nain v. Prabhu Lal* (1917), 44 I. A. 159; *Soundararajan v. Arunachalam Chetty* (1915) 39 Mad. 159. A suit for possession of a share would not be sufficient: *In the matter of Phul Koeri* (1869), 8 B. L. R. 388, note; *S. C. Debee Pershad v. Phool Koeree* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 510.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 325.

⁷ See *Moro Vishwanath v. Ganesh Fithal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 444, at p. 452.

the same importance as under the Mitakshara school, but there may be such a distinction when a claim is made by the family to property which was acquired by the coparcener before separation.

Separation may be proved by acts or declarations ¹ which show such agreement and intention to separate, such as cesser of commensality,² separate occupation of portions of the property,³ separate enjoyment of distinct shares of the profits,⁴ separate definement of shares in the Revenue records,⁵ agreement to divide the proceeds in definite shares,⁶ or other acts which are inconsistent with the family remaining joint, such as separate transactions between themselves or with others.⁷

Proof of separation.

Mere cesser of commensality,⁸ or of co-worship,⁹ division of the income,¹⁰

¹ *Jivubai v. Krishnaji* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 351.

² See *Ganesh Dutt Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Jewach Thakoorain (Mussummat)* (1903), 31 I. A. 10; 31 Calc. 262; 8 C. W. N. 146; 6 Bom. L. R. 1; *Joyanarain Giri v. Goluck Chunder Mytee* (1876), 25 W. R. C. R. 355.

³ *Murari Vitthoji v. Mukund Shivaaji Nait Golatkar* (1890), 15 Bom. 201; *Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vitthal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 444, at p. 453; *Surbessur Methoor v. Gossain Doss Methoor* (1872), 17 W. R. C. R. 210.

⁴ *Chyet Narain Singh v. Bunwaree Singh* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 395; *Jeonee (Mussumat) v. Dhurum Kooree* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 108; *Kalika Sahoy v. Gourree Sunkur* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 287; *Mohabeer Pershad (Lalla) v. Kundun Koovar (Mussumat)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 116; *Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Dukharam Singh* (1883), 5 All. 532; *Mohroo Kooree (Musst.) v. Gunsoo Kooree (Musst.)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 385.

⁵ *Ram Lal v. Debi Dat* (1888), 10 All. 490; *Ram Pershad Singh v. Lakhpati Koer* (1902), 30 I. A. 1; 30 Calc. 231; 7 C. W. N. 162; 5 Bom. L. R. 103. See *Ambika Datt v. Sukhmani Kuar* (1877), 1 All. 437. See ante, p. 347.

⁶ *Ram Kissen Singh (Maharajah) v. Sheonund Singh (Rajah)* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 412.

⁷ *Munshi Ram v. Gaiinda Mal* (1914), 16 Punj. L. R. 319; *Sunundra Koonwar v. Kalee Churn Singh* (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 197; 8 B. L. R. 390, note. "Narada," chap. xiii. paras. 40, 41; "Dayabhaga," chap. xiv. paras. 7, 8, 9; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 407.

⁸ *Suraj Narain v. Ikbal Narain* (1912), 40 I. A. 40; 35 All. 80; 17 C. W. N. 333; 15 Bom. L. R. 456; *Ganesh Dutt Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Jewach Thakoorain (Mussummat)* (1903), 31 I. A. 10; 31 Calc. 262; 8 C. W. N. 146; *Rewun Pershad v. Radha Beeby (Mussumat)* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 137, at p. 168; 7 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 37; *Anundee Koonwar (Mussumat) v. Khedoo Lal* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 412; 18 W. R. C. R. 69; *Belas Koer (Mussumat) v. Bhowanee Buksh (Baboo)* (1863), Marsh. 641; *Chhabila Manchand v. Jadavbai* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. O. C. 87; *Kristnappa Chetty v. Ramasawmy Iyer* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 25; *Shidnarain Bose v. Ram Nidhee Bose* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 87; *Jivubai v. Krishnaji* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 351. See *Khilut Chunder Ghose v. Koonjlal Dhur* (1868), 11 B. L. R. 194, note; 10 W. R. C. R. 333.

⁹ *Suraj Narain v. Ikbal Narain* (1912), 40 I. A. 40; 35 All. 80; 15 C. W. N. 333; 15 Bom. L. R. 456.

¹⁰ *Sonatin Bysack v. Juggutsoundree Dossee* (1859), 8 M. I. A. 66, at p. 86.

definement of shares in the revenue¹ or land registration² records, separate occupation of portions of the property,³ or separate collections of rents,⁴ or separate dealings,⁵ are not conclusive, unless there is an intention to separate. They are all evidence of separation, and may lead to the inference that there was a separation.⁶

The fact that a man availed himself of his near agnatic relations in the administration of his property at the same time that he gave them maintenance and paid the expenses of their marriage and other ceremonies is not inconsistent with his position as a separated member.⁷

An act of a stranger, as, for instance, the attachment of a share under sec. 88 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (Act V. of 1898), does not effect a separation.⁸

Conversion to Mahomedanism,⁹ or to Christianity,¹⁰ *ipso facto* separates the convert from the coparcenery.

A decree for partition is on the same footing as an agreement for partition.¹¹

A decree declaring the shares¹² or directing partition,¹³ or a decree giving effect to a suit, which, though not in terms

Conversion from
Hinduism.

Decree for
partition.

Decree.

¹ *Ram Singh v. Tursa Kunwar* (Musst.) (1913), 17 C. W. N. 1085; 15 Bom. L. R. 863; *Ambika Dai v. Sukhmani Kuar* (1877), 1 All. 437, commented on in *Tej Pratap Singh v. Champa Kalee Koer* (1885), 12 Calc. 96, at p. 104; *Gajendar Singh v. Sardar Singh* (1896), 18 All. 176.

² *Hoolash Koor v. Kassee Proshad* (1881), 7 Calc. 369.

³ *Runjeet Singh v. Gujraj Singh* (Koor) (1873), 1 I. A. 9; *Babashet v. Jirshet* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. 71; *Moro Vishvanath v. Ganesh Vilhal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 444, at p. 453; *Chhabila Manchand v. Jadavbai* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. O. C. 87. See *Luchmun Pershad v. Moonee Koonwer* (Mussumat) (1866), 1 Agra, 220.

⁴ *Badamoo Koor v. Wazeer Sing* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 78, differed from in *Vato Koer* (Mussumat) v. *Roushun, Singh* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 82.

⁵ *Kristnappa Chetty v. Ramasawmy Iyer* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 25.

⁶ See *Jagun Koor v. Rughoonundun Lall Shahoo* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 128.

⁷ *Deoki Singh v. Anupa* (Musammat) (1905), 10 C. W. N. 338.

⁸ See *Secretary of State v. Ranga-*

sami Ayyangar (1916, 39 Mad. 831.

⁹ *Gobind Krishna Narain v. Abdul Qayyum* (1903), 25 All. 564, at p. 573; *Gobind Krishna Narain v. Khunni Lal* (1907), 29 All. 487. This decision was reversed on appeal on another point, *post*, p. 374, note 10, see *ante*, p. 24.

¹⁰ *Abraham v. Abraham* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 199, at p. 241; 1 W. R. P. C. 1, at p. 5; *Kulada Prasad Pandey v. Haripada Chatterjee* (1912), 40 Calc. 407; 17 C. W. N. 102; see *ante*, p. 23, note 7.

¹¹ *Tej Pratap Singh v. Champa Kalee Koer* (1885), 12 Calc. 96; *Babaji Parshram v. Kashibai* (1879), 4 Bom. 157.

¹² See *Babaji Akoba v. Dattu Laxman* (1912), 37 Bom. 64; 14 Bom. L. R. 923.

¹³ *Chudambaram Chettiar v. Gouri Nachiar* (1879), 6 I. A. 177; 2 Mad. 83; *Subbaraya Mudali v. Manika Mudali* (1896), 19 Mad. 345; *Lade v. Sadashiva* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 35; *Narayana v. Ramalinga* (1915), 39 Mad. 587. In *Babaji Parshram v. Kashibai* (1879), 4 Bom. 157, a mere decree for partition was held not to operate as a separation.

seeking a partition, indicates a distinct intention of obtaining a separation in estate, or an award by arbitrators,¹ operates as a separation.²

The fact that the decree postpones the vesting of the share does not make any difference.³

According to the preponderance of authority the decree creates a severance pending an appeal,⁴ and it is clear that if pending the appeal the parties treat the decree as creating a severance it has such effect.⁵

Where, in a suit for general partition of a family estate, the plaintiff succeeded with regard only to a small portion thereof, it was held that the family did not in consequence of these proceedings become a divided one.⁶

In a case under the Bengal school of law, where the parties disregarded the decree, and continued to live as a joint family, it was held that there was no separation.⁷

An order for sale of a share of family property in execution of decree would not create a separation.⁸ Order for sale of share.

“The disruption of a joint family cannot be effected by an order of Court against the intention of the parties, unless it be followed by an actual conversion of the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common, or an actual partition by metes and bounds.”⁹

A suit for partition may be brought by a person who is entitled to a partition.¹⁰ Suit for partition.

¹ *Krishna Panda v. Balaram Panda* (1896), 19 Mad. 290; *Subbaraya Chetti v. Sadasiva Chetti* (1897), 20 Mad. 490.

² *Joy Narain Giri v. Grish Chunder Myti* (1878), 5 I. A. 228; 4 Cal. 434, distinguishing *Debee Pershad v. Phool Koeree* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 510. The mere determination of the shares by a preliminary decree is not tantamount to partition, although it may effect a severance of the joint interest: *Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baldeo Das* (1907), 35 Cal. 961, at p. 966; 12 C. W. N. 127, at p. 129.

³ *Lakshman Darku v. Narayan Lakshman* (1899), 24 Bom. 182.

⁴ *Thandayuthapani Kangiar v. Rangunatha Kangiar* (1911), 35 Mad. 239, dissenting from *Sakharam Mahadev Dange v. Hari Krishna Dange* (1881), 6 Bom. 3; *Subbaraya Mu-*

dali v. Manika Mudali (1896), 19 Mad. 345; *Mahadev Laxman v. Govind Parashram* (1912), 36 Bom. 550; 14 Bom. L. R. 733.

⁵ See *Joynarain Giri v. Grish Chunder Myti* (1878), 5 I. A. 228; 4 Cal. 434.

⁶ *Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda) v. Durga Prasada Nayudu (Raja Yarlagadda)* (1900), 27 I. A. 151; 24 Mad. 147; 5 C. W. N. 74; 2 Bom. L. R. 350.

⁷ *Prawn Kissen Miller v. Ram Sunderee Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1842), Fulton, 410. See *Babaji Parsham v. Kashibai* (1879), 4 Bom. 157.

⁸ *Mudit Narayan Singh v. Ranglal Singh* (1902), 29 Cal. 797, at p. 801.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ See *ante*, pp. 325-329, as to who is entitled to partition.

A suit cannot be brought for a mere declaration of right to a share, if a partition is possible.¹

Limitation. A suit for partition is barred when twelve years have expired from the time when exclusion of the plaintiff from the coparcenary property becomes known to him.²

Res judicata. A decree in such suit bars the trial in another suit of questions determined in that suit.³

Receiver. A receiver of the whole property may be appointed in a partition suit.⁴

Parties to suits. All persons entitled to a share on partition, including the wife, mother, or grandmother, and purchasers of undivided shares⁵ or mortgages, should be parties to a suit for partition.⁶

Property in suit. A suit for partition must include all the property which is partible⁷ and available for partition at the time,⁸ and is within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is brought.⁹

There is authority that when the suit does not include all the

¹ *Suryanarayana Murti v. Tamanna* (1901), 25 Mad. 504.

² Act IX. of 1908, Sched. I. art. 127. See *Suroda Soondury Dossee v. Doyamoyce Dossee* (1880), 5 Cal. 938; *Jaganatha v. Ramabhadra* (1888), 11 Mad. 380; *Dhoorjeti Subbaya v. Dhoorjeti Venkayya* (1906), 30 Mad. 201; *Ajodhya Purshad v. Mahadeo Purshad* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 221; *Babaji Akoba v. Dattu Lazman* (1912), 37 Bom. 64; 14 Bom. L. R. 923; *Manjaya v. Shanmuga* (1913), 38 Mad. 684.

³ *Parsotam Rao Tuntia v. Radha Bai* (1910), 32 All. 469; *Nalini Kanta Lahuri v. Sarnamoyi Dehya* (1914), 41 I. A. 247; 19 C. W. N. 31; 17 Bom. L. R. 1.

⁴ *Poreshnath Mookerjee v. Omerto Navth Mitter* (1890), 17 Cal. 614.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 331. *Laljeet Singh v. Raj Coomar Singh* (1873), 12 B. L. R. 373, at p. 383; 20 W. R. C. R. 336, at p. 340.

⁶ Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), order I. rules 3, 4; Act XIV. of 1882, ss. 26, 28; *Nalini Kanta Lahuri v. Sarnamoyi Dehya* (1914), 41 I. A. 247; 19 C. W. N. 531; 17 Bom. L. R. 1; *Pahaladh Singh v. Luchmunbitty (Mussamat)* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 256.

⁷ Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Sched. I. order II. r. 1; Act XIV. of 1882, s. 43; *Hasmat Rai (Koer) v. Sunder Das* (1885), 11 Cal. 396, and cases, note 8 below; *Trimbak Dixit v. Narayan Dixit* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 69; *Ganpat v. Annaji* (1898), 23 Bom. 144; *Nanabhai Vallabhdas v. Nalabhai Haribhai* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. 46; *Narayan Babaji v. Nana Manohar* (1870), 7 Bom. H. C. A. C. 153, at p. 178; *Haridas Sanyal v. Pran Nath Sanyal* (1886), 12 Cal. 566. *Contrà Padmamani Dasi (Srimati) v. Jagadamba Dasi (Srimati)*, 6 B. L. R. 134, at p. 140. See *Parbati Churn Deb v. Ain-ud-deen* (1881), 7 Cal. 577; 9 C. L. R. 170.

⁸ See *Pattaray Mudali v. Audimula Mudali* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 419. Thus, where property has been mortgaged with possession it need not be brought into the partition: *Kristayya v. Narasimham* (1900), 23 Mad. 608; *Balkrishna Vilhal v. Hari Shankar* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 64; *Narayan Babaji v. Pandurang Ramchandra* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 148, at p. 155; *Shivmurteppa v. Virappa* (1899), 24 Bom. 128; 1 Bom. L. R. 620.

⁹ *Punchanun Mullick v. Shib Chunder Mullick* (1887), 14 Cal. 835.

coparcenary property the suit should be dismissed,¹ but it is submitted that where the objection is raised, the proper course is to permit the plaintiff to amend his plaint so as to include the whole property.²

Where by mistake or fraud property is omitted from the partition a subsequent suit lies.³

In a suit filed in the ordinary original jurisdiction of a High Court there is no difficulty in including other property after an interlocutory decree for partition.

In a suit for partition the judge must first find that the plaintiff had a title to the property.⁴

A defendant may insist that joint property which is not mentioned in the plaint be brought into the partition,⁵ even if it be situate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is brought,⁶ provided it can be dealt with in the suit, but he cannot require the plaintiff to bring into the partition land which is outside British India.⁷

Where no objection is raised by the parties there seems to be no reason why a partial partition, which is partial either as to property⁸ or as to the parties, should not be effected even in a suit.⁹

Partial
partition.

There would be a right to subsequent partition.¹⁰

When the coparcenary property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one Court, suits can be brought in the several Courts having jurisdiction.¹¹

Property
within
different
jurisdictions.

¹ See *Jogendra Nath Mukerji v. Jugobundhu Mukerji* (1886), 14 Cal. 122; *Ramjoy Ghose v. Ram Runjun Chuckerbutti* (1881), 8 C. L. R. 367; *Haridas Sanyal v. Pran Nath Sanyal* (1886), 12 Cal. 566.

² See *Punchanun Mullick v. Shub Chunder Mullick* (1887), 14 Cal. 835; *Mukunda Lal Chakravarti v. Jogesh Chunder Chakravarti* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 1276; 1 Patna L. J. 393.

³ *Mukunda Lal Chakravarti v. Jogesh Chunder Chakravarti* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 1276; 1 Patna L. J. 393.

⁴ *Shashi Bhushan Beed v. Jotindra Nath Roy Chowdhry* (1911), 38 Cal. 681.

⁵ See *Shivmurteppa v. Virappa* (1899), 24 Bom. 128; 1 Bom. L. R. 620.

⁶ *Hari Narayan Brahme v. Ganpatrav Daji* (1883), 7 Bom. 272; *Lalljeet Singh (Baboo) v. Raj Coomarr*

Singh (Baboo) (1876), 25 W. R. 353; *Ram Lochun Patuck v. Rughoobur Dyal* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 111; *Balaram Bhaskarji v. Ramchandra Bhaskarji* (1898), 22 Bom. 922, at p. 928.

⁷ *Ramacharya v. Anantacharya* (1893), 18 Bom. 389; *Purushottam v. Atmaram* (1899), 23 Bom. 597; 1 Bom. L. R. 76.

⁸ See *Chandar Shekhar v. Kundan Lal* (1908), 31 All. 3.

⁹ See *Manjanatha Shanabhaga v. Narayana Shanabhaga* (1882), 5 Mad. 362. As to a partial partition by arrangement, see *ante*, p. 344.

¹⁰ *Bhowani Proshad Shahu v. Juggenath Shahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 309; *Moonsharam Chakravarty v. Gonesh Chandra Chakravarty* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 521; see *ante*, p. 341.

¹¹ *Subba Rau v. Rama Rau* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 376; *Punchanun Mullick v. Shub Chunder Mullick* (1887),

When there is property of the family held jointly by the whole family with other persons, a separate suit should be brought for partition of such property,¹ except where such persons have bought the interests of coparceners in the whole coparcenary property.

A separate suit will lie with regard to property which belongs to some of the coparceners only.²

Purchaser
of share.

A purchaser of a share of one of the coparceners in a portion of the coparcenary property is, when such purchase is permissible,³ entitled to bring a suit for partition of that portion only, when such partial partition will not cause much inconvenience to the other sharers,⁴ but any coparcener may require his share in the whole of the coparcenary property to be ascertained and partitioned in such suit.⁵

A coparcener is entitled to bring against such purchaser a partition suit limited to the property so purchased.⁶

As to the rights of purchasers or mortgagees of shares on a partition, see *ante*, pp. 301-303.

Where a portion of the family property has passed entirely into the hands of strangers, there is no reason why the right thereto should not be determined without reference to the remaining property of the family.⁷

Inquiry as to
property.

In the case of a decree for partition and of a partition by arrangement, it is necessary to ascertain the amount of the coparcenary property, and what is available for partition.

14 Cal. 835; *Balaram Bhaskarji v. Ramchandra Bhaskarji* (1898), 22 Bom. 922. See *Jairam Narayan Raje v. Atmaram Narayan Raje* (1880), 4 Bom. 482; *Padmamani Dasi (Srimati) v. Jagadamba Dasi (Srimati)* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 134; *Ram Harakh v. Ram Lal* (1916), 38 All. 217. Cf. *Abdul Karim Sahib v. Badrudeen Sahib* (1904), 24 Mad. 216.

¹ See *Purushottam v. Atmaram Janardan* (1899), 23 Bom. 597; 1 Bom. L. R. 76.

² *Lakshmi Narain v. Janki Das* (1901), 23 All. 216.

³ *Ante*, pp. 301, 302.

⁴ *Hari Kristna Chowdary (Duvvada) v. Venkata Lakshmi Narayana (Sripada)* (1910), 34 Mad. 402. A different view was taken in *Manjaya v. Shanmuga* (1913), 38 Mad. 684.

⁵ *Murarrao v. Sitaram* (1898), 23 Bom. 184; *Shivmurteppa v. Virappa*

(1899), 24 Bom. 128; 1 Bom. L. R. 620; see *Pandurang Anandrav v. Bhaskar Shadashv* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 72; *Ram Mohan Lal v. Mulchand* (1905), 28 All. 39; *Iburaamsa Rowthan v. Theruvenkatasami Naick* (1910), 34 Mad. 269. See *Venkatarama v. Meera Labar* (1859), 13 Mad. 275, approved of in *Palani Konan v. Masa Konan* (1896), 20 Mad. 243; *Subramanya Chettyar v. Padmanabha Chettyar* (1896), 19 Mad. 267. See, however, *Hasmat Ras (Koer) v. Sunder Das* (1885), 11 Cal. 396, at p. 399.

⁶ *Ram Charan v. Ajudhia Prasad* (1905), 28 All. 50; *Chinna Sanyasi Razu (Sripati) v. Suriya Razu (Sripati)* (1882), 5 Mad. 196; *Subramanya Chettyar v. Padmanabha Chettyar* (1896), 19 Mad. 267. See *Venkayya v. Lakshmayya* (1892), 16 Mad. 98.

⁷ *Subbarazu v. Venkataratnam* (1891), 15 Mad. 234.

The presumption is that, "in the absence of evidence, the property for partition is such as exists at the time of the suit for partition."¹

An inquiry as to what the coparcenary property consists of generally involves, it is submitted, an account of the rents and profits which have been received by the manager.²

Where one member of the family has been entirely excluded from Account of the enjoyment of the property, he would be entitled to an account of mesne profits, mesne profits on an ordinary footing.³

An account of mesne profits is also allowed when an arrangement for the enjoyment of the property in specific and definite shares has been disturbed.⁴

In the absence of an express agreement, a coparcener is not entitled Improve- to credit for sums laid out by him in the improvement or upkeep of the ments. coparcenary property.⁵

Provision must first be made for all debts due by the family as such,⁶ including debts due by the father of separating brothers,⁷ and also for all proper charges upon the family property for maintenance,⁸ the marriages of dependent female members,⁹ the expenses of whose marriages are not payable out of individual shares, and such religious ceremonies as are payable by the whole family,¹⁰ and cannot be adjusted so as to be paid out of individual shares. Provision for debts, etc.

¹ *Damodaradas Maneklal v. Uttamram Maneklal* (1892), 9 Bom. 271, at p. 279.

² See *ante*, p. 272.

³ *Krishna v. Subbanna* (1884), 7 Mad. 564; *Bhivray v. Sitaram* (1894), 19 Bom. 532; *Konerrav v. Gurra* (1881), 5 Bom. 589, at p. 595; *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur (Rajah) v. Narayya Appa Row Bahadur (Rajah)* (1879), 7 I. A. 38, at p. 51; 2 Mad. 128, at p. 137; 6 C. L. R. 153, at p. 162. See Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), order xx. rule 12.

⁴ *Shankar Baksh v. Hardeo Baksh* (1888), 16 I. A. 71; 16 Calc. 397. See *Ramabhadra (Rajah Setrucherla) v. Virabhadra Suryanarayana (Rajah Setrucherla)* (1899), 26 I. A. 167; 22 Mad. 470; 3 C. W. N. 533; 1 Bom. L. R. 388.

⁵ *Muttusvami Gaundan v. Subbira-maniya Gaundan* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 309. See *post*, p. 356.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 276.

⁷ *Tara Chand v. Reeb Ram* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 177, at p. 181; *Laksh-*

man Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik (1876), 1 Bom. 561; "Dayabhaga," chap. i. para. 47; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 6, paras. 1, 2; chap. v. s. 5, para. 14; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 73, 389, 390.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 234, 235, 271.

⁹ "Dayabhaga," chap. iii. s. 2, para. 39; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 7, para. 5; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 96; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 313.

¹⁰ As to the expenses of initiation, see "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 7, paras. 3, 4; "Dayabhaga," chap. iii. s. 2, para. 41; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 96, 97; *Srinivasa Iyengar v. Thiruvengadathaiyengar* (1914), 38 Mad. 556. As to the funeral expenses of the mother, see *Vaidyanatha Aiyar v. Aiyasami Aiyar* (1908), 32 Mad. 191. In a suit for partition brought by a Hindu against his father and brothers, the brothers (but not the children of brothers) are entitled to have set apart from the family property a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of

No provision is to be made for the expenses of the marriage of a coparcener who was unmarried at the time of the severance of the joint family.¹

An arrangement may be made for the expenses of the marriages of the daughters of brothers, who are making the partition.²

Each member of the coparcenary is obliged to bring into hotchpot, and submit to partition any coparcenary property, or property acquired from coparcenary funds which may be in his hands.³

He is not required to account for money which has been received by him for his expenses.⁴

Where a single coparcener has purported to deal with a defined portion of the family property as if it were his own, it may be equitable to allot such portion to the purchaser if possible.⁵ Where he has dealt with a share in a defined portion, it may be equitable on partition to allot him a share in such portion. If such course be not equitable or practicable, the alienee would only have a right of compensation against the alienor personally.⁶

Where a coparcener has, by arrangement or without objection, occupied a particular portion of the family property, or where he has laid out his separate money on a certain portion of the property, it may be equitable to allot to him the portion occupied, or improved by him, provided that he does not thereby get more than his share.

In one case,⁷ where a coparcener built with his separate money a house upon ground belonging to the family, the Court held that each of the coparceners was entitled to a share in the house and the site upon which it was built, equal in value to his share of the site.

How partition
made by
Court.

When the property is partible and capable of partition, the Court will ordinarily order a partition by metes and bounds.

Partition Act,
1893.

The following provisions of the Partition Act, 1893,⁸ apply to all partitions by the Court, but do not affect any local law providing for the partition of immovable property paying revenue to Government.

Power to
Court to

Sec.². Whenever in any suit for partition in which, if instituted prior

their prospective thread, betrothal, and marriage ceremonies, such sum to be calculated according to the extent of the family property : *Jairam v. Nathu* (1906), 31 Bom. 54; 8 Bom. L. R. 632.

¹ *Narayana v. Ramalinga* (1915), 39 Mad. 587, differing from *Srinivasa Iyengar v. Thiruvengadathayangar* (1914), 38 Mad. 556.

² *Anantanarayana Iyer v. Savithri Ammal* (1911), 36 Mad. 161.

³ *Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik* (1876), 1 Bom.

561. See *ante*, p. 254.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Konerrav v. Gurav* (1881), 5 Bom. 589, at p. 595.

⁵ *Pandurang Anandrav v. Bhaskar Shadashiv* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 72; *Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji* (1875), 11 Bom. H. C. 76; *Narayan v. Gumnaji* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 945.

⁶ *Aiyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyagari Ramayya* (1902), 25 Mad. 690, at pp. 718, 719.

⁷ *Vithoba Bava v. Hariba Bava* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 54.

⁸ Act IV, of 1893.

to the commencement of this Act, a decree for partition might have been made, it appears to the Court that, by reason of the nature of the property to which the suit relates, or of the number of the shareholders therein, or of any other special circumstance, a division of the property cannot reasonably or conveniently be made, and that a sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds would be more beneficial for all the shareholders, the Court may, if it thinks fit, on the request of any of such shareholders interested individually or collectively to the extent of one moiety or upwards, direct a sale of the property and a distribution of the proceeds.¹

order sale instead of division in partition suits.

Sec. 3. (1) If, in any case in which the Court is requested under the last foregoing section to direct a sale, any other shareholder applies for leave to buy at a valuation the share or shares of the party or parties asking for a sale, the Court shall order a valuation of the share or shares in such manner as it may think fit and offer to sell the same to such shareholder at the price so ascertained, and may give all necessary and proper directions in that behalf.

Procedure when sharer undertakes to buy.

(2) If two or more shareholders severally apply for leave to buy as provided in sub-section (1), the Court shall order a sale of the share or shares to the shareholder who offers to pay the highest price above the valuation made by the Court.

(3) If no such shareholder is willing to buy such share or shares at the price so ascertained, the applicant or applicants shall be liable to pay all costs of or incident to the application or applications.

Sec. 4. (1) Where a share of a dwelling-house belonging to an undivided family² has been transferred to a person who is not a member of such family and such transferee sues for partition, the Court shall, if any member of the family being a shareholder shall undertake to buy the share of such transferee, make a valuation of such share in such manner as it thinks fit and direct the sale of such share to such shareholder, and may give all necessary and proper directions in that behalf.

Partition suit by transferee of share in dwelling-house.

(2) If in any case described in sub-section (1) two or more members of the family being such shareholders severally undertake to buy such share, the Court shall follow the procedure prescribed by sub-section (2) of the last foregoing section.

5. In any suit for partition a request for sale may be made or an undertaking, or application for leave, to buy may be given or made on behalf of any party under disability by any person authorized to act on behalf of such party in such suit, but the Court shall not be bound to comply with any such request, undertaking, or application unless it is of opinion that the sale or purchase will be for the benefit of the party under such disability.

Representation of parties under disability.

6. (1) Every sale under section 2 shall be subject to a reserved bidding, and the amount of such bidding shall be fixed by the Court in such manner as it may think fit and may be varied from time to time.

Reserved bidding and bidding of shareholders.

(2) On any such sale any of the shareholders shall be at liberty to bid at the sale on such terms as to non-payment of deposit or as to setting off or accounting for the purchase-money or any part thereof instead of paying the same as to the Court may seem reasonable.

¹ *Hirakore (Bai) v. Trikamdas* (1907), 4 Bom. 103.

the right, *Vaman Vishnu Gokhale v. Vasudev Morbhat Kale* (1898), 23 Bom. 73.

² Ownership, not occupation, gives

(3) If two or more persons, of whom one is a shareholder in the property, respectively advance the same sum at any bidding at such sale, such bidding shall be deemed to be the bidding of the shareholder.

Procedure to be followed in case of sales.

7. Save as hereinbefore provided, when any property is directed to be sold under this Act, the following procedure shall, as far as practicable, be adopted, namely:—

- (a) if the property be sold under a decree or order of the High Court of Calcutta, Madras or Bombay in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or of the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon,¹ the procedure of such Court in its original civil jurisdiction for the sale of property by the Registrar;
- (b) if the property be sold under a decree or order of any other Court, such procedure as the High Court may from time to time by rules prescribe in this behalf, and until such rules are made the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure² in respect of sales in execution of decrees.

8. Any order for sale made by the Court under section 2, 3, or 4 shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.²

Saving of power to order partly partition and partly sale.

9. In any suit for partition the Court may, if it shall think fit, make a decree for a partition of part of the property to which the suit relates and a sale of the remainder under this Act.

Application Act to pending suits.

10. This Act shall apply to suits instituted before the commencement thereof, in which no scheme for the partition of the property has been finally approved by the Court.

Partition of revenue-paying estate.

A Civil Court can make a decree for a partition of an estate paying revenue to Government, but cannot carry out his decree,³ unless no separate allotment of the revenue be asked for.⁴ If the decree be for the partition, or for the separate possession of a share of an undivided estate assessed as such to the payment of undivided revenue to Government,⁵ the partition of the estate or the separation of the share shall be made by the Collector according to the law, if any, for the time being in force for the partition, or the separate possession of such estate.⁶

¹ This now would be the Chief Court of Lower Burma in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. See Act VI. of 1900.

² Act V. of 1908.

³ *Meherban Rawoot v. Behari Lal Barik* (1896), 23 Calc. 679; *Dattatraya Vithal v. Mahadaji Parashram* (1891), 16 Bom. 528; *Ramjoy Ghose v. Ramranjun Chuckerbutti* (1881), 8 C. L. R. 387; *Parbudas Lakhmidas v. Shankaribhai* (1886), 11 Bom. 662; *Chundernath Nundi v. Hur Naram*

Deb (1881), 7 Calc. 153.

⁴ *Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chundra Lahury* (1897), 24 Calc. 725; 1 C. W. N. 374.

⁵ This does not include a ryotwari estate in Madras, *Muttuchidambara v. Karuppa* (1884), 7 Mad. 382, or a share of a certain defined portion of a mahal, *Ram Dayal v. Megu Lal* (1884), 6 All. 452.

⁶ Civil Procedure Code (Act V. of 1908), s. 54.

No Civil Court, except the Bombay High Court, can entertain a suit or an application for the partition of a Gujarat taluqdari estate.¹

The law relating to the partition of revenue-paying estates is to be found in the following enactments:—

Partition by
Revenue
authorities.

For Ajmere.—Reg. II. of 1877.

For Bengal.—Regulations VIII. of 1793, XVIII. of 1812, and VII. of 1822; Act V. (Ben. C.) of 1897.²

For Madras.—Mad. Reg. II. of 1803; Act II. of 1884.

For Assam.—Reg. I. of 1886, ss. 96–121, 154.

For Bombay.—Act X. of 1876; Act V. (Bom. C.) of 1879, ss. 113, 114; Act VI. (Bom. C.) of 1888.

For the Central Provinces.—Act XVIII. of 1881, s. 136, as amended by Act XVI. of 1889, s. 26.

For the United Provinces.—Act III. (N. W. P. C.) of 1901, ss. 105–140, 203.³

For the Punjab.—Act XVII. of 1887, ss. 112–135, 158.

For Coorg.—Reg. I. of 1899.

Partition does not annul the filial relation nor, subject to the preference of an undivided son,⁴ or brother,⁵ the right of inheritance incidental to such relation.⁶

Effect of
partition.

REUNION.

The parties to a partition,⁷ or some of them,⁸ may reunite so as to constitute, after such reunion, a joint family, and to remit them to the same status as before the partition.⁹

Reunion.

The question as to whether there has been a reunion is a question of fact.¹⁰

¹ Act VI. (Bo. C.) of 1888, s. 21.

² See *Tajamal Ali v. Mussud Ali* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 632.

³ See *Jagan Nath v. Tirbeni Sahi* (1908), 31 All. 41.

⁴ *Post*, p. 381.

⁵ *Post*, p. 391.

⁶ *Marudayi v. Doraisami Karambian* (1907), 30 Mad. 348; *Ramappa Naicken v. Sithammal* (1879), 2 Mad. 182.

⁷ *Balabuz Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai* (1903), 30 I. A. 130, at p. 136; 30 Calc. 725, at p. 734; 7 C. W. N. 642, at p. 646; 5 Bom. L. R. 469; *Pran Kishen Paul Chowdry v. Mothooramohun Paul Chowdry* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 403; 4 W. R. P. C. 11; *Vishwanath Gangadhar v. Krishnaji Gangadhar* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. A. C. 69. See

Lakshmi Bai v. Ganpat Moroba (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. O. C. 150, at pp. 165, 166. Persons who have never been joint cannot “reunite,” *Akshay Chandra Bhattacharya v. Hari Das Goswami* (1908), 35 Calc. 721; 12 C. W. N. 511.

⁸ See *Abhai Churn Jana v. Mangal Jana* (1892), 19 Calc. 634; *Tara Chand Ghose v. Pudum Lochun Ghose* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 249.

⁹ They will succeed by survivorship, *Narasimha Charlu v. Venkata Singaramma* (1909), 33 Mad. 165. See, however, Mayne’s “Hindu Law,” 8th ed., pp. 824–826. As to the law of inheritance, see *post*, pp. 414, 415.

¹⁰ *Raghubir Singh v. Motikunwar* (1912), 35 All. 41; 17 C. W. N. 443; 15 Bom. L. R. 426.

There must be a complete junction of estate with an intention to reunite, and not a mere living together,¹ or joint enjoyment of the property.²

Where any of their descendants think fit to unite, they may do so; but such a union is not a reunion in the sense of the Hindu law, and does not affect the inheritance.³

According to the Mitakshara,⁴ reunion is restricted to three classes of cases, namely, (1) between father and son, (2) between brothers, (3) between paternal uncle and nephews.⁵ The same view is taken in the Smṛiti Chandrika,⁶ the Daya-bhaga,⁷ the Viramitrodaya,⁸ and the Mayukha.⁹ The Mithila school permits any of the late co-sharers to reunite.¹⁰

An agreement to reunite cannot apparently be made by, or on behalf of, a minor.¹¹

The burden of proof of reunion is on the person alleging it.¹²

¹ *Rusi Mendli v. Sundar Mendli* (1910), 37 Calc. 703; *Gopal Chunder Daghoria v. Kenaram Daghoria* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 35; *Kuta Bully Viraya v. Kuta Chudappavuthamulu* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 235.

² See *Balkishen Das v. Ramnuraïn Sahu* (1903), 30 I. A. 139; 30 Calc. 738; 7 C. W. N. 578; 5 Bom. L. R. 461.

³ *Vishvanath Gangadhar v. Krishnaji Gangadhar* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. A. C. 69. See *Krodes Sen v. Kamini Mohun Sen* (1881), 10 C. L. R. 161; *Ram Hari Sarma v. Trihi Ram Sarma* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 336; 15 W. R. C. R. 442.

⁴ Chap. ii. s. 9, paras. 2, 3.

⁵ *Basanta Kumar Singha v. Jogen-dra Nath Singha* (1905), 33 Calc. 371;

10 C. W. N. 236.

⁶ Chap. xii. para. 1. *Abhai Churn Jana v. Mangal Jana* (1892), 19 Calc. 634, at p. 638.

⁷ Chap. xii. paras. 3, 4. See also "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. v. para. 4.

⁸ G. C. Sarkar's translation, pp. 168, 169, 205.

⁹ Chap. iv. s. 19, para. 1.

¹⁰ "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 301; "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. v. para. 5.

¹¹ *Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukmabai* (1903), 30 I. A. 130, at p. 136; 30 Calc. 725, at pp. 734, 735; 7 C. W. N. 642, at p. 646; 5 Bom. L. R. 469.

¹² *Gopal Chunder Daghoria v. Kenaram Daghoria* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 35.

CHAPTER X.

PRINCIPLES OF INHERITANCE.

THE Law of Inheritance is the law as to the devolution of Definition.
property on the death of an absolute owner intestate.

There is old authority that when a Hindu relinquishes all worldly Abandon-
affairs, his heir takes his property.¹ In the event of such a question ment of
arising it would have to be shown clearly that there was a formal and worldly
conclusive abandonment of all interests in property. affairs.

Under the Bengal school of law all the property of which To what
a Hindu dies possessed, whether it be separate or coparcenary, property
passes to his heir, if he has made no valid bequest thereof.² inheritance
applies.

Under the Mitakshara law the heir is entitled only to—

- (a) The separate acquisitions of a deceased member of a coparcenary.³
- (b) Property which had belonged to a coparcenary of which the deceased was the sole surviving member.⁴
- (c) The property, however acquired, of a deceased Hindu, who was at the time of his death separate from the other members of his family.⁵

No question of inheritance to coparcenary property governed by the

¹ Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 185; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. pp. 525, 536; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. ii. para. 57. See *Hafzoonnissa Begum v. Radhabinode Missur*, Ben. S. D. A. 1856, p. 595; *Sidh Narain v. Futeh Narain* (1805), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 118 (new edition, 156); *Jagannath Pal v. Bidyanand* (1868), 1 B. L. R. 114; 10 W. R. C. R. 172; *Dharmapuram Pandara Sannadhi v. Virapandiyam Pillai* (1898), 22 Mad. 302; *Harish Chandra Roy v. Atir Mahmud* (1913), 40 Cal. 545.

² *Durga Nath Pramanik v. Chintamani Dass* (1903), 31 Cal. 214; 8

C. W. N. 11.

³ *Katama Natchiar v. The Rajah of Shivagunga* (1864), 9 M. I. A. 543; 2 W. R. P. C. 31; *Periasami v. Periasami* (1878), 5 I. A. 61; 1 Mad. 312; 2 C. L. R. 81; *Pitum Koonwar (Musst) v. Joy Kishen Doss* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 101.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 219, 220.

⁵ *Doorga Persad Singh (Tekait) v. Doorga Konwar (Tekaitni)* (1878), 5 I. A. 149, at p. 160; 4 Cal. 190, at p. 202; 3 C. L. R. 31, at p. 40; *Soorjoon (Musumat) v. Ishree Brahmun* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 74.

Mitakshara school of law can arise when there is a surviving coparcener, however remotely connected with the deceased.¹

As to the devolution of coparcenary property, see *ante*, pp. 236, 237.

As to the devolution of the separate property of a member of a *tarwad*, see *Govindan Nair v. Sankaran Nair* (1909), 32 Mad. 351.

As to the devolution of property which by grant or custom passes to a single heir, see *post*, Chap. XVII.

As to the devolution of *mala* property, see Bombay Matadars Act (VI. (Bom. C.) of 1887), ss. 9, 10; *Daya Khushal v. Bhikhu (Bai)* (1915), 17 Bom. L. R. 504.

Property
vested in
deceased.

In the absence of a valid bequest an heir is entitled to succeed to all property, which was vested in the deceased in title or in possession at the time of his death, although the enjoyment of the deceased therein may have been postponed.²

He is not entitled to succeed to property which was not so vested.³

Vesting of
inheritance.

The right of the nearest heir to inherit vests at the moment of the death of the owner of the property, or of a female heir taking a restricted estate.⁴ It cannot under any circumstances remain in abeyance in expectation of the birth of a preferable heir not conceived at the time of the owner's death.⁵

The question in each case is who is the nearest heir when the succession opens out, i.e. on the death of the propositus or on the death of a woman who does not make a fresh stock of descent.

A person who is born between the date of the death of a full owner and the death of a female limited owner will take if he is at the latter date the nearest heir of the last full owner.⁶

It is not obligatory on a Hindu heir to obtain letters of administration to the estate of the last owner.⁷

¹ *Ante*, pp. 236, 237.

² *Revun Persad v. Radha Beeby (Jussumat)* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 137, at p. 176; 7 W. R. P. C. 35, at p. 40; *Hurrosoondery Debea Chowdranee v. Rajessure Dabea* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 321.

³ *Balamma v. Pullayya* (1894), 18 Mad. 168.

⁴ *Post*, Chap. XV.

⁵ *Nilcomul Lahuri v. Jotendro Mohun Lahuri* (1881), 7 Calc. 178, at p. 188; 8 C. L. R. 401, at p. 404; *Behari Lal Laha v. Kailas Chunder Laha* (1896), 1 C. W. N. 121; *Amrito Lal Dutt v. Surnomoni Dasi* (1898), 25 Calc. 662, at pp. 690, 691; 2 C. W. N. 389, at p. 396; *Koylasnath Doss v. Gyanonee Doss*, W. R. 1864, C. R.

314; *Rash Beharee Roy v. Nimaye Churn*, *Ibid.* 223; *Kesub Chunder Ghose v. Bishnopursaud Bose*, Ben. S. D. A. 1860, vol. ii. 340; *Gordhandas v. Ramcoover (Bai)* (1901), 26 Bom. 449; 3 Bom. L. R. 857; *Lakhi Priya v. Bhairab Chandra Chaudhuri* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 315 (new edition), 369; *Banymodhi Ghose v. Juggodumba Doss*, 2 Sev. App. C. 248; Norton L. C. 421.

⁶ *Seeta Ram Gossain v. Fukeer Chand Chuckerbutty* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 433.

⁷ *Jogendra Chunder Dutt v. Apurna Dassi* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 1190; *Saboo Sidick (Haji) v. Ally Mahomed* (1904), 30 Bom. 270; 6 Bom. L. R. 1135.

The right can only be divested by the valid adoption of a son to the late owner,¹ or by the birth of a child who was conceived at the time of his death² (or when the succession opened out),³ and would have had a preferential right to the inheritance.⁴

There might also be a case where a testator had made a bequest to operate *in futuro*; then the estate of the heir would be divested on the bequest coming into operation.⁵

An estate once vested cannot be divested by the birth of a nearer heir, who was not conceived at the time the succession opened out, nor can it be partially divested by the birth of a person who would have been a co-heir if he had been born at the time when the inheritance vested.⁶

Illustration.

A Hindu died in 1832 leaving an only son who had been blind from his birth, and two widows the survivor of whom died in 1849. On the death of the surviving widow, a nephew succeeded as heir, the blind son being by Hindu law excluded from inheritance.⁷ The blind man, having married, a son was born to him in 1858. The blind man died in 1861. His son did not oust the nephew.⁸

An heir succeeds by virtue of his own right as the nearest heir, that is to say, by his own propinquity, or capacity to offer oblations as the case may be. He does not acquire his right through or under any other person.⁹

A person does not take because he was heir of a person who would have taken if he had survived the deceased.

"Heritable blood is a foreign importation from a foreign law, and

¹ See *ante*, pp. 193, 198.

² *Berogah Moye (Mt) v. Nubokissen Roy*, 2 Sev. App. C. 239; Norton L. C. 422. This has no application to the case of a still-born child, *Goura Chowdhraim (Mussamut) v. Chummun Chowdry*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 340, at p. 342.

³ *Rash Beharec Roy v. Nimaye Churn*, W. R. (1864), C. R. 223.

⁴ Cases *ante*, p. 362, note 5, and *post*, p. 373, note 7. *Aulim Chund Dhur v. Bejai Govind Burrall* (1838), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 224 (new ed., 278); *Bama Soonduree Dossee v. Anund Moyee Dossee* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 353; *Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das* (1869), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 103; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 11; cf. *Minakshi v. Virappa* (1884), 8 Mad. 89; *Yekeyamian v. Agniswarian*

(1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 307, at p. 311; *Hanmant Ramchundra v. Bhimacharya* (1887), 12 Bom. 105; *Goura Chowdhraim (Mussamut) v. Chummun Chowdry*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 340.

⁵ See *Bramamayi Dasi (Srimati) v. Jages Chandra Dutt* (1871), 8 B. L. R. 400, at p. 407.

⁶ *Narasimha Razu v. Veerabhadra Razu* (1893), 17 Mad. 287.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 370, 371.

⁸ *Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das* (1869), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 103; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 11; and see other cases, *post*, p. 374.

⁹ See *Brojo Mohun Thakoor v. Gource Pershad Chowdhry* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 70; *Balamma v. Pullaya* (1894), 18 Mad. 168, at p. 170.

Divesting of inheritance.

Right not acquired through others.

grafting it upon the Hindu system can only lead to further confusion and inconsistency.”¹

An heir is not disqualified because the person through whom he is related to the deceased cannot take. Thus a sister's son succeeds² although a sister cannot succeed. The same observations apply in the case of a mother's sister, a mother's father's sister, a brother's daughter, a father's brother's daughter, a father's sister, a father's father's brother's daughter, and a father's father's sister. If the sons of these persons predecease the owner, their sons, not being heirs, cannot take under the Bengal school. Again, the son of a disqualified person may inherit by virtue of his own heirship,³ although his father could not have taken.⁴

Illustrations.

(a) A son dies before his father, leaving a daughter. The daughter cannot succeed to her grandfather, although if her father had survived her grandfather, she would have inherited the property.⁵

(b) A niece does not take the property of her uncle, although her father, if he had been alive, would have inherited.

Thus, except in some cases in the Bombay Presidency,⁶ a widow cannot, as such, inherit the property of any person other than her husband, *i.e.* no right accrues to her as widow to succeed to a person to whom her husband would have been an heir if he had lived.

The widow of a son,⁷ of a son's son,⁸ of a daughter's son,⁹ of a father,¹⁰ of a brother,¹¹ of an uncle,¹² or of a cousin,¹³ has no right of inheritance as such.

¹ *Chelikani Tirupati Rayanlingaru v. Suraneni Vencata Gopala Narasimha Rau Bahadur (Rajah)* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 278, at p. 287.

² *Post*, pp. 402, 428.

³ *Post*, p. 373.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 370, 371.

⁵ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 176.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 412, 413.

⁷ *Ananda Bibee v. Nownut Lal* (1882), 9 Cal. 315; *Amrit (Bai) v. Manik (Bai)* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 79; *Himulta Chowdrayn (Mussumaut) v. Pudoo Munee Chowdrayn (Mussumaut)* (1825), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 19 (new edition, 25); *Rai Sham Bullubh v. Prankishen Ghose* (1820), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 35 (new edition, 44); *Ayabulee (Mussumaut) v. Rajkishen Sahoo* (1820), *Ibid.* 28 (new edition, 38); Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. pp. 233, 234.

⁸ *Goornee (Mussumat) v. Oomrao Koonwer (Mussumat)* (1866), 1 Agra H. C. 149.

⁹ W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 47.

¹⁰ *Seethai v. Nachiar* (1912), 37 Mad. 286; *Ramkoonur v. Ummur* (1817), 1 Borr. 415; *Bhyrobee Dossee v. Nubkissen Bhoose* (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 53 (new edition, 61).

¹¹ *Thayammal v. Annamalai Mudali* (1895), 19 Mad. 35; *Peddammittu Viramani v. Appu Rau* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 117; *Jogdamba Koer v. Secretary of State* (1889), 16 Cal. 367; *Chooru v. Busunttee (Mussumat)* (1866), 1 Agra H. C. 174; *Jymunee Dibiah (Mussumaut) v. Ramjoy Chowdree* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 289 (2nd ed., 385).

¹² *Gauri Sahai v. Rukko* (1880), 3 All. 45; *Upendra Mohan Tagore v. Thanda Das* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 349; 12 W. R. C. R. 263.

¹³ *Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramonnee Burmoneah (Mussumat)* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 81; 1 B. L. R. F. C. 26; 10 W. R. P. C. 35

An heir cannot be excluded by a testator from inheritance Disinherison. otherwise than by a valid devise to some other person.¹

The course of inheritance prescribed by the Hindu law cannot be altered by a private arrangement,² or by will,³ but there is nothing to prevent persons, in whom interests have become vested by inheritance, making arrangements *inter se* as to their shares, or waiving their rights.⁴

On property descending to a male Hindu as heir, he becomes a fresh stock of descent, and on his death the property passes to his heir and not to the heir of the previous owner.

When property descends to a female, she does not,⁵ except in some cases in Bombay,⁶ become a new stock of descent, but on her death the person, who would have been heir to the last full owner if he or she had been living at the death of the female, takes, and, if a male, becomes a new stock of descent.

Except in the case of the inheritance of a son, of a son's son, or of a son's son's son to the property of a male Hindu,⁷ in which case the doctrine of representation excludes the rule of preference,⁸ the existence of a class of nearer heirs excludes all members of a more remote class.⁹

For example, a brother's son cannot succeed while there is in existence a brother capable of taking.¹⁰

¹ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Supp. vol. 47, at p. 79; 3 B. L. R. 377, at pp. 409, 410; 18 W. R. C. P. 359, at p. 371; *Toolseydas Ludha v. Premji Tricumdas* (1888), 13 Bom. 61, at p. 69.

² *Balkrishna Trimback Tendulkar v. Savitribai* (1878), 3 Bom. 54; *Venkata Mahapatra Surya Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja Rao) v. Venkata Mahapatra Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur (Hon. Sri Raja Rao)* (1886), 13 I. A. 97; 9 Mad. 499.

³ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Supp. vol. 47, at pp. 64, 65; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 394; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 364; *Tarakeswar Roy (Kumar) v. Shoshi Shikareswar (Kumar)* (1883), 10 I. A. 51, at p. 58; 9 Cal. 952, at p. 958; 13 C. L. R. 62, at pp. 65, 66.

⁴ *Meherban Singh v. Sheo Koonwer (Mussumat)* (1866), 1 Agra, 106; *Dal Chund v. Soonder (Mussumat)* (1867), 2 Agra, 173.

⁵ *Post*, p. 464.

⁶ *Post*, p. 467.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 381, 382. As to illegitimate sons, see *post*, pp. 382, 383. As to *stridhan* property, see *post*, p. 449.

⁸ *Muttuvaduganaiha Tevar v. Periasami* (1892), 16 Mad. 11, at p. 15; *Marudayi v. Doraisami Karambian* (1907), 30 Mad. 348, at p. 351.

⁹ *Chandika Bakhsh v. Muga Kuar* (1902), 29 I. A. 70; 24 All. 273; 6 C. W. N. 425; 4 Bom. L. R. 376; *Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama Ayyangar* (1905), 29 Mad. 115; *Mahabeer Pershad v. Ram Surun* (1866), 3 Agra, 6; *Khetur Gopal Chatterjee v. Poorno Chunder Chatterjee* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 482.

¹⁰ *Rooder Chunder Chowdhry v.*

The Hindu treatises on the law of inheritance among sons and grandsons proceed on the assumption of a partition made immediately after the death of the "propositus."¹

Rights of
women.

The rights of women to inherit property are on a different footing from that of males.

Under the Bengal,² Benares,³ and Madras⁴ schools, women inherit only by virtue of express texts, but in Madras certain female heirs are entitled to succeed in default of all male heirs.⁵

The Crown succeeds by escheat in preference to a woman who is not so named.⁶

Although women may not be heirs, their sons may be heirs on their own merits and not through their mothers.⁷ Thus the sister's son,⁸ the son of an uncle's daughter, the son of a brother's daughter, the son of a nephew's daughter, a son's daughter's son,⁹ or a daughter's daughter's son,¹⁰ are heirs, although their mothers are not heirs.

In the Bombay Presidency widows of male relatives and certain female relatives, who are excluded in the other Presidencies, are entitled to inherit.¹¹

Sumbhoo Chunder Chowdhry (1821), 3 Ben. Sol. R. 106 (new edition, 142); *Jymunee Dibiah* (*Mussummaut*) v. *Ramjoy Chowdree* (1824), *Ibid.* 289 (new edition, 385); *Prithee Singh v. Court of Wards* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 272; S. C. on appeal, *Sheo Soondary v. Pirthee Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 147.

¹ West and Buhler, 3rd ed., 68; *Marudayi v. Doraisami Karambian* (1907), 30 Mad. 348, at p. 350.

² *Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy v. Cassibai* (1880), 7 I. A. 212, at p. 231; 5 Bom. 110, at p. 118; S. C. in Court below, *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuxarbhai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at pp. 418, 428, 438; *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 37; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 49, at p. 58; *Madhumala Dassi* (*Srimati*) v. *Lakshan Chandra Pal* (1913), 20 C. W. N. 627; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 11.

³ *Nanhi v. Gauri Shankar* (1905), 28 All. 187; *Jagannath v. Champa* (1905), 28 All. 307, dissenting from *Bansidhar v. Ganeshi* (1900), 22 All. 338; *Gauri Sahai v. Rukko* (1880),

3 All. 45; *Jagatnaraïn v. Sheo Das* (1883), 5 All. 311; see *Ananda Bibee v. Nounit Lal* (1882), 9 Cal. 315.

⁴ *Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy v. Cassibai* (1880), 7 I. A. 212, at p. 231; 5 Bom. 110, at p. 118; S. C. in Court below, *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuxarbhai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at pp. 418, 428, 438; *Mari v. Chinnammal* (1884), 8 Mad. 107, at pp. 117, 127, 129. See *Lakshmanammal v. Tiruvengada* (1882), 5 Mad. 241, at p. 249.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 413, 414.

⁶ *Jogdamba Koor v. Secretary of State* (1889), 16 Cal. 367; see *post*, p. 416.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 363.

⁸ *Post*, p. 402. See *Chelikani Tirupati Rayanagaru v. Vencata Gopala Narasimha Rau Bahadur* (*Rajah Suraneni*) (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 278, at p. 288.

⁹ *Nanhi v. Gauri Shankar* (1905), 28 All. 187; *Koomud Chunder Roy v. Seetakanth Roy*, W. R. F. B. R. 75.

¹⁰ *Jagannath v. Champa* (1905), 28 All. 307.

¹¹ *Post*, pp. 412, 413.

"The principle of the general incapacity of women for inheritance . . . has not been adopted in Western India, where, for example, sisters are competent to inherit." ¹

Except in certain cases in the Bombay Presidency,² on the death of a female in whom the inheritance has vested, the then next heir to the last full owner takes the estate, *i.e.* the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the last full owner if he (or she in the case of *stridhan*) had lived up to and died at the moment of the death of such female owner.³ Succession after female.

As to the estate taken by a female in inherited property and her power over such property, see *post*, Chap. XV.

In the case of the male agnate descendants of a deceased male Hindu,⁴ and in the case of the succession of the sons of daughters in cases governed by the "*Mayukha*,"⁵ and in the distribution of *stridhan* property among sons' sons and among daughters' sons,⁶ the heirs take *per stirpes*. Succession when per stirpes.

In other cases persons of the same relationship to the deceased take *per capita*, *i.e.* each sharer takes an equal share independently of the stock from which he came. Succession when per capita.

This follows from the rule that there is no representation in inheritance.⁷

Thus brothers' sons⁸ and daughters' sons⁹ succeed *per capita*.

"There is no positive reason in favour of applying the rule of succession *per stirpes* to the case of the remote *gotraja sapindas*, while there are certain important considerations pointing the other way. . . . As

¹ *Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy v. Cassibai* (1880), 7 I. A 212, at p. 231; 5 Bom. 110, at p. 118.

² *Post*, p. 167.

³ *Post*, p. 464.

⁴ "*Mitakshara*," chap. i. s. v. paras. 1, 2; "*Daya-Bhaga*," chap. iii. s. i. para. 21; "*Smriti Chandrika*," chap. viii. paras. 1, 2.

⁵ "*Vyavahara Mayukha*," chap. iv. s. x. para. 20.

⁶ "*Mitakshara*," chap. ii. s. xii. para. 16; "*Vyavahara Mayukha*," chap. iv. s. x. para. 21; "*Smriti Chandrika*," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 25; Banerjee's "*Law of Marriage*," 3rd ed., p. 402.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 363.

⁸ *Brojo Kishore Dassee v. Sreenath*

Bose (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 463; *Brojo Mohun Thakoor v. Gouree Pershad Chowdhry* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 70; *Gooroo Churn Sircar v. Koylash Chunder Sircar* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 93; *Rulton Kristo Bosoo v. Bhugoban Chunder Bosoo* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 32; R. K. Sarvadhikari's "*Hindu Law of Inheritance*," p. 483.

⁹ (*Mitakshara School*) *Nagesh v. Gururao* (1892), 17 Bom. 303; *Ram Swaruth Pandey v. Basdeo Singh (Bahoo)* (1867), 2 Agra, 168; *Sheo Sehai Singh v. Omed Konwur (Mussummat)* (1840), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 301 (2nd ed., 378). (*Bengal School*) *Ramdhun Sein v. Kishen Kanth Sein* (1821), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 100 (new edition, 133).

regards daughters' sons, it has always been held that they succeed not *per stirpes* but *per capita*. . . . So in the case of brothers' sons the same rule has been laid down. In both cases the succession is direct, the nephews being entitled to claim as nephews, and being liable to be excluded by any uncle or aunt, as the case may be, if one happens to survive the *propositus*. The similarity between the succession of these nephews with that of the remoter *gotraja sapindas* is more complete than that between the succession of the latter, and that of lineal descendants."¹

Relinquish-
ment of heir-
ship.

There is apparently no objection to an heir, either under the Mitakshara² or the Bengal law,³ relinquishing his rights of inheritance in favour of the next heir.

This applies also to the case of an impartible Raj.⁴

EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE.

Unchaste
widow.

An unchaste widow is not entitled to succeed to the property of her husband,⁵ but where before the loss of chastity the property has vested in her,⁶ although she may not have acquired possession thereof,⁷ her rights therein are not divested by the subsequent loss of chastity.

Unchastity which has been condoned by the husband is not a bar.⁸

Other un-
chaste heirs.

In parts of India governed by the Mitakshara law a widow is the only female heir, at any rate in Bombay and Madras, who is excluded by unchastity from inheritance to a male Hindu.⁹

¹ *Nagesh v. Gururao* (1892), 17 Bom. 303; *Ramgutti Doss v. Nundo Koomar Doss* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 11. "Partition is equal in the absence of special texts to the contrary," Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 442.

² "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. ii. para. 11; *Ruvre Bhadr Sheo Bhadr v. Roopshunkur Shunkerjee* (1823), 2 Borr. 656, at p. 665. See *Meherban Singh v. Sheo Koonwer (Musumati)* (1866), 1 Agra, 106; *ante*, p. 230.

³ *Rujoyeekant Mitter v. Premchand Bose* (1862), Marsh, 241. See *Ram Kannye Gossamee v. Meernomoyee Dosssee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 49.

⁴ *Luchmeenarain Singh v. Gibbon* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 197.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. i. paras. 37-39, s. ii. para. 2; *Kery Kolitany v. Moneram Kolita* (1873), 13 B. L. R. 1, at pp. 11, 12; 19 W. R.

C. R. 367, at p. 371; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. paras. 2, 6, 8, 9; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. i. para. 56. See *Rajkoonwaree Dasse v. Golabee Dasse*, Ben. S. D. A. 1858, p. 1891. As to her right of maintenance, see *ante*, p. 83.

⁶ *Monuram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115; 5 Calc. 776; 6 C. L. R. 322; S. C. (in court below) (1873), 13 B. L. R. 1; 19 W. R. C. R. 367; *Parvati v. Bhiku* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 25; *Nehalo v. Kishen Lal* (1879), 2 All. 150; *Sellam v. Chinnammal* (1901), 24 Mad. 441.

⁷ *Bhawani v. Mahtab Kuar* (1879), 2 All. 171.

⁸ *Gangadhar v. Yellu* (1911), 36 Bom. 138; 13 Bom. L. R. 1038.

⁹ (As to daughter) *Tara v. Krishna* (1907), 31 Bom. 495, at p. 502; 9 Bom. L. R. 774; *Adnyapa v. Rudrama*

The "Smrita Chandrika,"¹ which is of great authority in Madras,² and the "Viramitrodaya,"³ which is of authority in the Benares school,⁴ make chastity a condition for inheritance, but the "Mitakshara" and the "Mayukha" omit to impose upon a daughter the condition of being chaste.⁵ The law is thus clear in Bombay, and in Madras the question is covered by the decision in *Kojiyadu v. Lakshmi*.⁶ There is no authority elsewhere, but it is submitted that the omission of this condition from the "Mitakshara" decides the question.

According to the Bengal school, in addition to the widow any other female heir to a male is excluded by her unchastity⁷ antecedent to the vesting.

Unchastity is not a bar to inheriting *stridhan* property.⁸ *Stridhan.*

"The only disqualification for a widow to inherit her husband's estate is that one of physical unchastity."⁹

Act XV. of 1856, which empowers Hindu widows to remarry. *Forfeiture of property by remarriage.*
provides as follows:—

Sec. 2. "All rights and interests which any widow may have in her deceased husband's property by way of maintenance, or by inheritance to her husband or to his lineal successors,¹⁰ or by virtue of any will or testamentary disposition conferring upon her, without express permission to remarry, only a limited interest in such property, with no power of alienating the same, shall, upon her remarriage, cease and determine, as if

(1879), 4 Bom. 104; *Kojiyadu v. Lakshmi* (1882), 5 Mad. 149, at p. 155; *Vedammal v. Vedanayaga Mudaliar* (1907), 31 Mad. 100; *Angammal v. Venkata Reddy* (1902), 26 Mad. 509, at p. 511; *Gunga Jati (Musammal) v. Ghasita* (1875), 1 All. 46; *Deokee (Musammal) v. Sookhdeo* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 361. (As to a mother) *Dal Singh v. Dini (Musammal)* (1909), 32 All. 155; *Kojiyadu v. Lakshmi* (1882), 5 Mad. 149; *Baldeo Singh v. Mathura Kunwar* (1911), 33 All. 702.

¹ Chap. xi. s. ii. para. 26.

² *Ante*, p. 17.

³ Chap. iii. pt. ii. s. 3.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 16, 17.

⁵ See *Advaya v. Rudrava* (1879), 4 Bom. 104, at pp. 110, 111.

⁶ (1882), 5 Mad. 149.

⁷ Raghavanandan's commentary on "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. ii. para. 31, referred to in *Ramnath Tolapattro v. Durga Sundari Debi* (1878), 4

Calc. 550, at p. 554; *Sundari Letani v. Pitambari Letani* (1905), 32 Calc. 871; 9 C. W. N. 1003; *Ramananda v. Raikishori Barmani* (1894), 22 Calc. 347; *Ramnath Tolapattro v. Durga Sundari Debi* (1878), 4 Calc. 550; *Kery Kolitany v. Moneeram Kolita* (1873), 13 B. L. R. 1, at p. 48; 19 W. R. C. R. 367, at p. 393.

⁸ *Gunga Jati (Musammal) v. Ghasita* (1878), 1 All. 46; *Nogendra Nandini Dassi v. Benoy Krishna Deb* (1902), 30 Calc. 521; 7 C. W. N. 121; *Angammal v. Venkata Reddy* (1902), 26 Mad. 509. Sastri G. C. Sarkar disputes this ("Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 333).

⁹ *Khettermoni Dassi (Sm.) v. Kadumbini Dassi (Sm.)* (1912), 16 C. W. N. 984, at p. 966.

¹⁰ Thus she forfeits property inherited from a son; *Vithu v. Govinda* (1896), 22 Bom. 321.

she had then died, and the next heirs of her deceased husband, or other persons entitled to the property on her death, shall thereupon succeed to the same."

Remarriage of widow. There is a conflict of authority as to whether this applies whether or not she has before such remarriage abandoned Hinduism. On the one hand it has been held that the Act only applies to widows who are professed Hindus at the time of remarriage.¹ On the other hand there is authority that a woman cannot by a change of religion retain the rights which she would otherwise have lost.² It is submitted that the latter view is correct.

A widow does not by remarriage lose her rights to succeed thereafter to her son or other lineal successor of her husband.³

There is a conflict of opinion as to whether widows, who are by the custom of their caste entitled to remarry, lose their interests in the property of their husbands by remarriage. The Allahabad High Court⁴ considers that they do not, but the High Courts at Calcutta,⁵ Madras,⁶ and Bombay⁷ have taken the opposite view.

She has the same rights of inheritance to her new husband as she would have had, had such marriage been her first marriage.⁸

Physical defects.

Certain physical defects exclude from inheritance and coparcenary,⁹ viz. impotence,¹⁰ idiocy,¹¹ congenital blindness,¹²

¹ *Abdul Aziz Khan v. Norma* (1913), 35 All. 366.

² *Matungini Gupta v. Ram Rutton Roy* (1891), 19 Calc. 289, overruling *Gopal Singh v. Dhungazee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 206.

³ *Akora Suth v. Boreani* (1868), 2 B. L. R. 199; 11 W. R. C. R. 82; *Basappa v. Rayava* (1904), 29 Bom. 91; 6 Bom. L. R. 779; *Haru Dalmel (Chamar) v. Kashi* (1902), 26 Bom. 388; 4 Bom. L. R. 737; *Lakshmana Sasamallo v. Siva Sasamallayani* (1905), 28 Mad. 425.

⁴ *Khuddo v. Durga Prasad* (1906), 29 All. 122; *Har Saran Das v. Nandi* (1889), 11 All. 330; *Ranjit v. Radha Ram* (1898), 20 All. 476; *Gajadhar v. Kaunsilla* (1908), 31 All. 161. These decisions were accepted with hesitation in *Mula v. Partab* (1910), 32 All. 489.

⁵ *Rasul Jehan Begum v. Ram Surun Singh* (1895), 22 Calc. 589; *Gourichurn Patni v. Sita Patni* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 346; *Mahammad Umbar v. Mankuar (Must.)* (1917), 21 C. W. N. 906.

⁶ *Murugayi v. Viramakali* (1877), 1 Mad. 226.

⁷ *Vithu v. Govinda* (1896), 22 Bom. 321.

⁸ Act XV. of 1856, sec. 5.

⁹ See *ante*, pp. 228, 229.

¹⁰ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. v. paras. 7, 8; "Viramitrodaya," chap. viii. The "Mitakshara" (chap. ii. s. 10, para. 2) describes an impotent person as one of the third sex, but in "Bala-abhata" the authoress (Lakshmi Devi) includes a male eunuch, so, according to her, impotence need not be congenital. The "Viramitrodaya" takes a different view, but the "Mitakshara" (chap. ii. s. 10, para. 3) includes persons who have become impotent. "Manu," chap. ix. para. 201, excludes eunuchs, so apparently non-congenital impotence will be a ground of exclusion. Except in the cases of hermaphrodites and eunuchs, impotence, so as to exclude from inheritance, is very difficult to prove: see Bhattacharya's "Law of Joint Family," pp. 405, 406.

¹¹ I.e. of unsound and imbecile mind. See *Tirumamagal Annal v. Ramaswami Ayyangar* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 214. The "Mitakshara" (chap. ii. s. 10, para. 2) defines an idiot as a "person deprived of the internal faculty; meaning one incapable of discriminating right from wrong."

¹² *Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai*

deafness or dumbness,¹ absence of a limb or sense,² lameness, i.e. complete incapacity to walk,³ lunacy,⁴ although not congenital⁵ or incurable.⁶

If the interest be vested by birth, it cannot be divested by subsequent lunacy⁷; nor can it be divested by lunacy commencing after the succession has opened out.⁸

The rule of Hindu law which disqualifies "idiots" and "madmen" from inheritance, should be enforced only upon the most clear and satisfactory proof that its requirements are satisfied. The rule does not contemplate the disqualification of persons who are merely of weak intellect in the sense that they are not up to the average standard of human intelligence, or endowed with the business capacity to manage their affairs properly.⁹

(1876), 1 Bom. 177. See *Bakubai v. Manchhabai* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 5. Blindness, even if incurable, is not, if it is not congenital, a ground of exclusion; *Umabai v. Bhavu Padmanji* (1877), 1 Bom. 557; *Mohesh Chunder Roy v. Chunder Mohun Roy* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 273; 23 W. R. C. R. 78; *Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das* (1869), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 103; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 11. See *Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Family,"* p. 419.

¹ *Muddun Gopal Lal (Lala) v. Khikinda Koer (Mussumat)* (1890), 18 I. A. 9; 18 Calc. 341; *Hira Singh (Chaudri) v. Gunga Sahai (Chaudhri)* (1883), 11 I. A. 20; 6 All. 322; *Vallabhram Shivanarayan v. Hariganga (Bai)* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. A. C. 135; *Pareshmani Dasi v. Dmanath Das* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 117; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 19, note; *Balgovind Lall v. Rampertab Singh*, Ben. S. D. A. 1860, vol. i. p. 661.

² "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. v. s. 7. "Literally, an organ; explained by some as a sense, as that of smelling, or of sight, etc., but by others, a limb, as the hand, foot, and so forth." Colebrooke's annotation to "Daya-Bhaga," chap. v. para. 7.

³ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. v. para. 10; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 421. "There is no text which declares that lameness should be congenital," *Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law,"* 2nd ed., p. 350, but in *Venkata Subba Rao v. Puroshottam*

(1902), 26 Mad. 133, it was held that lameness which was not congenital did not exclude. See *Futtick Chunder Chatterjee v. Juggut Mohinee Dabee* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 348; Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 1005.

⁴ *Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut* (1882), 8 Calc. 919.

⁵ *Ram Sahye Bhukkt v. Laljee Sahye (Lalla)* (1881), 8 Calc. 149; 9 C. L. R. 457; *Dwarkanath Bysak v. Mahendranath Bysak* (1872), 9 B. L. R. 198; 18 W. R. C. R. 305; *Wooma Pershad Roy v. Grish Chunder Prochundo* (1884), 10 Calc. 639; *Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash* (1883), 5 All. 509. See *Bodhnarain Singh (Baboo) v. Omrao Singh (Baboo)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 519; 6 B. L. R. 509; 15 W. R. P. C. 1; *Goureenath v. Collector of Monghyr* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 5; *Murari Gokuldas v. Parvatibai* (1876), 1 Bom. 177, at p. 182.

⁶ *Dwarkanath Bysak v. Mahendranath Bysak* (1872), 9 B. L. R. 198; 18 W. R. C. R. 305; *Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash* (1883), 5 All. 509.

⁷ *Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar* (1905), 28 All. 247; *Braja Bhukan Lal Ahusti v. Bichan Dobi* (1870), 9 B. L. R. 204, note; 14 W. R. C. R. 329; *Sanku v. Puttamma* (1890), 14 Mad. 289.

⁸ *Dwarkanath Bysak v. Mahendranath Bysak* (1872), 9 B. L. R. 198; 18 W. R. C. R. 305; *Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash* (1883), 5 All. 509.

⁹ *Surti v. Narain Das* (1890), 12 All. 530.

A physical defect, which would exclude a male from the inheritance, would also exclude a female.¹

The ancient text-books also exclude persons suffering from an incurable disease.² Under modern authorities, persons suffering from the aggravated form of leprosy, viz. the sanious or ulcerous type, are excluded,³ but persons suffering from the less aggravated form of that disease, viz. the anæsthetic form, are not excluded.⁴

Deformity and unfitness for social intercourse arising from the virulent and disgusting nature of the disease are the tests for the exclusion from inheritance.⁵

Although there are no cases on the subject, there seems no reason why the text of the law should not be followed, and why, if it be clearly proved that a person is suffering from a serious and incurable disease such as cancer or phthisis he should not be excluded. In the case of the latter disease, as modern research has produced cures in cases which before were treated as incurable, it would be difficult to prove a case of exclusion. As to the former disease much might depend on the situation and stage of the disease.⁶

In ancient times there were many other grounds for exclusion from inheritance and partition, but as they were removable by expiation, it is said that the Courts would not apparently now give effect to them.⁷ There is, however, authority that expiation is necessary.⁸ For instance, "an enemy of his father" was excluded,⁹ but this portion of the law is now obsolete.¹⁰

¹ See *Bakubai v. Manchabai* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 5.

² "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, in para. 2, "marasmus" (atrophy) is given as an example; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 321.

³ *Ananta v. Ramabai* (1877), 1 Bom. 554; *Janardhan Pandurang v. Gopal* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 145; *Muttuvilaya v. Parasakti*, 1 Mad. S. D. A. 239; *Bhoobunessuree Debia v. Gouree Doss Turkopunchan* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 535. See *Bhagaban Ramanuj Das (Mohunt) v. Roghunundun Ramanuj Das (Mohunt)* (1895), 22 I. A. 94; 22 Calc. 843; *Lakhi Priya v. Bhairab Chandra Chaudhuri* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 315 (2nd ed. 369); K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law of Joint Family," pp. 408, 409.

⁴ *Kayarahana Pathan v. Subbaraya Thevan* (1913), 38 Mad. 250; *Runchod Naran v. Ajoobai* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 114.

⁵ *Kayarahana Pathan v. Subbaraya*

Thevan (1917), 38 Mad. 250, at p. 255.

⁶ K. K. Bhattacharya ("Law of Joint Family," pp. 407, 408) points out the difficulty in holding that a disease is incurable. See *Issur Chunder Sein v. Ranees Dossee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 125.

⁷ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 830.

⁸ Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., pp. 1007, 1008. See, however, *Bhoobunessuree Debia v. Gouree Doss Turkopunchan* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 535; *Bholanath Raee v. Sabitra (Mussummaut)* (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 62 (new edition, 71); *Sheonauth Rai v. Dayamyee Chowdrain* (1814), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 108 (new edition, 137).

⁹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 10, para. 3. See *Jye Koonwur (Musst.) v. Bhikaree Singh*, Ben. S. D. A. 1848, p. 320; *Bholanath Raee v. Sabitra (Mussummaut)* (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 62 (new edition, 71).

¹⁰ *Kalka Pershad v. Budree Sah*

Although "Manu" ¹ treats fraud by one of the coparcener as operating as a forfeiture of his share, it seems clear that it has no such effect, but that the defrauding coparcener is merely compelled to bring into partition the property of which he sought to defraud his coparceners.²

The burden of proof is upon the person seeking to prove the disqualification.³

No one is entitled to take by inheritance the property of a person to whose murder he has been an accessory.⁴ Murder by heir.

It has been held that he is entitled to maintenance out of such estate.⁵

When an heir is disqualified, the next heir of the deceased succeeds, as if the disqualified person were dead.⁶ Result of disqualification.

The son of a person excluded from inheritance can inherit if he is himself an heir, but he does not inherit as the son of his father.⁷

Illustration.

A. leaves a sister's son who is blind, and has a son B. B. cannot inherit.⁸

The wife or widow of a disqualified Hindu, in cases governed by the Bombay law, does not become incapable of inheriting property merely by reason of her husband's disqualification, whether she claims as heir to a deceased person through her husband or otherwise, if she be herself Wife of disqualified person in Bombay.

(1871), 3 N. W. P. H. C. 267. See *Khettermoni Dassi (Sm.) v. Kadambini Dassi (Sm.)* (1912), 16 C. W. N. 964, at p. 967.

¹ Chap. ix. para. 213.

² *Kalka Pershad v. Budree Sah* (1871), 3 N. W. P. H. C. 267. See Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 564, vol. iii. p. 398; "Yajnavalkya," ii. para. 126; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. 9; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. xiv. paras. 4-6; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 6, para. 3; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 232; Strange's "Manual," s. 273; West and Buhler's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 307, 308; "Viramitrodaya" (Sarkar's translation), p. 245; "Dayabhaga," chap. xiii. para. 2; "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. viii.

³ See *Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh (Dewan) v. Jagatpal Singh (Rae)* (1890), 17 I. A. 173; 18 Calo. 111.

⁴ *Vedanayaga Mudaliar v. Vedammal* (1904), 27 Mad. 591; S. C. after remand, *Vedammal v. Veda-*

nayaga Mudaliar (1907), 31 Mad. 100; *Gangu v. Chandrabhagabai* (1907), 32 Bom. 275; 12 Bom. L. R. 140. It may be an interesting question as to what is the effect upon the right of survivorship in the case of the murder of one coparcener by another.

⁵ *Nilmadhab Mitter v. Jotindra Nath Mitter* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 341.

⁶ *Pareshmani Das v. Dinanath Das* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 117; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 19, note; *Bodhnarain Singh (Baboo) v. Omrao Singh (Baboo)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 519; 6 B. L. R. 509; 15 W. R. P. C. 1; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 42.

⁷ *Pareshmani Dasi v. Dinanath Das* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 117; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 19, note. As to adopted sons of disqualified persons, see *ante*, pp. 109, 110.

⁸ *Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das* (1869), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 103, at p. 116; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 11, at p. 16.

free from any of the defects which exclude a person from inheritance under the Hindu law.¹

There is nothing to prevent the widow of a disqualified person from inheriting as heir to her husband, or to her son.²

Property which has once vested cannot be divested by a subsequent disqualification,³ and conversely the removal of the ground of exclusion, as, for instance, when the insanity ceases, does not divest the estate of a person who has taken.⁴

The birth of a son to the disqualified person does not divest the estate of a person who has taken as heir.⁵

Stridhan
property.

It is undecided whether the physical defects which exclude from inheritance to the property of a male also exclude in the case of inheritance to a female,⁶ the texts on the subject being directed to the case of inheritance from males.

Sastri G. C. Sarkar contends that no distinction is to be made between the two cases.⁷ The question as to whether a married daughter having a dumb son can inherit *stridhan* property under the Bengal school was considered in *Charuchunder Pal v. Nobo Sunderi Dasi*,⁸ and decided in her favour on the ground that it was not shown that the dumbness was incurable.

Change of
religion and
loss of caste.

Change of religion or loss of caste for any reason⁹ does not *per se* exclude from inheritance.¹⁰

¹ *Gangu v. Chandrabhagabai* (1907), 32 Bom. 275; 10 Bom. L. R. 149.

² See *Ooma Dibya v. Rammuni Dibya* (1812), Wm. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," ii. 130.

³ *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolitany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115, at p. 153; 5 Calc. 776, at p. 788; 6 C. L. R. 322, at p. 332; *Abilakh Bhagat v. Bhekhi Mahto* (1895), 22 Calc. 864; *Turbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar* (1905), 28 All. 247; *Sanku v. Puttamma* (1890), 14 Mad. 289, at p. 294; *Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash* (1883), 5 All. 509; *Balgovinda (Musst.) v. Lal Buhadoor*, Ben. S. D. A. 1854, p. 244; *Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh (Dewar) v. Jagatpal Singh (Rae)* (1890), 17 I. A. 173; 18 Calc. 111.

⁴ *Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash* (1883), 5 All. 509.

⁵ *Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das* (1869), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 103; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 11; *Pareshmani Dasi v. Dinanath Das* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 117; 11 W. R. A. O. J. 19, note;

Deo Kishen v. Budh Prakash (1883), 5 All. 509; *Bapuji Lakshman v. Pandurang* (1882), 6 Bom. 616; *Pawadcwa v. Venkatesh Hanmant Kulkarni* (1908), 32 Bom. 455; 10 Bom. L. R. 559.

⁶ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 361, 362.

⁷ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 333.

⁸ (1891), 18 Calc. 327.

⁹ *Subbaraya Pillai v. Ramasami Pillai* (1899), 23 Mad 171.

¹⁰ Act XXI. of 1850. *Bhujjun Lal v. Gya Pershad* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 446; *Taij Singh v. Kousilla (Musst.)* (1866), 1 Agra, 90; *Honamma v. Timannabhat* (1877), 1 Bom. 559; *Gopal Singh v. Dhungazee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 206; *Karuthedatta v. Mele Pullakat Vassa Devan Namboodri* (1866), 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 236. See *Khunni Lal (Lala) v. Gobind Krishna Narain (Kumwar)* (1911), 38 I. A. 87; 33 All. 356; 15 C. W. N. 545; 13 Bom. L. R. 427, reversing *Gobind Krishna Narain v. Khunni Lal* (1907), 29 All. 487.

Where the circumstances create the disability, apart from the exclusion of caste, the Freedom of Religion Act ¹ gives no relief, as where a widow forfeits her right by unchastity.²

As to inheritance by a prostitute daughter, see *post*, p. 388.

A member of one of the twice-born classes who is clearly proved to have completely and finally abandoned all worldly affairs,³ as by entering "into an order of devotion" or becoming a hermit, an ascetic or a perpetual religious student,⁴ is excluded from inheritance.⁵

Abandonment
of worldly
affairs by heir.

There does not seem to be anything in the law to preclude him from returning to the world and resuming his rights if they have not vested in others.

A Sudra who becomes an ascetic is not excluded from inheritance unless some usage is proved to the contrary.⁶

An heir can renounce his right to succession to property.⁷

Renunciation
of succession.

¹ XXI. of 1850.

² *Ante*, pp. 368, 369.

³ This does not include Byragoes, *Teeluck Chunder v. Shama Churn Prokash* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 209.

⁴ As to the succession to his property, if any, see *post*, pp. 415, 416.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. x. para. 3; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. v. para. 11; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s.

xi. para. 5.

⁶ *Harish Chandra Roy v. Atir Mahmud* (1913), 40 Calc. 545; 17 C. W. N. 517; *Dharmapuram Pandara Sannadhi v. Virapandiyam Pillai* (1898), 22 Mad. 302.

⁷ See *Gooshaecn Teekunjee v. Pur-sotum Lalljee* (1868), 3 Agra, 238; *Ladooiah (Mussumat) v. Sanvaley* (1868), *Ibid.* 101.

CHAPTER XI.

ORDER OF INHERITANCE TO MALES ACCORDING TO THE MITAKSHARA LAW.

Connection
between
religion and
law of
Inheritance.

“THERE is in the Hindu law so close a connection between their religion and their succession to property that the preferable right to perform the *śradh* is commonly viewed as governing also the question of the preferable right to succession of property; and as a general rule they would be expected to be found in union.”¹

As to the performance of the *śradh*, see *post*, pp. 418, 419.

“He who is entitled to celebrate the obsequial rites of the deceased is also entitled to inherit the property, and he who gets the property must perform the funeral rites of the last owner.”²

“It is not a maxim of the law that he who performs the obsequies is heir, but that he who succeeds to the property must perform them.”³

Fixed rules.

“To whatever extent rules of succession may have been founded on religious observances or may now be explained by them, it is clear that fixed rules of law for succession have been established for ages.”⁴

For an account of the origin and growth of the Hindu principles of inheritance, see “The Principles of the Hindu Law of Inheritance,” by Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, Lectures II., III.

Differences
between
Mitakshara
and Bengal
systems.

The Mitakshara law of inheritance and the Bengal law on the same subject differ in some particulars. According to the

¹ *Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramo-
nee Burmoneah (Mussamut)* (1868),
12 M. I. A. 81, at pp. 96, 97; 1
B. L. R. P. C. 26, at p. 36; 10 W. R.
P. C. 35, at p. 38. See *Katama
Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga*
(1863), 9 M. I. A. 543, at p. 614; 2
W. R. P. C. 31, at p. 39; *Neelkisto
Deb Burmono v. Beer Chunder Thakoor*
(1869), 12 M. I. A. 523, at p. 514; 3
B. L. R. P. C. 13, at p. 18; 12 W. R.
P. C. 21, at p. 23; *Ram Singh (Bhyah)*

v. Ugur Singh (Bhyah), 13 M. I. A.
373; 5 B. L. R. 293; 14 W. R. P. C.
1; Jolly's “Hindu Law of Partition,
etc.,” p. 168.

² R. K. Sarvadhikari's “Hindu Law
of Inheritance,” p. 12.

³ Colebrooke in Strange's “Hindu
Law,” vol. ii. p. 242.

⁴ *Muihuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunam-
bedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar*
(1896), 23 I. A. 83, at p. 90; 19 Mad.
405, at p. 409.

“Mitakshara” all agnates down to the last *samanoduka* must be exhausted before cognates acquire any right.¹ According to the “Daya-Bhaga” cognate *sapindas* are preferred to all *sakulyas*, and cognate *sakulyas* to all *samanodakas*.²

There are also other differences arising from the circumstance that according to the former propinquity,³ and according to the latter, the capacity to benefit the manes of the deceased determines the order of succession.⁴

In the system of inheritance under the Mitakshara school of law propinquity of relationship is the guiding principle for determining the order of inheritance.⁵

Mitakshara
school.
Guiding
principle.

The circumstance that agnates down to the last *samanoduka* are preferred to cognates,⁶ some of whom are capable of giving greater religious benefits than agnates who are preferred to them, shows this principle clearly.

“According to the ‘Mitakshara’ *sapinda*⁷ relationship arises between two people through their being connected by particles of one body.”⁸

The expression “*sapinda*,” according to the “Mitakshara,” is derived from “*saha*” (with) and “*pinda*” (body), i.e. connected by particles of the body.⁹

“Under the Mitakshara, whilst the right of inheritance arises from *sapinda* relationship, or community of blood, in

¹ *Post*, pp. 380, 397, 398.

² *Post*, p. 421.

³ Note 5, below.

⁴ *Post*, p. 417.

⁵ See *Suba Singh v. Sarafraz Kumhar* (1896), 19 All. 215; *Parot Bapalal Sevakram v. Mehta Hurilal Surajram* (1894), 19 Bom. 631; *Balusami Pandithar v. Narayana Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 342, at p. 347.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 380, 397, 398.

⁷ As to *sapinda* relationship, see *post*, p. 379.

⁸ *Umaid Bahadur v. Udai Chand* (1880), 6 Calc. 119, at p. 124; 6 C. L. R. 500, at p. 512; *Ramchandra Morland Waikar v. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar* (1914), 41 I. A. 290, at p. 301; 42 Calc. 384; at p. 405; 18 C. W. N. 1154, at p. 1167; 16 Bom. L. R. 863, at p. 888. See *Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram* (1894), 22 Calc. 339; *Nallanna v. Ponnal* (1890), 14 Mad. 149; *Ramappa Udayan v. Arumugath*

Udayan (1893), 17 Mad. 182; *Subramanya Pandya Chokka Talavar v. Siva Subramanya Pillai* (1894), 17 Mad. 316.

⁹ See *Umaid Bahadur v. Udai Chand* (1880), 6 Calc. 119, at p. 124; 6 C. L. R. 500, at pp. 511, 512; *Anrita Kumari Debi v. Laksi Narayan Chuckerbutty* (1868), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 28, at p. 33; S. C. Omrit Koomaree Dabee v. Luckhee Narain Chuckerbutty, 10 W. R. F. B. 76, at p. 33; *Guru Govind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1876), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 35; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at p. 57; *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 262; *Lallubhai Babubhai v. Manikvarbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 423; Jolly's “Hindu Law of Partition, etc.,” 1883, p. 171. As to the meaning of *sapinda*, according to the Bengal school, see *post*, p. 418.

judging of the nearness of blood relationship or propinquity among the *gotraja sapindas*, the test to be applied to discover the preferential heir is the capacity to offer oblations." ¹

In some cases persons who confer no religious benefit are under the Mitakshara system admitted as heirs.

"By the law of the 'Mitakshara,' as interpreted and accepted in Western India, the preferential right to inherit in the classes of *sapindas* is to be determined by family relationship or the community of corporal particles, and not alone by the capacity of performing funeral rites. It may happen that in some instances the same person would be the preferential heir, whichever of these tests was adopted." ²

"The theory that a spiritual bargain regarding the oblation of the customary offerings to the deceased by the taker of the inheritance is the real basis of the whole Indian law of Inheritance, is a mistake which has arisen in the early period of the administration of Hindu law from a too exclusive study of the writers of the Bengal school, and from certain terms often occurring in Colebrooke's translation of Indian law books, notably from the term 'connected by funeral oblations,' ³ the English equivalent chosen by Colebrooke for the well-known Sanskrit term '*Sapinda*.'"⁴

"Propinquity according to the 'Mitakshara' is the ruling principle of the law of inheritance.⁵ This propinquity is consanguineous according to Visvesvara Bhatta and Balam Bhatta, the two eminent commentators of the 'Mitakshara,' and it is measured, says Mitra Mi-ra, the great expounder of the doctrines of the Benares school, by the spiritual benefits conferred on the deceased proprietor. Spiritual benefits, says the author of the Viramitrodaya, furnish the great test of consanguineous propinquity. Spiritual benefit, he adds, cannot create the heritable right, it is true; but it determines, with precision, the preferable right of *gotrajas* and other heirs, where there is more than one claimant to the heritage." ⁶

¹ *Buddha Singh v. Lattu Singh* (1915), 42 I. A. 208, at p. 227; 37 All. 604, at p. 623; 20 C. W. N. 1, at p. 14; 17 Bom. L. R. 1022, at p. 1039; *Adit Narayan Singh v. Mahabir Prosad Tewari* (1916), 1 Patna L. J. 324; 21 C. W. N. [1917, Pat.] 12; *Suba Singh v. Sarafraz Kunwar* (1896), 19 All. 215, at p. 232; *Ram Singh (Bhyah) v. Ugur Singh (Bhyah)* (1870), 13 M. L. A. 373, at p. 392; 5 B. L. R. 203, at p. 303; 14 W. R. P. C. 1, at p. 3. See *Balusami Pandithar v. Narayana Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 342, at p. 348; *Gunesh Chunder Roy v. Nilkomul Roy* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 264; "Viramitrodaya" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), pp. 155-159; Bhat-tacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 458; R. K. Sarvadhikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 713.

² *Lulloobhoy Bappooobhoy v. Cassibai* (1880), 7 I. A. 212, at p. 234; 5 Bom. 110, at p. 121; 7 C. L. R. 450; S. C. in court below, *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankurbari* (1876), 2 Bom. 388.

³ This has now been recognized as a mistranslation, see *Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram* (1894), 22 Calc. 339, at p. 343; *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankurbari* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 431.

⁴ Jolly's "Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," p. 168, approved of in *Suba Singh v. Sarafraz Kunwar* (1896), 19 All. 215, at p. 227.

⁵ See *Appandai Vathiyar v. Bagubali Mudaliyar* (1909), 33 Mad. 436.

⁶ Sarvadhikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance," pp. 647, 648, approved of in *Janki Ram v. Nand Ram* (1888), 11 All. 194, at pp. 212, 213.

The Mitakshara school recognizes two successive classes of heirs : (a) gentiles, viz. males descended from a common male ancestor entirely through males ; and (b) *bandhus*, viz. persons within the degree of *sapinda* but connected through females. Classes of heirs.

The gentiles are divided into : (a) the *sagotra* or *gotraja* ¹ *sapindas*, i.e. persons within the degree of *sapinda* and connected entirely through males ; and (b) *samanodakas*.

According to the "Mitakshara" definition a *sapinda* of a man means and includes :—

"1. Any descendant within the seventh degree ² reckoned from and inclusive of himself ; that is, any of his six descendants ; Meaning of "sapinda."

"2. Any ascendant within the seventh degree reckoned from and inclusive of himself in the paternal line ;

"3. Any collateral descendant within the seventh degree reckoned from and inclusive of any of the six paternal ascendants, that is, any of the first six ascendants in the paternal line ;

"4. Any ascendant within the fifth degree reckoned from and inclusive of himself in the maternal line ; that is, any of the four maternal ancestors, namely, the mother, her father, her grandfather, and the rest ; and

"5. Any collateral descendant within the fifth degree reckoned from and inclusive of any of the three maternal ancestors, beginning with the mother's father ; that is, any of the first four descendants of any of the three maternal ancestors, beginning with the mother's father." ³

Thus a paternal grandfather's son's son's daughter's daughter's son is not an heir.⁴

According to the Mitakshara system *samanodakas* (lit. Meaning of "samanodaka."

¹ Belonging to the same *gotra* or family.

² Colebrooke's translation of "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 5, is said to be inaccurate. It should be : "In this manner must be understood the succession of *sagotra sapindas* as far as the seventh person." Jolly's "Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," pp. 209, 210. In this calculation of degrees both the propositus and the heir are included.

³ *Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram* (1894), 22 Cal. 339, at p. 345, referring to

R. K. Sarvadhikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance," pp. 601-605; *Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar* (1914), 41 I. A. 290; 42 Cal. 384; 18 C. W. N. 1154; 16 Bom. L. R. 863. See *Kalian Singh v. Pan Kuar (Mussamat)* (1875), 7 N. W. P. 338; "Manu," chap. v. para. 60; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 21.

⁴ *Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar* (1914), 41 I. A. 290; 42 Cal. 384; 18 C. W. N. 1154; 16 Bom. L. R. 863.

connected through libations of water) include all agnates who are not *sapindas*.¹

According to some authorities they do not include relations beyond the thirteenth degree.²

Sastri G. C. Sarkar³ enumerates the *samanodakas* in the following words: "They are thirteen descendants of the deceased himself, his thirteen ascendants, and thirteen descendants of each of these thirteen ascendants—all in the male line; from these the *sapindas* are to be deducted, then the remaining one hundred and forty-seven relations are within the term *samanodakas*. They are the distant agnate relations. According to some, the term includes remoter distant relations of the same *gotra*, if the relationship can be traced and is remembered."

As to the order of their succession, see *post*, pp. 381 *et seq.*

Polyandrous
tribes.

Among polyandrous tribes succession is necessarily traced through the mother.⁴

Sagotra Sapindas.

Order of suc-
cession.

Under the Mitakshara law the succession first goes to the *sagotra sapindas*⁵ in order of propinquity,⁶ such as are joint with the deceased being preferred to others of the same class.⁷

Order of pro-
pinquity.

Apart from the widow,⁸ and the daughter's son,⁹ the scheme of succession of *gotraja sapindas* is described by Rajkumar Sarvadhikari¹⁰ as follows:—

"There are thus fourteen classes of sapinda heirs. Four of these classes belong to propinquous sapindas, and ten to remote sapindas.

Propinquous Sapinda Heirs.

1. The three immediate descendants of the deceased.
2. The mother, the father, and their three immediate descendants.

¹ *Ram Baran Rai v. Rajwanti Kuar* (*Musammat*) (1910), 32 All. 595; *Nursingh Narain v. Bhuttun Lall* (1864), W. R. C. R. 197; *Devkore (Bai) v. Amrutram Jamiatram* (1885), 10 Bom. 372; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 21; "Manu," chap. v. para. 60; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 6; Jolly's "Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," p. 210; "Viramitrodaya" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), pp. 199, 200. See *Kalka Parshad v. Mathura Parshad* (1908), 35 I. A. 166; 30 All. 510; 13 C. W. N. 1.

² *Naraini Kuar v. Chandi Din* (1886), 9 All. 467.

³ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., 262.

⁴ See *Munda Chetti v. Timmaju Hensu* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 380;

Timmappa Heggade v. Mahalinga Heggade (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 28; *Devu v. Deyi* (1885), 8 Mad. 353; *Mahalinga v. Marryamma* (1889), 12 Mad. 462.

⁵ *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Manku-varbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at pp. 417, 437; *Rutcheputty Dutt Jha v. Rajunder Narain Rae* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 133 (a Mithila case).

⁶ *Samat v. Amra* (1882), 6 Bom. 394; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 21; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 525. See "Manu," chap. ix. para. 187.

⁷ See *post*, p. 391.

⁸ *Post*, pp. 386, 387.

⁹ *Post*, pp. 389, 390.

¹⁰ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," pp. 654, 655.

3. The grandmother and the grandfather with their three immediate descendants.

4. The great grandmother and the great grandfather with their three immediate descendants.

Remote Sapinda Heirs.

5. The three remote descendants of the deceased.
6. The three remote descendants in the father's line.
7. The three remote descendants in the grandfather's line.
8. The three remote descendants in the great grandfather's line.
9. The fourth in ascent with his three immediate descendants.
10. The fifth in ascent with his three immediate descendants.
11. The sixth in ascent with his three immediate descendants.
12. The three remote descendants of the fourth ancestor.
13. The three remote descendants of the fifth ancestor.
14. The three remote descendants of the sixth ancestor."

Dr. Jogendronath Bhattacharya took the same view in his work on Hindu law.¹ It was also taken by Mr. Rama Row in the tables drawn up by him for Sir H. S. Cunningham,² by Baboo Shama Churn Sircar in his "Vyavastha Chandrika,"³ and Mr. Strange in his "Manual of Hindu Law."⁴

This system of succession has now been approved by the Judicial Committee.⁵

In addition to possible *gotraja sapindas* the following list includes some remote ascendants and descendants who, although theoretically heirs, cannot in the ordinary course of nature be expected to survive the deceased in question.

The *sagotra sapindas* succeed in the following order :—

1. Son.⁶

Son.

If there be more than one son, the sons, whether they are by the same or by different mothers, succeed equally.⁷

A son, son's son, or son's son's son who has remained joint with his father, grandfather, or greatgrandfather, as the case may be, excludes a son,⁸ son's son,⁹ or son's son's son, who has separated. Failing an unseparated

undivided
before
divided.

¹ 2nd ed., p. 436.

² Cunningham's "Digest of Hindu Law," p. 115.

³ Vol. iii. pp. 90 *et seq.*

⁴ Para 315.

⁵ As expressed in *Buddha Singh v. Lalru Singh* (1915), 42 I. A. 208; 37 All. 604; 20 C. W. L. 1; 17 Bom. L. R. 1022, and *Rutcheputty Dutt Jha v. Rajunder Narain Rae* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 133, but the question in the latter case was only whether all *sagotra sapindas* come before *bandhus*.

⁶ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 28; *Ramappa Naicken v. Sithammal*

(1879), 2 Mad. 182; *Yachereddy Chinna Bassavapa v. Yachereddy Gowdapa* (1835), 5 W. R. P. C. 114.

⁷ *Nugendur Narain (Rajah) v. Rughoonath Narain Dey*, W. R. (1864), C. R. 20.

⁸ *Ramappa Naicken v. Sithammal* (1879), 2 Mad. 182, at p. 185; *Nana Tawker v. Ramachandra Tawker* (1908), 32 Mad. 377.

⁹ *Fakirappa v. Yellappa* (1896), 22 Bom. 101. See *Maruday v. Doraisami Karambian* (1907), 30 Mad 348, at p. 353.

son,¹ son's son, or son's son's son, a separated son succeeds, his son or son's son taking by representation.²

Illegitimate sons.

"The Hindu law does not, like the English law, consider an illegitimate person *quasi nullius filius*. It recognizes his relationship to his father and family, and secures him substantial rights."³

As to his right to inherit to his mother, see *post*, p. 462.

Twice-born classes.

According to all the schools the illegitimate son of a member of one of the twice-born classes has no rights of inheritance to his father, even if his father was himself illegitimate,⁴ but he is entitled to maintenance.⁵

A custom to inherit might be valid, but in all the reported cases in which one has been set up, the right has been negatived.⁶

In *Radhakishen v. Rajkuar* (1891),⁷ the Allahabad High Court upheld the rights of the illegitimate sons of a Brahmin who had been outcasted, had separated from his family, and acquired, after such separation, the property in dispute.

Sudras.

According to the Mitakshara school⁸ in the case of *Sudras*, an illegitimate son is an heir of his father,⁹ provided his mother

¹ See *Marudayn v. Doraisami Karambian* (1907), 30 Mad. 348; *Ramappa Naicken v. Sithammal* (1879), 2 Mad. 182; *Balkrishna Trimbak Tendulkar v. Savitribai* (1878), 3 Bom. 54; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. vi. paras. 4-6.

² *Post*, pp. 385, 386.

³ *Pandaiya Telaver v. Puli Telaver* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 478, at p. 482; *Ram Kuli v. Janma* (1908), 30 All. 508, at p. 509.

⁴ *Hari Krishna Devi Garu (Sri Gajapaty) v. Radhika Patta Mahadevi Garu (Sri Gajapaty)* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 369.

⁵ *Ran Murdun Syn (Chutorya) v. Sahub Purhulad Syn* (1857), 7 M. I. A. 18; 4 W. R. P. C. 132; *Parichat (Rajah) v. Zalim Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 159; 3 Calc. 214; *Muttusawmy Jagavera Yettappa Naicker v. Vencataswara Yettaya* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 203; 2 B. L. R. P. C. 15; 11 W. R. P. C. 6; S. C. on remand, *Coomara Yettapa Naikar v. Venkateswara Yettia* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 405; *Pandaiya Telaver v. Puli Telaver*

(1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 478, at p. 482 (S. C. on appeal, below note 9); *Puhoop Singh v. Khooman* (1868), 3 Agra, 313; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. xii. para. 3; *ante*, pp. 99, 207, 208.

⁶ *Bhaoni v. Maharaj Singh* (1881), 3 All. 738; *Mohun Sing v. Chumun Rai* (1799), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 28 (new edition, 37); *Pershad Singh v. Mulhcsree (Rancee)* (1821), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 132 (new edition, 176).

⁷ 13 All. 573. Although in this case substantial justice may have been done it is submitted that the loss of caste and subsequent conduct did not prevent the application of the Hindu law.

⁸ As to the Bengal school, see *post*, p. 423.

⁹ *Inderun Valungypooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talaver* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 141, at p. 159; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 1, at p. 21; 12 W. R. P. C. 41, at p. 43; S. C. in court below, *Pandaiya Telaver v. Puli Telaver* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 478; *Krishnayyan v. Muttusami* (1883), 7 Mad. 407, at p. 412; *Brindavana v. Radhamani*

was a kept mistress of his father,¹ and he was not the fruit of intercourse with a woman whom the law did not permit the father to marry.

Thus a son by a married woman,² or by a woman within the prohibited degrees for marriage,³ or by a widow whose remarriage is not permitted by Hindu law,⁴ does not inherit.

The Mitakshara law on this subject is based upon the following text of Yajñavalkya: ⁵ "Even the son begotten by a Sudra on a Dasi ⁶ shall have such share as (the father) may allot. (But if there be no partition till) after the father's death, then the brothers are to assign him half a share; if there be no such brothers nor daughter's sons, he takes the whole." The "Mitakshara" ⁷ supplements this by providing that if there be a daughter or daughter's son, the illegitimate son takes half a share, and that failing these he takes the whole estate. Competition with other heirs.

The following is the result of the decisions upon these texts: Where there are legitimate sons, the illegitimate son becomes a coparcener with them, ⁸ with rights of survivorship to the exclusion of the widow, ⁹ and on a partition he takes half the share of a legitimate son. ¹⁰ With legitimate sons.

(1888), 12 Mad. 72, at p. 86; *Vencataram v. Vencata Lutchemee Ummal* (1816), 2 Str. N. C. 127, at p. 137. He is a male lineal descendant within the meaning of the Agra Tenancy Act (II. (N. W. P.) of 1901), s. 22, *Ram Kali v. Jamma* (1908), 30 All. 508.

¹ *Sarasuti v. Mannu* (1879), 2 All. 134; *Krishnayyan v. Mutthusami* (1883), 7 Mad. 407; *Sadu v. Baiza* (1878), 4 Bom. 37, at p. 44; *Rahi v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97; *Gangubai v. Bandu* (1915), 40 Bom. 369; 18 Bom. L. R. 70; R. K. Sarvad-hikari ("Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 939) contends that the law under the "Mitakshara" is the same in this respect as under the Bengal school (*post*, p. 423). In *Chatturbhuj Patnaik v. Krishna Patnaik* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 442, at p. 445 the Court said, "We hold, therefore, that if a Sudra governed by the Mitakshara law has a permanent, continuous and exclusive concubine, who lives as a member of his family, she is a *dasi*, and his illegitimate son by her who is himself brought up as a member of the family, is a *dasi putra* within the meaning of the rule laid down in the Mitakshara."

² *Rahi v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97; *Dalip v. Ganpat* (1886), 8 All. 387; *Vencatachella Chetty v. Paratham* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 134. See as to this, Jolly's

"Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," p. 188. As to his right of maintenance, see *ante*, pp. 207, 208.

³ *Datti Parsi Nayudu v. Datti Bangaru Nayudu* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 204.

⁴ *Anmayan v. Chinnan* (1909), 33 Mad. 366.

⁵ II. 133, 134. Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 602.

⁶ This expression, though primarily meaning a female slave, includes any unmarried female Sudra, see Jolly's "Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," p. 189.

⁷ Chap. i. s. xii. para. 2.

⁸ *Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra (Raja) v. Nityanand Mansingh* (1890), 17 I. A. 128; 18 Calc. 151; S. C. in court below (1885), 11 Calc. 702; *Vencataram v. Vencata Lutchemee Ummal* (1815), 2 Str. N. C. 127, at p. 137; *Soundararajan v. Arunachalam Chetty* (1915), 39 Mad. 136; *ante*, pp. 227, 228.

⁹ *Sadu v. Baiza* (1878), 4 Bom. 37.

¹⁰ *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1887), 10 Mad. 334, at p. 344; *Rahi v. Govinda, Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97, at p. 104; *Kesaree v. Samardhan* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 94; *Chellammal v. Ranganatham Pillai* (1910), 24 Mad. 277; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. xii. para. 2; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. 4, para. 32; "Viramitrodaya" (G. C.

There is a difference of opinion as to whether the half share to be taken by an illegitimate son means half the share which has been actually taken by the legitimate son,¹ or whether it means half the share which the illegitimate son would have taken if he had been legitimate.² In the former case a legitimate and illegitimate son would share in the proportion of two to one, and in the latter case they would share in the proportion of three to one. It is submitted that reason and the greater authority is to be found in support of the former view.

With daughter
or daughter's
son.

The rights of an illegitimate son in competition with a widow, a daughter, or a daughter's son, do not seem to be quite settled. In competition with a daughter or daughter's son, he would, under the above text of the "Mitakshara,"³ take half the share taken by such daughter or daughter's son.⁴ It has been held in Madras that he is an equal sharer with a daughter's son,⁵ but it is submitted that this decision is not justified by the text⁶ of the "Mitakshara."

Competition
with widow.

It has been held in Bombay⁷ that where there is a widow and an illegitimate son, the latter takes the whole property subject to the maintenance of the widow, but that decision has been doubted in Madras.⁸ The case of a widow was not provided for by the texts, probably on the ground that her rights had not then arisen, but as she is now recognized as a preferable heir to a daughter, it is submitted that her rights in competition with an illegitimate son are not less than those of a daughter, and that the texts might be construed as implying the rights of an illegitimate son to a half share in the case of the existence of any heir down to and including a daughter's son, and to not more than such half a share,⁹ otherwise the result might be that, where there is an illegitimate son, the daughter gets a share to the exclusion of the widow, and where there is no such son the daughter is postponed to the widow. This is somewhat anomalous,

Sarkar's translation), p. 130. Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya ("Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 434) says as to the text of Yajñavalkya (*ante*, p. 383), "The injunction is so worded as to show clearly that the illegitimate son has no legal right to such share."

¹ See *Sadu v. Baiza* (1878), 4 Bom. 37, at p. 42; Jolly's "Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," pp. 188, 189; *Kesaree v. Sumardhan* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 95.

² Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 773, 774; West and Buhler's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 40, 41, 108, 110. Cf. "Mitakshara," chap. 1. s. vii. para. 7.

³ *Ante*, p. 383.

⁴ *Gangaban v. Bandu* (1915), 40 Bom. 369; 18 Bom. L. R. 70; *Sarasuti v. Mannu* (1879), 2 All. 134; Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 656, 661; Sarvadthikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 943. See *Ranoji v. Kandoji* (1885), 8 Mad. 557, at p. 561; *Rahu v.*

Govinda Valad Teja (1875), 1 Bom. 97, at p. 104.

⁵ *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1887), 10 Mad. 334, at p. 344; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 70.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 383.

⁷ *Rahu v. Govinda Valad Teja* (1875), 1 Bom. 97, at p. 106. Dr. Jolly ("Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," pp. 189, 190) supports this view. See *Sadu v. Baiza* (1878), 4 Bom. 37, at p. 52, which was a case of the sons succeeding as coparceners, and therefore stands upon a different footing, see *ante*, pp. 227, 228.

⁸ *Ranoji v. Kandoji* (1885), 8 Mad. 557, at pp. 561, 563.

⁹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 771-774; *Shesgiri v. Girewa* (1887), 14 Bom. 282; *Ranoji v. Kandoji* (1885), 8 Mad. 557, at pp. 561, 563; *Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan* (1901), 25 Mad. 519, at pp. 521, 522; *Ambabai v. Govind* (1898), 23 Bom. 257, at p. 265.

but it is said to be "one of those arbitrary arrangements not uncommon in Hindu law."¹

It has been held in Madras² that when there is a widow and an illegitimate son, they each get half, but it is submitted that that decision is not correct.³ In Bombay a case,⁴ where there were a widow and daughter and illegitimate sons, it was held that the sons took a half share, but the question as to competition with the widow did not arise.

The illegitimate son takes the whole in preference to any heir after a daughter's son.⁵

Competition with other heirs.

It has been held in Madras that an undivided brother⁶ and a widow⁷ are to be preferred to an illegitimate son in the succession to an impartible Raj; but in *Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra (Raja) v. Nityanund Mansingh*,⁸ the Judicial Committee held that an illegitimate son succeeded to his brother in an ancestral impartible Raj as against the widows and daughter of the brother.

Impartible estate.

An illegitimate son has only rights in his father's or mother's property. He does not succeed as heir to any collaterals.⁹

No inheritance to collaterals.

For a comparison of the rights of an adopted son and of an illegitimate son, see *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1889), 10 Mad. 334, at p. 344.

2. Son's son.¹⁰

Son's son.

Son's sons take by representation in equal shares the share of a son who has predeceased his father, even if the deceased has left a son.¹¹

As to the preference of the undivided before the divided son's sons, see *ante*, pp. 381, 382.

¹ *Sadu v. Baiza* (1878), 4 Bom. 37, at p. 56.

² *Chinnamal v. Varadarajulu* (1892), 15 Mad. 307; *Meenakshi Anni v. Appakutti* (1909), 33 Mad. 226.

³ See Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 661.

⁴ *Shesgiri v. Girewa* (1889), 14 Bom. 282.

⁵ *Sarasuti v. Mannu* (1879), 2 All. 134; "Dattaka Chandrika," chap. v. paras. 30, 31.

⁶ *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1887), 10 Mad. 334.

⁷ *Kulanihai Natchear v. Ramamani* (Mad. Reg. App. 86 of 1865), referred to in *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1887), 10 Mad. 334, at p. 346.

⁸ (1890), 17 I. A. 128; 18 Calc. 151; *post*, p. 520.

⁹ *Shome Shankar Rajendra Varere v. Rajesar Swami Jangam* (1898), 21 All. 99, where it was held that he

did not inherit to a brother; *Parvathi v. Thirumalai* (1887), 10 Mad. 334, at p. 344; *Nissar Murtojah v. Dhunwunt Roy (Kowar)* (1863), Marsh, 609; *Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan* (1901), 25 Mad. 519, at p. 522; *Krishnayyan v. Muttusami* (1883), 7 Mad. 407; *Karuppa Goundan v. Kumarasami Goundan* (1901), 25 Mad. 429; *Ravji v. Sakuji* (1909), 34 Bom. 321; 12 Bom. L. R. 204.

¹⁰ *Balkrishna Trimbak Tendulkar v. Savitribai* (1878), 3 Bom. 54. See "Mitakshara," note to chap. xi.

¹¹ *Marudayi v. Doraisami* (1907), Mad. 348; *Ananda Bibee v. Nounit Lal* (1882), 9 Calc. 315, at p. 320; *Ram Singh (Bhyah) v. Ugur Singh (Bhyah)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 363, at p. 378; *Luchmun Pershad v. Debee Pershad* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 317; *Butcheputti Dutt Jha v. Rajunder Narain Rae* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 133, at p. 158.

The legitimate son of an illegitimate son has the same rights of succession as his father had against the brothers and sons of his grandfather.¹

A son's daughter is not a *gotraja sapinda* even in Bombay.²

Son's son's son.

8. Son's son's son.³

Where a son and his sons have predeceased the deceased, the son's son's son will take by representation, even though the deceased or his son has left other sons.⁴ If there be more than one son's son's son, they take in equal shares.

Widow.

4. Widow.⁵

On marriage a wife enters the *gotra* (family) of her husband.⁶ A widow is looked upon as being the surviving half of her husband.⁷

As to the interest taken by a widow in the estate of her husband, see *post*, Chap. XV.

Among the Tiyan community in Calicut a brother succeeds to self-acquired property in preference to the widow.⁸

¹ *Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan* (1901), 25 Mad. 519. As to the illegitimate son of an illegitimate son, see *ibid.* at p. 524; *Fakirappa v. Fakirappa* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 809. As to the right of an illegitimate son, see *ante*, pp. 382-385.

² *Venilal v. Parjaram* (1894), 2 Bom. 173.

³ See "Mitakshara," note to chap. xi.

⁴ See cases *ante*, p. 385, note 11.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. ii s. i. paras. 5, 6; s. ii. para. 2; "Virada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), pp. 290, 291; *Katama Natchar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543, at pp. 611, 612; 2 W. R. P. C. 31, at p. 39; *Perasami v. Periasami* (1878), 5 I. A. 61; 1 Mad. 312; 2 C. L. R. 81; *Doorga Persad Singh (Tekait) v. Doorga Konuuri (Tekaitni)* (1878), 5 I. A. 149, at p. 160; 4 Calc. 190, at p. 202; 3 C. L. R. 31, at p. 40; *Venkata Gopalla Narasimha Row Bahadur (Rajah Suraneni) v. Lakshma Venkama Row (Rajah Suraneni)*, 13 M. I. A. 113; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 41; 12 W. R. P. C. 40; *Radhika Patta Maha Devi Guru (Sri Gajapati)* v.

Nilamani Patta Maha Devi Guru (Sri Gajapati) (1870), 13 M. I. A. 497; 6 B. L. R. 202; 14 W. R. P. C. 33; *Narayan Ayyar v. Lakshmi Ammal* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 289; *Patni Mal (Rajah) v. Ray Manohar Lal* (1834), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 349 (new edition, 410); *Keerul Sing v. Koolahul Sing* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 331; 5 W. R. P. C. 131; *Soorjoon (Musumut) v. Ishree Brahmun* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 74; *Goolab (Mt.) v. Phool (Mt.)* (1816), 1 Borr. 154; *Govinddas Dhoolubhdas v. Muha Lukshumee* (1819), 1 Borr. 241. As to Jains, see *Sheo Singh Rar v. Dakho (Musst)* (1874), 6 N. W. P. 382; S. C. on appeal (1878), 5 I. A. 87; 1 All. 688; 2 C. L. R. 193.

⁶ *Lallubhai Babubhai v. Manku-varbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at pp. 420, 440.

⁷ *Murugayi v. Viramakali* (1877), 1 Mad. 226, at p. 228; Colebrooke, "Digest," vol. iii. p. 458; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. xi. s. i. para. 6. See Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 437, note.

⁸ *Rarichan v. Perachi* (1892), 15 Mad. 281.

Where there is more than one widow, they all take as a single heir with Two or more rights of survivorship¹ and partition.² widows.

There is nothing to prevent a widow releasing her right of survivorship.³

In the case of impartible property the senior widow takes, the other Impartible widows having rights of maintenance.⁴ property.

The estate of the widow is divested by the birth⁵ or Devesting of adoption⁶ of a son. estate.

5. Daughter.⁷

Daughter

Of daughters an unmarried one is preferred,⁸ whether Unmarried. or not she is well to do.⁹

Failing unmarried daughters, married daughters succeed.¹⁰ Married. Among married daughters the one who is "unprovided for" is to be preferred to the one who has means,¹¹ either derived from her father or from other sources.¹²

Comparative poverty is in each case the criterion by which the claims of married daughters are settled,¹³ but such comparison does not apparently involve a minute investigation of the means of the daughters, the question being whether the pecuniary circumstances of the one are so far different from those of the other as to give her a prior right of inheritance.¹⁴

¹ *Rumea v. Bhagee* (1862), 1 Bom. H. C. 66; *Jijoyiamba Bayi Sarba* (H. H. M.) v. *Kamakshi Bayi Sarba* (H. H. M.) (1868), 3 Mad. H. C. 424; *Bhugwandeem Doobey v. Myna Bae* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 487; 9 W. R. P. C. 23; *Nilamani Patla Maha Devi Garu* (Sri Gajapathi) v. *Radhamani Patla Maha Devi Garu* (1877), 4 I. A. 212; 1 Mad. 290; *Venkatayamma Garu* (Raja Chelikani) v. *Venkataramanayamma* (Raja Chelikani) (1902), 29 I. A. 156, at p. 165; 25 Mad. 678, at p. 687; 7 C. W. N. 1, at p. 8; 4 Bom. L. R. 657.

² See *ante*, pp. 327, 328.

³ *Ramakhal v. Ramasami Narayan* (1899), 22 Mad. 522.

⁴ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 776.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 303.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 193.

⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. ii. para. 2; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. paras. 10-12; *Pranjeevandas Toolseydas v. Dewcooverbaee* (1859), 1 Bom. H. C. 130.

⁸ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. ii. para. 2; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. v.

s. viii. para. 11; *Dowlut Koore v. Burma Deo Sahoy* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 246, note; 22 W. R. C. R. 54.

⁹ *Jamnabai v. Khimji Vullubdass* (1889), 14 Bom. 1, at p. 13.

¹⁰ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. ii. para. 3; *Himnuchull v. Maharaj Singh* (1866), 1 Agra, 210; *Buryar Singh v. Hunsee* (Mussumat) (1867), 2 Agra, 166; *Golab Koonwer* (Musst) v. *Shib Sahai* (1867), 2 Agra, 54; *Binode Koomaree Dabee v. Purdhan Gopal Sahee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 176, at p. 177.

¹¹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. ii. para. 4; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 12.

¹² *Danno v. Darbo* (1882), 4 All. 243. The text on which the Court relied in this case, viz. "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 13, refers to the succession to stridhan property.

¹³ *Audh Kumari v. Chandra Dai* (1879), 2 All. 561.

¹⁴ *Bakubai v. Manchhabai* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 5; *Poli v. Narotum Bapu* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 183; *Totawa v. Basawa* (1898), 23 Bom. 229.

A married daughter with means is preferred to a daughter's son.¹

The Mithila law makes no distinction between indigence and wealth, in the case of daughters.²

A daughter who has, or is likely to have, male issue is not, as in Bengal,³ preferred to a barren or childless widow.⁴

Except in the Bombay Presidency, where her interest passes to her heir,⁵ on the death of a daughter the estate taken by her, as such, passes (in preference to her sons) to her sisters who have taken or are competent to take.⁶

Except in the Bombay Presidency, where daughters take not only absolute but several estates,⁷ daughters take by inheritance a joint estate with rights of survivorship⁸ and partition.

The circumstance that her unmarried sister had been preferred to her, does not exclude a married daughter from the inheritance on the death of such sister.⁹

Prostitute daughters.

"A woman, who in her maiden condition becomes a prostitute, being neither a *kanya* (unmarried) nor a *kulastrī* (married), but being at the same time, notwithstanding her prostitution, a qualified heir, as held in *Advaya v. Rudrava*,¹⁰ would be entitled to succeed to her father's property only in default of either unmarried or married sisters."¹¹

As to the rights of the daughter of a Sudra in competition with the father's illegitimate son, see *ante*, p. 384.

As to the interest taken by a daughter, see *post*, Chap. XV.

Illegitimate daughters have no rights of inheritance.¹²

For cases of customs, excluding daughters and their issue, see *Bajrangī Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh* (1907), 35 I. A. 1; 30 All. 1; 12 C. W. N. 74; 9 Bom. L. R. 1348 (Bhale Sultan Chhathris); *Nanaji Utpat (Bhau) v. Sundrabai* (1874), 11 Bom. H. C. 249 (Utpat families of Pandharpur); *Pragjivan Dayaram v. Reva (Bai)* (1881), 5 Bom. 482; *Verabhai*

¹ *Dulari v. Mul Chand* (1910), 32 All. 314; see *post*, p. 425.

² "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tahore's translation), p. 293.

³ *Post*, pp. 424, 425.

⁴ *Uma Deji (Srimati) v. Gokoolanund Das Mahapatra* (1878), 5 I. A. 40; 3 Calo. 587; 2 C. L. R. 51; *Bakubai v. Manoharbai* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 5; *Poli v. Narotum Bapu* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. J. 183; *Simmani Ammal v. Muttammal* (1880), 3 Mad. 265.

⁵ *Bhagirthibai v. Kahnunirav* (1886), 11 Bom. 285; *post*, p. 467.

⁶ *Baijnath v. Mahabir* (1878), 1 All. 608; *Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran* (1886), 8 All. 365, at pp. 369, 370; *Dulari v. Mul Chand* (1910), 32 All.

314; see *post*, p. 425.

⁷ *Post* p. 410.

⁸ *Bulakhrdas v. Keshavlall* (1881), 6 Bom. 85; *Kattama Nachar v. Dorasingha Tevar* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 310.

⁹ *Dowlut Kooer v. Burma Deo Sahoy* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 246, note; 22 W. R. C. R. 54. See *Kattama Nachar v. Dorasingha Tevar* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 310, at p. 332; *Dulari v. Mul Chand* (1910), 32 All. 314.

¹⁰ (1879), 4 Bom. 104.

¹¹ *Tara v. Krishna* (1907), 31 Bom. 495, at p. 510; 9 Bom. L. R. 774. See *post*, p. 462.

¹² *Bhikya v. Babu* (1908), 32 Bom. 562; 10 Bom. L. R. 736.

Ajubhai v. Hiraba (Bai) (1903), 30 I. A. 234, at p. 236; 27 Bom. 492, at p. 498; 7 C. W. N. 716, at pp. 718, 719 (Chudasama Gameti Garasias); *Parbati Kunwar (Mussammat) v. Chandarpal Kunwar (Rani)* (1909), 36 I. A. 125; 31 All. 457; 13 C. W. N. 1073; 11 Bom. L. R. 890 (Chauhan Rajputs in Oudh). In a case of Gohel Girasias the custom was not established, *Ranchhodas Vithaldas (Desai) v. Raval Nathubai Kesabhai* (1895), 21 Bom. 110.

On the death of all the daughters the property passes, except in Bombay,¹ to the then next heir of the father.²

6. Daughter's son.³

Daughter's
son.

He cannot succeed as long as there is any daughter capable of inheriting in existence.⁴

The daughter's son is the only heir connected through a female (*bandhu*) who under the Mitakshara system is placed in the order of succession amongst the *gotraja sapindas*. He is so placed in accordance with special texts.⁵

If he predeceases any one of his maternal grandfather's daughters, his son does not take his place,⁶ but succeeds as a *bandhu*.⁷

As to the succession of a daughter's son in competition with the illegitimate son of his mother's father, see *ante*, p. 384.

Except under the "Mayukha," daughters' sons take *per capita*, not *per stirpes*.⁸

Where a widowed daughter having sons remarries, and has sons, apparently the sons of both marriages would succeed equally, but there is no decision on the subject.

When the sons of a daughter are living together as members of a joint family, property so inherited belongs to the coparcenary, and there is a right of survivorship.⁹

As in the case of other male heirs, on the death of a daughter's son, in whom the estate has vested, the succession passes to his heirs, and not to the heirs of his maternal grandfather.¹⁰

¹ *Post*, p. 467.

² *Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall* (1878), 6 I. A. 15; 4 Calc. 744; 3 C. L. R. 465; *Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar* (1881), 8 I. A. 99; 3 Mad. 290; *ante*, p. 365.

³ *Kattama Nachiar v. Dorasinga Tevar* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 310; *Buryar Singh v. Hunsee (Mussumat)* (1867), 2 Agra, 166; *Ram Sivaruth Pandey v. Basdeo Singh (Baboo)* (1867), *Ibid.* 168; *Surja Kumari v. Gandhrup Singh* (1837), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 140 (new ed., 168) (a Mithila case).

⁴ *Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran* (1886), 8 All. 365; *Dulari v. Mul Chand* (1910), 32 All. 314.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. ii. para. 6; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. xi. s. ii. para. 28; "Vyavahara Mayukha,"

chap. iv. s. viii. para. 13; "Vivada Chintamani" (Tagore's translation), p. 294.

⁶ *Srinivasa v. Dandayudapani* (1889), 12 Mad. 411; *Dharup Nath v. Gobind Saran* (1886), 8 All. 614.

⁷ *Post*, p. 403.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 367.

⁹ *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikuni) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikuni)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156; 25 Mad. 678; 7 C. W. N. 1; 4 Bom. L. R. 657; *ante*, p. 241.

¹⁰ *Sibta v. Badri Prasad* (1880), 3 All. 134; *Muttuvaduganadha Tevar v. Periasami* (1896), 23 I. A. 128; 19 Mad. 451; S. C. in court below (1892), 16 Mad. 11; *Ramjoy See v. Tarrachund* (1816), 2 Morley's Digest, 79. *Ante*, p. 365.

Impartible
property.

Impartible property passes on the death of all daughters to the eldest surviving daughter's son.¹

Parents of Deceased and their Descendants to the Third Degree.

Mother.

7. Mother.²

"Mayukha."

Where the "Mayukha" prevails³ the father is preferred to the mother.⁴

Stepmother.

Except that in Bombay she has a right of inheritance as the widow of her husband,⁵ and that in Madras she has possibly some right of inheritance as a *bandhu*,⁶ neither a stepmother nor a stepgrandmother has any rights of inheritance.⁷

Father.

8. Father.⁸

Brother.

9. Brother.⁹

Uterine brothers, *i.e.* brothers of the whole blood, take before brothers of the half blood.¹⁰

¹ *Kattama Nachiar v. Dorasinga Tevar* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 310, at p. 333; *Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar* (1881), 8 I. A. 99; 3 Mad. 290.

² *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1876), 4 I. A. 1; 1 Mad. 174; *Balkrishna Bapuji Apte v. Lakshman Dinkar* (1890), 14 Bom. 605; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 3; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), pp. 293-295. The adoptive mother comes before the adoptive father, *Anandi v. Hari Suba Pat* (1909), 33 Bom. 404; 11 Bom. L. R. 641. As to her right to inherit, see *ante*, p. 181.

³ *Ante*, pp. 18, 19.

⁴ *Khodabhai Mahaji v. Bahdhar Dala* (1882), 6 Bom. 541; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 14. See also "Smriti Chandrika," chap. xi. s. i. para. 3; s. ii. paras. 12-15.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 412, 413; *Russoobai v. Zoolekhabai* (1895), 19 Bom. 707; *Rakhmabai v. Tukaram* (1886), 11 Bom. 47; *Kesserbai v. Valab Raoji* (1879), 4 Bom. 188, at p. 208.

⁶ See *Muttammal v. Vengalakshmiammal* (1882), 5 Mad. 32; *Kumaravelu v. Virana Goundan* (1879), 5 Mad. 29; *Mari v. Chinnammal* (1884),

8 Mad. 107, at pp. 117, 127, 129; *post*, pp. 413, 414.

⁷ *Joti Lal (Lala) v. Durani Kower (Mussamat)* (1864), R. L. R. F. B. R. 67; W. R. F. B. R. 173; *Tahaldai Kumri v. Gaya Pershad Sahu* (1909), 37 Calo. 214; 14 C. W. N. 443; *Rama Nand v. Surgiani* (1894), 16 All. 221; *Muttammal v. Vengalakshmiammal* (1882), 5 Mad. 32, approving of *Kumaravelu v. Virana Goundan* (1879), 5 Mad. 29; *Ramasami v. Narasamma* (1884), 8 Mad. 133; *Mari v. Chinnammal* (1884), 8 Mad. 107; *Seetha v. Nachiar* (1912), 37 Mad. 286; *Sundarmani Dei v. Gokulnand Chowdhury* (1912), 18 C. W. N. 160; *Kesserbai v. Valab Raoji* (1879), 4 Bom. 188, at p. 208.

⁸ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 2.

⁹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 1; *Burhum Deo Ray v. Punchoo Roy* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 123.

¹⁰ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. iv. paras. 5, 6; *Anant Singh (Thakur) v. Durga Singh (Thakur)* (1910), 37 I. A. 191; 32 All. 363; 14 C. W. N. 770; 12 Bom. L. R. 504; *Samat v. Amra* (1882), 6 Bom. 394, at p. 397; *Krishnaji Vyanlktesh v. Pandurang* (1875), 12 Bomb. H. C. 65; *Parmappa v. Shiddappa* (1906), 30 Bom. 607; 8 Bom. L. R. 685.

The "Mayukha" ¹ places the sons of brothers of the whole blood after their fathers, and ² declares that brothers of the half blood share with the paternal grandfather.³

"If there be a competition between whole brothers associated and whole brothers unassociated, and between half brothers associated and half brothers unassociated, the former exclude the latter."⁴

"The reunited half brother and the separated whole brother take the estate in equal shares."⁵

As to whether in the case of the remarriage of a widow,⁶ or the marriage of a woman after divorce,⁷ there is any relationship between the sons of the different marriages, *quære*.⁸ It is submitted that there is none, except perhaps where the remarriage is authorized by local or caste custom.⁹

As to sisters, see *post*, pp. 392, 393.

10. Brothers' sons.¹⁰

Brothers' sons.

According to the "Mitakshara" and the "Mayukha," sons of brothers of the whole blood are preferred to sons of brothers of the half blood ¹¹ (an undivided member of each class being preferred to a divided member),¹² and according to the latter authority sons of brothers of the half blood are postponed until after the father's brother.¹³

According to the "Mayukha," sons of brothers who are dead share along with surviving brothers, but this rule does not go beyond brothers and brothers' children.¹⁴

The brother's son ends what is generally known as the "compact series" of heirs according to the "Mitakshara."¹⁵

In the case of a competition between *sapindas* not enumerated in the

¹ Chap. iv. s. viii. para. 16; *Samat v. Amra* (1882), 6 Bom. 394, at p. 397.

² Chap. iv. s. viii. para. 20.

³ See *post*, p. 394.

⁴ Sarvadhikari's "Law of Inheritance," p. 921 (see also p. 922). See *Sham Narain v. Court of Wards* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 197, at pp. 200, 201; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. ix. para. 7.

⁵ Sarvadhikari's "Law of Inheritance," p. 922; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. ix. para. 7; see *post*, pp. 414, 415.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 37, 369, 370.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 63, 64.

⁸ *Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram* (1894), 22 Calo. 339, at p. 345.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 37.

¹⁰ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. iv.

para. 7; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 17; "Viramitrodaya" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), p. 195.

¹¹ *Samat v. Amra* (1882), 6 Bom. 394, at p. 397; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. iv. paras. 5-7.

¹² See Sarvadhikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance," pp. 927, 928.

¹³ Chap. iv. s. viii. paras. 16, 18, 20.

¹⁴ *Chandika Bakhsh v. Muna Kuar* (1902), 29 I. A. 70; 24 All. 273; 6 C. W. N. 425; 4 Bom. L. R. 376; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 17.

¹⁵ Chap. ii. s. v. para. 2; *Mohandas v. Krishnabai* (1881), 5 Bom. 597, at p. 602.

texts, preference should be given to the *sapinda* belonging to the nearer line.¹

Brother's
son's son.

11. Brother's son's son.²

The list of *gotraja sapindas* in the "Mitakshara" is apparently not exhaustive.³ It is now settled that the proper place of the brother's son's son is next after the brother's son.⁴

Relationship
of half blood.

According to the Bombay authorities, neither the "Mitakshara" nor the "Mayukha" makes any distinctions between relations of the whole blood and relations of the half blood, except in the case of brothers and sons of brothers,⁵ but the Allahabad High Court⁶ has held that the distinction between the whole and the half blood extends to the descendants of the grandfather, it may be to the fourteenth degree, but certainly to the case before them. In that case a grandson of a half brother of the great grandfather of the propositus was postponed to a grandson of a whole brother of such great grandfather. Sastri G. C. Sarkar⁷ says: "The preference based upon connection by whole blood, applies to all collateral relations of equal degree; propinquity being the principle of the order of succession, a relation of the full blood by reason of his propinquity excludes a relation of the same degree who is of the half blood."

It is quite clear that a *sapinda* of the half blood is preferred to a more distant *sapinda* of the whole blood.⁸

Sister and
sister's son.

The other descendants of the father, namely the sister⁹ and the sister's

¹ *Chinnasami Pillai v. Kunja Pillai* (1911), 35 Mad. 152.

² *Kalian Rai v. Ram Chandar* (1910), 24 All. 128. "As a deceased person's own great grandson inherits before his parents, so it may not be unreasonable to hold that his father's great grandson inherits before his grandfather," Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 444. The great grandson of the grandfather was preferred to the grandson of the great grandfather in *Buddha Singh v. Lallu Singh* (1915), 42 I. A. 208; 37 All. 604; 20 C. W. N. 1; 17 Bom. L. R. 1022. See "Vyavastha Chandrika," vol. i. p. 178, note †. Varadaraja (Burnell's translation, p. 36) admits him after the brother's son. In the table of succession, compiled by Mr. Rama Row, at p. 115 of Cunningham's Digest, a brother's son's son is placed after a brother's son. The spiritual principle would give him this place (see ante, pp. 377, 378), Sarvadhikari's "Law of Inheritance," p. 467. *Oorhya Kooer (Mussamut) v. Rajoo Nye Sookool* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 208; *Kureem Chand Gurain v. Odung Gurain* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 158.

³ See *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Manku-varba* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 433.

⁴ *Buddha Singh v. Lallu Singh* (1915), 42 I. A. 208; 37 All. 604; 20 C. W. N. 1; 17 Bom. L. R. 1022.

⁵ *Samat v. Amra* (1882), 6 Bom. 394, at p. 397; *Vithalrao Krishna Vinchurkar v. Ramrao Krishna Vinchurkar* (1899), 24 Bom. 317; 2 Bom. L. R. 139. See *Saguna v. Sadashiv* (1902), 26 Bom. 710, at p. 715; 4 Bom. L. R. 527. As to a mother's half brother, see *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunamedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar* (1896), 23 I. A. 83, at p. 91; 19 Mad. 405, at p. 410.

⁶ *Suba Singh v. Sarafraz Kunwar* (1896), 19 All. 215.

⁷ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 259.

⁸ *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Salamedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar* (1896), 23 I. A. 83, at p. 91; 19 Mad. 405, at p. 410; *Ganga Sahai v. Kesri* (1915), 42 I. A. 177; 37 All. 545; 19 C. W. N. 1175; 17 Bom. L. R. 998; S. C. in Court below, *Kesri v. Ganga Sahai* (1910), 32 All. 541.

⁹ *Julessur Kooer v. Uggur Roy* (1882), 9 Calc. 725; 12 C. L. R. 460; *Jagat Narain v. Sheo Das*

son, do not come in at this point under the Mitakshara school, as they are not *gotraja sapindas*. The sister's son succeeds as a *bandhu*.¹ As to the rights of a sister in Bombay and Madras, see *post*, pp. 410, 411, 413.

Grandparents of the Deceased and their Descendants to the Third Degree.

12. Father's mother.²

Grandmother.

After the brother's son the remaining *gotraja* heirs are only dealt with in the following paragraphs of the "Mitakshara." Chap. ii. s. v. para. 4; "Here on failure of the father's descendants, the heirs are successively the paternal grandmother, the paternal grandfather, the uncles and their sons." Para. 5: "On failure of the paternal grandfather's line, the paternal great grandmother, the great grandfather, his sons and their issue inherit. In this manner must be understood the succession of kindred belonging to the same general family and who are *sapindus*."³

This enumeration is not exhaustive.⁴ The "Subodhini"⁵ commenting on the words of the "Mitakshara," "On failure of the paternal grandfather's line, the paternal great grandmother, the great grandfather, his sons and their issue inherit," carries the enumeration a little further, viz. "the paternal great grandfather's mother, great grandfather's father, great grandfather's brothers and their sons. The paternal great grandfather's grandmother, great grandfather's grandfather, great grandfather's uncles and their sons."

In the Bombay Presidency the sister is placed between the father's mother and the father's father.⁶

13. Father's father.⁷

Grandfather.

According to the "Mayukha"⁸ he takes equally with the half-brother.

14. Father's brother.⁹

Paternal uncle.

(1883), 5 All. 311. The question was raised but not decided in *Goolab Sing (Koorer) v. Kurun Sing (Rao)* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 176, at p. 194; 10 B. L. R. 1, at p. 8.

¹ *Post*, p. 402.

² *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192, at p. 212; 1 Bom. L. R. 574; *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 432; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 2; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 8.

³ See *ante*, p. 378, note 3.

⁴ *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 433.

⁵ (A commentary on the "Mitakshara" composed in the thirteenth

century by Bishveshar Bhatta; Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., 33.) Chap. ii. s. 5, para. 5; Colebrooke's note to "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 5; *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 433.

⁶ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 19; *post*, pp. 410, 411.

⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. paras. 4, 5; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 20.

⁸ Chap. iv. s. viii. para. 20; *ante*, p. 391.

⁹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 2. As to the preference of those of the whole blood, see *ante*, p. 392.

According to the "Mayukha,"¹ the paternal great grandfather, the father's brother and the sons of the half-brother share the inheritance.

An uncle of the full blood is preferred to an uncle of the half blood.²

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| His son. | 15. Father's brother's son. |
| His grandson. | 16. Father's brother's son's son. ³ |

The reasons which place the brother's son's son before the father's mother, would place the father's brother's son's son in this position.

Great Grandparents of the Deceased and their Descendants to the Third Degree.

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Great grand-
mother. | 17. Father's father's mother. ⁴ |
| Great grand-
father. | 18. Father's father's father. ⁵ |
| His son. | 19. Father's father's brother. ⁶ |
| His grandson. | 20. Father's father's brother's son. ⁷ |
| His great
grandson. | 21. Father's father's brother's son's son. ⁸ |

REMOTE SAPINDA HEIRS.

Descendants of Deceased from the Fourth to the Sixth Degree.

- | | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Grandson's
grandson. | 22. Son's son's son's son. ⁹ |
| His son. | 23. Son's son's son's son's son. ¹⁰ |
| His grandson. | 24. Son's son's son's son's son's son. ¹¹ |

Descendants of Father of Deceased from the Fourth to the Sixth Degree.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Brother's
great
grandson. | 25. Brother's son's son's son. ¹² |
| His son. | 26. Brother's son's son's son's son. ¹³ |
| His grandson. | 27. Brother's son's son's son's son's son. ¹⁴ |

¹ Chap iv. s. viii. para. 20.

² *Ganga Nuhai v. Kesri* (1915), 42 I. A. 177; 37 All. 545; 19 C. W. N. 1175; 7 Bom. L. R. 998; *ante*, p. 392.

³ *Buddha Singh v. Lattu Singh* (1915), 42 I. A. 208; 37 All. 604; 20 C. W. N. 1; 17 Bom. L. R. 1022; S. C. in Court below, (1912), 34 All. 663. Cunningham's "Digest of Hindu Law," p. 115; Sarvadhikari's "Law of Inheritance," p. 654; *Kashibai v. Moreshwar Raghunath* (1911), 35 Bom. 389; 13 Bom. L. R. 352.

⁴ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 5; *ante*, p. 393.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Ganesh v. Waghu* (1903), 27 Bom. 610; 5 Bom. L. R. 581.

⁸ *Duroo Sing v. Rai Sing*, S. D. A. N. W. P. (1864), p. 521. See *ante*, p. 393.

⁹ *Ram Singh (Bhyah) v. Ugur Singh (Bhyah)* (1870), 13 M. L. A. 373; 5 B. L. R. 293; 14 W. R. P. C. 1. It is scarcely possible that so remote a descendant would be born at the time of the death of the propositus.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Venilal v. Parjaram* (1894), 20 Bom. 173. See *ante*, p. 393.

¹³ See *ante*, p. 393.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Descendants of Grandfather of Deceased from Fourth to Sixth Degree.

- | | |
|--|-------------------------|
| 28. Father's brother's son's son's son. | Uncle's great grandson. |
| 29. Father's brother's son's son's son's son. ¹ | His son. |
| 30. Father's brother's son's son's son's son's son. ² | His grandson. |

Descendants of Great Grandfather of Deceased from Fourth to Sixth Degree.

- | | |
|--|-------------------------------|
| 31. Father's father's brother's son's son's son. | Great uncle's son's grandson. |
| 32. Father's father's brother's son's son's son's son. | His son. |
| 33. Father's father's brother's son's son's son's son's son. | His grandson. |

Ancestors of Deceased in the Fourth Degree and their Descendants to the Third Degree.³

- | | |
|--|----------------------------|
| 34. Father's father's father's mother. | Grandfather's grandmother. |
| 35. Father's father's father's father. | Grandfather's grandfather. |
| 36. Father's father's father's father's son. | His son. |
| 37. Father's father's father's father's son's son. | His grandson. |
| 38. Father's father's father's father's son's son's son. | His great grandson. |

Ancestors of Deceased in Fifth Degree and their Descendants to the Third Degree.⁴

- | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| 39. Father's father's father's father's mother. | Grandfather's grandfather's mother. |
| 40. Father's father's father's father's father. | Grandfather's great grandfather. |
| 41. Father's father's father's father's father's son. | His son. |
| 42. Father's father's father's father's father's son's son. | His grandson. |
| 43. Father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son. ⁵ | His great grandson. |

Ancestors of Deceased in Sixth Degree, and their Descendants to the Third Degree.⁶

- | | |
|--|--|
| 44. Father's father's father's father's father's mother. | Great grandfather's great grandmother. |
| 45. Father's father's father's father's father's father. | Great grandfather's great grandfather. |
| 46. Father's father's father's father's father's father's son. | His son. |
| 47. Father's father's father's father's father's father's son's son. | His grandson. |

son.

¹ See, however, Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., 262.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ante*, p. 381.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Jeeb Nath Singh (Thakoor) v.*

Court of Wards (1875), 2 I. A. 163; 15 B. L. R. 190; 23 W. R. C. R. 409; S. C. in court below (1870), 5 B. L. R. 442; 14 W. R. P. C. 117.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 381.

His great
grandson.

48. Father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son.

Descendants from Fourth to Sixth Degree of Ancestors in Fourth Degree.

Grandfather's
grandfather's
grandson's
grandson.
His son.

49. Father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son.

50. Father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son's son.

His grandson.

51. Father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son's son's son.

Descendants from Fourth to Sixth Degree of Ancestors in Fifth Degree.

Grandfather's
great grand-
father's grand-
son's grand-
son.
His son.

52. Father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son.

53. Father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son's son.¹

His grandson.

54. Father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son's son's son.

Descendants from Fourth to Sixth Degree of Ancestors in Sixth Degree.

Great grand-
father's great
grandfather's
grandson's
grandson.
His son.

55. Father's father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son.

56. Father's father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son's son.

His grandson.

57. Father's father's father's father's father's father's son's son's son's son's son's son.

"Smriti
Chandrika."

The "Smriti Chandrika" ² gives the following order of succession of *sapindas* after a brother's son :—

- I. The son of the grandfather.
- II. His son.
- III. The son of the great grandfather.
- IV. His son.
- V. The son of the great great grandfather.
- VI. His son.
- VII. The son of the father of the great great grandfather.
- VIII. His son.

¹ *Ram Singh (Bhyah)* v. *Ugur Singh (Bhyah)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. P. C. I. ² Chap. xi. s. v. paras. 8-12, and 373; 5 B. L. R. 293; 14 W. R. summary.

sapindas, who are called *bandhus* or *bhinnagotra sapindas*, i.e. "springing from a different family, and connected by common corporeal particles, or by consanguinity,"¹ through females.²

With the exception of the daughter's son, who succeeds under special texts,³ no cognate can succeed while there is any agnate down to the last *samanodaka* alive and capable of taking.⁴

Inheritance
of *bandhus*.

The difficulty in laying down any definite rules as to the inheritance of *bandhus* arises from the lack of information in the "Mitakshara" on the subject. Chapter II. Section VI.; para. 1, which contains all that is said in the Mitakshara with regard to what *bandhus* inherit, is as follows:—

1. "On failure of Gentiles, the cognates are heirs. Cognates are of three kinds; related to person himself, to his father, or to his mother as is declared by the following text. 'The sons of his own father's sister, the sons of his own mother's sister, and the sons of his own maternal uncle, must be considered as his own cognate kindred. The sons of his father's paternal aunt, the sons of his father's maternal uncle, must be deemed his father's cognate kindred. The sons of his mother's paternal aunt, the sons of his mother's maternal aunt, and the sons of his mother's maternal uncle must be reckoned his mother's cognate kindred.'"⁵

This enumeration is only illustrative and is not exhaustive.⁶

15 B. L. R. 190; 23 W. R. C. R. 409; *Ram Singh (Bhyah) v. Ugur Singh (Bhyah)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 373; 5 B. L. R. 293; 14 W. R. P. C. 1; *Naraini Kuar v. Chandi Din* (1886), 9 All. 467; *Digdayi (Musst.) v. Bhatan Lall* (1869), 5 B. L. R. 448, note; 11 W. R. C. R. 300; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vi para. 1.

¹ *Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram* (1894), 22 Calc. 339, at p. 343.

² *Muttusami v. Muttukumarasami* (1892), 16 Mad. 23.

³ *Ante*, p. 389.

⁴ *Naraini Kuar v. Chandi Din* (1886), 9 All. 467; *Ram Singh (Bhyah) v. Ugur Singh (Bhyah)* (1870), 13 M. I. A. 373, at p. 390; 5 B. L. R. 293, at p. 302; 14 W. R. P. C. 1, at p. 3. See *Rutcheputty Dutt Jha v. Rajunder Narain Rae* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 133 (a Mithila

case); *Goolab Sing (Koor) v. Rao Kurun Sing* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 176; 10 B. L. R. 1.

⁵ See *Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhinarayan Chuckerbutty* (1868), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 28, at p. 37; 10 W. R. F. B. 76, at p. 77.

⁶ *Gridhari Lall Roy v. Bengal Government* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 448; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 44; 10 W. R. P. C. 31; *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunambedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar* (1896), 23 I. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405; *Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhinarayan Chuckerbutty* (1868), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 28; 10 W. R. F. B. 76; *Umaid Bahadur v. Udai Chand* (1880), 6 Calc. 119; 6 C. L. R. 500; *Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram* (1894), 22 Calc. 339, at p. 344; *Ratnasubbu Chetti v. Ponnappa Chetti* (1882), 5 Mad. 69.

The following propositions have been laid down by Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari ¹ :—

“ I. A *bandhu* is a cognate *sapinda* within four degrees counting (1) from the deceased himself, in ascent or descent ; (2) from any one of the four immediate ancestors of the deceased.” ²

Bandhus who inherit.

“ II. The right of inheritance accrues to a *bandhu* if the late owner and the person claiming the heritable right were related as *sapindas* to each other, either directly through themselves or through their mothers or fathers.

Sapinda relationship must be mutual.

“ In other words, a heritable *bandhu* is a cognate *sapinda* within four degrees, counting from—

“ 1. The deceased in ascent or descent.

“ 2. Deceased's paternal ancestor within four degrees.

“ 3. Deceased's maternal ancestor within four degrees.

“ 4. Deceased's father's maternal ancestor within four degrees.

“ 5. Deceased's mother's maternal ancestor within four degrees.”

“ N.B.—The word ‘five’ is to be substituted for ‘four’ in the case of father's *bandhus*. If the deceased or his ancestor be related through father's mother, then *five* degrees instead of four should be counted in both directions. Thus grandson's daughter's grandson is related to the deceased (or his paternal ancestor) through father's mother.”

“ III. Rule of exclusion :—

Rule of exclusion.

“ 1. The cognate descendant of each of these classes is excluded from inheritance when (i.) the deceased or (ii.) the deceased's ancestor does not belong to—

“ (a) His maternal grandfather's line.

“ (b) His father's ditto.

“ (c) His mother's ditto.

“ 2. Cognate ascendant of the deceased is excluded from inheritance when he does not belong to—

“ (a) The deceased's maternal grandfather's line.”

¹ “Hindu Law of Inheritance,” pp. 703–707.

² The word “ancestors” includes here : (1) ancestors of the deceased *ex parte paternâ* ; (2) ancestors of the

deceased *ex parte maternâ* ; (3) ancestors of the father of the deceased *ex parte maternâ* ; (4) ancestors of the mother of the deceased *ex parte maternâ*, *Ibid.*, p 704.


“(b) The deceased’s father’s ditto.¹

“(c) The deceased’s mother’s ditto.”

Sapinda
relationship
must be
mutual.

A *sapinda* to be capable of inheriting must be so related to the late owner, that the late owner was also his *sapinda* either directly or through his father or mother, or in other words the *sapinda* relationship must be mutual.²

Among *gotraja sapindas*, *sapindaship* is always mutual, but this is not always the case amongst *bandhus*. In *Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand*³ we find the following : Take for illustration :—



“A is the common ancestor, B, his son, is the propositus. C, a daughter of A; D, her daughter, both dead; E is the son of D and has a son F. Now B and E are *sapindas* to each other, but not B and F. Although F is” B’s *sapinda* being “within six degrees of the common ancestor, yet B, not being a descendant of the line of the maternal grandfather, either of F or of his father and mother,” is not F’s *sapinda*, and therefore, “they are not *sapindas* to each other; but B being a *sapinda* of E through his mother they are *sapindas* of each other.”

Kinds of
bandhus.

Bandhus are of three kinds, taking the inheritance in order, viz. :—

- (a) The cognate kindred of the deceased. These are called *Atma bandhus*.
- (b) His father’s cognate kindred. These are called *Pitri bandhus*.
- (c) His mother’s cognate kindred.⁴ These are called *Matri bandhus*.

These classes cannot be added to⁵

¹ As to the father’s maternal grandfather’s line, see *post*, p. 408.

² *Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar* (1914), 41 I. A. 290; 42 Calc. 384; 18 C. W. N. 1154; 16 Bom. L. R. 863; *Babu Lal v. Nanku Ram* (1894), 22 Calc. 339, at p. 344; *Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand* (1880), 6 Calc. 119, at pp 127, 128; 6 C. L. R. 500, at p. 515; *Shib Sahai v. Saraswati* (1915),

37 All. 583, where it was held that a grandfather’s great grandson’s daughter’s son was not a *bandhu*.

³ (1880), 6 Calc. 119; 6 C. L. R. 500.

⁴ “*Mitakshara*,” chap. ii. s. vi. para. 2.

⁵ *Ramchandra Martand Waikar v. Vinayak Venkatesh Kothekar* (1914), 41 I. A. 290; 42 Calc. 384; 18 C. W. N. 1154; 16 Bom. L. R. 863.

Some of these *bandhus* included in the Mitakshara system are not heirs according to the Bengal system.¹

I. All *atma bandhus* precede *pitri bandhus*, and all *pitri bandhus* precede *matri bandhus*.² Order of succession.

II. In each of these classes as between cognates related through the father of the deceased and those connected through his mother, preference is given to those related through his father.³

III. Subject to the above, the nearer line excludes the more remote.⁴

Thus the son of a sister's son comes before the son of a maternal uncle.⁵

IV. Subject to the above rules preference is to be given to the claimant, between whom and the stem there intervenes one female link, to that claimant who is separated from the stem by two such links.⁶

Thus a daughter's son's son will be preferred to a daughter's daughter's son.⁷

This ground of distinction in favour of a person will not apply when he competes with one of a nearer line.⁸

The intervention of two females in the line of inheritance is not a bar.⁹

The following order of succession is in the main to be found in Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law,"¹⁰ and Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance."¹¹

The decision in *Muttusami v. Muttukumarasami*¹² points out instances

¹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 716-718.

² "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 2; *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunambedu Muthukumaraswami* (1896), 23 I. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405; *Appandai Vathiyar v. Bagubali Mudaliyar* (1910), 33 Mad. 539.

³ *Sundrammal v. Rangasami Mudaliar* (1894), 18 Mad. 193.

⁴ *Balusami Pandithar v. Narayana Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 342; *Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama Ayyangar* (1905), 29 Mad. 115; *Muttusami v. Muttukumarasami* (1892), 16 Mad. 23, at p. 30 (affirmed on appeal (1896), 23 I. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405).

⁵ *Balusami Pandithar v. Narayana Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 342.

⁶ *Tirumalachariar v. Andal Ammal* (1907), 30 Mad. 406.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama Ayyangar* (1905), 29 Mad. 115.

⁹ *Parot Bapalal Sevakram v. Mehta Harilal Surajram* (1894), 19 Bom. 631, at p. 634; *Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand* (1880), 6 Cal. 119; 6 C. L. R. 500; *Venkatagiri v. Chandru* (1899), 23 Mad. 123; *Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama Ayyangar* (1905), 29 Mad. 115.

¹⁰ 2nd ed., pp. 460-462.

¹¹ Pp. 707 *et seq*.

¹² (1892), 16 Mad. 23; affirmed on appeal (1896), 23 I. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405.

in which that order is inconsistent with the "Mitakshara," but the lists given by those authors are most valuable and complete.

In regard to the succession of cognates, there is no difference between the rules laid down in the "Mitakshara" and the "Mayukha."¹

Order of
inheritance
Atma bandhus.

Atma bandhus are (1) related through daughters of the family, (2) related through the mother of the deceased.

The former class come first. Of them the descendants of the deceased are preferred.

We have seen that the daughter's son, although a *bandhu*, has a special place among the *gotraja sapindas*.²

Following the above rules, the order of inheritance is as follows :—

Sons of Daughters of the Family.

Sons of
daughters of
the family.

1. The son's daughter's son.
2. The son's son's daughter's son.
3. Sister's son.³

The *bandhus* of the deceased connected with him through his father have preference over those connected through his mother.⁴

A step-sister's son is entitled to inherit.⁵

4. Brother's daughter's son.⁶
5. Brother's son's daughter's son.
6. Father's father's daughter's son.⁷
7. Father's father's son's daughter's son.
8. Father's father's son's son's daughter's son.

¹ *Parot Bapalal Sevakram v. Mehta Harilal Surajram* (1894), 19 Bom. 631.

² *Ante*, p. 389.

³ *Amrita Kumari Devi v. Lakshmanarayan Chuckerbutty* (1868), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 28; 10 W. R. F. B. 76; *Chelikani Tirupati Rayanagaru v. Vencata Gopala Narasimha Rau Bahadur (Rajah Suraneni)* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 278; *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Rengasami Ayyangar* (1879), 2 Mad. 304; *Raghunath Kuari v. Munnar Mir* (1897), 20 All. 191; *Naraini Kuari v. Chandi Din* (1886), 9 All. 467; *Lakshmanammal v. Tiruvengada Mudali* (1882), 5 Mad. 241. For a history of the vindication of the right of a sister's son to succeed as a *bandhu*, see Mayne's

"Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 806-810. The question was treated as an open one in *Kurun Sing (Rao) v. Mahomed Fyz Ali Khan (Nawab)* (1871), 14 M. L. A. 187, at p. 195; 10 B. L. R. P. C. 7, at pp. 9, 10.

⁴ *Saguna v. Sadashiv* (1902), 26 Bom. 710, at p. 715; 4 Bom. L. R. 527.

⁵ *Subbaraya v. Kylasa* (1891), 15 Mad. 300; *Sreenarain Rai v. Bhyja Jha* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 33 (new edition, 29); see *ante*, pp. 392, 393.

⁶ *Doorga Bibee Mussamut v. Janaki Pershad* (1872), 10 B. L. R. 341; 18 W. R. C. R. 331.

⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 1; *ante*, p. 398; *Tahaldai Kumri v. Gaya Pershad Sahu* (1909), 37 Calc. 214; 14 C. W. N. 443.

According to both Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya,¹ and Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari,² the great grandfather's daughter's son³ will next succeed as an *atma bandhu*, but he is described in the "Mitakshara" as a *pitri bandhu*,⁴ and has therefore been held to be such.⁵ It would follow that the great grandfather's son's daughter's son,⁶ the great grandfather's son's son's daughter's son,⁷ the great great grandfather's daughter's son,⁸ and his son's daughter's son⁹ and son's son's daughter's son¹⁰ cannot be classed as *atma bandhus* although they are so classed by those two authors.

Sons of Daughter's Sons of the Family.

Next come, according to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya¹¹ and Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari,¹² those of the *atma bandhus* *ex parte paternâ* to whom the deceased was a *pitri bandhu*, viz.—

9. Daughter's son's son¹³ and
10. Son's daughter's son's son.

Here Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari inserts the son's son's daughter's son's son.¹⁴

11. Father's daughter's son's son.¹⁵

The sister's son's son's son is not an heir.¹⁶

12. Brother's daughter's son's son.
13. Father's father's daughter's son's son.
14. Father's father's son's daughter's son's son.

The above two learned authors also include here the following, viz. the great grandfather's daughter's son's son,¹⁷ the great grandfather's son's daughter's son's son,¹⁸ the great great grandfather's daughter's son's son,¹⁹

¹ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 460.

² "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 713.

³ *Post*, p. 407.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 398.

⁵ *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunambedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar* (1896), 23 L. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405; S. C. in court below (1892), 16 Mad. 23; *Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama Ayyangar* (1905), 29 Mad. 115.

⁶ *Post*, p. 407.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 460.

¹² "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 714.

¹³ *Tirumalachariar v. Andal Ammal* (1907), 30 Mad. 406; *Krishnayya v. Pichamma* (1887), 11 Mad. 287; *Sheobarat Kuari v. Bhagwati Prasad* (1895), 17 All. 523.

¹⁴ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 714.

¹⁵ *Balusami Pandithar v. Narayana Rau* (1897), 20 Mad. 342.

¹⁶ *Louji v. Mithabai* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 842.

¹⁷ *Post*, p. 407.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

and great great grandfather's son's daughter's son's son,¹ but having regard to what has been held with regard to the great grandfather's daughter's son,² it seems to be impossible to place these among the *atma bandhus*.

Sons of Daughter's Daughters of the Family.

Sons of
daughter's
daughters of
the family.

Next come, according to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya³ and Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari,⁴ those of the *atma bandhus ex parte paternâ* to whom the deceased was *matri bandhu*, viz.—

15. Daughter's daughter's son.⁵
16. Son's daughter's daughter's son.
17. Father's daughter's daughter's son.⁶
18. Father's son's daughter's daughter's son.
19. Grandfather's daughter's daughter's son.⁷
20. Grandfather's son's daughter's daughter's son.

The last-named authors also include in the same class the following, viz. great grandfather's daughter's daughter's son,⁸ great grandfather's son's daughter's daughter's son,⁹ the great great grandfather's daughter's daughter's son,¹⁰ and the great great grandfather's son's daughter's daughter's son,¹¹ but having regard to what has been held with regard to the great grandfather's daughter's son, it seems impossible to place these among the *atma bandhus*.

*Atma bandhus
ex parte
maternâ.*

To whom
deceased was
*atma bandhu
ex parte
paternâ.*

We now come to the *atma bandhus ex parte maternâ*.

21. Mother's father.¹²

Then come first those to whom the deceased is *atma bandhu ex parte paternâ*, viz.—

22. Mother's brother.¹³

¹ *Post*, p. 407.

² *Ante*, p. 403.

³ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 460.

⁴ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 714.

⁵ *Tirumalachariar v. Andal Ammal* (1907), 30 Mad. 406; *Ajudhia v. Ram Sumer Misir* (1909), 31 All. 454; *Ramphal Thakur v. Pan Mati Padain* (1910), 32 All. 640.

⁶ *Umaid Bahadur v. Udoi Chand* (1880), 6 Calc. 119; 6 C. L. R. 500.

⁷ *Parot Bapatal Sevakram v. Mehta Harilal Surajram* (1894), 19 Bom. 631; *Venkatagiri v. Chandru* (1899), 23 Mad. 123; *Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama Ayyangar* (1905), 29 Mad. 115.

⁸ *Post*, p. 407.

⁹ *Post*, p. 407.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Chinnammal v. Venkatachala* (1891), 15 Mad. 421.

¹³ *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunambedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar* (1896), 23 I. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405; "Viramatrodaya" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), p. 200, referred to in *Gridhari Lall Roy v. Bengal Government* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 448, at pp. 466, 467; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 44, at pp. 52, 53; 10 W. R. P. C. 31, at p. 34; *Saguna v. Sadashiv* (1902), 26 Bom. 710; 4 Bom. L. R. 527; *Narasimma v. Mangammal* (1889), 13 Mad. 10; *Mohandas v. Krishnabai* (1881), 5 Bom. 597.

23. Mother's brother's son.¹

In a Jain case (*Appandai Vathiyar v. Bagubali Mudaliyar* (1910), 33 Mad. 439) the Madras High Court on the authority of the "Smriti Chandrika" (*ante*, p. 17), chap. xi. s. 5, para. 15, the "Sarasvati Vilasa" (*ante*, p. 18), para. 595, and the Vyavahara Mayukha (*ante*, pp. 18, 19), chap. iv. s. 9, para. 22, preferred the mother's sister's son to the mother's brother's son. The question depends upon whether the persons named in those texts and in the above para. of the "Mitakshara" (*ante*, p. 398), take in the order named therein. The Allahabad High Court has differed from the Madras High Court, *Ram Charan Lal v. Rahim Baksh* (1916), 38 All. 416. This last decision is, it is submitted, to be preferred.

24. Mother's brother's son's son.

(25. Mother's father's father.²)

26. Mother's father's brother.

27. Mother's father's brother's son.

28. Mother's father's brother's son's son.³

(29. Mother's grandfather's father.)

30. Mother's grandfather's brother.

31. Mother's grandfather's brother's son.

32. Mother's grandfather's brother's son's son.

Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya⁴ adds here the great grandson of the mother's father, mother's father's father and mother's father's father's father in order. These are placed by Pundit Rajkumar Sarvad-hikari⁵ after the maternal grandfather's grandson's daughter's son.⁶

Then come *atma bandhus ex parte maternā* to whom the propositus was *atma bandhu ex parte maternā*.

They are all daughter's sons.

To whom
deceased was
atma bandhu
ex parte
maternā.

33. The mother's sister's son.⁷

34. The maternal grandfather's son's daughter's son.

¹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vi., para. 1; *ante*, p. 398; *Balusami Pandithar v. Narayana Rao* (1897), 20 Mad. 342. It was held in *Ram Charan Lal v. Rahim Baksh* (1916), 38 All. 416, that the mother's brother's son came before the mother's sister's son.

² See *Krishnayya v. Pichamma* (1887), 11 Mad. 287.

³ *Ramasubbhu Chetti v. Ponnappa Chetti* (1882), 5 Mad. 69.

⁴ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 460.

⁵ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 716.

⁶ *Post*, p. 406.

⁷ *Gunesh Chunder Roy v. Nil Komul Roy* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 264; *Chamanlal Maganlal (Sha) v. Doshi Ganesh Motichand* (1904), 28 Bom. 453; 6 Bom. L. R. 460; see *Mohandas v. Krishnabai* (1881), 5 Bom. 597; *Appandai Vathiyar v. Bagubali Mudaliyar* (1910), 33 Mad. 439; *Ram Charan Lal v. Rahim Baksh* (1916), 38 All. 416; above, note 1.

35. The maternal grandfather's son's son's daughter's son.
 Then, according to Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, come—
 36. Maternal grandfather's great great grandson.
 37. Maternal great grandfather's great great grandson.
 38. Maternal great great grandfather's great great grandson.

As to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya's view, see *ante*, p. 405.

Then, according to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya¹ and Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari,² follow in the same class the daughter's son, son's daughter's son and son's son's daughter's son of the maternal great grandfather,³ and the daughter's son, son's daughter's son and son's son's daughter's son of the maternal great great grandfather,⁴ but as the first of these is mentioned in the "Mitakshara" as a *matri bandhu*⁵ it follows that the subsequent ones also are *matri bandhus*.

To whom
deceased was
pitri bandhu.

Then come the *atma bandhus ex parte materni* to whom the deceased was *pitri bandhu*.

They are all sons of daughter's sons.

39. Mother's sister's son's son.⁶

The Patna High Court⁷ has postponed the mother's sister's son's son to the daughter's son of the maternal great grandfather, but the latter is described in the "Mitakshara"⁸ as a *matri bandhu*, and should therefore, it is submitted, not be preferable to the former, who is an *atma bandhu*.⁹

40. Mother's brother's daughter's son's son.

Then follow in the same class, according to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya¹⁰ and Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari,¹¹ daughter's son's sons,¹² and son's daughter's son's sons¹³ of the maternal great grandfather, and the daughter's son's son,¹⁴ and the son's daughter's son's son¹⁵ of the maternal great great grandfather. As the maternal great grandfather's daughter's son is mentioned in the "Mitakshara" as a *matri bandhu*,¹⁶ it follows that his son, and consequently those following his son, are not *atma bandhus*.

¹ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 460.

² "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 716.

³ *Post*, p. 409.

⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 398.

⁶ *Vijla (Bai) v. Prabhalakshmi (Bai)* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1129.

⁷ *Adil Narayan Singh v. Mahabir Prasad Tewari* (1916), 1 Patna L. J. 324; 21 C. W. N. [1917, Pat. 12].

⁸ Chap. II., sec. 6.

⁹ Cf. *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunambedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar* (1896), 23 I. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405.

¹⁰ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 460.

¹¹ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 716.

¹² *Post*, p. 409.

¹³ *Ibid*.

¹⁴ *Ibid*.

¹⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁶ *Ante*, p. 398.

Then follow the *atma bandhus ex parte maternâ* to whom the deceased was *matri bandhu*. To whom deceased was *matri bandhu*.

These are sons of daughters' daughters.

41. Mother's sister's daughter's son.

42. Mother's brother's daughter's daughter's son.

Then follow in the same class, according to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya¹ and Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari,² the daughter's daughter's son and son's daughter's daughter's son of the maternal great grandfather, and of the maternal great great grandfather,³ but as the son of the maternal great grandfather's daughter is classed as a *matri bandhu*,⁴ it is apparent that the daughter's daughter's son of such maternal great grandfather and the others cannot be classed as *atma bandhus*.

We next come to the *pitri bandhus*. The list will apparently *Pitri bandhus* commence with those already referred to,⁵ viz.—

43. Great grandfather's daughter's son.⁶

44. Great grandfather's son's daughter's son.⁷

45. Great grandfather's son's son's daughter's son.

46. Great great grandfather's daughter's son.

47. Great great grandfather's son's daughter's son.

48. Great great grandfather's son's son's daughter's son.⁸

49. Great grandfather's daughter's son's son.⁹

50. Great grandfather's son's daughter's son's son.

51. Great great grandfather's daughter's son's son.

52. Great great grandfather's son's daughter's son's son.

53. Great grandfather's daughter's daughter's son.

54. Great grandfather's son's daughter's daughter's son.

55. Great great grandfather's daughter's daughter's son.

56. Great great grandfather's son's daughter's daughter's son.

Then follow the *pitri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *atma bandhu ex parte paternâ*. Those to whom deceased was *atma bandhu ex parte paternâ*.

¹ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 461.

² "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 716.

³ *Post*, p. 409.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 398.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 403.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 398. "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 1; *Muthuswami Mudaliyar v. Sunambedu Muthukumaraswami Mudaliyar* (1896), 23 L. A. 83; 19 Mad. 405; S. C. in court below (1892), 16 Mad. 23. See *Krishna Ayyangar v. Venkatarama*

Ayyangar (1905), 29 Mad. 615.

⁷ See *K. Kissen Lala v. Javallah Prasad Lala* (1867), 2 Mad. H. C. 346; *Parmanandas v. Parbhudas* (1912), 14 Bom. L. R. 1630.

⁸ *Manik Chand Golecha v. Jagat Setani Prankumari Bibi* (1889), 17 Cal. 518.

⁹ *Seithurama v. Ponnammal* (1888), 12 Mad. 155; *Chamanlal Magamlal (Sha) v. Doshi Ganesh Motichand* (1904), 28 Bom. 453; 6 Bom. L. R. 460.

57-59. The son,¹ grandson, and great grandson of the father's maternal grandfather.

60-62. The son, grandson, and great grandson of the father's maternal great grandfather.

63-65. The son, grandson, and great grandson of the father's maternal great great grandfather.

At this point Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya² puts in the great great grandson of the father's three maternal ancestors in order, but according to Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari³ they would apparently come after the grandson's daughter's son of the father's maternal great great grandfather.⁴

Those to
whom
deceased was
atma bandhu
ex parte
maternâ.

Then follow the *pitri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *atma bandhu ex parte maternâ.*

66-68. The daughter's son, the son's daughter's son, and the grandson's daughter's son of the father's maternal grandfather.

69-71. The daughter's son, the son's daughter's son, and the grandson's daughter's son of the father's maternal great grandfather.

72-74. The daughter's son, the son's daughter's son, and the grandson's daughter's son of the father's maternal great great grandfather.

75, 76, 77. Great great grandson of father's mother's father, of his father, and of his grandfather.

Those to
whom
deceased was
pitri bandhu.

Now come the *pitri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *pitri bandhu*, viz.—

78, 79. Daughter's grandson, and son's daughter's grandson of the father's maternal grandfather.

80, 81. Daughter's grandson and son's daughter's grandson of the father's maternal great grandfather.

Those to
whom
deceased was
matri bandhu.

Then come the *pitri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *matri bandhu*, viz.—

82, 83. Daughter's daughter's son and son's daughter's daughter's son of the father's maternal grandfather.

84, 85. Daughter's daughter's son and son's daughter's daughter's son of the father's maternal great grandfather.

Matri bandhus.

Then come the *matri bandhus*. They apparently commence with those who have been before referred to,⁵ viz.—

¹ *Gridhari Lall Roy v. Bengal Government* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 448;
1 B. L. R. P. C. 45; 10 W. R. P. C. 31.

² "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 461.

³ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 717.

⁴ See below.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 406.

86-88. The daughter's son, son's daughter's son, and son's son's daughter's son of the maternal great grandfather.

Sec, however, *Adit Narayan v. Mahabir Prosad Tewari* (1916), 1 Patna L. J. 324 ; 21 C. W. N. [1917, Pat.] 12, ante, p. 406.

89-91. The daughter's son, son's daughter's son, and son's son's daughter's son of the maternal great grandfather.

92, 93. The daughter's son's son, and son's daughter's son's son of the maternal great grandfather.

94, 95. The daughter's son's son and son's daughter's son's son of the maternal great great grandfather.

96, 97. The daughter's daughter's son and son's daughter's daughter's son of the maternal great grandfather.

98, 99. The daughter's daughter's son and son's daughter's daughter's son of the maternal great great grandfather.

Then come the *matri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *pitri bandhu ex parte paternā*, viz.—

Those to whom the deceased was *pitri bandhu ex parte paternā*.

100-103. The mother's maternal grandfather, his son, grandson,¹ and great grandson.

104-107. The mother's maternal great grandfather, his son, grandson, and great grandson.

Here Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya² places the great great grandson of the mother's maternal grandfather and great grandfather, but according to Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari³ they will apparently come after the daughter's son of the mother's maternal great grandfather.⁴

Then come the *matri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *atma bandhu ex parte maternā*, viz.—

Those to whom the deceased was *atma bandhu ex parte maternā*.

108-110. The daughter's son,⁵ the son's daughter's son, and the grandson's daughter's son of the mother's maternal grandfather.

111-113. The daughter's son, the son's daughter's son, and the grandson's daughter's son of the mother's maternal great grandfather.

Then apparently follow⁶—

114, 115. The great great grandson of the mother's maternal grandfather and great grandfather.

¹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 1 ; ante, p. 398.

² "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 461.

³ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 717.

⁴ Below.

⁵ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 1.

⁶ Above.

Those to
whom de-
ceased was
pitri bandhu.

Then follow the *matri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *pitri bandhu*, viz.—

116, 117. The daughter's grandson, and son's daughter's grandson of the mother's maternal grandfather.

118, 119. The daughter's grandson and son's daughter's grandson of the mother's maternal great grandfather.

Those to
whom de-
ceased was
matri bandhu.

Then follow the *matri bandhus* to whom the deceased was *matri bandhu*, viz.—

120, 121. The daughter's daughter's son, and son's daughter's daughter's son of the mother's maternal grandfather.¹

121, 123. The daughter's daughter's son, and son's daughter's daughter's son of the mother's maternal great grandfather.

Female Heirs in Bombay.

Sister in
Bombay
Presidency.

In the Bombay Presidency a sister is treated as a *gotraja sapinda*,² and inherits after the paternal grandmother and before the paternal grandfather, whether the case be governed by the "Mitakshara"³ or by the "Mayukha,"⁴ except where there is an invariable and ancient custom to the contrary.⁵

She comes before a half-brother,⁶ and after a brother's son.⁷ In cases governed by the "Mitakshara," where the competition is between her and a half-brother's son,⁸ the latter is entitled to preference over her as heir,⁹ but it would be otherwise in cases governed purely by the "Vyavahara Mayukha."¹⁰

¹ As to these, however, see Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 152; see *ante*, p. 400.

² In *Lallubhai Babubhai v. Mankuvarbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 421, West, J., says: "It seems to me that he (Nilakantha in the 'Vyavahara Mayukha') introduces her rather on the ground of *sapindaship* than of *gotraship*, but calls to his aid a quibbling play, upon the term 'gotra' as a make-weight." See *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192, at p. 213; 1 Bom. L. R. 574.

³ *Bhagwan Vithoba v. Warubai* (1908), 32 Bom. 300; 10 Bom. L. R. 389.

⁴ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 19; *Venayack Anundrow v. Luxmeebaee* (1864), 9 M. I. A.

520; 3 W. R. P. C. 41; S. C. in court below (1861), 1 Bom. H. C. 117; *Sakharam Sadashiv Adhikari v. Sitabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 353.

⁵ *Sakharam Sadashiv Adhikari v. Sitabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 353.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Mulji Purshotum v. Cursandas Natha* (1900), 24 Bom. 563; 2 Bom. L. R. 721.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 391.

⁹ *Bhagwan Vithoba v. Warubai* (1908), 32 Bom. 300; 10 Bom. L. R. 389; *Hari v. Vasudev* (1914), 38 Bom. 438; 16 Bom. L. R. 283.

¹⁰ *Bhagwan Vithoba v. Warubai* (1908), 32 Bom. 300; 10 Bom. L. R. 389; *Sakharam Sadashiv Adhikari v. Sitabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 353.

She comes before a father's brother's son¹ or his son,² a stepmother,³ a brother's widow,⁴ an uncle's widow,⁵ or a more remote male relative.⁶

The fact that another heir has intervened between the last male holder and the sister does not exclude the right of the sister.⁷

Half-sisters apparently succeed after half-brothers.⁸

Sisters of the half blood.

They take before a stepmother, a paternal uncle,⁹ or a paternal uncle's widow.¹⁰

An unendowed sister has no prior right over an endowed sister, such as an unendowed daughter has over an endowed daughter.¹¹

In the Bombay Presidency sisters take absolute estates in severalty, and not as joint tenants.¹²

The position of other females born in the family is by no means clear.

Other females born in the family.

It is argued that the text of the "Mayukha,"¹³ which supports the right of the sister on the ground that "Being begotten in her brother's family (*gotra*) she possesses the qualifications of a *gotraja*," can be applied by parity of reasoning to the daughters of all *gotraja sapindas*, but the right of a sister is expressed,¹⁴ and with the exception of a daughter and sister no female born in the family is placed among the *gotraja sapindas*.¹⁵ There is some authority¹⁶ that they are heirs. In one case¹⁷ the father's half-sister was preferred to the mother's brother. There is no authority showing their exact position (if any) amongst the *bandhus*. In the absence of custom they should be placed, it is submitted, after all the *bandhus* who have been enumerated. As the Hindu law does not favour an escheat, something may be said for this arrangement. In one case referred to in West and Bühler's "Hindu Law,"¹⁸ the sastris preferred the brother's daughters to their sons. In another case a daughter's daughter was treated as an heir.¹⁹

¹ *Venayack Anundrow v. Luxumee-bace* (1864), 9 M. I. A. 520; 3 W. R. P. C. 41; *Lakshmi v. Dada Nanaji* (1879), 4 Bom. 210.

² *Biru v. Khandu* (1879), 4 Bom. 214.

³ *Lakshmi v. Dada Nanaji* (1879), 4 Bom. 210.

⁴ *Rudrapa v. Irava* (1903), 28 Bom. 82; 5 Bom. L. R. 676.

⁵ *Mahantapa v. Nilgangawa* (1879), 3 Bom. 368, note.

⁶ *Dhondur Gurav v. Gangabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 369.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ West and Bühler (2nd ed., p. 186) place them immediately after whole sisters, see Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 743; but this would, in cases governed by the "Mayukha," place them before half-brothers (above).

⁹ *Trikam Purshotam v. Natha Daji* (1911), 36 Bom. 120; 13 Bom. L. R. 863.

¹⁰ *Keserbai v. Valab Raoji* (1879),

4 Bom. 188.

¹¹ *Bhagirathi v. Baya* (1881), 5 Bom. 264.

¹² *Rindabai v. Anacharya* (1890), 15 Bom. 206.

¹³ Chap. iv. s. viii para. 19.

¹⁴ See *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Man-kuvarbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 446.

¹⁵ See *Ganesh v. Wagh* (1903), 27 Bom. 610; 5 Bom. L. R. 581; *Venilal v. Parjaram* (1894), 20 Bom. 173.

¹⁶ See *Madhavram v. Dave Trambaklal* (1896), 21 Bom. 739, at p. 744 (as to niece and grandniece); *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Mankuvarbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at p. 446; *Tuljaram Morarji v. Mathuradas* (1881), 5 Bom. 662, at p. 672.

¹⁷ *Saguna v. Sadashiv Pandu* (1902), 26 Bom. 710; 4 Bom. L. R. 527.

¹⁸ 2nd ed., p. 207.

¹⁹ *Gangaram v. Ballia Vithoba*, Bom. P. J. 1876, p. 31.

Widows of
sapindas.

In the Bombay Presidency the widows of *gotraja sapindas*¹ and of *samanodakas*² are held to be heirs.

Subject to the preferential rights of the persons enumerated in what is called the compact series of heirs,³ they take in the place occupied by their husbands, but immediately after all the male *gotrajas* who belong to the line⁴ to which their respective husbands belonged.⁵

"We think that the preponderance of reason is in favour of holding that the females in each line of *gotrajas* are excluded by any males existing in that line, within the limits to which *gotraja* relationship extends."⁶ Thus the sons of a paternal uncle inherit in preference to the widow of another paternal uncle of the deceased,⁷ and the paternal uncle's son's son is preferred to a paternal uncle's widow.⁸ The brother's widow comes before a grandson of a paternal uncle.⁹

They take even if their husbands are disqualified from taking.¹⁰

The right of these widows must be mainly rested on the ground of positive acceptance and usage.¹¹ It does not extend to widows of *bandhus*.¹²

The rights of the following have been declared by the Courts, viz. the son's widow¹³ (whom Balambhatta places immediately after the paternal

¹ *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Manku-varbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, at pp. 444, 445; S. C. affirmed on appeal, *Lulloobhoy Bappooobhoy v. Cassibai* (1880), 7 I. A. 212; 5 Bom. 110; 7 C. L. R. 445. See cases below, notes 5 and 6.

² *Lakshmiibai v. Jayram Hari* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 152.

³ I.e. the list of heirs ending with the brother's sons. "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 2 (*ante*, p. 391); "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 18; *Mohandas v. Krishnabai* (1881), 5 Bom. 597, at p. 602; *Nahalchand Harakchand v. Hemchand* (1884), 9 Bom. 31, at p. 34.

⁴ I.e. the widows of males in the paternal grandfather's line come after males in the same line, and similarly in the paternal great grandfather's line, and the paternal great great grandfather's line the males are preferred, see *Rachava v. Kalingapa* (1892), 16 Bom. 716, at pp. 719, 720; *Kashibai v. Moreshtar Raghunath* (1911), 35 Bom. 389; 13 Bom. L. R. 552; *Ambaidas v. Jijibhai* (1912), 14 Bom. L. R. 261 (a Mayukha case).

⁵ *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Manku-varbai* (1876), 2 Bom. 388, as explained by *Rachava v. Kalingapa*

(1892), 16 Bom. 716; *Nahalchand Harakchand v. Hemchand* (1884), 9 Bom. 31; *Russoobai v. Zoolekhabai* (1895), 19 Bom. 707; *Venkapa v. Holyawa* (1873), 9 Bom. 34, note; *Sita Ram v. Chintaman* (1902), 24 All. 472, at p. 474.

⁶ *Rachava v. Kalingapa* (1892), 16 Bom. 716, at p. 719.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Kashibai v. Moreshtar Raghunath* (1911), 35 Bom. 389; 13 Bom. L. R. 552; *Ranchod Naran v. Ajoobai* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1149.

⁹ *Khandacharya v. Govindacharya* (1911), 13 Bom. L. R. 1005.

¹⁰ *Gangu v. Chandrabhagabai* (1907), 32 Bom. 275; 10 Bom. L. R. 149.

¹¹ *Lulloobhoy Bappooobhoy v. Cassibai* (1880), 7 I. A. 212, at p. 237; 5 Bom. 110, at p. 124; 7 C. L. R. 445, at p. 453; S. C. in Court below (1876), 2 Bom. 388.

¹² *Vallabhdas Jamnadas v. Sakarbai* (1900), 25 Bom. 281; 2 Bom. L. R. 343.

¹³ *Roopchund Tilukchund v. Phoolchund Dhurmchund* (1824), 2 Borr. 616; *Jetha (Bai) v. Haribai*, Bom. P. J. 38 of 1872. She is excluded by a brother or brother's son, *Vithal Raghunath v. Haribayee* (1871), 9 Bom. 34, note; *Venkapa v. Holyawa*

grandmother), the stepmother,¹ brother's widow,² brother's son's widow,³ the widow of a paternal first cousin,⁴ and a paternal uncle's widow.⁵

As to the estate taken by such widows, see *post*, p. 464

Female Heirs in Madras.

Although it has been held⁶ that in the Madras Presidency Female heirs
in Madras. women do not take unless they are expressly named in the text-books, the Madras High Court has treated certain female relatives as *bandhus*, on the ground that "any relative who is also a cognate may be treated as coming within the definition of *bhinna gotra sapinda*, and that the term '*sapinda*' as used in chap. ii. s. vi. of the '*Mitakshara*' included females."⁷ It places them, however, after all male *bandhus*.⁸

On the above principle the following have been held to be heirs, viz. sister,⁹ half sister,¹⁰ son's daughter,¹¹ daughter's daughter,¹² father's sister,¹³ brother's daughter.¹⁴

(1873), *Ibid.*; but takes before a paternal first cousin, *Vithaldas Manickdas v. Jeshubai* (1879), 4 Bom. 219.

¹ *Kesserbai v. Valab Raoji* (1879), 4 Bom. 188, at p. 208. She comes before the widow of a half-brother, *Rakhmabai v. Tukaram* (1886), 11 Bom. 47, and before a paternal uncle's son, *Russoobai v. Zoolekhabai* (1895), 19 Bom. 707.

² *Khandacharya v. Govindacharya* (1911), 13 Bom. L. R. 1005. She is excluded by a daughter, *Sita Ram v. Chintaman* (1902), 24 All. 472, and by a brother's son, even if he be separated, *Nahalchand Harakchand v. Hemchand* (1884), 9 Bom. 31. She comes before a paternal uncle's son, *Basangavda v. Basangavda* (1914), 39 Bom. 87; 16 Bom. L. R. 699. As to the widow of an undivided brother, see *Manjappa Hegade v. Lakshmi* (1890), 15 Bom. 234.

³ *Madhavram Mugatram v. Dave Trambaklal Bhawanishankar* (1896), 21 Bom. 739.

⁴ *Lulloobhoy Bappoobhoy v. Cassibai* (1880), 7 I. A. 212; 5 Bom. 110; 7 C. L. R. 445.

⁵ *Kashibai v. Moreshwar Raghunath* (1911), 35 Bom. 389; 13 Bom. L. R. 552.

⁶ *Anie*, p. 366.

⁷ *Balamma v. Pullayya* (1894), 18

Mad. 168, at p. 170; *Kutti Ammal v. Radakristna Aiyar* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 88; *Venkatasubramaniam Chetti v. Thayarammah* (1898), 21 Mad. 263, at p. 267.

⁸ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao Bahadur (Rajah) v. Venkata Purushothama Jagannadha Gopala Row Bahadur (Rajah Surenani)* (1908), 31 Mad. 321. See *Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row (Rajah) v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi Narsayya* (1870), 4 I. A. 1, at p. 8; 1 Mad. 174, at p. 185; 26 W. R. C. R. 21, at p. 22.

⁹ *Kutti Ammal v. Radakristna Aiyar* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 88. Her claim is inferior to that of her son, *Lakshmanammal v. Tiruvengada Mudali* (1882), 5 Mad. 241.

¹⁰ *Kumaravelu v. Virana Goundan* (1879), 5 Mad. 29.

¹¹ *Nallanna v. Ponnal* (1890), 14 Mad. 149.

¹² *Ramappa Udayan v. Arumugath Udayan* (1893), 17 Mad. 182. As to sister's daughter, see *Sundrammal v. Rangasami Mudaliar* (1894), 18 Mad. 193.

¹³ *Chinnammal v. Venkatuchalu* (1891), 15 Mad. 421. See *Narasimha v. Mangammal* (1889), 13 Mad. 10.

¹⁴ *Venkatasubramaniam Chetti v. Thayarammah* (1898), 21 Mad. 263.

Earlier decisions negatived the claims of these women to be heirs,¹ and Mr. Mayne² gives excellent reasons for doubting the soundness of the decisions of the Madras High Court. So far as the "Mitakshara," which is the paramount authority in the Madras Presidency, is concerned, the construction put upon it by the other High Courts³ seems the right one, and there is not in Madras, as in Bombay,⁴ an express text of a local authority or a custom to support the view.

The Madras system does not admit the wives of *gotraja sapindas* as heirs.⁵

Inheritance on Reunion.

Inheritance on
reunion.

Both under the Mitakshara and Bengal systems of law there are special rules for the inheritance in case of reunion after partition.⁶

According to the Bengal school "the reason for inheritance by a reunited coparcener is not spiritual benefit, but a quasi-contractual relation and affection for each other."⁷

Reunited
brothers.

A reunited brother of the whole blood has precedence over a non-reunited brother of the whole blood, and a reunited brother of the half-blood has precedence over a non-reunited brother of the half-blood, *i.e.* relationship being equal, the succession is regulated by union. A reunited brother of the half-blood shares equally with a non-reunited brother of the whole blood. A whole brother reunited excludes a half-brother reunited, *i.e.* union being equal, superior relationship rules the succession.⁸

Descendants.

Where there has been a reunion, properly so called,⁹ and where the descendants of the persons reuniting continue to be

¹ See cases cited in Norton's Leading Cases, 531.

² "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 748-753.

³ *Ante*, p. 366.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 410, 411.

⁵ *Balarjma v. Pullaya* (1894), 18 Mad. 168; *Kanakammal v. Ananthamathi Ammal* (1912), 37 Mad. 293.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 359, 360.

⁷ *Akshay Chandra Bhattacharya v. Hari Das Goswami* (1908), 35 Calc. 721, at p. 726; 12 C. W. N. 511, at p. 514.

⁸ "Mitakshara," chap. ii, s. ix, paras. 5-13; "Daya-Bhaga," chap.

xi. s. v. paras. 13-39; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. ix. paras. 5, 13; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 308; *Ramasami v. Venkatesam* (1892), 16 Mad. 440; *Tara Chand Ghose v. Pudum Lochun Ghose* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 249; *Sham Narain v. Court of Wards* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 197; *Gopal Chunder Daghorja v. Kenaram Daghorja* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 35; *Raj Kishore Lahoory v. Gobind Chunder Lahoory* (1875), 1 Calc. 27, at p. 35; 24 W. R. 234, at p. 236.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 359, 360.

members of the reunited family, the law of inheritance applicable is the same as in the case of the death of any of those between whom the reunion took place.¹

The "Smriti Chandrika" lays down further rules for the succession in case of reunion.² According to the "Viramitrodaya,"³ after the reunited brothers of the half-blood, or brothers of the full blood, come the father or paternal uncle if reunited, then half-brothers not reunited, then the father not reunited, then the mother, and then the widow. Then comes the sister, and, failing her, the unassociated *sapindas*.

Hermits and Members of Religious Orders.

The Hindu law has made special rules as to the succession to the property of a hermit (*Vanaprastha*), an ascetic (*Sannyasi* or *Joti*),⁴ or a professed religious student (*Bramachari*) belonging to the three religious orders into which the twice-born classes may enter. The property of the first would go to a spiritual brother, associated in holiness, i.e. belonging to the same hermitage, that of the second to a virtuous pupil (disciple),⁵ and that of the third to his religious preceptor.⁶ On failure of these, "any one associated in holiness takes the goods."⁷

Inheritance to
hermits, etc.

This principle is based entirely upon fellowship and personal association, and a stranger, though of the same order, is excluded.⁸ As these persons would rarely possess private property of any substance, the rules are not of great importance. There must be a real and not a fictitious or incomplete renunciation of worldly affairs to render these rules applicable.⁹

¹ *Abhai Churn Jana v. Mangal Jana* (1892), 19 Calc. 634.

² Chap. xii. paras. 23-29; "Viramitrodaya" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), p. 214.

³ (G. C. Sarkar's translation), pp. 214-216.

⁴ It is doubtful whether a *Bairagi* can be classed as a *Sannyasi*, *Ramdas Gopaldas (Sadhu) v. Baldevdas Kanchalyadasji* (1914), 39 Bom. 168; 16 Bom. L. R. 757. A custom that the preceptor's preceptor succeeded was proved in *Collector of Dacca v. Jagat Chunder Goswami* (1901), 28 Calc. 608; 5 C. W. N. 873.

⁵ See *Dukharam Bharti v. Luchmun Bharti* (1879), 4 Calc. 954; 4 C. L. R. 49; *Sheoproskash Doss (Mohunt) v. Joyram Doss (Mohunt)* (1866), 5 W. R. M. R. 57; *Ram Dass v. Gunga Dass* (1862), 3 Agra, 295; *Ramdas*

Gopaldas (Sadhu) v. Baldevdasji Kanchalyadasji (1914), 39 Bom. 168; 16 Bom. L. R. 757. This does not apply to the chela of a mohunt, *Ramdhan Puri (Gossain) v. Dulmir Puri (Gossain)* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 191. A pupil, who had left his master, would have no rights, *Sogun Chund v. Gopal Gir* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 101.

⁶ See *Chhajju Gir v. Diwan* (1906), 29 All. 109.

⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. viii. paras. 1-6; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. paras. 35, 36. See *Giyana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran* (1887), 10 Mad. 375, at p. 384.

⁸ *Khuggender Narain Chowdhry v. Sharupgir Oghorenath* (1878), 4 Calc. 543.

⁹ See *Mudhoobun Dass (Mohunt) v. Hurey Kishen Bhunj*, Ben. S. D. A.

In the case of *sannyasis* a pupil has no right of inheritance until the performance of the final ceremony which severs him from his family.¹

These rules have no application to Sudras,² unless some usage be proved to the contrary, as they cannot become *jotis* or *sannyasis*.³

As to the widow of a *garbhari gosavi*, see *Gutabai v. Shivbakas* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 318.

The property of an endowment would necessarily follow the rules of succession in force in the particular endowment.⁴

As to the succession to the private property of a mohunt, see *Ramdhan Puri (Gossain) v. Dalmir Puri (Gossain)* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 191.

Escheat.

Escheat.

On failure of all these heirs the King, as represented by the Secretary of State, takes by way of escheat.⁵

It may be a question whether in the case of Brahmins the King does not take the property by way of trust for other Brahmins.⁶ The ancient texts provided in the case of Brahmins for the succession of the spiritual preceptor, pupil, fellow student in the Vedas, and lastly the Brahmins of the same village, endowed with learning in the three Vedas and other qualities.⁷ It is difficult, however, to see how the Government would be bound by a trust of so vague a character.

There is no right of escheat in favour of a zemindar.⁸

The burden is upon the Government to show the absence of heirs.⁹

When the Government takes, it takes like any other heir, *i.e.* subject to all legal charges,¹⁰ but not subject to unauthorized alienations.¹¹

As to the superintendence of escheats, see Bengal Regulation XIX. of 1810, s. 7, and Madras Regulation VII. of 1817, s. 6.

1852, p. 1089; *Khoodeeram Chatterjee v. Rookhinee Bostobee* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 197; *Gouri Sunker Byas v. Nader Sing* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 59.

¹ *Ramdhan Puri (Gossain) v. Dalmir Pari (Gossain)* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 191.

² *Dharmapuram Pandara Sannadhi v. Virapandiyam Pillai* (1898), 22 Mad. 302.

³ *Harish Chandra Roy v. Atir Mahmud* (1913), 40 Calc. 545; 17 C. W. N. 517.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 568-572.

⁵ *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah* (1860), 8 M. I. A. 500; 2 W. R. P. C. 59; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vii. para. 6; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 27.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870),

5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 38; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at p. 59; *Jugdanund Gossamee v. Kessub Nund Gossamee*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 146; "Vyavastha Darpana" (2nd ed.), 308; "Vyavastha Chandrika," pp. 198-200; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. vii. paras. 1-4; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 26.

⁸ *Sonet Kowar (Ranee) v. Himmut Bahadoor (Mirza)* (1876), 3 I. A. 92; 1 Calc. 391.

⁹ *Gradhari Lall Roy v. Bengal Government* (1868), 12 M. I. A. 448; 1 B. L. R. P. C. 44; 10 W. R. P. C. 31.

¹⁰ *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah* (1860), 8 M. I. A. 500, at p. 528; 2 W. R. P. C. 59, at p. 61; *Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah v. Collector of Masulipatam* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 619; 10 W. R. P. C. 47.

¹¹ *Post*, p. 514.

CHAPTER XII.

INHERITANCE TO MALES ACCORDING TO THE BENGAL SCHOOL.

THE law of inheritance, according to the Bengal school, is founded upon the principle of spiritual benefit.¹

"The heir or heirs are selected who are most capable of exercising those religious rites which are considered to be beneficial to the deceased."²

The theory of spiritual benefit is not, however, in every case the guiding principle.³ As in the case of the Mitakshara school⁴ succession has in most cases been fixed by the texts of ancient writers.

"In most cases propinquity, spiritual efficacy, and natural love and affection run in the same lines and no difficulty arises, but whenever they run in different lines Jimutavahana⁵ was compelled to ignore spiritual efficacy and had recourse to other principles or express texts."⁶

"The succession of females, according to Hindu law, is quite exceptional, and is not founded upon the ordinary rule, viz. that of spiritual benefit. It is true that in the case of the widow, she confers some spiritual benefit, but if that were the sole test, she would have ranked much lower than she does now. Daughters confer no benefit, but they succeed because their sons do."⁷

The principles of the Bengal system of inheritance, so far as they depend upon spiritual efficacy, are derived from the rules which have been laid down for the performance of the

¹ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15; 13 W. R. F. B. 49; *Kedar Nath Banerjee v. Hari Das Ghose* (1915), 43 Calc. 1; 19 C. W. N. 1181.

² *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup. vol. 47, at p. 64; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 394; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 364.

³ See Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., pp. 288, 289; *Toolesey Dass Seal*

v. Luckhymoney Dassee (Sm.) (1900), 4 C. W. N. 743.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 376.

⁵ The author of the "Daya-Bhaga," the leading treatise of the Bengal school. See *ante*, pp. 14, 15.

⁶ *Akshay Chandra Bhattacharya v. Hari Das Goswami* (1908), 35 Calc. 721, at p. 726; 12 C. W. N. 511, at p. 514.

⁷ *Gunga Pershad Kur v. Shumbhounath Burmun* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 393, at pp. 394, 395.

*Parvana Sradh*¹ (ceremony of veneration) in honour of ancestors. In the course of such ceremonies the performer of the *sradh* offers a *pinda* or funeral cake, or, as it is called, an undivided oblation to his father, his father's father, and his father's father's father,² and also to his mother's father, his mother's father's father, and his mother's father's father's father.³

He thus becomes the *sapinda* or sharer in the funeral cake,⁴ not only of each one of the persons to whom he offers a cake, but also, secondly, of each person who on his death would at a similar ceremony offer a cake to his *manes*, and also, thirdly, of each person who offers a cake to any of the persons to whom he is bound to offer a cake.⁵

"Since the father and certain other ancestors partake of three funeral oblations as participating in the offering at obsequies, and since the son and other descendants to the number of three present oblations to the deceased (or to be shared by his *manes*); and he, who while living presents an oblation to an ancestor, partakes, when deceased, of oblations presented to the same person; therefore, such being the case, the middlemost of seven, who, while living, offered food to the *manes* of ancestors, and when dead partook of offerings made to them, became the object to which the oblations of his descendants were addressed in their lifetime, and shares with them, when they are deceased, the food which must be offered by the daughter's son and other descendants beyond the third degree. Hence, those ancestors to whom he presented oblations, and those descendants who present oblations to him, partake of an undivided offering in the form of (*pinda*) food at obsequies. Persons who partake of such offerings are *sapindas*." ⁶

Classes of
pindas.

Pindas are of three descriptions in the following order of superiority ⁷ :—

¹ For a complete description of the ceremonies performed, see Colebrooke's "Miscellaneous Essays," vol. ii. p. 166, and R. K. Sarvadhikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance," pp. 57, 94-100. The *parvana sradh*, at which two sets of oblations are offered, is to be distinguished from the *ekoddishtha sradh* which is in honour of a single ancestor.

² "Manu," chap. iii. para. 216.

³ These last were not included in Manu, but were added by Yajñavalkya, the law-giver, who promulgated his code towards the middle of the first century, A.D.; Rajkumar Sarvadhikari's "Law of Inheritance,"

pp. 58, 59. See Balusami Panditkar v. Narayana Rau (1897), 20 Mad. 342.

⁴ See Wilson's "Glossary," p. 465.

⁵ *Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhi Narayan Chuckerbutty* (1868), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 28, at p. 32; *S. C. Omrit Koomaree Dabee v. Luckee Narain Chuckerbutty*, 10 W. R. F. B. 76, at p. 81.

⁶ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. i. para. 38; *Guru Gobind Shahi Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at pp. 39, 40; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at pp. 59, 60.

⁷ R. K. Sarvadhikari's "Law of Inheritance," pp. 817, 818,

1. Those presented directly to the deceased.

2. Those offered to his three paternal ancestors and participated in by him.

"That the *pindas* offered to paternal ancestors are primary, and those offered to maternal ancestors are secondary in importance, and that there is a difference between the efficacy of the two classes of *pindas* is not only laid down in distinct terms by Jagannath,¹ but is to be well deduced from Rughunundun's 'Sradha Tattwa.'"²

3. Those which he was bound to offer to his three maternal ancestors.

"Although the deceased has no right of participation in the oblations presented to his maternal ancestors, still, inasmuch as the three immediate maternal ancestors received oblations from him, and the agnate and cognate descendants of each offered *pindas* which the deceased was bound to give, there is thus a heritable bond between him and his maternal kinsmen."³

In each of these three classes *pindas* presented by agnate descendants of a common ancestor are preferred to *pindas* presented by cognate descendants of such ancestor.⁴

After offering these *pindas* or cakes the performer wipes his hand with *kusa* grass, and offers the wipings or crumbs of the cakes (*lepa*)—which are spoken of as divided offerings—to the three next highest paternal ancestors. He thus, upon similar principles, becomes what is called a *sakulya*, not only of such ancestors, but also of such of his descendants as would offer the *lepa* to him, and of such persons who offer the *lepa* to an individual to whom he offers the *lepa*. Sakulyas.

He is also the *sakulya* of persons who offer a *lepa* to an individual to whom he offers a *pinda*, and of persons who offer a *pinda* to an individual to whom he offers the *lepa*.

He then offers libations of water to the *manes* of seven additional generations of paternal ancestors. The persons connected with him by virtue of these libations of water are called his *samanodakas*.⁵ Samanodak

¹ See Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 572.

² *Huri Das Bundopadhya v. Bama Churn Chattopadhya* (1888), 15 Cal. 780, at p. 791.

³ *R. K. Sarvadhikari's "Law of*

Inheritance," pp. 818, 819.

⁴ *Ibid.*; above, note 2.

⁵ *Rajkumar Sarvadhikari's "Hindu Law of Inheritance,"* p. 57; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 6.

He would also be a *samanodaka* of persons who offer libations to an individual to whom he offers a *pinda* or the *lepa*, and of persons who offer a *pinda* or the *lepa* to an individual to whom he offers libations.

"The doctrine of funeral cakes is the key to the whole Hindu law of inheritance."¹

Mother,
grandmother,
great grand-
mother.
Division of
*sapindā*⁴.

A man is also the *sapindu* of his mother,² his father's mother,³ and his father's father's mother.⁴

Sapindas are either agnate or *gotraja*⁵ *sapindas*, i.e. connected entirely through males, or cognate or *bhinna-gotra*⁶ *sapindas* otherwise *bandhus*, i.e. connected through females.

Under the Bengal school *sapinda* relation extends to the third degree. Under the Mitakshara school (*ante*, p. 379), it extends to the sixth degree, *sakulyas* not being recognized, as such, by the latter school.

Bandhus.
Ex parte
paternā.

According to the "Daya-Bhaga" *bandhus* are either—

(1) Connected with the deceased through the father, father's father, or father's father's father of the mother of the *bandhu*.

These are all daughters' sons in the branch to which they belong. They rank after the male issue in their branch, and, according to Rajkumar Sarvadhikari, before the males of the branch above them.⁷ Three are mentioned in the "Daya-Bhaga,"⁸ viz. the sons of the daughter of the father,⁹ of the grandfather,¹⁰ of the great grandfather.¹¹

Ex parte
maternā.

Or (2) connected with the deceased through the father, father's father, or father's father's father of the mother of the deceased.

The first kind are *sapindas* because they offer cakes to their maternal ancestors who are the paternal ancestors of the deceased.

The second kind are *sapindas* because they offer cakes to their paternal ancestors, who are the maternal ancestors of the deceased.

"Therefore a kinsman whether sprung from the family (of the deceased), though of different male descent, as his own daughter's son, or his father's daughter's son, or sprung from a different family, as his maternal uncle or the like, being allied by a common funeral cake (*pinda*) on account of

¹ *Amrita Kumari Debi v. Lakhi Narayan Chuckerbutty* (1868), 2 B. L. R. F. B. 28, at p. 39; *S. C. Omrit Koomaree Dabee v. Luckee Narain Chuckerbutty*, 10 W. R. F. B. 76, at p. 84; *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 34; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at p. 57.

² See *post*, pp. 426, 427.

³ See *post*, p. 429.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Belonging to the same *gotra* or family.

⁶ Belonging to a different *gotra* or family.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 429, 430, 431.

⁸ Chap. xi. s. vi. paras. 8, 9.

⁹ *Post*, p. 429.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Post*, p. 430.

their presenting offerings to three ancestors in the paternal and the maternal family of the deceased owner, is a *sapinda*.”¹

The relative efficacy of the different kinds of offerings gives rise to the following rules for determining the order of succession:—

I. All *sapindas*, whether agnate or cognate, succeed before any *sakulya*, and all *sakulyas* are preferred to any *sumanodaka*.²

Order of succession.
before others.

Thus a brother's daughter's son comes before the great great grandson of the owner's great grandfather.³

“The *sapindas* are allowed to come in before the *sakulyas*, because undivided oblations are considered to be of higher spiritual value than divided ones; and the *sakulyas* are in their turn preferred to the *samanodakas*, because divided oblations are considered to be more valuable than libations of water.”⁴

The following rules are laid down primarily with regard to *sapindas*, but, bearing in mind Rule I., they are equally applicable to *sakulyas* and *samanodakas*.⁵

II. Those who offer the *pinda* to the deceased are preferred to those who offer it to any of his ancestors.

Descendants of deceased.

There is an exception in the case of the son's daughter's son, and the son's son's daughter's son.⁶

III. Those who offer funeral cakes to the paternal ancestors of the deceased are preferred to those who offer to his maternal ancestors only, irrespectively of the number of cakes offered.⁷

Descendants of paternal ancestors.

Thus the father's brother's daughter's son,⁸ and the grandfather's brother's daughter's son,⁹ are preferred to the mother's brother's son.

¹ “*Daya-Bhaga*,” chap. xi. s. vi. para. 19; *Uma Sunker Moitro v. Kali Komul Mozumdar* (1880), 6 Calc. 256, at pp. 263, 264; 7 C. L. R. 145, at p. 153.

² *Digumber Roy Chowdhry v. Moti Lal Bundopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 563; 12 C. L. R. 204; *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 38; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 49, at p. 59; *Deyanath Roy v. Muthoor Nath Ghose* (1835), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 27 (new edition, 30); *Kedar Nath Ray v. Amrita Lal Mukerjee* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 492.

³ *Digumber Roy Chowdhry v. Moti Lal Bundopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 563; 12 C. L. R. 204.

⁴ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870),

5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 38; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at p. 59.

⁵ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 39; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 49, at p. 59.

⁶ *Post*, p. 430.

⁷ *Gobind Proshad Talookdar v. Mohesh Chunder Surma Ghuttuck* (1874), 15 B. L. R. 35; 23 W. R. C. R. 117; *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 39; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 49, at p. 59.

⁸ *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285.

⁹ *Kailash Chundra Adhikari v. Karana Nath Chowdhry* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 477.

"The *sapindas* in the paternal line offer oblations to the paternal ancestors which the deceased was bound to offer, and in which he participates, and the *sapindas* in the maternal line offer oblations to the maternal ancestors, which the deceased was bound to offer, but in which he does not participate; so that, while they both confer spiritual benefit on the deceased, the former benefit him doubly by enabling him to participate in the oblations offered by them and by discharging a duty that was incumbent on him of offering oblations to certain ancestors, and the latter benefit him only in one way, namely, by offering certain oblations which he was bound to offer; and therefore, while both are entitled to inherit his estate, the latter succeed only on failure of the former."¹

Descendants of father before those of grand-father, etc.

IV. A *sapinda* who offers oblations to the father of the deceased is to be preferred to a *sapinda* who offers oblations to the grandfather or great grandfather, although the latter offers more cakes of the same description, and similarly a *sapinda* who offers to the paternal grandfather is preferred to one who offers to the paternal great grandfather.²

Agnates before cognates in same line.

V. Agnate *sapindas* in any line are always preferred to the cognate *sapindas* of the same line.³

Agnates before cognates of equal degree.

VI. Between an agnate *sapinda* and a cognate *sapinda* of equal degree of propinquity, the former is preferred to the latter, although the latter is the giver of a larger number of cakes in which the deceased would participate than the former.⁴

Number of cakes offered.

VII. Subject to the above rules, those who offer the larger number of cakes of a particular description are invariably preferred to those who offer a less number of cakes of the same description which the deceased receives or in which he participates.⁵

Thus a brother comes before a brother's son.

This is generally equivalent to saying that the nearer *sapinda* excludes the more remote.⁶

Half blood.

As an example of this rule, those who offer oblations to both

¹ *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Cal. 285, at p. 291; *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 39; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at p. 59.

² "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. paras. 5, 6; *Pran Nath Surma Jewardar v. Surrut Chunder Bhattacharjee* (1882), 8 Cal. 460; 10 C. L. R. 484.

³ *Huri Das Bundopadhyaya v. Bama Churn Chattopadhyaya* (1888), 15 Cal. 780, at pp. 790, 791.

⁴ *Huri Das Bundopadhyaya v. Bama Churn Chattopadhyaya* (1888), 15 Cal. 780, at p. 790.

⁵ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 39; 13 W. R. F. B. R. 49, at p. 59.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 417.

paternal and maternal ancestors, are superior to those who offer only to the paternal ancestors.¹

A brother of the full blood is therefore preferred to a brother of the half blood.²

VIII. Where the number of such cakes is equal, those that are offered to nearer ancestors are preferred to those offered to more distant ones.³ Offering to nearer ancestors.

According to these rules cognates are not, as in the "Mitakshara,"⁴ postponed to all agnates, but are preferred to such agnates as are capable of less religious efficacy.

Following the above rules we find the order of succession among *sapindas*, according to the Bengal school, to be as follows :— Order of succession among *sapindas*.

Descendants of the Deceased⁵ and his Widow.

1. Son.⁶

Sons.

It is clear that the illegitimate sons of the twice-born have no rights of inheritance,⁷ and, according to the decisions of the High Court of Bengal, an illegitimate son of a Sudra cannot inherit according to the Bengal school. Illegitimate sons.

This view has been arrived at by limiting the expression "*dasiputra*" in the "Daya-Bhaga"⁸ to the son of a female slave,⁹ and by holding that the abolition of slavery precludes the existence of a "*dasiputra*" at the present day. His father can give him a share of the property.¹⁰

¹ *Sheo Soondary v. Purthee Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 147, at p. 152; *Rajkishore Lahoory v. Gobind Chunder Lahoory* (1875), 1 Calc. 27; 24 W. R. C. R. 234; 4 I. A. 153, note; Colbrook's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 480.

² *Post*, p. 427; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. v. para. 12.

³ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 39; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at p. 59; *Gobind Proshad Talookdar v. Mohesh Chunder Surma Ghutuck* (1874), 15 B. L. R. 35, at p. 47; 23 W. R. C. R. 117, at p. 120.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 397, 398.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 421.

⁶ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iii. s. i. para. 18; chap. xi. s. i. para. 32.

⁷ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. ix. para.

25. See *ante*, pp. 382-385.

⁸ Chap. ix. paras. 29, 30.

⁹ *Ram Saran Garain v. Tekchand Garain* (1900), 28 Calc. 194; *Karpal Narain Tewari v. Sukurmoni* (1891), 19 Calc. 91; *Narain Dhara v. Rakhal Gain* (1875), 1 Calc. 1; 23 W. R. C. R. 334. If this question be considered it may well be held that the texts contemplate the son, not only of a slave, but of any kept woman, see Jolly's "Hindu Law of Partition, etc.," pp. 187, 188; Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 189, 190; Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 655-659. It is not very clear why the expression *dasi putra* should have a different meaning under the "Daya-Bhaga" from that which it has under the "Mitakshara," see *ante*, p. 383, note 1.

¹⁰ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. ix. para. 29.

Grandson.

2. Son's son.¹

As in the case of the Mitakshara (*ante*, p. 385), son's sons take the share of their deceased father by representation.

Great grandson.

3. Son's son's son.²

As in the case of the Mitakshara (*ante*, p. 386), son's son's sons take the share of their deceased father by representation.

Widow.

4. Widow.³

The widow succeeds whether the property be divided or undivided.⁴

Where there are several widows, they take jointly with rights of survivorship and of partition as in the case of those governed by the "Mitakshara."⁵

For a custom excluding sonless widows, see *Russic Lal Bhunj v. Purush Munnee*, Beng. S. D. A. 1847, p. 205.

The estate of the widow is devested by the birth⁶ or adoption⁷ of a son. As to the interest taken by a widow, see *post*, chap. xv.

Daughter.

5. Daughter.⁸

"Daughters confer no benefit, but they succeed because their sons do."⁹

Priority amongst daughters.

"The unmarried daughter is first entitled to inherit: if there be no maiden daughter, then the daughter who has, and the daughter who is likely to have, male issue¹⁰ are together entitled to the succession. Daughters who are barren, or

¹ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iii. s. i. para. 18; chap. xi. s. i. para. 34.

² "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iii. s. i. para. 18; chap. xi. s. i. para. 34; *Goorogobindo Choudhry v. Hureemadhub Roy* (1863), Marsh, 398; 2 Hay, 401.

³ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. i. paras. 6, 43; *Cossinout Bysack v. Hurroosondry Dossee* (1819), Morley's "Digest," vol. ii. p. 198; Norton's L. C. 85; S. C. on appeal (1826), Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 97; Clarke, 91; Montrou's cases, p. 495; *Mohun Lall Khan v. Siroomunnee (Ranee)* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 32 (new edition, 40); *Durga Nath Pramank v. Chintamani Dassi* (1903), 31 Calc. 214; 8 C. W. N. 11; *Deepo Debia v. Gobindo Deb* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 42; *Chunder Kant Surmah v. Bungshee Deb Surmah* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 61.

⁴ *Srinath Serma v. Radhakaunt* (1796), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 15 (2nd ed., 19); *Bhyroochund Rai v. Russcoo-*

munee (1799), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 27 (2nd ed., 36); *Radha Churn Rai v. Kishenchund Rai* (1801), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 33 (2nd ed., 44); and other cases cited in 1 Morley, 316.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 387.

⁶ *Bamundoss Mookerjee v. Tarinee (Mussamut)* (1858), 7 M. I. A. 169, at p. 183; *ante*, p. 387.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 193, 194.

⁸ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. ii. para. 1.

⁹ *Gunga Pershad Kur v. Shumhoonath Burmun* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 393.

¹⁰ It does not seem to be necessary that the son should be capable of presenting oblations, as the text of the "Daya-Bhaga" (chap. xi. s. ii. para. 3), upon which the right of the married daughters is based, does not contain expressions, which in the case of succession to *stridhan* gave foundation to the arguments used in *Charu Chunder Pal v. Nobo Sunderi Dasi* (1891), 18 Calc. 327.

widows without male issue, or mothers of daughters only can under no circumstances inherit." ¹

Sastri G. C. Sarkar ² considers that a daughter having a power of adoption must now be considered as capable of having a son and therefore as an heir, but it is submitted that there is no authority for this proposition.

A childless widow does not acquire by remarriage any right to inherit to her father,³ but by remarrying before her father's death she becomes entitled to inherit her father's estate along with other married daughters.⁴

It has been suggested ⁵ that a widowed daughter, who is not past the age of childbearing, can inherit, as the law now permits her to remarry,⁶ but it is submitted that modern legislation, although it may supersede the authority of ancient texts, cannot be used for construing them.

On the death of a daughter who has taken, the estate passes (in preference to her sons) to her sisters who have taken or are competent to take.⁷

Daughters, who inherit, take a joint estate with rights of survivorship and partition.⁸ A surviving sister takes by survivorship, not as a reversioner.⁹

Where two daughters have succeeded jointly to their father's estate, and at the death of one of them the survivor is a childless widow, the latter will nevertheless take by survivorship the whole estate.¹⁰

As to the nature of the estate taken by a daughter, see *post*, chap. xv.

6. Daughter's son.¹¹

Daughter's son.

A daughter's son is not entitled to succeed as heir to his maternal grandfather's estate, so long as any daughter not disqualified, or in whom a right of inheritance has once vested, survives.¹²

¹ *Mokunda Lal Chakrabarti v. Monmohini Debi* (1914), 19 C. W. N. 472; *Binode Koomaree Dabee v. Purdhan Gopal Sahee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 176, at p. 177; *Taramonee Gooptea v. Luckheemonee Dossee* (1862), Marsh, 29; 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 22; Hay, 67; *Radha Kishen Manjhee v. Ram Mundul (Rajah)* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 147; *Rajchunder Das v. Dhunmunee (Mussummaut)* (1824), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 362 (new edition, 482); "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. ii. para. 3. As to an unmarried prostitute daughter, see *ante*, p. 388.

² "Law of Adoption," pp. 397, 398.

³ Act XV. of 1856, s. 4.

⁴ See *Ibid.*, s. 5.

⁵ *Bimola (Sreemutty) v. Dangoo Kansaree* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 189.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 37.

⁷ *Tinumonni Dasi v. Nibarun Chunder Gupta* (1882), 9 Cal. 154; 12 C. L. R. 376, overruling *Radha*

Kishen Manjhee v. Ram Mundul (Rajah) (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 147, see *ante*, p. 389.

⁸ *Aumirtolall Bose v. Rajoneekant Mitter* (1875), 2 I. A. 113, at pp. 126, 127; 15 B. L. R. 10, at p. 24; 23 W. R. C. R. 214, at p. 218; *Boidya Nath Sett v. Durga Charan Basak* (1865), S. C. Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., pp. 170, 171.

⁹ *Ibid.*; *Sachindra Kishore Dey v. Rajani Kant Chuckerbutty* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 904.

¹⁰ *Aumirtolall Bose v. Rajoneekant Mitter* (1875), 2 I. A. 113; 15 B. L. R. 10; 23 W. R. C. R. 214.

¹¹ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. ii. paras. 2, 17-29.

¹² *Aumirtolall Bose v. Rajoneekant Mitter* (1875), 2 I. A. 113; 15 B. L. R. 10; 23 W. R. C. R. 214. See *Sib Chunder Mullick v. Trepoorah Soon-dary Dossee* (1842), Fulton, 98.

Daughter's
son's son.
Son's
daughter's
son and
grandson's
daughter's
son.

A daughter's son's son is not an heir according to the Bengal school.

Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari¹ at this point introduces the son's daughter's son,² and the son's son's daughter's son,³ on the ground that they also present *pinḍas* directly to the deceased,⁴ and this is said by Mr. J. C. Ghose⁵ to be the law as laid down by the *Rishis* (sages of antiquity). Opinions of judges⁶ have, however, placed these persons in the succession following the paternal great grandfather's daughter's son.⁷ Sastri G. C. Sarkar⁸ would apparently place them after the mother's sister's son.⁹ If the principle that an offering to the deceased himself is to be preferred to an offering in which he participates¹⁰ be carried out to its entirety, these descendants would be entitled to the position assigned to them by Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari. The fact that they are not mentioned in the "Daya-Bhaga" is not by itself conclusive,¹¹ but in this case goes a long way to show that they were not intended to come in at this point.

Father and his
descendants.

The descendants of the deceased being exhausted, the inheritance passes to the father of the deceased, and after him in order of proximity (after the mother) to such of the agnate descendants of the father as are *sapinḍas* of the deceased, and then also in order of proximity to such of the cognate descendants of the father as are *sapinḍas* of the deceased.

Father.

7. The father.¹²

The father is preferred to the mother because he presents oblations to the father's father and father's father's father of the deceased.

Mother.

8. The mother.¹³

The "Daya-Bhaga"¹⁴ gives the mother this right in the following words: "Her claim properly precedes that of the brothers and the rest; since it is necessary to make a grateful return to her, for benefits which

¹ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 821. See also J. N. Bhattacharya's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., 503.

² See *post*, p. 430.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See *ante*, p. 421.

⁵ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 103, 105.

⁶ *Huri Das Bundopadhyaya v. Bama Churn Chattopadhyaya* (1888), 15 Calc. 780, at pp. 793, 794; *Prannath Surma Jowardar v. Surrut Chundra Bhattacharjee* (1882), 8 Calc. 460, at pp. 463, 464; 10 C. L. R. 484, at p. 487, citing Colebrooke's "Digest," iii. 530. See *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285, at p. 291.

⁷ *Post*, p. 430. See *Gobind Proshad Talookdar v. Mohesh Chunder Surma*

Ghuttuck (1874), 15 B. L. R. 35; 23 W. R. C. R. 117.

⁸ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 286.

⁹ *Post*, p. 431.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 419.

¹¹ Cf. *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 42; 13 W. R. F. B. 49, at p. 61; *Prannath Surma Jowardar v. Surrut Chundra Bhattacharjee* (1882), 8 Calc. 460, at p. 463; 10 C. L. R. 484, at p. 486.

¹² "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. iii.; *Hemlutta Debea v. Goluck Chunder Gosayn* (1842), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 108 (new edition, 127).

¹³ "Manu," chap. ix. paras. 131-140.

¹⁴ Chap. xi. s. iv. para. 2. See also "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. vi. para. 2.

she has conferred by bearing the child in her womb and nurturing him during his infancy; and also because she confers benefits on him by the birth of other sons who may offer funeral oblations in which he will participate. A mother tastes with her husband the funeral repast consisting of oblations to the manes; and the paternal grandmother with her husband; and the paternal great grandmother with hers."¹

A stepmother has no rights of inheritance, as she confers no spiritual Stepmother. benefit on her stepson.²

Father's Agnate Descendants.

9. Brothers.³

Brothers.

An undivided brother is preferred to a divided brother.⁴

Brothers of the whole blood are preferred to brothers of Half brothers. the half blood,⁵ whether the property be divided or undivided.⁶

The former make offerings both to the paternal and maternal ancestors of the deceased, and the latter offer to his paternal ancestors only.⁷

When a half brother is joint with the deceased, and the whole brother has separated, they take together.⁸

A sister is not an heir according to the Bengal school.⁹ The fact that Sister. a sister might produce an heir does not make her an heir,¹⁰ but if her son be conceived at the time of the succession opening out he will succeed.¹¹

¹ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 3; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 519, 598, 625. See "Manu," chap. ix. para. 45.

² "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 3; *Bhyrobee Dossee v. Nubkissen Ghose* (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 53 (new edition, 61); *Lakhi Priya v. Bhairab Chandra Chaudhuri* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 315 (new edition, 369); *Alhadmoni Dassea v. Gokoolmoni Dassea*, Ben. S. D. A. of 1852, p. 563.

³ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. v. paras. 1-3.

⁴ *Kesabram Mahapatrar v. Nandkishor Mahapatrar* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 7; 11 W. R. C. R. 308; *Jaudubchunder Ghose v. Benodbeharry Ghose* (1864), 1 Hyde, 214.

⁵ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. v. paras. 9-12; *Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beer Chunder Thakoor* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 523; at pp. 539, 541; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 13, at pp. 17, 18; 12 W. R. P. C. 21. at pp. 23, 24.

⁶ *Sheo Soondary v. Pirthee Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 147; approving of *Rajkishore Lahoory v. Gobind Chunder Lahoory* (1875), 1 Calc. 27; 24 W. R. C. R. 234; *Ishen Chunder*

Chowdhry v. Bhyrub Chunder Chowdhry (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 21.

⁷ *Sheo Soondary v. Pirthee Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 147, at p. 152; *ante*, pp. 422, 423.

⁸ *Sheo Soondary v. Pirthee Singh* (1877), 4 I. A. 147, at p. 153; *Rajkishore Lahoory v. Gobind Chunder Lahoory* (1875), 1 Calc. 27; 24 W. R. C. R. 234; 4 I. A. 153; Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 139.

⁹ *Kirpa Mayee Dibeeah (Raj Koonwarce) v. Damoodur Chunder Deyb* (1845), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 192 (2nd ed., 226); *Kalee Pershad Sarma v. Bhoirabee Dabee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 180; *Ramdyal Deb v. Magnee (Musst)* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 227; *Rukmini Dasi (Srimati) v. Kadarnath Ghose* (1870), 5 B. L. R. App. 87; *Anund Chunder Mookerjee v. Teetooram Chatterjee* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 215; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 517.

¹⁰ *Kesub Chunder Ghose v. Bishno Persaud Ghose*, Ben. S. D. A. 1890, ii. 340; 2 Sev. A. C. 240; *contra Karuna Mai v. Jai Chandra Ghose* (1830), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 46 (new edition, 50).

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 362, 363.

Brother's son.

10. Brother's son.

A brother's son who was joint with the deceased is preferred to one that was separate.¹

Half blood.

Sons of brothers of the whole blood succeed before sons of brothers of the half blood.²

A united brother's son of the whole blood succeeds before a divided brother's son of the whole blood, and a united brother's son of the half blood succeeds before a divided brother's son of the half blood, but if the son of the whole brother be separated, and the son of the half brother be united, then they both inherit together.³

The son of a reunited brother succeeds to the exclusion of all the sons of unassociated brothers.⁴

Brother's
grandson.

11. Brother's son's son.⁵

The same principle as to the preference of those who are united,⁶ and of those who are of full blood,⁷ as in the case of brothers and brothers' sons, would apparently apply.

A brother's son's daughter is not an heir.⁸

A brother's son's son's son is a *sakulya*, and therefore comes after a brother's daughter's son.⁹

Father's Cognate Descendants.

Sister's son.

12. Sister's son.¹⁰

¹ *Akshay Chandra Bhattacharya v. Hari Das Goswami* (1908), 35 Calc. 721, at p. 724; 12 C. W. N. 511, at p. 513; *Jaudub Chunder Ghose v. Benodbeharry Ghose* (1864), 1 Hyde, 214.

² *Kylash Chunder Sircar v. Gooroo Churn Sircar* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 43; S. C. affirmed on review, *Gooroo Churn Sircar v. Koylash Chunder Sircar* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 93; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 2.

³ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. viii. paras. 3-5.

⁴ W. Macphaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 72; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 524.

⁵ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 6.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 427.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Radha Pearee Dossee v. Doorga Monsee Dossia* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 131.

⁹ *Digamber Roy Chowdhry v. Moti*

Lal Bundopadhya (1883), 9 Calc. 563; 12 C. L. R. 204, differing from *Kashee Mohun Roy v. Raj Gobind Chuckerbutty* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 229.

¹⁰ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15; 13 W. R. F. B. 49; *Gunesh Chunder Roy v. Nilkomul Roy* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 264; *Seeta Ram Gossain v. Fukeer Chand Chuckerbutty* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 433; *Raj Chunder Narain Chowdhry v. Goculchund Goh* (1801), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 43 (new edition, 56); *Lakhi Priya v. Bhairab Chandra Chaudhuri* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 315 (new edition, 369); *Sumbochunder Roy v. Gunga Churn Sein* (1838), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 234 (new edition, 291); *Karuna Mai v. Jai Chandra Ghose* (1830), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 46 (new edition, 50); "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 8.

Great Grandfather's Agnate Descendants.

Paternal
granduncle.
Paternal
granduncle's
son.
Paternal
granduncle's
grandson.

21. Father's father's father's son.
22. His son.¹
23. His son's son.²

Great Grandfather's Cognate Descendants.

Paternal
grandaunt's
son.

24. Paternal great grandfather's daughter's son.³

Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari⁴ places at this point the great grandfather's son's daughter's son⁵ and the great grandfather's grandson's daughter's son.⁶

Following these⁷ come some heirs who would, according to Pundit R. K. Sarvadhikari, be placed earlier.⁸ Sastri G. C. Sarkar⁹ would place them after some of the maternal relations who take after them, and says that they are only to be placed here provisionally.¹⁰ They are described by Mr. J. C. Ghose¹¹ as daughter's sons and are as follows:—

25. Son's daughter's son.¹²
26. Son's son's daughter's son.¹³
27. Brother's daughter's son.¹³
28. Brother's son's daughter's son.¹⁴

Son's
daughter's
son
Grandson's
daughter's
son.
Brother's
daughter's
son.
Nephew's
daughter's
son.

¹ *Gopal Chunder Nath Coondoo v. Haridas Chini* (1885), 11 Calc. 343.

² *Mahoda v. Kuleani* (1803), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 67 (new edition, 82).

³ G. C. Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 286; *Gosaien Chund Kobraj v. Kishenmunnee* (*Mussumaut*) (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 77 (new edition, 90); "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 9.

⁴ "Hindu Law of Inheritance," p. 823. See *ante*, pp. 423 (rule viii.), 428, 429.

⁵ *Post*, p. 431.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ G. C. Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., pp. 307, 308.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 426.

⁹ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 286. See pp. 307, 308.

¹⁰ This apparently means that on further consideration a different place will be assigned to them. According

to Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari ("Hindu Law of Inheritance," pp. 821, 822) they will be placed respectively in the lines of the deceased, his father, his grandfather, and his great grandfather, following the persons in such lines who are heirs.

¹¹ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 139.

¹² Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 530.

¹³ *Ibid.*; *Digumber Roy Chowdhry v. Moti Lal Bundopadhyia* (1883), 9 Calc. 563; 12 C. L. R. 204; *Gobind Proshad Talookdar v. Mohesh Chunder Surma Ghattuck* (1874), 15 B. L. R. 35; 23 W. R. C. R. 17; *Huri Das Bundopadhyia v. Bama Churn Chatto-padhyia* (1888), 15 Calc. 780. See *ante*, p. 429.

¹⁴ *Prannath Surma Jowardar v. Surrut Chunder Bhuttacharjee* (1882), 8 Calc. 460; 10 C. L. R. 484; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 530.

29. Paternal uncle's daughter's son.¹

30. Paternal uncle's son's daughter's son.

31. Paternal granduncle's daughter's son.

32. Paternal granduncle's son's daughter's son.²

Then follow the *sapinda* relations of the deceased through his maternal grandfather.³

They are—

33. The maternal grandfather.⁴

The Agnate Descendants of the Maternal Grandfather.

34. Mother's brother.⁵

35. Mother's brother's son.⁶

36. Mother's brother's son's son.⁷

The Cognate Descendants of the Maternal Grandfather.

37. Mother's sister's son.⁸

Pundit Rajkumar Sarvadhikari would put in at this point the maternal grandfather's son's daughter's son, and the maternal grandfather's grandson's daughter's son, but, as in the cases above,⁹ they and the persons similarly situated in the lines of the maternal great grandfather and of the maternal great great grandfather would be postponed until after the maternal great great grandfather's daughter's son.¹⁰

Then follow the *sapinda* relations of the deceased through his maternal great grandfather.

Paternal
uncle's
daughter's
son.
Paternal
uncle's son's
daughter's
son.
Paternal
granduncle's
daughter's
son.
Granduncle's
son's
daughter's
son.
*Sapindas ex
parte maternâ.*
Maternal
grandfather.
Maternal
uncle.
His son.
His grandson.

Mother's
sister's son.

Maternal
great grand-
father's line.

¹ *Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 15; 13 W. R. F. B. 49; *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285; *Gopal Chunder Nath Coondoo v. Haridas Chini* (1885), 11 Calc. 343. See *Gobindo Hureekar v. Woomes Chunder Roy* (1864), W. R. F. B. R. 176; *Kedar Nath Roy v. Amrita Lal Mukerjee* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 492.

² It was held in *Kailash Chandra Adhikari v. Karuna Nath Chowdhry* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 477, followed in *Kedar Nath Banerjee v. Haridas Ghosh* (1915), 43 Calc. 1; 19 C. W. N. 1181, that he comes before a maternal uncle.

³ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. vi. para. 20; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. x. paras. 14-21.

⁴ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. x. para. 14.

⁵ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap.

i. s. x. para. 15; *Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 229; 8 Calc. 302.

⁶ *Roopchurn Mohapater v. Anund Lal Khan* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 35 (new edition, 45); *Srimuty Dibeah (Rany) v. Koond Luta (Rany)* (1847), 4 M. I. A. 292; 7 W. R. P. C. 44; *Kassee Issoree Dibbeah (Musst) v. Goluck Chunder Gungolee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1848, p. 28; *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285. See above, note 2.

⁷ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. x. para. 16.

⁸ *Deyanath Roy v. Muihoor Nath Ghose* (1835), 6 Ben. Se' R. 27 (new edition, 30).

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 429, 430.

¹⁰ *Post*, pp. 432, 433. According to Sastri G. C. Sarkar's views ("Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 286), they should not have preference of all *sakulyas*.

38. The maternal great grandfather.

*The Agnate Descendants of the Maternal Great Grandfather.*39. His son.¹40. His son's son.²41. His son's son's son.³*The Cognate Descendants of the Maternal Great Grandfather.*

42. His daughter's son.

Pundit Rāj Kumar Sarvadhikari ⁴ places here the maternal great grandfather's son's daughter's son, and grandson's daughter's son.⁵

Maternal
great great
grandfather's
line.

Then follow the *sapinda* relations of the deceased through his maternal great great grandfather.

43. The maternal great great grandfather.

*The Agnate Descendants of the Maternal Great Great Grandfather.*44. His son.⁶45. His son's son.⁶46. His son's son's son.⁶*The Cognate Descendants of the Maternal Great Great Grandfather.*47. The maternal great great grandfather's daughter's son.⁷

Pundit Rāj Kumar Sarvadhikari ⁸ places here the maternal great great grandfather's son's daughter's son, and grandson's daughter's son.⁹

Then apparently come the persons who, although *sapindas*, are not included in the foregoing enumeration, viz.—

48. The maternal grandfather's son's daughter's son.

Other
sapindas
ex parte
materna.

¹ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. x. para. 17.

² See *Pudma Coomari Debi v Court of Wards* (1881), 8 I. A. 89; 8 Calc. 302.

³ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. x. para. 17; *Braja Kishor Mitter Mazumdar v. Radha Gobind Dutt* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 435; 12 W. R. C. R. 339.

⁴ "Law of Inheritance," p. 823.

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 429, 430, 431, and below.

⁶ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. x. para. 19.

⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 20.

⁸ "Law of Inheritance," p. 823.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 429, 430, 431, and *post*, p. 433.

49. The maternal grandfather's grandson's daughter's son.

50. The maternal great grandfather's son's daughter's son.

51. The maternal great grandfather's grandson's daughter's son.

52. The maternal great great grandfather's son's daughter's son.

53. The maternal great great grandfather's grandson's daughter's son.

Failing all *sapindas*, whether *gotraja*, or *bhinna gotra*, the Succession of *sakulyas*,¹ succeed.

Failing all *sakulyas*, the *samanodakas* succeed.²

and
samanodakas.

In determining rival claims of *sakulyas* or of *samanodakas* the rules for determining the succession of *sapindas*³ are to be applied.⁴

As to inheritance to the property of hermits and members of religious orders, see *ante*, pp. 415, 416. As to escheat, see *ante*, p. 416.

¹ *Ante*, p. 419.

² *Ante*, pp. 419, 420.

³ *Ante*, pp. 421-423.

⁴ *Guru Gobind Shaha Manda* v.

Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar (1870),

5 B. L. R. 15, at p. 39; 13 W. R.

F. B. R. 49, at p. 59.

CHAPTER XIII.

STRIDHAN PROPERTY.

Meaning of
"Stridhana."
"Daya-
Bhaga."

"Mitak-
shara."

PROPERTY held by women is called "*Stridhana*."¹ This expression is, under the "*Daya-Bhaga*,"² confined to property which "she has power to give, sell or use, independently of her husband's control." This is sometimes described as "technical *stridhan*." In the "*Mitakshara*"³ the expression is not used in any technical sense. It includes all kinds of property held by a woman.

Property received by a woman by inheritance, and in which she has only a restricted interest, is dealt with in Chap. XV.; *post*. This chapter deals only with other property belonging to a female.

Except that the rules for inheritance of *sulka* differ from those in the case of other kinds of *stridhana*, the "*Mitakshara*" does not distinguish between different kinds of *stridhana*.

No distinction is made in the "*Mitakshara*" between property inherited by a woman from a male and from a female.⁴ According to the "*Mitakshara*," whatever is lawfully acquired in any manner by a woman, married or not, is her *stridhana*.⁵

"Mayukha."

The author of the "*Mayukha*," "like the author of the '*Mitakshara*,' declines to look upon the enumeration of specific kinds of *stridhan* in the old Smṛiti texts as exhaustive. He includes under the name all that under the law becomes the property of the woman, only, unlike the author

¹ "*Stri*," woman; "*Dhana*," property.

² Chap. i. s. i. para. 18.

³ Chap. ii. s. xi. paras. 3, 4. See *Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai* (1903), 30 I. A. 202, at p. 205; 25 All. 468, at p. 472; 7 C. W. N. 831, at p. 837; 5 Bom. L. R. 828; *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 272; *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192, at p. 217; *Virasangappa Shetti v. Rudrappa Shetti* (1895), 19 Mad. 110, at p. 118. The Southern Indian authorities seem

to limit the expression "*stridhana*" to the cases where the wife has complete control over property, see "*Daya-Vibhaga*" (Burnell's translation), pp. 40-42; "*Smṛiti Chandrika*," chap. ix. s. i.

⁴ *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192, at p. 217; 1 Bom. L. R. 574.

⁵ Chap. ii. s. xi.; *Salemma v. Lutchmana Reddi* (1897), 21 Mad. 100, at p. 103; *post*, p. 440. See Banerjee's "*Hindu Law of Marriage*," 3rd ed., pp. 291-296,

of the 'Mitakshara,' he distinguishes the specific kinds enumerated in the texts from those which are not so enumerated, for purposes of inheritance." ¹

Ancient writers described *stridhan* property with regard to the then usual modes of acquisition of property by a bride or wife, as such ; but such descriptions are not exhaustive.²

Stridhan
according to
ancient
writers.

Sources of property which with the change of ideas and habits became possible to a woman, such as property acquired by her by her own exertions, or by investment and speculation, would now be treated as *stridhana*.³

There is no special rule as to the burden of proof in a case where there is a question whether certain property is *stridhan* property or not. The ordinary rules of burden of proof in the case of claims to property will apply,⁴ and if a woman is out of possession and claims property as her *stridhan* she may have to prove her right. It has been held that where she claims property as her *stridhan* as against creditors of her husband, the burden is upon her.⁵

Stridhan property is classed according to the time when the woman acquired it.

Classification
of *stridhan*.

If given at the time of the nuptials, it is styled "*Yautaka*."⁶

If acquired by her at any other time, it is styled "*Ayautaka*."⁷

Property promised at the time of the marriage, but not given until after the marriage, is "*Ayautaka*."⁸

Property acquired by a woman in the following ways were described as *stridhan* in the *shastras* and Codes⁹ :—

Descriptions
of *stridhan*.

I. Gifts at the time of marriage (*yautaka*). These include—

¹ *Manilal Rewadat v. Rewa (Bai)* (1892), 17 Bom. 758, at p. 769; *Vijjarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 260; *post*, pp. 452, 453.

² See "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 4.

³ *Post*, p. 440.

⁴ See *Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh (Dewan) v. Indarpal Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 226; 26 Calc. 871; 4 C. W. N. 1; 2 Bom. L. R. 1; *Narayana v. Krishna* (1884), 8 Mad. 214; *Chowdrani v. Tariny Kanth Lahiry* (1882), 8 Calc. 545; 11 C. L. R. 41.

⁵ *Brojomohun Mytee v. Radha*

Koomaree (Mussamat) (1864), W. R. C. R. 60; *Lamb v. Govind Money (Musst.)* (1852), Ben. S. D. A. p. 125.

⁶ From "*Yuta*" (joined together), "*Daya-Bhaga*," chap. i. s. ii. paras. 13, 14; "*Vyavahara Mayukha*," chap. iv. s. x. para. 17; "*Smriti Chandrika*," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 13.

⁷ "*Daya-Krama Sangraha*," chap. ii. s. iv. para. 1.

⁸ *Mahendra Nath Maity v. Girish Chandra Maity* (1915), 19 Calc. 1287.

⁹ Sarkar's "*Hindu Law*," 3rd ed., pp. 364-366; Banerjee's "*Law of Marriage*," 3rd ed., pp. 279 *et seq.*

Gifts at
marriage.

(a) (*Adhyagnika stridhana*) Gifts before the nuptial fire,¹ i.e. at the actual marriage ceremony.

(b) (*Adhyavahanika stridhana*). Gifts received at the time of the marriage procession² or at any time of the marriage ceremonial (which lasts for several days) before or after the effective ceremony.³

The question whether a particular ceremony is a part of the marriage ceremony may be a question of the custom of a caste or district.⁴

Except under the "Daya-Bhaga"⁵ these include gifts given at the time by strangers.⁶

II. *Sulka* (gratuity).

According to the more usual view, this was the gratuity for the receipt of which a girl is given in marriage.⁷ It was originally paid to the father as the price of the bride, but when that was forbidden the father received it for the bride, and it became her property,⁸ as her dowry.

According to the "Viramitrodaya,"⁹ *sulka* is what is received by the bride or a married woman as a price of household furniture, conveyance, milch cattle, and ornaments. That work goes on to say:¹⁰ "It has been explained in the 'Madanaratna,' that the price of household furniture, etc., which is taken from the bridegroom or the like for giving (in marriage) the bride, in the shape of the bride's ornaments, is the fee or *sulka*. In the 'Mitakshara,' however, it is said that the fee or *sulka* is that which, having been taken, the bride is given in marriage. But in both (the books) it is intended that the father or the like takes on the understanding that it is to belong to the bride; because otherwise, in the absence of her right thereto the application of the denomination of woman's property to it would be unreasonable."

¹ "Manu," chap. ix. para. 194; "Narada Smṛiti" (Jolly's translation), p. 95; "Vishnu" ("Viramitrodaya," G. C. Sarkar's translation, p. 220); "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 2; *Churamun Sahu v. Gopi Sahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 994, at p. 996.

² "Manu," chap. ix. para. 194; "Narada Smṛiti" (Jolly's translation), p. 95. According to some authorities this class of gifts includes gifts at the time of the first visit to the husband's house for the purpose of staying there (*dviragamana*), G. C. Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 364.

³ See *Bistoo Pershad Burrall v. Radha Soonder Nath* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 115. In the "Daya-tattwa" (G. C. Sarkar's translation, p. 54) we find, "The time of marriage

means time previous and posterior to the actual time of marriage. This is described in the treatise on marriage to begin from the *śraddha* for prosperity and to end with the ceremony of prostrating before the husband."

⁴ *Bistoo Pershad Burrall v. Radha Soonder Nath* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 304.

⁵ Chap. iv. s. i. para. 6.

⁶ See W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," chap. ii. pp. 121, 122; Colebrooke's "Digest," chap. iii. pp. 559, 560.

⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 6.

⁸ See Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 314.

⁹ G. C. Sarkar's translation, pp. 222, 223.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

A different meaning of *sulka* is given in the following paragraphs of the "Daya-Bhaga" ¹:—

Para. 20. "What is given to a woman by artists constructing a house or executing other work, as a bribe to send her husband or other person of her family to labour on such particular work is her fee. It is the fruit of labour since its purpose is to engage a labourer." ² Para. 21, "Or a fee is that which is described by Vyasa, ³ 'what is given to bring the bride to her husband's house is denominated her fee.' That is what is given by way of bribe or the like to induce her to go to the house of her husband."

Sastri C. C. Sarkar ⁴ says: "The bridegroom's price also, which, according to recent practice originating in the moral and religious degradation of the so-called educated man, is extorted by the bridegroom's party from the bride's father, must on similar and stronger grounds of equity be considered to be the bride's *stridhana*, and the recipient must be held to be trustee for her." It is submitted that there are no grounds in law for this proposition, and it does not appear that in practice this money is treated as belonging to the bride.

Bridegroom's price.

III. *Adhivedanika*, or the compensation given by a husband to his wife, on his taking a second wife. ⁵

Compensation for second marriage.

IV. Gifts made to a wife after marriage by her relations or by her husband's relations (*anwadeyika*). ⁶

Gifts after marriage.

This obviously does not include family jewels lent to her for use. ⁷

¹ Chap. iv. s. iii. paras. 20, 21.

² See Colebrooke's "Digest," iii. p. 568. This paragraph arises from Jimutavahana having adopted a reading of the text of Katyayana defining a fee or *sulka* in which there is the word "*karminam*" (workmen) instead of "*kurmanam*" (acts), "*Viramitrodaya*" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), p. 223.

³ Colebrooke's "Digest," iii. p. 570. Whether this be called *sulka* or not it belongs to the woman, see Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 29.

⁴ "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 365.

⁵ "Vishnu" ("*Viramitrodaya*," G. C. Sarkar's translation, p. 220); "*Mitakshara*," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 2. See *ante*, p. 36.

⁶ *Basanti Kumari Debi v. Kamikshya Kumari Debi* (1905), 32 I. A. 181; 33 Calc. 25; 10 C. W. N. 1; 7 Bom. L. R. 904 (bequest by a brother); *Ram Gopal Bhattacharjee v. Narain Chunder Bandopadhyaya* (1905), 33 Calc. 315; 10 C. W. N. 510 (a

grant of a lease reserving annual rent); it includes gifts from parents or husband, *Sitabai v. Wasantrao* (1901), 3 Bom. L. R. 201. "Manu," chap. ix. para. 194, and "Narada Smriti" (Jolly's translation), p. 95, refer to gifts by a mother, brother, and father. "Manu," chap. ix. s. 195, refers to gifts by the husband's family. "Vishnu" ("*Viramitrodaya*," G. C. Sarkar's translation, p. 220) speaks of "what is given by the father and mother, the son or the brother," and also of what is given by the "*bandhus*." "*Mitakshara*," chap. ii s. xi. paras. 5-7. Additional presents given by a father after marriage come under this head, although he gave others at the marriage, *Gopal Chandra Pal v. Ram Chandra Pramank* (1901), 28 Calc. 311.

⁷ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x para. 6; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. i. para. 11.

Property in
lieu of main-
tenance.

V. Property given for the purpose, or in lieu, of maintenance,¹ but not property allotted on partition to a wife or widow.²

Arrears of maintenance due to a Hindu widow at the time of her death,³ and property purchased with money given to her for maintenance,⁴ are her *stridhana*.

Property
when maiden.

VI. Property belonging to a woman before marriage, whether obtained by gift⁵ or otherwise.

Gifts by
husband.

VII. Gifts or bequests by the husband (*prtidatta*),⁶ whether of movable or immovable property.⁷

As to gifts or bequests of immovable property by a husband to his wife, see *post*, pp. 441–443.

Ornaments bought by the husband for investment,⁸ or for use only on special occasions,⁹ would not be the *stridhan* property of the wife.

The following modes of acquiring property were also referred to :—

Gifts by
strangers.

Presents by strangers given after the time of the marriage and during coverture.

The “Viramitrodaya,”¹⁰ “Daya-Bhaga,”¹¹ and “Smriti Chandrika,”¹² while classing these as *stridhan*, assert the husband’s dominion over them. They are really treated as presents to the husband.¹³

“It may . . . be deduced from the texts that, as a rule, it is only gifts obtained by a woman from her relations, and her ornaments and

¹ *Doorga Koonwar (Mussamut) v. Tejoo Koonwar (Mussamut)* (1866), 5 W. R. M. A. 53; *Nellankumar Chetti v. Marakathammal* (1876), 1 Mad. 166; *Subramanian Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti* (1904), 28 Mad. 1.

² *Ante*, p. 336.

³ *Court of Wards v. Mohessur Roy (Rajah)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 76; “Daya-Bhaga,” chap. iv. s. i. para. 15.

⁴ *Subramanian Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti* (1904), 28 Mad. 1.

⁵ See *Judoonath Sircar v. Bussunt Coomar Roy Chowdhry* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 286; 19 W. R. C. R. 264; “Manu,” chap. ix. para. 200.

⁶ Lit. gifts in token of love. This expression includes gifts by relations.

⁷ See “Manu,” chap. ix. s. 195;

“Narada Smriti” (Jolly’s translation), p. 95; *Venkata Rama Rao v. Venkata Suriya Rao* (1880), 2 Mad. 333; 8 C. L. R. 309; S. C. in court below (1877), 1 Mad. 281; *Radha (Musst) v. Bisheshur Dass* (1874), 6 N. W. P. 279.

⁸ See G. C. Sarkar’s “Hindu Law,” 3rd ed., p. 365.

⁹ *Radha (Musst) v. Bisheshur Dass* (1874), 6 N. W. P. 279.

¹⁰ G. C. Sarkar’s translation, p. 221.

¹¹ Chap. iv. s. i. para. 20; *Ramdulol Sircar v. Joymoney Dabey (Sreemutty)* (1816), 2 Morley’s “Digest,” 65.

¹² Chap. ix. s. i. para. 16.

¹³ See G. C. Sarkar’s “Hindu Law,” 3rd ed., p. 365.

apparel, that constitute her *stridhana*; and that the only gifts from strangers which come under that denomination are presents before the nuptial fire, and (according to some) presents made at the bridal procession. But neither gifts obtained from strangers at any other time, nor her acquisition by labour and skill, would constitute her *stridhana*.”¹

Property acquired by a *sunnud* from Government, in which a widow gets a full proprietary and transferable right, is descendible to her heirs,² and it has been held that a service *inam* which had been enfranchised in a married woman's favour was her *stridhana* property and descendible to her heirs.³ Sunnud from Government.
Enfranchised inam.⁴

Acquisitions made by a woman before or after marriage by mechanical arts,⁴ labour or skill.⁵

“Wealth earned by a woman by the mechanical arts during coverture does not, except in the Benares and Maharashtra school, become her *stridhana*.”⁶

The “*Mitakshara*”⁷ adds, “which she may have acquired by inheritance, partition,⁸ seizure, or finding.” It also, after enumerating the different kinds of *stridhan*,⁹ adds, “any other (separate acquisition).”¹⁰ “*Mitakshara*.”

The “*Viramitrodaya*” defines *stridhana* as property whereof a woman is the owner.¹¹ “*Viramitrodaya*.”

This clearly does not include, except in Bombay,¹² property acquired by a woman by inheritance,¹³ and Sir G. D. Banerjee¹⁴ argues that the expression in “*Yajñavalkya*” was not intended to bear the full meaning attributed to it by the “*Mitakshara*.”

Although women may not have an absolute interest in property acquired

¹ Banerjee's “*Hindu Law of Marriage*,” 3rd ed., p. 287. See, however, below.

² *Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Janki Koer (Ranee)* (1877), 5 I. A. 1; 1 C. L. R. 318.

³ *Salemma v. Lutchmana Reddi* (1897), 21 Mad. 100; see *post*, p. 466.

⁴ Such as painting and spinning, Macnaghten's “*Hindu Law*,” vol. ii. p. 241.

⁵ *Kandam Rajagopalacharyulu v. Secretary of State* (1913), 38 Mad. 997, where the property was earned by the joint exertions of the husband and wife.

⁶ Banerjee's “*Law of Marriage*,” 3rd ed., pp. 322, 323.

⁷ Chap. ii. s. xi. para. 2. See also “*Vyavahara Mayukha*,” chap. iv. s. x. para. 26; *Vijjarangam v. Lakshu-*

man (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 260.

⁸ See *ante*, pp. 331–336.

⁹ Chap. ii. s. xi. para. 1.

¹⁰ See also “*Vyavahara Mayukha*,” chap. iv. s. x. para. 2.

¹¹ G. C. Sarkar's translation, p. 221. See also “*Vyavahara Mayukha*,” as interpreted in Banerjee's “*Hindu Law of Marriage*,” 3rd ed., p. 292.

¹² *Post*, p. 467.

¹³ *Bhugwandeon Doobey v. Myna Bae* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 487; 9 W. R. P. C. 23; *Thakoor Deyhee (Mussumat) v. Baluk Ram (Rai)* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 139; 10 W. R. P. C. 4; 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 106; *post*, pp. 464–466.

¹⁴ “*Hindu Law of Marriage*,” 3rd ed., pp. 289, 290.

by inheritance,¹ or partition,² the income of such property is at their disposal.³

There is nothing to prevent women owning property, even though it may not have been acquired in any of the modes enumerated by the ancient writers.

"We are not prepared to hold that the rules of Hindu law are so inelastic as to be capable of application only to such descriptions of interests in property as formed the subject-matter of transactions at the time when the rules were first formulated."⁴

Investments.

Property purchased by a woman from funds, or from the proceeds of property to which she is absolutely entitled, or in exchange for property to which she is so entitled, belongs to her absolutely, and she can dispose of it by will or otherwise, whether it be movable or immovable.⁵

As to accumulations of income of inherited property, see *post*, pp. 474, 475.

As to a married woman's power to contract, see *ante*, p. 75.

Adverse possession.

Property acquired by adverse possession⁶ is under the absolute control of a woman, and passes to her *stridhan* heirs.⁷

Power to deal with *stridhana*.

A woman's interest⁸ in her *stridhan* property is measured by her power to deal with it.

Maiden.¹

"During maidenhood, excepting the disqualification by reason of nonage, a Hindu female labours under no other incapacity as regards her power over her *stridhana*, and, except in the capacity of guardian, her father and her other relations have no control over it."⁸ On her marriage she would retain the control over such property.

¹ *Post*, pp. 464, 465.

² *Ante*, pp. 331-336.

³ *Post*, p. 471.

⁴ *Ram Gopal Bhuttacharjee v. Narain Chandra Bandopadhyaya* (1905), 33 Calc. 315, at p. 319; 10 C. W. N. 510, at p. 511.

⁵ *Luchmun Chunder Geer Gossain v. Kalli Churn Singh* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 292; *Venkata Rama Rao v. Venkata Suriya Rao* (1877), 1 Mad. 281; S. C. on appeal (1880), 2 Mad. 333; 8 C. L. R. 304; *Mada-*

varayya v. Tirtha Sami (1877), 1 Mad. 307; *Nellaikumar Chetti v. Marakathammal* (1876), 1 Mad. 166; *Subramanian Chetti v. Arunachelam Chetti* (1904), 28 Mad. 1.

⁶ See *post*, p. 509.

⁷ *Kanhai Ram v. Amri (Musammal)* (1910), 32 All. 189; *Mohim Chunder Sanyal v. Kashi Kani Sanyal* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 161.

⁸ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 329, 457, 458.

All property given ¹ or bequeathed ² to a woman by her *Saudayika*, husband, her relations, or his relations, before or after marriage, ³ is termed her "*saudayika*" (*lit.* gifts of affectionate kindred), and, except in the case of gifts by her husband, ⁴ is absolutely at her disposal. ⁵

Property into which such property has been converted is also absolutely at her disposal. ⁶

The testamentary power of a Hindu female is commensurate with her power of disposition in her lifetime. ⁷

Except in cases to which the Hindu Wills Act, 1870, or the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, applies, ⁸ a gift or devise by the husband of immovable property ⁹ to his wife without express words creating an absolute interest, conveys only the interest of a widow. ¹⁰

Gift of immov-
able property
by husband
to wife.

¹ *Gosaien Chund Kobraj v. Kishen-munnee (Mussammatt)* (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 77 (2nd ed., 90) (gift by a brother, and by a father's brother's son); *Doorga Koonwar (Mussamat) v. Tejoo Koonwar (Mussamat)* (1866), 5 W. R. M. R. 53 (gift by a son); *Madavarayya v. Tirtha Sami* (1877), 1 Mad. 307 (gift by father); *Jeevun Punda v. Sona (Mussamat)* (1869), 1 N. W. P. 66 (gift by husband); *Kashee Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Gour Kishore Goocho* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 139 (ditto); *Venkata Rama Rao v. Venkata Suriya Rao* (1880), 2 Mad. 333; 8 C. L. R. 304 (ditto); *Radha (Mussamat) v. Bisheshur Dass* (1874), 6 N. W. P. 279 (ditto); *Basanta Kumari Debi v. Kamikshya Kumari Debi* (1905), 32 I. A. 181; 33 Cal. 23; 10 C. W. N. 1; 7 Bom. L. R. 904 (gift by brother); *Munia v. Puran* (1883), 5 All. 310 (acquired from brother); *Hurymohun Shaha v. Shonatan Shaha* (1876), 1 Calc. 275 (gift by husband's father's sister's son); *Bhau v. Raghunath Krishna Gurav* (1905), 30 Bom. 229; 7 Bom. L. R. 936.

² *Damodar Madhewji v. Purmandas Jeevandas* (1883), 7 Bom. 155 (legacy from husband); *Judoonath Sircar v. Bussunt Coomar Roy Chowdhry* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 286, at p. 295; 19 W. R. C. R. 264 (legacy from father); *Ramdulol Sircar v. Joymoney Dabey (Sreemutty)* (1816),

Morley's "Digest," ii. 65.

³ *Muthukaruppa Pillai v. Selluthammal* (1914), 39 Mad. 298.

⁴ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 328; *Teencowree Chatterjee v. Denonath Banerjee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 49.

⁵ See *post*, p. 443.

⁶ *Venkata Rama Rao v. Venkata Suriya Rao* (1880), 2 Mad. 333; *S. C. Rowvenkata Mahapati v. Mohipati Suriath*, 8 C. L. R. 304.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Caralapathi Chunna Cunniah v. Cota Nammalwariah* (1909), 33 Mad. 91. *Post*, p. 443.

⁹ With this is classed every kind of property producing a periodical income; *Vijurangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 265. Cf. *Sakharam Hari v. Lazmi-priya Tirtha Swami* (1910), 34 Bom. 349; 12 Bom. L. R. 157; *Madhavrao Moreshwar v. Kashibai* (1909), 34 Bom. 287; 12 Bom. L. R. 9.

¹⁰ *Saroda Sundari Dass v. Kristo Jiban Pal* (1900), 5 C. W. N. 300; *Bhoba Tarini Debya v. Peary Lall Sanjal* (1897), 24 Calc. 646; 1 C. W. N. 378; *Koonjbhari Dhur v. Premchand Dutt* (1880), 5 Calc. 684; 5 C. L. R. 561; *Ram Narain Sing v. Pearay Bhugut* (1883), 9 Calc. 830; 13 C. L. R. 109; *Kullianbutti Koer v. Tulupal Singh* (1882), 11 C. L. R. 204, at p. 207; *Prosunno Coomar Ghose v. Tarrucknath Sirkar*

This restriction has no application to movable property given by the husband, and invested by the wife in land,¹ and it is not extended to a case where a widow obtains an absolute estate by a compromise with her husband's relations.²

Power to alienate.

Provided there be a gift of an absolute estate,³ and a power of alienation can be implied, the widow can alienate the property, although there is not an express power of alienation.⁴ It is submitted that the gift of an absolute estate would ordinarily imply a power to alienate.

Presumption.

There is no presumption that a gift to a mother,⁵ daughter,⁶ or other female relation⁷ confers a less estate than would have been conferred had she been a male, but in construing a will or deed giving property to a female it may be assumed that a Hindu knows, as a general rule, at all events, that women do not take absolute estates of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate,⁸ and the Courts will lean against

(1873), 10 B. L. R. 267; *Pabitra Dasi v. Damodar Jana* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 697; *Jamna Das v. Ramautar Pande* (1904), 27 All. 364; *Janki v. Bhairon* (1896), 19 All. 133; *Rudr Narain Singh v. Rup Kuar* (1878), 1 All. 734; *Gunput Singh (Baboo) v. Gunga Pershad* (1867), 2 Agra, 230; *Mulhunnakshi Ammal v. Chendra Sekhara Ayyar* (1902), 27 Mad. 498; *Seshayya v. Narasamma* (1899), 22 Mad. 357; *Gangadaranya v. Parameswaramma* (1869), 5 Mad. H. C. 111; *Motlal Mithalal v. Advocate-General of Bombay* (1910), 35 Bom. 279; *Ambalal v. Rewa (Bai)* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 334; *Kotarbasapa v. Chanverova* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 403; *Harilal v. Rewa (Bai)* (1895), 21 Bom. 376; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. i. para. 23; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. ii. para. 10; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 9; "Sarasvati Vilasa," paras. 257, 258. In *Bhujanga Ravi v. Ramayamma* (1884), 7 Mad. 387, the Court held that although an absolute estate was given, there was no power of alienation. See *Surajmani (Musammat) v. Rabi Nath Ojha* (1907), 35 I. A. 17; 30 All. 84; 12 C. W. N. 231; 10 Bom. L. R. 59; *Kanhia v. Mahin Lal* (1888), 10 All. 495; *Jeewun Pundia v. Sona (Musummat)* (1869), 1 N. W. P. 66; *Seth Mulchand Badharsha v. Mancha (Bai)* (1883), 7 Bom. 491; *Keserbai (Bai) v. Hunsraj Morarji* (1906), 33 I. A. 176, at p. 187; 30 Bom. 431, at p. 442; 10 C. W. N. 802, at p. 807; 8 Bom. L. R. 446; *Chunilal v. Muli (Bai)* (1900), 2 Bom. L. R. 46; *Jairam v. Kesorjee* (1902),

4 Bom. L. R. 555. See, however, *Braja Kishera v. Kundana Devi* (1899), 1 Bom. L. R. 287.

¹ *Venkata Rama Rao v. Venkata Suriya Rao* (1880), 2 Mad. 333; S. C. *Rowvenkata Mahapati v. Mohipati Suriah* (1880), 8 C. L. R. 304.

² *Sambasiva Ayyar v. Venkataswara, Ayyar* (1907), 31 Mad. 179; S. C. 30 Mad. 356.

³ A mere direction that she is to remain in possession does not give an absolute estate: *Brij Lal v. Suraj Bukram Singh* (1912), 39 I. A. 150; 34 All. 405; 16 C. W. N. 745; 14 Bom. L. R. 827.

⁴ See *Surajmani (Musammat) v. Rabi Nath Ojha* (1907), 35 I. A. 17; 30 All. 84; 12 C. W. N. 231; 10 Bom. L. R. 59; *Janki v. Bhairon* (1896), 19 All. 133, differing from *Koonjbehari Dhur v. Premchand Dutt* (1880), 5 Calc. 684; 5 C. L. R. 561; *Saroda Sundari Dassi v. Kristo Jiban Pal* (1900), 5 C. W. N. 300, at p. 303.

⁵ *Atul Krishna Sircar v. Sanyasi Churn Sircar* (1905), 37 Calc. 1051; 9 C. W. N. 784.

⁶ *Ramasami v. Pupayya* (1893), 16 Mad. 466; *Kollany Koer (Musammat) v. Luchmee Pershad* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 395. See *Thakur Singh v. Nokhe Singh* (1901), 23 All. 309.

⁷ *Ramjewan Lal (Lala) v. Dal Koer* (1897), 24 Calc. 406. In *Ramachandra Naiker v. Vijayaragavulu Naidu* (1908), 31 Mad. 349, there was an absolute gift to a daughter-in-law for her maintenance.

⁸ *Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvie) v. Shewukram* (1874), 2 I. A. 7, at

a construction giving her such absolute right.¹ The circumstance that the beneficiary is a female may throw light upon the construction of a deed or will, but it cannot destroy the effect of express words creating an absolute estate.²

In a case governed by the Hindu Wills Act, 1870, or by the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, a mere devise of immovable property, even to a wife, passes an absolute estate, unless it appears from the will that only a restricted interest was intended for her.³

Except in the case of *saudayika*,⁴ and gifts by her husband, a woman's power of disposal over her *stridhan* property is, during coverture, subject to her husband's consent, and without such consent she cannot bequeath it by will when her husband survives her, unless he consents to the will.⁵ Control by husband.

The "Smriti Chandrika" ⁶ says "it must be concluded that women possess independent power only over *saudayika* and over their husband's donation, except immovables, and that their power is not independent over other sorts of property, although they may be *stridhana*."

"Acquisitions made by a woman by the practice of a mechanical art are subject to the control of the husband, who appears to be entitled to the fruits of the wife's bodily labour." ⁷ That is, she cannot alienate it

pp. 14, 15; 14 B. L. R. 226, at pp 231, 232; 22 W. R. C. R. 409, at p. 410; *Radha Prosad Mullick v. Ranimoni Dassi* (1908), 35 I. A. 118, at p. 129; 35 Calc. 896, at p. 902; 12 C. W. N. 729, at p. 737; 10 Bom. L. R. 604; *Mathura Das v. Bhikan Mal* (1896), 19 All. 16; *Annaji Dattatraya v. Chandrabai* (1892), 17 Bom. 503; *Nunnu Meah v. Krishna-sawmi* (1890), 14 Mad. 274; *Bhoba Tarini Debya v. Peary Lall Sanyal* (1897), 24 Calc. 646; 1 C. W. N. 578; *Seshaya v. Narasamma* (1899), 22 Mad. 357; *Lakshmi Bai v. Hirabai* (1886), 11 Bom. 69; S. C. on appeal, *Hirabai v. Lakshmi Bai* (1887), 11 Bom. 573; *Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao Bahadur (Rajah) v. Surenani Venkata Purushothama Jagannaddha Gopala Row Bahadur (Rajah)* (1908), 31 Mad. 321; cf. *Sambasiva Ayyar v. Visvam Ayyar* (1907), 30 Mad. 356; *Ganpat Rao v. Ram Chandar* (1888), 11 All. 296.

¹ *Harilal v. Rewa (Bai)* (1895), 21 Bom. 376, at pp. 380, 381.

² *Surajmani (Musammat) v. Rabi*

Nath Ojha (1907), 35 I. A. 17; 30 All. 84; 12 C. W. N. 231; 10 Bom. L. R. 59. See *Ramachandra Naiker v. Vijayaragavulu Naidu* (1908), 31 Mad. 349; *Amarendra Nath Bose v. Shuradhani Dasi* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 458.

³ Acts XXI. of 1870, s. 2, and I. of 1869, s. 19, applying Act X. of 1865 (Ind. Succession Act), s. 82; *Bhoba Tarini Debya v. Peary Lall Sanyal* (1897), 24 Calc. 646; 1 C. W. N. 578; *Saroda Sundari Dassi v. Kristo Jiban Pal* (1900), 5 C. W. N. 300. See *Caralapathi Chunna Cunniah v. Cota Nammahwarriah* (1909), 33 Mad. 91.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 441.

⁵ *Bhau v. Raghunath Krishna Gurav* (1905), 30 Bom. 229; 7 Bom. L. R. 936. See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 335.

⁶ Chap. ix. s. ii. para. 12.

⁷ G. C. Sarker's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 365. See "Viramitrodaya" (G. C. Sarker's translation), p. 222; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. ix. s. x. para. 7; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. i. paras. 19, 20.

without his consent, and he can use it.¹ Katyana says: "The wealth which is earned by mechanical arts, or which is received through affection from a stranger, is subject to her husband's dominion. The rest is pronounced to be woman's property."²

Although there is no provision as to what is to become of "what is earned by mechanical arts or what is received through affection through a stranger,"³ where the woman predeceases her husband, Sir G. D. Banerjee considers that Jagannatha's opinion⁴ should be followed, and that the property devolves upon the woman's *stridhan* heirs according to the "Mitakshara."⁵

Power of husband.

A husband can in times of pressing need,⁶ and then only,⁷ use his wife's *stridhana* of any kind without her consent.

His creditors have no such right.⁸ He is bound if he has means to reimburse her for the amount so expended.⁹

Rights of widow.

With the above exception of immovable property given to her by her husband, and which she has not a power to alienate,¹⁰ a widow has complete control over her *stridhan* property of every kind and whensoever acquired,¹¹ and can alienate it during her lifetime or by will.¹²

There is authority that in the case of immovable property given

¹ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 334.

² "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. i. para. 16; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. i. para. 19; "Daya-Tattwa," chap. ix. para. 1; "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. ii. s. ii. para. 25.

³ *Ante*, pp. 438, 439.

⁴ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 629.

⁵ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 458, 459.

⁶ See *Mohima Chunder Roy v. Durga Monee* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 184; *Tukaram v. Gunaji* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 129; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. 11, paras. 32, 33; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. i. paras. 19-25; "Vivada Chintamani" (Tagore's translation, pp. 264, 265; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. paras. 7-10; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. ii. para. 14; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 330-335.

⁷ *Sooda Ram Doss v. Joogul Ki-*

shore Goopto (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 274; *Mohima Chunder Roy v. Durga Monee* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 184.

⁸ *Radha (Mussumat) v. Bisheshur Dass* (1875), 6 N. W. P. 279; *Tukaram v. Gunaji* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 129; *Hammuckah v. Rungapah* (1808), Strange's "Hindu Law," ii. 23.

⁹ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 330-333.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 441.

¹¹ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 628; *Kullammal, Doedem v. Kuppu Pillai* (1862), 1 Mad. H. C. 85; *Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Janki Koer (Ramee)* (1877), 5 I. A. 1, at p. 15; 1 C. L. R. 318, at pp. 325, 326; *Venkata Rama Rau v. Venkata Suriya Rau* (1877), 1 Mad. 281, at p. 286.

¹² *Behary Lal Sandyal v. Juggo Mohun Gossain* (1878), 4 Calc. 1, at p. 6; 2 C. L. R. 422, at p. 425; *Nellai-kumaru Chetti v. Marakathammal* (1876), 1 Mad. 160.

absolutely by the husband without an express or implied power of alienation, the widow has no testamentary power, and that it passes to her *stridhan* heirs.¹ There is nothing expressly said as to this in the Hindu law.² It is submitted that if the property is given absolutely, she can deal with it by will.

¹ *Bhujanga Rau v. Ramayamma* (1884), 7 Mad. 387. The other authorities given in Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 541, 542, are

distinguishable.

² Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 338.

CHAPTER XIV.

INHERITANCE TO STRIDHAN PROPERTY.

INHERITANCE to property held absolutely by a woman is not governed by the rules which govern inheritance to the property of a male.

It is only by the death of the woman that the heir succeeds ; no one acquires by birth any interest in *stridhan* property.¹

As to the inheritance to property which has been inherited by a woman from a male, see *ante*, p. 367, and *post*, p. 464.

Principle.

The inheritance to a woman's property varies to some extent according to the source from which the property comes. It depends upon express texts, and is founded on nearness of kin, preference being in some cases given to female descendants.

The doctrine of spiritual benefit has no application to the succession to *stridhana* in the Mitakshara school ;² and even in the Bengal school that doctrine only applies to remote relations.³

When the form of the *stridhan* property has been changed by exchange, sale, or otherwise, succession to the proceeds will be the same as the succession to the original property.

Maiden's Property.

Maiden.

The schools do not differ as to the property of a maiden. It passes in the following order :—

1. Uterine brothers.
2. Mother.
3. Father.⁴

¹ "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 9.

² *Ganga Jati (Musammat) v. Ghaisia* (1875), 1 All. 46, at pp. 49, 50.

³ *Ibid.*; *Toolsee Dass Seal v. Luckhymoney Dassie (Sm)* (1900), 4 C. W. N. 743; *Nogendra Nandini*

Dassi v. Benoy Krishna Deb (1902), 30 Calo. 521, at p. 527; 7 C. W. N. 121, at p. 125.

⁴ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. iii. para. 7; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 30; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 35; "Vyavahara

4. Her nearest relations,¹ the *sapindas* of the father being preferred to the mother's relations.²

Thus a sister is preferred to a father's brother's son,³ and a father's mother's sister to a maternal grandmother,⁴ and a stepmother to a mother's sister.⁵ As to a paternal grandmother, see *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192; 1 Bom. L. R. 574.

Under the Mitakshara, and the Mayukha, a father's sister in Bombay is preferred to a remote *sapinda*.⁶

When a maiden dies after betrothal, the bridegroom is entitled to the Presents by presents given by him after deducting all expenses incurred by himself bridegroom. or by the parent or other guardian of the damsel.⁷ Failing the bridegroom, such presents are said to devolve upon her heirs,⁸ as above.

Devolution of Stridhan according to the "Mitakshara."

Under the "Mitakshara," the property of a married woman Married woman's property. devolves as follows:—

I. *Sulka*⁹ apparently goes first to the mother and then to Mitakshara. Sulka. the uterine brothers,¹⁰ but it is not quite settled whether the mother does not succeed the brothers.

On this subject there is a difference of opinion as to the proper translation of a text of Gautama. According to the "Mitakshara"¹¹ and the "Mayukha,"¹² it is translated: "The sister's fee belongs to the uterine

Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 34; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 270; *Narasayya v. Venkayya*, 2 Mad. L. J. 149, referred to in *Venkatarama Krishna Rau v. Bhujanga Rau* (1895), 19 Mad. 107, at p. 109.

¹ See *Dwarka Nath Roy v. Sarat Chandra Singh Roy* (1914), 39 Cal. 319; 15 C. W. N. 1036.

² *Kamala v. Bhagirathi* (1912), 38 Mad. 45.

³ *Dwarka Nath Roy v. Sarat Chandra Singh Roy* (1911), 39 Cal. 319; 15 C. W. N. 1036.

⁴ *Janghubai v. Jetha Appaji Marwadi* (1908), 32 Bom. 409; 10 Bom. L. R. 522; *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192, at p. 212; 1 Bom. L. R. 574; "Viramitrodaya" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), p. 241. See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 443.

⁵ *Kamala v. Bhagirathi* (1912), 38 Mad. 45.

⁶ *Tukaram v. Narayan* (1911), 36 Bom. 339; 14 Bom. L. R. 89.

⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. paras. 34, 35; "Daya-Krama-Sangraha," chap. ii. s. i. para 2; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 34; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 33; Colebrooke's "Digest," iii. p. 624; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 38.

⁸ "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 733.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 436, 437.

¹⁰ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 14, Colebrooke's note.

¹¹ Chap. ii. s. xi. para. 14.

¹² Chap. iv. s. x. para. 32. Sastri G. C. Sarkar ("Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 413) says: "The reason is that it originally belonged to the parents; but later on it was declared to be the bride's *stridhan*; and this rule of succession appears to be a compromise between the original and the later views."

brothers ; after (the death of) the mother." According to the "Viramitrodaya,"¹ the "Smriti Chandrika,"² the "Daya-Bhaga,"³ and the "Chintamani,"⁴ it reads : "The sister's fee belongs to the uterine brothers ; after (them) it goes to the mother." As to this, Sir G. D. Banerjee⁵ says : "Even in the 'Mitakshara' it would appear from the context that it is understood in the same sense, for the uterine brothers are mentioned as the first among the heirs." Sastri G. C. Sarkar⁶ and Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya⁷ also take the view that the brothers succeed first even according to the "Mitakshara" ; see also Cunningham's "Hindu Law," p. 119.

The texts are silent as to the devolution of this kind of *stridhan* on failure of mother and brothers. It would apparently go to the persons who succeed to other kinds of *stridhan*.

Other *stridhan* property. II. Other *stridhan* property⁸ devolves, if she has children, as follows :—

Daughter.

1. Unmarried daughter.⁹

2. Married daughter who is "unprovided for,"¹⁰ i.e. who is either indigent or childless.¹¹

3. Married daughter who is "provided for" whether she has a son or not.¹²

As regards the relative claims of childless, well-to-do daughters and indigent daughters, Sir G. D. Banerjee¹³ says thus : "I think Vijnanesvara's meaning is that the rich daughters, whether they have children or not, should all be excluded by the indigent daughters, whether they are childless or have children. And I presume that the childless daughters would be preferred to those having issue only when the competitors are not poor, and their means and circumstances are equal. In the case of daughters who are poor in different degrees, no hard and fast rule can be laid down ; but a Court of Justice should look to the circumstances of each case, and order distribution accordingly."

¹ G. C. Sarkar's translation, p. 242.

² Chap. ix. s. iii. paras. 32, 33.

³ Chap. iv. s. iii. paras. 27, 28.

⁴ P. C. Tagore's translation, p. 270.

⁵ "Hindu Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 381.

⁶ "Vyavastha Chandrika," vol. ii. pp. 523, 550.

⁷ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., p. 578.

⁸ *Salemma v. Lutchmana Reddi* (1897), 21 Mad. 100. As to inherited property in the Bombay Presidency, see *post*, p. 467.

⁹ Whether then betrothed or not, Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 357.

¹⁰ The expression is irrespective of the sources of provision, *Danno v. Darbo* (1882), 4 All. 243.

¹¹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 13 ; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. paras. 20-23 (referring to *yautaka stridhan*), *post*, p. 452.

¹² *Binode Koomaree Dabee v. Purdhan Gopal Sahee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 175, at p. 177 ; *Muthappudayan v. Ammani Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 58. "It is explained by Apararka and the author of the Kalpataru that 'unprovided' means childless, indigent, neglected (by the husband), or widowed. Vijnanesvara and others attach to the term the first two of the above meanings." "Viramitrodaya" (G. C. Sarkar's translation), p. 231.

¹³ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., at p. 357.

It has been held that comparative poverty is the only criterion settling the claims of daughters *inter se*.¹ In one case² the Bombay High Court directed an issue as to whether the peculiar circumstances of the daughters—one being a widow, and the other married—were so far different as to give the widow a prior right of inheritance over the daughter whose husband was alive, on the ground that she was an "unprovided" daughter.

Sir G. D. Banerjee³ says that "barren and childless widowed daughters are actually preferred to those who have or are likely to have male issue, when the means and circumstances of the competitors are equal."

The rule as to the preference of unendowed before endowed daughters cannot be extended to other female relations such as sisters in Bombay.⁴

It has been held in Madras that, where several daughters inherit *stridhan* property, on the death of one her interest passes to the survivors⁵ as heirs of their mother. This is disputed by Sir G. D. Banerjee,⁶ who points out that sons inheriting their mother's *stridhana* take as tenants in common without any right of survivorship.⁷

A prostitute daughter would apparently come after all other daughters.⁸

4. Daughter's daughter.⁹

They take *per stirpes*.¹⁰

5. Daughter's son.¹¹

6. Son.¹²

Right of survivors.

Daughter's daughter.

Daughter's son.
Son.

¹ *Poli v. Narotum Bapu* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 183; *Audh Kumari v. Chandra Dai* (1879), 2 All. 561.

² *Bakubai v. Manchhabai* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 5, followed in *Poli v. Narotum Bapu* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 183.

³ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 358, 359.

⁴ *Bhagirathbai v. Baya* (1881), 5 Bom. 264.

⁵ *Sengamalathammal v. Valaynda Mudali* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 312, at p. 317.

⁶ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 362, 363.

⁷ *Karuppai Nuchiar v. Sankaranaryanan Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300; *Parson (Bai) v. Somli (Bai)* (1912), 36 Bom. 424; 14 Bom. L. R. 400, *see ante*, p. 254.

⁸ *See Tara v. Krishna* (1907), 31 Bom. 495; 9 Bom. L. R. 774, *post*, p. 463, and *ante*, p. 388.

⁹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 15; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 21; "Manu," chap. ix. para. 193; *Subramanian Chetti v.*

Arunachalam Chetti (1904), 28 Mad. 1.

¹⁰ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 16, *ante*, p. 367; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," p. 121.

¹¹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 18; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 20. Sir G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 364, 365, considers that this does not include the adopted son of a daughter.

¹² *Karuppai Nuchiar v. Sankaranaryanan Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 19. The difference between the Benares and the Bengal school (*post*, p. 457) in the rights of sons arises from different constructions of "Manu," chap. ix. para. 192. *See* Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 366, 367. As to the rights of an adopted son, *see ante*, p. 181. The share of an adopted son in case of the birth of a legitimate son after the adoption, is apparently the same as in the case of inheritance to males (*ante*, pp. 187, 188; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 364, 365).

As to stepsons, see *post*, p. 454. "Sons" exclude son's sons, whose father is dead.

It has been held that there is no benefit of survivorship between co-heirs inheriting *stridhan* property, and that sons take as tenants in common, not as joint tenants, even if they be members of a joint Mitakshara family;¹ but it is submitted that where the sons, or other male co-heirs, hold the property jointly and are members of a Mitakshara joint family, there is a right of survivorship.²

Son's son. 7. Son's son.³

Grandsons by different sons inherit *per stirpes* and not *per capita*.⁴

There is authority that the adopted son of a natural son in competition with another natural son takes only the share which his father would have had had he been an adopted son.⁵

Succession to childless woman.

The succession to a childless woman depends upon the form of the woman's marriage.

If married in *Brahma* form.

If she has been married in the *Brahma* form,⁶ and the marriage will be presumed as being in that form⁷ (even in the case of Sudras if the parties belong to a respectable family),⁸ the property goes to her husband,⁹ and after him to his nearest *sapindas*, in order¹⁰ of their rights of succession to him.

¹ *Karupai Nachiar v. Sankaranarayanan Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 300; *Parson (Bai) v. Somli (Bai)* (1912), 36 Bom. 424; 14 Bom. L. R. 400.

² See *Venkayamma Garu (Raja Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156, at p. 165; 25 Mad. 678, at p. 687; 7 C. W. N. 1, at p. 8; 4 Bom. L. R. 657; *Katama Natchiar v. Shivagunga (Rajah of)* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543, at p. 615; 2 W. R. P. C. 31, at pp. 39, 40; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. iv. para. 2; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 603; *ante*, pp. 238, 239.

³ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 24.

⁴ "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 25; "Vyavastha Chandrika," vol. ii. pp. 535, 552. See *ante*, p. 367.

⁵ *Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss* (1878), 4 Calc. 425; 3 C. L. R. 524; "Dattaka Chandrika" (Bharat Chandra Siromani's edition), p. 30, referred to in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 373, note 6. See *Nagindas Bhugvandas v. Bachoo Hurkisondas* (1915), 43 I. A. 56; 40 Bom. 270; 18 Bom. L. R. 172.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 54.

⁷ *Jagannath Prosad Gupta v. Runjit Singh* (1897), 25 Calc. 354; *Authikesavulu Chetty v. Ramanujam Chetty* (1909), 32 Mad. 512. In *Moosa Haji Joonas v. Abdul Rahim Haji* (1905), 30 Bom. 197, at p. 203; 7 Bom. L. R. 147, Jenkins, C.J., said: "The legal consequences of the classes of marriage, the approved and the disapproved vary according as their leading characteristics are blameworthy or not, and suggest the inference that it is the quality and not the form of the marriage that decides the course of devolution." In that case a marriage by Cutchi Memons was treated as being in the approved form, and the same reasoning would apply to marriages by Brahmos and other Hindus, who do not marry according to strict Hindu forms.

⁸ *Jagannath Raghumath v. Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 553; 12 Bom. L. R. 545.

⁹ See *Bharu v. Raghumath* (1905), 30 Bom. 229; 7 Bom. L. R. 936. He takes before a stepson; *Bhima-charya v. Ramacharya* (1909), 33 Bom. 452; 11 Bom. L. R., p. 654.

¹⁰ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 11; *Jagannath Prosad Gupta*

The order of succession after the husband is to some extent the subject of dispute.¹ Sir G. D. Banerjee² accepts Kamalakara's interpretation of the "Mitakshara," according to which "the successive heirs after the husband would be the stepson,³ the step grandson,⁴ the rival wife,⁵ the step daughter,⁶ her son, the husband's mother, his father, his brothers,⁷ their sons,⁸ and the husband's other *gotraja sapindas* and *bandhus* in the order in which they inherit his property."

The husband's sister's sons are preferred to the husband's paternal great grandfather's great grandsons,⁹ and to the woman's own sister's sons.¹⁰

The husband's brother's daughter's son comes before the sister's daughter's son.¹¹

A remote *sapinda* of the husband was held entitled to succeed in *Cham-pat v. Shiba* (1886), 8 All. 393.

According to the "Mitakshara," the property would then go to the woman's blood relations,¹² but there is a question whether the *samandakas* of the husband do not come before such relations.¹³

If she has been married in the *Asura* form¹⁴ (or apparently if married in any local or special form¹⁵) the *stridhan* of a childless married woman goes to her mother, then to her father, and then to her father's next of kin,¹⁶ and failing them to the mother's next of kin.¹⁷

If married in *Asura* form.

v. *Runjit Singh* (1897), 25 Calc. 354; *Cham-pat v. Shiba* (1886), 8 All. 393; *Kanakammal v. Ananthamathi Ammal* (1912), 37 Mad. 293.

¹ G. D. Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 375-377.

² *Ibid.*, p. 379.

³ Natural and adopted stepsons take equally: *Gungadhur Bogla (Kumar) v. Hira Lal Bogla (Kumar)* (1916), 43 Calc. 944; 20 C. W. N. 489. In *Brahmappa v. Papanna* (1889), 13 Mad. 138, the stepson was preferred to the sister's son; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 38. See, however, Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 930.

⁴ *Gajabai v. Shakhajirao Maloji Raje Bhosle (Shrimant)* (1892), 17 Bom. 114.

⁵ *Keserbai (Bai) v. Hunsraj Morari* (1906), 33 I. A. 176; 30 Bom. 431; 10 C. W. N. 802; 8 Bom. L. R. 446, in preference to husband's brother or his son; *Krishnai v. Shripati* (1905), 30 Bom. 333; 8 Bom. L. R. 12, in preference to grandsons of husband's father's brother.

⁶ *Nanja Pillai v. Sivabagayathachi* (1911), 36 Mad. 116. Sir G. D. Baner-

jee ("Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 406) considers that stepdaughters come before stepsons.

⁷ Full brothers being preferred to half-brothers, *Parmappa v. Shiddappa* (1906), 30 Bom. 607.

⁸ *Bachha Jha v. Jugmon Jha* (1885), 12 Calc. 348 (a Mithila case).

⁹ *Mohun Pershad Narain Singh v. Kishen Kishore Narain Singh* (1893), 21 Calc. 344 (a Mithila case).

¹⁰ *Ganeshi Lal v. Ajudhia Prasad* (1906), 28 All. 345.

¹¹ *Venkatasubramaniam Chetti v. Thayarammah* (1898), 21 Mad. 263.

¹² Chap. ii. s. xi. para. 11; *Kanakammal v. Ananthamathi Ammal* (1912), 37 Mad. 293.

¹³ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 393-396.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 55.

¹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 57, 58.

¹⁶ *Dwarka Nath Roy v. Sarat Chandra Singh Roy* (1911), 39 Calc. 119; 15 C. W. N. 1036.

¹⁷ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 11. See *Vijjarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244.

The sister is preferred to the sister's son ¹ in Madras, and the father's sister is preferred to the mother's brother.²

Devolution of Stridhan according to the "Vyavahara Mayukha."

Mayukha." According to the "Mayukha," the *stridhan* property of a married woman devolves as follows:—

Sulka. I. *Sulka* devolves in the same way as according to the "Mitakshara."³

Gifts by relations after marriage, and gifts by husband. II. *Anwadeyika stridhana* ⁴ (gifts subsequent to marriage) and *priti-datta* (gifts by the husband on account of affection) go to sons ⁵ and unmarried daughters in equal shares. Failing unmarried daughters the property goes to sons and married daughters in equal shares.⁶

Failing sons and daughters, daughter's children, and failing them, son's sons apparently become heirs.⁷

Compensation given by the husband to the wife on his taking another wife ⁸ would also apparently follow the same rule—at any rate, sons would not be preferred to daughters.⁹

Yautaka stridhan. III. *Yautaka stridhana* ¹⁰ goes to the maiden daughters alone in the first instance.¹¹

The further succession of this kind of property would apparently be as according to the "Mitakshara," ¹² but it is said ¹³ that in respect of property given by the kindred at an *asura* marriage, "That which has been given to her by her kindred goes on failure of kindred to her son."

Other property. IV. Property acquired in other ways goes to the sons,

¹ *Raju Gramany v. Ammani Ammal* (1906), 29 Mad. 358.

² *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 261.

³ *Ante*, pp. 447, 448; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 32.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 437. See *Sitabai v. Wasantrao* (1901), 3 Bom. L. R. 201.

⁵ Who are born to her by her husband, *Jagannath Raghunath v. Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 553; 12 Bom. L. R. 545.

⁶ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. paras. 13, 15; *Dayaldas Laldas v. Savaribai* (1909), 34 Bom. 385;

12 Bom. L. R. 386; *Sitabai v. Wasantrao* (1901), 3 Bom. L. R. 201; *Ashabai v. Tyeb Haji Rahimtualla (Haji)* (1882), 9 Bom. 115.

⁷ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 20. See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 387.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 437.

⁹ See "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 24.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 435.

¹¹ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 17.

¹² *Ante*, pp. 450, 451.

¹³ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 31.

grandsons, and great grandsons, even if there be daughters.¹ After them come daughters and their issue.

In those parts of the Bombay Presidency where the "Mayukha" is paramount, namely, in Gujarat, in the Northern Konkan, and in the island of Bombay, such inherited property as a woman takes absolutely² passes in the same way.³

In those parts of the Bombay Presidency where the "Mitakshara" is paramount, namely, in the Mahratta country and in the Southern Konkan and Northern Kanara, the property descends to the daughters to the exclusion of her sons.⁴

"It seems quite reasonable to lay down that as regards that class of property which is emphatically woman's property, being expressly so named by the old sages, the female offspring shall take precedence over the male; while as regards that which is not such, the general preference given to the male offspring over female by Hindu law should have effect. On the other hand, there is no obvious reason why in the case of collateral relations any similar distinction should be maintained between the two classes."⁵

In the case of *stridhan* of all kinds⁶ the succession to a childless woman depends upon the form of the woman's marriage.

If she has been married in the *Brahma* form,⁷ and there be no issue of the marriage,⁸ the property goes to her husband; and failing him, to his *sapindas* in the order in which they inherit to him.⁹

¹ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 26; *Manilal Rewadat v. Rewa (Bai)* (1892), 17 Bom. 759; *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at pp. 260, 261.

² *Post*, p. 467.

³ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 26; *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 261; *Bhagirthibai v. Kahnunijirav* (1886), 11 Bom. 285, at pp. 303, 310; *Gandhi Maganlal Motichand v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192; 1 Bom. L. R. 574; *Gulappa Domingappa Kusugal v. Tayauva* (1907), 31 Bom. 453; 9 Bom. L. R. 834.

⁴ *Jankibai v. Sundra* (1890), 14 Bom. 612; *Gulappa Domingappa Kusugal v. Tayauva* (1907), 31 Bom. 453. See *ante*, pp. 448, 449, as to inheritance according to the Mitakshara.

⁵ *Manilal Rewadat v. Rewa (Bai)* (1892), 17 Bom. 758, at pp. 769, 770.

⁶ *Ibid.*, at p. 769. See *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at p. 260.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 54. As to Cutchi Memmons, see *Moosa Haji Joonas Noorani v. Abdul Rahim (Haji)* (1905), 30 Bom. 197; 7 Bom. L. R. 447.

⁸ *Jagannath Raghunath v. Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 553; 12 Bom. L. R. 545.

⁹ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. paras. 28, 30; *Kesserbai (Bai) v. Hunsraj Morarji* (1906), 33 I. A. 176, at p. 197; 30 Bom. 431, at pp. 451, 452; 10 C. W. N. 802, at pp. 813, 814; 8 Bom. L. R. 446; *Bachha Jha v. Jugmon Jha* (1885), 12 Calc. 348, at p. 355. This will include the wives of *gotraja sapindas* (*ante*, pp. 412, 413), see *Narmada (Bai) v. Bhagwantrai* (1888), 12 Bom. 505.

Succession to childless woman

If married in Brahma form.

The above has been deduced from the view expressed in *Manilal Revadat v. Rewa (Bai)*¹ that, except so far as the succession of children is concerned, there is, according to the "Mayukha," no difference between the succession to the different kinds of *stridhan* property. Earlier cases had held that in the case of inherited property the property devolved (independently of the form of marriage) as if the deceased woman were a male² and the only son of her father. This would coincide with the succession in the case of the marriage being in the *Asura* form.³

The husband's son is preferred to the co-widow and to the husband's nephew.⁴ The husband's brother comes before the husband's brother's son.⁵

A co-widow comes before the husband's brother or brother's son,⁶ and a daughter-in-law before the daughter of a deceased daughter.⁷

The son of a stepdaughter is an heir of the widow.⁸

As the "Mitakshara" and the "Mayukha" include in the expression "*sapinda*" any relation within the seventh degree from descent from a common ancestor,⁹ kinsmen up to that degree will succeed.¹⁰ There is authority that a daughter's grandson and a husband's sister are heirs.¹¹

It is unsettled whether *samanodokas*¹² succeed, but Sir G. D. Banerjee¹³ inclines to the opinion that they will so succeed.

Where there is a failure of the husband's relations, Messrs. West and Bühler¹⁴ consider that her own relations succeed, whether before or after her husband's *samanodokas* it is not clear. Sir G. D. Banerjee inclines to the same opinion.¹⁵

A father's sister is preferred to a mother's brother,¹⁶ and a father's sister's son to a father's sister's son's son.¹⁷

If married in
Asura form.

If the woman was married in the *Asura* (or apparently in any local or special) form of marriage, the property goes to

¹ (1892), 17 Bom. 758, at pp. 761, 765.

² *Narmada (Bai) v. Bhagwantrao* (1888), 12 Bom. 505; *Dalpat Narotam v. Bhagvan Khushal* (1885), 9 Bom. 301, at p. 304; *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at pp. 260, 261. See also Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 864.

³ Below.

⁴ *Gojabai v. Shahajirao Maloji Raje Bhosle (Shrimanti)* (1892), 17 Bom. 114.

⁵ *Huneraji v. Monghibai (Bai)* (1905), 7 Bom. L. R. 622.

⁶ *Kesserbai (Bai) v. Hunsraj Morari* (1906), 33 L. A. 176; 30 Bom. 431; 10 C. W. N. 802; 8 Bom. L. R. 446.

⁷ *Narmada (Bai) v. Bhagwantrao* (1888), 12 Bom. 505.

⁸ *Motiram, Sucram v. Mayaram*

Barkatram, Bom. P. J. for 1880, p. 119.

⁹ "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. v. para. 6; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. paras. 18, 19. See *ante*, p. 379.

¹⁰ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 393.

¹¹ West and Bühler, 2nd ed., pp. 242, 243.

¹² *Ante*, pp. 379, 380.

¹³ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 393, 394.

¹⁴ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 244 *et seq.*

¹⁵ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 395, 396.

¹⁶ *Vijiarangam v. Lakshuman* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 244, at pp. 260, 261.

¹⁷ *Dalpat Narotam v. Bhagvan Khushal* (1885), 9 Bom. 301.

her mother, then to her father;¹ and failing them, to her father's *sapindas* in order of their succession to him.

Derolution of Stridhan according to the "Smriti Chandrika."

According to the 'Smriti Chandrika,' which is of considerable authority in Southern India,² the *stridhan* property of a married woman devolves as follows:—

I. The *sulka* goes to the uterine brothers in preference to *Sulka*; the mother.³

If the woman has issue.

II. The *Anwadeya* (or *Anwadeyika*) *stridhana*⁴ and the *pritudatta stridhana*⁵ devolve, as in the case of the "Mayukha,"⁶ except that widowed daughters are excluded from inheriting this kind of *stridhan*,⁷ and that widows of *gotraja sapindas* have none of the rights which they have under the Bombay system.⁸

III. *Yautaka*.⁹

This goes first to the maiden daughter and subsequently as under the "Mitakshara."¹⁰

IV. Other kinds of *stridhan*.

The daughters who are unmarried and those who are "unprovided for"¹¹ first succeed,¹² the subsequent succession being as under the "Mitakshara."¹³

Under the Madras system the widows of *gotraja sapindas* do not take,

¹ "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. x. para. 28; "Mitakshara," chap. ii. s. xi. para. 11; *Kesserbai (Bai) v. Hunsraj Morarji* (1906), 33 I. A. 176, at p. 197; 30 Bom. 431, at pp. 451, 452; 10 C. W. N. 802, at pp. 813, 814; 8 Bom. L. R. 446.

² It does not supersede the "Mitakshara," *Raju Gramany v. Ammani Ammal* (1906), 29 Mad. 358; *ante*, p. 17.

³ "Smriti Chandrika," chap. iv. s. iii. para. 33; cf. *ante*, pp. 447, 448, 452, and *post*, pp. 456, 460.

⁴ Gifts subsequent to marriage, see *ante*, p. 437.

⁵ Gifts by husband on account of affection, *ante*, p. 438.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 452; "Smriti Chan-

drika," chap. ix. s. iii. paras. 1-11; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 402, 403.

⁷ "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 9.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 412, 413, 454; *Thayammal v. Annamalai Mudali* (1895), 19 Mad. 35; *Bandam Settah v. Bandam Maha Lakshmy* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 180.

⁹ Gifts at the time of marriage.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 448-450.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 448, 449.

¹² "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. para. 17.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 448-450; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. ix. s. iii. paras. 20-24, 29-32.

therefore neither the brother's widow¹ nor the daughter-in-law² takes as heir.

"On the subject of succession to *stridhana*, the Madhaviya commentary³ generally follows the "Mitakshara," differing from it only in the enumeration of the heirs after the husband and the parents."⁴

Derolution of Stridhan according to the Mithila School.

Mithila school. According to the Mithila school the succession to a married woman is as follows :—

Sulka. I. *Sulka* goes first to the uterine brothers, then to the mother, and then to the father.⁵

II. Nuptial gifts (*parinayya*), which are described as "furniture, such as a mirror, combs, and so forth," are shared by the daughters; and failing them, by the sons.⁶

This apparently applies to all *yautaka stridhan*—at any rate, in the case of the woman being married in the *Brahma* form.⁷

Other stridhan.

III. Other kinds of *stridhan* property are shared by the sons and unmarried daughters equally.⁸

Daughters who are "unprovided for"⁹ apparently take as if they were unmarried.¹⁰ Failing daughters, sons apparently succeed.¹¹ According to the "Ratnakara,"¹² daughter's daughters and daughter's sons come before sons.

Childless woman.

The succession to a childless woman is as in accordance with the "Mitakshara."¹³

¹ *Thayammal v. Annamalai Mudali* (1895), 19 Mad. 35; *Kanakammal v. Ananthamathi Ammal* (1912), 37 Mad. 293.

² *Bandam Settah v. Bandam Maha Lakshmy* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 180.

³ *Ante*, p. 17.

⁴ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 398.

⁵ "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 270.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 268, 269.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 448, 449.

¹⁰ See "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 267.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

¹² Table of succession in Tagore's translation of "Vivada Chintamani," p. xevi.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 450, 451; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 269. See *Bachha Jha v. Jugmon Jha* (1885), 12 Calc. 348. The construction of Brihaspati's text by the Judicial Committee in *Kesserbai (Bai) v. Hunsraj Morarji* (1906), 33 I. A. 176, at p. 197; 30 Bom. 431, at pp. 451, 452; 10 C. W. N. 802, at pp. 813, 814; 8 Bom. L. R. 446, will apply to Mithila cases. This view does not agree with the views expressed in *Mohun Pershad Narain Singh v. Kishen Kishore Narain Singh* (1893), 21 Calc. 344.

According to the "Madana Parijata,"¹ a co-wife's daughter or daughter's son is an heir.

According to the Mithila school, the sons of half sisters succeed.²

A son adopted by a woman according to the *Kritrima* form inherits her *Kritrima* adoption.
stridhan property.³

Devolution of Stridhan according to the Bengal School.

The property (except the *sulka*)⁴ of a married woman Bengal school.
having children devolves as follows :—

I. *Yautaka stridhan*.⁵

Yautaka.

1. Unbetrothed daughters.
2. Betrothed daughters.⁶
3. Married daughters having, or likely to have, male issue.⁷
4. Barren and childless widowed daughters.⁸
- 5 Sons.⁹
6. Daughter's sons.¹⁰

The son of a daughter's son¹¹ and a daughter's daughter¹² do not succeed to *stridhan* property according to the Bengal school.

7. Son's son.
8. Son's grandson in the male line.¹³
9. Stepson.¹⁴
10. Son's son of a co-wife.

¹ Table of Succession in P. C. Tagore's translation of "Vivada Chintamani," p. xcvi.

² *Sreenarain Rai v. Bhya Jha* (1812), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 23, at pp. 27, 28; (2nd ed., 29, at p. 35).

³ See *ante*, pp. 201, 202.

⁴ *Post*, p. 460.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 435.

⁶ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. para. 23; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 5.

⁷ This includes a widow having a dumb son who is incompetent to inherit (*ante*, pp. 370, 371), *Charu Chunder Pal v. Nobo Sunder Dasi* (1891), 18 Cal. 327.

⁸ Note to "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. para. 23 (Colebrooke's translation); "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iii. paras. 5, 7. See Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. pp. 597, 602, 603.

⁹ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. paras. 13, 17-20. This includes adopted sons, see *ante*, p. 181.

¹⁰ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 9.

¹¹ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. para. 34; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 2.

¹² Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 429; *Srinath Gangopadhyaya v. Sarbamangula Debi* (1868), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 144; 10 W. R. C. R. 488; *Madhumala Dassi (Srimati) v. Lakshan Chandra Pat* (1913), 20 C. W. N. 627. As to the "Mitakshara," see *ante*, p. 449.

¹³ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. paras. 17-21; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 10.

¹⁴ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. iii. para. 32; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 11.

Given by
father.

11. Son's son's son of a co-wife.¹
- II. Property given to a woman by her father at any time other than at the time of the marriage (*Pitridatta ayautaka stridhana*).²
 1. The unmarried daughter.³
 2. Son.⁴
 3. The daughter having or likely to have a son.
 4. Daughter's son.
 5. Son's son.⁵
 6. Son's son's son.
 7. Son of co-wife.
 8. Co-wife's son's son.
 9. Co-wife's son's son's son.
 10. Barren daughter, and sonless widowed daughter.⁶

According to Dr. Jogendranath Bhattacharya,⁷ "all the general rules relating to *Yautaka* and *Ayautaka* property apply also to the *Pitridatta*, excepting only so far as they are modified by the special rule that the unmarried daughter alone inherits the *Pitridatta* in the first instance." According to Sir G. D. Banerjee,⁸ "the order given in the 'Daya-Krama Sangraha' is the same as that for the *Yautaka*; and it seems to be in accordance with the opinions of Jimutavahana and of Raghunandana."

III. Other *stridhan* property.⁹

1. The son and maiden (unbetrothed)¹⁰ daughter.¹¹

¹ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 13; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 714.

² "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. para. 16; explained in *Prosanno Kumar Bose v. Sarat Shoshi Ghosh* (1908), 36 Calc. 86; 12 C. W. N. 924.

³ This has been held not to include a betrothed daughter, *Srinath Gangopadhyaya v. Sarbamangala Devi* (1868), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 144; 10 W. R. C. R. 488.

⁴ *Prosanno Kumar Bose v. Sarat Shoshi Ghosh* (1908), 36 Calc. 86; 12 C. W. N. 924.

⁵ This is according to Colebrooke's translation. According to Siromani's translation, a son's son comes before a daughter's son; Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 426, 427.

⁶ Srikrishna in the "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. v. p. 3, places these daughters before sons, but this order is not in accordance with the same author's commentary on the

"Daya-Bhaga" (end of chap. iv.); see *Prosanno Kumar Bose v. Sarat Shoshi Ghosh* (1908), 36 Calc. 86, at p. 105; 12 C. W. N. 924, at p. 936; *Ram Gopal Bhattacharjee v. Narain Chandra Bandopadhyaya* (1905), 33 Calc. 315, at p. 325; 10 C. W. N. 510, at p. 516.

⁷ "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., pp. 594-596.

⁸ "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 426.

⁹ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. paras. 1-12; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iv. paras. 1-10.

¹⁰ *Srinath Gangopadhyaya v. Sarbamangala Devi* (1868), 2 B. L. R. A. C. 144; 10 W. R. C. R. 488. See, however, Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 590.

¹¹ *Basanta Kumari Devi v. Kamikshya Kumari Devi* (1905), 32 I. A. 181; 33 Calc. 23; 10 C. W. N. 1; 7 Bom. L. R. 904.

2. The married daughter having, or who may have, male issue.¹

3. Son's son.²

4. Daughter's son.³

5. Son's son's son.

6. The son of a rival wife.⁴

7. Her son's son.

8. Her son's son's son.

9. A barren daughter or sonless widowed daughter.⁵

According to the "Daya-Bhaga,"⁶ the barren and widowed daughters come after the daughter's son. Raghunandana⁷ and Srikrishna⁸ place the son's grandson after the daughter's son, and Srikrishna also interposes the son, grandson, and great grandson (in the male line) of a rival wife between the son's grandson and the barren and widowed daughter. Srikrishna's views are said to be usually accepted in this matter.⁹

Where a woman has left no children, or stepsons or their male issue, the next group of heirs consist of her parents, her brothers, and her husband.

Succession to childless woman.

I. Property given to her by her parents during maidenhood, and gifts from her husband's family¹⁰ and from her own family subsequent to marriage (*anwadaya*),¹¹ devolve on—

Gifts during maidenhood and subsequent to marriage.

1. Whole¹² brother.

¹ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. para. 9.

² "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. ii. para. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, para. 10.

⁴ *Gosaien Chund Kobraj v. Kishen-munnee* (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 77 (new edition, 90). Sastri G. C. Sarkar ("Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 415) puts him after a son's son, and before a daughter's son.

⁵ "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 733.

⁶ Chap. iv. s. ii. para. 12; G. C. Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 415.

⁷ G. C. Sarkar's translation of the "Daya-Tattva," p. 53.

⁸ Srikrishna's Commentary on the "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. iii.; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iv. para. 9.

⁹ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 419, 420; S. C. Sircar's

"Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 718; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 39.

¹⁰ *Hurymohun Shaha v. Shonatum Shaha* (1876), 1 Calc. 275; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. iii. paras. 10, 29.

¹¹ *Judoo Nath Sircar v. Bussunt Coomar Roy Chowdry* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 286; 19 W. R. C. R. 264; S. C. (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 105 (gift by father before marriage); *Gopal Chandra Pal v. Ram Chandra Pramanik* (1901), 28 Calc. 311 (gift by father after marriage); *Ram Gopal Bhattacharjee v. Narain Chandra Bandopadhyaya* (1905), 33 Calc. 315; 10 C. W. N. 510 (Do.); *Mahendra Nath Maity v. Giru Chandra Maity* (1915), 19 C. W. N. 1287 (gift by brother after marriage); "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. iii. paras. 10, 29.

¹² *Debiprasanna Roy Chowdhry v. Harendra Nath Ghose* (1910), 37 Calc. 863; 15 C. W. N. 383.

2. Mother.
3. Father.
4. Husband.

Sulka devolves in the same way, whether the woman has left children or not.¹

II. Other *stridhan* property devolves as follows :—

(a) If she has been married in the *Brahma* form on—

1. Husband.²
2. Brother.
3. Mother.
4. Father.³

(b) Where the marriage is in the *Asura*, or apparently in a local or special form, the order is—

1. Mother.
2. Father.
3. Brother.
4. Husband.⁴

After the above heirs, according to the text-books, *stridhan* property of all kinds, and whatever be the form of marriage,⁵ then devolves, according to the interpretation of Brihaspati's text, accepted by the "*Daya-Bhaga*,"⁶ on the sister's son,⁷ husband's sister's son, husband's brother's son, brother's son, son-in-law, and husband's younger brother in the following order⁸ :—

¹ "*Daya-Bhaga*," chap. iv. s. iii. paras. 27, 28.

² *Bistoo Pershad Burral v. Radha Soonder Nath* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 115; S. C. *ibid.* 304; "*Daya-Bhaga*," chap. iv. s. iii. paras. 2, 4.

³ "*Daya-Krama Sangraha*," chap. ii. s. iii. paras. 16, 17; Srikrishna's Commentary on the "*Daya-Bhaga*"; Macnaghten's "*Hindu Law*," vol. 1. pp. 39, 50; "*Vyavastha Darpana*," 2nd ed., pp. 719, 720. The "*Daya-Tattwa*" places the mother before the brother (chap. x. para. 26).

⁴ "*Daya-Krama Sangraha*," chap. ii. s. iii. paras. 19-22; Srikrishna's Commentary on the "*Daya-Bhaga*," chap. iv.

⁵ "*Vyavastha Darpana*," 2nd ed., pp. 719, 720.

⁶ Chap. iv. s. iii. para. 31. As to

the interpretation of that text, see *Kesserbai (Bai) v. Humsraj Morarji* (1906), 33 I. A. 176, at p. 197; 30 Bom. 431, at pp. 451, 452; 10 C. W. N. 802, at pp. 813, 814; 8 Bom. L. R. 446.

⁷ This includes stepsister's son, *Dasharathi Kundu v. Bipin Behari Kundu* (1904), 32 Calc. 261; 9 C. W. N. 119; *Shashi Bhushan Lahiri v. Rajendra Nath Joardar* (1912), 40 Calc. 82; 16 C. W. N. 1094.

⁸ "*Daya-Bhaga*," chap. iv. s. iii. paras. 37, 38; "*Daya-Tattwa*," chap. x. paras. 27-36; "*Daya-Krama Sangraha*," chap. ii. s. vi. paras. 1-9; Banerjee's "*Law of Marriage*," 3rd ed., pp. 437-439; *Bachha Jha v. Jugmon Jha* (1885), 12 Calc. 348, at p. 353.

Other
property.

Subsequent
succession to
all property.

1. Husband's younger brother.¹
2. Son of husband's elder or younger brother.
3. Sister's son.
4. Husband's sister's son.
5. Brother's son.¹
6. Daughter's husband.

It has been held that the son of a co-wife is to be preferred to the daughter's son of the paternal grandfather.²

The "Daya-Bhaga,"³ distinctly repudiates the preference of any other persons, and after the above-named the Bengal school places the following :—

7. Father-in-law.
8. Husband's elder brother.⁴
9. Her father-in-law's great grandson in the male line.
10. The paternal grandfather of her husband or his issue.
11. The paternal great grandfather of her husband or his issue.⁵

12. The *sakulyas* and *samanodakas* of her husband in the same order as in the case of the property of males.⁶

13. The "Daya-Krama Sangraha" places next the *samanapravaras*,⁷ which would apparently mean the *samanapravaras* of her husband.⁸

Jagannatha⁹ places the woman's kindred on her father's side as far as the tenth degree, and after them the family of her mother after her husband's *samanodakas*, and makes no mention of the *samanapravaras*.

If the view of Brihaspati's text which has been adopted by the Judicial Construction of Brihaspati's text.

¹ The husband's younger brother comes before the widow's stepbrother; *Debiprasanna Roy Chowdhry v. Harendra Nath Ghose* (1910), 37 Calc. 863; 15 C. W. N. 383. In *Tooley Dass Seal v. Luckymoney Dassee* (1900), 4 C. W. N. 743, at p. 747, Sale, J., held "with diffidence" that a brother's son came before the husband's younger brother of the half blood.

² *Gosaien Chund Kobraj v. Kishenmunnee (Mussumaut)* (1836), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 77 (new edition, 90).

³ Chap. iv. s. iii. para. 41.

⁴ "Daya-Bhaga," chap. iv. s. iii. para. 39; "Daya-Tattwa," chap. x.

para. 38; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 10.

⁵ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 623.

⁶ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 11, as translated in Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 440, 441, and Sircar's "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 727.

⁷ *Ibid.* The expression means persons descended from the same patriarch in the male line.

⁸ Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., p. 441.

⁹ Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 623. See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 441, 442.

Committee in a Bombay case ¹ is to be applied to the Bengal school, the succession, after the husband, father, mother, and brother will devolve, if the woman has been married in the *Brahma* form, on the heirs of her husband, and if she has been married in the *Asura* (or apparently if in a local or special form) falls upon the heirs of her father.

Escheat. Failing all the above-named *stridhan* heirs, the Crown takes by escheat.²

The texts excepted the right of the Crown in the case of a Brahmani woman,³ but this limitation is not now effectual.⁴

Illegitimate children. Illegitimacy is not a bar to the succession of children to their mother's property,⁵ but in a competition between legitimate and illegitimate children the rights of the former prevail.⁶

This has no application to the illegitimate child of a married woman.⁷

As to the rights of children by different fathers, see *Arunagiri Mudali v. Ranganayaki Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 40.

Dancing-girls
and prosti-
tutes.

There is a conflict of authority as to the inheritance to the property of a dancing-girl attached to a pagoda, of a prostitute or of a woman who had become degraded by unchastity. The earlier cases in Madras related to dancing-girls attached to pagodas. The rights of their illegitimate issue to inherit, daughters taking before sons, were upheld by the Courts.⁸

This view has been accepted in Bombay.⁹

Strange¹⁰ lays down the rule that on failure of issue the property of a dancing-girl will go to the pagoda to which she is attached. In the absence of custom there seems to be no real ground for this rule.¹¹

¹ *Kesserbai (Bai) v. Hunsraj Morarji* (1906), 33 I. A. 176; 30 Bom. 431; 10 C. W. N. 802; 8 Bom. L. R. 446.

² See "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 13.

³ "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. vi. para. 12; Colebrooke's "Digest," vol. iii. p. 623.

⁴ See *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah* (1860), 8 M. I. A. 500; 2 W. R. P. C. 59; ante, p. 416.

⁵ *Mayna Bai v. Uttaram* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 196, at p. 201; *Arunagiri Mudali v. Ranganayaki Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 40; Ghose's "Hindu Law," 2nd ed., 658; "Narada" (Jolly's translation, p. 96) says: "Let the damsel's son, born through

his mother's folly, whose father is unknown, present the funeral cake to the father of his mother, and inherit his property."

⁶ *Meenakshi v. Muniandi Panikkan* (1914), 38 Mad. 1144.

⁷ *Jagannath Raghunath v. Narayan* (1910), 34 Bom. 553; 12 Bom. L. R. 545.

⁸ *Kamakshi v. Nagarathnam* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 161; Strange's "Manual," p. 89, para. 361. See *Narasanna v. Gangu* (1889), 13 Mad. 133; *Arunagiri Mudali v. Ranganayaki Ammal* (1897), 21 Mad. 40.

⁹ *Jaya Madhav v. Manjunath* (1916), 19 Bom. L. R. 320.

¹⁰ "Manual," p. 89, para. 362.

¹¹ See Banerjee's "Law of Marriage," 3rd ed., pp. 407-412.

The difficulty arises as to other heirs. On the one hand it has been held that "with prostitutes, the tie of kindred being broken, none of their relations, who remain undegraded in caste, whether offspring or not, inherit from them. Their issue after their degradation succeed."¹ On the other hand, it has been held that "prostitution does not sever the legal relation, and therefore the degradation of a woman does not in law entail a cessation of the tie of kindred between her and the members of her natural family, or between her and the members of her husband's family,"² and that the ordinary rules of inheritance apply.³ The better authority is in favour of the latter view.

In one case the right of the husband,⁴ in another that of the stepson,⁵ in a third the right of a daughter,⁶ and in a fourth that of a brother's son⁷ was maintained.

There may be a local custom or usage by which only degraded relations succeed.⁸

As to adoptions by dancing-girls and prostitutes, see *ante*, pp. 163, 164.

¹ Strange's "Manual," p. 89, para. 363; *In the goods of Kamineymoney Bewah* (1894), 21 Calc. 697; *Tara Mune Dossea v. Motee Buneanee* (1846), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 273 (new edition, 325); *Narasanna v. Gangu* (1889), 13 Mad. 133, at p. 134; *Sivasangu v. Minal* (1889), 12 Mad. 277; *Mayna Bai v. Uttaram* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 196, at p. 203; *Tripura Charan Bannerjee v. Harimati Dassi* (1911), 38 Calc. 495; 15 C. W. N. 807.

² *Subbaraya Pillai v. Ramusami Pillai* (1899), 23 Mad. 171, approved of in *Narain Das v. Tirlok Tiwari* (1906), 29 All. 4; *Meenakshi v. Munandi Panikkan* (1914), 38 Mad. 1144; *Hiralal Singha v. Tripura Charan Ray* (1913), 40 Calc. 650; 17 C. W. N. 679 (a Full Bench case), which now settles the law in Bengal.

Cf. ante, p. 388. Sir Gurudas Banerjee in the "Law of Marriage and Stridhan," 4th ed., pp. 417-425, combats the view of the above Full Bench case.

³ *Sarna Moyee Bewa v. Secretary of State* (1897), 25 Calc. 254; 2 C. W. N. 97; *Kamakshi v. Nagarathnam* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 161; Cunningham's "Digest," p. 112.

⁴ *Narain Das v. Tirlok Tiwari* (1906), 29 All. 4.

⁵ *Subbaraya Pillai v. Ramasami Pillai* (1899), 23 Mad. 171.

⁶ *Tara v. Krishna* (1907), 31 Bom. 495.

⁷ *Hiralal Singha v. Tripura Charan Roy* (1913), 40 Calc. 650; 17 C. W. N. 679.

⁸ See *Sarna Moyee Bewa v. Secretary of State* (1897), 25 Calc. 254; 2 C. W. N. 97.

CHAPTER XV.

POWERS OF WOMEN OVER PROPERTY INHERITED BY THEM.

Limited
powers of
female heirs,

EXCEPT in certain cases in the Bombay Presidency,¹ a woman who succeeds as heir, whether to a male² or to a female,³ has not complete dominion over the property inherited by her, so as to be able to alienate it otherwise than in case of necessity,⁴ or to a certain extent for the spiritual welfare of the last full owner,⁵ or in case of her validly accelerating the estate of the reversioner.⁶ She does not become a fresh stock of descent, and on her death it passes to the then heir of the last full owner, *i.e.* to the person who would have been the heir of the last full owner, if such full owner had died simultaneously with the limited owner.⁷

¹ *Post*, pp. 467, 468.

² Cases, *post*, p. 465, notes 4, 5, 7.

³ (Benares school) *Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai* (1903), 30 I. A. 202; 25 All. 468; 7 C. W. N. 831, reversing *Debi Sahai v. Sheo Shankar Lal* (1900), 22 All. 353; *Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh (Lal) v. Allahabad Bank* (1903), 30 I. A. 209; 25 All. 476; 7 C. W. N. 840; 5 Bom. L. R. 833; *Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall* (1878), 6 I. A. 15; 4 Calc. 744; 3 C. L. R. 465; S. C. in Court below (1874), 14 B. L. R. 235, at p. 237; *Thaloor Deyhee (Mussumat) v. Baluk Ram (Rai)* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 139; 10 W. R. P. C. 3; *Bhugwandeem Doobey v. Myrna Bae* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 487; 9 W. R. P. C. 23; (Madras) *Venkatarama Krishna Rau v. Bhujanga Rau* (1895), 19 Mad. 107; *Virasangappa Shetti v. Rudrappa Shetti* (1895), 19 Mad. 110; *Sengamalaihammal v. Valaynda Mudali* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 312; *Raju Gramany v. Ammani Ammal* (1906), 29 Mad. 358. (Bengal school) *Ja-*

gendra Chandra Banerjee v. Phani Bhushan Mookerjee (1915), 43 Calc. 64; *Madhumala Dassi (Srimati) v. Lakshan Chandra Pal* (1913), 20 C. W. N. 627; *Prankissen Laha v. Noyanmoney Dassee (Sreemutty)* (1879), 5 Calc. 222; *Huri Doyal Singh Sarmana v. Grish Chunder Mookerjee* (1890), 17 Calc. 911; *Bhoobun Mohun Banerjee v. Muddon Mohun Sing* (1877), 1 Shome's L. R. C. R. 3; *Prankishen Sing v. Bhagwutee (Mussummat)* (1793), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 4; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. ii. s. iii. para. 6.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 478 *et seq.*

⁵ *Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser* (1915), 43 Calc. 574, *post*, p. 480.

⁶ *Post*, p. 490.

⁷ *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Koli-tany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115, at p. 154; 5 Calc. 776, at pp. 789, 790; 6 C. L. R. 322, at pp. 332, 333; *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543; 2 W. R. P. C. 31.

An estate similar to that acquired by a female heir may also be created by contract, or grant, or prescription,¹ or by will.²

In the case of *stridhan* property the *stridhan* heir of the woman from whom the deceased female inherited, will inherit, or in other words that what has once descended as *stridhan* does not so descend again.³

A widow's estate is not enlarged in the case of succession to tenancies by sec. 22 of the N. W. P. Tenancy Act, 1901 (Act II. N. W. P. C. of 1901); *Bisheshar Ahir v. Dukhawan Ahir* (1916), 38 All. 197.

As to movable property, see *post*, pp. 469, 470.

Thus a widow,⁴ a daughter⁵ (except in Bombay⁶), a mother⁷

¹ *Meda Vengamma v. Mulla Chelamaya* (1912), 36 Mad. 484.

² *Kullianbutti Koer v. Tulapal Singh* (1882), 11 C. L. R. 204; Phillips and Trevelyan's "Law relating to Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 88, 89.

³ *Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai* (1903), 30 I. A. 202; 25 All. 468; 7 C. W. N. 831; 5 Bom. L. R. 828; *Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh (Lal) v. Allahabad Bank* (1903), 30 I. A. 209; 25 All. 276; 7 C. W. N. 840; *Huri Doyal Singh Sarmana v. Grish Chunder Mookerjee* (1890), 17 Calc. 911.

⁴ *Keerut Sing v. Koolahul Sing* (1839), 2 M. I. A. 331; 5 W. R. P. C. 131; *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapak* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 529; 2 W. R. P. C. 61; *Thakoor Deyhee (Mussumat) v. Baluk Ram (Rai)* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 139; 10 W. R. P. C. 5; 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 106; *Bhugwandeem Doobey v. Myna Bace* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 487; 9 W. R. P. C. 23; *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kohitany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115, at p. 154; 5 Calc. 776, at pp. 789, 790; 6 C. L. R. 322, at pp. 332, 333; S. C. in Court below, *Kery Kohitany v. Moneeram Kolita* (1873), 13 B. L. R. 1, at p. 5; 19 W. R. C. R. 367, at p. 368; *Panchowree Mahtoon v. Kaleechurn* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 490; *Haridas Dutt v. Ranganmani Dasi* (1851), 2 Taylor and Bell, 279; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 124; *Gurunath Nilkanth v. Krishnaji Govind* (1880), 4 Bom. 462; *Jamiatram v. Jamna (Bai)* (1864), 2 Bom. H. C. 10; *Lakshmiabar v. Ganpat Moroba* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. O. C. 150, at p. 163; *Bhaskar Trimbak Acharya v. Mahadev Ramje* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. O. C. 1; *Karuppa Thevan v. Alayu Pillai* (1881), 4 Mad. 152; "Daya-Bhaga,"

chap. xi. s. i. para. 61; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. iv. s. viii. para. 4; "Viramitrodaya," chap. iii. part i. s. 3; "Smriti Chandrika," chap. xi. s. i. para. 28; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 261; (widow of *sapinda* in Bombay) *Bharmangavda v. Rudrappavda* (1879), 4 Bom. 181; *Tuljaram Morarji v. Mathuradas* (1881), 5 Bom. 662; *Madhavram Mugatram v. Dave Trambaklal Bhawanishankar* (1896), 21 Bom. 739. This applies also to the widow of a Nambudhri Brahmin, *Vasudevan v. Secretary of State* (1887), 11 Mad. 157, at p. 165.

⁵ *Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall* (1878), 6 I. A. 15; 4 Calc. 744; 3 C. L. R. 465; *Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar* (1881), 8 I. A. 99; 3 Mad. 290; *Venkayamma Garu (Raju Chelikani) v. Venkataramanayamma (Raja Chelikani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 156; 25 Mad. 678; 7 C. W. N. 1; 4 Bom. L. R. 657; *Dowlut Kooc v. Burmadeo Sahoy* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 246, note; 22 W. R. C. R. 54; *Deo Persad v. Lujoo Roy* (1873), 14 B. L. R. 245, note; 20 W. R. C. R. 102; *Gyan Koowur (Mussumat) v. Dookhurn Singh* (1829), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 330 (new edition, 420); *Sheo Sehai Singh v. Omed Konwur (Mussumat)* (1840), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 301 (new edition, 378); *Gunga Mya v. Kishen Kishore Chowdhry* (1821), 3 Ben. Sel. R. 128 (new edition, 170); *Kattama Nachiar v. Dorasingar Tevar* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 310.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 467, 468.

⁷ (Bombay cases) *Vrijbhukandas Dwarkadas v. Parvati (Bai)* (1907), 32 Bom. 2; 9 Bom. L. R. 1187; *Madhavram v. Dave Trambaklal* (1896), 21 Bom. 739, at p. 744; *Tuljaram Morarji*

and a grandmother¹ (except in Bombay²) take only a restricted estate.

She has no greater right over the self-acquired property of the last full owner than over the property inherited by him.³

The restriction applies to *inams*, even though they be enfranchised in the widow's name.⁴

Cannot alter estate.

A restricted female owner cannot alter the nature of the estate held by her. Thus a widow cannot, "by any act or declaration of her own, while retaining possession of her husband's estate, give her possession or estate a character different from that attaching to the possession or estate of a Hindu widow,"⁵ and daughters cannot by any arrangement alter the rights of the reversionary heirs.⁶

Even the whole body of immediate reversioners cannot enlarge the estate of a restricted female heir by a release or otherwise,⁷ but reversioners giving such release for good consideration may be bound by it.⁸

The interest of the widow is not altered by a new settlement being made

v. *Mathuradas* (1881), 5 Bom. 662, at p. 70; *Bharmangavda v. Rudrapgavda* (1879), 4 Bom. 181, at p. 187; *Sakharam Sadashiv Adhikari v. Sitabai* (1879), 3 Bom. 353; *Narsappa Lingappa v. Sakharam Krishna* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 215; *Vinayek Anundrao v. Luxumeebaee* (1861), 1 Bom. H. C. 117. (It is submitted that the reasons given in *Gandhi Maganlal Motichand v. Jadab (Bai)* (1897), 24 Bom. 192; 1 Bom. L. R. 574, for holding that a grandmother takes an absolute estate in Bombay might also be applied to a mother.) (Madras cases) *P. Bachiraju v. Venkattappadu* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 402; *Kutti Ammal v. Radakristna Ayyan* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 88. (Benares school) *Jullessur Koer v. Uggur Roy* (1882), 9 Calc. 725; 12 C. L. R. 460; *Punchanund Ojhab v. Lalshan Musser* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 140. (Mithila school) *Ibid.*; "Vivada Chintamani" (P. C. Tagore's translation), p. 263. (Bengal school) *Poorendra Nath Sen v. Hemangini Das* (1908), 36 Calc. 75; 12 C. W. N. 1002; *Bijja Dibell (Mussummaui) v. Unpoorna Dibell (Mussummaui)* (1806), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 162 (new edition, 215); *Nufur Mitter v. Ram Koomar Chuttoojiya* (1828), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 310 (new edition, 393); *Hemlutta Debea v. Goluck Chunder Gosain* (1842), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 108 (new edition, 127).

¹ *Phurkar Singh v. Ranjit Singh* (1878), 1 All. 661.

² In Bombay a grandmother takes absolutely, *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192; 1 Bom. L. R. 574, *post*, pp. 467, 468. See, however, *Madhavram Mugatram v. Dave Trambaklal* (1896), 21 Bom. 739, at p. 744.

³ *Namasivaya Chetti v. Sivagami* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 374.

⁴ *Vangala Dikshatulu v. Vangala Gavaramma* (1904), 28 Mad. 13. See *ante*, p. 439.

⁵ *Sham Lal Mitra v. Amarendro Nath Bose* (1895), 23 Calc. 460, at p. 473.

⁶ *Sengamalathammal v. Valaynda Mudali* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 312, at p. 317; *Karlash Chandra Chuckerbutty v. Kashi Chandra Chuckerbutty* (1897), 24 Calc. 339; *Gobind Krishna Narain v. Abdul Qayyum* (1903), 25 All. 546; *Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal* (1899), 23 Mad. 504.

⁷ *Narasimham v. Madhavaradugu*, 13 M. L. J. 323; *Hemchunder Sanyal v. Sarnamoyi Debi* (1894), 22 Calc. 354; *Dhoorjets Subbayya v. Dhoorjets Venkayya* (1906), 30 Mad. 201; *Hargawan Magan v. Baijnath Das* (1909), 32 All. 88; *contrá Kahchand Dutt v. Moore* (1837), 1 Fulton, 76; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 107. See *Olati Pulliah Chetti v. Varadarajulu Chetti* (1908), 31 Mad. 474; *post*, pp. 490, 491.

⁸ *Kali Kishore Pal v. Abdul Karim* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 132. See *Ganpatrao Moroji v. Vamanrao Shamrao* (1908), 10 Bom. L. R. 210.

with her by the Government ¹ unless it is quite clear from the terms of the settlement that it has been so altered.

"The restrictions on a Hindu widow's power of alienation are in- Restrictions separable from her estate, and . . . their existence does not depend on not dependent that of heirs capable of taking it on her death." ² on heirs.

The reason for a woman's interest being limited is that the property should not leave the *gotra* (family) of the person from whom she has inherited it.

In the Bombay Presidency, whether in places where the Inherited property in Bombay, "Mitakshara" or in places where the "Mayukha" is paramount, property inherited by a woman from a male, or from a female, otherwise than as widow, mother, daughter-in-law, or widow of a *gotraja sapinda*, is, except so far as it may be subject to her husband's control during his lifetime,³ her absolute and several property. She can deal with the property *inter vivos* or by will, and on her death it descends to the heirs of her *stridhan* property.⁴

This rule has been applied to a woman inheriting as daughter,⁵ sister,⁶ niece,⁷ or grandniece.⁸

It was held by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of *Gandhi Maganlal Motichand v. Jadab (Bai)* ⁹ that a paternal grandmother in Gujarat, inheriting movable and immovable property from her maiden

¹ See *Kashi Prasad v. Inda Kunwar* (1908), 30 All. 490.

² *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narainappa* (1861), 8 M. L. A. 529, at p. 553; 2 W. R. P. C. 61, at p. 64.

³ *Ante*, pp. 443, 444; *Bhau v. Raghunath Krishna Gurav* (1905), 30 Bom. 229; 7 Bom. L. R. 936.

⁴ *Ante*, chap. xiv.

⁵ *Gulappa Domingappa Kusugal v. Tayava* (1907), 31 Bom. 453; 9 Bom. L. R. 834; *Rindabai v. Anacharya* (1890), 15 Bom. 206, at p. 208; *Jankibai v. Sundra* (1890), 14 Bom. 612; *Bhagirthibai v. Kahnajirav* (1880), 11 Bom. 285; *Haribhat v. Damodharibhat* (1878), 3 Bom. 171; *Bulakhidas v. Kesharlall* (1881), 6 Bom. 85; *Babaji v. Balaji Ganesh* (1881), 5 Bom. 660; *Bhau v. Raghunath Krishna Gurav* (1905), 30 Bom. 229, at pp. 236, 237; *Navakram Almaram v. Nandkishor Shwmarayen* (1864), 1 Bom. H. C. 209; *Pranjee-*

vandas Toolseydas v. Dewcooverbaee (1859); *Ibid.*, 130; *Rukhmani (Bai) v. Kesharlal* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1293; *Vithappa v. Savitri* (1910), 34 Bom 510; 12 Bom. L. R. 487. See Acharya's "Law of Codification," pp. 345 *et seq*

⁶ *Rindabai v. Anacharya* (1890), 15 Bom. 206; *Bharmangavda v. Rudragavda* (1879), 4 Bom. 181, at p. 187; *Bhaskar Trimbak Acharya v. Mahadev Ramji* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. O. C. 1; *Vinayek Anundrao v. Luzumeebaee* (1861), 1 Bom. H. C. 117; S. C. on appeal (1864), 9 M. I. A. 520; 3 W. R. P. C. 41.

⁷ *Madhavram v. Dave Trambaklal* (1896), 21 Bom. 739, at p. 744.

⁸ *Tuljaram Morarji v. Mathuradas* (1881), 5 Bom. 662; *Madhavram v. Dave Trambaklal* (1896), 21 Bom. 739, at p. 744.

⁹ (1899), 24 Bom. 192; 1 Bom. L. R. 574.

granddaughter, takes an absolute interest in such property,¹ and that on her death the property goes to her heir, and not to the heir of the granddaughter. Mr. Mayne considered² that this decision has been impliedly overruled by the decisions of the Judicial Committee in *Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai*,³ and *Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh (Lal) v. Allahabad Bank*.⁴ It is submitted, however, that this does not necessarily follow. The Bombay decision was founded on the peculiar law of that Presidency. Under that law a grandmother, as in other places governed by the Mitakshara system, succeeds *quâ* grandmother, and not *quâ* widow of the grandfather. She has not, therefore, the limited estate which the Bombay system of law gives to the widows of *gotraja sapindas*,⁵ but under that law she is treated as if she were herself a *gotraja sapinda*, and therefore, although a woman, she is, by analogy to the cases of sisters and nieces, under that law entitled to an absolute estate. Similarly the Bombay rule as to the absolute character of the estate of a daughter has not been affected by the above decisions of the Judicial Committee.⁶ The same reasoning would, it is submitted, apply to the case of a mother.

Where more than one of the same class take, they each take a several interest without rights of survivorship.⁷

It has been laid down that female heirs who have not become members of the family of the late owner by marriage take absolutely,⁸ but there is authority that the question is one of *sapinda relationship*, not of marriage.⁹

In the Bombay Presidency female heirs as a general rule take absolutely. The cases of dependent widows, mothers, collateral *sapindas*, and daughters-in-law are an exception. Where a woman inherits to a male owner as a widow, or as a mother, or as the wife of a *gotraja sapinda*, she takes only a limited estate,¹⁰ as in the case of the inheritance of women in other parts of India.

¹ On the ground that a grandmother takes in her own right, and not as widow of the grandfather.

² "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 854, 855.

³ (1903), 30 I. A. 202; 25 All. 468; 7 C. W. N. 831; 5 Bom. L. R. 828.

⁴ (1903), 30 I. A. 209; 25 All. 476; 7 C. W. N. 840; 5 Bom. L. R. 833.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 467.

⁶ See *Bhau v. Raghunath Krishna Gurav* (1905), 30 Bom. 229, at pp. 236, 237; 7 Bom. L. R. 936.

⁷ *Vithappa v. Savitri* (1910), 34 Bom. 510; 12 Bom. L. R. 487; *Rukhmani (Bai) v. Keshavlal* (1907), 9 Bom. L. R. 1293.

⁸ *Bhau v. Raghunath Krishna* (1905),

30 Bom. 229, at p. 237, approved of in *Vrijbhukandas v. Parvati (Bai)* (1907), 32 Bom. 26, at p. 29; 9 Bom. L. R. 1187; *Tuljaram Morari v. Mathuradas* (1881), 5 Bom. 662, at p. 664; *Rindabai v. Anacharya* (1890), 15 Bom. 206; *Madhavram v. Dave Trambaklal* (1896), 21 Bom. 739; *Dhondi v. Radhabai* (1912), 36 Bom. 546; 14 Bom. L. R. 569.

⁹ *Gandhi Maganlal v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192, at p. 213; 1 Bom. L. R. 574.

¹⁰ See *Dhondi v. Radhabai* (1912), 36 Bom. 546; 14 Bom. L. R. 569; *Gadadhar Bhat v. Chandrabhagabai* (1892), 17 Bom. 690; *Tuljaram Morari v. Mathuradas* (1881), 5 Bom. 662; *ante*, p. 465, note 4.

"The principle of dependence, which perhaps governs the extent of power, may regulate the exceptions where widowed females inherit from males, but in all other cases the rule of absolute dominion must be allowed to prevail." ¹

In the case of a deceased maiden daughter property inherited by her from her mother is said to pass (at any rate in Madras) by a special rule under which she becomes as much an absolute owner as her mother,² but there is authority to the contrary.³

The text of the "Mitakshara," ⁴ upon which this rule is said to be based, does not seem to give her greater rights than any other female heir to *stridhan* property.

"A sonless widow of a Saraogee-Agarwala takes by the custom of Jains. the sect a very much larger dominion over the estate of her husband than is conceded by Hindu law to the widows of orthodox Hindus: that is, she takes an absolute interest, at least in the self-acquired property of her husband. . . ." ⁵

In the case of ancestral property, she takes only the interest which is taken by an orthodox Hindu widow.⁶

A widow or other limited heir has no greater power over the movable property inherited by her than she has over the immovable property according to the schools of Bengal ⁷ and Benares.⁸ The Madras High Court has taken the same view as to the law prevalent in Southern India.⁹

The law in Bombay on this subject is not so settled.

¹ *Gandhi Maganlal Motichand v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192, at p. 214; 1 Bom. L. R. 574.

² See *Narasayya v. Venkayya*, 2 Mad. L. J. 149, explained in *Venkataramakrishna Rau v. Bhujanga Rau* (1895), 19 Mad. 107, at p. 109; *Gandhi Maganlal Motichand v. Jadab (Bai)* (1899), 24 Bom. 192; 1 Bom. L. R. 574.

³ *Janakisetty Sooryudu v. Miryala Hanumayya* (1909), 32 Mad. 521; see *Virasangappa Shetti v. Rudrappa Shetti* (1895), 19 Mad. 110.

⁴ Chap. ii. s. xi. para. 30.

⁵ *Sheo Singh Rai v. Dakho (Mussumat)* (1874), 6 N. W. P. 382, at p. 411, approved on appeal (1878), 5 I. A. 87, at p. 110; 1 All. 688, at p. 704; *Shimshu Nath v. Gayan Chand* (1894), 16 All. 379; *Harnab Pershad v. Mandil Dass* (1899), 27 Cal. 379.

⁶ *Shimshu Nath v. Gayan Chand*

(1894), 16 All. 379.

⁷ *Durga Nath Pramanik v. Chintamoni Dasi* (1903), 31 Cal. 214; 8 C. W. N. 11; *Kashnath Basak v. Harasundari Dasi* (1826), "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., 97; Clarke's "Rules and Orders," p. 91; S. C. in Court below, *Cossanant Bysack v. Hurroosondry Dossee* (1819), 2 Morley's "Digest," 198; *Thakoor Deyhee (Mussumat) v. Baluk Ram (Rai)* (1866), 11 M. I. A. 139, at p. 175; 10 W. R. P. C. 3, at p. 9.

⁸ *Bhugwandeem Doobey v. Myna Bae* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 487; 9 W. R. P. C. 23.

⁹ *Narasimha v. Venkatadhri* (1885), 8 Mad. 290; *Buchi Ramayya v. Jagapathi* (1884), 8 Mad. 304. There were decisions in the Madras Sudder Court to a contrary effect, see Norton's L. C. pp. 648, 652.

It is clear that in those districts of the Bombay Presidency where the "Mitakshara" is supreme,¹ she has no greater power than in Bengal or Benares.² It is also clear that even in territories governed by the "Mayukha" a widow has no testamentary power of disposition over movables which have been inherited by her from her husband,³ and that on her death they do not pass to her heirs, and are not available in their hands for the payment of her debts.⁴ She may exercise a power given to her by the will of her husband.⁵ "Even in the 'Mayukha' there is not a text which distinctly and definitely supports the widow's absolute dominion and power over movables inherited from her husband."⁶ There is, however, considerable judicial authority that in cases governed by the "Mayukha" a widow or other female owner can dispose of the movable property during her lifetime.⁷

"It is observed by Mr. Mayne, in s. 229, that the power must generally be taken to be limited to such necessary or suitable purposes as would come within the ordinary power of the head of a household. We should prefer to say that the nature of movable property being such that in many cases conversion is essential to its enjoyment, the widow is not precluded from converting it, but must preserve the capital, unless the expenditure of it is necessitated by the insufficiency of the income to provide for her maintenance, subject, nevertheless, to a power to dispose of a moderate portion for works of piety."⁸

Under the Mithila law a childless Hindu widow, although she cannot alienate the immovable property, has an absolute right over the movable property inherited from her husband, and can alienate it in any manner she pleases.⁹

¹ *Ante*, p. 19.

² *Pandharinath Vishvanath v. Govind Shivram* (1907), 32 Bom. 59; 9 Bom. L. R. 305. See *Gadadhar Bhat v. Chandrabhagabai* (1892), 17 Bom. 690.

³ *Chamanlal Maganlal Sha v. Doshi Ganesht Motchand* (1904), 28 Bom. 453; 6 Bom. L. R. 460, following *Gadadhar Bhat v. Chandrabhagabai* (1892), 17 Bom. 690. See *Harilal Harjivandas v. Pranvalavdas Parbhudas* (1888), 16 Bom. 229; *Motilal Lalubhai v. Ratilal Mahiputram* (1895), 21 Bom. 170.

⁴ *Jamna (Bai) v. Bhaishankar* (1891), 16 Bom. 233.

⁵ *Motilal Lalubhai v. Ratilal Mahiputram* (1895), 21 Bom. 170.

⁶ *Pandharinath v. Govind* (1907), 32 Bom. 59, at p. 73; 9 Bom. L. R. 1305.

⁷ *Bechur Bhugwan v. Lukmee (Bae)* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C. 56; *Vinayek Amundrao v. Luxumeebace*

(1861), 1 Bom. H. C. 117; *Pranjeewandas v. Dewcooverbae* (1859), 1 Bom. H. C. 130; *Laksmibai v. Ganpat Moroba* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. O. C. 150, at p. 162. In *Bhagirthibai v. Kahnujirav* (1886), 11 Bom. 285, at p. 297, West, J., says that the widow's absolute right to movable property inherited from her husband has never been seriously questioned in Bombay. See also *Balvantrav v. Purshotam* (1872), 9 Bom. H. C. 99, at p. 111; *Tuljaram Morarji v. Mathuradas* (1881), 5 Bom. 662, at p. 670; *Damodar Madhowji v. Purmanandas* (1883), 7 Bom. 155, at p. 163.

⁸ *Narasimha v. Venkatadri* (1885), 8 Mad. 290, at p. 293, referred to in *Gadadhar Bhat v. Chandrabhagabai* (1892), 17 Bom. 690, at pp. 703, 704.

⁹ *Birajun Koer v. Luchmi Narain Mahata* (1884), 10 Calc. 392; *Doorga Dayee v. Poorun Dayee* (1886), 5

Even where a woman has power to dispose of property will inherited by her by an act *inter vivos*, she cannot dispose of it by will,¹ and if it has not been disposed of, it passes to the next heir.²

As to the interest taken by a mother or grandmother in property allotted to her on partition, see *ante*, pp. 335, 336. Share on partition.

The whole estate is vested in the widow or other restricted female owner.³ She completely represents it.⁴ She is entitled to the absolute possession of it,⁵ and the full enjoyment of its produce, which she can spend without being accountable to any one.⁶ She cannot waste the corpus of the property, nor can she alienate it beyond her lifetime,⁷ except for purposes of necessity or with the assent of the next reversioners, *i.e.* of the persons who are at the time of the alienation heirs of the last full owner.⁸ All acts for the benefit of the estate or for necessity bind the estate.⁹ Nature of estate of widow or other limited female heir.

During her lifetime no one else has any interest in the estate.¹⁰

"It is clear that under the Hindu law the widow, though she takes as heir, takes a special and qualified estate. Compared with any estate that passes under the English law by inheritance it is an anomalous estate. It

W. R. C. R. 141; *Sreenarain Rai v. Bhya Jha* (1812), 2 Ben. Sol. R. 23, at p. 27 (new edition, 29, at p. 36); "*Vivada Chintamani*" (Tagore's translation), pp. 261, 262.

¹ For instance she cannot by will create a charge on her husband's immovable property for the purpose of paying debts incurred for necessary purposes; *Vishvanath v. Narayan* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 314.

² *Thakoor Deyhee (Mussumat) v. Baluk Ram (Rai)* (1886), 11 M. I. A. 139; 10 W. R. P. C. 3; *Gadadhar Bhal v. Chundrubhagabai* (1892), 17 Bom. 690; *Harilal Harjivandas v. Pranvalavdas Parbhudas* (1888), 16 Bom. 229. See "*Vivada Chintamani*," pp. 261, 262.

³ *Janaki Ammal v. Nurayanasumi Aiyer* (1916), 43 I. A. 207; 39 Mad. 634; 20 C. W. N. 1323; 18 Bom. L. R. 856; *Anandibai v. Rajaram Chintaman Pethe* (1897), 22 Bom 984; *Kamavadhani Venkata Subbaiya v. Joya Narasingappa* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 116.

⁴ *Kery Kolitany v. Monceram Koitta* (1873), 13 B. L. R. 1, at p. 53; 19 W. R. C. R. 367, at p. 396; *Bhala Nahana v. Parbhu Hari* (1877), 2 Bom. 67, at pp. 73, 74, and cases therein cited; *Karimuddin (Munshi) v. Gobind Krishna Narain (Kunwar)* (1909), 36 I. A. 138; 31 All. 497; 13 C. W. N. 1117; 11 Bom. L. R. 911.

⁵ *Kashinath Basak v. Harasundari Dasi* (1826), Clarke's "Rules and Orders;" Montrieux's "Cases of Hindu Law," p. 495; "*Vyavastha Darpana*," 2nd ed., p. 97; *Biswanath Chandra v. Khantomani Dasi* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 747.

⁶ *Kamavadhani Venkata Subbaiya v. Joya Narasingappa* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 116; *In the goods of Harendranarayana* (1853), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 41, note.

⁷ *Post*, p. 477.

⁸ *Post*, pp. 486, 487.

⁹ *Sudasi Koer v. Ramgobind Singh* (1911), 15 C. W. N. 857.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 499.

is a qualified proprietorship, and it is only by the principles of Hindu law that the extent and nature of the estate can be determined.”¹

“A widow who succeeds to the estate of her husband in default of male issue, whether she succeeds by inheritance or survivorship . . . does not take a mere life estate in the property. The whole estate is for the time vested in her absolutely for some purposes, though in some respects for only a qualified interest. Her estate is an anomalous one, and has been compared to that of a tenant in tail. It would perhaps be more correct to say that she holds an estate of inheritance to her and the heirs of her husband.”²

But the estate of a Hindu widow is very different from a mere life estate. “The case of *Kashinath Basak v. Hanasundari Dasi*³ . . . establishes that the estate of the widow is something higher than a life estate, that it entitles her to the possession of the property without restriction; and that she has a qualified power of disposition in it, the limits of which it is difficult, if not impossible, to define further than by saying that the propriety of any particular exercise of that power must depend on the circumstances in which it is made, and must be consistent with the general principles of Hindu law regarding such dispositions. The cases of *Oojul-monee Dossee v. Sagormonee Dossee* and *Hurry Doss Datt v. Runjunmonee Dossee*,⁴ which have established in this Court the right of the reversionary heirs, though their interest is only contingent, to maintain a suit to restrain waste by the widow⁵ (particularly the latter case in which the late Chief Justice entered at large into the nature of the widow’s estate) are quite consistent with what I have above stated. Sir Lawrence Peel there says: ‘The estate, though sometimes so expressed to be, is not an estate for life; when a widow alienates she does so by virtue of her interest, not of a power, and she passes the absolute interest, which she could not do if she had but a life estate.’”⁶

Different from manager. Her position is different from that of a manager. “A manager stands in a different position. He can act only with the assent, express or implied, of the body of coparceners.”⁷ In the widow’s case the coparceners are reduced to herself, and the estate centres in her.”⁸

Acknowledgment. As a reversioner does not derive title through the restricted heir, an acknowledgment of a right or liability by her does not under the existing limitation law⁹ bind the reversioner.¹⁰

¹ *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Venkata Narayanappa* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 529, at p. 550; 2 W. R. P. C. 61, at p. 64.

² *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolytany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115, at p. 154; 5 Calc. 776, at pp. 789, 790; 6 C. L. R. 322, at pp. 332, 333. See *Bhala Nahana v. Parbhu Hari* (1877), 2 Bom. 67, at pp. 73, 74, and cases there cited; *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543; 2 W. R. P. C. 31.

³ (1826), Clarke 91; Montrou’s “Cases of Hindu Law,” p. 495; “Vyavastha Darpana,” 2nd ed., p. 97.

⁴ (1851), 2 Taylor and Bell, p. 279; “Vyavastha Darpana,” 2nd ed., p. 125; Sev. 657.

⁵ See *post*, pp. 501, 502.

⁶ *Jadomoney Dabee v. Sarada Pro-sanno Mookerjee* (1856), 1 Boul. 120, at p. 129.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 274.

⁸ *Chimnaji Govind Godbole v. Din-kar Dhondev Godbole* (1886), 11 Bom. 320, at p. 324.

⁹ Act IX. of 1908, s. 19.

¹⁰ *Shib Shankar Lal v. Soni Ram* (1909), 32 All. 33; affirmed on appeal, *Soni Ram v. Kanhaiya Lal* (1913), 35 All. 227; 17 C. W. N. 605; 15 Bom. L. R. 480.

The Court will not interfere with the action of the limited female owner, unless it is shown that there is danger from the mode in which she is dealing with the property, or that her acts have endangered the estate or the reversion.¹

Interference
with her acts.

"A bill filed by the presumptive heir in succession against the immediate owner who has succeeded by inheritance, must show a case approaching to spoliation, must enable the Court to see that there is probable ground for apprehending that, unless an injunction be granted to restrain some threatened or impending act, ultimate loss to the heirs who may come into possession by succession will ensue. It is not enough to make out that some gift has been made or some disposition taken place, or that such is about to be made or to take place, which the law would not support. The estate of the female owner, her own personal estate, might be large, and adequate to repay ten times over the alleged spoliation, and there might not be the remotest prospect of loss, and the thing alienated might have no specific peculiar value."²

The mere fact of the widow keeping in hand for about three months part of the corpus for the alleged purpose of an eligible investment does not amount to waste, nor is it in derogation of the rights of those entitled to reversion.³

If there be an apprehension of waste of movable property allotted to a widow on partition, provision may be made in the final decree to safeguard the interests of the reversioners.⁴ In one case the Bombay High Court⁵ required a sum of money to which a widow was entitled as such to be secured for the benefit of the reversion, but in another case the Calcutta High Court held that she cannot be compelled, without proof of waste, to give security for the value received by her of lands belonging to her husband's estate taken by a railway company.⁶ The Court may now direct the investment of the proceeds of land belonging to a restricted heir which has been acquired for public purposes.⁷

"The principle that a Hindu widow is entitled to the uncontrolled possession of property, movable and immovable, of her deceased husband, is clearly laid down by Lord Gifford in *Cossinath Bysack v. Hurrosoondry Dossee*.⁸ . . . The general apprehension of danger that, if personal property be entrusted to a Hindu widow, there is every probability of its being parted with, and if so, it may not be recovered, is an element which cannot

¹ *Hurrydoss Dutt v. Uppoornah Dossee* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 433. See *post*, pp. 501, 502.

² *Haridas Dutt v. Ranganmani Dasi* (1851), 2 Taylor and Bell, 279; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., 127; Sev. 657. See *Hurrydoss Dutt v. Uppoornah Dossee* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 433.

³ *Hurrydoss Dutt v. Uppoornah Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 433.

⁴ *Durga Nath Pramanik v. Chintamani Dassi* (1903), 31 Calc. 214; 8 C. W. N. 11.

⁵ *Gambhirmal v. Hamirmal* (1890), 21 Bom. 747.

⁶ *Bindoo Bassinee Dossee v. Bohé Chand Seti* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 125.

⁷ Land Acquisition Act (I. of 1894), s. 32; see *Mrinalni Dasi v. Abinash Chandra Dutt* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 1024.

⁸ (1826), Clarke's "Rules and Orders," App. 91; Montriou's "Cases of Hindu Law," p. 495; "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., p. 97

be allowed to exist or considered consistently with the views of the Privy Council in the case last cited. The danger must be established not as a matter of probable speculation, but as one of reasonable certainty to the satisfaction of the Court."¹

Where more
than one
widow.

There is authority that where there is more than one widow the elder widow has the preferable claim to the management of the property.²

Two or more widows may by an agreement *inter se*, not prejudicial to the rights of the next heir in succession, provide for the distributive enjoyment of the benefit of the joint property by an apportionment thereof.³

Additions to
estate.

Where additions are made to an estate by a restricted female owner with the intention that they should form part of the estate, such additions pass with the estate and not to the heirs of such owner, though they have been made with funds over which she has absolute powers of disposal.

Such intention will be presumed in the case of the erection of buildings on land belonging to the estate.⁴

Accumula-
tions. 1

A widow or other restricted female owner may use for her own purposes and may alienate the income of the estate which has accumulated in her hands, or which has accumulated in the hands of some other person from whom she recovers it.⁵

"The true test to be applied to cases of this description is to determine from the surrounding circumstances the intention of the widow. Did she intend to treat the disputed property as part and parcel of the estate of her husband, or did she treat it as a temporary saving liable to be applied by her subsequently for her own purposes?"⁶

Should there be no proof of any distinct intention to appropriate to herself investments made from income or accumulations of income, they will be considered accretions to the estate.⁷

¹ Per Paul, J., in *Biswanath Chandra v. Khantomani Dasi* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 747, at p. 751.

² *Jijoyamba Bayi Saiba (H. H. M.) v. Kamakshi Bayi Saiba (H. H. M.)* (1868), 3 Mad. H. C. 424.

³ *Ibid.* at p. 453; *Mahaderappa v. Basagawdu* (1905), 29 Bom. 346; 7 Bom. L. R. 238.

⁴ *Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao Bahadur (Rajah) v. Venkata Purushothama Jagannadha Gopala Row Bahadur (Rajah Surenani)* (1908), 31 Mad. 321; *Fakira Dobe v. Gopi Lal* (1880), 6 C. L. R. 66.

⁵ *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundoo Mullick* (1862), 9 M. L. A. 123; *Pannalal Seal v. Bama-sundari Dasi* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 732;

Soudaminee Dossee v. Administrator General of Bengal (1892), 20 I. A. 12; 20 Calc. 433; *Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutts Koerain (Mussumut)* (1883), 10 I. A. 150, at p. 158; 10 Calc. 324, at p. 334; 13 C. L. R. 418, at p. 424; *Saminatha Pillai v. Manakiasami Pillai* (1899), 22 Mad. 356. See, however, *Grose v. Amirtamayi Dasi* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 1, at pp. 40, 42; 12 W. R. O. C. J. 13, at pp. 28, 29.

⁶ *Bhagabati Koer v. Sahudra Koer* (1911), 16 C. W. N. 834, at pp. 836, 837.

⁷ *Sheo Lochun Singh (Babu) v. Saheb Singh (Babu)* (1887), 14 I. A. 63; 14 Calc. 387; *Gonda Koer v. Oodey Singh (Koer)* (1874), 14 B. L. R.

When a widow purchases property with money borrowed on the credit of her husband's estate, his heir is entitled to it, subject to the burden of paying the debt.¹ Where she uses accumulations for purchasing property which had belonged to her husband, it may be inferred that she intended to treat it as part of her husband's estate.²

If she invest the income with the intention that it should be an accretion to her husband's estate, she cannot thereafter deal with it, except under circumstances which would justify her dealing with the original estate.³

Should she invest the income in such a way as to indicate her intention that it was not to form part of her husband's estate, but to remain at her disposal, whether such investment be of a temporary or permanent nature, she can deal with it, at any rate, during her lifetime.⁴ Should she not dispose of the property during her lifetime it does not pass to her heir, but is treated as a portion of her husband's estate.⁵

It is not "possible to lay down any sharp definition of the line which separates accretions to the husband's estate from income held in suspense in the hands of the widow, as to which she has not determined whether or no she will spend it." ⁶

159. See, however, *Akkanna v. Venkayya* (1901), 25 Mad. 351, at pp. 359, 360.

¹ *Oodey Singh (Kooer) v. Phool Chund* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 197.

² *Bhagabati Koer v. Sahudra Koer* (1911), 16 C. W. N. 834.

³ *Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain (Mussumut)* (1883), 10 I. A. 150, at p. 161; 10 Calc. 324, at p. 337; 13 C. L. R. 418, at p. 427.

⁴ See *Sowdaminee Dossee v. Administrator General of Bengal* (1892), 20 I. A. 12; 20 Calc. 433; *Akkanna v. Venkayya* (1901), 25 Mad. 351; *Puddo Monee Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Dwarka Nath Biswas* (1876), 25 W. R. 335, at p. 340; *Nihal Khan v. Hur Churn Lall* (1866), 1 Agra, 219.

⁵ *Wahid Ali Khan v. Tori Ram* (1913), 35 All. 551, at p. 555; *Kula Chandra Chakravarti v. Bama Sundari Dasee* (1914), 41 Calc. 870; *Amund Chundra Mundul v. Nilmoney Jourdar* (1883), 9 Calc. 758; *Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain (Mussumut)* (1883), 10 I. A. 150, at p. 158; 10 Calc. 324, at p. 334; 13 C. L. R. 418, at p. 429;

S. C. in Court below, *Hansbutti Kerain v. Ishri Dutt Koer* (1879), 5 Calc. 512, at p. 521; 4 C. L. R. 511, at pp. 519, 520; *Sridhar Chattopadhyaya v. Kalipada Chuckerbutty* (1911), 16 C. W. N. 106, where it was held that an agent appointed by a Hindu widow is bound to account to the reversioner for profits realized by him in the widow's lifetime and not paid to her. See *Bhagbutti Dasee (Mussumat) v. Bholanath Thakoor (Chowdhry)* (1875), 2 I. A. 256, at pp. 260, 261; 24 W. R. C. R. 168, at pp. 169, 170; S. C. in Court below, *Bholanath Thakoor (Chowdhry) v. Bhagabutti Deyi (Musst)* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 93, at p. 100; 15 W. R. C. R. 63, at p. 64, relying on *Chundrabulee Debra v. Brody* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 584, and *Nihal Khan v. Hur Churn Lall* (1866), 1 Agra, 219; *Oodey Singh (Kooer) v. Phool Chund* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 197, at p. 201.

⁶ *Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain (Mussumut)* (1883), 10 I. A. 150, at pp. 160, 161; 10 Calc. 324, at p. 337; 13 C. L. R. 418, at p. 427.

Income not appropriated by the restricted owner at the time of her death passes to the reversioner and not to her *stridhan* heir.¹

Where under a deed or will a Hindu widow is given complete power to appropriate the profits, the profits unappropriated at the time of her death will apparently pass to her heir.²

Savings from maintenance money.

Where the widow is not owner of her husband's estate but invests money received therefrom on account of her maintenance, it is her *stridhan*,³ and passes as such to her heirs.⁴

Presumption.

There is no presumption of law that property acquired by a Hindu widow after her husband's death forms part of his estate.⁵

Leases.

A restricted female owner can grant leases or do other acts in the ordinary course of management.⁶

Leases in excess of such power, such as permanent leases,⁷ or leases for a long term of years,⁸ are voidable by the reversioners at her death, unless they are justified by such circumstances as justify an alienation,⁹ or perhaps in exceptional cases where they are justified by rules of prudent management,¹⁰ or are for the benefit of the estate.¹¹

The lease would at least enure for the life of the restricted owner.¹²

A suit to set aside such lease must be brought within twelve years from the restricted owner's death.¹³

¹ *Rivett Carnac v. Jiribai* (1886), 10 Bom. 478; *Bhagabati Koer v. Sahudra Koer* (1911), 16 C. W. N. 834. See *Hunsbuthi Kerain v. Ishri Dutt Koer* (1879), 5 Calc. 512, at p. 525; 4 C. L. R. 511, at p. 523.

² *Guru Prasad Roy v. Nafar Das Roy* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 121; 11 W. R. C. R. 497.

³ *Ante*, p. 438.

⁴ *Subramanian Chelli v. Arunachalam Chelli* (1904), 28 Mad. 1; *ante*, chap. xiv.

⁵ *Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh (Diwan) v. Indar Pal Singh* (1899), 26 I. A. 226; 26 Calc. 871; 4 C. W. N. 1; 2 Bom. L. R. 1; *Dakhina Kali Debi v. Jagadishwar Bhattacharjee* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 197. See *Bissessur Chuckerbutty v. Ramjoy Mojomdar* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 326; 8 Sev. 708; *Gobind Chunder Mojomdar v. Dulmeer Khan* (1874), 23 W. R. C. R. 125.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 471.

⁷ *Modhu Sudan Singh (Raja) v. Rooke* (1897), 24 I. A. 164; 25 Calc. 1; 1 C. W. N. 433. Cf. *Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara*

(1917), 44 I. A. 147; 21 C. W. N. 729.

⁸ *Sadai Naik v. Serai Naik* (1901), 28 Calc. 532; 5 C. W. N. 279; *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Nil Ratan Mukerji* (1903), 30 Calc. 990; 7 C. W. N. 864; S. C. on appeal, *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (Srimati)* (1907), 34 I. A. 87; 34 Calc. 329; 11 C. W. N. 424; 9 Bom. L. R. 602. Cf. *Banee Madhub Ghose v. Thakoor Doss Mundul* (1866), B. L. R. F. B. R. 588; 6 W. R. Act X. R. 71.

⁹ *Post*, pp. 477 et seq.

¹⁰ See *Sankar Nath Mukerji v. Bejoy Gopal Mukerji* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 201.

¹¹ *Dayamani Debi v. Srinibash Kundu* (1906), 33 Calc. 842.

¹² *Mohunkoorur (Mussamut) v. Zoramun Singh (Baboo)* (1862), Marsh, 166; 1 Hay, 272; *Raie Churn Paul v. Suroop Chunder Mytee* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 598. See *post*, p. 477.

¹³ *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (Srimati)* (1907), 34 I. A. 87; 34 Calc. 329; 11 C. W. N. 424; 9 Bom. L. R. 602; *post*, pp. 477 et seq.

As to borrowing money for constructing a house, see *Bhogaraju Venkarama Jogiraju v. Addepalli Seshayya* (1912), 35 Mad. 569. See *post*, p. 483.

A Hindu widow can work a quarry and apply the proceeds for her own purpose, at any rate, provided that she does not exhaust the land.¹ Quarry or mine.

A widow² or other restricted female owner³ can alienate the property or her interest in it, if she be a joint owner,⁴ for her lifetime, and the transferee acquires all her rights.⁵ When she purports to alienate the whole estate in the property, but on the ground of want of necessity or otherwise her act is not binding on the reversioners, the alienation will enure until her death,⁶ or if she has inherited the property as widow, until her remarriage.⁷ Alienation by restricted owner for her life.

This applies even when the widow holds under an arrangement which prevents her alienating, without expressly prohibiting her from alienating the estate for her life.⁸

A compromise may or may not amount to an alienation. Whether it does so depends upon the circumstances.⁹

As to partition between co-widows, see *ante*, pp. 327, 328.

¹ *Subba Reddi v. Chengalamma* (1898), 22 Mad. 126.

² *Ramakul v. Ramasami Naickan* (1899), 22 Mad. 522; *Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagauti Prasad* (1897), 19 All. 357; *Durga Kunwar v. Matu Mal* (1913), 35 All. 311.

³ *Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal* (1899), 23 Mad. 504.

⁴ *Janokinath Mukhopadhyaya v. Mothuranath Mukhopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 580; 12 C. L. R. 15; *Hari Narayan Jog v. Vitai* (1907), 31 Bom. 560; 9 Bom. L. R. 1049. This alienation will not prevent the right of survivorship of a widow or sister, *ibid.*, *Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal* (1899), 23 Mad. 504.

⁵ *Durga Kunwar v. Matu Mal* (1913), 35 All. 311.

⁶ *Chedamparamma v. Hussainamma* (1915), 39 Mad. 565; *Vadali Mamidigadu v. Kotipalli Ramayya* (1902), 26 Mad. 334; *Sreeramulu v. Kristamma* (1902), 26 Mad. 143; *Bhagavatamma v. Pampanna Gaud* (1865), 2 Mad. H. C. 393; *Kamavadhani Venkata Subbaya v. Joysa Narasingappa* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 116; *Munatal Chaudri v. Gajraj*

Singh (1889), 17 Calc. 246; *Gobindmani Dasi v. Shamal Bysak* (1864), B. L. R. F. B. R. 48; W. R. F. B. R. 165; *Tarinee Churn Banerjee v. Nund Coomar Banerjee* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 47; *Ram Gutty Kurmukar v. Boishub Churn Mojoomdar* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 167; *Radha (Mussamut) v. Kour (Mussamut)*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 148; *Ramchandra Mankeshwar v. Bhimrav Ravji* (1877), 1 Bom. 577; *Melgirappa v. Shivappa* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 270; *Mayaram Bhairam v. Motiram Govindram* (1865), 2 Bom. H. C. 331 (2nd ed., 313); *Prag Das v. Hari Kishn* (1877), 1 All. 503; *Loll Soonder Doss v. Hurry Kishen Doss* (1862), Marsh, 113; 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 32; 1 Hay, 33; *Haradhun Naug v. Issur Chunder Bose* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 222. Cf. cases, *ante*, p. 199, note 7.

⁷ See *Haribhai v. Uka* (1899), 1 Bom. L. R. 201.

⁸ *Sahodra (Mussummat Bebea) v. Jung Bahadoor (Roy)* (1881), 8 I. A. 210; 8 Calc. 224.

⁹ See *Kambinayani Timnaji v. Kambinayani Subbaraju* (1910), 33 Mad. 473; *post*, p. 495.

Execution of
decree.

The personal interest of the restricted owner may be sold in execution of a decree.¹

Where the interest of a widow was sold, her heirs were held to be entitled to the proceeds.²

When widow,
etc., can
alienate.

For purposes of legal necessity,³ caused by circumstances over which she had no control,⁴ a widow or other woman with a restricted estate can alienate or charge⁵ the property so as to bind the reversion. Where the income is sufficient to meet the necessity, the reversioners are not bound.⁶

She cannot do so by will.⁷

When she does not purport to bind the estate, the fact that there was necessity does not enlarge the operation of the transfer.⁸

Whether she intended by the transaction to bind the estate or merely to deal with her own interest depends upon the terms of the document.⁹

As to the principles upon which such deed is to be construed see *Vasonji Morarji v. Chanda Bibi* (1915), 37 All. 369; 19 C. W. N. 873; 17 Bom. L. R. 556; following *Hunooman Pershad Panday v. Munraj Koonweree* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393, at pp. 411, 412.

Duty of purchaser or mortgagee and burden of proof.

The principles laid down in the leading case of *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree* (*Mussumat Babooce*),¹⁰ and the cases following it, as to what amounts to necessity, what is the duty of a person dealing with the manager for an

¹ Act V. of 1908, s. 60; *Kanni Ammal v. Ammakannu Ammal* (1899), 23 Mad. 504.

² *Chooney Money Dasse v. Ram Kinkur Dutt* (1900), 28 Calc. 155; 5 C. W. N. 242.

³ *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 529, at p. 551; 2 W. R. P. C. 61, at p. 64; *Raj Lukhee Dabee v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 209; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 57; 12 W. R. P. C. 47; *Kurun Sing (Rao) v. Mahomed Fyz Ali Khan* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 187; 10 B. L. R. 1; *Jagannath Vishal v. Apaji Vishnu* (1868), 5 Bom. "H. C. A. C. 217, at p. 221; *Panchcouree Mahtoon v. Kalee Churn* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 490; *Bulwunt Narain Singh v. Ram Kishen Singh*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 102.

⁴ *Hafzoonnissa Begum v. Radhabindoo Misser*, Ben. S. D. A., 1856, p. 595, at p. 605.

⁵ This would include a permanent or long lease: see *Felaram Roy v. Bagalanand Banerjee* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 895, ante, p. 476.

⁶ *Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh* (1911), 38 Calc. 721; upheld on appeal (1915), 43 Calc. 417. See *Kaleenarain Roy Chowdhry v. Ram Coomarr Chand*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 14.

⁷ Ante, p. 471.

⁸ *Prosunno Kumar Nandi v. Umedur Raja Chowdhry* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 353.

⁹ See *Damodar v. Jankibai* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 350. The mere fact that the woman purports to mortgage "her right and interest" does not show that she intended only to transfer her life estate: *Narainbati v. Ramdhari Singh* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 734.

¹⁰ (1856) 6 M. I. A. 393; 18 W. R. C. R., note to p. 81.

infant heir, and the burden of proof where an alienation by such manager is in question,¹ apply equally to the cases of persons dealing with Hindu widows or other restricted female owners.²

She cannot raise the money until the necessity has actually arisen.³ There must be a clear necessity for raising it, and an actual pressure.⁴ Circumstances
of pressure.

In *Upendranath Bose v. Bindesri Prosad* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 210, there are expressions which would extend the power of alienation beyond the case of pressing necessity, but in that case the alienation was binding as being in settlement of a *bonâ fide* dispute, and as being assented to by the reversioner.

The "necessity" involves some notion of pressure from without and not merely a desire to better or to develop the estate.⁵ It involves generally circumstances of pressure which render the raising of money necessary for the protection or preservation of the estate.

Where there is no legal necessity, although the payment be for the benefit of the estate, as where a co-sharer paid the widow's share of the Government revenue, an alienation cannot be supported.⁶

An alienation cannot be supported by debts which have been paid by the widow during her husband's lifetime.⁷

A family settlement, whereby a Hindu widow gave up a portion of the property, was held not to bind the reversioners, who were then born, and not parties thereto.⁸

¹ *Ante*, pp. 288-297.

² *Kamcswar Pershad (Baboo) v. Run Bahadoor Singh* (1880), 8 I. A. 8; 6 Calc. 843; 8 C. L. R. 361; *Amarnath Sah (Lala) v. Achan Kuar (Rani)* (1892), 19 I. A. 196; 14 All. 420; *Maheshwar Bakesh Singh v. Ratan Singh* (1896), 23 I. A. 57; 23 Calc. 766; *Cavalry Venkata Narrasnapah v. Collector of Masulipatam* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 619; 10 W. R. P. C. 47; *Birj Lal (Lala) v. Inda Kunwar (Musammatt)* (1914), 36 All. 187; 18 C. W. N. 652; 16 Bom. L. R. 352.

³ *Mullikal v. Mada Chetty*, 6 Mad. Jur. 261, referred to in Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 882.

⁴ *Dharam Chand Lal v. Bhawani Misran* (1897), 24 I. A. 183; 25 Calc. 189; 1 C. W. N. 697; *Bygnath*

Pershad (Lalla) v. Bissen Beharee Sahoy Singh (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 79.

⁵ *Ganap v. Subbi* (1908), 32 Bom. 577; 10 Bom. L. R. 927. See *Himmat Bahadur v. Bhawani Kunwar* (1908), 30 All. 352; affirmed on appeal, *Bhawani Kunwar v. Himmat Bahadur* (1911), 33 All. 342; 15 C. W. N. 466; 13 Bom. L. R. 384.

⁶ *Upendra Lal Mukerjee v. Girindra Nath Mukherjee* (1898), 25 Calc. 565; 2 C. W. N. 425.

⁷ *Himmat Bahadur v. Bhawani Kunwar* (1908), 30 All. 352; affirmed on appeal, *Bhawani Kunwar v. Himmat Bahadur* (1911), 33 All. 342; 15 C. W. N. 466; 13 Bom. L. R. 354.

⁸ *Asharam Sadhani v. Chandi Churn Mukerjee* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 147.

Right to
alienate
extends to
all property.

The right to alienate for purposes of necessity extends to all property which has come to a woman as such restricted heir.

Family
business.

Where a share has been allotted to a widow on partition with a co-widow, she can alienate it for necessity.¹ She cannot without necessity alienate property even if it has been made over to her for her maintenance.²

The restrictions on a Hindu widow's power of alienation are not relaxed in reference to an ancestral family business which has devolved upon her. In all such cases the authority of the manager to pledge ancestral estate without the consent of the parties interested depends on proof that alienation is necessary to pay the debts of the business; and the onus of proof rests on the party who seeks to enforce his security.³

Co-widows.

An alienation by one of two co-widows is not *ipso facto* invalid with reference to the interest of the other co-widow or of persons interested in the reversion.⁴

What are
"necessary"
purposes.
Religious
ceremonies.

The following are proper objects for the alienation of the property:—

(a) The payment of the funeral or periodical *śradh* ceremonies and annual ceremonies of the husband,⁵ or other last full owner, and of such religious ceremonies as he was bound to perform, as for instance his mother's *śradh*.⁶

"For religious or charitable purposes, or those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband, a widow has a larger power of disposition than that which she possesses for purely worldly purposes."⁷

¹ *Takurmani Singh v. Dai Rani Kori* (1906), 33 Calc. 1079.

² *Seith Gobin Das v. Ranchore* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 324, see *ante*, p. 438.

³ *Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunuar* (1898), 25 I. A. 183; 21 All 71; 2 C. W. N. 729. See *ante*, pp. 274, 275.

⁴ *Subbammal v. Avudaiyammal* (1906), 30 Mad. 3.

⁵ *Mutteeram Kowar v. Gopaul Sahoo* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 416; 20 W. R. C. R. 187; *Lakshminarayana v. Dasu* (1887), 11 Mad. 288; *Chrumun Lall v. Gunput Lall (Lalla)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52; *Junmejoy Mullick (Chowdhry) v. Russomoyee Dossee* (1868), 1 B. L. R. 418, note; 10 W. R. C. R. 309; "Daya-Bhaga," chap. xi. s. 1, para. 61. In *Tatagya v.*

Ramakrishnamura (1910), 34 Mad. 288, at p. 290, the Court said: "We think we are warranted in holding that if the property sold or gifted bears a small proportion (which it is impossible to define more exactly) to the estate inherited and the occasion of the disposition or expenditure is reasonable and proper according to the common notions of the Hindus, it is justifiable and cannot be impeached by the reversioner."

⁶ *Junmejoy Mullick (Chowdhry) v. Russomoyee Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1868), 11 B. L. R. 418, note; 10 W. R. C. R. 309.

⁷ *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 529, at p. 551; 2 W. R. P. C. 61, at p. 64.

A woman inheriting as mother would not apparently have any power to sell for the religious benefit of her son.¹

A pilgrimage by a widow for her husband's religious benefit, as by a *sradh* at Gya, might justify an alienation² but a pilgrimage for her own religious benefit,³ although it may indirectly benefit her husband,⁴ does not justify an alienation, except perhaps of a small portion.⁵

It has been held in Allahabad that a feast given on return from a pilgrimage even for the religious benefit of the husband does not justify an alienation,⁶ but a different view has been entertained in Calcutta.⁷ The expenses of the feast are, it is submitted, part of the expenses of the pilgrimage.

In some old cases gifts of a small portion of the corpus of the husband's property to Brahmins and to idols were upheld,⁸ and in a recent case a gift of a very small portion of the property by a daughter was justified.⁹ Modern authority would apparently, in most cases, repudiate such gifts on the ground that they conduce to the spiritual benefit of the widow alone,¹⁰ but where the gift is for the spiritual benefit of the husband it may be upheld.¹¹ It is clear that a dedication of a substantial portion of the property for the endowment of an idol is voidable.¹²

The digging of a tank, although a meritorious act, does not justify a sale,¹³ except where it is necessary in connection with a temple founded by the deceased husband.¹⁴

¹ *Hurmanaye Narain Singh v. Ram Gopal Achary* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 782.

² *Mohamed Ushruf v. Brojessurce Dossee* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 118; 19 W. R. C. R. 426; *Mutteeram Kowar v. Gopaul Sahoo* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 410; 20 W. R. C. R. 187. See *Tarini Prasad Chatterjee v. Bholanath Mookerjee* (1891), 21 Calc. 190, note; *Ganpat v. Tulsiram* (1911), 36 Bom. 88; 13 Bom. L. R. 860. Cf. *Ram Kant Chuckerbutty v. Chunder Narain Dutta Roy* (1878), 2 C. L. R. 474.

³ *Huro Mohun Audhikar v. Auluck Monee Dassee* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 252. See *Hari Kissen Bhagat v. Bajrang Sahai Singh* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 544, at p. 547; S. C. on appeal, *Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Pershad Singh* (1914), 42 I. A. 64; 42 Calc. 876; 19 C. W. N. 370; 17 Bom. L. R. 426.

⁴ *Rama v. Ranga* (1885), 8 Mad. 552.

⁵ See *Ibid.*, at p. 554.

⁶ *Makhan Lal v. Gayan Singh* (1910), 33 All. 255.

⁷ *Dinanath Ghose v. Hrishkesh Pal* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 1303.

⁸ *Jugjeerun Nuthoojee v. Deo Sunkar Kaseeram* (1812), 1 Borr. 394; *Kupoor Bhuvanee v. Seerukram Seeshunkur* (1815), 1 Borr. 405. Here there was a gift of a house. In *Chooneelal v. Jussoo Mull Devedas* (1813), 1 Borr. 55, the law officer of

the Sadr Adawlut held that the widow cannot make a gift of landed property to her priest. See *Ram Kaval Singh v. Ram Kishore Das* (1895), 22 Calc. 506; *Ram Chunder Surma v. Gungagovind Bunnhoofirih* (1826), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 117 (new edition, 147).

⁹ *Tutayya v. Rumakrishnamma* (1910), 34 Mad. 288.

¹⁰ *Kartick Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Gow Mohun Roy* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 48.

¹¹ *Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser* (1915), 43 Calc. 574.

¹² *Chooramani Dasi v. Baidya Nath Nask* (1904), 32 Calc. 473; *Ram Kaval Singh v. Ram Kishore Das* (1895), 22 Calc. 506. See *Bhaskar Trimback Acharya v. Mahadev Ramji* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. O. C. 1; *Hurmanaye Narain Singh v. Ram Gopal Achary* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 782. It has been held that she can do so with the consent of the reversioners, *Brajanath Baisakh v. Matilal Baisakh* (1869), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 92.

¹³ *Runjeet Ram Koolal v. Mahomed Waris* (1873), 2 W. R. C. R. 49. See, however, *fatwah* of pundits in *Kashinath Basak v. Harasundari Dasi* (1826), "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., 101.

¹⁴ *Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser* (1915), 43 Calc. 574.

Payment
of debts.

- (b) The payment of the debts of a previous full owner,¹ for the payment of which no provision has been made.²

She is not obliged to pay such debts out of income.³

As in the case of the widow the obligation is one of religious duty, she is entitled to alienate in respect of debts which are barred by the law of limitation,⁴ or by any other enactment, which permits the debtor to evade the obligation,⁵ unless they have been repudiated by her husband.⁶ In the case of debts contracted for immoral purposes she would, it is submitted, only be entitled to alienate where the debt can be enforced in a court of law.

She must in paying such debts act fairly to all the creditors as a body, and not unduly prefer any of them.⁷ She is not obliged to wait until the creditor has brought pressure by way of a suit,⁸ but there must be a pressure of some kind.⁹

Government
Revenue, etc.

- (c) The payment of Government Revenue or other dues the non-payment of which would imperil the estate,¹⁰ such as the satisfaction of a decree, even if such decree was obtained against a female representing the estate.¹¹

¹ Colebrooke's "Digest," chap. i. p. 270; "Vyavahara Mayukha," chap. v. s. iv. paras. 17, 20; *Debi Dayal Sahoo v. Bhan Pertab Singh* (1903), 31 Calc. 433; 8 C. W. N. 408; *Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma* (1902), 27 Mad. 45; *Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai* (1877), 2 Bom. 494, at p. 499; cases note 10, below. See *Maheshwar Bakesh Singh v. Ratan Singh* (1896), 23 I. A. 57; 23 Calc. 766; *Hemchund Mujoomdar v. Tara Munnee (Mussumaut)* (1811), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 359 (new edition, 481); *Lukmeeram v. Khooshalee* (1818), 1 Borr. 412, and cases cited in Norton's L. C. pp. 641, 642; *Soorjoo Pershad v. Krishan Pertab Bahadoor Sahie (Rajah)* (1869), 1 N. W. P. 46; *Felaram Roy v. Bagatanand Banerjee* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 895; in *Bhau Babaji v. Gopala Mahipati* (1886), 11 Bom. 325, an alienation for the purpose of paying the debts of a father-in-law was upheld.

² In *Tiluck Roy v. Phoolman Roy* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 450, the debt was provided for under the terms of a farm lease. As to debts paid by a widow during her husband's lifetime, see *ante*, p. 479.

³ *Ramasami Chetti v. Mangaikarasu*

Nachiur (1894), 18 Mad. 113.

⁴ *Chimnaji Govind Godbole v. Dinkar Dhondev Godbole* (1886), 11 Bom. 320; *Kondappa v. Subba* (1889), 13 Mad. 189; *Udar Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Ashutosh Das Mozumdar* (1893), 21 Calc. 190. In this respect her position is different from that of a manager. See *ante*, p. 277.

⁵ As, for instance, the Dekhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII. of 1879), *Bhau Babaji v. Gopala Mahipati* (1886), 11 Bom. 325.

⁶ *Bhagwat v. Nivratti* (1914), 39 Bom. 113; 16 Bom. L. R. 738.

⁷ *Rangilbhai Kalyandas v. Vilayak Vishnu* (1887), 11 Bom. 606.

⁸ *Kaihur Singh v. Roop Singh* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 4.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 479.

¹⁰ *Srimohan Jha v. Brijbhary Misser* (1909), 36 Calc. 753; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 203; *Gooroopersaud Jenu v. Mud-dunmohun Soor*, Ben. S. D. A., 1856, p. 980; *Sreenath Roy v. Ruttunmalla Chowdhraim*, Ben. S. D. A., 1859, p. 421.

¹¹ *Karimuddin (Munshi) v. Gobind Krishna Narain (Kunwar)* (1909), 36 I. A. 138; 31 All. 487; 13 C. W. N. 1117; 11 Bom. L. R. 911.

The payment of the debts of a family business, which forms part of the estate, justifies an alienation.¹

- (d) Reasonable ² costs of necessary litigation "in recovering Costs,
or preserving the estate, or in defending her rights," ³
or other necessary legal expenses, such as the cost
of obtaining a succession certificate,⁴ but not the costs
of imprudent litigation which is not for the benefit of
the estate.⁵
- (e) The protection and preservation of the estate,⁶ such as Repairs, etc.
the cost of repairs and other expenses necessary to the
well-being of the estate.⁷

The construction of a house which is not necessary for the management of the estate would not justify an alienation ⁸ except perhaps where it is impossible to provide accommodation otherwise for the widow's residence.

It has been held that she cannot sell for the purpose of paying a personal debt, such as arrears of road cess,⁹ payable under the Public Demands Recovery Act,¹⁰ but as this is a debt which may be incurred in the proper management of the estate, it is submitted that it cannot be laid down generally that a widow cannot alienate for this purpose.

- (f) To provide for her maintenance, and the expenses of Her mainten-
such religious ceremonies as a woman in her position is ance.
required to perform.¹¹

¹ *Jagarnath Prasad v. Jaikishun Prasad* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 16.

² *Bhimaraddi v. Bhaskar* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 628.

³ *Karimuddin (Munshi) v. Gobind Krishna Narain (Kunwar)* (1909), 36 I. A. 138; 31 All. 497; 13 C. W. N. 1117; 11 Bom. L. R. 911; *Debi Dayal Sahoo v. Bhan Pertab Singh* (1903), 31 Calc. 433; 8 C. W. N. 408; *Amjad Ali v. Moniram Kahla* (1885), 12 Calc. 52. See *Pannalal Seal v. Bamasundari Dasi (Srimati)* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 732; *Phool Koer (Mussamut) v. Dabee Pershad* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 187.

⁴ *Srinohan Jha v. Brijbehary Misser* (1909), 36 Calc. 753.

⁵ *Indar Kuar v. Lalla Prasad Singh* (1882), 4 All. 532.

⁶ *Soorjoo Pershad v. Krishan Pertab Bahadoor Sahie (Rajah)* (1869), 1 N. W. P. 46.

⁷ See *Hurry Mohun Rai v. Gonesh Chunder Doss* (1884), 10 Calc. 823.

⁸ *Bhogaraju Venkatrama Jogiraju v. Addepalli Seshaya* (1911), 35 Mad. 560.

⁹ *Srinohan Jha v. Brijbehary Misser* (1909), 36 Calc. 753.

¹⁰ Act VII. (Ben. C.) of 1880.

¹¹ *Sadashiv Bhaskar Joshi v. Dhakubai* (1889), 5 Bom. 450; *Soorjoo Pershad v. Krishan Pertab Bahadoor Sahie (Rajah)* (1869), 1 N. W. P. 46; *Sreenath Roy v. Ruttunmalla Chowdhraim*, Ben. S. D. A., 1859, p. 421; "Daya-Krama Sangraha," chap. i. s. ii. para. 6; Strange's "Hindu Law," vol. i. p. 246; vol. ii. p. 251; *Raj Chunder Paramanik (Doe dem) v. Bulloram Biswas* (1837), 1 Fulton, 133. Where the next heir agrees to support her she cannot sell, Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 211. She can provide for her maintenance out of the estate even though she be living with a paramour, *Amjad Ali v. Moniram Kahla* (1885), 12 Calc. 52.

Maintenance
of dependent
members of
family.

- (g) To provide for the maintenance of dependent members of her family, whom her husband or the other last full owner (as the case may be) was legally or morally bound to support, and for their marriages or other necessary religious ceremonies,¹ on a reasonable scale, having regard to the amount of the property and the position of the family.²

The maintenance of the grandsons of the husband,³ and the performance of the *sradh* of a mother⁴ have been held to justify a sale.

Marriage of
daughter.

- (h) To provide for the marriage expenses of a daughter,⁵ or other female member of the family.⁶

In one case where a Hindu widow borrowed a sum of money for the purpose of defraying the marriage expenses of a son's daughter, the Court held that such sum was recoverable from the reversioners after the widow's death, although it was not charged on the estate.⁷

Gift to
daughter on
marriage.

When upon the death of a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara law, his property is taken by the widow, a gift by the widow to her daughter, on the occasion of her marriage, out of the estate of her husband is within her power, provided that the portion so given is reasonable in amount,⁸ i.e. that it does not exceed one-fourth of the property.⁹ There would be the same right according to the Bengal school.¹⁰

It has been held that she can borrow money for the purpose of cultivating the estate, so that she may be maintained, *Oodey Singh (Koer) v. Phool Chund* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 197.

¹ *Debi Dayal Sahoo v. Bhan Pertap Singh* (1903), 31 Calc. 433; 8 C. W. N. 408; *Ganpat v. Tulsiram* (1911), 13 Bom. L. R. 860 (betrothal of daughter); *Preaj Narain v. Ajodhyapurshad* (1848), 7 Ben. Sel. R. 513 (new edition, 602) (marriage of daughter); *Rustam Singh v. Moti Singh* (1896), 18 All. 474 (Do.). In this last case the mother alienated property which had descended to her from her father.

² See *Doorhyar Roy v. Dulsinghar Singh* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 367.

³ *Chumun Lall v. Gunput Lall (Lalla)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52. A grandfather cannot be compelled to maintain his grandchildren, *ante*, p. 211, but he is morally bound to maintain them.

⁴ *Srimohan Jha v. Brijbehary Misser* (1909), 36 Calc. 753.

⁵ *Chumun Lall v. Gunput Lall (Lalla)* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 52; *Makhan Lal v. Gayan Singh* (1910), 33 All. 255.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 235, 271, 289.

⁷ *Ramcoomar Mitter v. Ichamoyi Dasi* (1880), 6 Calc. 36; 6 C. L. R. 429; see *post*, pp. 492, 493.

⁸ *Churamun Sahu v. Gopi Sahu* (1909), 37 Calc. 1, at p. 8; 13 C. W. N. 994, at p. 999; *Abhesang Tirabhar v. Raisang Fatesang* (1912), 14 Bom. L. R. 602. This applies also when the widow has taken as mother, *Ramasami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar* (1898), 22 Mad. 113.

⁹ *Churamun Sahu v. Gopi Sahu* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 994, at p. 999; "Mitakshara," chap. i. s. vii. paras. 5-14.

¹⁰ *Kashinath Basak v. Harasundari Dasi* (1826), "Vyavastha Darpana," 2nd ed., 97, at p. 101. The provision of a portion for a daughter is there put as a religious purpose; see *ante*, p. 33.

This rule has been extended to a gift at the time of the *gouna* or *dwiragan* ceremony, when the wife, upon the attainment of puberty, goes to reside with her husband,¹ but although presents are given at such ceremony, it is, it is submitted, very doubtful whether a gift of a portion of the husband's immovable property is permissible. The *gouna* ceremony is not in law a part of the marriage ceremony. A gift to a son-in-law on the occasion of the marriage has been also upheld.²

The estate is not liable for the marriage expenses of a daughter's daughter, although the son-in-law is a *ghar jamai*, i.e. resides with his mother-in-law.³

"A widow, like a manager⁴ of the family, must be allowed a reasonable latitude in the exercise of her powers, provided, as Mr. Justice West says in *Chimnaji Govind Godbole v. Dinkar Dhonev Godbole*,⁵ 'she acts fairly to the expectant heirs.'"⁶

Latitude in
exercise of
powers.

A family arrangement by which the widow granted an *ijara* of the property was upheld by the Judicial Committee in *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Girendra Nath Mukerji* (1914), 41 Calc. 793; 18 C. W. N. 673; 16 Bom. L. R. 425.

A sale by a widow in order to pay off a mortgage, which is not yet due, may be justifiable.⁷

A widow "is not bound to mortgage any portion of her husband's estate, if that would be more prejudicial to her than a sale, by reducing her income to a greater extent, as she does not hold the property for the benefit of the reversioner, nor is she bound to raise money on her personal security."⁸

Mortgage.

It is sometimes impossible for a widow to arrange a sale of a portion of the property exactly sufficient to pay the amount required. When under these circumstances she sells more, the sale would be justified.⁹

When she raises money by a mortgage she can borrow only to the extent of the necessity.¹⁰

The reversioners are only bound by a rate of interest which is reasonable under the circumstances.¹¹

Rate of
interest.

The form of the alienation is immaterial provided that the document

¹ *Churamun Sahu v. Gopi Sahu* (1909), 37 Calc. 1; 13 C. W. N. 994.

² *Ramasami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar* (1898), 22 Mad. 113.

³ *Narainbati v. Ramdhari Singh* (1916), 20 C. W. N. 734; 1 Pat. L. J. 81.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 272.

⁵ (1886), 11 Bom. 320, at p. 324.

⁶ *Venkaji Shrivdhar v. Vishnu Babaji Beri* (1893), 18 Bom. 534, at p. 536.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Singam Setti Sanjivi Kondaya v. Draupadi Bayamma* (1907), 31 Mad. 153, at pp. 154, 155; *Nabakumar Haldar v. Bhadasundari Debi* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 375; *Phool*

Ohund Lall v. Rughoobuns Suhaye (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 107; cf. *Mohanund Mondul v. Nafur Mondul* (1899), 26 Calc. 820; 3 C. W. N. 470.

⁹ See *Kamikhaprasad Roy v. Jagadamba Dasi (Srimati)* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 508, at p. 520; *Felaram Roy v. Bagalanand Banerjee* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 895; *Chatranarayana (Lala) v. Uba Kumwari* (1868), 1 B. L. R. (A. C.) 201; *Sugeeram Begum v. Judoobuns Suhaye* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 284.

¹⁰ See *Lalit Panday v. Sridhar Deo Narayan Singh* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 176.

¹¹ *Stevens v. Janki Ballabh* (1913), 19 C. W. N. 80.

purports to deal with the whole interest in the property. The fact that the widow purported to alienate the property as guardian of a son, whose adoption turned out to be invalid, was held not to depreciate the validity of the alienation.¹

Avoidance
of alienation.

An alienation by a restricted owner in excess of her powers is voidable by the reversioners. It is not void.²

The reversioner may ratify the alienation,³ or he may treat it as a nullity.⁴ It is not necessary for him to sue to set it aside.⁵

It cannot be avoided by any one except the reversioner.⁶

As to compensation on setting aside an alienation, see *ante*, p. 307.

Consent of
reversioners
to alienation.

A sale of the whole of her interest in the property by a female holding a qualified estate, although it be not on account of a legal necessity, transfers the whole interest in the property, if it be effected with the consent, at the time of the transaction or thereafter,⁷ of all⁸ the presumptive reversioners, that is to say, of all the members of the class of persons who would be entitled to succeed to a full estate in the property, if the widow had died at the moment of the sale,⁹ or

¹ *Parbhu Lall (Lala) v. Mylne* (1887), 14 Cal. 401.

² *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (Srimati)* (1907), 34 I. A. 87; 34 Cal. 329; 11 C. W. N. 424; 9 Bom. L. R. 602; *Kishori Pal v. Bhūsai Bhuiya (Sheikh)* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 106; *Deonandan Pershad v. Udit Narayan Singh* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 940.

³ *Modhu Sudan Singh (Raja) v. Rooke* (1897), 24 I. A. 164; 25 Cal. 1; 1 C. W. N. 433; *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Nil Ratan Mukerji* (1903), 30 Cal. 990; 7 C. W. N. 864; S. C. (on appeal) (1907), 34 I. A. 87; 34 Cal. 329; 11 C. W. N. 424; 9 Bom. L. R. 602; *Hayes v. Harendra Narain* (1904), 31 Cal. 698.

⁴ *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (Srimati)* (1907), 34 I. A. 87; 34 Cal. 329; 11 C. W. N. 424; 9 Bom. L. R. 602.

⁵ *Harihar Ojha v. Dasarathi Misra* (1905), 33 Cal. 257; 9 C. W. N. 636.

⁶ *Deonandan Pershad v. Udit Narayan Singh* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 940.

⁷ *Bajrang Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh* (1907), 35 I. A. 1;

30 All. 1; 12 C. W. N. 74; 9 Bom. L. R. 1348. See *Khuwani Singh v. Chet Ram* (1916), 39 All. 1.

⁸ *Radha Shyam Sircar v. Joyram Senapati* (1890), 17 Cal. 896.

⁹ *Bajrang Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh* (1907), 35 I. A. 1; 30 All. 1; 12 C. W. N. 74; 9 Bom. L. R. 1348; *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapak* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 529, at p. 551; 2 W. R. P. C. 61, at p. 64; *Srinivasya Dubeah (Rany) v. Koonal Luta (Rany)* (1847), 4 M. I. A. 292; *Rangappa Naik v. Kamte Naik* (1908), 31 Mad. 366; *Pilu v. Babaji* (1909), 34 Bom. 165; 11 Bom. L. R. 1291; *Nobo Kishore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy* (1884), 10 Cal. 1102; *Brajanath Barsakh v. Matlal Buisakh* (1869), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 92; *Raj Bullubh Sen v. Oomesh Chunder Roor* (1878), 5 Cal. 44; 3 C. L. R. 384; *Vinayak Vilhal Bhang v. Govind Venkatesh Kulkarni* (1900), 25 Bom. 129; 2 Bom. L. R. 820; *Kishen Geer (Mohunt) v. Busgeet Roy* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 379; *Trilochun Chuckerbutty v. Umesh Chunder Lahiri* (1880), 7 C. L. R. 57;

(if the consent be subsequent to the sale) at the time of the consent.

The alienation can in that case be supported by the theory of relinquishment.¹ Sir G. D. Banerjee ("Law of Marriage," 4th ed., pp. 237, 239) contends with reason that a transfer of a portion of the property is valid.

Ordinarily the consent of the whole body of persons constituting the next reversion should be obtained,² though there may be cases in which special circumstances may render the strict enforcement of the rule impossible.³ "At all events there should be such a concurrence of the members of the family as suffices to raise a presumption that the transaction was a fair one, and one justified by Hindu law."⁴

Where the alienation by the widow does not amount to a complete relinquishment of all her interest in the property of her husband the consent of the reversioners is *prima facie*, and cogent evidence of necessity,⁵ or inquiry, but can be rebutted by evidence showing the absence of such necessity or inquiry.⁶

Kali Kishore Pal v. Abdul Karim (1897), 2 C. W. N. 132; *Radha (Mussamut) v. Kour (Mussamut)*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 148; *Abhesang Tirabhai v. Rai Sang Fatesang* (1912), 14 Bom. L. R. 602; *Mallik Saheb v. Mallikarjunappa* (1913), 15 Bom. L. R. 1142; *Narayana Aiyar v. Rama Aiyar* (1913), 38 Mad. 396. See *Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat* (1913), 40 Calc. 721; 17 C. W. N. 701. See also cases collected in Norton's "Leading Cases," pp. 626, 627. For a contrary view, see *Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kuari* (1883), 6 All. 116; *Varjivan Rangji v. Ghelji Gokaldas* (1881), 5 Bom. 563, which must now be considered as overruled.

¹ *Post*, p. 490. *Suressur Misser (Chowdhury) v. Mohesh Ram Mesrain (Musetti)* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 142.

² *Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhury* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 209, at p. 228; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 57, at p. 63; 12 W. R. P. C. 47, at p. 50; *Radha Shyam Sircar v. Joy Ram Senapati* (1890), 17 Calc. 896. In a Bombay case (*Vinayak v. Govind* (1900), 25 Bom. 129; 2 Bom. L. R. 820), where a man died leaving a widow, a sister, and her son, the Court upheld an alienation by the widow

with the consent of the sister's son on the ground that he was the only male reversioner, and that his consent showed the propriety of the sale.

³ *Bajrangji Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh* (1907), 35 I. A. 1, at p. 16; 30 All. 1, at p. 21; 12 C. W. N. 74, at p. 83; 9 Bom. L. R. 1348.

⁴ *Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhury* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 209, at p. 228; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 57, at p. 63; 12 W. R. P. C. 47, at p. 50; *Varjivan Rangji v. Ghelji Gokaldas* (1881), 5 Bom. 563, at p. 571; *Vinayak v. Govind* (1909), 25 Bom. 129, at p. 139; 2 Bom. L. R. 820. In *Ram Krishna Kuppuswami v. Tripurabai* (1911), 13 Bom. L. R. 940, it was held that the consent of the nearest reversioner did not validate an alienation.

⁵ *Bejoy Gopal Mukerji v. Girindra Nath Mukerji* (1914), 41 Calc. 793; 18 C. W. N. 673; 16 Bom. L. R. 425; *Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Pershad Singh* (1914), 42 I. A. 64; 42 Calc. 876; 19 C. W. N. 370; 17 Bom. L. R. 426.

⁶ *Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat* (1913), 40 Calc. 721; 17 C. W. N. 401; *Nabin Chandra Saha v. Hem Chandra Ray* (1913), 19 C. W. N. 265.

As, for instance, a sale of a portion of the estate,¹ a mortgage,² or a long lease executed to save the property from destruction.³

A sale or other alienation of the whole property with the consent of some only of the reversioners stands upon the same footing.⁴

Where the immediate reversioner would, if she succeeded, be a restricted owner, both her consent and that of subsequent reversioners would be necessary.

The consent of a female reversioner, who would in turn become a restricted owner, is not sufficient.⁵ It might, it is submitted, be some evidence to corroborate other evidence of necessity.

There was a controversy as to the basis upon which the right of the widow to sell with the consent of the reversioners rested. According to one view the consent derived its force from the power supposed to reside in a widow of accelerating by the surrender of her own interest the interests of the reversioners;⁶ but the doctrine of acceleration consequent on relinquishment is in theory inapplicable where the widow transfers for a price or retains an interest in the purchase-money.⁷ The other view was that the consent of the persons interested to oppose the transaction evidenced

¹ *Gopeshwar Misra v. Durgamani Baishnabi* (1913), 17 C. W. N. 1062; *Marudamuthu Nudan v. Srinvasa Pillai* (1898), 21 Mad. 128; *Muthuveeru Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Mudaliar* (1908), 32 Mad. 206; see *Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat* (1913), 40 Calc. 721; 17 C. W. N. 701; *Pulin Chandra Mandal v. Bolai Mandal* (1908), 35 Calc. 939; 12 C. W. N. 837; *Rangappa Nair v. Kamti Nair* (1908), 31 Mad. 366, at p. 370. In *Bajrangji Singh v. Manokarnika Bakhsh Singh* (1907), 35 I. A. 1; 30 All. 1; 12 C. W. N. 74; 9 Bom. L. R. 1348; the sales of successive portions which made up the whole estate, and in *Vinayak v. Govind* (1900), 25 Bom. 129; 2 Bom. L. R. 820, a sale of a portion only were upheld.

² *Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Pershad Singh* (1914), 42 I. A. 64; 42 Calc. 876; 19 C. W. N. 370; 17 Bom. L. R. 426; *Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat* (1913), 40 Calc. 721; 17 C. W. N. 701; *Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Bajrang Sahai Singh* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 544, at p. 548.

³ *Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Girindra*

Nath Mukerji (1914), 41 Calc. 793; 18 C. W. N. 673; 16 Bom. L. R. 425.

⁴ *Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat* (1913), 40 Calc. 721, at p. 476; 17 C. W. N. 701, at p. 731.

⁵ *Goolab Sing (Kooer) v. Rao Kurun Sing* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 176; 10 B. L. R. 1; *Bepin Behari Kundu v. Durga Charan Banerji* (1908), 35 Calc. 1086; 12 C. W. N. 914. See *Akkineri Sreeramulu v. Mullapudi Ramayya* (1902), 25 Mad. 731. There is some authority in Bombay that even where the female reversioner would on succession take an absolute estate her consent would not be sufficient, *Varjivan v. Ghelji* (1881), 5 Bom. 563; approved of in *Vinayak v. Govind* (1900), 25 Bom. 129, at pp. 134, 135; 2 Bom. L. R. 820. See, however, *Mallik Saheb v. Mullikarjunappa* (1913), 38 Bom. 224; 15 Bom. L. R. 1142, in which a different view was acted upon.

⁶ *Post*, pp. 490, 491.

⁷ *Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golap Bhagat* (1913), 40 Calc. 721, at pp. 779, 780; 17 C. W. N. 701, at p. 733.

its propriety, if not its actual necessity.¹ There can be no doubt that such consent is very strong evidence of necessity, and also that such reversioner either immediate or subsequent, as consented to the alienation will be estopped from disputing it.²

A ratification stands on the same footing as a consent.³

The form of consent is immaterial.

Form of
consent.

Consent may take the form of signature or attestation of the document,⁴ and sometimes subsequent acquiescence may imply consent, as for instance by the receipt of rent from the holder of a tenure created by the widow.⁵

The consent to be of any effect must be given with full knowledge of the circumstances and of the effect of the transaction and with an intelligent intention to consent to such effect.⁶ It must be free from any defect, such as fraud or mistake, which would vitiate a contract. It must be given in good faith, and not for an indirect purpose.⁷

Consent by a *purdahnashin* lady requires the strictest possible proof that she was fully aware of the circumstances and of her rights, and that no advantage was taken of her position.⁸

The mere omission to object, or to take steps to have the transaction set aside, does not amount to consent.

A sale which has been rendered effective by the necessary consent cannot be questioned by any reversioner subsequently born⁹ or adopted.¹⁰

The assent of the reversioner does not affect other reversioners where the widow does not purport to deal with anything beyond her own interest.¹¹

¹ *Vinayak v. Govind* (1900), 25 Bom. 129, at p. 133; 2 Bom. L. R. 820; *Pihu v. Babaji* (1909), 34 Bom. 165; 11 Bom. L. R. 1291. See *Madhub Chunder Hajrah v. Gobind Chunder Banerjee* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 350.

² Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 115; *Gopaul Chunder Manna v. Gour Monee Dossae* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 52; *post*, p. 507.

³ *Narayana v. Rama* (1913), 38 Mad. 396, at p. 402.

⁴ *Muteoolah (Sheikh) v. Radhabinod Misur*, Ben. S. D. A. 1856, p. 596. As to the effect of an attestation, see *Abhay Churn Ghose v. Attarmona Dassee* (1898), 13 C. W. N. 931. Mere attestation does not import concurrence; *Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Pershad Singh* (1914), 42 I. A. 64; 42 Calc. 876; 19 C. W. N. 370; 17 Bom. L. R. 426; see *Narayana v. Rama* (1913), 38 Mad. 396.

⁵ *Mohesh Chunder Bose v. Ugra Kant Banerjee* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 127.

⁶ *Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kumar* (1898), 25 I. A. 183, at p. 189;

21 All. 71, at p. 80; 2 C. W. N. 720, at p. 733; *Hari Kishen Bhagat v. Kashi Pershad Singh* (1914), 42 I. A. 64; 42 Calc. 876; 19 C. W. N. 370; 17 Bom. L. R. 426.

⁷ *Kolandaya Sholagan v. Vedamuthu Sholagan* (1896), 19 Mad. 337, where the transfer was made for the purpose of defeating the claims of a subsequent reversioner.

⁸ See *Bhagwat Dayal Singh (Raja Rai) v. Debi Dayal Sahu* (1908), 35 I. A. 48; 35 Calc. 420; 12 C. W. N. 393; 10 Bom. L. R. 230; and cases cited in Ameer Ali and Woodroffe's Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), notes to s. 111; see *post*, p. 511.

⁹ *Vinayak Vithal Bhangre v. Govind Venkatesh Kulkarni* (1900), 25 Bom. 129; 1 Bom. L. R. 820.

¹⁰ *Raj Kristo Roy v. Kishoree Mohun Majumdar* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 14; *ante*, pp. 199, 200.

¹¹ *Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi (Musammatt)* (1909), 36 I. A. 103; 36 Calc. 780; 13 C. W. N. 920; 11 Bom. L. R. 833. See *Jivan Singh v. Misri Lal* (1895), 23 I. A. 1; 18 All. 146.

A reversioner cannot delegate to his executor the option of assenting to the sale.¹

The fact that the widow obtained a benefit from the alienation, *e.g.* when as the result of a compromise an interest in the property is given to her, does not avoid the alienation, if it be in other respects unobjectionable.²

Gift.

Even with the consent of the reversioners a gift by the restricted owner to any one but the next reversioners is invalid.³

A reversioner who consented may be estopped from disputing the gift.⁴

Surrender of restricted estate.

A widow, or other female with a restricted estate, can surrender⁵ her whole estate⁶ in the whole property⁷ to the then next reversioners, whose estate is thereby accelerated and who obtain thereby as full a title as if they had taken directly from the last full owner,⁸ but such relinquishment does not affect prior alienations.⁹

¹ *Hayes v. Harendra Narain* (1904), 31 Cal. 698.

² *Suresur Misser (Chowdhury) v. Mohesh Rami Mesrain (Musst)* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 142.

³ *Bakhtawar v. Bhagwana* (1910), 32 All. 176; *Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kuari* (1883), 6 All. 116; *Abdulla v. Ram Lal* (1911), 34 All. 129; *Khawani Singh v. Chet Ram* (1916), 39 All. 1; *Raja Dei v. Umed Singh* (1912), 34 All. 207, where there was a gift by the widow to her daughter's son with the consent of her daughter.

⁴ *Bakhtawar v. Bhagwana* (1910), 32 All. 176.

⁵ A disclaimer may have the same effect as a surrender, see *Rujoneekant Mitter v. Premchand Bose* (1862), Marsh. 241; 1 Hay, 518.

⁶ *Rangappa Naik v. Kamti Naik* (1908), 31 Mad. 366, at pp. 369, 370; *Beharilal v. Madholal Ahir Gyawal* (1891), 19 I. A. 30, at p. 32; 19 Cal. 236, at p. 241; *Moti Raji v. Laldas Jibhai* (1916), 41 Bom. 93; 18 Bom. L. R. 954; *Janak Keshori Kuar v. Debi Prasad Singh (Babu)* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 490.

⁷ *Beharilal v. Madholal Ahir Gyawal* (1891), 19 I. A. 30; 19 Cal. 236.

(The observations of the Judicial Committee in that case dispose, it is submitted, of the views entertained in *Dul Singh v. Sundar Singh* (1892), 14 All. 377, and *Madan Mohan v. Puran Mal* (1884), 6 All. 288); *Annada Kumar Roy v. Indra Bhusan Mukhopadhyaya* (1907), 12 C. W. N. 49; *Hemchunder Sanyal v. Sarnamoyi Debi* (1894), 22 Cal. 453; *Hunsraj v. Monghubar (Bai)* (1905), 7 Bom. L. R. 622. See *Raj Kishore v. Durga Charan Lal* (1906), 29 All. 71; *Nobo Kishore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy* (1884), 10 Cal. 1102; *Noferdoss Roy v. Modhu Soondari Burmonia* (1880), 5 Cal. 732; 5 C. L. R. 551; *Jadumani Debi (Sramati) v. Saroda Prosanno Mookerjee* (1856), 1 Boul. 120; *Shama Soonduree v. Shurut Chunder Dutt* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 500; *Marudamathu Nadan v. Srinivasa Pillai* (1898), 2 Mad. 128, at p. 133. For older cases see Norton's Leading Cases, pp. 627, 628.

⁸ *Gunga Pershad Kur v. Shumhoonath Burmun* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 393.

⁹ *Subbamma v. Subramanyam* (1915), 39 Mad. 1035.

She can surrender to a female reversioner.¹ She cannot surrender to some only of the next reversioners.²

There is a conflict of decisions as to whether a surrender to subsequent reversioners with the consent of the immediate reversioners is valid.³

There is, it is submitted, nothing to prevent a relinquishment of all rights in the estate by the immediate reversioner, but no relinquishment short of this would be sufficient.⁴

The surrender is not effectual if it imposes on the reversioners obligations, which would not have existed if the property had devolved on them by inheritance.⁵

An arrangement which, besides a surrender of the whole estate, includes an absolute gift of half to the widow is entirely ineffectual so far as such half is concerned,⁶ but there is nothing to prevent an arrangement for the widow's maintenance on a surrender by her,⁷ or an arrangement by which a part of the property is transferred to some one else.⁸

Where the widow or other female owner has abandoned all worldly affairs the estate of the reversioners may be expedited.⁹

Abandonment
of worldly
affairs,

A widow or other restricted female owner cannot apparently relinquish a portion only of the estate in favour even of the whole body of the reversioners.¹⁰

The powers of a Hindu widow, or other restricted heir, who takes under a will, depend upon the terms of the will.¹¹

Powers under
will.

¹ *Bhupal Ram v. Lachma Kuar* (1888), 11 All. 253. See *Udhar Singh v. Ramee Koonver (Mussumat)* (1866), 1 Agra, 234; *Rup Ram v. Rewari (Musammam)* (1910), 32 All. 582.

² *Hem Chunder Sanyal v. Sarnamayi Debi* (1894), 22 Calo. 355. See *Annada Kumar Roy v. Indra Bhusan Mukhopadhyaya* (1907), 12 C. W. N. 49.

³ *Raja Dei v. Umed Singh* (1912), 34 All. 207; *Protap Chunder Roy Chowdhury v. Joy Monee Dabee Chowdhurain (Sreemutty)* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 98.

⁴ Cf. ante, p. 487.

⁵ *Sriramulu Naidu v. Andalammal* (1906), 30 Mad. 145.

⁶ *Hem Chunder Sanyal v. Sarnamayi Debi* (1894), 22 Calo. 354; *Kanuram Deb v. Kashi Chandra Sharma Chowdhuri* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 226. See, however, per Sankaran Nair, J., in *Challa Subbiah Sastri v. Palury Pattabhiramayya* (1908), 31 Mad. 446, at p. 450. In a

similar case the transaction was upheld on the ground that the reversioners were estopped, *Rangappa Naik v. Kamti Naik* (1908), 31 Mad. 366.

⁷ *Kundee Lall (Lalla) v. Kalee Pershad (Lalla)* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 307.

⁸ *Challa Subbiah Sastri v. Palury Pattabhiramayya* (1908), 31 Mad. 446.

⁹ See *Hafzonissa Begum v. Radhabinod Mitter*, Ben S. D. A. 1856, p. 595.

¹⁰ *Rangappa Naik v. Kamti Naik* (1908), 31 Mad. 366, at p. 370; *Marudamuthu Nandan v. Srinivasa Pillai* (1898), 21 Mad. 128, at p. 152; *Debi Prosad Chowdhury v. Golup Bhagat* (1913), 40 Calo. 721, at p. 750; 17 C. W. N. 701, at p. 718; *Suresur Mitter (Chowdhury) v. Mohesh Ranu Mesraia (Mussti)* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 142. *Contrâ Kanuram Deb v. Kashi Chandra Sarma Chowdhuri* (1909), 14 C. W. N. 226. See ante, p. 490.

¹¹ *Chundermoney Dossee v. Hurry Doss Mitter* (1880), 5 C. L. R. 557.

If the will merely confers the interest which the law would give her a heiress, the general law would apply.

Powers given
by Court.

Where a widow or other restricted female owner has obtained special powers from a Court under the provisions of an Act of the Legislature, her power to deal with the property is derived from the order of the Court.¹

If she has obtained letters of administration her powers are those of an administratrix.²

If she obtains permission to alienate under s. 90 of the Probate and Administration Act,³ she can confer an absolute title irrespective of necessity or of the consent of the reversioners.⁴

Debts not
charged on
property.

There is a difference of opinion as to whether the reversioners are responsible for debts incurred by a widow from legal necessity, but in respect of which no document charging the property beyond the widow's lifetime has been executed by the widow.

Where there is no legal necessity for the debts, it is clear that the reversioners are not bound to pay them.

There can be no reasonable doubt that reasonable trade debts in respect of a family business are payable out of the trade assets whether they are secured or not.⁵

The difficulty arises in cases where they were not incurred in respect of such business. The Allahabad High Court has declined to hold the reversioners responsible.⁶ The Madras High Court,⁷ and a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court⁸ have held them responsible. A recent decision of the Calcutta High Court has adopted the contrary view,⁹ but the Full Bench case does not appear to have been cited.

In one case the Bombay High Court exempted the reversioners,¹⁰ but

¹ See *Bhugwan Dass v. Luchmee Nairai* (1865), 2 W. R. M. A. 19

² *Loganada Mudali v. Ramaswami* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 384.

³ Act V. of 1881.

⁴ *Kamukya Nath Mukerjee v. Hari Churn Sen* (1899), 26 Cal. 607.

⁵ *Sakrabai Nathubai v. Maganlal Mulchand* (1901), 26 Bom. 206; 3 Bom. L. R. 738.

⁶ *Dhiraj Singh v. Manga Ram* (1897), 19 All. 300; *Shiamanand v. Har Lal* (1896), 18 All. 471. See *Kallu v. Faiyaz Ali Khan* (1908), 30 All. 394.

⁷ *Regella Jogayya v. Nimushakani*

Venkataratnamma (1910), 33 Mad. 492; *Veerabhadra Aiyar v. Murudaga Nachar* (1910), 34 Mad. 188; *Maharaja of Bobbili v. Zamindar of Chundi* (1910), 35 Mad. 108.

⁸ *Hurry Mohun Rai v. Gonesh Chunder Doss* (1884), 10 Calc. 823; *Ramcoomar Mitter v. Ichamoyi Dasi* (1880), 6 Calc. 36; 6 C. L. R. 429.

⁹ *Giribala Dassi v. Srinath Chandra Singh* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 769. Cf. *Prosunno Kumar Nandi v. Umedur Raja Chowdhry* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 353.

¹⁰ *Gadgeppa Desai v. Apaji Jivanrao* (1879), 3 Bom. 237.

in a recent case a Full Bench of the same Court considered that they are bound.¹

It is submitted that ordinarily reversioners are not responsible. A manager cannot bind the coparceners, or a minor owner personally,² although he may bind them by a mortgage or sale. Why should a widow be in a different position?

If credit be given to the estate, the creditors would generally insist upon security. Ordinarily it is to the present holder—the widow, to whom the creditors look for payment.

In the case where a female restricted owner, who has acquired the estate as a wife, daughter, or mother, is a ward of a Court of Wards, the powers of alienation given to the Courts of Wards by the several Acts constituting such Courts can only be exercised where the necessity is such as would have justified the owner in alienating the property herself.³

Wards of
Courts of
Wards.

A woman cannot (even, it is submitted, with the consent of the reversioners) by will dispose of the property in which she has only a restricted interest.⁴

Disposal by
will.

A widow or other female restricted owner fully represents the estate in legal or other proceedings with reference thereto.

Proceedings
by or against
limited heir as
representing
estate.

Where a decree has been made against the last full owner, it can be against the female holder as representing the estate.⁵

When a suit is pending against a Hindu defendant at the time of his death intestate, his heir, even though she be a female, should be put in his place in such suit, but her liability is limited to the assets which come to her hands.

When the decree is against the representative of a deceased person, a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree is bound to satisfy himself that the party sued as the representative of the deceased is his legal representative.⁶

If the widow does not represent the estate nothing passes by the sale,⁷

¹ *Sakrabhai Nathubhai v. Maganlal Mulchand* (1901), 26 Bom. 206; 3 Bom. L. R. 738.

² *Waghela Rajsanji v. Masludin* (Shekh) (1887), 14 I. A. 89; 11 Bom. 551; *Indur Chunder Singh v. Radhakishna Ghose* (1892), 19 I. A. 90; 19 Cal. 507; *Ranmal Singji (Maharana Shri) v. Vadilal Vakhatchand* (1894), 20 Bom. 61; *Surendra Nath Sarkar v. Atul Chandra Roy* (1907), 34 Cal. 892.

³ See Bengal Ward's Manual, 1909, pp. 19, 20.

⁴ *Goburdhun Nath v. Onoop Roy* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 105.

⁵ *Natha Hari v. Jamni* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 37; *Hari Vydianathayyan v. Minakshi Ammal* (1882), 5 Mad. 5.

⁶ *Natha Hari v. Jamni* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 37, at pp. 41, 42.

⁷ *Siva Bhagiam v. Palani Padiachi* (1882), 4 Mad. 401; *Ramasami Chetti v. Saluckai Tevar* (1875), 8 Mad. H. C. 186; *Jatha Naik v. Venkata* (1880), 5 Bom. 14; *Akoba Dada v. Sakharam* (1885), 9 Bom. 429; *Subbanna v. Venkatakrishnan* (1888), 11 Mad. 408; *Ahukmonee Dabee v. Banee Madhub Chuckerbutty* (1878), 4 Cal. 677; 3 C. L. R. 473.

unless the persons in whom the estate was vested are substantially represented by the widow.¹

Suit to recover
property.

As she represents the estate the widow or other female restricted owner is the person who should sue for such portion of the estate as is in the hands of others.

If she neglect to sue, apparently the immediate reversioner, and failing him, a subsequent reversioner, can sue.²

When decree
binds rever-
sioners.

The reversioners are bound by a decision fairly obtained on a question directly and substantially in issue and necessary to be decided,³ in a suit against a female restricted owner, as representing the estate, or in a suit by such restricted owner,⁴ "unless it could be shown that there had not been a fair trial of the right in that suit—or in other words, unless that decree could have been successfully impeached on some special ground, it would have been an effectual bar to any new suit" . . . by any person claiming in succession to such restricted owner.⁵

A decision in a suit by or against the limited heir not as representing the estate, but on matters personal to her, as, for instance, a decree against her for rent,⁶ or on account of a tortious act,⁷ does not bind the reversioners.⁸ For example, they are not liable for a wrongful act committed by her.⁹ In some cases where she has acted for the benefit of the estate, the estate may be liable for mesne profits.¹⁰

¹ There are cases where a widow is put on the record as representing her minor sons. In those cases the question is what is actually sold; see *Achut v. Manjunath* (1896), 21 Bom. 539, and cases cited in Trevelyan's "Law of Minors," 5th ed., p. 290, note 5.

² See *Joy Mooruth Koor v. Buldeo Singh* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 444; *Chunder Koomar Gangooly v. Raj Kishen Banjerjee* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 322.

³ *Muljibhai Narbharam v. Patel Lakshmidas* (1911), 36 Bom. 127, at p. 131; 13 Bom. L. R. 1035, at p. 1037.

⁴ See *Risal Singh v. Balwant Singh* (1915), 37 All. 496.

⁵ *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shavagunga* (1863), 9 M. L. A. 543, at p. 608; 2 W. R. P. C. 31, at p. 37; *Partab Narain Singh v. Trilokanath Singh* (1884), 11 I. A. 197; 11 Calc. 186; *Hurrinath Chatterjee v. Mothoor Mohun Goswami (Mohnut)* (1893), 20 I. A. 183; 21 Calo. 8; *Madan Mohan*

Lal v. Akbaryar Khan (1905), 28 All. 241; *Jharula Das v. Jalandhar Thakur* (1912), 39 Calc. 887; *Bhogaraju Venkatrama Jogiraju v. Addepalli Seshayya* (1912), 35 Mad. 560; *Ghelabai v. Javer (Bai)* (1912), 37 Bom. 172; 14 Bom. L. R. 1142; *Mohendra Nath Biswas v. Shamsunnessa Khatun* (1914), 19 C. W. N. 1280; *Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagavati Prasad* (1897), 19 All. 357, at p. 371; *Sachai v. Budhva Kuar* (1886), 8 All. 429; *Nand Kumar v. Radha Kuari* (1876), 1 All. 282.

⁶ *Bireswar Das Dey v. Kamal Kumar Dutt* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 337.

⁷ *Najar Chandra Pal Choudhury v. Kamini Kumar Lahiri* (1912), 18 C. W. N. 542.

⁸ *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285.

⁹ See *Sadas Koer v. Ramgobind Singh* (1911), 15 C. W. N. 357.

¹⁰ *Lalji Sahay v. Goberdhone Jha* (1909), 15 C. W. N. 859, note.

The majority of the Court held in *Risal Singh v. Bulwant Singh* (1915), 37 All. 496, that the reversioners were bound by a decree in a suit brought by a widow to set aside an adoption.

It is the duty of the widow to protect the estate, and if she collusively allow judgment to be given and execution to be taken out, the sale will be set aside.¹ She is not bound to contest a just claim.² A decree properly obtained in an undefended suit binds the estate.³

The Allahabad High Court has held that the reversioners can only be bound by decree made after a full contest in a *bonâ fide* litigation, and are not bound by a compromise, even though it be followed by a decree.⁴

It has been held in Madras that a decree passed on a compromise into which the widow enters will have no higher effect against the reversioners than a contract entered into by her.⁵

In Bengal it has been held⁶ that a widow, as representative of the entire estate in the litigation, has the same control with respect to compromise as she has with respect to the assertion of rights and with respect to appeal against an adverse decision. "It is, of course, possible that the trust thus reposed in the widow may be abused without detection, as may the very large discretion which, as the law now stands, she undoubtedly possesses in other matters; but, on the whole, we think it will be found most favourable for the heirs that she should have the power of making an honest compromise at every stage of the proceedings."

It is, it is submitted, clear that a compromise or an award⁷ which amounts to an alienation without necessity, or is otherwise distinctly disadvantageous to the reversioners,⁸ or is made by the restricted heir for her own personal advantage only,⁹ would not bind them, and would be treated as an alienation. Where the compromise amounts to a *bonâ fide* settlement of disputes, and was arrived at with due care and caution,¹⁰ it will be upheld.¹¹

¹ *Parekh Ranchor v. Vakhat (Bai)* (1886), 11 Bom. 119; see that case as to the law of limitation.

² *Subbammal v. Arudayammal* (1906), 30 Mad. 3.

³ *Gurnak Prasad v. Jai Narain Lal* (19 2), 34 All. 385.

⁴ *Mahadei v. Baldeo* (1907), 30 All. 75; *Gobind Krishna Narain v. Khunni Lal* (1907), 29 All. 487 (reversed on appeal, see below, note 12); *Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran* (1886), 8 All. 365; *Ram Sarup v. Ram Dei* (1906), 29 All. 239. See *Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Koerry* (1882), 10 C. L. R. 337. In *Jeram Laljee v. Veerba* (1905), 5 Bom. L. R. 885, the Court said: "I think that in the absence of authority to the contrary, it would be unsafe to treat anything short of a decree in a suit contested to the end as coming within the ruling in the *Shina Ganga* case."

⁵ *Bhogaraju Venkatrama Jogiraju*

v. Addepalli Seshayya (1912), 35 Mad. 560.

⁶ *Tarini Charan Ganguli v. Watson* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 437, at pp. 444, 445; 12 W. R. C. R. 413, at p. 417; *Kanhaiya Lal v. Kishori Lal* (1916), 38 All. 679.

⁷ *Moti Raiji v. Lailas Jebhor* (1916), 41 Bom. 93; 18 Bom. L. R. 954.

⁸ *Indro Koor (Mussamut) v. Abdool Burkat (Shaikh)* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 146. See *Kambinayani Timmaji v. Kambinayani Subbaraju* (1910), 33 Mad. 473.

⁹ See *Imrit Konwar v. Roop Narain Singh* (1880), 6 C. L. R. 76; *Janak Keshori Kuar v. Debi Prasad Singh (Babu)* (1917), 2 Pat. L. J. 495.

¹⁰ *Kumarasami Odayar v. Subramania Iyer* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 87.

¹¹ See *Khunni Lal (Lala) v. Gobind Krishna Narain (Kunwar)* (1911), 38 I. A. 87; 23 All. 356; 15 C. W. N. 545; 13 Bom. L. R. 427; *Hiran*

A compromise which affects only her personal rights is unimpeachable. Parties to suit. It may be sometimes safer to make the next reversioners parties to a suit in order to bind them,¹ but the widow fully represents the estate, and the rights of subsequent reversioners will not be affected by the inclusion of the immediate reversioners in the suit. In *Srinath Das v. Hari Paula Mitter*,² Jenkins, J., drew a distinction between cases in which the charge was created by the widow and those in which it was not created by her. There is, it is submitted, no ground for this distinction. There is no reason why next reversioners any more than subsequent reversioners should be made parties.

Costs of suit. The estate is liable for the costs of a suit brought against the widow and defended by her on account of the estate.³ It may also be liable for the costs of an unsuccessful suit brought by her as representing the estate.⁴

The reversioners are not bound by a decree made after the death of the widow against her representatives.⁵

Sale in execution of decree. A sale in execution of a decree, made against a widow or other female restricted owner and enforcing merely a personal claim, will only transfer the life interest of the widow.⁶

This, it is submitted,⁷ applies also when the decree is for a debt incurred on the personal security of the widow, although such debt may have been incurred for legal necessity.⁸

It applies to a claim for rent accrued due after the death of the last full owner.⁹

Bibi (Musammul) v. Sohan Bibi (1914), 18 C. W. N. 928; *Bihari Lal v. David Husain* (1913), 35 All. 240; *Upendra Nath Bose v. Bindesri Prosad* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 210.

¹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 896, note (y).

² (1899), 3 C. W. N. 637.

³ *Chunder Coomar Roy v. Gonesh Chunder Doss* (1886), 13 Calc. 283.

⁴ *Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v. Kally Kanto Chuckerbutty* (1880), 6 Calc. 479; 8 C. L. R. 1.

⁵ *Kailash Chandra Bose v. Grijia Sundari Debi* (1912), 16 C. W. N. 658.

⁶ *Nugender Chunder Ghose v. Kaminee Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 241; 8 W. R. P. C. 17; *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285; see *Mohima Chunder Roy Chowdhuri v. Gouri Nath Dey Chowdhuri* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 162; *Jugol Kishore v. Jotindromohun Tagore (Maharajah)* (1884), 11 I. A. 66; 10 Calc. 985; *Narana Maitya v. Vasteva Karanta* (1893), 17 Mad. 208; *Baijun*

Doobey v. Brij Bhokun Lall Awusti (1875), 2 I. A. 275; 1 Calc. 133; 24 W. R. C. R. 306; *Mohima Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Ram Kishore Acharjee Chowdhry* (1875), 15 B. L. R. 142; 23 W. R. C. R. 174; *Kisto Moyee Dassee v. Prosunno Narain Chowdhry* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 304; *Kristo Gobind Majumdar v. Hem Chunder Chowdhry* (1889), 16 Calc. 511; *Ram Shewuk Roy v. Sheo Gobind Sahoo* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 519; *Radha Mohun Mundul v. Soshi Bhoosun Biswas* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 530.

⁷ See ante, p. 492.

⁸ *Kallu v. Faiyaz Ali Khan* (1908), 30 All. 394.

⁹ *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285; *Mahomed Sadat Ali Milki v. Hara Sundari Debya* (1912), 16 C. W. N. 1070; *Kristo Gobind Majumdar v. Hem Chunder Chowdhry* (1889), 16 Calc. 511; *Bireswar Das Dey v. Kamal Kumar Dutt* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 337; *Rameswar Mondal v. Provabati Debi* (1914), 19 C. W. N. 313.

A sale in execution of a decree made against the restricted owner as representing the estate, will bind the estate if the whole interest be sold, and the debt upon which the decree was based was one which would have bound the reversion, either as being a debt of the last male owner, or as being a debt in respect of a transaction by which she could, and did bind the estate.¹ Otherwise her interest alone is affected by the sale.²

As to a sale of the reversion, see *post*, p. 500.

The question frequently arises as to whether on the proceedings the whole interest passes.³ "In execution proceedings the Court will look at the substance of the transaction, and will not be disposed to set aside an execution upon mere technical grounds when they find that it is substantially right."⁴

This question depends upon the nature of the interest sold⁵ and the terms of the decree in execution.⁶ In order to ascertain what passed by the sale, the Court may look at the judgment,⁷ or the pleadings,⁸ or the proceedings or decree.⁹

In the case of a sale in execution of a decree made on a mortgage and executed by a widow the question as to whether more than the widow's personal interest passed depends also upon whether there was necessity for the mortgage.¹⁰

Where property is sold to satisfy several decrees, some of which bind the estate, the Court will not interfere with the possession of the purchaser.¹¹

¹ *Jugol Kishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore (Maharajah)* (1884), 11 I. A. 66; 10 Calc. 985.

² *Ranjit Singh (Raja) v. Ram Chandra Mookerjee* (1899), 4 C. W. N. 415; *Nabin Chandra Saha v. Hem Chandra Ray* (1913), 19 C. W. N. 265; *Rameswar Mondal v. Provabati Debi* (1914), 19 C. W. N. 313.

³ See *Baroda Kanta Chattopadhyaya v. Jatindra Narain Roy* (1895), 22 Calc. 974.

⁴ *Bussessur Lall Sahoo v. Luchmessur Singh (Maharajah)* (1876), 6 I. A. 233, at p. 238; 5 C. L. R. 477, at p. 481; *General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Ramaput Sing (Maharajah Coomar)*, 14 M. I. A. 605; 10 B. L. R. 294; 17 W. R. C. R. 459; *Ishan Chunder Mitter v. Buksh Ali Soudagur* (1863), Marshall, 614; W. R. F. B. R. 199.

⁵ The mere fact that the right, title, and interest of the widow is being sold does not preclude the Court from ascertaining from the

judgment or proceedings what was actually sold; *Jugol Kishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore (Maharajah)* (1884), 11 I. A. 66; 10 Calc. 985; *General Manager of Raj Durbhunga v. Ramaput Sing (Maharajah Coomar)* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 605; 10 B. L. R. 294; 17 W. R. C. R. 459; and see cases above, note 4.

⁶ *Ram Lal Shookool v. Akhoy Charan Mitter* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 619.

⁷ *Jugol Kishore v. Jotindro Mohun Tagore (Maharajah)* (1884), 11 I. A. 66; 10 Calc. 985.

⁸ *Srinath Das v. Hari Pada Mitter* (1899), 3 C. W. N. 637.

⁹ *Zuhoorul Huq (Ghowdhry) v. Gooroo Churn Roy* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 329.

¹⁰ *Bistobehari Sahoy v. Biajnath Prasad (Lala)* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 213; 16 W. R. C. R. 49.

¹¹ *Debendro Narain Roy (Rajah) v. Chundernath Roy (Coomar)* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 30.

An execution sale in satisfaction of debts contracted by the widow and the next reversioner has not the effect of a sale by her and that reversioner.¹

Sale for
arrears of
Revenue.

¶ In a sale for arrears of Government revenue payable in respect of the share of an estate in the possession of an Hindu female restricted owner, the whole interest passes.²

As to a sale for arrears of rent, see *Chowdhry Zuhoorul Huq v. Goorco Churn Roy* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 329; *Raja Ram Banerjee v. Sonatun Roy* (1875), 23 W. R. C. R. 404; *Braja Lal Sen v. Jiban Krishna Roy* (1898), 26 Calc. 285.

¹ *Mohima Chunder Roy Chowdhuri v. Gouri Nath Dey Chowdhuri* (1897), 2 C. W. N. 162. See *ante*, pp. 486, 487.

² *Debi Das Chowdhuri v. Bipro*

Charan Ghosal (1895), 22 Calc. 641; *Banalata Dasi v. Monmotha Nath Goswami* (1907), 11 C. W. N. 821; Act XI. of 1859 (Revenue Sale law), s. 54.

CHAPTER XVI.

REVERSIONERS AND THEIR RIGHTS.

UNTIL the expiration of the estate of the widow or other restricted female heir, i.e. on her death (or possibly on her abandoning all interests in worldly affairs¹), it is impossible to ascertain who will succeed to the property.

Interest of
reversioners.

“The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow’s estate. Upon the termination of that estate the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had lived up to and died at the moment of her death.”²

During the lifetime of the widow or other limited heir the interest of a reversioner is not vested. It amounts merely to a “*spes successionis*.”³

“None of these reversioners, speaking strictly, can be said individually to possess any certain or tangible interest in the reversion; for the person who will get it is only he who shall actually survive the qualified proprietor and who shall occupy at her death the position of heir to the last full owner, and who that will be it is of course impossible to say.”⁴

A reversioner is not entitled to a declaration of his right to succeed.⁵ He has sufficient interest to entitle him to challenge the will of the last male owner.⁶

He has not an interest entitling him to redeem, during the lifetime of the widow, property mortgaged by the widow’s husband;⁷ but if he

¹ *Anle*, p. 361.

² *Moniram Kolita v. Kerry Kolytany* (1880), 7 I. A. 115, at p. 154; 5 Cal. 776, at pp. 789, 790; 6 C. L. R. 322, at pp. 332, 333.

³ *Cases post*, p. 500, note 2.

⁴ *Chirusolu Punnamma v. Chirusolu Perrazu* (1906), 29 Mad. 390, at p. 391.

⁵ *Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tever* (1875), 2 I. A. 169; 15 B. L. R. 83; 23 W. R. C. R. 314; *Janaki Ammal v. Narayana Samsi Aiyer*

(1916), 43 I. A. 207; 39 Mad. 634; 20 C. W. N. 1323; 18 Bom. L. R. 856. See Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42; *Shama Soondurée Chowdhraïn v. Jumoona Chowdhraïn* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 86, explaining *Brinda Dabee Chowdhraïn v. Pearee Lall Chowdhry* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 460.

⁶ *Syama Charan Baisya v. Prafulla Sandari Gupta* (1915), 19 C. W. N. 882.

⁷ *Ram Chandar v. Kallu* (1908), 30 All. 497; Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 91.

pays money to save the sale of the property in execution of a decree for arrears of rent or revenue he is entitled to sue the defaulting widow for the amount.¹

The interest of the reversioner is incapable of being transferred,² or of being renounced,³ or of being attached in execution of a decree.⁴ In case of his insolvency it does not vest in the Official Assignee or other assignee in insolvency.⁵

An agreement to divide the reversion when it should fall in, creates no vested right, but only a right to claim specific performance.⁶ No effect can be given to a contract for sale of a reversion even after the reversion has fallen in.⁷

A compromise between the reversioner and the widow acknowledging the right of the widow under a will is within the competence of the reversioners,⁸ but they cannot bind subsequent reversioners by any compromise of their rights.⁹

There is nothing to prevent the reversion being sold in execution of a decree in respect of a debt due by the last male owner, where the widow's interest cannot be sold.¹⁰

Where there are several reversioners entitled successively to succeed to an estate held for life by a widow or other restricted owner, no one of such reversioners can be held to claim through or derive his title from another reversioner, even if that other

¹ Act IX. (Contracts) of 1872, s. 69; *Pankhabaiti Chaudhurani v. Nani Lal Singh* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 778.

² Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 6 (a); *Muthuveeru Mudahar v. Vythilinga Mudahar* (1908), 32 Mad. 206; *Manickam Pillai v. Ramalinga Pillai* (1905), 29 Mad. 120; *Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perrazu* (1906), 29 Mad. 390, at p. 399; *Hargawan Magan v. Baijnath Das* (1909), 32 All. 88; *Jagannath v. Dibbo* (1908), 31 All. 53; *Nund Kishore Lal v. Kanee Ram Tewary* (1902), 29 Calc. 355; 6 C. W. N. 395, in which it was held that *Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar* (1898), 25 I. A. 183; 21 All. 71; 2 C. W. N. 729 (S. C. in Court below, *Achhan Kunwar v. Thakur Das* (1895), 17 All. 125), overruled *Brahmadeo Narayan v. Harjan Singh* (1898), 25 Calc. 778; *Bhogaraju Venkatrama Jogiraju v. Addepalli Seshayya* (1911), 35 Mad. 560. See *Doolichand v. Birj Bhokun Lal Awasthi* (1880), 10 C. L. R. 61, at p. 65; 6 C. L. R. 528, at p. 538; *Kanti Chandra Mukerji v.*

Ali-i-Nabi (1911), 33 All. 414; *Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer* (1916), 43 I. A. 207; 39 Mad. 634; 20 C. W. N. 1323; 18 Bom. L. R. 856.

³ *Dhoorjeti Subbayya v. Dhoorjeti Venkayya* (1906), 30 Mad. 201.

⁴ Code of Civil Procedure (Act V. of 1908), s. 60 (m).

⁵ *Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji Krishnarav* (1895), 21 Bom. 319. See Insolvency (Presidency towns) Act (III. of 1909), s. 52; Provincial Insolvency Act (III. of 1907), s. 2 (e).

⁶ *Pindripolu Sooraparaju v. Pindripolu Veerabhadradu* (1907), 30 Mad. 486.

⁷ *Jaganadha Raju (Sri) v. Prasada Rao (Sri Rajah)* (1915), 39 Mad. 554.

⁸ *Olath Pullah Chetti v. Varadara-julu Chetti* (1908), 31 Mad. 474.

⁹ See *Ram Shankar Lal v. Ganesh Prasad* (1907), 29 All. 451. As to a compromise by reversioners to impartible estates, see *Harpal Singh v. Lekhraj Kunwar* (1908), 30 All. 406, and cases therein cited.

¹⁰ *Chidambaramma v. Hussainamma* (1915), 39 Mad. 565.

happens to be his father, but each derives his title from the last full owner.¹

They do not derive their title from the restricted owner.²

There is no privity of estate between one reversioner and another as such, and consequently an act or omission by one reversioner, except so far as he can consent to an alienation by the limited female owner,³ cannot bind other reversioners, whether or not they happen to be his heirs.⁴

Although even an immediate reversioner has no interest higher than a hope of succession,⁵ he or she,⁶ if not barred by estoppel,⁷ limitation,⁸ or otherwise, can sue to restrain a widow, or other restricted owner, or her assignee,⁹ from committing waste,¹⁰ or injuring the property;¹¹ and in the discretion of the Court can obtain a declaration that an alienation,¹² or any unauthorized act which is injurious to the estate or to the reversion, or will be likely to injure the interests of the reversioners, is voidable at their instance,¹³ except during the life of the restricted owner.¹⁴

Suit to restrain waste.

¹ *Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal* (1904), 28 Mad. 57; *Bhagwanta v. Sukhi* (1899), 22 All. 33; *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Cal. 62, at p. 71; 9 C. W. N. 25, at p. 31; *Shib Shankar Lal v. Soni Ram* (1909), 32 All. 33, at p. 41; *Chhiddu Singh v. Durga Dei* (1900), *ibid.* 382; *ante*, p. 365.

² *Shib Shankar Lal v. Soni Ram* (1909), 32 All. 33, at p. 41; affirmed on appeal; *Soniram v. Kanhaiya Lal* (1913), 35 All. 227; 17 C. W. N. 605; 15 Bom. L. R. 489.

³ *Ante*, pp. 486, 487.

⁴ See *Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh* (1901), 29 I. A. 1; 24 All. 94; 6 C. W. N. 169; 4 Bom. L. R. 233; *Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal* (1904), 28 Mad. 57; *Veerayya v. Gangamma* (1912), 36 Mad. 570; *Manokarami Devi (Srimutti) v. Haripada Mitter* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 718. See *post*, pp. 505–507 as to the effect of a declaratory suit by a reversioner.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 499.

⁶ Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), ss. 39, 54, *illus.* (m); *Golab Koonwer (Musst) v. Shib Sahai* (1867), 2 Agra, 54; *Gunesb Dutt v. Lall Muttee Koor (Mussamut)* (1871), 17 W. R. C. R. 11.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 489.

⁸ *Post*, p. 504.

⁹ *Gobindmani Dasi v. Shamlal Bysak* (1864), B. L. R. F. B. R. 48; W. R. F. B. R. 165; *Kamavadhani Venkata Subbaya v. Joysa Narasingappa* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 116, at p. 119.

¹⁰ *Chatu Misser v. Jeeva Misser* (1880), 6 C. L. R. 588. See *ante*, p. 473.

¹¹ *Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tever* (1875), 2 I. A. 169, at p. 191; 15 B. L. R. 83, at p. 119; 23 W. R. C. R. 314, at p. 322; *Shurut Chunder Sein v. Muthooranath Pudattick* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 303.

¹² This includes a division among the female members of a family after a collusive arbitration, *Ram Sarup v. Ram Dei* (1906), 29 All. 239. It includes a mortgage by conditional sale (*Oditi Naram Singh v. Dhurm Maktoon*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 263), or any other form of mortgage. As to a compromise by the restricted owner, see *ante*, pp. 495, 496.

¹³ Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42, *illus.* (e), *Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvie) v. Shewurkam* (1874),

If the transaction be by a written instrument the Court can order it to be delivered up and cancelled.¹

The reversioner can also, if it is submitted, sue to protect the estate from any injury, against the happening of which the limited owner is not taking sufficient precautions.

There must be an injury to the reversion.² Where the widow purports only to convey her own interest there is no ground for interference, but where the act is an injury to the reversioners the Court will interfere.³

"The principle upon which a reversionary heir is allowed to maintain a declaratory suit, although it may turn out in the end that he is not the person who actually gets the property, is that otherwise evidence regarding the true character of the alienation might disappear and be not available when required."⁴

"The plaintiff would indeed have a right to restrain the widow from waste; but his right to do this arises less from the necessity of protecting his own interests than from the function vested by the Hindu law in the next male heir of a person whose estate descends to a female, namely, that of protecting the estate. And it is obvious that, if heirs in expectancy were debarred from suing to protect waste until the succession had actually accrued, the waste would, in most cases, be past remedy, and the estate irretrievably impaired."⁵

2 I. A. 7; 14 B. L. R. 226; 22 W. R. C. R. 609; *Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain (Mussumut)* (1883), 10 I. A. 150; 10 Calc. 324; 13 C. L. R. 418; *Raj Lukhee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 209; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 57; 12 W. R. P. C. 47; *Goolab Sing (Koor) v. Kurun Sing (Rao)* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 176; 10 B. L. R. 1; *Jumoon Dassya Chowdhry v. Bamasoonderai Dassya Chowdhry* (1876), 3 I. A. 72; 1 Calc. 289; 25 W. R. C. R. 235; *Balbhadra v. Bhawani* (1907), 34 Calc. 853; 11 C. W. N. 956; *Hem Chunder Sanyal v. Sarnamoyi Debi* (1894), 22 Calc. 354; *Chottoo Misser v. Jemah Misser* (1880), 6 Calc. 198; 6 C. L. R. 588; *Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Dukharan Singh* (1883), 5 All. 532; *Upendranarain Myti v. Gopeenath Bera* (1883), 9 Calc. 817; 12 C. L. R. 356; *Gangayya v. Mahalakshmi* (1886), 10 Mad. 90; *Gopichand v. Sujan Kuar* (1886), 8 All. 646; *Gobindmani Dasi v. Shamlal Bysak* (1864), B. L. R. F. B. R. 48; W. R. F. B. R. 165; *Oodoy Chand Jha v. Dhun Monee Debia* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 183; *Grose v. Amirtamayi Dasi* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 1; 12 W. R. A. O. J. 13; *Shevak Ram Roy v. Mohammed Shamsul Hoda*

(1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 196; 12 W. R. C. R. 26; *Chuttur Narain (Lalla) v. Wooma Koonwaree (Mussumut)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 273; *Bistobehari Sahoy v. Bijnath Prasad (Lala)* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 213; 16 W. R. C. R. 49; *Damoodur Surmah v. Mohee Kant Surmah* (1873), 21 W. R. C. R. 54; *Radha (Mussumut) v. Kour (Mussumut)*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 148.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 477.

¹ Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 39.

² See *Sreenarain Mitter v. Kishen Soondory Dassee* (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 149; 11 B. L. R. 171; 19 W. R. C. R. 133.

³ See *Ram Pershad Chowdry v. Jokhoo Roy* (1884), 10 Calc. 1003.

⁴ Per Mookerjee, J., in *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Calc. 62, at pp. 66, 67; 9 C. W. N. 25, at p. 27; *Chottoo Misser v. Jemah Misser* (1880), 6 Calc. 198; 6 C. L. R. 588; *Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Petrazu* (1906), 29 Mad. 390, at p. 402. See *Behary Lall Mohurwar v. Madho Lall Shir Gyawal* (1874), 13 B. L. R. 22; 21 W. R. C. R. 430.

⁵ *Pranputtee Koer v. Futteh Bahadur Singh (Lalla)* (1863), 2 Hay,

Such suit is based on the danger to the inheritance common to all the reversioners.¹

"Suits of that kind form a very special class, and have been entertained by the Courts *ex necessitate rei*. It seems, however, to their Lordships that if such a suit as that is brought it must be brought by the reversioner with that object, and for that purpose alone, and that the question to be discussed is solely between him and the widow; that he cannot by bringing such a suit, get, as between him and a third party, an adjudication of title which he could not get without it."²

The granting of a merely declaratory decree³ or of an injunction⁴ is discretionary.

Declaratory
decree or
injunction.

Where the reversioner sues to have an alienation made by the widow declared to be void except during her life, a strong case of expediency must be shown to justify a Court in refusing declaratory relief.⁵

In the exercise of its discretion the Court would refuse to make a declaration with regard to a mortgage for a small sum of money which might be paid off by the widow in her lifetime.⁶

In a case where the widow purported to deal with the property by will the Court gave the reversioner a declaratory decree,⁷ but in another case⁸ such decree was refused, and where an arrangement was one only to take effect on the widow's death the Court declined to give a decree.⁹

In a declaratory suit by reversioners during the lifetime of the widow it is premature to raise the question whether the alienees, having spent money upon the property purchased by them from the widow, are entitled to compensation.¹⁰

608, at p. 611; approved of in *Chummun Mohunt v. Rajendur Sohoo* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 119.

¹ *Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal* (1915), 42 I. A. 125; 38 Mad. 406; 19 C. W. N. 641; 17 Bom. L. R. 468; *Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer* (1916), 43 I. A. 207; 39 Mad. 639; 20 C. W. N. 1323; 18 Bom. L. R. 856.

² *Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tever* (1875), 2 I. A. 169, at p. 191, approved of in *Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh* (1916), 43 I. A. 91, at p. 98; 43 Calc. 694, at p. 705; 20 C. W. N. 738, at p. 744; 18 Bom. L. R. 397, at p. 406.

³ Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42; *Sreenarain Mitter v. Kishen Soondoree Dassee* (1873), I. A. Sup. Vol. 149; 11 B. L. R. 171; 19 W. R. C. R. 133. The Privy Council is reluctant to overrule the discretion of the lower Courts in granting a declaratory decree under s. 42 of Act I. of 1877; *Jaipal Kummar (Thakurain) v. Indar Bahadur Singh*

(*Bhaiya*) (1904), 31 I. A. 67; 28 All. 238; 8 C. W. N. 465; 6 Bom. L. R. 495; *Sadut Ali Khan v. Abdool Gunneh (Khajeh)*, I. A. Sup. Vol. 165; 11 B. L. R. 203. As to interference with the discretion of Courts in India, by higher Courts in that country, see *Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran* (1886), 8 All. 365.

⁴ Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 52.

⁵ *Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutti Koe-rain (Mussumut)* (1883), 10 I. A. 150; 10 Calc. 324; 13 C. L. R. 418.

⁶ *Chhotu Mahlon v. Sheobarti Koer (Musst)* (1901), 5 C. W. N. 445.

⁷ *Kalian Singh v. Sanwal Singh* (1884), 7 All. 163.

⁸ *Umrao Kunwar v. Badri* (1915), 37 All. 422.

⁹ *Behary Lall Mohurwar v. Madho Lall Shir Gyawal* (1874), 13 B. L. R. 222; 21 W. R. C. R. 430.

¹⁰ *Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi (Mus-sammal)* (1909), 36 I. A. 103; 36 Calc. 780; 13 C. W. N. 920; 11 Bom. L. R. 833.

As to a suit by a reversioner to set aside an adoption, see *ante*, pp. 164-166.

Limitation of
suit

A suit during the life of a Hindu female by a Hindu, who, if the female died at the date of instituting the suit, would be entitled to the possession of land, to have an alienation¹ of such land made by the female declared to be void except for her life or until her marriage, is barred unless it be brought within twelve years from the date of the alienation.²

This does not prevent a suit for possession after the death of the widow.³

As to the limitation in suits by subsequent reversioners, see *post*, pp. 507, 508.

Reversioner
need not sue.

The reversioner is not obliged to sue during the lifetime of the restricted owner for relief in respect of an alienation or other act.⁴ He can wait until the property vests in him, and then sue for possession.

Neglect to get
in property.

When the restricted owner refuses to have any concern with the assets, or when she refuses or neglects to get in the property,⁵ or acquiesces in a wrongful possession,⁶ the reversioner can sue.

It is submitted that the reversioner can in some cases sue to clear a cloud from the title to the property when the restricted owner declines or omits to sue.⁷

Right to oust
restricted
owner.

The circumstance that there has been a wrongful alienation does not ordinarily entitle the reversioner to oust the restricted owner from possession, unless she has committed some act involving forfeiture of the property.⁸

¹ See *ante*, p. 501, note 12.

² Limitation Acts, IX. of 1908, Sched. I. art. 125; XV. of 1877, Sched. II. art. 125

³ *Mesaw (Musst) v. Gvranundan Tewari* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 857; *post*, p. 509.

⁴ *Juggendronath Banerjee v. Rajendronath Holdar* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 357.

⁵ *Radha Mohan Dhar v. Ram Dass Dey* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 362; 24 W. R. C. R. 86, note. See *Joy Mooruth Koor v. Buldeo Singh* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 444; *Chunder Koomar Gangooly v. Rajkishen Banerjee* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 322.

⁶ *Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Duk-*

haran Singh (1883), 5 All. 532; *Gunesb Dutt v. Lall Muttee Koor (Mussamut)*, 17 W. R. C. R. 11

⁷ See, however, *Suraj Bansi Kunwar (Mussamat) v. Mahipat Sing* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 669; 16 W. R. C. R. 18.

⁸ *Haradhun Naug v. Issur Chunder Bose* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 222; *Kishnee (Mussumat) v. Khealee Ram* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 424; *Jwala Nath v. Kulloo* (1868), 3 Agra, 55; *Shub Koeree (Mussamat) v. Joogun Singh* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 155; *Loll Soonder Doss v. Hurry Kishen Doss* (1862), Marsh, 113; 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 32; 1 Hay, 33.

An attempt at a false adoption of a son does not entail forfeiture or by itself justify the Court in appointing a receiver.¹

In a case where the waste committed by the limited owner shows that she is quite incapable of managing the property, and only in such case, or where it is necessary to prevent waste or injury to the reversion² or to protect the estate, when she declines to take possession of it,³ the Court may deprive her of the control and may appoint a manager or receiver.⁴ It may, if it be for the benefit of the estate, nominate the reversioner to the management,⁵ requiring him to pay the income to the widow. A similar course might be adopted where the widow has allowed the property to leave her hands or has neglected to get it in.⁶

A subsequent reversioner is not bound by a declaratory decree made in a suit brought by the immediate or any other reversioner,⁷ such as a decree in a suit seeking to declare the widow's alienation invalid.⁸

The Court would probably in its discretion refuse to give a declaratory decree where the matter had been fully discussed in a suit brought by a reversioner who had antecedent rights.

A suit for such purpose does not abate on the death of the plaintiff, but can be continued by a subsequent reversioner.⁹

A suit for a declaration as to an alienation, or to restrain waste,¹⁰ may be brought by a more distant reversioner, if the reversioners nearer in succession are in collusion with the holder

¹ *Komul Monee Dossee v. Alhad-monee Dossee* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 256.

² *Jwala Nath v. Kulloo* (1868), 3 Agra, 55.

³ See *Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Dukharan Singh* (1883), 5 All. 532.

⁴ *Shama Soonaduree Chowdhraïn v. Jumoonâ Chowdhraïn* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 86. See *Ex parte Mathuri Jijai Amba (Rani)* (1890), 13 Mad. 390.

⁵ *Maharani (Musst) v. Nanda Lal Misser* (1868), 1 B. L. R. A. C. 27; 10 W. R. C. R. 73; *Gunesh Dutt v. Lall Muttee Koer (Mussumut)* (1871), 17 W. R. C. R. 11; *Nundlal Baboo v. Bolakee Bebee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1854, p. 351; *Golukmonee Dasse v. Kishenpersad Kanoongoe*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 210; *Dankishen Shatrah v. Gungadhur Mookerjee* (1863), 2 Hay, 582; *Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Dukharan Singh* (1883), 5 All. 532.

Seo Koroanamoyee Dasse v. Gobind-nath Roy, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 944.

⁶ *Radha Mohan Dhar v. Ram Das Dey* (1869), 3 B. L. R. A. C. 362; 24 W. R. C. R. 86, note.

⁷ Act I. of 1877 (Specific Relief), s. 43.

⁸ *Chhiddu Singh v. Durga Dei* (1900), 22 All. 382; *Sakyahani Ingle Rao Sahib v. Bhavani Bozi Sahib* (1904), 27 Mad. 588. See *Chiruwolu Punnamma v. Chiruwolu Perrazu* (1906), 29 Mad. 390.

⁹ *Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbannal* (1915), 42 T. A. 125; 38 Mad. 406; 19 C. W. N. 641; 17 Bom. L. R. 468; differing from *China Veerayya v. Lakshminarasammu* (1912), 38 Mad. 406; *Sakyahani Ingle Rao Sahib v. Bhavani Bozi Sahib* (1904), 27 Mad. 588; *Muthusami Mudaliyar v. Masilamani* (1910), 33 Mad. 342.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 501.

of the restricted estate,¹ or are precluded from suing by consent to the alienation,² waiver,³ limitation or otherwise,⁴ or where the immediate reversioner has waived all rights in the reversion,⁵ or refuses without sufficient cause to sue,⁶ but under no other circumstances.⁷

Where the next immediate reversioner will, if she succeeds to the property, be a restricted owner, the Calcutta⁸ and Madras⁹ High Courts have held that the reversioner next in succession may sue. This is, it is submitted, the correct view. The Allahabad High Court is not agreed on this subject, one view being that the next reversioner can only so sue in case of collusion or connivance.¹⁰

¹ See *Naikram Lall v. Soorujbuns Sahee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 891.

² *Bakhtawar v. Bhagwana* (1910), 32 All. 76. *Ante*, pp. 486-489.

³ *Bhikaji Apaji v. Jagannath Vithal* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 351; approved of in *Anund Koer (Rani) v. Court of Wards* (1880), 8 I. A. 14, at p. 22; 6 Cal. 764, at p. 772; 8 C. L. R. 381, at p. 385; *Ammur Singh v. Murdun Singh* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 31.

⁴ *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Cal. 62; 9 C. W. N. 25; *Govinda Pillai v. Thayammal* (1904), 28 Mad. 7; *Jhula v. Kanta Prasad* (1887), 9 All. 441; *Madari v. Malki* (1884), 6 All. 428; *Raghunath v. Thakuri* (1881), 4 All. 16; *Gauri Dut v. Gur Sahai* (1878), 2 All. 41; *Dowar Rai v. Boonda (Musumat)* (1866), N. W. P. F. B. R. 56; *Shama Soonduree Choudhrai v. Jumona Choudhrai* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 86; *Retoo Raj Pandey v. Laljee Pandey* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 399; *Bama Soonduree Dossee v. Bama Soonduree Dossee* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 301. The subsequent reversioner is not entitled to wait until a suit by the immediate reversioner is barred by limitation; *Kunwar Bahadoor v. Bindrabai* (1914), 37 All. 195.

⁵ *Ammur Singh v. Murdun Singh* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 31. In *Rai Chetan Pal v. Pyari Mani Dasi* (1869), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 70, where the immediate reversioner had assigned

his interests to the next reversioner, the Court declined to permit a suit by the assignee.

⁶ *Jhula v. Kanta Prasad* (1887), 9 All. 441; *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Cal. 62; 9 C. W. N. 2513.

⁷ *Meghu Rai v. Ram Khelawan Rai* (1913), 35 All. 326; *Jhandhu v. Tariff* (1914), 37 All. 45; 19 C. W. N. 197; 17 Bom. L. R. 44; following *Anund Koer (Rani) v. Court of Wards* (1880), 8 I. A. 14; 6 Cal. 764; 8 C. L. R. 381.

⁸ *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Cal. 62; 9 C. W. N. 25, differing from *Ishwar Narain v. Janki* (1893), 15 All. 132; *Chunder Koomar Hazaree v. Dwar Kanath Purdhan*, Ben. S. D. A. 1859, p. 1623, and earlier cases cited in *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Cal. 62, at p. 67; 9 C. W. N. 25, at p. 28; *Bal Gobind Ram v. Hirusranee* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 255; *contra Bama Soonduree Dossee v. Bama Soonduree Dossee* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 301, in which the earlier cases were not referred to.

⁹ *Kandasami v. Akkamal* (1889), 13 Mad. 195; *Raghupati v. Trimalai* (1892), 15 Mad. 422; *Chidambara Reddiar v. Nallammal* (1909), 33 Mad. 410.

¹⁰ *Ishwar Narain v. Janki* (1893), 15 All. 132, agreeing with *Madari v. Malki* (1884), 6 All. 428, and differing from *Bal Gobind v. Ramkumar*

"Their lordships are of opinion that although a suit of this nature¹ may be brought by a contingent reversionary heir, yet that as a general rule, it must be brought by the presumptive reversionary heir, that is to say, by the person who would succeed if the widow were to die at that moment. They are also of opinion that such a suit may be brought by a more distant reversioner if those nearer in succession are in collusion with the widow, or have precluded themselves from interfering. They consider that the rule laid down in *Bhikaji Apaji v. Jagannath Vithal*² is correct. It cannot be the law that any one who may have a possibility of succeeding on the death of the widow can maintain a suit of the present nature, for, if so, the right to sue would belong to every one in the line of succession, however remote. The right to sue must, in their lordships' opinion, be limited. If the nearest reversionary heir refuses without sufficient cause, to institute proceedings, or if he has precluded himself by his own act or conduct, from suing, or has colluded with the widow or concurred in the act alleged to be wrongful, the next presumable heir would be entitled to sue: see *Goolab Sing (Kooer) v. Kurun Sing (Rao)*.³ In such a case, upon a plaint stating the circumstances under which the more distant reversionary heir claims to sue, the Court must exercise a judicial discretion in determining whether the remote reversioner is entitled to sue, and would probably require the nearer reversioner to be made a party to the suit."⁴

Mere delay by a reversioner in instituting a suit to set aside an illegal sale made by a childless Hindu widow, cannot be understood to amount to acquiescence in the sale. The acquiescence which would entitle a more remote reversioner to maintain the suit must be such as would amount to an equitable estoppel, precluding the first reversioner from contesting the validity of the sale made by the widow.⁵

Although the right of the nearest reversioner to maintain a Limitation. declaratory suit may be barred by the law of limitation, the rights of subsequent reversioners are not thereby barred.⁶

(1884), 6 All. 431. See *Radha Kishen v. Bakhtavur Lall* (1866), 1 Agra, 1. The latest decision (*Raja Dei v. Umed Singh* (1912), 34 All. 207) is in favour of the right to sue.

¹ I.e. to set aside an adoption. The principle will apply to other acts of the widow which injure the interests of the reversion.

² (1873) 10 Bom. H. C. 351; *ante*, p. 506.

³ (1871) 14 M. I. A. 176, at p. 193; 10 B. L. R. 1, at p. 8. These remarks cover the case where the nearest reversionary heir is a female who supports the alienation in question, and the nearest reversionary heir presumptively entitled to the full ownership of the property is the

person in whose favour the transfer complained of was made: *Raja Dei v. Umed Singh* (1912), 34 All. 207, at p. 210.

⁴ *Anund Koror (Rani) v. Court of Wards* (1880), 8 I. A. 14, at pp. 22, 23; 6 Calc. 764, at pp. 772, 773; 8 C. L. R. 381, at pp. 385, 386.

⁵ *Balgobind v. Ramkumar* (1884), 6 All. 431, at p. 434; *Duleep Singh v. Sree Kishoon Panday* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 83.

⁶ *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Calc. 62; 9 C. W. N. 25; *contra Jannabai v. Dharsey* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 893. See *Mesraw (Musst) v. Girjanundant Tewari* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 857, at p. 859. See *ante*, p. 500.

A subsequent reversioner would be bound to bring his suit within six years from the time when his right to sue occurred.¹

A minor who is suing to declare an alienation invalid can obtain the advantage of s. 6 of the Limitation Act,² although the right of previous reversioners be barred.³

Reversioner
can dispute
acts derogatory to suc-
cession.

At any rate where the widow or other restricted female owner omits to take proper steps to safeguard the estate, the immediate reversioner,⁴ and apparently where he neglects to do so, or is precluded from doing so, a subsequent reversioner can dispute any act derogatory to his succession, which he could have disputed if the property had been vested in him.

For instance, he may dispute the will of the last male owner, or an act of a person in whom the property had previously been vested.⁵

It has been held that a person entitled to an estate in reversion expectant on the death of a Hindu widow is entitled to bring a suit for administration of the estate of her husband.⁶

Falling in of
reversion.

On the death of the restricted heir, the then next heir of the last full owner is entitled to the property.⁷

As to his right to apply for a succession certificate, see *Abinas Chandra Paul v. Probodh Chandra Paul* (1911), 15 C. W. N. 1018.

If the immediate reversioner disclaims, the next subsequent reversioner would be entitled to the property.⁸

The reversioner who becomes the owner is entitled to dispute all unauthorized acts of the restricted owner.⁹

He is entitled to recover the property in the state in which it was at the death of the restricted owner.¹⁰

As to the liability for any improvements made by an alienee holding under an unauthorized act of the widow, see *post*, p. 513.

¹ Limitation Acts, IX. of 1908, Sched. I art. 120; XV. of 1877, Sched. II. art. 120; *Chooramani Dasi v. Baidya Nath Naik* (1904), 32 Calc. 473.

² Act IX. of 1908; Act XV. of 1877, s. 7.

³ *Govinda Pallai v. Thayammal* (1904), 28 Mad. 57. See *Bhagwanrao v. Sukhi* (1899), 22 All. 33; *Abinash Chandra Mazumdar v. Harinath Shaha* (1904), 32 Calc. 62; 9 C. W. N. 25.

⁴ *Rojomoyee Dasse v. Troyluck Mohiney Dasse* (1901), 29 Calc. 260; 6 C. W. N. 267. See *Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran* (1886), 8 All. 365. See, however, *Jeenuar Narain v. Janki*

(1893), 15 All. 132.

⁵ *Bykunt Nath Roy v. Grish Chunder Mookerjee* (1871), 15 W. R. C. R. 96; *Bheem Ram Chuckerbutty v. Huree Kishore Roy* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 359.

⁶ *Rojomoyee Dasse v. Troyluck Mohiney Dasse* (1901), 29 Calc. 260; 6 C. W. N. 267.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 367.

⁸ *Gooshaeen Teekumjee v. Pursotum Lalljee* (1868), 3 Agra, 238; *Ladooiah (Mussumat) v. Sanwaley* (1868), *ibid.* 191.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 501.

¹⁰ *Vrijbhukandas Dwarkadas v. Dayaram Jadavji* (1907), 32 Bom. 32; 9 Bom. L. R. 1181.

A suit by a Hindu entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu female,¹ or by a person to whom, after the death of the female, he has assigned the property, may be brought within twelve years from the death of such female, even though the property has passed into other hands by her alienation, or is held adversely to her.²

This applies to a suit brought by a female reversioner³ and to a suit brought by a person who is entitled to the reversion after the property has been held by two females in succession.⁴

The cause of action by a reversioner for possession commences at the death of the widow, whether there has been in name or effect an alienation for her life.⁵

The right of reversioners after the death of the restricted heir is not affected by possession held adversely to the widow, as their right does not accrue until after her death.⁶

Where there has been an alleged adoption, which is disputed, the reversioner has the same time within which he can sue for possession.⁷

If the widow held not as a Hindu widow, but under an independent and adverse title, the reversioners are barred by such hostile possession for twelve years.⁸

¹ Limitation Act IX. of 1908, Sched. I. art. 141; Act XV. of 1877, Sched. II. art. 141; *Run-chordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibhai* (1899), 26 I. A. 71; 23 Bom. 725; 3 C. W. N. 621; 1 Bom. L. R. 607; S. C. in Courts below (1897), 21 Bom. 646; (1889) 14 Bom. 482; *Byjoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (Srimati)* (1907), 34 I. A. 87; 34 Calc. 329; 11 C. W. N. 424; 9 Bom. L. R. 602; *Harihar Ojha v. Dasarathi Misra* (1905), 33 Cal. 257; 9 C. W. N. 636; *Rakhma-bai v. Keshav Raghunath Bhise* (1906), 31 Bom. 1; *Mukta v. Dada* (1893), 18 Bom. 216; *Cursandas Govindji v. Vandravandas Purshotam* (1889), 14 Bom. 482, at p. 488; *Mesraw (Musst) v. Girjanundan Tewari* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 857; *Srinath Kur v. Pro-sunno Kumar Ghose* (1883), 9 Calc. 934; 13 C. L. R. 372; *Pursut Koer v. Palut Roy* (1881), 8 Calc. 442; *Ram Dei Kunwar v. Abu Jafar* (1905), 27 All. 494; *Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagauti Prasad* (1897), 19 All. 357; *Ram Kali v. Kedarnath* (1892), 14 All. 156; *Jhamman Kunwar v. Tiloki* (1903), 25 All. 435, and *Amrit Dhar v. Bindeeri Prasad* (1901), 23 All.

448, differing from *Tikaram v. Shama Charan* (1897), 20 All. 42; *Sreeramulu v. Kristamma* (1902), 26 Mad. 143, at p. 147.

² *Gadadhar Roy v. Hari Krishna Sarkar* (1904), 8 C. W. N. 535. This will only apply to an assignment after the death of the widow, ante, p. 500.

³ *Ram Dei Kunwar v. Abu Jafar* (1905), 27 All. 494.

⁴ *Jhamman Kunwar v. Tiloki* (1903), 25 All. 435; *Sambasiva v. Ragava* (1890), 13 Mad. 512. See, however, *Chhaganram Astikram v. Motigavri (Bai)* (1890), 14 Bom. 512.

⁵ *Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagauti Prasad* (1897), 19 All. 357; *Ram Shewuk Roy v. Sheo Gobind Sahoo* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 519.

⁶ See *Ram Kali v. Kedarnath* (1892), 14 All. 156; *Sheoraji v. Ramjas Pande* (1911), 33 All. 430. As to the old law, see *Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Guru Persad Doss* (1868), B. L. R. F. B. R. 1008; 9 W. R. C. R. 505.

⁷ *Bhagwat Pershad v. Murari Lal* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 524.

⁸ *Shamkoer v. Dah Koer* (1902), 29 I. A. 132; 29 Calc. 664; 6 C. W. N.

Where there is a dispute on the subject, the fact of the death of the widow must be proved by the reversioners.¹

Proof in suit
in which
alienation is
in question.

In a suit in which an alienation by a restricted female owner is in question, the alienee must either prove the necessity, or that he made *bond fide* inquiries as to it, and satisfied himself as a reasonable man as to its existence.² He is not, if he so inquires and acts honestly, affected by the precedent mismanagement of the estate,³ or by the fact that the necessity was created by the action of the widow. If he made such inquiries, he need not see that the money he advances is applied to meet the necessity,⁴ nor is he bound to ascertain that the whole money so advanced is actually required therefor.⁵

The purchaser or mortgagee must in a case of dispute prove that the woman executed the deed with full knowledge of her rights, of all the circumstances, and of the consequences⁶ and of the nature of the alienation

657; 4 Bom. L. R. 547; *Lachhan Kumwar (Mussummat) v. Anant Singh* (1894), 22 I. A. 25; 22 Calc. 445, as explained in *Jhamman Kuar v. Tuloki* (1903), 25 All. 435, and in *Amrit Dhar v. Bindesri Prasad* (1901), 23 All. 448; *Mahabir Pershad v. Adhikari Koer* (1896), 23 Calc. 942; *Gajadhar Pande v. Parbati* (1910), 33 All. 312. See *Babu v. Bhikaji* (1889), 14 Bom. 317. See *Ganpatrao Moroji v. Vamanrao Shamrao* (1908), 10 Bom. L. R. 216, where the widow was given an absolute title by arrangement with the reversioners.

¹ *Walihan (Mussummat) v. Jogeshwar Narayan* (1907), 35 I. A. 38; 35 Calc. 189; 12 C. W. N. 227; 10 Bom. L. R. 9.

² *Dharam Chand Lal v. Bhawuni Misra* (1897), 24 I. A. 183; 25 Calc. 189; 1 C. W. N. 697; *Mahe-shar Bakesh Singh v. Ratan Singh* (1896), 23 I. A. 57; 23 Calc. 266; *Bunga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagatkrishore Acharjya Chowdhuri* (1916), 43 I. A. 249; 44 Calc. 186; 21 C. W. N. 225; 18 Bom. L. R. 368; *Birj Lal (Lala) v. Inda Kumwar* (1914), 36 All. 187; 18 C. W. N. 652; 16 Bom. L. R. 352; *Manokarani Debi (Srimutty) v. Haripada Mitter* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 718; *Byjnath Pershad (Lalla) v. Bissen Beharee Sahoy Singh* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 79;

Amarnath Sah (Lala) v. Achan Kuar (Rani) (1892), 19 I. A. 196; 14 All. 436; *Bhumaraddi v. Bhaskar* (1904), 6 Bom. L. R. 628. See *ante*, pp. 293, 294. In *Janhabis (Musst) v. Bal-bhadra Suar* (1911), 15 C. W. N. 793, the Court held that mere inquiries from the widow were insufficient.

³ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (Mussumat Babooee)* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393; 18 W. R. C. R. note to p. 81; *Mata Pershad v. Bhageeruthee* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 78; *Sreenath Roy v. Ruttunmalla Chowdhraim*, Ben. S. D. A., 1859, p. 421.

⁴ *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree (Mussumat Babooee)* (1856), 6 M. I. A. 393; 18 W. R. C. R. note to p. 81; *Ghansham Singh v. Badiya Lal* (1902), 24 All. 547; *Ram Pershad Sing v. Nagbung-shee Koorer (Mussumat)* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 501.

⁵ *Ghansham Singh v. Badiya Lal* (1902), 24 All. 547.

⁶ See *Kameswar Persaud (Baboo) v. Run Bahadoor Singh* (1880), 8 I. A. 8; 6 Calc. 843; 8 C. L. R. 361; *Ramratam Sukal v. Nandu (Mussumat)* (1891), 19 I. A. 1; 19 Calc. 249; *Sadaashiv Bhaskar Joshi v. Dhakubai* (1880), 5 Bom. 450. As to presumption of knowledge of contents of document, see *Bhuban*

she was making, and that such alienation was justified by necessity, or that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself of the existence¹ and extent² of the necessity.

Apart from any question of necessity, it is clear that a *pardahnashin* *Purdah-lady* is not bound by an alienation unless it be distinctly proved that she was aware of all the circumstances and of the nature and effect of the transaction,³ and that no advantage was taken of her position.⁴

Although in many cases the Court has required evidence that the lady had an independent adviser, independent advice is not always necessary.⁵ "Advice is merely a means to secure that which is essential, an intelligent apprehension of the transaction."⁶

As to evidence of the execution of a document behind a *pardah*, see *Padarath v. Ram Narain Upadhia (Pandit)* (1915), 42 I. A. 163; 37 All. 474; 19 C. W. N. 991; 17 Bom. L. R. 617; *Rukmini Koori (Musst)* v. *Nulmani Bandyopadhyaya* (1915), 19 C. W. N. 1309.

The burden is upon the purchaser to aver and prove that she sold the property under such special circumstances as justify a Hindu widow in alienating the immovable property of her husband without the consent of his heirs.⁷

General evidence to the effect that the husband died in debt, and that his widow had substituted new securities at reduced interest for old ones, does not exempt the person upholding the transaction from proving that the particular transaction in question was justified, nor does it throw on the other side the onus of proving the solvency of the husband's estate.⁸

Mohini Dasi v. Gajalakshmi Debi (1915), 19 C. W. N. 1330.

¹ *Bhagwat Dayal Singh (Raja Rai)* v. *Debi Dayal Sahu* (1908), 35 I. A. 48; 35 Calc. 420; 12 C. W. N. 393.

² *Lalit Panday v. Sridhar Deo Narayan Singh* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 176.

³ *Kali Baksh Singh v. Ram Gopal Singh* (1913), 41 I. A. 23; 36 All. 81; 18 C. W. N. 282; 16 Bom. L. R. 147.

⁴ *Keshub Lal Pyne v. Radha Raman Nundy* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 991; at p. 995.

⁵ See *Sudisht Lal v. Sheobarat Koer (Mussummat)* (1881), 8 I. A. 39; 7 Calc. 245; *Tika Ram v. Deputy Commissioner of Bara Banki* (1899), 26 I. A. 97; 26 Calc. 707; 3 C. W. N. 573; 1 Bom. L. R. 692; *Sham Koer v. Dah Koer* (1902), 29 I. A. 132; 29 Calc. 664; 6 C. W. N. 657; 4 Bom. L. R. 547; *Bhagwat Dayal Singh (Raja Rai)* v. *Debi Dayal Sahu* (1908), 35 I. A. 48; 35 Calc. 420; 12 C. W. N. 393; 10 Bom. L. R. 230; *Sumsuddin Goolam Husein v. Abdul Husein Kalimuddin* (1906), 31 Bom. 165; *Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan* (1880), 5 Bom. 99, at p. 107; *Achhan Kuar v. Thakur Das* (1895), 17 All.

125; *Sajjad Husain (Mirza)* v. *Wazir Ali Khan (Nawal)* (1912), 39 I. A. 156; 34 All. 455; 14 Bom. L. R. 1055, and cases cited in Ameer Ali and Woodroffe's *Indian Evidence Act*, note to s. 111. As to the attestation of documents executed by *pardahnashins*, see *Sarur Jigar Begum v. Barada Kanta Mitter* (1910), 37 Calc. 526; 14 C. W. N. 974.

⁶ See *Kamini Dasee v. Krishnachandra Mukerjee* (1912), 39 Calc. 933; 16 C. W. N. 649; *Badanassa Bibee v. Ambika Charan Ghose* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 1133. In *Mohabir Prosad (Lala)* v. *Taj Begum (Mussummat)*, 19 C. W. N. 162; the Court declined to uphold a mortgage in favour of the legal adviser of the lady. As to the duty of persons standing in a fiduciary relationship to the lady, see *Sri Kishan Lal v. Kashmiro (Mussummat)* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 362.

⁷ *Gurunath Nilkanth v. Krishnaji Govind* (1880), 4 Bom. 462.

⁸ *Maheshwar Baksh Singh v. Ratan Singh* (1896), 23 I. A. 57; 23 Calc. 266. See *Tayammaul v. Sashachalla Naiker* (1865), 10 M. I. A. 429, at p. 433.

Lapse of time does not affect the question of onus of proof, except in so far as it may give rise to a presumption of acquiescence or save the alienee from adverse inferences, arising from the scanty proof which may be offered.¹

As to the effect of a recital of the necessity, see *ante*, p. 296.

Where portion
only of
necessity
proved,

Where a portion only of the justifying necessity is proved, and the alienee knew, or might, if he made proper inquiries, have known that a less amount than the amount paid by him was required to meet the necessity, the estate may be charged with the lesser amount,² and may be released on payment thereof,³ or the sale may be set aside on payment of the amount due with interest, mesne profits being set off in case the alienee has had possession;⁴ or possession may be conditional on the repayment.⁵

It was said in one case: ⁶ "It has been held by the Privy Council in the case of *Deputy Commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh* ⁷ that where a sale by a widow is partially invalid owing to absence of legal necessity, the whole sale must be set aside, the purchaser accounting for the mesne profits, and the sums expended for legal necessity being set off against them." The Judicial Committee laid down no such general proposition in that case. In another case,⁸ it was said: "It would manifestly be impossible, and possibly prejudicial to the interest of the estate, if the widow were to be held to be bound in every instance to sell property for payment of a debt due from her husband for exactly the sum due to the creditor, and we are of opinion that the Privy Council did not intend to lay down any such rule." On the question as to whether an alienation should be entirely set aside, should not the test be: having regard to the fact that there was some necessity, was the transaction a proper one and

¹ *Ravaneshwar Prasad Singh v. Chandi Prasad Singh* (1911), 38 Calc. 721; upheld on appeal (1915), 43 Calc. 417.

² See *Kamakhaprasad Roy v. Jagadamba Dasi (Srimati)* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 508; *Gobind Singh v. Baldeo Singh* (1903), 25 All. 330; *Thakurnani Singh v. Dai Rani Koeri* (1908), 33 Calc. 1079; *Deputy Commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh* (1907), 34 I. A. 72; 29 All. 331; 11 C. W. N. 474; 9 Bom. L. R. 591; *Lalit Panday v. Sridhar Deo Narayan Sing* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 176; 13 W. R. C. R. 457; *Paparayudu v. Rattamma* (1912), 37 Mad. 275.

³ *Ram Dei Kunwar v. Abu Jafar* (1905), 27 All. 494; *Phool Chund Lall v. Rughooburns Suhaye* (1868),

9 W. R. C. R. 107, followed in *Sugeeram Begum v. Juddooburns Suhaye* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 284.

⁴ See *Deputy Commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh* (1907), 34 I. A. 72; 29 All. 331; 11 C. W. N. 474; 9 Bom. L. R. 591.

⁵ *Bhagwat Dayal Singh (Raja Rai) v. Debi Dayal Sahu* (1908), 35 I. A. 48; 35 Calc. 420; 12 C. W. N. 393; 10 Bom. L. R. 230.

⁶ *Hari Kissen Bhagat v. Bajrang Sahu Singh* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 544, at p. 549.

⁷ (1907), 34 I. A. 72; 29 All. 331; 11 C. W. N. 474; 9 Bom. L. R. 591.

⁸ *Felaram Roy v. Bagalanand Banerjee* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 895, at p. 896.

for the benefit of the estate? ¹ Otherwise, if the alienation be set aside altogether, a *bonâ fide* alienee might lose his money and have no security.

There is authority that a suit to set aside a sale, where the necessity for the whole of the purchase money was not proved, cannot be successful unless the plaintiff offers in his plaint to pay the sum due; ² but other authority, which is, it is submitted, preferable, shows that no such offer is necessary. ³

Where an alienation is set aside, the reversioner may sometimes be required to pay the amount, to the extent of which the estate has derived benefit. Equities on setting aside alienation.

Where the widow raises money to pay off a mortgage, although she has funds sufficient for the purpose the reversioner is not entitled to set aside the sale except upon the terms of paying off the mortgage. ⁴

Where the widow borrows money for the purpose of increasing her husband's estate by purchase of other property, the reversioners, if claiming the acquisition, must satisfy the debt. ⁵

Where the purchaser has to the knowledge of the reversioner, and without any protest from him, ⁶ or if he believed in good faith that he had an absolute title, ⁷ laid out sums for the improvement and benefit of the property, the reversioner, on obtaining the reversal of the sale, may be required to compensate the purchaser, ⁸ but the purchaser cannot claim money spent on repairs, or the right to remove any building which he may have erected. ⁹

On the death of the restricted owner the reversioner takes her place in suits pending by or against her on account of the estate, ¹⁰ and can execute decrees obtained by her in such suits. ¹¹ Pending suits.

If the *stridhan* heir of the widow is erroneously substituted in the proceedings the reversioner is not bound. ¹²

¹ See *Phool Chund Lall v. Rughoobuns Suhaye* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 107; see *ante*, p. 485.

² *Singam Setti Sanjivi Kondaya v. Draupadi Bayamma* (1907), 31 Mad. 153; *Mutteeram Kowar v. Gopaul Sahoo* (1873), 11 B. L. R. 416; 20 W. R. C. R. 187. See *Phool Chund Lall v. Rughoobuns Suhaye* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 107, at p. 109.

³ *Paparayadu v. Rattamana* (1912), 37 Mad. 275.

⁴ See *Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvi) v. Shewukram* (1874), 2 I. A. 7; 14 B. L. R. 226; 22 W. R. C. R. 409; *Sadasshiv Bhaskar Joshi v. Dhakubai* (1880), 5 Bom. 450.

⁵ *Oodey Singh (Kooer) v. Phool Chund* (1873), 5 N. W. P. 197; *Shewak Ram (Ras) v. Bhowani Buksh Singh* (1880), 6 C. L. R. 140.

⁶ See *Dattaji Sakharam Rajad-hikesh v. Kalba Yese Parabha* (1896),

21 Bom. 749.

⁷ Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 51; *Abhoy Churn Ghose v. Attarmon Dassee* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 931.

⁸ *Kedar Nath v. Matha Mal* (1913), 40 Calc. 555; 17 C. W. N. 797; 15 Bom. L. R. 467. See *ante*, p. 307.

⁹ *Vrijbhukandas v. Dayaram* (1907), 32 Bom. 32; 9 Bom. L. R. 1181.

¹⁰ *Rikhai Ras v. Sheo Pujan Singh* (1910), 33 All. 15; *Premmoyi Choudhram v. Preonath Dhur* (1896), 23 Calc. 636; *Jadubansi Kunwar v. Mahpal Singh* (1915), 38 All. 111. See *Chintamony Dutt v. Mohesh Chundra Banerjee* (1896), 23 Calc. 454.

¹¹ *Mahadeo Singh v. Sheokaran Singh* (1913), 35 All. 481.

¹² *Kailash Chandra Bose v. Girija Sundari Debi* (1912), 39 Calc. 925; 16 C. W. N. 658.

Rights of
Crown.

When there are no heirs of the last full owner the Crown, as ultimate heir, can (it is submitted, during the woman's lifetime or thereafter) impeach the unauthorized act of a restricted female owner,¹ and has, it is submitted, all such other rights as may be possessed by a reversioner.

Except a reversioner or a person who has purchased at an execution sale, which disposed of the whole interest in the property,² no one else is entitled to dispute the acts of a restricted owner.³

¹ *Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavalry Vencata Narrainapah* (1861), 8 M. I. A. 529; 2 W. R. P. C. 61.

² *Rajkishen Sircar v. Jaheeroorul Huq (Chowdhry)* W. R. 1864, C. R. 351.

³ *Deonandan Pershad v. Udit Narain Singh* (1914), 18 C. W. N. 940. See *Brojokishoree Dassee v. Sreenath Bose* (1868), 9 W. R. C. R. 463.

CHAPTER XVII.

INHERITANCE TO PRIVATE IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY.

THE succession to property which is impartible in the sense that it descends to a single heir¹ depends upon custom,² or on the terms of the grant by Government.³

"The question whether an estate is subject to the ordinary Hindu law succession, or descends according to the rule of primogeniture, must be decided in each case according to the evidence given in it."⁴

"The acceptance of a *sanad* in the common form under Madras Regulation XXV. of 1802, does not of itself, and apart from other circumstances, avail to alter the succession to an hereditary estate."⁵

The burden of proof is upon the person asserting that the ordinary Hindu law of inheritance does not apply.⁶

"When inheritance is impartible it is enjoyed in a different

Principles of inheritance.

¹ See *ante*, pp. 259-262.

² As to custom, see *ante*, pp. 27-32.

³ See *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Rajah) v. Court of Wards*, 7 I. A. 38; 6 C. L. R. 153; *Ramnada Case* (1893), 24 Mad. 613, and cases below, note 5. As to a grant by the East India Company in 1771, see *Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer (Maharani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 178; 29 Calc. 828; 7 C. W. N. 57; 4 Bom. L. R. 664.

⁴ *Malikarjuna (Srimantu Rajah Yarlagadda) v. Durga (Srimantu Rajah Yarlagadda)* (1890), 17 I. A. 134, at p. 144; 13 Mad. 406, at p. 423; *Kachi Kaliyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar* (1905), 32 I. A. 261, at p. 269; 28 Mad. 508, at p. 515; 10 C. W. N. 95, at p. 106; 7 Bom. L. R. 907; *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 61; 37 Mad. 199, at p. 209; 17 C. W. N. 1221, at p. 1224; 15 Bom. L. R. 1010, at p.

1014; *Durga Charan Mahito v. Raghunath Mahito* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 55.

⁵ *Kachi Kaliyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar* (1905), 32 I. A. 261, at p. 269; 28 Mad. 508, at p. 515; 10 C. W. N. 95, at p. 106; 7 Bom. L. R. 907; *Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar* (1881), 8 I. A. 99; 3 Mad. 290; *Mahakarjuna (Srimantu Rajah Yarlagadda) v. Durga (Srimantu Rajah Yarlagadda)* (1890), 17 I. A. 134; 13 Mad. 406; *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Rajah) v. Court of Wards* (1879), 7 I. A. 38; 6 C. L. R. 153; *Collector of Trichinopoly v. Lekkumani* (1874), 1 I. A. 282; 14 B. L. R. 115.

⁶ See *Venkata Narasimha Appa Row (Sri Raja) v. Parthasarathy (Sri Raja)* (1913), 41 I. A. 51, at p. 61; 37 Mad. 199, at p. 209; 17 C. W. N. 1221, at p. 1224; 15 Bom. L. R. 1010, at p. 1014; *Durga Charan Mahito v. Raghunath Mahito* (1913), 18 C. W. N. 55. See *ante*, p. 32.

Separate
acquisition.

Where the impartible estate is a separate acquisition,¹ the law of the succession to separate acquisitions applies, and a woman can succeed as in the case of partible property.²

“There is no inconsistency between a custom of impartibility and the right of females to inherit, as may be illustrated by the well-known *Shivagunga* case,³ and therefore the general law must prevail unless it be proved that the custom extends to the exclusion of females.”⁴

Thus in default of male issue the widow succeeds.⁵ As to the case where there is more than one widow, see *ante*, p. 387.

As to the daughters' sons, see *ante*, p. 390.

Nearest
coparcener of
senior line.

When ancestral impartible property governed by the Mitakshara law passes from one line to another, it devolves, not on the coparcener nearest in blood, but on the nearest coparcener of the senior line.⁶

Primogeni-
ture.

If there be no indication to the contrary, the property descends according to the rule of primogeniture,⁷ i.e. as between persons of the same class the elder would be entitled to succeed.⁸

In some cases another ground of selection and not primogeniture is the governing rule of the family.⁹

¹ As where there is a grant from the Government independently of the family. See *Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer* (1902), 29 I. A. 178; 29 Calc. 828; 7 C. W. N. 57; 4 Bom. L. R. 644.

² *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543; 2 W. R. P. C. 31; *Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer (Maharani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 178; 29 Calc. 828; 7 C. W. N. 57; 4 Bom. L. R. 644.

³ *Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga* (1863), 9 M. I. A. 543; 2 W. R. P. C. 31.

⁴ *Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer (Maharani)* (1902), 29 I. A. 178, at p. 194; 29 Calc. 828, at p. 852; 7 C. W. N. 57, at p. 73; 4 Bom. L. R. 664.

⁵ *Periasami v. Perasami* (1878), 5 I. A. 61; 1 Mad. 312; 2 C. L. R. 81; *Doorga Persad Singh (Tekant) v. Doorga Komwari (Tekaitni)* (1878), 5 I. A. 149, at p. 160; 4 Calc. 190, at p. 202; 3 C. L. R. 32, at p. 40.

⁶ *Kachi Kaliyana Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar v. Kachi Yuva Rengappa Kalakka Thola Udayar*

(1905), 32 I. A. 261; 28 Mad. 508; 10 C. W. N. 95; 7 Bom. L. R. 907, approving of *Naraganti v. Venkatachalapati* (1881), 4 Mad. 250; *Muttuvaduganatha Tevar v. Periasami* (1892), 16 Mad. 11, at p. 16, affirmed on appeal (1896), 23 I. A. 128; 19 Mad. 451. See *Achal Ram v. Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh* (1883), 11 I. A. 51; 10 Calc. 511; *Narindar Bahadur Singh v. Achal Ram* (1893), 20 I. A. 77; 20 Calc. 649; *Banjath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh* (1916), 38 All. 591.

⁷ *Ishri Singh (Thakur) v. Baldeo Singh* (1884), 11 I. A. 135, at p. 145; 10 Calc. 792, at p. 805; *Bhavani Ghulam v. Deo Raj Kuari* (1883), 5 All. 542.

⁸ *Subramanya Pandya Chokka Talavar v. Siva Subramanya Pillai* (1894), 17 Mad. 316, at p. 325.

⁹ *Ishri Singh (Thakur) v. Baldeo Singh* (1884), 11 I. A. 135; 10 Calc. 792; *Achal Ram v. Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh* (1883), 11 I. A. 51; 10 Calc. 51; *Moresh Chunder Dhal v. Satrugan Dhal* (1902), 29 I. A. 62; 29 Calc. 343; 6 C. W. N. 459;

As to Oudh taluqdars, see *Debi Baksh Singh v. Chandrabhan Singh* (1910), 37 I. A. 168; 32 All. 599; 14 C. W. N. 1010; 12 Bom. L. R. 1015.

Nearness of blood is no ground of preference under the Mitakshara law amongst members of the same class. Nearness of blood.

Thus an elder brother of the half blood would be preferred to a younger brother of the whole blood.¹

In a case governed by the Bengal school of law the heir will be the eldest member of the class of persons who are nearer of kin to the late owner than any other class.² Bengal school.

Thus a brother of the whole blood would be preferred to an elder brother of the half blood.³

In the absence of a custom that sons take in accordance with the seniority of their mothers,⁴ the eldest son of the deceased born of any one of his wives succeeds.⁵ Sons.

The question of the caste of the mother in the absence of a custom to the contrary⁶ does not apparently make any difference.⁷

On the death of such eldest son after the property has vested in him, the estate would pass in his line.⁸

It seems unsettled whether when an eldest son has died, before the

4 Bom. L. R. 372. As to other customs, see *Nutanund Murdara v. Sreekurun Juggernath Bewartah Patnaick* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 116.

¹ *Subramanya Pandya Chokka Talavar v. Siva Subramanya Pillai* (1894), 17 Mad. 316.

² Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 767.

³ *Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor* (1869), 12 M. I. A. 523; 3 B. L. R. P. C. 13; 12 W. R. P. C. 21. See *Subramanya Pandya Chokka Talavar v. Siva Subramanya Pillai* (1894), 17 Mad. 316, at p. 330.

⁴ *Ramasami Kamaya Naik v. Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik* (1894), 17 Mad. 422; affirmed on appeal, *Sundaralingasami Kamaya Naik v. Ramasami Kamaya Naik* (1899), 26 I. A. 55; 22 Mad. 515; 1 Bom. L. R. 850.

⁵ *Jagdesh Bahadur v. Sheo Partab Singh* (1901), 28 I. A. 100; 23 All. 369; 5 C. W. N. 602; 3 Bom. L. R.

298; *Rughonath Singh (Rajah) v. Hurrechur Singh (Rajah)* (1843), 7 Ben Sel. R. 126 (new edition, 146); *Bhujangrav v. Malojirav* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. A. C. 161; *Ramatlakshmi Ammal v. Sivanantha Perumal Sethurayar* (1872), 14 M. I. A. 570; 1 A. Sup. Vol. 1; 12 B. L. R. 396; 17 W. R. C. R. 553; *Pedda Ramappa Nayanvaru v. Bangari Seshamma Nayanvaru* (1880), 8 I. A. 1; 2 Mad. 286; 8 C. L. R. 315; *Radaik Ghaserain v. Budaik Pershad Sing* (1863), Marsh. 644.

⁶ *Bistooprea Patmohadea (Ranee) v. Basodeb Dull Dewartee Patnaik* (1865), 2 W. R. C. R. 232.

⁷ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., pp. 756-758.

⁸ Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 759. This was held to be the custom of the family in *Mohesh Chunder Dhal v. Satrugan Dhal* (1902), 29 I. A. 62; 29 Calc. 343; 6 C. W. N. 459; 4 Bom. L. R. 372.

estate has become vested in him, his eldest son takes in preference to his brothers.¹

An illegitimate son of the father of the deceased may succeed in preference to some remote relation.²

As to an illegitimate son, see *ante*, p. 385.

As in the case of inheritance to partible property, each male owner becomes a fresh stock of descent.³

¹ See Mayne's "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 759.

² *Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra (Raja) v. Nityanund Mansingh* (1890), 17 I. A. 128; 18

Calc. 151.

³ *Mutturaduganadha Tevar v. Periasami* (1896), 23 I. A. 128; 19 Mad. 451.

CHAPTER XVIII.

GIFTS AND WILLS.

THE chief importance of the Hindu law of gifts at the present time arises from the fact that the law of Hindu wills as administered by the Court of British India is founded on the Hindu law of gifts.

A Hindu of full age ¹ can transfer by way of gift any property ^{Power of} over which he has power of disposal,² or can create a charge ^{gift.} upon his property by way of gift.³

As to separate acquisitions, see *ante*, pp. 249, 251. As to the gift of a share by a coparcener in a family governed by the Mitakshara law, see *ante*, p. 303. As to gifts of property, subject to rights of maintenance, see *ante*, pp. 84, 85. As to gifts of rights of worship, see *post*, p. 573.

The fact that he is disqualified by physical defects from inheritance does not prevent him giving away property which belongs to him.⁴

Subject to the restrictions as to persons not in existence at ^{Donee.} the time of the gift, any person is competent to accept a gift.

For instance, there is no prohibition in Hindu law against a gift to an infant,⁵ or to an idiot.⁶

In either case his guardian could accept the gift for him.⁷

A minor donee who accepts property, or for whom property is accepted, burdened by any obligation is not bound by his acceptance; but if after attaining majority, and being aware of the obligation, he retains the property given, he becomes so bound.⁸

¹ *Gulab (Bai) v. Thakorelal Pranjivandas* (1912), 36 Bom. 622; 14 Bom. L. R. 748. There is nothing to prevent a minor making a small gift, such as would be usual in the case of persons in his position.

² *Abhachari v. Ramachendrayya* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 393.

³ *Chetti Chalamanna v. Pandrangi Subbamma* (1883), 7 Mad. 23.

⁴ *Shamachurn Audhiccaree Byragee v. Roop Doss Byragee* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 68.

⁵ Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," Vol. ii. chap. viii. para. 36, pp. 243, 244.

⁶ *Kooldebnarain Shahee (Baboo) v. Wooma Coomaree (Mussamut)* (1863), Marsh. 357; 2 Hay, 370.

⁷ See *Joitaram v. Ramkrishna* (1902), 27 Bom. 31; 4 Bom. L. R. 754.

⁸ Act IV. of 1882 (Transfer of Property), s. 127; *Subramania Ayyar v. Sitha Lakshmi* (1896), 20 Mad. 147.

Under the Hindu law the legal requisites to constitute a perfect disposition by gift were the giving either orally or in writing, with the intention to pass the property in the thing given, accompanied by its actual delivery and acceptance in the donor's lifetime.¹

"The reason for delivery being necessary is that the gift may not be resumed."²

Necessity for making over possession.

Under the Hindu law there must be such making over of possession to the donee as is possible under the circumstances.³

Where the land is in the possession of tenants a delivery of the documents of title, or a direction to the tenants to pay their rents to the donee or the receipt of rents by the donee is sufficient.⁴

Mere registration of a deed is insufficient,⁵ but it has been held that delivery of the deed of gift is sufficient to pass the title.⁶

When the donor has done all he can to complete the gift, the gift cannot be set aside on the ground that the donor was out of possession.⁷

Since the passing of the Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), an agreement although without consideration is enforceable as a contract if it be made on account of natural love and affection and be registered under the law for the time being in force for the registration of documents.⁸

¹ *Kishto Soondary Dabee v. Kishtomotee (Ranee)* (1863), Marsh, 367; *Dagai Dabee v. Mothura Nath Chattopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 859; 12 C. L. R. 530; *Dharmodas Das v. Nistarini Dasi* (1887), 14 Calc. 446; *Lakshimoni Dasi v. Nitayananda Day* (1892), 20 Calc. 464; *Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh* (1899), 27 Calc. 242; *Harjivan Anandram v. Naran Haribhai* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. (A. C.) 31; *Bank of Hindustan v. Premchand Raichand* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. (O. C.) 83, at p. 94; *Kachu Bayaji v. Kachoba Pitthoba* (1873), 10 Bom. H. C. 491; *Lalubhai Surchand v. Amrit (Bai)* (1877), 2 Bom. 299; *Hasha v. Ragho Ambo Gondhali* (1881), 6 Bom. 165; *Sobhagchand Gulabchand v. Bhaichand* (1880), 6 Bom. 193; *Lakshmandas Sarupchand v. Dasrat* (1880), 6 Bom. 168; *Vasudev Bhat v. Narayan Daji Damle* (1882), 7 Bom. 131; *Kushal (Bai) v. Lakhma Mana* (1883), 7 Bom. 452; *Ugarchand Manakchand v. Madapa Somana* (1885), 9 Bom. 324; *Bhaskar Pursotam v. Sarasvathi* (1892), 17 Bom. 486 (gift in contemplation of death); *Visalat-*

chmi Ammal v. Subbu Pillai (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 270 (Ditto); *Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das* (1894), 16 All. 185.

² *Kali Das Mullick v. Kanhya Lal Pundit* (1884), 11 I. A. 218, at p. 230; 11 Calc. 121, at p. 132.

³ *Man Bhari v. Nannidh* (1881), 4 All. 40; *Wannathian v. Keyakadath* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 194; *Abaji Gangadhar v. Mukta* (1893), 18 Bom. 688.

⁴ *Harjivan Anandram v. Nuran Haribhai* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. (A. C. J.) 31; *Bank of Hindustan, &c. v. Ahmedbhai Haribhai* (1868), 5 Bom. H. C. (O. C. J.) 83.

⁵ *Lakshimoni Dasi v. Nitayananda Day* (1892), 20 Calc. 464; *Dagai Dabee v. Mothuranath Chattopadhyaya* (1883), 9 Calc. 854; 12 C. L. R. 530; *Vasudev Bhat v. Narayan Daji Damle* (1882), 7 Bom. 131.

⁶ *Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das* (1894), 16 All. 185.

⁷ *Kali Das Mullick v. Kanhya Lal Pundit* (1884), 11 I. A. 218; 11 Calc. 121; *Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das* (1894), 16 All. 185.

⁸ Act IX. of 1872, s. 25.

Possession can be taken by a guardian on behalf of a minor.¹

Where the donor is the guardian of the donee, the Court will presume that continued possession of the subject of the gift by the former is really for the benefit of and in trust for the latter.²

Where one of the donees is in actual possession, a declaration by the donor assented to by the donee in possession is sufficient.³

So far as the necessity for actual delivery is concerned, the law is now to be found in s. 123⁴ of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), which enacted as follows :—

Transfer how effected.

“For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses.

“For the purpose of making a gift of movable property, the transfer may be effected by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery.

“Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered.”⁵

Acceptance of a gift during the lifetime of the owner is still necessary.⁶

Section 123 has no application to gifts of movable property made in contemplation of death.⁷

Donations mortis causa.

The Hindu law makes no distinction in favour of gifts in contemplation of death, as respects the legal requisites to constitute a perfect disposition by gift. When all these requisites have been fulfilled there is nothing in Hindu law to prevent effect being given to a gift in contemplation of death.⁸

¹ See *Joitaram v. Ram Krishna* (1902), 27 Bom. 31.

² *Taro Bhee v. Ghasiram* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 247, relying on *Anundchund Rai v. Kshen Mohun Bunoja* (1805), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 115 (2nd ed., 152). See *Venkatachella Maniyakarar v. Thathammal* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 406.

³ *Kushal (Bai) v. Lakhma Mana* (1883), 7 Bom. 452.

⁴ *Dharmadas v. Nistarini Dasi* (1887), 14 Cal. 446; *Rambai (Bai) v. Mani (Bai)* (1898), 23 Bom. 234; *Madhwarao Moreshwar v. Kashibai* (1909), 34 Bom. 287; 12 Bom. L. R.

9; *Phul Chand v. Lakku* (1903), 25 All. 358. Cf. *Alabi Koya v. Mussa Koya* (1901), 24 Mad. 513.

⁵ As to the delivery of goods sold, see Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), ss. 90-94.

⁶ Act IV. of 1882, s. 122.

⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 129.

⁸ *Visalatchmi Ammal v. Subbu Pillar* (1871), 6 Mad. H. C. 270. See *Upendra Krishna Deb Bahadur (Kumara) v. Nabm Krishna Bose* (1869), 3 B. L. R. O. C. 113; *S. C. Krishna Deb v. Woopendra Krishna Deb*, 12 W. R. O. C. 4.

In one case ¹ where the son of the donor had made over possession to the donee after the death of the donor, the gift was upheld.

Gifts to
unborn
persons.

Until the passing of the Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act, 1914 (Madras Act I. of 1914), and the Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916 (Act XV. of 1916), a Hindu could not by gift *inter vivos* or transfer for consideration, any more than he could by will,² confer any benefit upon a person who was not born at the time of the gift.³

Law in
Madras.

The former Act applies to all transfers *inter vivos* made by persons governed by the Hindu law (including persons governed by the Marumakkatayam or the Aliyasantana law) who are domiciled within the limits of the Presidency of Madras.⁴

How far Act
retrospective.

In the case of transfers *inter vivos* executed before the passing of the Act, the provisions of the Act apply to such of the dispositions thereby made as were intended to come into operation at a time which is subsequent to such date. Provided that this provision does not affect *bonâ fide* transferees for valuable consideration in whom the right to any property has vested prior to the date of the Act.

Transfers and
bequests in
favour of
unborn
persons.

By section 3 of the Act a transfer *inter vivos* of any property is not invalid by reason only that the transferee is an unborn person at the date of the transfer.

Rule against
perpetuity in
regard to
transfers.

By section 4 of the Act no transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the lifetime of one or more persons living at the date of the transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.

Hindu Dis-
position of
Property Act,
1916.

The Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916 (Act XV. of 1916), extends, in the first instance, to the whole of British India, except the Province of Madras: Provided that the Governor General in Council may by notification in the Gazette of India, extend the Act to the Province of Madras.

Dispositions
for benefit of
persons not
in existence.

By section 2 of the Act, subject to the limitations and provisions below mentioned, no disposition of property by a Hindu ⁵ by transfer *inter vivos* shall be invalid by reason only that any

¹ *Bhaskar Purshotam v. Saraswati* (1892), 17 Bom. 482.

² *Post*, pp. 533-536.

³ See cases, *ante*, p. 522, note 1.

⁴ Act I. (M. C.) of 1914, s. 2.

⁵ As to the application of the Act to Khojas see sec. 5 of the Act.

person for whose benefit it may have been made was not in existence at the date of such disposition.

The limitations and provisions referred to are to be found in sections 13, 14, and 20 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV. of 1882),¹ which are as follows :—

Sec. 13.—Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property.

Transfer for benefit of unborn person.

Illustration.

A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and after the death of the survivor for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A's second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A's remaining interest in the property.

Sec. 14.—No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life-time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong.

Rule against perpetuity.

Sec. 20.—Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not then living, he acquires upon his birth, unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer, a vested interest, although he may not be entitled to the enjoyment thereof immediately on his birth.

When unborn person acquires vested interest on transfer for his benefit.

Where a disposition of property fails by reason of any of the above limitations, any disposition intended to take effect after or upon failure of such prior disposition also fails.²

Failure of prior disposition.

“A will is the legal declaration of the intention of the testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.”³

Definition of “will.”

¹ Act XV. of 1916, s. 3.

² Act XV. of 1916, s. 4.

³ Indian Succession Act (X. of

1865), s. 3; Probate and Administration Act (V. of 1881), s. 3.

The conduct of the testator and the surrounding circumstances may sometimes show whether a document was intended to be a present gift or a will.¹

Law founded
on law of gifts.

The Hindu law books do not provide rules as to wills in distinction from gifts *inter vivos*, but the introduction of gifts by will into general use has followed in India, as it has done in other countries, the transfer of property *inter vivos*,² and under the English rule a body of law applicable to wills has grown up from the foundation of the Hindu law of gifts.³

Limits of
analogy.

"Even if wills are not universally to be regarded in all respects as gifts to take effect upon death. they are generally so to be regarded as to the property which they can transfer and the persons to whom it can be transferred." ⁴

There is not a complete identity between the law of gifts and that of wills.⁵

The history of the practice of making wills by Hindus is somewhat obscure. It seems to have commenced in Calcutta about the middle of the eighteenth century of the Christian Era. At one time, the right of making a will was denied to Hindus by the Courts, but after considerable fluctuation of opinion the practice was recognized as settled in 1832. Probably the practice arose from the desire of Hindus to enjoy a privilege which was exercised by their Christian and Mahomedan fellow-subjects.

Subject of
will.

A Hindu who is of sound mind,⁶ and not a minor,⁷ within the

¹ See *Chunder Mohinee Dossee v. Hurrosoonduree Dossee* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 200; *post*, pp. 527, 528.

² *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 68; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 397; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 366.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 69; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 399; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 366; *Motivahoo (Bai) v. Mamooibai (Bai)* (1897), 24 I. A. 93, at p. 105; 21 Bom. 709, at p. 721; 1 C. W. N. 366, at pp. 368, 369. See *Beer Pertab Sahee (Baboo) v. Rajender Pertab Sahee (Maharajah)* (1867), 12 M. I. A. 1, at p. 38; 9 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 22.

⁵ See *Bushen Chand (Rai) v. Asmaida Koer (Mussumat)* (1884), 11 I. A. 164, at p. 177; 6 All. 560, at p. 572; *Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik* (1880), 7 I. A. 181, at p. 194; 5 Bom. 48, at

pp. 61, 62; 7 C. L. R. 320, at p. 328; *Lakshmibai v. Ganpat Moroba* (1867), 4 Bom. H. C. O. C. 150, at p. 158; *Seth Mulchand Badharsha v. Mancha (Bai)* (1883), 7 Bom. 491, at p. 493.

⁶ See Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 46, applied to certain Hindu wills (*post*, p. 545), by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 2; *Woomesh Chunder Biswas v. Rashmohini Dassi* (1893), 21 Calc. 279, at p. 291; S. C. affirmed on appeal, *Rashmohini Dasi v. Umesh Chunder Biswas* (1898), 25 I. A. 109; 25 Calc. 824; 2 C. W. N. 321.

⁷ Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 46, applied to certain Hindu wills (*post*, p. 545), by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 2; *Hardwari Lal v. Gomi* (1911), 33 All. 525; W. Macnaghten's "Hindu Law," vol. ii. p. 219, note; *Cossinaut Bysack v. Hurrosoondery Dossee* (1819), F. Macnaghten, 81; 2 Morley's "Digest," 198.

meaning of the Indian Majority Act (IX. of 1875),¹ can by will dispose of all property which he may give away in his lifetime.²

“Decided cases, too numerous to be now questioned, have determined that the testamentary power exists, and may be exercised, at least within the limits which the law prescribes to alienation by gift *inter vivos*.”³

The owner of an impartible estate can dispose of it by will, unless there be a special family custom, or a tenure prohibiting alienation.⁴

A Hindu woman can dispose of her *stridhan* property by will,⁵ subject in some cases to the consent of her husband.⁶

As to the power to transfer her *stridhan* property by gift, see *ante*, pp. 443, 445.

She cannot by will dispose of the income or accumulations of an estate, in which she is only a restricted owner, and which she has not shown an intention to appropriate, although she may have a power of disposing of them during her lifetime.⁷

In cases not governed by the Hindu Wills Act⁸ the form of will, of document, provided it be of a testamentary character, is immaterial. No formalities are necessary.⁹ A nuncupative will is permissible.¹⁰

The following have been held to be of a testamentary nature:—

1. A statement before a Revenue official, which was recorded by him.¹¹
2. An unsigned will.¹²

¹ *Gulab (Bai) v. Thakorelul* (1912), 36 Bom. 622; 14 Bom. L. R. 748; *Krishnamachariar v. Krishnamachariar* (1913), 38 Mad. 166.

² See Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 3, *post*, p. 543.

³ *Beer Pertab Sahee (Bahoo) v. Rajender Pertab Sahee (Maharajah)* (1867), 12 M. I. A. 1, at p. 38; 9 W. R. P. C. 15, at p. 22; *Adjoodhia Gir v. Kashee Gir* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 31; *Pitum Koonwar (Musst) v. Joy Kishen Doss* (1866), 6 W. R. C. R. 101; *Valluvayagam Pillai v. Pachche* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 326.

⁴ *Venkata Surya Mahipati Rama Krishna Rao Bahadoor (Sri Raja Rao) v. Court of Wards* (1898), 26 I. A. 83; 22 Mad. 383; 3 C. W. N. 415; 1 Bom. L. R. 277; *Sartaj Kuari (Rani) v. Deoraj Kuari (Rani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 51; 10 All. 272; *Beresford v. Ramasubba* (1889), 13 Mad. 197.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 443, 445.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 443.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 474, 475.

⁸ *Post*, pp. 542, 543.

⁹ *Bapuji Jagannath* (1895), 20 Bom. 674; *Radhabai v. Ganesh Tatya Gholap* (1878), 3 Bom. 7, following *Muncherji Pestonjee v. Narayan Luxmonjee* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C. 77; *Vinayak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 224.

¹⁰ *Gokul Chand v. Mangal Sen* (1903), 25 All. 313; *Hari Chintaman Dikshit v. Moro Lahsman* (1886), 11 Bom. 89; *Bhagvan Dullabh v. Kala Shankar* (1877), 1 Bom. 641; *Srinivasammal v. Vijayammal* (1864), 2 Mad. H. C. 37.

¹¹ *Kalian Singh v. Sanwal Singh* (1884), 7 All. 163.

¹² *Tarachund Bose v. Nobeon Chunder Mitter* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 138.

3. A draft will.¹
4. A petition to the Revenue authorities.²
5. Entries in a *wajib-ul-arz*.³
6. A matrimonial arrangement deed.⁴
7. A *mooktarnamah* (power of attorney).⁵
8. A deed of settlement made at the time of an adoption.⁶
9. A deed of assignment.⁷
10. An agreement.⁸

One of the invariable tests is whether the document is revocable or not.⁹

A document, although in name a will, which is intended to speak from the time when it was executed, is not a will.¹⁰

Any instrument which confers or reserves a life estate to the maker cannot, according to the Bombay High Court, be a will.¹¹ This proposition is, it is submitted, not invariable.¹²

Construction
of wills.

There are no technical rules for the construction of Hindu wills.¹³

First consider
intention,
then apply
law.

"The true mode of construing a will is to consider it as expressing in all its parts, whether consistent with law or not, the intention of the testator, and to determine upon a reading of the whole will together¹⁴ whether,

¹ *Janki v. Kallu Mal* (1908), 31 All. 236.

² *Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvie) v. Shewulkram* (1874), 2 I. A. 7; 14 B. L. R. 226; 22 W. R. C. R. 409; *Kollany Koer (Mussamut) v. Luchmee Pershad* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 395. See also *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal* (1876), 3 I. A. 259; 26 W. R. C. R. 55, which was a case under the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869).

³ *Mathura Das v. Bhukhan Mal* (1896), 19 All. 16. See *Lali (Musammat) v. Murli Dhar* (1906), 33 I. A. 97; 28 All. 488; 10 C. W. N. 730; 8 Bom. L. R. 402; *Sahodra v. Ganesht Parshad* (1905), 10 C. W. N. 249.

⁴ *Din Tanini Debi v. Krishna Gopal Bagchi* (1908), 36 Calc. 149; 13 C. W. N. 291.

⁵ *Kollany Koer (Mussamut) v. Luchmee Pershad* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 395; *Kooldeb Narain Shahee (Baboo) v. Woomacoomaree (Mussamut)* (1863), Marshall, 357; 2 Hay, 370.

⁶ *Lakshmi v. Subramanya* (1889), 12 Mad. 490.

⁷ *Ishri Singh (Thakur) v. Baldeo Singh* (1884), 11 I. A. 135; 10 Calc. 792; *Udai Raj Singh v. Bhagwan Baksh Singh* (1910), 37 I. A. 46;

32 All. 227; 14 C. W. N. 641; 12 Bom. L. R. 409.

⁸ *Rajammal v. Authiammal* (1909), 33 Mad. 304.

⁹ *Rajammal v. Authiammal* (1909), 33 Mad. 304; *Sita Koer (Musst) v. Deo Nath Sahay (Munshi)* (1904), 8 C. W. N. 614.

¹⁰ *Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh* (1913), 40 I. A. 161; 35 All. 337; 17 C. W. N. 949; 15 Bom. L. R. 652.

¹¹ *Pursab v. Gurappa Basappa* (1913), 38 Bom. 227; 16 Bom. L. R. 111.

¹² *Rajammal v. Authiammal* (1909), 23 Mad. 304.

¹³ Technical rules of English conveyancing are not to be made use of in construing Hindu wills, *Jageswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt* (1896), 23 I. A. 37, at p. 49; 23 Calc. 670, at p. 679.

¹⁴ Indian Succession Act (X. of 1895), s. 69, applied to certain Hindu wills by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 2, *post*, p. 545; *Amirthayyan v. Ketharammayyan* (1890), 14 Mad. 65, at p. 69. An invalid gift over may indicate the testator's intention to limit an estate which he has created; *Anand Rao Vinayak v. Administrator General of Bombay* (1895), 20 Bom. 450.

assuming the limitations therein mentioned to take effect,¹ an interest claimed under it was intended under the circumstances to be conferred.² The will is to be construed in its plain ordinary meaning.³

"A benignant construction is to be used and . . . if the real meaning of the document can be reasonably ascertained from the language used, though that language be ungrammatical or untechnical, or mistaken as to name or description, or in any other manner incorrect, provided it sufficiently indicates what was meant, that meaning shall be enforced to the extent and in the form which the law allows."⁴ Benignant construction.

In construing a will the Court must have regard to the words used, and then may take into consideration the surrounding circumstances,⁵ the law relative to the subject,⁶ and where there is ambiguity⁷ the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus.⁸ Surrounding circumstances.

It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate, especially an ancestral estate, shall be retained in his family, and it may be assumed that a Hindu knows that as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estates of inheritance, which they are enabled to alienate.⁹

"Where the language of the will is clear and consistent, it shall receive its literal construction unless there is something in the will itself to suggest departure from it."¹⁰ Literal construction.

¹ What is intended to be a life estate cannot be extended into a greater estate by the failure of the limitations, *Tarakeswar Roy (Kumar) v. Shoshi Shikareswar (Kumar)* (1883), 10 I. A. 51; 9 Cal. 952; 13 C. L. R. 62.

² *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 79; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 409; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 371; *Sookhmoy Chunder Dass v. Monohurri Das (Srimati)* (1885), 12 I. A. 103, at p. 110; 11 Cal. 684, at p. 692.

³ *Bhagbutti Dae (Mussumat) v. Bholanath Thakoor (Chowdry)* (1875), 2 I. A. 256, at p. 259, 261; 24 W. R. C. R. 168, at p. 169; *Kristoromoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Norendro Krishna Bahadoor (Maharajah)* (1888), 16 I. A. 29, at p. 41; 16 Cal. 383, at p. 394.

⁴ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 95; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 395; 18 W. R. C. R. 350, at p. 364.

⁵ *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundhoo Mullick* (1857) 6 M. I. A. 526, at p. 550; 4 W. R. P. C. 114; *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Cal. 112, at p. 124.

⁶ *Bissonauth Chunder v. Bamasoodery Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1867), 12 M. I. A. 41, at p. 59; *S. C. Prankisto Chunder v. Bamasoodery Dossee*, 9 W. R. P. C. 1; *Karsandas Natha v. Ladhkavahu* (1887), 12 Bom. 185, at p. 200; *Lakshmbai v. Hirabai* (1886), 11 Bom. 69, at p. 74; *Motilal Mithalal v. Advocate General of Bombay* (1910), 35 Bom. 279; 13 Bom. L. R. 471.

⁷ *Parami v. Mahadevi* (1909), 3 Bom. 278; 12 Bom. L. R. 196.

⁸ See *Radha Prosad Mullick v. Ranmoni Dass* (1908), 35 I. A. 118, at p. 129; 35 Cal. 896, at p. 902; 12 C. W. N. 729, at p. 737; 10 Bom. L. R. 604; *Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvie) v. Shewukram* (1874), 2 I. A. 7, at pp. 14, 15; 14 B. L. R. 226, at pp. 231, 232; 22 W. R. C. R. 409, at p. 410.

⁹ *Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvie) v. Shewukram* (1874), 2 I. A. 7, at pp. 14, 15; 14 B. L. R. 226, at pp. 231, 232; 22 W. R. C. R. 409, at p. 410; see *ante*, pp. 441, 442.

¹⁰ *Gurusami Pillai v. Sivakami Ammal* (1896), 22 I. A. 119, at p. 128; 18 Mad. 347, at p. 358. See *Krishnarao Ramchandra v. Benabai* (1895), 20 Bom. 571.

"Clear and unambiguous dispositive words are not to be controlled or qualified by any general expression of intention." ¹

Technical words.

"Technical words or words of known legal import must have their legal effect, even though the testator uses inconsistent words, unless those inconsistent words are of such a nature as to make it perfectly clear that the testator did not mean to use the technical terms in their proper sense." ²

Disinherison.

By giving his property by will to some other person,³ a Hindu can defeat the rights of his heirs.⁴

He can defeat the inheritance of a son whom he has taken in adoption,⁵ or of a son taken in adoption subsequently to the will.⁶

Right of maintenance.

He cannot by will defeat the legal right of his wife or any other person to maintenance;⁷ but he can by will deprive his wife of the share which she gets on partition,⁸ and, provided he leaves sufficient property for the maintenance of his widow and those whom he is legally bound to support, a Hindu can dispose of his property by gift or will, so as to free it from claims to maintenance.⁹

Tagore case.

The leading case in the subject of Hindu gifts and wills is the well-known *Tagore case*,¹⁰ which laid down principles which

¹ *Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chuk-kun Lall Roy* (1897), 24 I. A. 76, at p. 85; 24 Calc. 334, at p. 846; 1 C. W. N. 387, at p. 388.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Prosunno Coomar Ghose v. Tarrucknath Sircar* (1873), 10 B. L. R. 267; *S. C. Tarucknath Sircar v. Prosono Coomar Ghose*, 19 W. R. C. R. 48.

⁴ *Mulraz Lachmia v. Chalekany Vencata Rama Jagganadha Row* (1838), 2 M. I. A. 54; *Barwa Misser v. Bishen Prokash Narain Singh* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 287; *Narayanasiams Chetti v. Arunachala Chetti* (1832), 1 Mad. H. C. 487; *Subbayya v. Surayya* (1887), 10 Mad. 251; *Narottam Jagjwan v. Narsandas Harikisandas* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. A. C. 6.

⁵ *Purshotam, Shama Shenvi v. Vasudev Krishna Shenvi* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. O. C. 196; *Lakshmi v. Subramanya* (1889), 12 Mad. 490.

⁶ *Vinayak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 224. In this case the natural father was at the time of the adoption aware of the provisions of the will.

⁷ *Promotha Nath Roy v. Nagen-drabala Chaudhrani* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 808; see ante, pp. 84, 85.

⁸ *Poorendra Nath Sen v. Heman-gini Dasi* (1908), 36 Calc. 75; see ante, p. 334.

⁹ *Debendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry v. Brojendra Coomar Roy Chowdhry* (1890), 17 Calc. 886; *Bhoobunmoyee Debea Chowdhraim v. Ramkissore Acharj Chowdhry*, Ben. S. D. A. 1860, p. 485, at p. 489; *Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy* (1888), 15 Calc. 292, at p. 306. See *Razabar v. Sadu* (1871), 8 Bom. H. C. A. C. 98; *Lakshmi v. Subramanya* (1889), 12 Mad. 490, at p. 494; answers of law officers in *Mulraz Lachmia v. Chalekany Vencata Rama Jagganadha Row* (1838), 2 M. I. A. 54, at p. 57. The widow's claim to maintenance cannot be defeated merely by implication, *Joylara v. Ramhari Sardar* (1884), 10 Calc. 638; *Comulmony Dossee v. Rammannath Bysack* (1843), 1 Fulton, 189, at p. 193.

¹⁰ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol. 47; 9 B. L. R. 377; 18 W. R. C. R. 359.

have been the foundation of most other decisions on the subject of Hindu gifts, settlements, and wills.

The facts of that case, so far as at present material, are shortly as follows :—The testator gave his property to A for life, and on A's death to the eldest son of A who should be born during the testator's life for the life of such eldest son ; "and after the determination of that estate to the use of the first and other sons successively of the eldest son of " A, "according to their respective seniorities, and the heirs male of their respective bodies issuing successively ; and upon the failure or determination of that estate, to the use of the second and other sons of " A "who shall be born during" the testator's life "successively, according to their respective seniorities for the life of each such sons respectively ; and upon the failure or determination of that estate, to the use of the first and other sons successively of such second or other sons of " A, "and the heirs male of their respective bodies issuing, so that the elder of the sons of " A born in the testator's lifetime, "and his first and other sons successively. and the heirs male of their respective bodies issuing, may be preferred to and take before the younger of the sons of " A born in the testator's lifetime, "and his and their respective first and other sons successively, and the heirs male of their respective bodies issuing ; and after the failure and determination of the uses and estates hereinbefore limited, to the use of each of the sons of " A who shall be born after the death of the testator "successively, according to their respective seniorities, and the heirs male of their respective bodies issuing, so that the elder of such sons and the heirs male of his body may be preferred to and take before the younger of such sons and the heirs male of them and his respective bodies issuing ; and after the failure or determination of the uses and estates hereinbefore limited, then to the use of " B for "the term of his natural life and after the failure or determination of that estate," then to the sons of C, "and their sons and the heirs male of their body respectively, in like manner as for " A's, "and after the failure or determination of the said several estates and uses, to the first and other sons, and their sons, and the heirs male of their body of " D "successively, and respectively in like manner as in the case of sons of " A and C.

These are what are called in England estates in tail male.

The following principles are to be found in the decision in the above case, and in the decisions founded thereon.

I. Where property is given or bequeathed to any person, he is entitled to the whole interest of the testator therein, unless it appears from the will that only a restricted interest was intended for him.¹

Presumption that whole interest passes.

"If an estate were given to a man simply without express words of

¹ Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 82, applied to certain Hindu wills by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 2 ; *Damodar Das Tapidas* v. *Dayahai Tapidas* (1898), 25 I. A.

126 ; 22 Bom. 833 ; 2 C. W. N. 417. This principle is equally applicable to the cases of Hindu wills, not governed by the Hindu Wills Act, see cases in next note.

inheritance, it would, in the absence of a conflicting context, carry by Hindu law . . . an estate of inheritance. If there were added to such gift an imperfect description of it as a gift of inheritance, not excluding the inheritance imposed by the law, an estate of inheritance would pass."¹

In spite of an apparent absolute interest it may be shown by other provisions of the will or gift that a life interest only was intended to be given.²

As to bequests by husbands to their wives, see *ante*, pp. 441-443.

Attempt to
alter law of
inheritance.

II. "All estates of inheritance created by gift, arrangement; or will, so far as they are inconsistent with the general law of inheritance, are void as such."

"A man cannot create a new form of estate, or alter the line of succession allowed by law, for the purpose of carrying out his own wishes or views of policy."³ This rule does not prevent the validity of a life estate, which precedes an invalid provision for the succession.⁴

Repugnant
condition.

III. Where an absolute estate is given by the gift or will, a condition repugnant to the estate previously given, or a restriction in the mode of enjoyment, is void.⁵

¹ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 65; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 395; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 365; *Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy* (1897), 24 I. A. 76, at p. 88; 24 Calc. 834, at p. 849; 1 C. W. N. 387, at p. 390; *Manikya-mala Bose v. Nandu Kumar Bose* (1906), 33 Calc. 1306; 11 C. W. N. 12. See *Anundomohoy Dossee v. Doe dem East India Company* (1859), 8 M. L. A. 43; 4 W. R. P. C. 51; *Basanta Kumari Debi v. Kamikshya Kumari Debi* (1905), 32 I. A. 181; 33 Calc. 23; 10 C. W. N. 1; 7 Bom. L. R. 904.

² *Somasundara Mudahar v. Ganga Bissen Soni* (1904), 28 Mad. 386.

³ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 65; 9 B. L. R. 377, at pp. 394, 395; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 364 (in that case an attempt was made to create an estate in tail male); *Tarakeswar Roy (Kumar) v. Shoshi Shikareswar (Kumar)* (1883), 10 I. A. 51; 9 Calc. 952; 13 C. L. R. 62; *Kristomoney Dossee (Sree-*

mutty) v. Norendro Krishna Baha door (Maharajah) (1888), 16 I. A. 29; 16 Calc. 383; *Vullabhdas Damodhar v. Thucker Gordhandas Damodhar* (1890), 14 Bom. 360; *Purna Sashi Bhattacharji v. Kalidhan Rai Chowdhuri* (1911), 38 I. A. 112; 38 Calc. 603; 15 C. W. N. 693; 13 Bom. L. R. 451 (a case of a settlement *inter vivos*), and other cases cited in Phillips' and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 43-47; *Kunhamina (Mooryyat Peetikayil) v. Kunhambi (Mooryyat Peetikayil)* (1908), 32 Mad. 315.

⁴ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 65; 9 B. L. R. 377, at pp. 394, 395; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 364; *Rameshwar Prosad Singh v. Lachmi Prosad Singh* (1903), 31 Calc. 111; 7 C. W. N. 688. Cf. Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 103, applied to certain Hindu wills by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 2 (*post*, p. 545).

⁵ See Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 125, and cases *post*, p. 533, notes 2-8 below.

This applies also to a partition or other arrangement or transfer.¹

A prohibition against alienation² (even in the case of a gift to Brahmins),³ against obtaining possession,⁴ or against partition,⁵ or a provision that the property should not be liable for the debts of the beneficiary,⁶ a provision that the expenditure is to be controlled by certain trustees,⁷ or a provision that the income is to be accumulated,⁸ may be disregarded by the beneficiary.

A lawful condition not inconsistent with the gift or bequest is valid;⁹ but a gift or bequest upon a condition which is impossible,¹⁰ or is contrary to law or morality,¹¹ is void.

IV. A person capable of taking under a will, gift, or Bequest to unborn person. settlement must, either in fact or in contemplation of law,¹² be in existence at the death of the testator,¹³ or date of the gift,¹⁴ as the case may be.

¹ *Venkatramanna v. Bramanna Sastri* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 345; *Ali Hasan v. Dhirja* (1882), 4 All 518 (a mortgage); *Bhairu v. Parmeshri Dayal* (1884), 7 All. 516 (deed of compromise).

² *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 65; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 395; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 305; *Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee* (1879), 6 I. A. 182; 5 Calc. 438; 5 C. L. R. 296; *Sookhmoy Chunder Dass v. Monohurri Dasi (Srimati)* (1885), 12 I. A. 103; 11 Calc. 684; *Raikishori Dasi v. Debendranath Sircar* (1887), 15 I. A. 37; 15 Calc. 409; *Chundi Churn Barua v. Sidheswari Devi (Rani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 149; 16 Calc. 71; *Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy* (1897), 24 I. A. 76; 24 Calc. 834; 1 C. W. N. 387.

³ *Anamika Tirtha Charari v. Nagamuthu Ambalagaren* (1881), 4 Mad. 200.

⁴ *Cally Nath Naugh Chowdhry v. Chunder Nath Naugh Chowdhry* (1882), 8 Calc. 378; 10 C. L. R. 207; *Shivgar Dayagar (Gosavi) v. Rivett-Carnac* (1888), 13 Bom. 463.

⁵ *Mokoondo Lall Shaw v. Gonesh Chunder Shaw* (1875), 1 Calc. 104; *Raikishori Dasi v. Debendranath Sircar* (1887), 15 I. A. 37; 15 Calc. 409; *Narayan v. Kannan* (1884), 7 Mad. 315.

⁶ *Raikishori Dasi v. Debendranath Sircar* (1887), 15 I. A. 37; 15 Calc. 409.

⁷ *Motivahu (Bai) v. Mamubai (Bai)* (1895), 19 Bom. 647.

⁸ *Kolla Subramaniam Chetti v. Thellanayakulu Subramaniam Chetti* (1881), 4 Mad. 124. See *Raneemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Premmoney Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 1033; *post*, p. 542.

⁹ See *Hureehur Mookerjee v. Raj Kishen Mookerjee* (1874), 23 W. R. C. R. 236; *Ganendro Mohun Tagore v. Juttendro Mohun Tagore (Rajah)* (1874), 1 I. A. 387; 14 B. L. R. 60; 22 W. R. C. R. 377; *Bhoba Tarini Debya v. Peary Lall Sanyal* (1897), 24 Calc. 646; 1 C. W. N. 578. See Part XVI. of Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865) applied to certain Hindu wills (*post*, p. 545).

¹⁰ See Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 115, applied to certain Hindu wills by s. 2 (*post*, p. 545) of the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870).

¹¹ See *Ibid.*, s. 114. Where immoral conditions are subsequent to the gift, they are void and the gift is good, see *Ram Sarup v. Bela (Mussumat)* (1883), 11 I. A. 44; 6 All. 313.

¹² As in the case of a child in the womb or of an adopted son.

¹³ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at pp. 67, 70; 9 B. L. R. 377, at pp. 397, 400; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at pp. 366, 367; *Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao Bahadur (Sri Raja) v. Venkata Purashothama Jagannadha Gopala Row Bahadur (Sri Raja Suraneni)* (1908), 31 Mad. 310.

¹⁴ *Pudmanund Singh Bahadoor*

As to the present law on this subject, see *post*, pp. 536–539.

As to grants of impartible estates by Government, see *ante*, pp. 260–262.

In laying down the above rule in the *Tagore* case the Judicial Committee desired “not to express any opinion as to certain exceptional cases of provisions by means of contract or of conditional gift on marriage or other family provision for which authority may be found in Hindu law or usage.”¹

This rule was applicable to all wills of Hindus, by whatever school they may be governed,¹ and whether they were or were not subject to the Hindu Wills Act.²

It applied whether the bequest was to take effect immediately on the death of the testator, or was to be postponed by the intervention of a prior estate, or was contingent upon the happening of some event.³ It applied to a person taking under a power of appointment contained in a will,⁴ and indeed to every form of bequest.⁵

A bequest to the future wife of the testator’s son in case he should marry within ten years from the testator’s death was upheld on the ground that the wife was in fact born before the death of the testator.⁶

The decisions as to gifts to a class,⁷ some of the members of which are incapable of taking, have given rise to some difficulty.

Gift to a class.

(*Raja*) v. *Hayes* (1901), 28 I. A. 152; 28 Calc. 72; 5 C. W. N. 806; 3 Bom. L. R. 803 (a case of a *pottah* given in settlement of litigation).

¹ *Mangaldas Nathubhoy (Sr)* v. *Krishnabai* (1881), 6 Bom. 38.

² *Alongamonjori Dabee* v. *Sonamoni Dabee* (1882), 8 Calc. 637; 10 C. L. R. 459. See *Cally Nath Naugh Chowdhry* v. *Chunder Nath Naugh Chowdhry* (1882), 8 Calc. 378, at p. 390; 10 C. L. R. 207, at p. 215; *Jairam Narronji* v. *Kuverbai* (1885), 9 Bom. 491, at p. 506.

³ *Tarakeswar Roy (Kumar)* v. *Shoshi Shikareswar (Kumar)*, 10 I. A. 51; 9 Calc. 952; 13 C. L. R. 62; *Chundi Churn Barua* v. *Sidheswari Debi (Rani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 149; 16 Calc. 71; *Kristoromoney Dossee (Sreemutty)* v. *Norendro Krishna Bahadoor (Maharajah)* (1888), 16 I. A. 29; 16 Calc. 383; *Nistarini Dassi* v. *Nundo Lal Bose* (1902), 30 Calc. 369, at p. 385; 7 C. W. N. 353, at p. 364; *Javerbai* v. *Kablibai* (1891), 16 Bom. 492; *Anand Rao Vinayak* v. *Administrator-General of Bombay* (1895), 20 Bom. 450; *Ramgutte Acharjee* v. *Kistosoonduree Debi* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 472.

⁴ *Metiabai* (Bai) v. *Mamobai (Bai)* (1897), 24 I. A. 93; 21 Bom. 709; 1 C. W. N. 386; *Upendra Lal*

Boral v. *Hem Chundra Boral* (1897), 25 Calc. 405; 2 C. W. N. 295; *Goswami Shri Gurdharji* v. *Madhowsdas Premji* (1893), 17 Bom. 600, at p. 617; *Javerbai* v. *Kablibai* (1891), 16 Bom. 492. See *Tribhuvandas Rutionji Mody* v. *Gangadas Tricumji* (1893), 18 Bom. 7.

⁵ A gift to a person to be adopted by a son’s wife was held to be void, *Kashinath Chimmaji* v. *Chimmaji Sadasshiv* (1906), 30 Bom. 477.

⁶ *Nafar Chandra Kundoo* v. *Ratan Mala Debi* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 66; *Dines Chandra Roy Chowdhry* v. *Biraj Kamini Dasi* (1911), 39 Calc. 87; 15 C. W. N. 945; *Shyama Charan Bhattacharya* v. *Sarup Chandra Sen* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 39.

⁷ In Jarman on Wills (6th ed.), 336, we find the following:—“A number of persons are popularly said to form a class when they can be designated by some general name as ‘children,’ ‘grandchildren,’ ‘nephews,’ but in legal language the question whether a gift is one to a class depends not upon these considerations, but upon the mode of the gift itself, namely, that it is a gift of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, and who are all to take in

Where there is a bequest to a class, and the class is to be ascertained at the date of the death of the testator, the members of the class who are then capable of taking are entitled to the bequest.¹

Where there is a present gift, or bequest to persons capable of taking, which is intended afterwards to open out, and let in others who are in law not capable of taking, the gift or bequest operates in favour of the persons capable of taking.²

Where there was a bequest to a class, the members of which were to be ascertained at a date later than the date of the death of the testator, the bequest enured for the benefit of such members of the class as are capable of taking, although the class might be in terms wide enough to include persons not born at the date of the death of the testator.³ These principles

equal or some other definite proportions, the share of each being dependent for its amount upon the ultimate number of persons."

A bequest of a right of residence to a body of persons is not "a gift to a class," *Krishnanath Narayan v. Atmaram Narayan* (1891), 15 Bom. 543. A gift to named individuals would not ordinarily be a gift to a class, see *Sallay Mahomed v. Janbai (Lady)* (1901), 3 Bom. L. R. 785.

¹ See Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 98. In this case the class did not include any persons born after the death of the testator, and therefore did not offend against the rule laid down in the *Tagore* case (*ante*, p. 533).

² See *Bushen Chand (Rai) v. Asmaida Koer (Mussumat)* (1883), 11 I. A. 164; 6 All 560. In that case the Judicial Committee were considering a family arrangement, but in *Ram Lal Sett v. Kanai Lal Sett* (1886), 12 Calc. 663, which was a case of a gift *inter vivos*, Wilson, J., treated the judgment as applicable to the law of wills. See also *Manjamma v. Padmanabhayya* (1889), 12 Mad. 393 (a case of a settlement). This view was accepted in *Bhagabati Barmanya v. Kali Charan Singh* (1911), 38 I. A. 54; 38 Calc. 468; 15 C. W. N. 395; 13 Bom. L. R. 375; S. C. in Court below (1905), 32 Calc. 992; 9 C. W. N. 749, and in *Bhoba Tarini Debya v. Peary Lal Sanyal* (1897), 24 Calc. 646; 1 C. W. N. 578, which was a case of a will governed by the Hindu Wills Act.

³ This has now been settled by *Bhagabati Barmanya v. Kali Charan*

Singh (1911), 38 I. A. 54; 38 Calc. 468; 15 C. W. N. 393; 13 Bom. L. R. 375; S. C. in Court below (1905), 32 Calc. 992; 9 C. W. N. 749; see *Radha Prasad Mullick v. Rammoni Dasi* (1910), 38 Calc. 188; 15 C. W. N. 113; see S. C. on appeal, *Rammoni Dasi v. Radha Prasad Mullick* (1914), 41 I. A. 176; 41 Calc. 1007; 18 C. W. N. 873; 16 Bom. L. R. 787 (this case was decided with reference to the Hindu Wills Act); *Bhoba Tarini Debya v. Peary Lal Sanyal* (1897), 24 Calc. 646; 1 C. W. N. 578; *Ram Lal Sett v. Kanai Lal Sett* (1886), 12 Calc. 663 (a case of a family settlement); *Ranganadha Mudaliar v. Baghirathi Ammal* (1906), 29 Mad. 412; *Khettermohan Mullick v. Gunganarain Mullick* (1881), 4 C. W. N. 671, n.; *Krishnaramani Dasi (S. M.) v. Ananda Krishna Bose* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 231, at p. 279; *Soma Sundara Mudaliar v. Ganga Bissen Soni* (1904), 28 Mad. 386; *Manjamma v. Padmanabhayya* (1889), 12 Mad. 393; *Advocate-General v. Karmali* (1903), 29 Bom. 133, at p. 150; *Mangaldas Parmanandas v. Tribhuvandas Narsidas* (1891), 15 Bom. 652; *Tribhuvandas Ruttonji Mody v. Gangadas Tricumji* (1893), 18 Bom. 7; *Krishnarao Ramchandra v. Benabai* (1895), 20 Bom. 571; *Gordhandas v. Ramcoover (Bai)* (1901), 26 Bom. 449, at p. 468; 3 Bom. L. R. 857. *Contrá*, *Soudaminy Dossee v. Jogesh Chunder Dutt* (1877), 2 Calc. 262; *Kherode-money Dossee v. Doorgamoney Dossee* (1878), 4 Calc. 455; 3 C. L. R. 315; *Chundramoney Dossee v. Motilal Mullick* (1879), 5 C. L. R. 496; *Rojomoyee Dassee v. Troylucko Mohiney*

would apply also in cases governed by the Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act, 1914,¹ and the Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916,² where the class is to be ascertained within the limits prescribed by those enactments.

Where it is impossible to infer that the testator had the intention of benefiting at least those members of the class who are capable of taking there is authority to show that the whole bequest fails.³

Law in
Madras.
Application
and extent
of Hindu
Transfer and
Bequests Act.

In the Madras Presidency the law on this subject has been declared by the Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act, 1914,⁴ which applies to all wills made by persons governed by the Hindu law who are domiciled within the limits of the Presidency of Madras,⁵ including Hindus governed by the Marumakkatayam or the Alyasantara law.⁶

In the case of wills executed before the date of that Act (24th March, 1914), the provisions of the Act apply to such of the dispositions thereby made as are intended to come into operation at a time which is subsequent to that date.⁷

Bequests in
favour of
unborn
persons.

A disposition by will of any property shall not be invalid by reason only that the legatee is an unborn person at the date of the transfer or the death of the testator, as the case may be.⁸

Rule against
perpetuity in
regard to
bequests.

No bequest is valid whereby the vesting of the thing bequeathed may be delayed beyond the lifetime of one or more persons living at the testator's decease, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the thing bequeathed is to belong.⁹

This provision is identical with that contained in sec. 101¹⁰ of the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865) which was adopted by the Hindu Wills Act, 1870 (XXI. of 1870), s. 2, and by the Oudh Estates Act (I. of 1869), s. 12.

Hindu Dis-
position of
Property Act.

The Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916,¹¹ which came

Dassee (1901), 29 Calc. 260, at p. 276; 6 C. W. N. 267, at p. 278; *Bramamayi Dasi (Srimati) v. Jages Chandra Dutt* (1871), 8 B. L. R. 400; *Brajamath Dey Sirkar v. Anandamayi Dasi* (1871), 8 B. L. R. 208; *Jairam Narronji v. Kuverbai* (1885), 9 Bom. 491.

¹ Act I. (M. C.) of 1914, s. 5, below.

² Act XV. of 1916, s. 3, *post*, p. 537.

³ *Khimji Jairam Narronji v. Morarji Jairam Narronji* (1897), 22 Bom.

533. See *Chundi Churn Barua v. Sidheswari Debi (Rani)* (1888), 15 I. A. 149; 16 Calc. 71.

⁴ Act I. (M. C.) of 1914.

⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 2 (1).

⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 2 (2).

⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 2 (2).

⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 3. See *Kudapa Venkayamma v. Narasimma* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 33.

⁹ Act I. (M. C.) of 1914, s. 5.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 538.

¹¹ Act XV. of 1916.

into force on the 28th September, 1916, and extends in the first instance to the whole of British India, except the Province of Madras, but which may be extended by the Governor-General in Council to the Province of Madras, contains the following provisions:—

Section 2. "Subject to the limitations and provisions specified in this Act, no disposition of property by a Hindu,¹ . . . by will, shall be invalid by reason only that any person for whose benefit it may have been made was not in existence at the date of such disposition."

Dispositions
for the
benefit of
persons not
in existence.

Section 3. "The limitations and provisions referred to in Section 2 shall be the following, namely:—

Limitations
and con-
ditions.

* * * * *

(b) "In respect of dispositions by will, those contained in Sections 100 and 101 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865."²

Those sections of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, are as follows:—

Section 100. "Where a bequest is made to a person not in existence at the time of the testator's death, subject to a prior bequest contained in the will, the later bequest shall be void, unless it comprises the whole of the remaining interest of the testator in the thing bequeathed."

Bequest to
person not in
existence at
testator's
death, subject
to prior be-
quest.

Illustrations.

(a) Property is bequeathed to A for his life, and after his death to his eldest son for life, and after the death of the latter to his eldest son. At the time of the testator's death, A has no son. Here the bequest to A's eldest son is a bequest to a person not in existence at the testator's death. It is not a bequest of the whole interest that remains to the testator. The bequest to A's eldest son for his life is void.

(b) A fund is bequeathed to A for his life, and after his death to his daughters. A survives the testator. A has daughters, some of whom were not in existence at the testator's death. The bequest to A's daughters comprises the whole interest that remains to the testator in the thing bequeathed. The bequest to A's daughters is valid.

(c) A fund is bequeathed to A for his life, and after his death to his daughters, with a direction that, if any of them marries under the age of eighteen, her portion shall be settled so that it may belong to herself for life, and may be divisible among her children, after her death. A has no daughters living at the time of the testator's death, but has daughters born afterwards, who survive him. Here the direction for a settlement

¹ As to the application of this Act to *Khojas*, see s. 5 of the Act.

² Act X. of 1865.

has the effect, in the case of each daughter who marries under eighteen, of substituting for the absolute bequest to her a bequest to her merely for her life; that is to say, a bequest to a person not in existence at the time of the testator's death of something which is less than the whole interest that remains to the testator in the thing bequeathed. The direction to settle the fund is void.

(d) A bequeaths a sum of money to B for life, and directs that upon the death of B the fund shall be settled upon his daughters, so that the portion of each daughter may belong to herself for life, and may be divided among her children after her death. B has no daughter living at the time of the testator's death. In this case the only bequest to the daughters of B is contained in the direction to settle the fund, and this direction amounts to a bequest, to persons not yet born, of a life interest in the fund, that is to say, of something which is less than the whole interest that remains to the testator in the thing bequeathed. The direction to settle the fund upon the daughters of B is void."

This section was held to be inoperative in the case of Hindu wills, even if they be governed by the Hindu Wills Act.

The section contemplates a form of disposition extending further in time than that allowed by the Hindu Law. In the case of all Hindu wills, whether they be or be not governed by the Hindu Wills Act, no bequest in favour of a person not in existence at the time of the testator's death was valid, whether it did or did not comprise the whole of the remaining interest of the testator in the thing bequeathed.

Rule against
perpetuity.

Section 101. "No bequest is valid whereby the vesting of the thing bequeathed may be delayed beyond the lifetime of one or more persons living at the testator's decease, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the thing bequeathed is to belong.

Illustrations.

(a) A fund is bequeathed to A for his life; and after his death to B for his life; and after B's death to such of the sons of B as shall first attain the age of twenty-five. A and B survive the testator. Here the son of B who shall first attain the age of twenty-five, may be a son born after the death of the testator; such son may not attain twenty-five until more than eighteen years have elapsed from the death of the longer liver of A and B; and the vesting of the fund may thus be delayed beyond the lifetime of A and B, and the minority of the sons of B. The bequest after B's death is void.

(b) A fund is bequeathed to A for his life; and after his death to B for his life; and after B's death to such of his sons as shall first attain the age of twenty-five. B dies in the lifetime of the testator, leaving one or more sons. In this case the sons of B are persons living at the time of the testator's decease, and the time when either of them will attain twenty-five necessarily falls within his own lifetime. The bequest is valid.

(c) A fund is bequeathed to A for his life, and after his death to B for

his life, with a direction that after B's death it shall be divided among such of B's children as shall attain the age of eighteen; but that if no child of B shall attain that age, the fund shall go to C. Here the time for the division of the fund must arrive at the latest at the expiration of eighteen years from the death of B, a person living at the testator's decease. All the bequests are valid.

(d) A fund is bequeathed to trustees for the benefit of the testator's daughters, with a direction that if any of them marry under age, her share of the fund shall be settled so as to devolve after her death upon such of her children as shall attain the age of eighteen. Any daughter of the testator to whom the direction applies must be in existence at his decease, and any portion of the fund which may eventually be settled as directed must vest not later than eighteen years from the death of the daughter whose share it was. All these provisions are valid "

Although there are the above restrictions in the case of Religious and gifts or bequests to persons not in existence at the time of the charitable endowments. gift or unborn at the time of the death of the testator, there is nothing to prevent a devise,¹ or a charge² in favour of the service of an idol,³ or for the endowment of a temple, or for the maintenance of private or public religious ceremonies or worship,⁴ or for charitable purposes,⁵ or an endowment for the benefit of the public in the advancement of religion, knowledge,⁶

¹ *Kallyprosono Mitter v. Gopeenath Kur* (1880), 7 C. L. R. 241; *Rajender Dutt v. Sham Chund Mitter* (1880), 6 Calc. 106; *Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Sokheemoney Dossee (Mussamut)* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 289; 17 W. R. C. R. 41; *Prafulla Chunder Mullick v. Jogendra Nath Sreemany* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 528. See Phillips' and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 35-39, and *post*, p. 548.

² *Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee* (1879), 6 I. A. 182; 5 Calc. 438; 5 C. L. R. 296; *Sonatum Bysack v. Juggutscondree Dossee (Sreemutty)* (1859), 8 M. I. A. 66.

³ It was held that a devise in a will to an idol which has not been consecrated was invalid in *Upendra Lal Boral v. Hemchundra Boral* (1897), 25 Calc. 408; 2 C. W. N. 295; *Rojomoyee Dassee v. Troylukho Mohiney Dassee* (1901), 29 Calc. 260; 6 C. W. N. 267, and *Nogendranandini Dassi v. Benoy Krishna Deb* (1902), 30 Calc. 521; 7 C. W. N. 121. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has now held that such devise is valid, *Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha*

v. Ram Lal Maitra (1909), 37 Calc. 128; 14 C. W. N. 18, followed in *Mohar Singh v. Het Singh* (1910), 32 All. 337, and in *Chatarbhuj v. Chatarjit* (1911), 33 All. 253. A bequest in favour of an unnamed deity is void for uncertainty; *Phundan Lal v. Arya Prithi Nidhi* (1911), 33 All. 739; see *post*, p. 550.

⁴ *Mohar Singh v. Het Singh* (1910), 32 All. 337; *Dwarkanath Bysack v. Burroda Persaud Bysack* (1878), 4 Calc. 443; 1 C. L. R. 566; *Prafulla Chunder Mullick v. Jogendra Nath Sreemany* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 528; *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112, at p. 127; *Khusalchand v. Mahadevgiri* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 214.

⁵ See Phillips' and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 35-39. *Post*, chap. xix.

⁶ As to a University, *Manorama Dassi v. Kali Charan Banerjee* (1903), 31 Calc. 166; 8 C. W. N. 273. The endowment of the Tagore Law Professorship is an instance of this, *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup. Vol.

commerce, health,¹ safety, or any object beneficial to mankind.²

A grant to individuals is not exempt from the rule as to perpetuities although it may be actuated by religious motives.³

As to gifts and devises for religious or charitable purposes, see *post*, p. 548.

Joint gift.

"If an estate is limited to two jointly, the one capable of taking, the other not, he who is capable of taking shall take the whole."⁴

Appointment.

Provided that it do not offend against the above rules as to perpetuities,⁵ the Hindu law permits a power of appointment.⁶

Perpetuities.

Save so far as he can provide for religious and charitable endowments, a Hindu testator cannot create a perpetuity or limit for an indefinite period the enjoyment of the profits of his property.⁷

Settled estates in Bengal and Oudh.

So far as family settlements in Bengal and Oudh are concerned the doctrine that there can be no gift to a person not in being at the time of the gift has to some extent been modified by the Bengal Settled Estates Act,⁸ and the Oudh Settled Estates Act,⁹ respectively, which permit under certain conditions a settlement of property for three generations.

Trusts valid for valid purposes.

V. "Property, whether movable or immovable, must for many purposes be vested, more or less absolutely, in some person or persons for the benefit of other persons, and trusts of various kinds have been recognized and acted on in India in many cases," but trusts can only be sustained to the extent and for the purpose of giving effect to those beneficiary interests

47; 9 B. L. R. 377; 18 W. R. C. R. 359.

¹ As to a Hospital, *Fanindra Kumar Mitter v. Administrator General of Bengal* (1901), 6 C. W. N. 321.

² Cf. Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 17.

³ *Anantha Tirtha Chariar v. Nagamuthu Ambalagaren* (1881), 4 Mad. 200.

⁴ *Nandi Singh v. Sila Ram* (1888), 16 I. A. 44; 16 Calc. 677; Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 93.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 537, 538.

⁶ *Motivahoo (Bai) v. Mamoo Bai (Bai)* (1897), 24 I. A. 93; 21 Bom. 709; 1 C. W. N. 366; *Javerbai v. Kabbai* (1891), 16 Bom. 492, at pp. 498, 499; *Brij Lal v. Suraj Bikram Singh* (1912), 39 I. A. 150;

34 All. 405; 16 C. W. N. 745; 14 Bom. L. R. 827.

⁷ *Sookhmoy Chunder Dass v. Monohurri Dasi (Srimati)* (1885), 12 I. A. 103; 11 Calc. 684; *Raikishori Dasi v. Debendranath Sircar* (1887), 15 I. A. 37, 15 Calc. 409; *Vulubhadas Damodhar v. Thucker Gordhandas Damodhar* (1890), 14 Bom. 360; *Rameshwar Prosad Singh v. Lachmi Prosad Singh* (1903), 7 C. W. N. 688; in *Asima Krishna Deb (Kumara) v. Kumara Krishna Deb (Kumara)* (1868), 2 B. L. R. O. C. 11, a trust for the accumulation for ninety-nine years of the surplus income of an estate was held to be void. See *ante*, pp. 533-538.

⁸ Ben. Act III. of 1904.

⁹ Act II. (U. P.) of 1900.

which the law recognizes.¹ After the determination of those interests the beneficial interest in the residue of the property remains in the person who but for the will, would lawfully be entitled thereto.²

VI. It is competent to a Hindu to create a life estate, or successive life estates, or any other estate for a limited term.³

Before the passing of the Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act, 1914,⁴ and the Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 1916,⁵ a gift by will upon an event which was to happen, if at all, immediately at the close of a life in being would be good if the donee be in existence at the time of the death of the testator, but not otherwise.⁶ On these conditions an estate could be divested.⁷ Provided that the gift does not offend against the restrictions referred to in those Acts,⁸ it would now be valid.

(For instance, a gift to A., and on the death of A. without issue to B.⁹)

¹ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at pp. 71, 72; 9 B. L. R. 377, at pp. 401, 402; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at pp. 367, 368; *Krishnamani Dasi (S. M.) v. Ananda Krishna Bose* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 231; *Rajender Dutt v. Sham Chund Mitler* (1880), 6 Calc. 106.

² *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 72; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 402; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 368.

³ *Ibid.* 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47, at p. 75; 9 B. L. R. 377, at p. 405; 18 W. R. C. R. at p. 369; *Tarakeswar Roy (Kumar) v. Shoshi Shikareswar (Kumar)* (1883), 10 I. A. 51; 9 Calc. 952; 13 C. L. R. 62; *Kristoromoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Norendro Krishna (Maharajah)* (1888), 16 I. A. 29; 16 Calc. 383; *Mahomed Shumsool Hooda (Moulvie) v. Shewukram* (1874), 2 I. A. 7; 14 B. L. R. 226; 22 W. R. C. R. 409. A mere right of residence was given in *Krishnanath Narayan v. Atmaram Narayan* (1891), 15 Bom. 543, and in *Bhugobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112.

⁴ Act I. (M. C.) of 1914, *ante*, p. 536.

⁵ Act XV. of 1916, *ante*, pp. 536, 537.

⁶ *Kristoromoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Norendro Krishna Bahadoor (Maharajah)* (1888), 16 I. A. 29; 16 Calc. 383; *Tarakeswar Roy (Kumar) v. Shoshi Shikareswar (Kumar)* (1883), 10 I. A. 51; 9 Calc. 92; 13 C. L. R. 62; *Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State* (1881), 8 I. A. 46; 7 Calc. 304; 10 C. L. R. 349; *Soorjeemoney Dossee (Sreemutty) v. Denobundoo Mullick* (1862), 9 M. I. A. 123, at explained in *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore* (1872), 1 A. Sup. Vol. 47; 9 B. L. R. 377; 18 W. R. C. R. 359 (see observations of James, L.J., at p. 381, and of Sir L. Peel at p. 383 of 9 B. L. R.); *Bilaso v. Munnialal* (1911), 33 All. 558, following *Bhagabati Barmanya v. Kali Charan Singh* (1911), 38 I. A. 54; 38 Calc. 468; 15 C. W. N. 393; 13 Bom. L. R. 375. See Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), ss. 118-124, applied to certain Hindu Wills (*post*, p. 545) by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 536, 538.

⁹ *Lakshminarayana Nair v. Valiammal* (1910), 34 Mad. 250; *Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundho Mullick* (1857), 6 M. I. A. 526; (1862), 9 M. I. A. 123; *Bhoobun Mohinee*

Accumulations.

As to the provisions of those enactments see *ante*, pp. 536-538, the question how far, if at all, a Hindu can by will direct the accumulation of the profits of his property is not definitely settled.

It is apparently allowable for the period of a life in being, and the attainment of majority of the beneficiary, after the close of such life in being.

In *Amrito Lall Dutt v. Surnomoye Dassee* (1897),¹ Mr. Justice Jenkins held "that it was not incompetent for a Hindu, with proper limitations, to direct an accumulation of the income of property which, under his will, vests in his executors or trustees," and that "in the absence of special provision the limit must be that which determines the period during which the course of devolution of property can be directed or controlled by a testator." On appeal² the question did not arise, but one of the judges of the Calcutta High Court³ dissented from the above view. In another case arising out of the same will, Mr. Justice Woodroffe inclined to the opinion that accumulations were not valid beyond the minority of the devisee,⁴ and Mr. Mayne⁵ inclined to the view that accumulations are not permissible. A more recent Calcutta decision supports Mr. Justice Jenkins' view.⁶

In *Nafar Chandra Kundoo v. Ratan Mala Debi*, [1910] 15 C. W. N. 66, the Court upheld a direction to accumulate income for the marriage expenses of a son, and in Bombay a direction to accumulate for sixteen years has been upheld.⁷

Hindu Wills Act.

The Hindu Wills Act⁸ has applied certain of the sections of the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865) to the attestation, revocation, revival, interpretation, and probate of wills and codicils made by any Hindu, Jaina, Sikh, or Buddhist, on and after the 1st September, 1870, within the territories subject to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, or the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Courts of Madras or Bombay,⁹ and in the case of such wills and codicils

Application of Act.

Debya v. Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry (1878), 5 I. A. 138; 4 Calc. 23; 2 C. L. R. 339.

¹ 24 Calc. 589; 1 C. W. N. 345.

² (1898) 25 Calc. 662; 2 C. W. N. 389; (1900) 27 I. A. 128; 27 Calc. 996; 4 C. W. N. 549; 2 Bom. L. R. 446.

³ (1898) 25 Calc. at pp. 690, 691; 2 C. W. N. at pp. 395, 396.

⁴ *Ranee Money Dassee (Sreemutty) v. Premnoney Dassee (Sreemutty)*

(1905), 9 C. W. N. 1033, at p. 1043.

⁵ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 583-586, see *ante*, p. 362.

⁶ *Rajendra Lall Agarwalla v. Rajcoomari Debi* (1906), 34 Calc. 5; 11 C. W. N. 65.

⁷ *Jamnabai v. Dharsey* (1902), 4 Bom. L. R. 803.

⁸ Act XXI. of 1870.

⁹ Wherever the property be situate, *Ravji Ranchod Naik v. Vishnu Ranchod Naik* (1884), 9 Bom. 241,

made outside those limits, so far as relates to immovable property situated within those territories or limits.¹

The Act provides² that marriage shall not revoke any such Provisos. will or codicil,³ and that nothing therein contained shall authorize a testator to bequeath property which he could not have alienated *inter vivos*, or to deprive any person of any right of maintenance of which, but for s. 2 of the Act, he could not deprive him by will.

And that nothing therein contained shall affect any law of adoption or intestate succession, and that nothing therein contained shall authorize any Hindu, Jaina, Sikh, or Buddhist to create in property any interest which he could not have created before the 1st of September, 1870.

The word "interest" in this proviso has been held by more than one Interest. decision to include not only the extent or duration of the estate given, but also the capacity of the donee to take,⁴ and thereby to apply to wills governed by the Hindu Wills Act the rule⁵ prohibiting devises to a person who is unborn at the date of the death of the testator. The effect of these decisions was to render inoperative in the case of Hindu wills ss. 99-101 of the Indian Succession Act⁶ which have been expressly applied by the Act to Hindu Wills. Should the question come before the Judicial Committee that Board may take the view that effect must be given to all the sections of the Indian Succession Act⁷ which have been applied, and that the word "interest" does not include "capacity to take."⁸ This question does not arise in the cases to which recent enactments (*ante*, pp. 536-538) apply.

Under the Hindu Wills Act⁹ every testator must execute Execution of wills. his will according to the following rules :—

First.—The testator shall sign¹⁰ or affix his mark to the will,¹¹

¹ For an instance of a will, which in respect of some property was governed by the Hindu Wills Act, and which in respect of other property was not so governed, see *Jairam Narronji v. Kuverbai* (1885), 9 Bom. 491.

² S. 3.

³ In the case of a will not subject to the Hindu Wills Act, marriage does not revoke a will.

⁴ *Alangamanjori Dabee v. Sonamoni Dabee* (1882), 8 Calc. 637; 10 C. L. R. 459; *Callynath Naugh Chowdhry v. Chunder Nath Naugh Chowdhry* (per Pontifex, J.) (1882), 8 Calc. 378, at p. 390; 10 C. L. R. 207, at p. 215; *Radha Prasad Mallik v. Ranimoni Dasi* (1910), 38 Cal. 198; 15 C. W. N. 113; *Jairam*

Narronji v. Kuverbai (1885), 9 Bom. 491, at p. 506.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 533, 534.

⁶ Act X. of 1865.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Cf. *Norendranath Sircur v. Kamalbasini Dasi* (1896), 23 I. A. 18; 23 Calc. 563; *Bank of England v. Vaghano* (1891), A. C. 101.

⁹ Act X. of 1865, s. 50, applied by Act XXI. of 1870, s. 2.

¹⁰ The place of signature seems to be immaterial, see *In the goods of Porthouse* (1897), 24 Calc. 784.

¹¹ Affixing a mark by the direction of the testator is not sufficient: *Radhakrishna Mudahar v. Subraya Mudaliar* (1916), 31 Mad. L. J. 357.

or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction.¹

Second.—The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall show that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will.

Third.—The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or have seen some other person sign the will in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or have received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person, and each of the witnesses must sign the will in the presence of ² the testator, but it is not necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no form of attestation is necessary.

The witness must sign as such. His signature written as the name of the person who signed the will for the testator does not amount to an attestation of the will.³ The witness must sign. It is not sufficient that he should affix a mark,⁴ but his full signature is not necessary. The placing of his initials is sufficient.⁵

The attesting witnesses must sign the will after the testator has executed it.⁶

It is not necessary that the attesting witnesses should see the testator sign the will, or should observe any signature on the paper which they attest, provided that the testator's signature was on the will when the witnesses attested it, and that the testator makes them understand that the paper which they attest is his will.⁷

¹ The execution of a will by the impression of a stamp complies with the section, *Nirmal Chunder Bando-padhya v. Saratmoni Debya* (1898), 25 Calc 911; 2 C. W. N. 642.

² This means "in sight of," see *Esauas v. Gabriel* (1871), 3 N. W. P. 32. In the case of the execution of a will by a *pardahashin* lady the attestation by the Registrar, who was in the verandah outside the room in which she sat, and whom she could have seen if she liked, was held sufficient, *Horendranarain Acharji Chowdhry v. Chandra Kanta Lahuri* (1888), 16 Calc. 19.

³ *In the matter of the petition of Hemlota Dabee* (1882), 9 Calc. 226; *S. C. Gish Chunder Banerjee v. Hemlota Debi*, 11 C. L. R. 359.

⁴ *Nitye Gopal Sircar v. Nagendra Nath Mitter Mozumdar* (1885), 11 Calc. 429; *Fernandez v. Alves* (1879), 3 Bom. 382. These authorities were questioned in *Ammayee v. Yalumalai* (1891), 15 Mad. 261.

⁵ *Ammayee v. Yalumalai* (1891), 15 Mad. 261.

⁶ *In the matter of the petition of Hurrosundari Dabia* (1880), 6 Calc. 17; 6 C. L. R. 303; *Bissonath Dinda v. Doyaram Jana* (1880), 5 Calc. 738; 5 C. L. R. 565; *Fernandez v. Alves* (1879), 3 Bom. 382; *Khutun Kooer (Mussamut) v. Poona Kooer (Mussamut)* (1875), 24 W. R. C. R. 322.

⁷ *Manickbai v. Hurmasji Bomanji* (1877), 1 Bom. 547; *Amarendra Nath Chatterjee v. Kashi Nath Chatterjee* (1899), 27 Calc. 169.

An endorsement by the Registrar to the effect that the testator admitted to him the execution of the will is a good attestation.¹

Effect can be given to a legacy to an attesting witness.²

The following are the sections of the Indian Succession Act³ which have been applied by s. 2 of the Hindu Wills Act⁴ (as altered by the Probate and Administration Act⁵) to the above-mentioned Hindu Wills, viz. :—

Portions of
Succession
Act applied to
Hindu Wills.

Sections 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, and 57 to 77 (both inclusive), sections 82, 83, 85, 88 to 103 (both inclusive), sections 106 to 177 (both inclusive), and section 187.

The Probate and Administration Act⁶ provides for the grant of probate of wills and letters of administration to the estates of (amongst other persons) all Hindus.⁷

Probate and
Administra-
tion Act.

Under that Act⁸ the executor of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such.⁹ Before the passing of the Hindu Wills Act the estate of a deceased Hindu did not vest in the executor, even if probate had been granted to him.¹⁰ He was practically a manager.¹¹

The Malabar Wills Act¹² declares the testamentary power of, and provides rules for the execution of wills and codicils by, persons governed by the Marumakkattayam or the Aliyasantana law of inheritance. The effect of that Act is to place such persons to the extent of the matters dealt with in the Act, in the same position as persons governed by the Hindu Wills Act.

Malabar law.

Sections 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, and 57 to 77 (both inclusive), and sections 82, 83, 85, and 88 to 98 (both inclusive) of the Indian Succession Act¹³ apply to wills and codicils made by Oudh taluqdars.¹⁴

Oudh
taluqdars.

As to the construction of Hindu wills, see Phillips and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., chap. iv.

¹ *Horendranarain Acharji Chowdhry v. Chandra Kanta Lahiry* (1888), 16 Cal. 19; *Nitye Gopal Sircar v. Nagendra Nath Mitter Mozumdar* (1885), 11 Cal. 429; *In the matter of the petition of Hurrosundari Dabia* (1880), 6 Cal. 17; 6 C. L. R. 305; *In the goods of Roymonnee Dossee* (1875), 1 Cal. 150.

² Cf. s. 54 of the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), which has not been applied to Hindu wills.

³ Act X. of 1865.

⁴ Act XXI. of 1870.

⁵ Act V. of 1881, s. 154.

⁶ Act V. of 1881.

⁷ This includes Sikhs, see *Bhagwan Koer (Rani) v. Jogendra Chandra Bose* (1903), 30 I. A. 249; 31 Cal. 11; 7 C. W. N. 895; 5 Bom. L. R. 845.

As to what are "Hindus," see *ante*, pp. 22-26.

⁸ S. 4.

⁹ See Phillips and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 169, 170.

¹⁰ *Kherodemoney Dossee v. Doorgamoney Dossee* (1878), 4 Cal. 455, at p. 468; 3 C. L. R. 315, at p. 327; *Maniklal Atmaram v. Mancharsi Dinsha Coachman* (1876), 1 Bom. 269; *Jaykali Debi (Srimati) v. Shishnath Chatterjee* (1866), 2 B. L. R. O. C. I; *Sharo Bibi v. Buldeo Das* (1867), 1 B. L. R. O. C. 24.

¹¹ *Sarat Chandra Banerjee v. Bhupendra Nath Boru* (1897), 25 Cal. 103.

¹² Mad. Act V. of 1898.

¹³ Act X. of 1865.

¹⁴ Act I. of 1869, s. 19.

CHAPTER XIX.

RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS.

THERE are in India a large number of endowments for religious, charitable, educational, or public purposes.

Object of
endowment.

The objects of such endowments are various. An endowment may be in favour of an idol, or for the endowment of a temple, or for the maintenance of private or public religious ceremonies or worship, or for charitable purposes, or for the benefit of the public in the advancement of religion, knowledge, commerce, health, safety, or any object beneficial to mankind.¹

Gifts for religious and charitable purposes have always been common in India, under rulers of various races and creeds. Such gifts were made by sovereigns and subjects alike; and out of the public revenue as well as out of private property.²

In many of these gifts the giver participated in the enjoyment of the property along with the objects of his devotion; sharing, for instance, in the *prasād*,³ or offerings to the deity—as the worshipper participated in the sacrifice, receiving back a portion of his offering as consecrated. He also ordinarily retained the right of superintendence of property dedicated.⁴

The sanctity of such gifts enabled proprietors to screen their property from spoliation by dedicating it; and, in many cases, to retain the enjoyment of it under the cloak of a dedication which was only nominal. Moreover, the permanence of endowments offered a congenial mode of keeping intact family property which would otherwise have been liable to disintegration. Among primitive races it seems to have been felt that, so long as property was first dedicated to God, there was no objection to the beneficial enjoyment and control of it by the giver to an indefinite extent. Whatever may have been the feelings at work, it seems clear that the ostensible consecration of property was in India freely resorted to for the purpose of withdrawing it alike from the grasp of the oppressor and from the disintegrating action of the ordinary rules affecting it.⁵

¹ Cf. Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), s. 117.

² See Phillips' "Land Tenures of Lower Bengal" (Tagore Lectures, 1875), p. 214.

³ See *Kamini Debi (Srimati) v. Asutosh Mookerjee* (1888), 15 I. A.

159; 16 Cal. 103.

⁴ *Gossamee Sree Greedhareejee v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee* (1889), 16 I. A. 137; 17 Cal. 3.

⁵ Phillips and Trevelyan's "Hindu Wills," 2nd ed., pp. 36, 37.

It was at one time contended that trusts for Hindu religious purposes could not be recognized by the Courts, on the ground that they were illegal as being superstitious. The contention was, however, rejected.¹ Without a trust an endowment could not have any permanent effect.²

The consent of the State is not necessary for the creation of an endowment.³ Consent of State.

It is competent to the Civil Courts to determine rights of management of such endowments, and rights to hold offices thereunder, to interfere to protect the property of such endowments, to construe and preserve the schemes thereof and generally to decide questions which may arise in relation to the due performance of the trusts of the endowments.⁴ Powers of Courts.

A suit will lie to determine the rights of individuals or classes of individuals to worship in a particular temple or to exclude them from so worshipping.⁵

The Courts cannot deal with questions relating to worship in temples situate outside British India.⁶

It has been held in Madras⁷ that s. 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871,⁸ which enacts "Except as hereinafter provided, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit relating to any pension or grant of money or land revenue conferred or made by the British or any former Government, whatever may have been the consideration for any such pension or grant, and whatever may have been the nature of the payment, claim, or right for which such pension or grant may have been substituted," has no application to religious and charitable endowments, but an opposite view has been maintained in Bombay.⁹ Pensions Act.

¹ *Advocate General v. Vishvanath Aitaram* (1855), 1 Bom. H. C. App. ix. See *Khusalchund v. Mahadevgiri* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 214; *Krishnaramani Dasi (S.M.) v. Ananda Krishna Bose* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 231, at p. 287. Cf. *Merces v. Cones* (1864), 2 Hydr. 65.

² *Krishnarumani Dasi (S.M.) v. Ananda Krishna Bose* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 231, at p. 285.

³ *Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Sokheemoney Dossee (Mussumat)* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 289, at pp. 301, 302; 10 B. L. R. 19, at p. 31; 17 W. R. C. R. 41, at p. 43.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 5-8. See Act V. of 1908 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 9. As to a suit for a declaration that a mohunt has not been duly appointed, see *post*, p. 572.

⁵ See *Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswari Dorai (Raja)* (1908), 35 I. A. 176; 31 Mad. 236; 12 C. W. N. 946.

⁶ *Trimbak v. Lakshman* (1895), 20 Bom. 495.

⁷ *Venkateswari Aiyar v. Secretary of State* (1907), 31 Mad. 12; *Secretary of State v. Abdul Hakim Khan* (1880), 2 Mad. 294; *Kolandai Mudali v. Sankara Bharadhi* (1882), 5 Mad. 302; *Subramanya Ayyar v. Secretary of State* (1883), 6 Mad. 361; *Aithavulla v. Gouse* (1888), 11 Mad. 283.

⁸ XXIII. of 1871.

⁹ *Miya v. Bava Sahab Santi Miya (Sayad)* (1896), 22 Bom. 496; *Vyanji v. Sarjarao Apajirao* (1891), 16 Bom. 537. See *Maharaval Mohansingji Jeysingji v. Government of Bombay* (1881), 8 I. A. 77; 5 Bom. 408,

Creation of Endowment.

Mode of
creation of
endowment.
Conditions of
validity.

The endowment may be created by grant or by will, or in any other way by which property may be transferred.

In order to constitute a valid endowment all that is necessary is to set apart specific property for specific purposes, and where these purposes are clearly religious or charitable in their nature ¹ the trust is not invalid because it transgresses against the rule which forbids the creation of a perpetuity.²

No express words are necessary,³ nor is an express trust necessary.⁴

Perpetuity.

To be valid an endowment must be created in perpetuity for religious or charitable purposes.

"It appears therefore to their Lordships upon the authority of that case,⁵ and upon the principle of endowments, that this was not an endowment by the Maharajah in perpetuity for the benefit of the idol, so as to establish that the property so conveyed to the idol was to be the property of the idol for ever, and that nobody could alienate it. Suppose the Maharajah had established the idol in his house, would anybody pretend that he could not sell his house? Well, then, what would become of the idol's temple in the house? He could sell the house notwithstanding he had put an idol there; and what would become of the idol itself? Here there was no endowment, no priest, no public, no one legally interested in the worship of this idol, except the Maharajah himself, and nothing to show that the Maharajah intended to establish it for the benefit of his sons or heirs, or anybody else in perpetuity."⁶

Divesting of
interest of
endower.

The endower must divest himself of all beneficial interest in the property dedicated to the endowment.

Mr. Mayne said that the trust is imperfect "where the founder applies his own property to the creation of a pagoda, or any other religious or charitable foundation, keeping the property itself and the control of it absolutely in his own hands. The community may be greatly benefited by this arrangement, so long as it lasts, but its continuance is entirely at his own pleasure. It is like a private chapel in a gentleman's park, and

¹ *Ante*, pp. 539, 540.

² *Prafulla Chunder Mullick v. Jogendra Nath Sreemany* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 528, at p. 535; *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112, at pp. 126, 127.

³ *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112, at p. 127.

⁴ *Manohar Ganesb Tambekar v. Lakshmiram Govindram* (1887), 12

Bom. 247, at p. 263.

⁵ *Mahatab Chand v. Muddad Ali* (1833), 5 Ben. Sel. R. 268 (new edition, 313).

⁶ *Brojosoondery Debia (Maharanees) v. Luchmee Koonwaree (Ranees)* (1873), 15 B. L. R., note to p. 176, at p. 178; 20 W. R. C. R.: 95, at p. 96. See *Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi* (1910), 15 C. W. N.: 126.

the fact that the public have been permitted to resort to it will not prevent its being closed or pulled down, provided there has been no dedication of it to the public. It will pass equally unencumbered to his heirs, or to his assignees in insolvency. He may diminish the funds so appropriated at his pleasure, or absolutely cease to apply them to the purpose at all. In short, the character of the property will remain unchanged, and its application will be at his own discretion."¹

It is not necessary that there be a complete dedication and that the whole ownership in the property should be transferred. A trust for an endowment may be created by a charge upon the property or an appropriation of a portion of the income.²

Charge on property.

In that case the property can be dealt with,³ is partible,⁴ and descends subject to the charge. The interest subject to the charge can be attached and sold.⁵

In one case where the property was granted for the maintenance of a *mutt* (monastery) and the charities connected with it, the remainder of the profits to be applied to the maintenance of the grantee or his descendants, the Court upheld an assignment of property for such maintenance for the life of the assignee, who was a member of the family, but for no longer.⁶

A mere easement may be created for a charitable or religious purpose.

Easement.

For instance, a right to use a *ghat* to which persons on the point of death are removed.⁷

There is no objection to an endowment coming into operation at a future time, as, for instance, after a life estate.⁸

Future operation.

¹ "Hindu Law," 8th ed., p. 598. See *Brojosoondery Debia* (Maharane) v. *Luchmee Koonwaree* (Ranee) (1873), 15 B. L. R. 176, note; 29 W. R. C. R. 95.

² See *Sonatur Bysack v. Juggt-soondree Dossee* (1859), 8 M. I. A. 66; *Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee* (1879), 6 I. A. 182; 5 Cal. 438; 5 C. L. R. 296; *Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur* (Maharajah) v. *Hemanta Kumari Debi* (Rani) (1904), 31 I. A. 203, at pp. 209, 219; 32 Cal. 129, at pp. 140, 141; 8 C. W. N. 809, at p. 820; 6 Bom. L. R. 765; *Sakrappa v. Shivappa* (1910), 35 Bom. 153; 2 Bom. L. R. 584; *Kulada Prosad Deghoria v. Kali Das Naik* (1914), 42 Cal. 536; 19 C. W. N. 542.

³ *Basoo Dhul v. Kishen Chunder*

Geer Gosain (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 20; *Futtoo Bibee v. Bhurrit Lall Bhukut* (1868), 10 W. R. C. R. 299; see *Jadubindu Odhikaree v. Lokenauth Gere* (1863), Marsh, 303; 2 Hay, 160.

⁴ *Ram Goomar Paul v. Jogender Nath Paul* (1878), 4 Cal. 56; 2 C. L. R. 310; *Suppammal v. Collector of Tanjore* (1889), 12 Mad. 387, at p. 391.

⁵ *Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee* (1879), 6 I. A. 182; 5 Cal. 438; 5 C. L. R. 296; *Sakrappa v. Shivappa* (1910), 35 Bom. 153; 12 Bom. L. R. 584.

⁶ *Sathianama Bharati v. Saravana-bagi Ammal* (1894), 18 Mad. 266.

⁷ *Jaggamoni Das v. Nilmoni Ghosal* (1882), 9 Cal. 75; 11 C. L. R. 502.

⁸ *Gobind Prasad v. Gomti* (1908), 30 All. 288.

Certainty.

An endowment must be certain both as to its subject-matter and as to its object;¹ but it is unnecessary that a testator should fix the exact amount to be expended. If he supplies a measure of the bequest, the Court will ascertain how much should be applied, and will fix a scheme.²

Dharm.
Saragam.

A gift to trustees for use as "dharm,"³ or in "saragam,"⁴ or for purposes of popular usefulness or for purposes of charity⁵ has been held to be invalid as being too indefinite. As to a gift to an idol, see *ante*, p. 539, note 3.

In the following cases the bequest has been held to be sufficiently definite:—

"Charitable
purposes."

A settlement to the extent of Rs. 500 a month to be applied to "charitable purposes" at a dharamsala which the testator had founded.⁶

Feeding
Hindus.

The creation of a fund the income of which was to be spent in perpetuity in feeding indigent Hindus at the outer gate of the testator's house.⁷

"Sadavarat."

A direction that certain rents be used "for *sadavarat*"⁸ where from the will it appeared that the testator intended his executors to establish a definite *sadavarat* in some definite place.⁹

¹ See Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865), s. 76, applied to certain Hindu wills (*ante*, p. 545), by the Hindu Wills Act (XXI. of 1870), s. 2.

² See *Krishnaraman Dasi* (S. M.) v. *Ananda Krishna Bose* (1869), 4 B. L. R. O. C. 231. As to the settlement of a scheme, see *post*, p. 554.

³ "Law, virtue, legal or moral duty," Wilson's "Glossary," p. 137; *Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parvatibai* (1899), 26 I. A. 71; 23 Bom. 725; 3 C. W. N. 621; 1 Bom. L. R. 607; *Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Pratap Chandra Ghose* (1912), 40 Calc. 232; *Parthasarathy Pillai v. Thiruvengada Pillai* (1907), 30 Mad. 340. In the last-named case Subrahmanya Ayyar, J., held that the word "*dharmam*," when used in connection with gifts of property by a Hindu, has a perfectly well-settled meaning, and denotes objects indicated by the terms "*ishia*" and "*poorta*" (sacrifices and charities). He held that the word is a compendious term, and is not a mere vague and uncertain expression (see Mandlik's "*Vyavahara Mayukha*," pp. 333 *et seq.*, and Pundit Prannath Saraswati's "*Hindu Law of Endowments*," pp. 18 *et seq.*); but this view is, it is submitted,

inconsistent with the decision in *Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parvatibai* (above). See also *Motivahu (Bai) v. Mamubai (Bai)* (1895), 19 Bom. 647; *Devshankar Ncranbhai v. Motiram Jageshvar* (1893), 18 Bom. 136; *Morarji Cullianji v. Nenbai* (1892), 17 Bom. 351; *Gangbai v. Thavur Mulla* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C. 71; *Advocate-General v. Damothar* (1852), Perry's "Oriental Cases," 526; *Sib Chunder Mullick v. Trepoorah Soondary Dossee* (1842), Fulton, 98, 109.

⁴ Good works; *Bapi (Bai) v. Jamnadas Hathisang* (1897), 22 Bom. 774.

⁵ *Trikumdas Damodhar v. Haridas Morarji* (1907), 31 Bom. 583; 9 Bom. L. R. 560; *Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Pratap Chandra Ghose* (1912), 40 Calc. 232.

⁶ *Gordham Das v. Chunni Lal* (1907), 30 All. 111.

⁷ *Rajendra Lal Agarwalla v. Raj Coomari Debi* (1906), 34 Calc. 5.

⁸ "Distribution of provisions daily to passers-by, mendicants and paupers." Wilson's "Glossary," p. 449.

⁹ *Morarji Cullianji v. Nenbai* (1892), 17 Bom. 351; *Jamnabai v. Khimji Vullubdass* (1889), 14 Bom. 1.

A direction that the executors should "get a Shiva's temple erected Shiva's at a reasonable cost in a suitable place within the compound of the temple. brick-built *bhaitakhana* house, inclusive of the building and garden thereto." ¹

A bequest to complete the building of a temple, and to instal and main- Temple. tain an idol therein,² or to establish a *thakoor* (idol) at such place as the executor should think fit.³

A direction that certain properties should be placed in the hands of Worship of named persons who should spend the surplus income in the worship and *Kali*. sheba of Kali after establishing an image of the goddess.⁴

A direction to a trustee "to spend suitable sums at the annual *sraddhs* *Sradhs*, etc. or anniversaries of my father, mother, and grandfather, as well as of myself after my demise, for the performance of the ceremonies and the feeding of the Brahmins and the poor; to spend suitable sums for the annual contribution and gifts to the Brahmins, pundits holding *tolls* (native schools) for (diffusion of Sanskrit) learning in the country at the time of the Doorga Pujah; to spend suitable sums for the perusal of Mohabharat and Pooran, and for prayer to God during the month of Kartick. Should there be any surplus after the above expenditure, then I do hereby direct my trustee to spend the said surplus in the contribution toward the marriage of the daughters of the poor in my class and of the poor Brahmins and towards the education of the sons of the poor amongst my class, and of the poor Brahmins and other respectable castes as my trustee shall think fit to comply." ⁵

A direction to pay for the worship of Siva on the night called *Sivaratri*.⁶ *Swaratri*.

A bequest for the maintenance of an Anna Chatra.⁷ *Anna Chatra*.

¹ *Gokool Nath Guha v. Issur Lochun Roy* (1886), 14 Calc. 22. See *Ramtonoo Mullick v. Ramgopal Mullick* (1829), 1 Knapp. 295. In a similar case where the amount to be expended was left to the absolute discretion of the executor the Court refused to give effect to the bequest, *Surbomungola Dabee v. Mohendronath Nath* (1879), 4 Calc. 508. This decision is not consistent with *Parbati Bibee (Must)* v. *Ram Barun Upadhya* (1904), 31 Calc. 895; 8 C. W. N. 653, post, p. 552, note 1. See *Gangbai v. Thavar Moolla* (1863), 1 Bom. H. C. 73; *Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Pratap Chandra Ghose* (1912), 40 Calc. 232.

² *Mohar Singh v. Het Singh* (1910), 32 All. 337.

³ *Rojomoyee Dassee v. Troylucko Mohiney Dassee* (1901), 29 Calc. 260; 6 C. W. N. 267.

⁴ *Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra* (1909), 37 Calc. 128; 14 C. W. N. 18.

⁵ *Dwarkanath Bysack v. Burroda Persaud Bysack* (1878), 4 Calc. 443;

1 C. L. R. 566. On appeal the Court expressed a doubt as to whether the bequests to pundits holding tolls, and for the reading of the Mohabharat and Pooran and for prayer to God were valid, but it was unnecessary to decide the question. This case was followed in *Lakshmishankar v. Vainath* (1881), 6 Bom. 24, in which case the testator devised all his property to trustees, directing them to reduce it into money, and expend it in the performance of his funeral ceremonies, and in feeding Brahmins according to the custom of his caste. A direction to feed Brahmins on a certain day in the year was upheld in *Kedar Nath Dutt v. Atul Krishna Ghose* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 1083. A different view of a somewhat similar trust was expressed in *Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Pratap Chandra Ghose* (1912), 40 Calc. 232.

⁶ *Kedar Nath Dutt v. Atul Krishna Ghose* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 1083.

⁷ *Advocate-General v. Strangman* (1905), 6 Bom. L. R. 56.

A bequest to such religious and charitable purposes as the executor may think proper.¹

Pujah. A devise of certain house property first for the celebration of pujahs and the worship of an idol, and then that the children of the testator should be allowed to live there.²

Cypres doctrine. As to the application of the *cypres* doctrine where there has been a failure of the charitable bequest, see *Mayor of Lyons v. Advocate-General of Bengal* (1875), 3 I. A. 32; 1 Calc. 303.

Endowment must be real.

The dedication to be effectual must be real, and not merely colourable. It cannot be created as a means of keeping property in a particular family,³ and thus evading the rule⁴ requiring a donee to be a person living at the time of the gift or of the death of the testator. It must be an absolute gift for a religious or charitable purpose, constituting the dedicated property inalienable.⁵

If it be a pretended endowment to prevent creditors obtaining relief against the property of their debtors, no effect can be given to it.⁶

The mere use of the word "debutter" (belonging to a deity)⁷ or of a similar expression is not conclusive.

A deed of trust must be held to be nominal only when no charity or trust is brought into existence, when there is no proof of the application of the alleged endowments for the maintenance thereof and the whole conduct of the parties is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a genuine trust;⁸ but if the trust has once been effectually created, the fact that the parties have omitted to carry out the conditions of the trust will not invalidate it,⁹ or permit the founder to resume it as private property.¹⁰ In

¹ *Parbati (Bibee) v. Ram Barun Upadhyaya* (1904), 31 Calc. 895; 8 C. W. N. 653, and cases there cited. *Contrà Surbomungola Dabee v. Mohendronath Nath* (1879), 4 Calc. 508, and *Jamnabai v. Dharsey* (1903), 4 Bom. L. R. 893.

² *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112.

³ *Promotho Dassee v. Radhika Persaud Dutt* (1875), 14 B. L. R. 175. Where there is a real dedication it is not vitiated by a provision that a portion of the proceeds be paid to members of the family who are managers of the endowment: *Jadu Nath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ranji* (1917), 21 C. W. N. 552.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 533-537.

⁵ *HaraSunder Majumdar v. Basunia Kumar Roy* (1904), 9 C. W. N. 154.

⁶ *Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit Singh* (1899), 27 Calc. 242, at pp. 249, 250.

⁷ *Shama Charan Nandi v. Abhiram*

Goswami (1906), 33 Calc. 511; 10 C. W. N. 738.

⁸ *Roop Lal v. Lakshmi Doss* (1905), 29 Mad. 1; *Suppammal v. Collector of Tanjore* (1889), 12 Mad. 387. See *Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi* (*Srimati Rani*) (1910), 15 C. W. N. 126.

⁹ See *Suppammal v. Collector of Tanjore* (1889), 12 Mad. 387, at p. 391; *Gordhan Das v. Chunni Lal* (1907), 30 All. 111, at pp. 114, 115; *Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Sokhemoney Dossee* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 289, at p. 306; 10 B. L. R. 19, at pp. 33, 34; 17 W. R. 41, at p. 44; *Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi (Rani)* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 126; *Kasheshuree Dassee v. Krishnakaminee Dassee* (1803), 2 Hay, 557.

¹⁰ *Gopeenath Chowdhry v. Gooroo Dass Surma* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 472; *Ram Narain Singh v. Ramoon Paurey* (1874), 23 W. R. C. R. 76; see *post*, p. 554. As to the power of

that case the persons interested must take steps to enforce the performance of the trust.¹

The dedication must be clearly proved.²

Proof of
dedication.

"Where the trust itself is one declared by word of mouth by a person at the point of death, and is in terms by no means clearly indicating an intention on the part of the donor to deprive his family of all substantial enjoyment of his property, the Court may fairly require the fullest proof in support of such a trust."³

"Before it can be established that lands have been endowed in perpetuity, so that they can never be sold and must be tied up in perpetuity, some clear evidence of an endowment must be given."⁴

A mere purchase of land in the name of an idol does not by itself create an endowment.⁵

When the question is whether an alleged endowment is real or fictitious, the mode of dealing with the property by the donor and his successors is an important matter for consideration.⁶ The application of the proceeds of property for the benefit of an endowment by the founder or his heir is evidence of the existence and of the *bona fide* character of the endowment,⁷ but the mere fact that a portion of the profits of land has been used for the worship of an idol is not conclusive as to the existence of an endowment.⁸ It is, however, a fact which may well be taken into consideration when the intention of the founder has to be gathered from an ancient document expressed⁹ in ambiguous language.

Mode of
dealing with
property.

An incidental decision as to the validity of a debutter grant in a resumption proceeding may be some evidence, at any rate, of a claim to such grant.¹⁰

Resumption
proceeding.

The terms of an endowment will ordinarily be ascertained from the instrument of creation, or if the creation be by word

Evidence of
terms of en-
dowment.

the members of a family to repudiate an endowment for a family idol, see *post*, p. 574.

¹ *Hemangini Dasi v. Nobin Chand Ghose* (1882), 8 Calc. 788; 11 C. L. R. 370; *Brojomohun Doss v. Hurrolooll Doss* (1880), 5 Calc. 700; 6 C. L. R. 58; *Panchoonie Mull v. Chumroolall* (1878), 3 Calc. 563; 2 C. L. R. 121; *Ramnarsin Singh v. Ramoon Paurey* (1874), 23 W. R. C. R. 76.

² *Doorganath Roy (Konwur) v. Ramchunder Sen* (1876), 4 I. A. 52; 2 Calc. 341.

³ *Bipro Prosad Mytee v. Kenae Doyee (Mussamat)* (1866), 3 W. R. C. R. 165, at p. 167; 5 W. R. C. R. 82.

⁴ *Brojsoondery Debia (Maharamee) v. Luchmee Koonwaree (Ranee)* (1873), 15 B. L. R. 176, note; 20 W. R. C. R. 95.

⁵ *Ibid.* See *Bipro Prosad Mytee v. Kenae Doyee (Mussamat)* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 165.

⁶ *Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit*

Singh (1899), 27 Calc. 244, at p. 252; 4 C. W. N. 405, at p. 410.

⁷ *Gunga Narain Sircar v. Brindaban Chunder Kur Chowdhry* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 142; *Muddun Lal v. Komal Bibee (Sreemutty)* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 42; *Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani)* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 126.

⁸ See *Ram Pershad Doss Adhikaree v. Sreehuree Doss Adhikaree* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 399; *Narain Persad Mytee v. Roodur Narain Mungle* (1863), 2 Hay, 490. See *Doorganath Roy (Konwur) v. Ram Chunder Sen* (1876), 4 I. A. 52; 2 Calc. 341.

⁹ *Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi* (1909), 36 I. A. 148; 30 Calc. 1003; 14 C. W. N. 1.

¹⁰ *Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani)* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 126, explaining *Budh Singh Dhudhuria v. Niradburan Roy* (1905), 2 C. L. J. 431.

of mouth by the statement of the endower at the time of the creation. When the terms of the deed of endowment are ambiguous,¹ or where from lapse of time or for other reasons such evidence is not obtainable, the terms can be ascertained from the practice of the endowment, or from the practice of similar endowments.

The mode in which offices connected with an endowment have been held is evidence of the terms of the endowment.²

Settlement of scheme.

When a testator, having expressed a clear intention to create a trust, has failed to indicate the means by which the trust is to be carried out,³ or when for other reasons it is necessary so to do,⁴ the Court will settle a scheme for the management of a religious or charitable endowment.⁵

Such scheme should give due consideration to the established practice of the institution, to the position of persons connected with it, and the interests of the body of persons for whose benefit the trust was created.⁶

"The first thing to be done is to take an account of the trust property. Much must depend upon the result of that account. Until the trust funds are ascertained it seems impossible that any scheme can be settled."⁷

Variation of scheme.

A scheme passed by the Court is liable to variation for good cause shown,⁸ but only by the Court which passed the scheme.⁹

The Privy Council will only interfere with a scheme framed by a High Court, if the discretion has been improperly exercised or the High Court has not given consideration to matters which ought to have been considered.¹⁰

Revocation of trust.

A founder or his descendants cannot revoke an endowment which has been validly created.¹¹

¹ *Kulada Prosad Deghoria v. Kalidas Naik* (1914), 42 Cal. 536; 19 C. W. N. 542.

² See *Nimaye Churn Pojaree v. Moorolee Chowdhry* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 108.

³ *Prafulla Chunder Mullick v. Jogendra Nath Sreemany* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 528.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 550.

⁵ *Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. Tirumala Sriranga Chagrylu Varu* (1907), 34 I. A. 78; 31 Mad. 138; 11 C. W. N. 442; 9 Bom. L. R. 588; S. C. in Court below (1905), 28 Mad. 319; *Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursey* (1883), 8 Bom. 432.

⁶ Cf. *Mahomed Ismail Ariff v. Ahmad Moolla Dawood* (1916), 43 I. A. 127.

⁷ *Chotalal Lakhmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar* (1899), 26 I. A.

199; 24 Bom. 50; 4 C. W. N. 23; 2 Bom. L. R. 510; S. C. in Court below (1887), *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram*, 12 Bom. 247.

⁸ *Prayag Doss Jee Varu Mahant v. Tirumala Srirangachariavaru* (1905), 28 Mad. 319; S. C. on appeal (1907), 34 I. A. 78; 31 Mad. 138; 11 C. W. N. 442; 5 Bom. L. R. 588; *Damodarbhat v. Bhogilal Karsondas* (1899), 24 Bom. 45.

⁹ *Umeshchandra Datta v. Ravaneswar Prasad Singh* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 841.

¹⁰ *Sevak Kirpashankar Daji v. Gopalrao Manshar Tambekar* (1912), 15 Bom. L. R. 13.

¹¹ *Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Sokheemoney Dossee* (1871), 14 M. I. A. 289, at p. 302; 10 B. L. R. 19, at p. 31; 17 W. R. C. R. 41, at p. 43.

As to endowments for family idols, see *post*, p. 574.

The mere fact that the worship has not been properly performed or the terms of the endowment carried out does not give a right to recover possession.¹

The religious purposes for which religious endowments are ordinarily created by Hindus are for the worship at temples, or for *mutts* or *asthals* (monastic institutions devoted to the teaching of different systems of Hindu religious philosophy).

Purposes of religious endowments.

“The two classes of institutions, viz. temples and *mutts*, are supplementary in the Hindu ecclesiastical system, both conducing to spiritual welfare, the one by affording opportunities for prayer and worship, the other by facilitating spiritual instruction and the acquisition of religious knowledge, the presiding element being the deity or idol in the one, the learned and pious ascetic in the other.”²

Endowments for the worship of a public or of a private deity³ are permitted by Hindu law,⁴ even when the idol be not in existence or established.⁵

Endowment for worship of deity.

The deity of a temple is considered as a personality holding proprietary rights.⁶

Proprietary rights of deity.

According to Hindu notions, when an idol has been, so to say, consecrated by the appropriate ceremony performed, and *muntra* pronounced the deity of which the idol is the visible image, resides in it, and not in any substituted image, and the idol, so spiritualised, becomes what is called a juridical person.⁷ A suit cannot, however,

¹ *Mohesh Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Koylash Chunder Chuckerbutty* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 443; cases *ante*, p. 552, note 10, and p. 553, note 1.

² *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyamidhi Tirtha Swami* (1904), 27 Mad. 435, at p. 454.

³ The endowment is in favour of the deity, not of the image.

⁴ *Rupa Jagshet v. Krishnaji Govind* (1884), 9 Bom. 169; *Prafulla Chunder Mullick v. Jogendra Nath Sreemany* (1905), 9 C. W. N. 529. See *Shibes-suree Debia (Maharane)* v. *Mothoorunath Acharjo* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 270; 13 W. R. P. C. 18; *Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo* (1875), 2 I. A. 145; 14 B. L. R. 450; 23 W. R. C. R. 253; *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram* (1887), 12 Bom. 247; S. C. on appeal *Chotalal Lakhmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar* (1899), 26 I. A. 199;

24 Bom. 50; 4 C. W. N. 23; 2 Bom. L. R. 516.

⁵ *Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra* (1909), 37 Calc. 128; 14 C. W. N. 18; *ante*, p. 539, note 3.

⁶ *Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursey* (1883), 8 Bom. 432 at p. 456; *Tulsidas Mahanta v. Bejoy Kishore Shome* (1901), 6 C. W. N. 178; *Babajirao v. Laxmandas* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 932; *Shibes-suree Debia (Maharane)* v. *Mothooranath Acharjo* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 270. at p. 273; 13 W. R. P. C. 18, at p. 19.

⁷ *Doorga Proshad Doss v. Shco Proshad Pandah* (1880), 7 C. L. R. 278; approved of in *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyamidhi Tirtha Swami* (1904), 27 Mad. 435, at p. 440; (it was held in that case that a plaintiff claiming *debutter* land which together with the idol was in the possession of the defendant, must

be brought or defended in the name of the idol.¹ It must be brought by the manager,²

Lost or
broken idol.

"If the image is cracked, broken, mutilated, or lost it may be substituted by a new one duly consecrated.³ Fresh consecration or substitution is also necessary if the image be polluted in any way. Removal from the temple amounts to pollution in the case of an image of Siva only in some cases. A new image cannot be substituted when the original one is free from any defect of the kind mentioned. Nor can the old image be replaced by a new one, by reason of the occurrence of any defect therein, such as cracking, when it is an ancient image believed to have been established by a God, or by a saint, or by an Asura,⁴ or by a remote ancestor of a family, or when its origin is unknown. Nor is a new image necessary if it can be restored by rejoining its broken parts together, as when the same is metal, and a limb is severed. When an image is to be replaced by a new one, it must be done as soon as possible, for the damaged image ceases to be the God, and cannot be worshipped in those cases in which the substitution of a new image is necessary."⁵

Non-existing
idol.

A gift to a trustee either by an instrument *inter vivos* or by will for the purpose of establishing and dedicating a non-existing idol is valid.⁶

Trustee or Manager.

Trustees, etc.

Although the appointment of a trustee may not be in law necessary for the valid creation of an endowment,⁷ it follows from the nature of the things that there must be a trustee, manager, or other person charged with its administration.⁸

claim the idol also); *Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur (Maharajah) v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (Rani)* (1904), 31 I. A. 203, at pp. 209, 210; 32 Calc. 129, at pp. 140, 141; 8 C. W. N. 809, at p. 820; 6 Bom. L. R. 765; *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112, at p. 127; *Bali Panda v. Jadumoney Santra* (1910), 38 Calc. 284; 15 C. W. N. 36.
¹ *Jodhi Rai v. Basdeo Prasad* (1911), 33 All. 735, overruling *Raghunathji Maharaj (Thakur) v. Shah Lal Chand* (1897), 19 All. 330.

² *Post*, p. 563.

³ The destruction or mutilation of the image does not affect the endowment; *Bijoy Chand Mahatab v. Kali Pada Chatterjee* (1913), 41 Calc. 57; 17 C. W. N. 1013.

⁴ Evil spirit.

⁵ G. C. Sarkar's "Hindu Law," 3rd ed., p. 441, and texts there cited. See *Doorga Proshad Dass v. Sheo Proshad Pandah* (1880), 7 C. L. R.

278, at p. 281.

⁶ *Bhupati Nath Smritikirta v. Ram Lal Moitra* (1909), 37 Calc. 128; 14 C. W. N. 18, overruling *Upendra Lal Boral v. Hem Chandra Boral* (1897), 25 Calc. 405; 1 C. W. N. 295; *Rojomoyee Dassee v. Troylukho Mohiney Dassee* (1901), 29 Calc. 260; 6 C. W. N. 269, and *Nogendra Nandini Dassi v. Benoy Krishna Deb* (1902), 30 Calc. 521; 7 C. W. N. 121; *Mohar Singh v. Het Singh* (1910), 32 All. 337; *Chatarbhuj v. Chatarjit* (1911), 33 All. 253. As to a gift to an unnamed idol, see *ante*, p. 539, note 3.

⁷ See *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112; *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakshmiram Govindram* (1887), 12 Bom. 247, at p. 263.

⁸ See *Koonla Kant Ghosal v. Ram Huree Nund Gramee* (1827), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 196, at p. 200 (new edition 247, at p. 252).

A woman could not, as such, be excluded from the management of Females. endowed property, but she is incompetent to discharge spiritual duties.¹

There is nothing to prevent the person who creates the endowment constituting himself a trustee. Endower may be trustee.

It does not follow that where an endowment is created without a trustee the person creating the endowment is liable as trustee.²

When no endowment or trust has been created, there is no obligation to provide for the expenses of a family idol.³ No obligation where no endowment.

A trust is not necessary in law for the purpose of effecting Trust. a dedication to an idol; ⁴ but as it is only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong to an idol, the possession and management of it must in the nature of things be entrusted to some person as trustee or manager.⁵

The person to whom the management and superintendence *Shebait*. of an endowed temple or idol and of the worship are entrusted is called the *Shebait*.⁶

The *shebait* has not the legal property, but only the title of manager, of a religious endowment.⁷ The property is vested in the deity.⁸ His successor is not entitled to letters of administration of the property.⁹

The *shebait* is entitled to the custody of the idol and its property. Custody of As to the limitation in a suit by him for such custody, see *Bali Panda v. idol. Jadumani Santra*, [1910] 15 C. W. N. 36.

The right of a *shebait* or of a priest to offerings made to the idol would Right to offerings.

¹ See *Janoki Debi (Srimati) v. Gopal Acharjia (Sri)* (1882), 10 I. A. 32; 9 Calc. 766; 13 C. L. R. 30; *Joy Deb Surmah v. Huroputty Surmah* (1871), 16 W. R. C. R. 282; *Surendra Keshav Roy v. Doorgasundari Dassee* (1892), 19 I. A. 108, at p. 128; 19 Calc. 513, at pp. 531, 532; *Keshavbhat v. Bhagirathibai* (1866), 3 Bom. H. C. A. C. 75; *Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavanagurukkal* (1914), 38 Mad. 850; *Rajeswari Ammal (Raja) v. Subramania Archakar* (1915), 40 Mad. 105.

² *Raghubar Dial v. Kesho Ramanuj Das* (1888), 11 All. 18; *Ram Pershad Doss Adhikaree v. Sreehuree Doss Adhikaree* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 399.

³ *Sham Lal Set v. Huro Soonduree Goopla* (1866), 5 W. R. C. R. 29.

⁴ *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakshmiram Govindram* (1887), 12 Bom. 247, at p. 265; S. C. on appeal

Chotalal Lakhmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar (1899), 26 I. A. 199; 24 Bom. 50; 4 C. W. N. 23; 2 Bom. L. R. 516; *Bhuggobutty Prosonno Sen v. Gooroo Prosonno Sen* (1897), 25 Calc. 112.

⁵ *Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo* (1875), 2 I. A. 145, at p. 152; 14 B. L. R. 450, at p. 459; 23 W. R. C. R. 253, at pp. 255, 256; ante, p. 556.

⁶ See Wilson's "Glossary," p. 476.

⁷ *Shibessouree Debia (Maharane)* *v. Mothocranath Acharjo* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 270, at p. 273; 13 W. R. P. C. 18, at p. 19; *Babajirao v. Luzmandas* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 932; *Ratendra Lal Mitter v. Corporation of Calcutta* (1913), 41 Calc. 104.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 555.

⁹ Cf. *Jib Lal Gir (Mohunt) v. Jaga Mohan Gir (Mohunt)* (1898), 16 C. W. N. 798.

depend upon the nature of such offerings. Where they are of a perishable nature, such as articles of food, they would be appropriated by the priest or by the nearest Brahmin available; but where the idol is an ancient one permanently established for public worship, and the offerings are generally of a more or less permanent character, being coins and other metallic articles, in the absence of any custom or express declaration by the owner to the contrary, they are taken to be intended to contribute to the maintenance of the shrine with all its rites, ceremonies, and charities, and not become the personal property of the priest.¹

Right to
possession and
management.

The possession and management of the dedicated property and the office are vested in the *shebait*² or other manager.

The Court can in a proceeding under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (V. of 1898) declare the possession of a temple, but not of the offerings³ or of the right to act as priest.⁴

Although he is only a manager, all transactions including litigation are carried on by him in his own name.⁵

As to suits brought by him, see *post*, p. 563.

He is not only empowered but is bound to do whatever is necessary for the benefit or preservation of the properties of the idol⁶ or of the endowment.

As to his power to alienate the property, see *post*, p. 564.

Reimburse-
ment.

A manager, or trustee,⁷ or his executor after his death, is entitled to be reimbursed from the trust estate all sums properly expended by him as manager, including moneys properly expended by him in defending his position as *shebait* against an unsuccessful claimant to the office.⁸

In the case of a suit by the executor of the manager, the period of limitation is six years.⁹

¹ *Girijanund Datta Jha v. Saila-
janund Datta Jha* (1896), 23 Calo
645, at p. 655. As to an account of
the offerings, see *post*, p. 560. As to
the right of Agradani Brahmins to
things given away at a *sradh*, see
*Hari Churn Agradani v. Sasti Churn
Agradani* (1910), 14 C. W. N. 1005.

² *Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur
(Maharaja) v. Hemantha Kumara Debi
(Rani)* (1904), 31 I. A. 203; 32 Calo.
129; 8 C. W. N. 809; 6 Bom. L. R.
765; *Kunjamani Dossi v. Nikunja
Bihari Das* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 314.

³ *Ram Saran Pathak v. Raghu
Nandan Gir* (1910), 38 Calo. 387.
*Cf. Kader Batcha v. Kader Batcha
Rowthian* (1905), 29 Mad. 237.

⁴ *Gurram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das*

(1910), 37 Calo. 578.

⁵ *Juggodumba Dossee v. Puddo-
money Dossee* (1875), 15 B. L. R. 318,
at p. 330; *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami
v. Vidyamandir Tirtha Swami* (1904),
27 Mad. 435, at p. 442; *Babajirao v.
Luxmandas* (1903), 5 Bom. L. R. 932.

⁶ *Pramada Nath Roy v. Poorna
Chandra Roy* (1908), 35 Calo. 691, at
p. 698; 12 C. W. N. 550, at p. 557.

⁷ *Narayanan v. Lakshmanan* (1915),
39 Mad. 456.

⁸ *Peary Mohan Mukerji v. Norendra
Nath Mukerji* (1909), 37 I. A. 27;
37 Calo. 229; 14 C. W. N. 261.

⁹ *Ibid.* Act XV. of 1877 (Limita-
tion Act), Sch. II., Art. 120; Act IX,
of 1908, Sch. I., Art. 120,

"As regards the property, the manager is in the position of a trustee. Position of manager. But as regards the service of the temple and the duties that appertain to it he is rather in the position of the holder of an office or dignity which may have been originally conferred on a single individual, but which in course of time has become vested by descent in more than one person."¹

A trustee or manager has power to dismiss servants of the temple for misconduct.²

"It is the duty of the trustee or manager to maintain the customary usages of the institution, and if he fails to do so he is . . . guilty of a breach of trust, and, still more so, if he deliberately attempts to effect a vital change of usage and make it binding on the worshippers by obtaining a decree of the Court to establish it."³ To follow customary usage.

He may be restrained by injunction from making any unjustifiable changes which would affect the character of the temple as a religious institution.⁴

In the absence of an express injunction by the founder, a Court, where it is necessary, may permit a *shebait* to remove the idol to his house to remain there during his turn of worship.⁵

Where any details of the management are regulated by custom, such custom should, if reasonable, be followed, as, for instance, a custom as to the fund from which repairs are to be provided.⁶

Where there are joint managers they must execute the duties of their office jointly.⁷ Joint managers.

A decision of the majority of the trustees of a public trust, arrived at in the fair exercise of their powers, and after fair consideration by all of them,⁸ binds the minority in matters connected with the management of the trust property, yet it does not bind them in matters which are *ultra vires* and beyond the proper sphere of the trust.⁹ Decision of majority of trustees.

The manager must apply the income to the purposes of the endowment. Application of income.

¹ *Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti* (1906), 33 I. A. 139, at p. 144; 29 Mad. 283, at p. 289; 10 C. W. N. 824, at p. 829; 8 Bom. L. R. 598.

² *Seshadri Aiyangar v. Ranga Bhattar* (1911), 35 Mad. 631. As to the position of a superintendent, see *Ram Charan Bajpai v. Rakhal Das Mookerjee* (1913), 41 Cal. 19; 17 C. W. N. 1045.

³ Judgment of the Madras High Court in *Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswara Dorai* (1908), 35 I. A. 176, at p. 180; 12 C. W. N. 940, at p. 951. See *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyasidhi Tirtha Swami* (1904), 27 Mad. 435, at pp. 454, 455.

⁴ *Krishnasami Ayyangar v. Samarasingrachariar* (1906), 30 Mad. 158.

⁵ *Ram Soonder Thakoor v. Taruck Chunder Turkoruthun* (1872), 19 W. R. C. R. 28.

⁶ *Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Soomasundara Mudahar* (1893), 17 Mad. 199.

⁷ See *Abdul Gofur Mandal v. Umakanta Pandit* (1914), 19 C. W. N. 260.

⁸ *Charavur Teramath v. Urath Lakshmi* (1883), 6 Mad. 270; *Kunhan v. Moorthi* (1910), 34 Mad. 406.

⁹ *Samarasingrachariar v. Krishnasami Ayyangar* (1902), referred to at 30 Mad. 103.

As to the powers of the heads of *mutts*, see *post*, pp. 561, 562.

Where there was a *bonâ fide* dispute as to the succession to the office of *ojha* or high priest of a temple, the Court upheld an arrangement by which a sum of money was to be paid out of the offerings to one of the claimants.¹

Account.

A *shebait* or other manager or trustee is liable to account in respect of his management of, or dealing with, the property,² including offerings received on account of an idol, or gifts made to the institution.³

The votary "must needs be and is concerned in the maintenance of a decent and orderly worship. He is interested, too, in the honour and respect of the deity he reveres. . . . He desires a regular and continuous or at least a periodical round of sacred ceremonies, which might fail if the offerings of past years were all squandered, while those of any given year fell short."⁴

Brotherhoods
attached to
temples.

The constitution and rules of religious brotherhoods attached to Hindu temples are by no means uniform in their character, and the important principle to be observed by the Courts is to ascertain, if that be possible, the special laws and usages governing the particular community whose affairs become the subject of litigation, and to be guided by them."⁵

"Mutt."

A *mutt* or *muttam* (a monastic religious institution devoted to the teaching of the different systems of Hindu religious philosophy) is presided over by a head who is variously called a *mohunt*, a *swami*, a *gosavi*, a *sanmyasi* (if a Brahmin), a *paradasi* (if a Sudra), or a *jeer*.

Their origin.

"The origin of *muttams* is ordinarily as follows: A preceptor of religious doctrine gathers around him a number of disciples whom he initiates into the particular mysteries of the order, and instructs in his religious tenets. Such of these disciples as intend to become religious teachers,

¹ *Girijanund Datta Jha v. Saila-janund Datta Jha* (1896), 23 Cal. 645.

² Even if he is himself the founder of the endowment, *Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nurey* (1883), 8 Bom. 432.

³ *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram* (1887), 21 Bom. 247, at pp. 261, 262; S. C. on appeal *Chotalal Lakhmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar* (1899), 26 I. A. 199; 24 Bom. 50; 4 C. W. N. 23; 2 Bom. L. R. 516; *ante*, pp. 557, 558; *Jugal Kishore v. Lakshmandas* (1899),

23 Bom. 659. See *Rajeshwar Mullick v. Gopeshwar Mullick* (1907), 35 Cal. 226; 12 C. W. N. 323.

⁴ *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram* (1887), 12 Bom. 247, at pp. 261, 262; S. C. upheld on appeal *Chotalal Lakhmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar* (1899), 26 I. A. 199; 24 Bom. 50; 4 C. W. N. 23; 2 Bom. L. R. 516.

⁵ *Muthu Ramalinga Setupati (Rajha) v. Perianayagum Pillai* (1874), 1 I. A. 209, at p. 228.

renounce their connection with their family, and all claims to the family wealth, and, as it were, affiliate themselves to the spiritual teacher whose school they have entered. Pious persons endow the schools with property which is vested in the preceptor for the time being, and a house for the school is erected, and a *mattam* constituted. The property of the *mattam* does not descend to the disciples or elders in common; the preceptor, the head of the institution, selects among the affiliated disciples him whom he deems the most competent and in his own lifetime installs the disciple so selected as his successor, not uncommonly with some ceremonies. After the death of the preceptor the disciple so chosen is installed in the *gauldi*, and takes by succession the property which has been held by his predecessor. The property is in fact attached to the office and passes by inheritance to no one who does not fill the office." ¹

As to the origin of *mutts*, see *Kailasam Pillai v. Natarajah Tambiran* (1909), 33 Mad. 265; *Sammantha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti* (1879), 2 Mad. 175; *Giyana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran* (1887), 10 Mad. 375; *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyavidhi Tirtha Swami* (1904), 27 Mad. 435; Ghose's "Hindu Law," Chap. VIII.

"In the case of *mutts* . . . though there are idols connected therewith, the worship of such is quite a secondary matter, the principal purpose of such an institution being the maintenance, in circumstances likely to command the respect and estimation, of a line of competent religious teachers who . . . are given for the welfare of the foundation itself, a real and, so to speak, beneficial interest in the usufruct, the restrictions governing the disposition thereof being of the nature of a mere moral obligation. Having regard to these facts, it is obvious that the correct view to be taken is that in the case of *mutts* the ideal person is the office of the spiritual teacher *Acharya*, which, as it were, is incarnate in the person of each successive *swami* who for the time is a real owner, and not a mere trustee." ²

Object of
Mutt.

The law as to *mohunts* and their offices, functions and duties is to be found in custom and practice which in each case has to be proved by evidence.³

The position and powers of the *mohunt*, *swami*, or *gosavi* or other head of a *mutt* are different from those of the *shebait* or other manager of a temple or endowment for an idol.

Mohunt.

In the absence of a grant or usage enforcing a specific trust a *mohunt* is not accountable for his expenditure of the income

Powers over
income.

¹ *Sammantha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti* (1879), 2 Mad. 175, at p. 179.

Mad. 435, at pp. 442, 454, 455.

² *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyavidhi Tirtha Swami* (1904), 27

³ *Greedharee Doss v. Nundokishore Doss* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 405, at p. 428; 8 W. R. P. C. 25, at p. 26.

of the endowment. He is, however, required therewith to maintain the purposes of the *mutt*, the surplus, if any, being at his unfettered disposal. The property of the endowment is, in a certain sense, trust property; it is devoted to the maintenance of the establishment, but the superior has large dominion over it, and is not accountable for its management nor for the expenditure of the income, provided he does not apply it to any purpose other than what may fairly be regarded as in furtherance of the objects of the institution.¹

Powers over corpus. His powers over the corpus are no greater than those of other managers. He is not the owner of the *mutt* property, and on his death his successor is not entitled to letters of administration in respect of that property.²

Lunacy. In the absence of custom lunacy does not divest the rights of the head of a *mutt*.³

Manager need not be an ascetic. The manager of a *mutt* need not necessarily be an ascetic. Whether he must be so or not depends upon the usage of the institution.⁴

In some cases the head of a *mutt* may be a married man.⁵ Among the Gosains of the Deccan and certain other places marriage does not work a forfeiture of the office of *mohunt* and the rights and properties appendant to it.⁶

May own property. There is nothing to prevent a *mohunt* possessing private property, nor is there any presumption that property held by him belongs to the *mutt*,⁷ but it has been held in Bombay⁸ that the *swami* of a *mutt* presumably has no private property, and must be assumed to be pledging the credit of the *mutt* when he borrows money for the purposes of the *mutt*.

As to the inheritance to a *mohunt*, see *ante*, pp. 415, 416.

Powers of manager. "A *shebuit*, *mohunt*, or other manager of an endowment may deal with the endowed property for its benefit and preservation, and especially for the purpose of defending it from hostile litigious attack."⁹

¹ See *Ram Prakash Das (Mahant) v. Anand Das (Mahant)* (1916), 43 I. A. 73; 43 Cal. 707; 20 C. W. N. 802; 18 Bom. L. R. 490; *Kailasam Pillai v. Naturaja Thambiran* (1909), 33 Mad. 265, referring to *Gyanu Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Kanda Sami Tambiran* (1887), 10 Mad. 375, and *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyaniidhi Tirtha Swami* (1904), 27 Mad. 435; *Mulhusamier v. Sreemathanthi Swamiyar* (1913), 38 Mad. 356; *Burn Suroop Dass (Mohunt) v. Khashee Jha* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R. 471; *Khusulchund v. Mahadervgiri* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 214.

² *Jib Lal Gir (Mohunt) v. Jaga Mohan Gir (Mohunt)* (1898), 16 C. W.

N. 798.

³ *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyaniidhi Tirtha Swami* (1904), 27 Mad. 435.

⁴ *Sathappayyar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1, at pp. 9, 10.

⁵ See *Sathappayyar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1.

⁶ *Rambharti Jagrupbharti (Gosain) v. Surajbharti Haribharti (Mohant)* (1880), 5 Bom. 683.

⁷ *Kishoru Dossjee (Sree Mohant) v. Coimbatore Spinning and Weaving Company* (1902), 26 Mad. 79.

⁸ *Shankar Bharali Swami v. Venkapa Naik* (1885), 9 Bom. 422.

⁹ *Prosunno Kumari Debbya v. Golab Chand Baboo* (1875), 2 I. A. 145, at p.

He is "empowered to do whatever may be required for the service of the idol, and for the benefit and preservation of its property at least to as great a degree as the manager of an infant heir." ¹

The manager of an endowment has all the ordinary powers of a manager.

He can create derivative tenures and estates conformable to usage; Leases. and leases for a reasonable term. ²

As to permanent leases, see *post*, pp. 565, 566.

If the manager grant a lease for an unreasonable term, it would apparently enure so long as he continues to be manager. ³

A person who has no independent rights, but is a mere nominee of the person to whom the endowment was granted, has no authority to grant leases. ⁴

As to the power of a mohunt to dismiss a subordinate, see *Tiruvambal Desikar v. Manikkarachaka Desikar* (1915), 40 Mad. 177.

The deposition of the manager of an endowment by the act of a foreign state does not affect his rights in respect of property in British India. ⁵

A mohunt, shebait, or other manager of an endowment is Person to sue. entitled to sue where it be necessary on behalf of the endowment for the protection or realization of the property of the endowment, or otherwise for its benefit. ⁶

He is not entitled to sue for a mere declaration when he is entitled to substantive relief. ⁷

For an instance of a suit to exclude certain persons from worshipping in a temple, see *Sankaralinga Nadan v. Rajeswara Dorai (Raja)* (1908), 35 I. A. 176; 31 Mad. 236; 12 C. W. N. 546.

Persons interested as worshippers in a public religious endowment may Parties to suit. be added as parties to a suit instituted by a trustee on behalf of the

151; 14 B. L. R. 450, at p. 458; 23 W. R. C. R. 253, at p. 255; *Hossein Ali Khan v. Bhagaban Das (Mahanta)* (1906), 34 Calc. 249, at p. 255; 11 C. W. N. 261, at p. 265; *Pramada Nath Roy v. Poorna Chandra Roy* (1908), 35 Calc. 691, at p. 698; 12 C. W. N. 556, at p. 557.

¹ *Prosvanno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo* (1875), 2 I. A. 145, at p. 152; 14 B. L. R. 450, at p. 459; 23 W. R. C. R. 253, at pp. 255, 256.

² *Shibessuree Debia (Maharane)* v. *Mothooramath Acharjo* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 270; 13 W. R. P. C. 18; *Nallayappa Pillan v. Ambalavahana Pandara Sannadhi* (1903), 2 Mad. 465.

³ *Arruth Misser v. Juggurnath Indraswamee* (1872), 18 W. R. C. R. 439; *Burn Suroop Doss (Mohunt) v. Khashee Jha* (1873), 20 W. R. C. R.

471; *Ramchandra Shankarbava Dravid v. Kashinath Narayan Dravid* (1894), 19 Bom. 271, see *post*, p. 553.

⁴ *Ram Doss v. Mohesur Deb Missree* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 446.

⁵ *Goswami Shri Girdharji v. Madhowdas Premji* (1893), 17 Bom. 601; *Goswami (Shriman) v. Goswami Shri Girdharlalji* (1878), 17 Bom. 620.

⁶ See *Sankamurti Mudaliar v. Chidambara Nadan* (1893), 17 Mad. 143; *Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur (Maharaja) v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (Rani)* (1904), 31 I. A. 203; 32 Calc. 129; 8 C. W. N. 809; 6 Bom. L. R. 765. Where the manager is a minor he obtains the benefit of s. 6 of the Limitation Act (IX. of 1908), *ibid*. See also Act XV. of 1877, s. 7.

⁷ *Rathnasabapathi Pillai v. Ramasami Aiyar* (1910), 33 Mad. 452. Specific Relief Act (I. of 1877), s. 42.

endowment against third parties, if such joinder is considered by the Court as desirable in the interests of the trust,¹ as where the trustee after a decree by the first Court had relinquished his rights.²

Debts and
alienation.

The manager of an endowment may incur debts and borrow money for the proper expenses of the endowment such as keeping up the religious worship, repairing the temples,³ or other possessions of the idol, defending hostile litigious attacks, and other like objects. He may alienate or encumber the property to the extent to which there is an existing necessity for so doing, his power in that respect being analogous to that possessed by the manager for an infant heir,⁴ or a female with a restricted estate.⁵

The advisability of filling up a tank is not a sufficient necessity.⁶

The making of a tank may amount to a necessity.⁷

De facto
manager.

Debts incurred by a *de facto* manager of an endowment (other than a mere trespasser)⁸ *bonâ fide* in the interests of the endowment would apparently be on the same footing as that incurred by a *de jure* manager.⁹ A mortgage by a mere claimant to the membership is not sustainable.¹⁰

Personal
liability.

Except where he has pledged his personal credit the manager is not personally liable for the debts of the endowment.¹¹

As to the alienation of rights of worship, see *post*, pp. 573, 574.

¹ *Chidambaram Chethar v. Rungachariar (Sri)* (1905), 29 Mad. 106.

² *Sankralinga Nâdan v. Rajeswara Dorai (Raja)* (1908), 35 I. A. 176; 31 Mad. 236; 12 C. W. N. 546.

³ *Doorganath Roy (Konwur) v. Ramchunder Sen* (1876), 4 I. A. 52, at pp. 62, 63; 2 Calc. 341, at pp. 350, 351.

⁴ *Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi* (1909), 36 I. A. 148; 36 Calc. 1003; 14 C. W. N. 1; 11 Bom. L. R. 1234; *Prosunno Kumari Debja v. Golab Chand Baboo* (1875), 2 I. A. 145; 14 B. L. R. 450; 23 W. R. C. R. 253; *Hossein Ali Khan v. Bhagaban Das (Mahanta)* (1906), 34 Calc. 249; 11 C. W. N. 261; *Doorganath Roy (Konwur) v. Ramchunder Sen* (1876), 4 I. A. 52, at p. 63; 2 Calc. 341, at p. 351; *Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri* (1896), 24 Calc. 77, at p. 82; *Ramprasanna Nandi Chowdhuri v. Secretary of State* (1913), 40 Calc. 895; *Collector of Thana v. Hari Sitaram* (1882), 6 Bom. 546; *Parsotam Gir v. Dat Gir* (1903), 25 All. 296, at pp. 304, 311; *Deivasikamani Pandarasan-nidhi (Srimath) v. Noor Mahomed*

Routhan (1907), 31 Mad. 47; *Palanappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara* (1917), 44 I. A. 147; 21 C. W. N. 729; 19 Bom. L. R. 587; *Khusalchand v. Mahadevgiri* (1875), 12 Bom. H. C. 214. In *Narayan v. Chintaman* (1881), 5 Bom. 393, the Court limited the power to the pledging of the income. As to the powers of a manager for an infant heir, see *ante*, pp. 285-290.

⁵ *Jugessur Buttohyal v. Roodro Narain Roy (Rajah)* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 293; *Kunjamani Dassi v. Nikunja Bihari Das* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 314.

⁶ *Jnananjan Banerjee v. Adoremoney Dassee* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 805.

⁷ *Cf. Khub Lal Singh v. Ajodhya Misser* (1915), 43 Calc. 574.

⁸ *Ram Churn Pooree v. Nunhoo Mundul* (1870), 14 W. R. C. R. 147.

⁹ See *Saminatha v. Purushottama* (1892), 16 Mad. 67; *Kasim Saiba v. Sudhindra Thirtha Swami* (1895), 18 Mad. 359.

¹⁰ See *Madho Prasad v. Ramrattan Gir* (1911), 15 C. W. N. 838.

¹¹ See *Peary Mohun Mookerjee (Rajah) v. Narendra Krishna Mukerjee* (1900), 5 C. W. N. 273.

The annual revenues of endowments, as distinguished from ^{Pledges of} the *corpus*, may occasionally, when it is necessary to do so in ^{revenue.} order to raise money for purposes essential to the temple or other institution, but not further or otherwise, be pledged.¹

As to the proceeds of land acquired for public purposes, see *Kamini Debi v. Pramatha Nath Mookerjee* (1911), 39 Calc. 33; *Ramprasanna Nandi Chowdhuri v. Secretary of State* (1913), 40 Calc. 895; 19 C. W. N. 652.

A *mohunt*, manager, or other trustee of an endowment cannot, except for such necessary purposes as above mentioned, alienate or encumber the endowed property.²

Bombay Act II. of 1863, s. 8, cl. 8, provides :—

“It is, however, hereby declared that lands held on behalf ^{Lands} of religious or charitable institutions wholly or partially exempt ^{exempt from} from the payment of land revenue shall not be transferable from such institutions either by assignment, sale (whether such sale be judicial, public, or private), gift, devise, or otherwise howsoever, and no *Nazrana* shall be liable on account of such lands.”³

As to the exemption of religious and charitable institutions from land revenue in territories subject to Act XI. of 1852, *i.e.* in the territories of the Dekkan, Khandesh, and Southern Maratha country, and in other districts more recently annexed to the Bombay Presidency, see the above section.

A permanent lease cannot be given by a *mohunt*, *shebait*, or ^{Permanent} lease.

¹ *Narayan v. Chintaman* (1881), 5 Bom. 393.

² *Murugesam Pillai v. Manickavasaka Pandara* (1917), 44 I. A. 98; 40 Mad. 402; 21 C. W. N. 761; 19 Bom. L. R. 456; *Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi* (1909), 36 I. A. 148, at p. 164; 36 Calc. 1003, at p. 1013; 14 C. W. N. 1, at p. 10; 11 Bom. L. R. 1234, at p. 1247; *Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo* (1875), 2 I. A. 145; 14 B. L. R. 450; 23 W. R. C. R. 253; *Gnasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram* (1899), 27 I. A. 69; 22 Mad. 271; 4 C. W. N. 329; 2 Bom. L. R. 597; *Gopal Dass (Mohunt) v. Kerpam Dass (Mohunt)*, Ben. S. D. A. 1850, p. 250; *Jnananjan Banerjee v. Adoremoney Dassee* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 805; *Ganesh Dharmidkar Maharajdev (Shri) v. Keshavrao Gobind Kulavkar* (1890), 15 Bom. 625; *Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami*

v. Vidyavidhi Tirtha Swami (1904), 27 Mad. 435, at pp. 439, 456; *Shibeesuree Debia (Maharanees) v. Mothooranath Acharjo* (1869), 13 M. I. A. 270; 13 W. R. P. C. 18; *Narayan v. Chintaman* (1881), 5 Bom. 393; *Collector of Thana v. Hari Sitaran* (1882), 6 Bom. 546; *Nallayappa Pillan v. Ambalavahana Pandara Sannadhi* (1903), 27 Mad. 465; *Sambanda Mudaliyar v. Nanasambandapandara* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 298. When the property has been acquired by Government under the Land Acquisition Act (I. of 1894, s. 31 (2)), the award may direct investment of the compensation money in Government securities, *Shiva Rao v. Nagappa* (1905), 29 Mad. 117; *Kamini Debi v. Pramatha Nath Mookerjee* (1911), 39 Calc. 33; *Ramprasanna Nandi Chowdhuri v. Secretary of State* (1913), 40 Calc. 895.

³ See *Narayan v. Chintaman* (1881), 5 Bom. 393.

other manager except under circumstances which justify an alienation.¹

Limitation.

As to the limitation for a suit to set aside such lease, see Act IX. of 1908, Sched. 1, Art. 134; and as to the law under the Limitation Act of 1877, *Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi* (1909), 36 I. A. 148; 36 Calc. 1003; 14 C. W. N. 1; 11 Bom. L. R. 1234; followed in *Shyam Chand Jiu (Sri Sri Ishwar) v. Ram Kanai Ghose* (1911), 38 I. A. 76; 38 Calc. 526; 15 C. W. N. 417; 13 Bom. L. R. 421.

As to the alienation of the interest of the grantor in property upon which endowments have been charged, see *ante*, p. 549.

Repudiation.

An act in excess of his powers by a manager or other trustee is voidable, and subject to the law of limitation can be repudiated by a subsequent holder of the office,² or by any other person interested in the trust.

In the case of a *mutt* an unauthorized alienation by the head would apparently enure for the life of the grantor,³ or at any rate during his tenure of office, provided, at any rate, that the service of the *mutt* be not prejudiced thereby.

The successor bound by acts.

The *shebait* or other manager of an endowment is bound by the lawful acts of the previous incumbent, but not by acts done in fraud of the trust.⁴

Limitation.

The right of a manager to sue to recover property of the endowment unlawfully alienated by his predecessor commences at the date of his accession to office.⁵

¹ *Abhiram Goswami v. Shama Charan Nandi* (1909), 36 I. A. 148; 36 Calc. 1003; 14 C. W. N. 1; 11 Bom. L. R. 1234; *Muthusamier v. Sreemethamithi Swamiyar (Sree)* (1913), 38 Mad. 356; *Jnananjan Banerjee v. Adoremoney Dassee* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 805; *Radha Bullubh Chund v. Juggut Chunder Chowdree* (1826), 4 Ben. Sel. R. 151 (new edition, 192); *Prosunno Moyee Dossee v. Koonjo Beharee Choudhree*, W. R. 1864, C. R. 157; *Juggessur Buttohyal v. Roodroo Narain Roy* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 299; *Tayubunnessg Bibee v. Sham Kishore Roy (Kuwar)* (1871), 7 B. L. R. 621; 15 W. R. C. R. 228; *Prosunno Kumar Adhikari v. Saroda Prosunno Adhikari* (1895), 22 Calc. 989; *Narasimha Chari v. Gopala Ayyangar* (1905), 28 Mad. 391; *Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara* (1917), 44 I. A. 147; 21 C. W. N. 729; 19 Bom. L. R. 587. Necessity was presumed where the land had

been held over sixty years under a lease, *Chakalingam Pillai v. Mayandi Chettiar* (1896), 19 Mad. 485.

² See *Mahomed v. Ganapati* (1889), 13 Mad. 277; *Jamal Saheb v. Murgaya Swami* (1885), 10 Bom. 34.

³ See *Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi* (1909), 36 I. A. 148; 36 Calc. 1003; 14 C. W. N. 1; 11 Bom. L. R. 1234; *Jamal Saheb v. Murgaya Swami* (1885), 10 Bom. 34; *Muthusamier v. Sreemethamithi Swamiyar* (1913), 38 Mad. 356.

⁴ *Goluck Chunder Bose v. Rughoonath Sree Chunder Roy* (1872), 1 B. L. R. 337, note; 17 W. R. C. R. 44.

⁵ *Mahomed v. Ganapati* (1889), 13 Mad. 277; *Vedapuratti v. Vallabha* (1890), *ibid.* 402; *Sathianama Bharati v. Saravanabagi Ammal* (1894), 18 Mad. 266. See *Nilmoney Singh v. Jagabandha Roy* (1896), 23 Calc. 536; *Gnasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram* (1899), 27 I. A. 69;

A right of adverse possession may be acquired against an idol or his *shebait*¹ or against any endowment. Adverse possession.

Possession of *debutter* property which is adverse against some of the *shebait*s is necessarily adverse against all of them.²

Adverse possession during a previous office holder's time bars his successor.³

As to a suit for a declaration of right to the offerings to the idol, see *Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das* (1914), 41 I. A. 267; 42 Calc. 244; 18 C. W. N. 1029; 16 Bom. L. R. 845.

The manager may be sued as manager for debts lawfully contracted by his predecessor, although they were not expressly charged upon the endowed property.⁴ Debts of previous manager.

A decree untainted by fraud or collusion which is made in a suit by or against a *shebait* as representing the idol or against the head of a *mutt* as representing the *mutt* is binding on succeeding *shebait*s⁵ or heads of the *mutt*, as the case may be.⁶ Decree binds successor.

Property belonging to an endowment may be attached or sold under a decree properly made against the trustee or manager as such,⁷ but it cannot be attached or sold in pursuance of a decree passed against the trustee or manager personally.⁸ Attachment of property.

Where it is so attached⁹ or sold¹⁰ the manager may assert the rights of the endowment by a claim or suit, as the case may be.

23 Mad. 271; 4 C. W. N. 329; 2 Bom. L. R. 597 (hereditary office).

¹ See *Dumodar Das v. Lakhan Das (Adhikari)* (1910), 37 I. A. 147; 37 Calc. 885; 14 C. W. N. 889; 12 Bom. L. R. 632; *Pandurang Balaji v. Dnyanu* (1911), 36 Bom. 135; 13 Bom. L. R. 1169.

² *Jnananjan Banerjee v. Adoremoney Dassee* (1909), 13 C. W. N. 805.

³ *Chidambaran Chetti v. Minammal* (1898), 23 Mad. 439.

⁴ *Davasisikamani Pandara Sannidhi (Srimath) v. Noor Mahomed Routhan* (1907), 31 Mad. 47.

⁵ *Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo* (1875), 2 I. A. 145; 14 B. L. R. 450; 23 W. R. C. R. 253; S. C. in Court below (1873), 11 B. L. R. 332; *Ranjit Sinha Bahadur (Raja) v. Basunta Kumar Ghose* (1908), 12 C. W. N. 739; *Gora Chand Lurki v. Makhan Lal Chakravarty* (1907), 11 C. W. N. 489; *Krishna Kissors Chakravarti v. Sukha Sindhu Samyal* (1906), 10 C. W. N. 1006; *Tulsidas*

Mahanta v. Bejoy Kishore Shome (1901), 6 C. W. N. 178; *Jharula Das v. Jalandhar Thakur* (1912), 39 Calc. 887; S. C. on appeal, *Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das* (1914), 41 I. A. 267; 42 Calc. 244; 18 C. W. N. 1029; 16 Bom. L. R. 845; *Nagendra Nath Mukerjee v. Probal Chandra Mukerjee* (1912), 17 C. W. N. 964.

⁶ *Manikka Vasaka Desikar v. Balagopala Krishna Chetty* (1906), 29 Mad. 553; *Subindra v. Budan* (1885), 9 Mad. 80.

⁷ *Pramada Nath Roy v. Poorna Chandra Roy* (1908), 35 Calc. 691; 12 C. W. N. 550.

⁸ *Bishen Chand Basawut v. Nadir Hossein (Syed)* (1887), 15 I. A. 1; 15 Calc. 329; *Ram Krishna Mahapatra v. Padma Charan Deb Goswami (Mohunt)* (1902), 6 C. W. N. 663.

⁹ *Jogendra Nath Sarkar v. Gobinda Chandra Dutt* (1908), 35 Calc. 364; 12 C. W. N. 310; *Bhojahari Pal v. Ram Lal Das* (1901), 6 C. W. N. 63.

¹⁰ *Amar Chand Kundu v. Nani*

The sale does not give the purchaser any right as *shebani*.¹

Devolution of Trust or Management.

Terms of
endowment.

Where the terms of the grant creating the endowment provide for the devolution of the trusteeship or managership they should be followed.²

For instance, a grant to a *gosavi* and his disciples in perpetual succession.³

Where it was provided that the succession should be "*shishya shishya-rukrame*" (disciple following disciple), it was held that a disciple could succeed a co-disciple.⁴

Usage.

In the absence of evidence of the endower having laid down a rule of succession, the usage which has been observed in the selection of a successor in the particular institution should be followed.⁵

"In determining who is to be entitled to succeed as *mohunt* in such a case as the present, the only law to be observed is to be found in custom and practice, which must be proved by testimony, and the claimant must show that he is entitled according to the custom to recover the office and the land and property belonging to it. This has been laid down by the Committee in several cases."⁶

Gopal Mukerjee (1907), 12 C. W. N. 308; *Ram Krishna Mahapatra v. Padma Charan Deb Goswami (Mohunt)* (1902), 6 C. W. N. 663.

¹ *Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das* (1914), 41 I. A. 267; 42 Calo. 244; 18 C. W. N. 1029; 16 Bom. L. R. 845; post, p. 573.

² See *Sitapershad v. Thakur Dass* (1879), 5 C. L. R. 73; *Bishambhar Das v. Drigvijai Singh* (1905), 27 All. 581; 9 C. W. N. 914; *Ram Chunder Adhikaree v. Ram Jeebun Adhikaree* (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 427; *Raj Krishna Dey v. Bipin Behary Dey* (1912), 40 Calo. 245; 17 C. W. N. 591.

³ *Khusalchand v. Mahadevgiri* (1875), 12 Bom. H., C. 214.

⁴ *Gopal Chandra Chakrabarty v. Radharaman Das Babaji* (1911), 16 C. W. N. 108.

⁵ *Janoki Debi (Srimati) v. Sri Gopal Acharya* (1882), 10 I. A. 32; 9 Calo. 766; 13 C. L. R. 30; *Greedharee Doss v. Nundo Kishore Doss Mohunt* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 405, at p. 428 (see p. 421); 8 W. R. P. C. 25;

Muttu Ramalinga Setupati (Rajah) v. Perianayagum Pillai (1874), 1 I. A. 209; *Vurmah Valia (Rajah) v. Vurmah Mutha (Ravi)* (1876), 4 I. A. 76; 1 Mad. 235, at p. 250; *Lahar Puri (Mohunt) v. Puran Nath (Mohunt)* (1915), 42 I. A. 115; 37 All. 298; 19 C. W. N. 718; 17 Bom. L. R. 475; *Ram Parkash Das (Mohunt) v. Anand Das (Mohunt)* (1816), 43 I. A. 73; 43 Calo. 707; 20 C. W. N. 802; 18 Bom. L. R. 490; *Ramji Dass (Mahanth) v. Lachhu Dass* (1902), 7 C. W. N. 145; *Rangachariar v. Yegna Dikshatur* (1890), 13 Mad. 524, at p. 534; *Sitapershad v. Thakur Dass* (1879), 5 C. L. R. 73; *Gajapati v. Bhagavan Das* (1891), 15 Mad. 44; *Basdeo v. Gharib Das* (1890), 13 All. 256; *Raj Krishna Dey v. Bupin Behary Dey* (1912), 40 Calo. 245; 17 C. W. N. 591.

⁶ *Genda Puri v. Chhatar Puri* (1886), 13 I. A. 100, at p. 105; 9 All. 1, at p. 8; *Ramji Dass (Mahanth) v. Lachhu Dass* (1902), 7 C. W. N. 145.

The same principle is applicable to the *dharmakarta* ¹ of a *devasthanam* or temple.²

In one case an unbroken usage for nineteen years was held conclusive evidence of a family arrangement for turns of management.³

As to a temple belonging to the Ballavacharya Gossain sect, see *Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj* (1913), 40 I. A. 97; 35 All. 283; 17 C. W. N. 740; 15 Bom. L. R. 606.

As to the appointment of *mohunts*, see *post*. pp. 571, 572.

There may be an hereditary right of managership or *sebit*-^{Hereditary right.}
ship.

Such right only applies when the person in question is qualified to perform the duties of the office.⁴

Such right must be proved.⁵ It may have been provided for in the grant, as is usual in the case of a private religious endowment,⁶ or may be established by usage.

In providing for the succession by inheritance to the management of an endowment the rules laid down in the *Tagore* case,⁷ prohibiting the creation of estates of inheritance inconsistent with the general law of inheritance, apply.⁸

Where the right to manage a religious or charitable endowment, without any beneficial interest in the endowed properties, is vested in a joint Hindu family the senior male member of such a family is, until a partition is effected,⁹ entitled to exercise the right.¹⁰

In a family governed by the Mitakshara school of law, when the right of management of the *debutter* property belongs to the family, a member of the family becomes on birth entitled to be *shebait*.¹¹

In the absence of custom an hereditary priestly office apparently descends Females. in default of males through females.¹²

A female cannot be *archaka* in a Saivite temple.¹³

¹ Manager.

² *Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai* (1893), 20 I. A. 150; 16 Mad. 490; *Appasami v. Nagappa* (1884), 7 Mad. 499.

³ *Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugappa Chetti* (1906), 33 I. A. 139; 29 Mad. 283; 10 C. W. N. 825.

⁴ See *Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj* (1913), 40 I. A. 97; 35 All. 283; 17 C. W. N. 740; 15 Bom. L. R. 606; *Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavanagarukkal* (1914), 38 Mad. 850.

⁵ *Appasami v. Nagappa* (1884), 7 Mad. 499.

⁶ *Collector of Moorsheadabad v. Shubessuree (Ranee)* (1872), 11 B. L. R. 86, at p. 116; 18 W. R. C. R. 226, at p. 228.

⁷ *Juttendromohun Tagore v. Ganendro Mohun Tagore* (1872), I. A. Sup.

Vol. 47, at p. 65; 9 B. L. R. 377, at pp. 394, 395; 18 W. R. C. R. 359, at p. 364, *ante*, p. 532.

⁸ *Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram* (1899), 27 I. A. 69, at p. 78; 2 Mad. 271, at p. 281; 4 C. W. N. 329, at p. 332; 2 Bom. L. R. 597.

⁹ As to partition, see *post*, p. 575.

¹⁰ *Thandavaroya Pillai v. Shunmugam Pillai* (1908), 32 Mad. 167. See *Purappavanalingam Chetti v. Nullaswan Chetti* (1863), 1 Mad. H. C. 415, at p. 417.

¹¹ *Ramchandra Panda v. Ram Krishna Mahapatra* (1906), 33 Calo. 507.

¹² *Sitarambhat v. Sitaram Ganesh* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 250; see *ante*, p. 557.

¹³ *Sandarambal Ammal v. Yoga vanagarukkal* (1914), 38 Mad. 850.

For instances of hereditary trustees of religious endowments, see *Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram* (1899), 27 I. A. 69; 23 Mad. 1; 4 C. W. N. 329; 2 Bom. L. R. 597; *Nanabhai v. Shriman Goswami Giridhariji* (1888), 12 Bom. 331; *Annasami Pillai v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar* (1900), 24 Mad. 219.

Section 63 of the Madras Court of Wards Act (I. (Mad. C.) of 1902) is as follows :—

Powers of Court in regard to religious endowments of which ward is hereditary trustee or manager.

If a ward is the hereditary trustee or manager of a temple, mosque, or other religious establishment or endowment, the Court, notwithstanding anything contained in s. 22 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863,¹ may make such arrangements as it thinks fit for the discharge, during the wardship, of the ward's duties as trustee or manager, provided that for the direct and personal management of the religious affairs of any such institution, establishment, or endowment the Court shall appoint suitable persons other than officers of Government, and that the Court shall, as far as possible, restrict superintendence to the preservation of the property belonging to the institution, establishment, or endowment.

The instructions to Collectors and Estate Collectors on this subject are to be found in Standing Order 155 of the Madras Court of Wards.

Powers of manager as to appointment.

A *mohunt* or other head of an endowment cannot alter the succession,² nor can he provide for the succession after the person appointed by him.³

Right of founder.

In the absence of express provision in the grant, or of usage, or in the case of omission by the person entitled to nominate to the office the right to nominate a manager or *shebait* reverts to the founder or his heirs.⁴

¹ XX. of 1863, *post*, p. 595.

² *Ramji Dass (Mahant) v. Lachhu Dass* (1902), 7 C. W. N. 145; *Rumun Doss (Mohunt) v. Ashbul Doss (Mohunt)* (1864), 1 W. R. C. R. 160.

³ *Greedharee Doss v. Nundkishore Dutt Mohunt* (1863), Marsh, 573; 2 Hay, 633; approved on appeal (1867), 11 M. I. A. 405, at p. 428; 8 W. R. P. C. 25.

⁴ *Greedhareejee (Gossamee Sree) v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee* (1889), 16 I. A. 137; 17 Calc. 3 (public religious endowment); *Sheoratan Kunwar v. Ram Pargash* (1896), 18 All. 227 (public temple); *Chandranath Chakrabarti v. Jadbendra Chakrabarti* (1906), 28 All. 689 (ditto); *Mohan Lalji v. Madhusudan Lala* (1910), 32 All. 461 (ditto); *Sheo Prasad v. Aya Ram* (1907), 29 All. 663 (Sikh religious endowment); *Jai Bansi Kunwar (Mussamat) v. Chatter Dhari Sing* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 181; S. C. Peet

Koonwur v. Chutthur Dharce Singh (1870), 13 W. R. C. R. 396 (temple); *Hori Dasi Debi v. Secretary of State* (1879), 5 Calc. 229; 4 C. L. R. 77; S. C. on appeal *Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State* (1881), 8 I. A. 46; 7 Calc. 304; 10 C. L. R. 349 (charitable endowment); *Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Runjit Singh* (1897), 25 Calc. 355 (endowment for idol); *Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur (Maharajah) v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (Rani)* (1904), 31 I. A. 203, at p. 208; 32 Calc. 129, at p. 399; 8 C. W. N. 809, at pp. 818, 819; 6 Bom. L. R. 765; *Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj* (1913), 40 I. A. 97; 35 All. 283; 17 C. W. N. 740; 15 Bom. L. R. 606; *Gopal Chunder Bose v. Kartick Chunder Dey* (1902), 29 Calc. 716; *Kunjamani Dasi v. Nikunja Bihari Das* (1915), 20 C. W. N. 314; *Gauranga Sahu v. Sudevi Mata* (1917), 40 Mad. 612.

The right of management of family properties devoted to charities ordinarily descends to the heirs of the donor except in the few cases where the office is descendible to a single heir.¹

When the family of the *shebait* appointed by the founder dies out, the *shebaitship* would revert to the family of the original grantor.²

Failing an appointment by the person entitled to appoint the Court will appoint.³

A right as manager or to appoint a manager may be acquired by prescription.⁴ Prescriptive right.

The practice as to the appointment of *mohunts* or other heads of *mutts* or *muttams* (monasteries) varies in accordance with the custom of the particular institution, which must be proved by evidence in each case.⁵ Appointment of mohunt.

As to evidence of the fact of election, see *Lahar Puri v. Puran Nath* (1915), 42 I. A. 115; 37 All. 298; 19 C. W. N. 718; 17 Bom. L. R. 475.

Usually one of the *chelas*, i.e. persons initiated by the deceased or retiring *mohunt*, would be selected,⁶ by act *inter vivos* or by will⁷ by the head of the *mutt*, such appointment being generally subject to confirmation by the *mohunts* of neighbouring *mutts* of the same sect.⁸ On failure of such

¹ *Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar* (1909), 34 Mad. 470.

² *Raj Krishna Dey v. Bipin Behary Dey* (1912), 40 Cal. 251; 17 C. W. N. 591; *Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi (Srimati Rani)* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 126; *Pital Das Babaji v. Protap Chandra Sarma* (1909), 11 C. L. J. 2.

³ *Raj Krishna Dey v. Bipin Behary Dey* (1912), 40 Cal. 251; 17 C. W. N. 591, which see as to the principles which will guide the Court in making an appointment.

⁴ *Annasami Pillai v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar* (1900), 24 Mad. 219; *Ramanathan Chetty v. Muragappa Chetty* (1903), 27 Mad. 192; S. C. on appeal (1906), 33 I. A. 139; 29 Mad. 283; 10 C. W. N. 824; 8 Bom. L. R. 498; see *Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das (Adhikari)* (1910), 37 I. A. 147; 37 Cal. 885; 14 C. W. N. 889; 12 Bom. L. R. 632.

⁵ *Greedharee Doss v. Nundokissore Doss Mohunt* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 405; 8 W. R. P. C. 25; *Genda Puri v. Chatar Puri* (1886), 13 I. A. 100; 9 All. 1; *Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai* (1893), 16 Mad. 490; *Ramji*

Dass (Mahanth) v. Lachhu Dass (1902), 7 C. W. N. 145; *Lahar Puri v. Puran Nath* (1915), 42 I. A. 115; 37 All. 290; 19 C. W. N. 718; 17 Bom. L. R. 475.

⁶ See *Gunes Gir v. Amrao Gir* (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 218 (2nd ed., 291); *Ramji Dass (Mahanth) v. Lachhu Dass* (1902), 7 C. W. N. 145; *Sheoproskash Dass (Mohunt) v. Joyram Doss* (1866), 5 W. R. M. A. 57.

⁷ Probate of such will is not necessary, *Baisnav Charan Das Bairagi v. Kishore Dass Mohanta* (1911), 15 C. W. N. 1014.

⁸ *Ramji Dass (Mahanth) v. Lachhu Dass* (1902), 7 C. W. N. 145; *Land Agents of Zillah Hoogly v. Krishnamund Dundee*, Ben. S. D. A. 1848, p. 253; *Greedharee Doss v. Nundokissore Doss Mohunt* (1867), 11 M. I. A. 405; 8 W. R. P. C. 25; *Trimbakpuri Guru Sitalpuri v. Gangabai* (1887), 11 Bom. 514; *Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai* (1893), 20 I. A. 150; 16 Mad. 490; *Madho Das v. Kamta Das* (1878), 1 All. 519; *Rama Nooj Doss (Mohunt) v. Debraj Doss (Mohunt)* (1839), 6 Ben. Sel. R. 262 (new edition, 328).

appointment the appointment would usually be made by such neighbouring *mohunts*.¹

The ordinary rule is that among the *Sanyasis* generally no *chela* has a right as such to succeed to the property of the deceased *guru*, he must be nominated by his *guru*, such nomination being generally confirmed by the *mohunts* of the order, or in default of such appointment, he must be elected by the *mohunts* and principal persons of the sect in the neighbourhood. But this is not a universal rule, and in some cases, according to custom, the principal *chela* succeeds as of right even without such appointment or formal election; but apparently even then an election or a recognition by members of the sect is necessary.²

In one case it was said, "The ordinary rule is that the *maths* of the same sect in a district, or *maths* having a common origin, are associated together, the *mohunts* of these acknowledging one of their number (who is for some reason pre-eminent) as a head; and on the occasion of the death of one the others assemble to elect a successor out of the *chelas* or disciples of the deceased, if possible; or if there be none of them qualified, then from the *chelas* of another *mohunt*. After the election the chosen disciple is installed on the *guddi* of his predecessor with much ceremony."³

In one case⁴ the *mohunt's* power to appoint his successor was limited to members of the *Adhinam*,⁵ a disciple of which founded the *mutt* in question.

There is authority that in the absence of a duly appointed *mohunt* the disciples of a *mutt* cannot sue for a declaration that a person claiming the office has not been duly appointed,⁶ but it is submitted that the refusal of relief in such a suit might compel an appointment which might afterwards turn out to be infructuous.

Condition.

Except where he is justified by the terms of the endowment in making an appointment, a *mohunt* has no power to attach any condition to the interest to be enjoyed by his appointee.⁷

¹ See *Gunes Gir v. Amrao Gir* (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. (2nd ed., 291); *Dhunsing Gir v. Mya Gir* (1806), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 153 (2nd ed., 202); *Ramrutun Das v. Bannamalee Das* (1806), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 170 (2nd ed., 202); *Narain Das v. Brindabun Das* (1815), 2 Ben. Sel. R. 151 (new edition, 192); *Madho Das v. Kamta Das* (1878), 1 All. 539. The Court of Sudder Dewany Adalat in Bengal ordered an assembly of *mohunts* to be convened to determine a right of succession (*Surubanund Purbut v. Deo Sing Purbut* (1810), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 296 (2nd ed., 396), and to instal the person in whom the right might be vested (*Ganga Das v. Taluk Das* (1810), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 309 (2nd ed., 414). Such procedure is scarcely possible at the present time.

² *Ramdhan Puri (Gossain) v. Dal-mir Puri (Gossain)* (1909), 14 C. W. N.

191; see *Gopal Dass (Mohunt) v. Kerparam Dass (Mohunt)*, Ben. S. D. A. 1850, p. 250.

³ *Dowkut Geer (Gossain) v. Bissessur Geer* (1873), 19 W. R. C. R. 215; H. H. Wilson's "Religion of Hindus," p. 51; *Narain Das v. Brindabun Das* (1815), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 151 (new edition, 192).

⁴ *Giyana Sambandha Pandara San-nadhi v. Kandasami Tamburan* (1887), 10 Mad. 375.

⁵ A religious institution.

⁶ *Srinivasa Swami v. Ramanuja Chariar* (1890), 22 Mad. 117. See, however, *post*, p. 577, note 10.

⁷ *Greedharee Doss v. Nundkishore Dutt Mohunt* (1863), Marsh, 573; 2 Hay, 633; affirmed on appeal, 11 M. I. A. 405; 8 W. R. P. C. 25. See *Gajapati v. Bhagavan Doss* (1891), 15 Mad. 44, at p. 45.

Alienation.

Except it be justified by the terms of the endowment or by usage,¹ a right of management,² or a trust or a power of appointment of a trustee or manager,³ or an office attached to a temple or other endowment,⁴ cannot be alienated or devised⁵ by the holder.

Alienation of management or trust or office.

A disqualified person, such as a female or a non-Hindu, cannot delegate the office.⁶

No proof of usage will justify an alienation for the pecuniary benefit of the alienor,⁷ or for the purpose of altering the form of worship.⁸

A right to receive offerings,⁹ or a turn of worship¹⁰ is not ordinarily alienable.

Under special circumstances the alienation of religious offices and rights of worship to persons standing in the line of succession and capable of

¹ See *Rajaram v. Ganesh* (1898), 23 Bom. 131, followed in *Manjunath v. Shankar* (1914), 16 Bom. L. R. 593; *Rangasami v. Ranga* (1892), 16 Mad. 146.

² *Rajeshwar Mullick v. Gopeshwar Mullick* (1907), 34 Cal. 818; 11 C. W. N. 782, S. C. 35 Cal. 226; 12 C. W. N. 323.

³ *Gnasambanda Pandaru Sannadhi v. Veli Pandaram* (1899), 27 I. A. 69; 2 Mad. 271; 4 C. W. N. 329; 2 Bom. L. R. 597; *Vurmah Valia (Rajah) v. Vurmah Mutha (Ravi)* (1876), 4 I. A. 76; 1 Mad. 235; *Rajeshwar Mullick v. Gopeshwar Mullick* (1907), 34 Cal. 828; 11 C. W. N. 782; S. C. 35 Cal. 226; 12 C. W. N. 323; *Rup Narain Singh v. Junko Bye* (1878), 3 C. L. R. 112; *Rama Varma Tambaran v. Raman Nayar* (1882), 5 Mad. 89; *Subbarayudu v. Kotayya* (1892), 15 Mad. 389; *Kannan v. Nilakandan* (1884), 7 Mad. 337; *Alagappa Mudaliar v. Svarasundara Mudaliar*, 15 Mad. 211.

⁴ *Lakshmanaaswami Naidu v. Rangamma* (1902), 26 Mad. 31; *Keyake Ilata Kotel Kanni v. Yadattil Vella-yangot* (1868), 3 Mad. H. C. 380; *Narayana v. Ranga* (1891), 15 Mad. 183; *Mallika Dasi (Srimati) v. Ratanmani Chakravarti*, 1 C. W. N. 493.

⁵ *Rajeshwar Mullick v. Gopeshwar Mullick* (1907), 34 Cal. 818; 11 C. W. N. 782; S. C. 35 Cal. 226; 12 C. W. N. 323.

⁶ *Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavanagurukkal* (1914), 38 Mad. 850.

⁷ *Vurmah Valia (Rajah) v. Vurmah Mutha* (1876), 4 I. A. 76; 1 Mad. 235; *Narasimha Thatta Acharya v. Ananiha Bhatta* (1881), 4 Mad. 391; *Kuppa Gurukul v. Dorasami Gurukul* (1882), 6 Mad. 76; *Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavanagurukkal* (1914), 38 Mad. 850.

⁸ *Venkatarayar v. Srinvasu Ayyangar* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 32.

⁹ *Puncha Thakur v. Bindeshri Thakur* (1915), 19 C. W. N. 580. Cf. *Sukh Lal v. Bishambhar* (1916), 39 All. 196. As to the alienation of the income of a temple, see *Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar* (1916), 40 Mad. 212, at p. 222.

¹⁰ *Rajeshwar Mullick v. Gopeshwar Mullick* (1907), 34 Cal. 818; 11 C. W. N. 782; S. C. 35 Cal. 226; 12 C. W. N. 323; *Ukoor Doss v. Chunder Sekur Doss* (1865), 3 W. R. C. R. 152. See *Durga Bibi v. Chanchal Ram* (1881), 4 All. 81. In *Jati Kar v. Mukunda Deb* (1911), 39 Cal. 227; 16 C. W. N. 129, effect was given to a transfer which has been acted upon for twenty-five years. A custom permitting such alienation was proved in *Mohamaya Devi v. Haridas Halder* (1914), 42 Cal. 455; 19 C. W. N. 208. This was a case of turns of worship at a public temple (Kalighat, near Calcutta).

performing the worship and other functions connected with it will be upheld if there be no impropriety in the transaction.¹ Such alienation would frequently amount to nothing more than a renunciation of the right.²

An assignment for the purpose of carrying on the *debsheba* ³ and making provision therefor has been upheld.⁴

A transfer to a *de jure* manager by a *de facto* manager who has acquired a right to the property by prescription will be upheld.⁵

A right to set aside an assignment may be barred by the law of limitation.⁶

When an alienation is permissible, the form of it is immaterial.⁷

Limits of alienation.

When a right of management or an office connected with an endowment is alienable, it can only be alienated in such a way that the trust may be carried out.⁸

Revocation of endowment of idol.

An endowment in favour of a family idol is not so permanent as a public endowment.⁹ Provided that the concurrence of all the members of the family can be obtained, the idol and its property can be transferred to another family for the purpose of carrying on the worship,¹⁰ and there is authority that with the consent of the whole family the dedicated property can be converted into secular property and appropriated by the members of the family.¹¹

Attachment.

A right of management or of trusteeship,¹² an office connected with a temple or other endowment,¹³ or a right of

¹ *Mancharam v. Pranshankar* (1882), 6 Bom. 298; *Sitarambhat v. Sitaram Ganesh* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. 250; *Baroda Charan Dutt v. Hemlata Dassi* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 642; *Nirod Mohani Dassi v. Shubodas Pal Dewasin* (1909), 36 Calc. 975; 13 C. W. N. 1084. See, however, *Narayana v. Ranga* (1891), 15 Mad. 183.

² See *Sitarambhat v. Sitaram Ganesh* (1869), 6 Bom. H. C. A. C. 250.

³ The worship of the deity.

⁴ *Jadubindu Odhikaree v. Lokenauth Gere* (1863), Marsh, 303; 2 Hay, 160; *Khetterchunder Ghose v. Hari Das Bundopadhy* (1890), 17 Calc. 557.

⁵ See *Annasami Pillay v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar* (1900), 24 Mad. 219.

⁶ See *Kannan v. Nilakandan* (1884), 1 Mad. 337.

⁷ See *Jati Kar v. Mukunda Deb* (1911), 39 Calc. 227; 16 C. W. N. 129.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 559.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 548, 549.

¹⁰ *Khetterchunder Ghose v. Hari Das Bundopadhy* (1890), 17 Calc. 557, followed in *Baroda Charan Dutt v. Hemlata Dassi* (1908), 13 C. W. N. 242.

¹¹ *Doorganath Roy (Konwar) v. Ram Chunder Sen* (1876), 4 I. A. 52, at p. 53; 2 Calc. 341, at p. 347; *Gobinda Kumar Roy Chowdhury v. Debendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury* (1907), 12 C. W. N. 98. See *Madhub Chandra Bera v. Sarat Kumari Debi (Srimati Rami)* (1910), 15 C. W. N. 126; *Dharma Das Mandol v. Gosta Behary Mandol* (1911), 16 C. W. N. 29.

¹² *Durga Bibi v. Chanchal Ram* (1881), 4 All. 81; *Juggurnath Roy Chowdhry v. Kishen Pershad Surmah* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 266.

¹³ *Rajaram v. Ganesh* (1898), 23 Bom. 131; *Dubo Misser v. Srinibas Misser* (1870), 5 B. L. R. 617; 14 W. R. C. R. 409; *Govind Lakshman Joshi v. Ramkrishna Hari Joshi* (1887),

worship,¹ or the right of an idol to receive voluntary offerings,² cannot be attached or sold in execution of a decree.³

A right to the surplus profits of the *sheba* cannot be attached if the amount be not ascertained.⁴

There is no objection to the sale of the right, title, and interest of a servant of the temple in land belonging to the temple which he holds as remuneration for his services.⁵

Public endowments and religious offices are naturally in- Partition.
divisible, though modern custom has sanctioned a departure in respect of allowing the parties entitled to share to officiate by turns, and of allowing alienation within certain restrictions.⁶

A right to manage a family idol, a temple, or religious Mode of
endowment, when such right belongs to a coparcenary, may be allotment.
partitioned by allotting to the coparceners an alternate recurring period of worship or holding in proportion to their shares, if the nature of the endowment renders it possible.⁷

The Court will give effect to a family arrangement for the due execution of the service of the temple in turn or in some settled order or sequence.⁸ In one case, where there were two idols belonging to the family, an arrangement by which one of the heirs took one of the idols and the property endowed for the worship thereof, and the other took the other idol and property, was approved by the Court.⁹

12 Bom. 366; *Durga Bibi v. Chanchal Ram* (1881), 4 All. 81. See *Jalandhar Thakur v. Jharula Das* (1914), 4 I. A. 267; 42 Cal. 244; 18 C. W. N. 1029; 16 Bom. L. R. 845.

¹ *Kalicharan Gir Gossain v. Bangshi Mohan Das Baboo* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 727; 15 W. R. 339.

² *Shoilojanund Ojha v. Peary Charan Dey* (1902), 29 Cal. 470; 6 C. W. N. 728.

³ Acts V. of 1908 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 60; XIV. of 1882 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 266.

⁴ *Juggurnath Roy Chowdhry v. Kishen Pershad Surmah* (1867), 7 W. R. C. R. 206.

⁵ *Lothkar v. Wagle* (1882), 6 Bom. 596.

⁶ *Trimbak v. Lakshman* (1895), 20 Bom. 495, at p. 501. See ante, p. 574.

⁷ *Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar* (1909), 34 Mad. 470; *Rajeshwar Mullick v. Gopeshwar Mullick* (1907), 34 Cal. 828; 11 C. W. N. 782; *Mancharam v. Pranshankar* (1882), 6 Bom.

298; *Mitta Kunth Audhicarry v. Neerunjun Audhicarry* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 166; 22 W. R. C. R. 437; *Anund Moyee Chowdhrair v. Boykantanath Roy* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 193; Bhattacharya's "Law of the Joint Hindu Family," pp. 452, 453. As to the law of limitation, see Act IX. of 1908, Sched. 1, Art. 131; *Eshan Chunder Roy v. Monmohini Dassi* (1878), 4 Cal. 683; *Gopee Kissen Gossamy v. Thakoor Doss Gossamy* (1882), 8 Cal. 807; 10 C. L. R. 439; *Gaur Mohan Chowdhry v. Madan Mohan Chowdhry* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 352; 15 W. R. C. R. 29; *Nubkissen Mitter v. Hurrischunder Mitter* (1818), 2 Morley's Dig. 146.

⁸ *Ramanathan Chetti v. Murugapa Chetti* (1906), 33 I. A. 139; 29 Mad. 283; 10 C. W. N. 824; 8 Bom. L. R. 998.

⁹ *Elder widow of Raja Chutter Sein v. Younger widow of Raja Chutter Sein* (1807), 1 Ben. Sel. R. 180 (new edition, 239).

In a Bombay case¹ the High Court on a partition gave the custody of the family idol and of the property appertaining thereto to the senior member of the family, reserving to the other members a right of access; but it is ordinarily the practice to allot to each of the coparceners the worship and custody in "palas" or turns.² It is submitted that the latter practice is the right one.

There is nothing to prevent an offering by a particular member of the family, although it may not be his turn of worship at the time.³

As to the partition of places of worship and sacrifice and property dedicated to an idol or to other religious or charitable purposes, see *ante*, p. 342.

Suits.

Suit for breach of trust.

Persons interested in a religious or charitable endowment, such as worshippers⁴ or devotees of an idol or members of the founder's family,⁵ are entitled to bring a suit complaining of a breach of trust with reference to the funds or property belonging to the endowment,⁶ or insisting upon the worship being properly performed,⁷ or the trust carried out.⁸

They can also sue for a declaration that the *mohunt* or *shebait* or other manager of the endowment has by his maladministration disqualified himself from holding the office.⁹

¹ *Damodardas Maneklal v. Uttamram Maneklal* (1892), 17 Bom. 271, at p. 288.

² See *Mitta Kunth Audhicarry v. Neerunjun Audhicarry* (1874), 14 B. L. R. 166; 22 W. R. C. R. 437; *Anund Moyee Choudhrai v. Boykantnath Roy* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 193. The refusal to deliver up the idol to a person entitled to a turn gives a right of suit; *Debendro Nath Mullick v. Odit Churn Mullick* (1878), 3 Calc. 390; *Anund Moyee Choudhrai v. Boykantnath Roy* (1867), 8 W. R. C. R. 193; *Gaur Mohan Choudhry v. Madan Mohan Choudhry* (1871), 6 B. L. R. 352; 15 W. R. C. R. 29; *Eshun Chunder Roy v. Monmohini Dassi* (1878), 4 Calc. 683; *Gopee Kishen Gossamy v. Thakoordass Gossamy* (1882), 8 Calc. 807; 10 C. L. R. 439. K. K. Bhattacharya's "Law of Joint Hindu Family," p. 462.

³ *Sona Dei v. Fakir Chand* (1913), 35 ALL. 412.

⁴ *Sajedur Raja Chowdhury v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav* (1897), 24 Calc. 418; *Jugal Kishore v. Lakshmandas*

Raghunathdas (1899), 23 Bom. 657; *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev* (1888), 15 Bom. 612. This will include priests worshipping on behalf of pilgrims at a shrine; *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram* (1887), 12 Bom. 247; S. C. on appeal *Chotalal Lakhmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar* (1899), 26 I. A. 199; 24 Bom. 50; 4 C. W. N. 23; 2 Bom. L. R. 516.

⁵ *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev* (1888), 15 Bom. 612.

⁶ *Radhabai v. Chinnaji* (1878), 3 Bom. 27. See *Sathappayyar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1.

⁷ See *Dhadphale v. Gurav* (1881), 6 Bom. 122; *Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhun Nursey* (1883), 8 Bom. 432.

⁸ *Ram Narain Singh v. Ramoon Paurey* (1874), 23 W. R. C. R. 76; *Panchcouri Mull v. Chumroolall* (1878), 3 Calc. 563; 2 C. L. R. 121; *Brojomohun Doss v. Hurroolall Doss* (1880), 5 Calc. 700; 6 C. L. R. 58; *Hemangini Dasi v. Nobin Chand Ghose* (1882), 8 Calc. 788; 11 C. L. R. 370.

⁹ See *Mohun Dass v. Lutchmun*

The plaintiff's right to an account in such a suit depends upon his Account-pleading and proving a distinct breach of trust.¹

Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code² enacts as follows :—

Suit with respect to public endowments.

“(1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes³ of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary⁴ for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons⁵ having an interest in the trust⁶ and having obtained⁷ the consent in writing of the Advocate-General⁸ may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the Local Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree—

“(a) removing any trustee;⁹

“(b) appointing a new trustee;¹⁰

Dass (1880), 6 Cal. 11; 6 C. L. R. 265; *Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursey* (1883), 8 Bom. 432; *Sathappayar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1; *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev* (1888), 15 Bom. 612.

¹ *Brojomohun Doss v. Hurrololl Doss* (1880), 5 Cal. 700; 6 C. L. R. 58.

² Act V. of 1908. This section re-enacts with some alteration, s. 539 of Act XIV. of 1882.

³ *Sathappayar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1; *Jugalkishore v. Lakshmandas Raghunathdas* (1899), 23 Bom. 659. As to what is a public trust, see *post*, p. 585

⁴ See *Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry* (1906), 33 Cal. 789, at p. 809; 10 C. W. N. 581, at p. 590.

⁵ A suit instituted by one plaintiff cannot be put right by the addition of another plaintiff, *Darves Haji Mahomed v. Jainudin* (1906), 30 Bom. 603; 8 Bom. L. R. 751.

⁶ *Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Barshnav* (1897), 24 Cal. 418; *Jugalkishore v. Lakshmandas Raghunathdas* (1899), 23 Bom. 659; *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakshmiram Govindram* (1887), 12 Bom. 249; S. C. on appeal *Chotalal Lakshmiram v. Manohar Ganesh Tambekar* (1899), 26 I. A. 199, 24 Bom. 50; 4 C. W. N. 23; 2 Bom. L. R. 516; *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev* (1888), 15 Bom. 612.

⁷ Consent after the institution of the suit is not sufficient, *Gopal Dei*

v. Kanno Dei (1903), 26 All. 162, differing from *Ramayyengar v. Krishnayyengar* (1886), 10 Mad. 185.

⁸ The consent must authorize the persons by name, *Gopal Dei v. Kanno Dei* (1903), 26 All. 162, and cannot include matters outside the terms of the consent, *Hussein Miyan (Sayad) v. Collector of Kaira* (1895), 21 Bom. 257.

⁹ *Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Barshnav* (1897), 24 Cal. 418. See *Damodhar Bhat v. Bhogilal* (1899), 24 Bom. 45. This applies to a *de facto* as well as to a *de jure* trustee, see *Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry* (1906), 33 Cal. 789, at pp. 805, 806; 10 C. W. N. 581, at pp. 587, 589; and the fact that the *de jure* trustee has lost his right by the law of limitation does not prevent a suit, *Lakshmandas Raghunathdas v. Jugalkishore* (1896); 22 Bom. 216. Where the alienation of property is the ground of removal it is not necessary to make the alienee a party, *Huseni Begum v. Collector of Moradabad* (1897), 20 All. 46.

¹⁰ This includes the case where the defendant is not the lawful trustee, and the trusteeship is therefore vacant, see *Neli Rama Jogiah v. Venkatacharulu* (1902), 26 Mad. 450. See, however, *Srinivasa Swami v. Ramanuja Chariar* (1890), 22 Mad. 117. It is not necessary to claim consequential relief (Act I. of 1877, s. 42), *Rama Jogiah v. Venkatacharulu* (1902), 26 Mad. 450. New

- "(c) vesting any property in a trustee ;
- "(d) directing accounts and enquiries :¹
- "(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust ;
- "(f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged, or exchanged ;
- "(g) settling a scheme ;² or
- "(h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.³

"(2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863,⁴ no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-s. (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section."⁵

This last provision disposes of the decisions which held that the corresponding provisions of the previous Codes of Civil procedure were permissive and not mandatory.

Object of provisions.

Referring to the corresponding section of the previous Code of Civil Procedure,⁶ the Bengal High Court said,⁷ "The real object of the special provisions of s. 539 seems to us to be clear. Persons interested in a trust were, if they would all join, always competent to maintain a suit against any trustee for his removal for breach of trust ; but where the joining of all of them was inconvenient or impracticable, it was considered desirable that some of them might sue without joining the others, provided they obtained the consent of the Advocate-General or of the Collector of the district ; and this condition was imposed to prevent an indefinite number of reckless and harassing suits being brought against trustees by different persons interested in the trust. Where this condition is fulfilled and the risk of harassing suits being brought against trustees is thus guarded against, there is no reason why suits brought under the section should be restricted in any other way."

For a summary of the results of s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and of the Religious Endowments Act, see Mullah's "Code of Civil Procedure," 3rd ed., p. 207.

A suit for one of the above purposes, but including a claim for the

or additional trustees may be appointed, although such appointment may not be in conformity with the original constitution of the trust, *Prayag Doss Ji Varu Mahant v. Tirumala Srirangacharlavaru* (1905), 28 Mad. 319.

¹ See *Ghazaffar Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain* (1905), 28 All. 112.

² A scheme may be framed even with respect to a temple which is subject to the control of a committee ; *Sitharama Chetty v. Subramania Iyer* (Sir S.) (1915), 39 Mad. 700. The scheme is liable to alteration. *Prayag Doss Ji Varu Mahant v. Tirumala Srirangacharlavaru* (1905), 28 Mad.

319 ; *Damodarbhut v. Bhogulal Karsondas* (1899), 24 Bom. 45.

³ See *Jamal-uddin v. Mujtaba Husain* (1903), 25 All. 631, at p. 635 ; *Budree Das Mukim v. Choomi Lal Johurry* (1906), 33 Calc. 789, at p. 810 ; 10 C. W. N. 581, at p. 591.

⁴ Act XX. of 1863, *post*, pp. 585, *et seq.*

⁵ See *Lutifunnissa Bibi v. Nazirun Bibi* (1884), 11 Calc. 33 ; *Wajid Ali Shah v. Dianat-ul-lah Beg* (1885), 8 All. 31.

⁶ Act XIV. of 1882.

⁷ *Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav* (1897), 24 Calc. 418, at p. 425.

recovery of trust property from the hands of a third party to whom it had been improperly alienated is within this section.¹

A suit lies against the committee of management of a temple receiving annually from Government a sum of money for the purpose of religious worship by the Advocate-General acting on behalf of the public to compel them to a due execution of their particular acts of duty.²

It has been held that this section has no application to—

(a) A suit for a declaration that the plaintiff is a trustee.³

Cases to which section has no application.

(b) A suit for a declaration of a right of management which is actually being exercised by the plaintiff.⁴

(c) A suit for a declaration of the right of the plaintiff to appoint a manager of a *mutt*.⁵

(d) A suit between two private parties claiming certain rights as managers.⁶

(e) A suit for the declaration of the existence of a trust.⁷

(f) A suit by worshippers at a temple for a declaration that the election of certain persons to the office of *dharmakarta*⁸ is void.⁹

(g) Suits brought not to establish a public right, but to remedy a particular infringement of an individual right.¹⁰

It has been held that suits not brought for any of the purposes specified in the section "being merely claims by trustees against persons who are strangers to the trust and who set up a title hostile thereto, such as alienees and mere trespassers holding adversely thereto, are not within the section."¹¹

¹ *Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baschnav* (1897), 24 Calc. 418, followed in *Ghazaffar Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain* (1905), 28 All. 112. As to whether a separate suit may be necessary to obtain possession, see the last-mentioned case, and *Neti Rama Jogiah v. Venkatacharulu* (1902), 26 Mad. 450.

² *Trimbak Gopal Parichak v. Krishnarao Pandurang* (1909), 33 Bom. 387. See *Attorney General v. Brodie* (1846), 4 M. I. A. 191; *Mayor of Lyons v. Advocate-General of Bengal* (1875), 3 I. A. 32; 1 Calc. 303; 26 W. R. C. R. 1.

³ *Miya v. Bava Sahab Santi Miya (Sayed)* (1896), 22 Bom. 496; *Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry* (1906), 33 Calc. 789, at p. 810; 10 C. W. N. 583, at p. 590.

⁴ *Navroji Manekji Wadia v. Dastur Kharsedji Manchharji* (1903), 28 Bom. 20.

⁵ *Gyana Sambandha Pandara Sanadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran* (1887), 10 Mad. 375.

⁶ *Manijam Bibee v. Khadem Hossein* (1904), 32 Calc. 273.

⁷ *Jamal-uddin v. Mujiaba Husain*

(1903), 25 All. 631, followed in *Dasondhay v. Muhammad Abu Nasar* (1911), 33 All. 660.

⁸ Manager.

⁹ *Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar* (1897), 23 Mad. 28.

¹⁰ *Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry* (1906), 33 Calc. 789, at p. 807; 10 C. W. N. 581, at p. 589; *Jawahra v. Akbar Husain* (1884), 7 All. 178, differing from *Jan Ali v. Ramnath Mundul* (1882), 8 Calc. 32; 9 C. L. R. 43, see *Lutifunnissah Bibi v. Nazirun Bibi* (1885), 11 Calc. 33; *Zafaryab Ali v. Bakhtawar Singh* (1883), 5 All. 497; *Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin* (1893), 20 Calc. 810.

¹¹ *Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry* (1906), 33 Calc. 789, at p. 805; 10 C. W. N. 581, at p. 587; *Ayatunnessa Bibi v. Kulfu Khalifa* (1914), 41 Calc. 749; 19 C. W. N. 234; *Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Swami* (1892), 16 Mad. 31; *Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar* (1916), 40 Mad. 212; *Muhammad Abdullah Khan v. Kalhu* (1899), 21 All. 187; *Malhar Bhagvant v. Narasinha Krishna* (1912), 37 Bom. 95; 14 Bom. L. R. 941; *Ghelabai Gajri*.

- Appeal.** A relator who is not a party to the suit cannot appeal.¹
- Execution of scheme.** The directions in a scheme framed under this section may be enforced in execution on application by persons interested.²
- Powers of Collectors.** The powers conferred upon the Advocate-General by the above section may, outside the Presidency towns, be, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, exercised also by the Collector or by such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf.³
- Duty of Advocate-General or Collector.** The Advocate-General, or Collector, as the case may be, in giving his consent to the institution of a suit must exercise his judgment in the matter, and see not only whether the persons suing are persons having an interest in the trust, but also whether the trust is a public trust of the kind contemplated by the section, and whether there are *prima facie* grounds for thinking that there has been a breach of trust. Where the form of the permission shows that he has omitted to exercise his judgment, the omission is a mere irregularity.⁴
- He should only give such consent if it be such a suit as he would consider himself justified in filing at the relation of such two persons in his own name.⁵
- There must be some dispute in existence of such a public nature that the intervention of the Advocate-General or Collector is necessary to decide if and by whom a suit should be brought to establish public rights.⁶
- Removal of trustee, etc.** When a *shebait*, *mohunt*, trustee, or other manager has by breach of trust or otherwise shown himself to be incompetent to carry on the duties of the trust, the Court can remove him.⁷
- A trustee who does not keep proper accounts, misappropriates moneys and makes false claims against the trust properties should be removed.⁸
- A *bonâ fide* claim to property which actually belongs to the endowment is not by itself ground for removing a manager; ⁹ but an assertion of a right to treat the property as his private estate might justify his removal.¹⁰
- The non-performance of customary religious ceremonies may amount to a breach of trust if funds, whether from voluntary contributions or otherwise, are available.¹¹

shankar v. Uderam Icharam (1911), 36 Bom. 29; 13 Bom. L. R. 989; see *Ghazaffar Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain* (1905), 28 All. 112; *Hassan (Kazi) v. Sagun Bakrishna* (1899), 24 Bom. 170; *Vishwanath Govind Deshmone v. Rambhat* (1890), 15 Bom. 148; *Lakshmandas Parashram v. Ganpatrav Krishna* (1884), 8 Bom. 365, see *ante*, p. 576.

¹ *Jan Mahomed v. Nurudin (Syed)* (1907), 32 Bom. 155; 9 Bom. L. R. 996.

² *Prayag Doss Ji Varu, Mahani v. Tirumala Srirangacharlavaru* (1905), 28 Mad. 319; see *Damodarbhat v. Bhogilal Karsondas* (1899), 24 Bom. 45; 1 Bom. L. R. 509.

³ Act V. of 1908, s. 93.

⁴ *Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav* (1897), 24 Cal. 418; Act V. of 1908 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 99.

⁵ *Suleman v. Ismail (Shaikh)* (1915), 39 Bom. 580; 17 Bom. L. R. 625.

⁶ *Manijan Bhee v. Khadem Hossein* (1904), 32 Cal. 273, at p. 276.

⁷ See Act XX. of 1863, s. 14, *post*, pp. 590, 591.

⁸ *Miyaji v. Ahmed Sahib (Sheskh)* (1908), 31 Mad. 212.

⁹ *Muhammed Jafar v. Muhammed Ibrahim* (1900), 24 Mad. 243.

¹⁰ *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev* (1888), 15 Bom. 612.

¹¹ *Elayakuar Reddiar v. Namberumal Chettiar* (1899), 23 Mad. 298.

A person holding land assigned for the support of an idol subject to the performance of the ceremonies of worship of the idol who fails to perform the required service may be compelled to do so, and on refusal may be removed.¹

"Courts of equity in England have always allowed themselves some latitude in dealing with the trustees of a public charity who under a mistake have misapplied the funds of the institution, and we think that we can similarly allow ourselves some degree of latitude in dealing with the managers and *pujaris* ² of public Hindu temples who for a long time have been accustomed to deem themselves owners of the temples of which in law they are only trustees, managers, and priests, and to overlook the past while taking care that for the future the administration of the temple is placed on a sound footing. The judgment in the *Chinchwad* case,³ while it established the jurisdiction of the Courts to deal with the managers of public Hindu temples, and, if necessary, for the good of the religious endowment to remove them from their position as managers, did not, we think, intend to lay down a hard and fast rule that every manager of a shrine who arrogated to himself the position of owner should be removed from his trust. . . . Each case must, we think, be decided with reference to its own circumstances."⁴

In the absence of fraud or dishonesty mere misconduct or mistake as to his position does not compel a Court to dismiss a manager.⁵ It may in some cases appoint a committee to supervise and control him, and frame a scheme for the management of the trust.⁶

On the removal of the manager a successor would then have to be appointed by the person entitled to make the appointment,⁷ and in default of such appointment the Court will appoint a fit successor,⁸ or will, if necessary, frame a scheme for the administration of the trust.

As to the power of the Court to appoint new trustees or managers of public religious endowments in cases to which Act XX. of 1863 is applicable, namely, in the case of public religious endowments which might have been taken charge of by the Boards of Revenue under Bengal Regulations XIX. of 1810, and Madras Regulations VII. of 1817, see *post*, p. 583.

Neither the Trustees and Mortgagees Powers Act⁹ nor the Trustee Act¹⁰ has any application to charitable or religious trusts.

¹ *Mohesh Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Koylash Chunder Chuckerbutty* (1869), 11 W. R. C. R. 443.

² Priests.

³ *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev* (1888), 15 Bom. 612.

⁴ *Damodar Bhatji v. Bhat Bhogilal Kasandas* (1896), 22 Bom. 493, at pp. 494, 495.

⁵ *Annaji Raghunath Gosavi v. Narayan Sitaram* (1896), 21 Bom. 556; *Sivasankama v. Vadagiri* (1889), 13 Mad. 6.

⁶ *Annaji Raghunath Gosavi v.*

Narayan Sitaram (1896), 21 Bom. 556.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 568 *et seq.* As to the form of decree when the person suing is entitled to nominate the successor, see *Sathappayyar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 571.

⁹ XXVIII. of 1866. *Dinsha Manekji Petit (Sir) v. Jamssetji Jijibhai (Sir)* (1908), 33 Bom. 509.

¹⁰ II. of 1882. *Gopu Kolandavelu Chetty v. Sami Royar* (1905), 28 Mad. 517.

Statutory provisions for the Superintendence of Charitable and Religious Endowments.

Bengal Regulation XIX. of 1810.

Bengal Regulation XIX. of 1810¹ vested in the Boards of Revenue and Commissioners the general superintendence of all lands granted for the support of mosques, Hindu temples, colleges, and for other pious and beneficial purposes, and of all public buildings, such as bridges, *sarais*,² *kattras*,³ and other edifices,⁴ and made provisions for giving effect to such superintendence.

Madras Regulation VII. of 1817.

By Madras Regulation VII. of 1817, framed under the above Regulation, the general superintendence of all endowments granted for the support of colleges, or for other beneficial purposes, and of all public buildings, such as bridges, *choultries*,⁵ or *chuttrums*,⁶ or other edifices in the Madras Presidency, were vested in the Madras Board of Revenue.⁷ The general superintendence of escheats was likewise vested in the Board of Revenue.⁸

So far as religious endowments are concerned, these Regulations have been repealed.⁹

These Regulations were intended to be supplemental to existing remedies.¹⁰ They apply to endowments created after the date of the Regulations, as well as to prior endowments.¹¹

Appropriation of endowments.

These Regulations¹² require the Board of Revenue,¹³ and in the case of Bengal the Board of Commissioners also, to take care that all endowments, the general superintendence of which are vested in them, are duly appropriated to the purpose for which they were destined by the Government or individual by whom such endowments were granted.

¹ Repealed in Assam by Act V. of 1897, and in the North-Western Provinces by Act VIII. of 1884

² Buildings for the shelter and accommodation of travellers.

³ Market places.

⁴ S. 2.

⁵ Shelter for travellers.

⁶ Places where refreshment is given gratuitously, especially to Brahmins.

⁷ S. 2.

⁸ Ben. Reg. XIX. of 1810, s. 7; Mad. Reg. VII. of 1817, s. 6.

⁹ *Post*, p. 584.

¹⁰ *Ponnambala Mudaliyar v. Varaguna Rama Pandya Chinnatambara* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 117.

¹¹ *Venkatachala Pillai v. Taluq Board, Saidapet* (1911), 34 Mad. 375; *Svayya v. Rami Reddi* (1899), 22 Mad. 223.

¹² Ben. Reg. XIX. of 1810, s. 3; Mad. Reg. VII. of 1817, s. 3.

¹³ In Ajmere the Chief Commissioner discharges the functions of the Board of Revenue, Reg. III. of 1877, s. 3.

There were also provisions ¹ as to the repair of public edifices and the disposal of ruined buildings.

They are bound to prevent endowed lands from being appropriated to private uses or in any other mode contrary to the intent and will of the donor.² Misappropriation.

There were to be local agents, of whom the Collector was to be one, in each district.³ Agents.

The duty of the agents is to ascertain and report the particulars of endowments, the names and particulars of the then trustees and managers, and all vacancies and casualties with full information as to the pretensions of claimants, and to recommend fit persons where the nomination vests in Government or any public officer.⁴

The Regulations give power to appoint trustees, managers, and superintendents in those cases in which the nomination has usually rested with the present or former Government, or with a public officer, or of right appertains to Government, in consequence of no private individual being competent and entitled to make sufficient provision for the succession to the trust and management.⁵ Appointment of trustees.

Under this provision the Board of Revenue can appoint hereditary trustees when such appointment does not interfere with any subsisting rights.⁶ Appointment of trustees.

This provision was not intended to limit the jurisdiction of the Courts to the cases contemplated in it, but rather to provide against the finality of erroneous orders that may be passed by the Board of Revenue under the Regulation.⁷

Section 15 of the Bengal Regulation and s. 14 of the Madras Regulation save the rights of individuals to recover by due course of law lands or buildings which had been appropriated under colour of the Regulations and compensation in damages for any loss or injury unduly sustained by them. Saving of private rights.

The Board cannot arbitrarily put an end to an arrangement permanently Termination of arrangement, or superintendence.

¹ Ben. Reg. XIX. of 1810, ss. 3, 4, and 6; Mad. Reg. VII. of 1817, ss. 3, 4.

² Ben. Reg. XIX. of 1810, s. 5; Mad. Reg. VII. of 1817, s. 5.

³ Ben. Reg. XIX. of 1810, ss. 8, 9; Mad. Reg. VII. of 1817, ss. 7, 8.

⁴ Ben. Reg. XIX. of 1810, ss. 10-13; Mad. Reg. VII. of 1817, ss. 9-12.

⁵ Ben. Reg. XIX. of 1810, s. 14;

Mad. Reg. VII. of 1817, s. 13. This cannot be done without first dismissing the existing trustee, *Venkatachala Pillar v. Taluk Board, Saidapet* (1911), 34 Mad. 375.

⁶ *Ganapathi Ayyar v. Vedavyasa Alasingha Bhattar (Sri)* (1906), 29 Mad. 534.

⁷ *Ponnambala Mudaliyar v. Varaguna Rama Pandia Chinnaambiar* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 117.

made by them, but may do so only for just and sufficient reasons.¹ The Board of Revenue can divest itself of its right of superintendence.²

Partial repeal
of Regula-
tions.

These Regulations still apply to charitable endowments, except in Assam³ and the North-Western provinces,⁴ but so far as religious endowments are concerned, they were repealed by the Religious Endowments Act,⁵ which is in force throughout India except in the Presidency towns and the Bombay Presidency, where it is in force in Kanara only.

Religious
Endowments
Act.

Transfer of
management
of endow-
ments to
Madras
Municipal
Council and
Madras Local
Boards.

It is competent to the Madras Board of Revenue, with the written consent of the Governor in Council and of the District Municipal Council, to make over to such municipal council the management and superintendence of any endowment vested in the Board by Madras Regulation VII. of 1817; and thereupon all powers and duties which attach to such Board of Revenue in respect thereof shall attach to such municipal council as if they had been specifically named in such Regulation.⁶ There is a similar provision in the Madras Local Boards Act, 1884.⁷

Religious
Endowments
Act.

The scope of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863,⁸ is to be ascertained from the preamble which recites that it is expedient to relieve the Boards of Revenue, and the local agents in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, and the Presidency of Fort St. George, from the duties imposed on them by the above Regulations, "so far as these duties embrace the superintendence of lands granted for the support of mosques or Hindu temples and for other religious uses; the appropriation of endowments made for the maintenance of such religious establishments; the repair and preservation of buildings connected therewith, and the appointment of trustees or managers thereof; or involve any connection with the management of such religious establishments."

The Act applies to all public religious endowments for the support of which lands have been granted by preceding Governments of India and

¹ *Ganapathi Ayyar v. Vedavyasa Alasinga Bhattar (Sri)* (1906), 29 Mad. 534.

² *Venkatesa Nayudu v. Shatagopa Shri Shatagopa Swami (Shrivan)* (1872), 7 Mad. H. C. 77.

³ Act V. of 1897.

⁴ Act VIII. of 1884.

⁵ XX. of 1863.

⁶ Act IV. (M. C.) of 1884, s. 26 (2), *Chairman, Municipal Council of Rajahmundry v. Susurla Venkateswarlu* (1907), 31 Mad. 111.

⁷ Act V. (M. C.) of 1884, s. 51 (2); *Venkatachala Pillai v. Taluk Board, Saidapet* (1911), 34 Mad. 375.

⁸ XX. of 1863.

by individuals, whether they had been taken under the control of the Board of Revenue or not,¹ and whether they existed at the time of the passing of the Act or have been subsequently created.² It applies to religious endowments which might have been taken under the control of the above Regulations, if such Regulations had remained in force,³ and whether or not they were in existence at the time of the repeal of such Regulations.⁴

The Act only applies to public trusts. It has no application to private trusts,⁵ and only applies to certain religious trusts and endowments which had been or might be under the management of the Government.⁶

A public endowment for religious uses has been defined⁷ as "one which distributes its benefits to all men of all classes professing a defined form of religion: a similar endowment for pious and charitable purposes generally would include all members of the community who chose to avail themselves of the means afforded them by the appropriation; every one would have an equal right to participate, and that at all time and at all seasons." To make a trust a public trust there must be an intention to confer a benefit either upon the people in general or upon a class of sectaries.⁸

For instance, an endowment for the purpose of supporting and maintaining *fakirs*, entertaining visitors, and the giving of alms.⁹

The Act applies to endowments the funds for which have been raised by subscription.¹⁰

The provisions of the Religious Endowments Act (XX. of 1863) are as follows:—

In the case of every mosque, temple, or religious establishment subject to the above Regulations which was under the management of a trustee, manager, or superintendent, whose nomination did not vest in, nor was exercised by, or was subject to the confirmation of, the Government, or of any public officer,

Private trusts.

Public endowment.

Transfer of religious trust property to trustees.

¹ *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundul* (1881), 8 Calc. 32; 9 C. L. R. 433; *Sheoramat Kunwari v. Ram Pargash* (1896), 18 All. 227; *Mahomed Athar v. Ramjan Khan* (1907), 34 Calc. 587.

² *Venkatachala Pillai v. Taluq Board, Saidapet* (1911), 34 Mad. 375.

³ See *Saturhuri Setaramanuja Charayulu v. Nanduri Seetapati* (1902), 26 Mad. 166, explaining *Muthu v. Gangathara* (1893), 17 Mad. 95; *Mahomed Athar v. Ramjan Khan* (1907), 34 Calc. 587.

⁴ *Sivayya v. Rami Reddi* (1899), 22 Mad. 223; *Venkatachala Pillai v. The Taluq Board, Saidapet* (1911), 34 Mad. 375.

⁵ See *Sathapayyar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1 (endowment for family of guru); *Ashgur Ali v. Delroos Banoo Begum* (1877), 3 Calc.

325; S. C. in Court below, *Delroos Banoo Begum v. Ashgur Ally Khan (Nawab Syud)* (1875), 15 B. L. R. 167; 23 W. R. C. R. 453; *Protap Chandra Misser v. Brojonath Misser* (1891), 19 Calc. 275 (endowment for family idol).

⁶ *Kalee Churn Giri v. Golabi* (1878), 2 C. L. R. 129, at p. 131.

⁷ *Delroos Banoo Begum v. Ashgur Ally Khan (Nawab Syud)* (1875), 15 B. L. R. 167, at p. 184; 23 W. R. C. R. 453, at p. 454. See *Venkatachala Pillai v. Taluq Board, Saidapet* (1911), 34 Mad. 375, at pp. 381, 382.

⁸ See *Sathapayyar v. Periasami* (1890), 14 Mad. 1.

⁹ *Puran Atal (Mohunt) v. Darshan Das* (1912), 34 All. 468.

¹⁰ *Muhammad Siraj-ul-Hay v. Imamud-din* (1896), 19 All. 104.

the local Government was required to transfer the property which was under the superintendence of the Board of Revenue to such manager, trustee, or superintendent.¹

Procedure
in case of
dispute as to
succession to
vacated
trusteeship.

When a dispute arises as to the succession to the office of any trustee, manager, or superintendent to whom the property has been so transferred,² the Civil Court may at the instance of any person interested in the mosque, temple, or religious establishment or in the performance of the worship or of the service thereof, or of the trusts relating thereto, appoint a manager to act until some other person has by suit established his right of succession to such office.³

A Collector can be appointed trustee under this provision.⁴

No appeal lies from an order made under this provision,⁵ but a High Court can revise such order.⁶

Rights,
powers, and
responsi-
bilities of
trustees, etc.,
to whom
charge trans-
ferred.

The rights, powers, and responsibilities of the trustee, manager, or superintendent to whom the property is so transferred, as well as the conditions of their appointment, election, and removal are the same as if the Act had not been passed except in respect of the liability to be sued under the Act.⁷ All the powers which might be exercised by any Board of Revenue or local agent for the recovery of the rent of land or other property so transferred may be exercised by any trustee, manager, or superintendent to whom such transfer is made.⁸

Appointment
of Com-
mittees.

In the case of every mosque, temple, or religious establishment to which the provisions of either of the above regulations were applicable and the nomination of the trustee, manager, or superintendent whereof was at the time of the passing of the Act vested in, or might be exercised by, the Government or any public officer or in which the nomination was subject to the confirmation of Government or any public officer,⁹ the Local

¹ S. 4. *Jusagheri Gossamiar v. Collector of Tanjore* (1870), 5 Mad. H. C. 334.

² *Ittuni Panikka v. Irani Nambudripad* (1881), 3 Mad. 401; *Gopala Ayyar v. Arunachallam Chetty* (1902), 26 Mad. 85.

³ S. 5. As to appeals, see *Sultan Ackens Sahib v. Bava Malimiyyar (Shahk)* (1879), 4 Mad. 295.

⁴ *Somasundara Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Mudaliar* (1896), 19 Mad. 285.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Gopala Ayyar v. Arunachallam Chetty* (1902), 26 Mad. 85.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 590-592.

⁸ S. 6.

⁹ S. 3. See *Siharama Chetty v. Subramania Iyer (Sr S.)* (1915), 39 Mad. 700; *Dhurrum Singh Mohunt v. Kissen Singh* (1881), 7 Calc. 767; 9 C. L. R. 410. The burden of proof is on the person alleging that the endowment is of the class mentioned in s. 3, if a committee has been appointed and has worked for many

Government was required once for all¹ to appoint committees of three or more persons to exercise the powers² given to the Board of Revenues and local agents by the above Regulations.³

As to the duties and powers of such committees, see *post*, pp. 589, 590.

"It cannot be contended that, owing to the neglect of Government to carry out the duties imposed upon them by s. 7 of that Act, the Board of Revenue can be deemed to be still invested with the powers and duties which attached to the Board under the Regulations."⁴

Two out of three of the members of a committee so appointed cannot maintain a suit,⁵ but a surviving member can do so.⁶

The members of the said committee were to be appointed from among persons professing the religion for the purposes of which the mosque, temple, or other religious endowment was founded, or was then maintained, and in accordance, so far as could be ascertained, with the general wishes of those who were interested in the maintenance of such mosque, temple, or other religious establishment. The appointment of the committee was to be notified in the *Official Gazette*. In order to ascertain the general wishes of such persons in respect of such appointment, the Local Government might cause an election to be held under such rules (not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act) as should be framed by such Local Government.⁷

Qualifications
for members
of such Com-
mittee.

Under s. 9 every member of a committee appointed as above shall hold his office for life, unless removed for misconduct or unfitness, and no such member shall be removed except by order of the Civil Court as thereafter provided.⁸

Every
member to
be appointed
for life unless
removed for
misconduct,
etc.

A member of a committee can retire from his office of his own will.⁹

Retirement
of member.

Section 10. — Whenever any vacancy shall occur among the members of a committee appointed as above, a new member

Provisions for
filling up
vacancies.

years, *Ponduranga v. Nagappa* (1889), 12 Mad. 306; *Bhima Rout v. Dasarithi Doss* (1912), 40 Calo. 323, at p. 333.

¹ *Rangappa v. Bhimappa* (1915), 39 Mad. 349. As to a change for Revenue purposes, see *ibid*.

² *Ante*, pp. 582, 583.

³ S. 7. As to giving consideration in return for votes, see *Krishnaswami Ayyangar v. Sivaswami Udayar* (1905), 29 Mad. 166.

⁴ *Mahomed v. Ganapati* (1889), 13 Mad. 277, at pp. 278, 279.

⁵ *Muhammad Hasan (Syed) v. Nazar Muhammad (Kazi)* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 437.

⁶ *Raghunandan Ramanuja Das v. Bibhuti Bhuvan Mukerjee* (1911), 39 Calo. 304, differing from *Samthalva v. Manganna Shetty* (1910), 34 Mad. 1.

⁷ Act XX. of 1863, s. 9. See standing orders of Madras Board of Revenue, Vol. I. chap. vi.

⁸ *Post*, p. 591.

⁹ *Tiruvengadu Ayyangar v. Rangayyengar* (1882), 6 Mad. 114.

shall be elected to fill the vacancy by the persons interested as above provided. The remaining members of the committee shall, as soon as possible, give public notice of such vacancy, and shall fix a day which shall not be later than three months from the date of such vacancy for an election of a new member by the persons interested as above provided, under rules for elections which shall be framed by the Local Government; and whoever shall be then elected under the said rules shall be a member of the committee to fill such vacancy. If any vacancy as aforesaid shall not be filled up by such election as aforesaid within three months after it has occurred, the Civil Court, on the application of any person whatever, may appoint a person to fill the vacancy, or may order the vacancy to be forthwith filled up by the remaining members of the committee, with which order it shall then be the duty of such remaining members to comply, and if this order be not complied with, the Civil Court may appoint a member to fill the said vacancy.¹

When the number is reduced to less than three, it has been held that the remaining members cannot perform any of the functions of the original committee.²

The Judge may appoint a new committee when the memberships are all vacant.³

There is no appeal from the exercise of the power given to the District Judge by this section,⁴ but the matter can be dealt with by the High Court on revision.⁵

No member of committee to be trustee, etc., of mosque, etc., under charge of such committee.

Transfer of property to committee.

No member of a committee can be or act also as a trustee, manager, or superintendent of the mosque, temple, or other religious establishment for the management of which such committee may have been appointed.

On the appointment of the committee the property of the endowment was to be transferred to the committee.⁶ All the

¹ As to the construction of this section, see *Vasudeva Aiyar v. Negapatam Devasthanam Committee* (1913), 38 Mad. 594 (upheld on appeal, 21·5·17).

² *Sanihalva v. Manjanna Shetty* (1910), 34 Mad. 1; differed from in *Siharama Chetty v. Subramania Iyer* (Sir S.) (1915), 39 Mad. 700, and in *Raghunandan Ramamuja Das v. Bikkuti Bhusan Mukerjee* (1911), 39 Cal. 304. See *Muhammad Hasan (Syed) v. Nazar Muhammad* (1916), 1 Pat. L. J. 437.

³ *Mahomed Athor (Syed) v. Sultan*

(1900), 4 C. W. N. 527.

⁴ *Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subraminaya Sastri* (1887), 14 I. A. 160; 11 Mad. 26.

⁵ *Vasudeva Aiyar v. Negapatam Devasthanam Committee* (1913), 38 Mad. 594. A contrary view was entertained in *Subbier v. Abhoy Naidu* (1915), 18 Mad. L. J. 671.

⁶ I.e. the property which was actually in the possession of the Board of Revenue when the Act was passed, *Ponduranga v. Nagappa* (1889), 12 Mad. 366, at p. 368.

powers which might be exercised by any Board of Revenue or local agent for the recovery of the rent of land or other property so transferred can be exercised by the committee.¹

The Act does not detail the powers and duties of the committee. They have apparently general powers of superintendence and control over the affairs of the endowment.² In exercising such general control, it is an unquestionable duty of theirs to see that the rents payable to the institutions are punctually collected and all steps legally necessary for their collection are duly taken. In the performance of this duty, however, the procedure to be observed by them is to get the managers to make the collection and perform all acts necessary for the purpose.³ Taking leases in their own name, though not regular, is not absolutely illegal.⁴

The duty of a *devasthanam* committee consists, primarily, in seeing that its endowments are appropriated to their legitimate purposes and are not wasted. It is not a part of the duty of such a committee to interfere with the trustees in matters relating to ritual.⁵

The committee cannot alter the constitution of the temple management established by the Board, and appoint additional trustees where some or all of the trustees are hereditary. The Act does not confer on the committee power, except for good and sufficient cause, to add to the number of trustees sanctioned under an existing scheme even if such trustees are not hereditary.⁶

They may appoint ~~new~~ trustees when there is no hereditary trustee to add to the existing trustees, but this power, though discretionary, must, as in the case of all powers exercised by them, be exercised reasonably and in good faith, and may be controlled by a Civil Court of original jurisdiction.⁷

The committee, or at least a majority thereof,⁸ has power to dismiss trustees and superintendents of temples and of pagodas⁹ or to suspend them¹⁰ for due cause and for due cause only.¹¹ Such dismissal must be at a meeting and after something like a judicial inquiry.¹²

The procedure of committees should be governed by the rules applicable to regular corporations.¹³

¹ Act XX. of 1863, s. 12.

² See *Kaliyanaramayyar v. Mustak Shah Sahib* (1896), 19 Mad. 395, at p. 396.

³ See *Kaliyanaramayyar v. Mustak Shah Sahib* (1896), 19 Mad. 395, at p. 397.

⁴ Revenue applied to the support of a temple.

⁵ *Tiruvengadath Ayyangar v. Srivasa Thathachariar* (1899), 22 Mad. 361.

⁶ *Ganapathi Ayyar v. Vedavyasa Alasinga Bhattar (Sr)* (1906), 29 Mad. 534.

⁷ *Davud Saiba (Shenkh) v. Hussein Saiba* (1893), 17 Mad. 212; *Tiruvengadath Aiyangar v. Ponnappiengar*

(1914), 38 Mad. 1176; Act II. of 1882 (Trusts), s. 49.

⁸ *Pandarungy Annachariyar v Iyathory Mudaly* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 443.

⁹ *Chinna Rangasiyangar v. Subbraya Mudali* (1867), 3 Mad. H. C. 334.

¹⁰ *Seshadri Ayyangar v. Nataraja Ayyar* (1898), 21 Mad. 179.

¹¹ Cases cited in *Bhima Rout v. Dasarathi Dass* (1912), 40 Calo. 323, at pp. 333, 334.

¹² *Thandavaraya v. Subbayyar* (1899), 23 Mad. 483.

¹³ *Anantanarayana Ayyar v. Kuttalam Pillai* (1899), 22 Mad. 481. As to a quorum, see *ibid*.

Suits.

They can without leave institute such suits as may be necessary for enforcing their powers,¹ but the trustee or manager is the person who is entitled to bring suits for the property.²

Possession of property.

The committee is not entitled to possession of the property of the endowment.³

Endowments not vested in Government.

Such committee has no power over trustees of endowments, the appointment of whom is not vested in Government.⁴

Accounts of receipts and disbursements.

The Act further provided—

“Section 13.—It shall be the duty of every trustee, manager, and superintendent of a mosque, temple, or religious establishment to which the provisions of this Act shall apply, to keep regular accounts of his receipts and disbursements in respect of the endowments and expenses of such mosque, temple, or other religious establishment, and it shall be the duty of every committee of management appointed or acting under authority of this Act to require from every trustee, manager, and superintendent of such mosque, temple, or other religious establishment the production of such regular accounts of such receipts and disbursements, at least once in every year, and every such committee of management shall themselves keep such accounts thereof.”

Failure to submit accounts to the committee justifies the dismissal of the trustee.⁵

Persons interested may singly sue in case of breach of trust, etc.

“Section 14.—Any person or persons interested in any mosque, temple, or religious establishment, or in the performance of the worship or of the service thereof, or of the trusts relating thereto may, without joining as plaintiff any of the other persons interested therein, sue before the Civil Court, the trustees,⁶ manager, or superintendent of such mosque, temple,⁷ or religious establishment, or the member of any committee appointed under this Act, for any misfeasance, breach of trust,

¹ See *Venkatasu Naidu v. Sadagopasamy Iyer* (1869), 4 Mad. H. C. 404.

² *Sanlamurti Mudaliar v. Chidambaram Nadan* (1893), 17 Mad 143.

³ *Ponduranga v. Nagappa* (1889), 12 Mad. 366.

⁴ *Venkatabala Krishna Chelthiyar v. Kaliyannaramaiah* (1869), 5 Mad. H. C. 48; *Ramiengar v. Gnasumbanda Pandarasannada* (1867), *ibid.* 53.

⁵ *Anantanarayana Ayyar v. Kuttalun Pillar* (1899), 22 Mad. 481.

⁶ Even if he be an hereditary trustee, *Natesa v. Ganapati* (1890), 14 Mad. 103; *Fakurudin Sahib v. Acken Sahib* (1880), 2 Mad. 197.

⁷ This would include a *de facto*, as well as a *de jure* manager or superintendent, see *Muhammad Siraj-ul-haq v. Imam-ud-din* (1896), 19 All. 104, but would have no application to a mere trespasser,

or neglect of duty committed by such trustee,¹ manager, superintendent, or member of such committee² in respect of the trusts vested in or confided to them respectively, and the Civil Court may direct the specific performance of any act by such trustee, manager, superintendent, or member of a committee, and may decree damages and costs against such trustee, manager, superintendent, or member of a committee, and may also direct the removal of such trustee, manager, superintendent, or member of a committee.”

This section is not confined to those endowments the nomination to which has been exercised by or had vested in the Board of Revenue under the above Regulations.³ It is generally applicable to all public religious endowments, whenever created,⁴ to which the above-named Regulations would have been applicable, if they had not been repealed to the extent that they have been repealed. In one case⁵ it was held that this section, although in its terms it appears to be more general than the earlier sections, applies in fact only to the same religious trusts to which the rest of the Act applies.⁶

Suits under this section can only be brought against the persons described in the section.⁷ A suit under the section cannot be brought against a person to whom the manager has by a breach of trust transferred the property of the endowment.⁸ The suit is personal and abates on the death of the defendant.⁹

Against whom
suit can be
brought
under Act.

The suit may be brought in *forma pauperis*.¹⁰

Pauper suit.
Further relief.

Provided that the cause of action be as specified in the section, it is competent to the Court in such suit to give such relief beyond the relief specified in the section, as may be ancillary to the relief specified, as, for instance, to appoint new trustees and frame a scheme,¹¹ or to make a

¹ See *Eluyalour Reddiar v. Namburumal Chettiar* (1899), 23 Mad 298.

² The appointment of a Sivite to be trustee of a Vishnuvite temple is not a breach of trust by the committee, *Gandavathera Ayyangar v. Devanayyudu Mudali* (1883), 7 Mad. 222.

³ *Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Paragash* (1896), 18 All. 227, at p. 231, differing from *Raghubar Dial v. Kesho Ramanuj Das* (1888), 11 All. 18 at p. 23; *Ganes Sing v. Ramgopal Sing* (1870), 5 B. L. R. App. 55, and cases ante, p. 585.

⁴ *Sivayya v. Rami Reddi* (1899), 22 Mad. 223; *Saturluri Seetaramanuja Charyulu v. Nanduri Seetapati* (1902), 26 Mad. 166; *Dhurrum Singh Mohunt v. Kissen Singh* (1881), 7 Cal. 767, at p. 770; 9 C. L. R. 410, at p. 413;

Muhammad Suraj-ul-Haq v. Imam-ud-din (1896), 19 All. 104; *Mahomed Athar v. Ramjan Khan* (1907), 34 Cal. 587; *Fakurudin Sahib v. Ackens Sahib* (1880), 2 Mad. 197. See, however, *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundul* (1881), 8 Cal. 32; 9 C. L. R. 433.

⁵ *Kalee Churn Guri v. Holabi* (1878), 2 C. L. R. 128, at p. 131, following *Panchcouric Mull v. Chumroolull* (1878), 3 Cal. 563; 2 C. L. R. 121.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 585.

⁷ See *ante*, p. 590, notes 6, 7.

⁸ *Sivayya v. Rami Reddi* (1899), 22 Mad. 223.

⁹ *Bhama Rout v. Daswathi Dass* (1912), 40 Cal. 323.

¹⁰ *Gurusami Chelli v. Krishnasami Naikar* (1901), 24 Mad. 419.

¹¹ *Narayana Ayyar v. Kumarasami Mudaliar* (1899), 23 Mad. 537; see,

declaration that property belongs to an institution,¹ or to deprive the defendants of the trusteeship or a right of puja,² or to restrain the superintendents from removing a holy book from the temple.³

The Court can, when directing the removal of a trustee, order a person competent to appoint a new trustee to make such appointment and to direct the trustee removed to surrender possession of property and pay any damages decreed to the new trustee to be appointed.⁴

Nature of order.

Grounds of removal.

An order under s. 14 should be mandatory, not merely prohibitory.⁵

Merely error of judgment does not disqualify a member of a *devasthanam* committee. To justify the removal of such an office-holder, it must be shown that the further holding by him of the office is incompatible with the interests of the temple under the charge of the committee of which he is a member.⁶ Cf. *ante*, p. 580.

The Act has no application to any suits other than those specified in s. 14,⁷ as, for instance—

Suits to which Act has no application.

(a) A suit to establish a right to share in the management of a temple.⁸

(b) A suit brought by the *dharmakarta* of a temple and one of its worshippers to compel the defendant as heir of the late manager to make good out of the property inherited by him the deficiency in the *Devasthanam* funds caused by breach of trust and misappropriation by the late manager.⁹

(c) A suit for the removal of a *mohunt*, and for the appointment of the plaintiff in his place.¹⁰

(d) A suit by a temple officer for wrongful dismissal.¹¹

(e) A suit for recovery of trust property¹² from a transferee even where the transaction amounted to a breach of trust.¹³

however, *Piotap Chandina Misser v. Brojonath Misser* (1891), 19 Cal. 275. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the Court has under this section power to appoint a trustee. In *Svayya v. Rami Reddi* (1899), 22 Mad. 223, at p. 227, Sheppard, J., considered that such power did not exist. In *Shcoralan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash* (1892), 18 All. 227, at p. 232, the Allahabad High Court held that the Court had such power. It is submitted that on the removal of a manager or trustee in a suit brought under this section the person ordinarily entitled to nominate a successor does not lose his right, but that in case of his refusing or neglecting to exercise such right the Court would have to make an appointment.

¹ *Muhammad Jafar v. Muhammad Ibrahim* (1900), 24 Mad. 243

² *Natesa v. Ganapati* (1890), 14 Mad. 103; in that case the suspension was withdrawn on terms.

³ *Dhurrum Singh v. Kissen Singh* (1881), 7 Cal. 767; 9 C. L. R. 410.

⁴ *Miyaji v. Ahmed Sahib (Sheikh)* (1908), 31 Mad. 212; *Gyana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Kandasami Tambiran* (1887), 10 Mad. 375, at p. 508.

⁵ *Dhurrum Singh v. Kissen Singh* (1881), 7 Cal. 767; 9 C. L. R. 410.

⁶ *Tiruvengadath Ayyangar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar* (1899), 22 Mad. 361.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 590, 591.

⁸ *Agri Sharma Embrandri v. Vistnu Embrandri* (1866), 3 Mad. H. C. 198.

⁹ *Y. K. K. A. M. R. C. Jeyangarulavaru v. Hathi E. M. M. Durma Dossji (Sri)* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 2.

¹⁰ *Kishore Bose Mohunt v. Kalee Churn Gree* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 364.

¹¹ *Amin Sahib (Syed) v. Ibrahim Sahib* (1868), 4 Mad. H. C. 112.

¹² *Mahalinga Rau v. Veraba Ghosami* (1881), 4 Mad. 157; *Virasami Nayudu v. Subba Rau* (1882), 6 Mad. 54.

¹³ *Svayya v. Rami Reddi* (1899), 22 Mad. 223.

(f) A claim as beneficiary under a deed of trust to a specified share which had been allotted to the claimant thereby.¹

(g) A claim by the settlor claiming possession of the property on the ground that the trust had not been carried out.²

"The Act,³ while it empowered persons to sue whose right to sue independently of the Act may be doubtful, did not deprive any one of the right to sue, which he may have independently of the Act."⁴

Suit independent of the Act.

Section 15.—"The interest required in order to entitle a person to sue under the last preceding section need not be a pecuniary or a direct or immediate interest, or such an interest as would entitle the person suing to take any part in the management or superintendence of the trusts.⁵ Any person having a right of attendance, or having been in the habit of attending at the performance of the worship or service of any mosque, temple, or religious establishment, or of partaking in the benefit of any distribution of alms, shall be deemed to be a person interested within the meaning of the last preceding section."⁶

Nature of interest entitling person to sue.

The Court has power to refer to arbitration matters in difference⁷ in suits or proceedings instituted under the Act.⁸

Reference to arbitration.

Section 18 (as amended by Act VII. of 1870) is as follows: "No suit shall be entertained under this Act without a preliminary application being first made to the Court for leave to institute such suit."

Application for leave to institute suit.

The Court on the perusal of the application shall determine whether there are sufficient *prima facie* grounds for the institution of a suit, and, if in the judgment of the Court there are such grounds, leave shall be given for its institution.

"If the Court shall be of opinion that the suit has been for the benefit of the trust, and⁹ that no party to the suit is in

Costs.

¹ *Kalub Hossein (Hajee) v. Mehru Beebee (Mussumat)* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 155.

² *Hidayat-oon-nissa v. Afzul Hossein (Syud)* (1870), 2 N. W. P. 420.

³ XX. of 1863.

⁴ *Kalub Hossein (Hajee) v. Mehru Beebee (Mussumat)* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 155, at p. 158; *Narayana Ayyar v. Kumarasami Mudaliar* (1899), 23 Mad. 537; *Puddolab Roy v. Ram Gopal Chatterjee* (1882), 9 Calc. 133; 11 C. L. R. 33.

⁵ See *Doyal Chund Mullick v.*

Kerumut Ali (1869), 12 W. R. C. R. 382.

⁶ *Narayana Ayyar v. Kumarasami Mudaliar* (1899), 23 Mad. 537.

⁷ But not the whole suit, *Karedla Vijayaraghava Perumalayya Naidu v. Yemavarapu Sitaramayya* (1902), 26 Mad. 361.

⁸ Act XX. of 1863, ss. 16, 17. *Perumal Nair v. Saminatha Pillai* (1896), 19 Mad. 498.

⁹ This does not mean "or:" *Nurendro Narayan Roy v. Ishan Chunder Sen* (1874), 22 W. R. C. R. 22.

fault, the Court may order the costs or such portion as it may consider just to be paid out of the estate."

Verification.	An application for leave to sue should be duly verified and presented either by the applicant in person or by his pleader. ¹
Notice.	It is not necessary to give notice to the person whom it is intended to sue. ²
Inquiries.	When sanction is given to two persons one cannot sue alone. ³ A District Judge acting under s. 18 of Act XX. of 1863 can make inquiries, and is not bound to decide on a bare perusal of the application for leave to sue. ⁴ If the suit instituted differs materially from the suit for which sanction was given, the plaint may properly be rejected. ⁵
Appeal.	No appeal lies from an order giving or refusing leave made under s. 18. ⁶
Suits in High Court.	It has been held that these sections do not apply to a suit brought under the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court, ⁷ and that therefore no sanction is necessary for such suit.
Court may require accounts of trust to be filed.	Section 19.—"Before giving leave for institution of a suit or after leave has been given, before any other proceeding is taken, or at any time when the suit is pending, the Court may order the trustee, manager, or superintendent or any member of a committee, as the case may be, to file in Court the accounts of the trust or such part thereof as to the Court may seem necessary."
Criminal proceedings.	Neither the Act nor any proceedings thereunder exclude the ordinary criminal law. ⁸

¹ *Amdoo Miyan v. Muhammad Davud Khan Bahadur* (1901), 24 Mad. 686.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Venkatesha Malia v. Ramaya Hegade* (1914), 38 Mad. 1192.

⁴ *Ramanathan Chelhar v. Ananihanarayana Aiyar* (1909), 33 Mad. 412.

⁵ *Srinivasa v. Venkata* (1887), 11 Mad. 148.

⁶ *Civil Revision Petition 101 of 1882*, 10 Mad. 98, note; *In re Venkateswara* (1886), 10 Mad. 98; *Kaviraja Sundara Murtiya Pillai v. Nalla Naikan Pillai* (1866), 3 Mad. 93; *Kalub Hossein (Hajee) v. Ali Hossein* (1872), 4 N. W. P. 3; *Delrus Banoo Begum v. Abdur Ruhman (Hajee)* (1874), 21 W. R. C. R. 368; *Protap Chandra Misser v. Brojonath Misser*

(1891), 19 Calc. 275; *Kazem Ali v. Azim Ali Khan* (1891), 18 Calc. 382; *Mozaffer Ali v. Hedayet Hossain* (1907), 34 Calc. 584. As to an appeal from an order for costs, see *Ramakissoor Dossji v. Sriranga Charlu* (1898), 21 Mad. 421.

⁷ *Annasami Pillai v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar* (1900), 24 Mad. 219, at pp. 231, 232; see *Panchcouriie Mull v. Chumroolall* (1878), 3 Calc. 563; 2 C. L. R. 121. If the case comes within the terms of the section, and the endowment be one to which the Act applies, there seems to be no reason why the section should not apply even to a suit brought in a Presidency town.

⁸ (1876), 1 Mad. 55. Act XX. of 1863, s. 20.

Section 21.—“In any case in which any land or other property has been granted for the support of an establishment partly of a religious and partly of a secular character, or in which the endowment made for the support of an establishment is appropriated partly to religious and partly to secular uses the Board of Revenue, before transferring to any trustee, manager, or superintendent, or to any committee of management appointed under this Act, shall determine what portion, if any, of the said land or other property shall remain under the superintendence of the said Board for application to secular uses, and what portion shall be transferred to the superintendence of the trustee, manager, or superintendent, or of the committee, and also what annual amount, if any, shall be charged on the land or other property which may be so transferred to the superintendence of the said trustee, manager, or superintendent, or of the committee, and made payable to the said Board or the local agents for secular uses as aforesaid. In every such case the provisions of this Act shall take effect only in respect to such land and other property as may be so transferred.”

Endowments partly for religious and partly for secular purposes.

Section 22.—“Except as provided in this Act, it shall not be lawful for any Government in India, or for any officer of any Government in his official character to undertake or resume the superintendence of any land or other property granted for the support of, or otherwise belonging to, any mosque, temple, or other religious establishment, or to take any part in the management or appropriation of any endowment made for the maintenance of any such mosque, temple, or other religious establishment, or to nominate or appoint any trustee, manager, or superintendent thereof, or to be in any way concerned therewith.”¹

Government not to hold charge of property for support of mosque, temple, etc.

There is also power given by the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890,² to the Local Government on the application of the person acting in the administration of a trust for a charitable purpose, or his executor or administrator or of a person proposing to apply property in trust for such a purpose, to vest the property in the Treasurer of Charitable Endowments;³ but

Charitable Endowments Act.

¹ Such appointment, if made, is void, see *Mahomed v. Ganapati* (1889), 13 Mad. 277.

² Act VI. of 1890.

³ *Ibid.*, s. 6.

such treasurer cannot, as such, act in the administration of the trust.¹

Coorg.

As to the management of temple funds in Coorg, see the Coorg Temple Funds Management Regulation, 1892 (IV. of 1892).

¹ Act VI. of 1890, s. 8.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT. *See* RELINQUISHMENT
of worldly affairs, 361, 375, 415
by female owner, 491

ABATEMENT OF SUIT,
by widow, 513

ABSENT COPARCENER, right on partition, 330, 331

ACCOUNT,
right of adopted son, 200
by manager of family, 272-274
in partition suit, 354, 355, 356
by manager of endowment, 566, 590, 594

ACKNOWLEDGMENT,
by manager, 277
by widow, 472

ACCRETIONS,
to coparcenary property, 246
to separate property, 254

ACCUMULATIONS,
by female owner, 474, 475
direction in will, 542

ACQUIESCENCE. *See* CONSENT
adoption, 174
alienation, 306

ACQUISITION. *See* SEPARATE PROPERTY
by family, 240, 246

ACTS. *See* LIST, pp. xcvi.-civ.
altering Hindu law, 21
recognizing custom, 28

ADDITIONS to estate by female owner, 474

ADHIVEDANIKA, 437

ADHYAGNIKA STRIDHANA, 436

ADHYAVAHANIKA STRIDHANA, 436

ADMINISTRATION, LETTERS OF,
heir need not take out, 362
Probate and Administration Act, 545

ADMINISTRATOR, powers of guardian when, 287

ADOPTED SON. *See* ADOPTION

marriage, 44, 45

power to dispute acts of widow, 199-201

alienations, 199-201

account of profits, 200, 201

marriage and adoption in natural family, 44, 45, 201

gift to person erroneously described as adopted, 204, 205

comparison with illegitimate son, 385

ADOPTION, Chap. III. *See* ADOPTED SON, KRITRIMA ADOPTION

application of Hindu Law, 3

as a *palaka putra*, 100

according to the *dattaka* form, 100 *et seq.*

definition, 101

necessity for, 101, 102

Jams, 102

motive, 102

custom prohibiting, 102

agreement not to adopt, 102, 103

of girl, 103

who may adopt, 103 *et seq.*

pregnancy of wife, 104

incapacity of son, 104

missing son, 105

death of son, 105

consent of son, 105, 106

bachelor or widow, 106

minor, 106-108

by two persons, 108

Courts of Wards, 108, 109

by disqualified person, 109, 110

change of religion or degradation, 110

impurity, 110, 111

ascetic, 111

assent of wife, 111, 112

by woman, 112

Permission to adopt, 112 *et seq.*

by disqualified person, 113

only to wife, 113

form, 114

registration, 114

revocation, 114, 115

to several widows, 115

absolute, 116

conditional, 116

contingent, 116, 117

restricted, 116

strict construction, 117

specification of boy, 117

motive of widow, 118

Adoption by widow, 118 *et seq.*

differences between schools, 118, 119

Bengal school, 119

ADOPTION—*continued*adoption by widow—*continued*

Benares school, 119

Jains, 119, 120

Dravida school, 120-124

consent of kinsmen, 120-124

nature of consent, 123

gifts, 123

senior widow, 124

Maharasthra school, 124-126

only son, 125

undivided family, 126

more than one widow, 126

Mithila school, 126

Punjab, 126

minor widow, 126, 127

when widow can adopt, 127

mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, 128

time for exercise of power, 128, 129

successive adoptions, 129, 130

termination of power, 130, 131

loss of power, 131, 132

remarriage, 132

unchastity, 132

impurity, 132

only when husband could adopt, 132, 133

no obligation to adopt, 133

covenant not to adopt, 134

who may give in adoption, 134-137

delegation, 136

by minor, 136, 137

abandonment of Hinduism, 137

remarriage, 137

who may be adopted, 138-149

relationship of adopter and mother, 138-145

Sudras, 144

relationship of adopting mother to father, 144, 145

no restriction as to generation, 145

Punjab, 145

Jains, 145

from adoptive family, 145

only son, 145

age, 146-148

orphan, 148

boy previously adopted, 148

personal defects, 148

simultaneous adoptions, 149

act of adoption, 149-155

giving and taking, 149, 150

writing, 150

consent of Government, 150

consideration, 151

conditional gift, 151

mental capacity, 151, 152

fraud, etc., 152

ADOPTION—*continued*

- act of adoption—*continued*
 - assent of boy, 153
 - religious ceremonies, 153–155
 - delegation, 155
- requirements of valid adoption, 156
 - subsequent event, 156
 - consent of reversioner, 156, 157
- cancellation or renunciation, 157
- Kritrima adoption, 157–160
 - who can adopt, 158
 - who may be adopted, 158, 159
 - consent, 159
 - ceremonies, 159
 - revocation, 160
- Gyawals, 160
- illatom* adoption, 160, 161
- Malabar law, 161, 162
- Nambudris, 121, 161, 162
- of girl by dancing-girls and prostitutes, 163, 164
- disputes as to, 164–167
 - who entitled to dispute, 164
- injunction, 164, *note 3*; 166, 167
- declaratory decree, 164–166
- suit to determine right to take, 166
- specific performance of agreement, 167
- who is bound by decision, 167, 168
- limitation to declare adoption invalid, 168–170
 - valid, 170
- adverse possession, 170
- election, 170, 171
- burden of proof, 171, 172
- estoppel, 172, 173
- mode of proof, 174, 175
- acquiescence, 174
- treatment by relations, 175
- probabilities, 176, 177
- presumption as to permission, 177
- proof of ceremonies, 177
- RESULTS OF DATTAKA ADOPTION, Chap. IV.
 - operates as affiliation, 178
 - rights date from adoption, 178
 - guardianship, 179
 - survivorship, 179
 - inheritance, 179–182
 - rights on attaining possession, 180
 - title or honour, 181
 - adopted son of disqualified man, 182
 - descendants, 182
 - rights, 186
 - father's powers not altered, 186
 - will, 186, 187
 - arrangement on adoption, 184–187
 - coparcenary property, 184
 - effect of birth of son, 187, 188

ADOPTION—*continued*

- competition with other relations, 187, 188
- renunciation or waiver of rights, 188
- exclusion from natural family, 189
- property vested before adoption, 189, 190
- Dvyamushyayana*, 190–193
- vesting and divesting of estate, 193–199, 362, 363, 387
- consent to divesting, 197
- rights of survivorship, 198
- power to dispute acts of widow, 199–201
- acts of widow, 199, 200
- account, 200
- alienation by father, 201
- marriage and adoption, 44, 45, 201
- effect of *Kritrima* adoption, 201, 202
 - invalid adoption, 202–205
 - arrangement, 204
 - gift to person erroneously described as adopted, 204, 205

ADULTERY,

- does not effect divorce, 64
- of wife, 69
- of husband, 71
- suit for damages, 74
- loss of maintenance, 78

ADVERSE POSSESSION,

- claims under adoption, 170
- against joint family, 234
- effect on separate property, 246
- by female owner, 440, 509
- against female owner, 509
- against manager of endowment, 567

AFFINITY, restrictions on intermarriage, 44

AGE. *See* ADOPTION, MAJORITY, MARRIAGE

- for investiture with thread, 35, *note* 9
- adoption, 146–148

AGREEMENT,

- between husband and wife, 65
- for maintenance, 89
- not to adopt, 102, 103
- at time of adoption, 184–186
- at invalid adoption, 204
- not to partition, 325

AJMERE, Hindu law administered in, 5

ALIENATION. *See* MANAGER, MORTGAGE, SALE, TRANSFER, WOMAN

- by female owner, 199, 200, 478 *et seq.*
- by coparcener other than manager, 298
- of share of joint property, 299–302
- setting aside, 304–370
- by son to avoid debt of father, 322

ALIENATION—*continued*

equities on setting aside, 303, 307, 513

right of Crown, 514

of endowed property, 573, 574

of worship, etc., 573

ALIMENT. *See* MAINTENANCE

ALTERATION of order for maintenance, 97, 98

ANCESTRAL PROPERTY, 223. *See* COPARCENARY PROPERTYANCESTRAL TRADE. *See* FAMILY TRADEANCIENT. *See* CUSTOM

ANITYA DITYAMUSHYAYANA, 192

ANNA CHATRA, bequest for, 551

ANWADEYIKA STRIDHANA,

described, 437

inheritance according to Mayukha, 452

Smriti Chandrika, 455

Bengal school, 459, 460

APAVIDDHA, 101

APPLICATION,

of proceeds of alienation, 292, 294

APPOINTED DAUGHTER, 100

APRATIBANDHADAYA, 241

APPOINTMENT, POWER OF, 540

ARBITRATION,

powers of manager, 277

ARRANGEMENT. *See* AGREEMENT

ARREARS of maintenance, 94, 95

ARSHA MARRIAGE, 54

ASCETIC,

adoption by, 104

inheritance to, 415, 416

ASSAM, Hindu law administered in, 4

ASSOCIATED BROTHER, 391, 414, 427

ASTHAL. *See* MUTT

ASURA MARRIAGE, 54, 55

inheritance to *stridhana*, 451, 454, 455, 456, 460

ATMA BANDHUS, 400

order of succession, 401-407

descendants preferred, 402

ATTACHMENT,

- of maintenance, 84
- of share of joint property, 299-301
- of endowed property, 567
- of right of management or worship, 574, 575

ATTESTATION by reversioner, 489

AURASA SON, 100

- of will, 544

AYAUTAKA STRIDHANA, defined, 435

AWARD based on necessity, 495

BABUANA GRANT, 263, 265

BACHELOR, adoption by, 106

BANDHUS. See ATMA, MATRI, PITRI

- defined, 379, 397, 398
- according to Mitakshara, 398-400
 - who inherit, 398-400
 - mutual *sapinda* relationship, 400
 - rule of exclusion, 399, 400
 - kinds of, 400
 - order of succession, 401, 402
- Mayukha, 402
- Bengal school, 420

BENARES SCHOOL, 13

- works of authority, 16, 17
- adoption, 119

BENGAL, Hindu law administered in, 4

BENGAL SCHOOL, 12. See COPARCENERS, COPARCENARY PROPERTY, SAPINDAS

- works of authority, 14, 15
- difference from Mitakshara school, 20, 21
- adoption, 119
- to what property inheritance applies, 362
- inheritance to males, Chap. XII.
- stridhana*, 457-462
- impartible estate, 519

BEQUEST. See DEVISE, WILL

- separate property, 251

BETROTHAL,

- Hindu law administered, 3-5
- marriage after, 37
- death of girl, 59

BIGAMY. See MARRIAGE, REMARRIAGE

- convert to Christianity, 23, note 6 ; 36
- Brahmo Somaj, 36, note 2
- of woman, 36, 37

BIHAR. Hindu law administered. 4

BIRTH,

rights vested by, under Mitakshara, 20, 225
when devests inheritance, 363, 387, 424
of son to disqualified person, 374

BLINDNESS,

adoption, 109
exclusion from coparcenership, 228, 229
inheritance, 370-372

BOMBAY,

female heirs, 410-413
then powers, 451

BOMBAY PRESIDENCY, Hindu law administered in, 4

BRAMACHARI, 415, 416

BRAHMA MARRIAGE, 54, 450, 453, 460
presumption, 62, 63, 450, 453

BRAHMINS, 22

gift to, by widow, 481

BRAHMOS,

marriage, 36, *note* 2 ; 58
adoption, 148

BREACH OF PROMISE of marriage, 59

BRITISH BELUCHISTAN, Hindu law administered in, 5

BROTHER,

right to give in marriage, 47
adoption, 136
adoption of, 143
partition, 338
inheritance, Mitakshara school, 390, 391
half blood, 390, 391
Mayukha, 391
associated before unassociated, 391, 414, 415
reunited, 399
Bengal school, 422, 426, 427
undivided before divided, 427
half blood, 427
inheritance to maiden's property, 447
stridhana, Mitakshara school, 451
Sulka, 447
Smriti Chandrika, 455
Mithila school, 456
Bengal school, 459, 460

BROTHER'S DAUGHTER,

Bombay, 411
Madras, 413
powers over property, Bombay, 467

BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 404

BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 364, 366

Mitakshara, 402

Bengal school, 421, 429, 430

BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 403

BROTHER'S SON,

take *per capita*, 367

Mayukha, 391, 394

Mitakshara, 391

half, competition with sister in Bombay, 410

Bengal school, 422, 428

stridhana, Bengal school, 461

BROTHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER,

Bengal, 428

Bombay, 411

powers, 467

BROTHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 366

Mitakshara, 402

Bengal school, 429, 430

BROTHER'S SON'S SON,

Mitakshara, 392

Bengal school, 428

BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,

Mitakshara, 394

Bengal school, 428

BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 394

BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 394

BROTHER'S SON'S WIDOW, in Bombay, 412

BROTHER'S WIDOW, 364

Bombay, 413

Madras, 456

BURDEN OF PROOF. *See* CUSTOM, PRESUMPTION

suit for maintenance, 83, 84

adoption, 171, 172, 177

joint family, 220-223

disqualification, 228, 229, 373

separate property, 254-259

change of property by treatment, 258

property acquired from savings of impartible estate, 262

sale or charge by manager, 293-295

by female heir, 478, 510-512

reunion, 360

BURMA, Hindu law administered in, 5

BUSINESS. *See* FAMILY TRADE

CANCELLATION of adoption, 157

CASTE. *See* CUSTOM

application of Hindu law, 3

questions of, 5-8

principal castes, 22, 23

indentity in marriage, 38, 39

adoption, 138

loss of, 23

desertion, 69, 70

by son, adoption, 104, 105

by adopting father, 110

guardianship, 216

effect on inheritance, 374, 375

CENTRAL PROVINCES, Hindu law administered in, 5

CEREMONIES. *See* RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES

marriage, 58-61

adoption, 149-155

burden of proof, 177

CERTIFICATE, succession of reversioner, 508

CHANGE OF RELIGION. *See* RELIGION, CHANGE OF, RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES

effect on coparcenary, 350

inheritance, 374, 375

CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS. *See* ENDOWMENTS

bequest to, 539, 540

CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTS ACT, 595

CHARITABLE PURPOSES,

alienation by woman for, 480

bequest for, 540, 550

CHASTITY. *See* UNCHASTITY

CHILDREN,

legitimate, 99

illegitimate, 99

presumption as to legitimacy, 99

CHRISTIANS,

effect of conversion, 25

succession, 25

on coparcenary, 350

polygamy, 36

CLASS, gift to, in gift or will, 534, 535

CODES, 11

COERCION, adoption, 152

COMMENTARIES, 12, 14-20

COMMITTEES,

- of religious endowments, 586-589
- suits against, 590, 591

“COMPACT” SERIES OF HEIRS, 391, 392

COMPENSATION, on setting aside alienation, 307, 315

COMPROMISE,

- property acquired by, 241
- by manager, 277
- by female owner, 495, 496

CONCUBINE, maintenance of, 85

CONDITION.

- on adoption, 116, 184-187
- repugnant, in gift or will, 532, 533

CONDITIONAL ADOPTION, 116

- conditional gift, 151

CONDITIONAL MARRIAGE, 60, 61

CONDONATION of marital offence, 70

CONJUGAL RIGHTS. *See* RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTSCONSENT. *See* ACQUIESCENCE

- of son to adoption, 105, 156, 157
- of kinsmen to adoption, 121-124, 126
- of person adopted, 153
- of giver and taker, 152
- to invalid adoption, 156, 157
- to divesting on adoption, 197
- to alienation by manager, 283, 293, 306
- of reversioners to alienation, 200, 486-490
 - form of, 489
 - mortgage, 487

CONSTRUCTION,

- of permission to adopt, 117
- of wills, 528-530

CONSUMMATION,

- not necessary to validity of marriage, 61
- restitution of conjugal rights, 70

CONTINGENT PERMISSION to adopt, 116

CONTRACT,

- application of Hindu law, 8
- payment to guardian for marriage, 5, 52
- by wife, 75

CONTRIBUTION, 234

COPARCENARY PROPERTY. *See* SEPARATE PROPERTY, IMPARTIBLE
PROPERTY, MANAGER OF JOINT FAMILY
right of adopted son, 184

COPARCENARY PROPERTY—*continued*

- what is, 223, 238-248
 - common interest, 237, 238
 - joint transfer, 239
 - acquisitions by family, 239, 240, 245
 - gift or devise, 240
 - acquired by compromise, 241
 - maternal grandfather's property, 241-243
 - unobstructed heritage, 241, 242
 - share on partition, 244
 - gift or devise by father 244
 - reunited coparceners, 245
 - property treated as, 245
 - accrutions, 246
 - slight or indirect aid, 246-248
- coparcenary as regards some coparceners only, 248
- endowed property, 248
- held by or in name of coparcener, 251-255
- management and disposal, Chap. VII.
- application of proceeds, 266
- payments, 266
- transactions, 266, 267
- no inheritance to, 361, 362

COPARCENERS. *See* COPARCENARY PROPERTY, JOINT FAMILY, LIMITATION
SEPARATE PROPERTY

- who are, 223-230
 - Bengal school, 223, 224
 - power of disposition, 224, 225
 - effect of death, 237
 - Mitakshara school, 225-228
 - interest of son, 225, 226
 - illegitimate sons, 227, 228
 - women, 228
- exclusion by infirmity, 228, 229
- renunciation of interest, 230
- rights, 230-236
 - joint possession, 230, 231, 233, 234
 - building with consent, 232, 233
 - suit for share, 233
 - maintenance, 234, 235
 - information as to management, 235
 - suit to restrain illegal act, 236
 - to partition, 236. *See* PARTITION
 - where father manager, 236, 237
- Mitakshara law, effect of death, 236, 237
- survivorship, 237
- shares not defined, 238
- powers over separate property, 248, 249
- to be parties to transactions, 266, 267
 - suits, 267-269
- right to account, 272
- decree against manager, 267, 278, 279
- alienation and charge, 283, 298
 - acts of, 275

surviving coparcener, 298, 299
alienation of undivided share, 299-302. See SHARES
who may contest alienation, 304, 305
how alienation set aside, 305, 306
 consent, 306
 limitation, 306
 compensation, 307
 improvements, 307
not liable for debts except of father, 324

suit against manager for account, 272
alienation to provide for, 290, 483

decisions, 21
control over guardian, 49, 50
powers as to marriage, 50, 51
jurisdiction as to marriage, 61, 62
duty in suit for maintenance, 97
suits as to worship, 547

Bengal, marriage of ward, 49
Madras, ditto, 49
adoption by wards of, 108, 109
sale by, 493
religious institution, 570

COVENANT. *See* AGREEMENT

CO-WIFE,
 succession to *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
 Mayukha, 453, 454

CROWN. See ESCHEAT
restraining acts of limited owner, 514

by husband, 68, 69
wife, 69

CUSTOM, 27-32
 definition, 27
 Acts recognizing, 28
 conditions of validity, 28-31
 definite and continuous, 28
 ancient, 28, 29
 immoral, 28, 29, 31
 construction, 29

CUSTOM—*continued*

- proof, 32
- discontinuance, 30
- judicial recognition, 31
- burden of proof, 32
- evidence of, 32
- customary forms of marriage, 56-58
- divorce, 63
- prohibiting adoption, 102
- appointment of manager of endowment, 568

CUTCHI MEMONS, 24

CYPRÉS DOCTRINE, 552

DAIVA MARRIAGE, 54

DAMAGES,

- for enticing wife, 74
- adultery, 74

DÁMDUPAT, 8, 9

DANCING GIRLS,

- adoption by, 31, 103, 164
- inheritance to, 462, 463

DATTA HOMAM, 153-155

DATTAKA ADOPTION. *See* ADOPTION

DATTAKA CHANDRIKA, 15, 18, 19

DATTAKA MIMANSA, 17, 19, 20

DATTAKA SON, 101. *See* ADOPTION

DAUGHTER,

- maintenance of, 206, 207, 234, 235, 271
- competition with illegitimate son, 384
- inheritance, Mitakshara school, 387-389
 - Mithila school, 388
- succession on her death, 388, 389
- estate taken by, 388, 467, Chap. XV.
- prostitute, 388
- illegitimate, 388
- Bengal school, 417, 424, 425
- stridhana*, Mitakshara, 448, 449
 - Mayukha, 452, 453
 - Smriti Chandrika, 455
 - Mithila school, 456
 - Bengal school, 457, 458, 459
- powers over inherited property, 465-467
 - Bombay, 467
 - maiden, 469
 - gift to, by widow, 484, 485

DAUGHTER-IN-LAW,

- maintenance of, 209, 210, 211
- inheritance, Bombay, 412, 413,
 - to *stridhana*, Mayukha, 454
 - Smṛti Chandrika, 456

DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER,

- Bombay, 411
- Madras, 413
- stridhana*, Mitakshara, 449
 - Mayukha, 452, 453, 454
 - Mithila school, 456
 - Bengal school, 457

DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 366

- Mitakshara, 401, 404

DAUGHTER'S SON. *See* COPARCENERS

- adoption of, 141
- take *per capita*, 367
 - competition with illegitimate son, 384
 - Mitakshara, 389, 390
 - Bengal school, 425, 426
- stridhana*, Mitakshara, 449
 - Mayukha, 452, 453
 - Mithila school, 456
 - Bengal school, 457, 458, 459

DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON,

- Mitakshara school, 389, 401, 403
- Bengal school, 426
- stridhana*, Mayukha, 454
- Bengal school, 457

DAUGHTER'S SON'S WIDOW, 364

DAYABHAGA, 14, 15

DAYABHAGA SCHOOL, 12, 13. *See* BENGAL SCHOOL

- works of authority, 14, 15

DAYA-KRAMA SANGRAHA, 15

DEAFNESS,

- exclusion from coparcenary, 228, 229
- inheritance, 371, 372

DEATH of coparcener (Mitakshara law), 236, 237

- family business, 237, 275, 276

DEBTS. *See* FATHER

- of remarried widow, 76
- preferred to maintenance, 88
- duty of manager, 271
- power of manager, 276
- election by creditor, 276, 277
- alienation to pay, by manager, 288
 - by female owner, 482, 483

DEBTS—*continued*

- liability of heir, 323, 324
 - impartible estate, 324
 - coparcener, 324
 - manager of endowment, 564, 567
- of father (Mitakshara law), Chap. VIII. *See* FATHER
- liability of heir or devisee or person in possession, 323, 324
 - successor to impartible property, 324
- provision for, on partition, 355
- barred by limitation, 288, 482

DEBUTTER PROPERTY. *See* ENDOWMENT

inheritance, 188

DECLARATORY DECREE,

- adoption, 165, 166
- alienation, 236, *note* 2, 305
- in suit by reversioner, 503-505
- does not bind subsequent reversioner, 565
- in suit by subsequent reversioner, 505-507

DECREE. *See* DECLARATORY DECREE, HUSBAND AND WIFE, RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

- for maintenance, 91-97
 - alteration, 97
 - execution, 98
- against manager, 267, 278
- at instance of manager, 278, 279
- against manager on mortgage, 280-282, 315
- for money against father, 317
- execution after death of father, 318, 319
- duty of judgment creditor, 320
 - purchaser, 320
- execution against female owner, 493
- against female owner, 494, 495
- sale in execution of, 496-498
- against manager of endowment, 567

DEDICATION, proof of, 553

DEITY. *See* IDOL

DESAI, land impartible, 261

DESERTION. *See* RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS, grounds of, 68-72

DESHMUKH, land impartible, 261

DETENTION OF WIFE,

- suit, 74
- summary remedies, 73, 74

DEVESTING OF INHERITANCE, 363, 374, 387

- on adoption, 193-199
- consent to, 197
- rights of survivorship, 198
- estate of widow, 387

- DEVISE. *See* BEQUEST
 to joint family, 240
 by father, 244
 of undivided share, 303
- DHARM, bequest for, 550
- DHARMA, 10
- DHARMA SASTRAS, 10, 11
- DIGESTS, 12, 14-20
- DISCLAIMER. *See* ABANDONMENT, RELINQUISHMENT
 by female owner, 490, *note* 5
 by other heir, 375
- DISEASE. *See* EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE
 defence to restitution of conjugal rights, 69
- DISINHERISON, 365, 530
- DISQUALIFICATION. *See* EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE
- DIVORCE. *See* DIVORCED WOMAN, 36, 37
 Hindu law administered, 3-5
 unknown to Hindu law, 63
 when allowed, 63, 64
 not effected by adultery, 64
 Indian Divorce Act, 64
 convert to Christianity, 64
 maintenance after, 77
- DIVORCED WOMAN, relationship of children of, 391
- DONATIONS *MORTIS CAUSA*, 523
- DONEE. *See* GIFT
- DRAVIDA (OR DRAVIRA) SCHOOL, 13
 works of authority, 17, 18
 adoption by widow, 120-124
- DUMBNESS,
 exclusion from coparcenership, 228, 229
 inheritance, 371, 372
- DVYAMUSHYAYANA,
 forms and conditions, 190, 191
 inheritance, 192, 193
 afterborn sons, 193
- DWAITA NIRNAYA, 20
- DWAITA PARISHISHTA, 20
- EASEMENT for religious or charitable purpose, 549
- ELECTION,
 as to adoption, 170, 171
 by creditor, 276, 277
 of manager, 269

ENDOWMENTS, Chap. XIX *See* MANAGER OF ENDOWED PROPERTY

- bequest for, 539, 540
- objects, 546, 555
- powers of Courts, 547
- creation, 548, 549
- conditions of validity, 548
- perpetuity, 548
- divesting of interest, 548, 549
- charge on property, 549
- casement, 549
- future operation, 549
- certainly, 550-552
- cypres doctrine, 552
- must be real, 552, 553
- mode of dedication, 553
- evidence of terms, 553, 554
- settlement of scheme, 554
- revocation, 554, 566
- for worship of deity, 555, 556. *See* TEMPLE
- trustee or manager, 556 *et seq.*
 - powers, 558, 561-564
 - position, 558
 - duty, 558, 559
 - application of income, 559
 - account, 560
 - Mutts, 560
 - Mohunt, 561, 562
 - suits, 563, 564
 - debts and alienation, 564, 565
- attachment of property, 567
- suits with respect to, 576-580
- removal of manager, etc., 580, 581
- statutory provisions for superintendence, 582-595
- appropriation by Board of Revenue, 583
- misappropriation, 583
- appointment of agents, 583
 - trustees, etc., 583
- transfer to Madras Municipal Council and Local Boards, 584
- Religious Endowments Act, 584-595
 - trustees, 585, 586
 - committees, 586-589
 - accounts, 590
 - suit, 590-594
- endowments partly religious partly secular, 595
- Government not to hold charge of, 595
- Charitable Endowments Act, 595
- Coorg, 596

ESCHEAT, 416

- in preference to unnamed woman, 411
- stridhana* property, 462
- management of property, 416

ESTATE. *See* DAUGHTER, WIDOW, WOMAN

- attempt to create new form, 532

ESTOPPEL,

adoption, 172, 173

alienation, 306

EUNUCH. *See* IMPOTENCE

marriage, 35

adoption, 109, 110

EVIDENCE. *See* PROOF

EXCLUSION FROM COPARCENARY, 228, 229

EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE,

right of adoption, 109, 110

unchaste widow, 368

other unchaste heirs, 368, 369

remarriage, 369, 370

physical defects, 370-372

murder, 373

result of, 373

wife of disqualified person, 373, 374

property not divested, 374

stridhan property, 374

change of religion, 374, 375

abandonment of worldly affairs, 375

EXECUTION. *See* DECREE

EXECUTOR, position of, 545

EXOAMY, 39

“*FACTUM VALET*,” doctrine of, 2, 3FAMILY. *See* JOINT FAMILY

custom, 27-32

FAMILY ARRANGEMENT, 485

FAMILY DWELLING HOUSE,

right of widow, 80, 81

purchaser, 80, 81

partition, 341, 357

FAMILY SETTLEMENT, 534

in Bengal and Oudh, 540

FAMILY TRADE OR BUSINESS,

powers of manager, 275, 276

new business, 275

alienation, 480

debts, 492

FATHER. *See* ADOPTION, COPARCENARY, MAINTENANCE, MANAGER OF JOINT

FAMILY, MARRIAGE, PARTITION

right to give in marriage, 47

delegation, 48

loss, 48

remarriage of widow, 51

FATHER—*continued.*

- marriage expenses, 53
- gift in adoption, 134–137
- adoptive father, powers, 183
 - alienation, 200, 201
- duties and rights, Chap. V.
- maintenance of children, 206
 - married daughter, 207
 - illegitimate children, 99, 207, 208
 - daughter-in-law, 209–211
 - son-in-law, 211
 - of parents, 212
- guardianship, 213, 214
 - loss of right, 215, 216
 - testamentary guardian, 213
 - remedies, 217
- manager of joint family (Mitakshara law), 236
- gift or devise by, 244, 284, 285
- decree against, as manager, 278
- power over movables, 285
- powers over coparcenary property, 285, 286
- setting aside alienation by, 304–306
- duty of son to pay his debts, 308
- alienation for payment of debts, 308–315
 - illegal or immoral purposes, 310–312
 - interest, 313
 - power limited to father, 313
 - official assignee, 313
 - mortgage for non-antecedent debt, 313, 314
 - when sons can set aside, 315
 - question whether passed property, 315
 - whether sons bound by decree, 315–318
 - rights of sons when not parties, 315–318
- when interest of sons pass by execution against father, 316, 317, 318, 319
- decree for money, 317
- execution of decree after death of father, 318, 319
- decree against sons, 321
- personal liability of father, 321
- simple contract debts, 321
- interest, 322
- limitation, 322
- debt not a charge, 322
 - effect of alienation, 322
 - remedy limited to assets, 323
 - liability after partition, 323
 - Bengal school, 323
- inheritance, Mayukha, 390
 - Mitakshara, 390
 - Bengal school, 426
 - maiden's property, 446, 447
 - stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
 - Mayukha, 454, 455
 - Mithila school, 456
 - Bengal school, 459, 460

"FATHER" includes adoptive father, 178, 179

FATHER-IN-LAW. *See* HUSBAND'S FATHER

FATHER'S BROTHER,

adoption of, 143

inheritance, Mitakshara, 393, 394

Mayukha, 393, 394

Smriti Chandrika, 396

Bengal school, 420

FATHER'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,

Mitakshara, 404

FATHER'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 364, 366

Mitakshara, 402

Bengal school, 421, 429, 431

FATHER'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 403

FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON,

adoption of, 143

inheritance, Mitakshara, 394

Smriti Chandrika, 396

after sister in Bombay, 411

Bengal school, 429

maiden's property, 447

FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON,

Mitakshara, 402

Bengal school, 429, 431

FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON,

adoption of, 143

Mitakshara, 394

after sister in Bombay, 411

Bengal school, 429

FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,

Mitakshara, 395

adoption of, 143

FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara,
395

FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S WIDOW, in Bombay, 412

FATHER'S BROTHER'S WIDOW, in Bombay, 412

FATHER'S DAUGHTER, *See* SISTER

FATHER'S FATHER,

right to give in marriage, 47

marriage expenses, 53

inheritance, Mitakshara, 393

Mayukha, 393

Bengal school, 429

FATHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER. *See* FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON

FATHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON. *See* FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON

FATHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 404

FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON. *See* FATHER'S SISTER'S SON

FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 403
stridhana, Mayukha, 454

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER,
Mitakshara, 394
Mayukha, 394
Bengal school, 429

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 404, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 403, 407
Bengal school, 426, 430

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 403, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S MOTHER,
Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 394
Smriti Chandrika, 397
Bengal school, 430

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 404, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 364
Mitakshara, 403, 407
Bengal school, 421, 422, 430, 431

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 403, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 394
Smriti Chandrika, 397
Bengal school, 430

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON

Mitakshara, 403, 407

Bengal school, 430, 431

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,

Mitakshara, 394

Bengal school, 430

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON,

Mitakshara, 395

Bengal school, 421

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON,

Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S

SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S

DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 404, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON.

Mitakshara, 403, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S

SON, Mitakshara, 403, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON,

Mitakshara, 395

Smriti Chandrika, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S

DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 404, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S

SON, Mitakshara, 403, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S

SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 404, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON.

Mitakshara, 395

Smriti Chandrika, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S

SON, Mitakshara, 403, 407

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,

Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S

SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S

SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S

SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S MOTHER,
Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 395
Smriti Chandrika, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 395
Smriti Chandrika, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER,
Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S
SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S
SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S
SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S
SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S
SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S
SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 396

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S MOTHER,
Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S MOTHER, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S MOTHER, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 416

FATHER'S FATHER'S MOTHER
Mitakshara, 394
Bengal school, 427, 429

FATHER'S FATHER'S SISTER'S SON, 364
Mitakshara, 398, 403

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON. *See* FATHER'S BROTHER

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 404

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 364, 366
Mitakshara, 402
Bengal school, 429, 432

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara,
403

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON. *See* FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 402
Bengal school, 429, 431

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON. *See* FATHER'S BROTHER'S
Son's Son

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara,
395

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitak-
shara, 395

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S WIDOW, in Bombay, 412, 413

FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S WIDOW, in Bombay, 412, 413

FATHER'S MOTHER,
Mitakshara, 393
Bengal school, 427, 429
maiden's property, 447
powers over inherited property, 464-468. *See* WOMAN
in Bombay, 451
share on partition, 334, 335

FATHER'S MOTHER'S BROTHER, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S BROTHER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitak-
shara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S
SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S
SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara.
408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitak-
shara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON.
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S
SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 408

FATHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 408, 409

FATHER'S MOTHER'S SISTER, inheritance to maiden's property, 447

FATHER'S SISTER,
Madras, 413
stridhana, 447, 451, 454

FATHER'S SISTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 404

FATHER'S SISTER'S SON, 364
Mitakshara, 402
Bengal school, 429
stridhana, Mayukha, 454
Bengal school, 461

FATHER'S SISTER'S SON'S SON. *See* FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON

FATHER'S SON. *See* BROTHER

FEEDING HINDUS, bequest for, 550

FEMALE HEIR. *See* WOMAN
not new stock of descent, 365, 367
except in Bombay, 451, 467
succession after her death, 367
unchastity, 368, 369
physical defect, 372
in Bombay, 410-413, 467, 468
Madras, 413, 414
Bengal school, 417
religious office, 557, 569

FORCE,
marriage, 51
adoption, 152

FORMS OF MARRIAGE, 54-58
presumption, 62, 63

FRAUD,
setting aside marriage, 51
adoption, 152
by a coparcener, 373
by manager, 277, 278
sale or charge, 297
partition, 344

FUNERAL EXPENSES,
of widow, 88
sale for, 289, 290, 480

GANDHARBA MARRIAGE, 55, 56
ceremonies, 59

GARBHARI GOSAVI,
marriage, 34
widow of, 416

GHAT, for moribund persons, 549

GIFT. *See* MARRIAGE, TRUST

of property subject to maintenance, 84, 85

to procure consent to adoption, 123

in adoption, 134-137

to joint family, 240

by father, 244, 284, 285

separate property, 251

of undivided share, 303

to wife, share on partition, 335

by husband to wife, 438

of immovable property, 441-443

to wife by relatives, 437

strangers, 438

presumption, 442, 443

to other female relation, 442

by female owner, 490

to daughter or son-in-law, 484, 485

power to make, 521

donee, 521

necessity for possession, 522

transfer, 523

mortis causa, 523

subject of, 521

to unborn person, 524, 525

failure of prior disposition, 525

GIFT OVER, 541

GIRL, adoption of, 103

GOTRA, meaning, 39, *note* 6 .

GOTRAJA SAPINDAS. *See* SAGOTRA SAPINDAS

defined, 379

widow of (in Bombay), 412, 413

Bengal school, 420

GOVERNMENT,

consent to adoption, 150

grants by, 251, 252, 260, 261

not to take charge of temple, etc., 595

GOVERNMENT REVENUE,

sale or charge for payment, by manager, 288

by female heir, 482, 498

exemption of endowed lands, 565

GRANDFATHER. *See* FATHER'S FATHER, MOTHER'S FATHER

gift in marriage, 47

adoption, 136

maintenance of grandchildren, 211

debts, 308. *See* FATHER

GRANDCHILDREN, maintenance of, 211

GRANDMOTHER. *See* FATHER'S MOTHER, MOTHER'S MOTHER

right on partition, 334, 335

GRANTS by Government, 251, 252, 260, 261

GREAT-GRANDFATHER. *See* FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER, MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER

GREAT-GRANDMOTHER. *See* FATHER'S FATHER'S MOTHER
right on partition, 335

GUARDIAN. *See* MARRIAGE

Hindu law, 5

right of father, 213-216

mother, 214

relations, 215

appointed by Court, 214, 215

testamentary, 213

illegitimate children, 214

partition, 313, 314

of property, 215

minor wife, 66

adopted son, 179, 213

loss of right, 215, 216

remarried widow, 216, 217

remedies, 217

share in Mitakshara family, 270, 271

powers over property, 217, 285 *et seq.*

acceptance of gift, 521, 523

GUUDHAJA, 100

GYAWALS, adoption, 160

HABEAS CORPUS, writ in nature of, 73, 217

HALF BLOOD, RELATIONSHIP OF, 390-392. *See* HALF-BROTHER, HALF-SISTER

HALF-BROTHER,

adoption, of, 137

Mitakshara and Mayukha, 390, 391

competition with sister, in Bombay, 410

Bengal school, 427

succession to *stridhan*, 444

HALF-SISTER,

Bombay, 411

Madras, 413

HALF-SISTER'S SON,

succession to *stridhana*, Mithila school, 457

HEIR. *See* INHERITANCE, WOMAN

duty as to maintenance, 212, 213

payment of debts, 323, 324

becomes fresh stock of descent, 365

unless female, 365

nearer excludes more remote, 367

may relinquish rights, 368

disinherison, 365, 530

H.L.

HEREDITARY OFFICES, when partible, 262

HERMIT, inheritance to, 415, 416. *See* ABANDONMENT

HIGH COURTS, Hindu law administered in, 3, 4

HINDU LAW,

- what it is, 1, 2
- difference from other systems, 3
- application of law, 3-10, 22-27
- sources, 10-21
- schools, 12-14
- custom, 27-32

HINDU DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY ACT, 524-526, 536-539

HINDU TRANSFERS AND BEQUESTS ACT, 524, 536

how far retrospective, 524

HINDU WILLS ACT, 542-545

- powers of adoption, 114
- devise by husband to wife, 441-443
- application, 542
- maintenance, 543
- gift to unborn persons, 543
- execution of wills, 543-545
- sections of Succession Act applied, 545

HINDUS,

- what are, 22-26
- change of religion, 23-25
- illegitimate children, 25
- conversion to Hinduism, 25, 26

HOMAM. *See* DATTA HOMAM

HOUSE. *See* FAMILY DWELLING-HOUSE

on coparcenary property, built by widow, 483

HUSBAND AND WIFE. *See* MAINTENANCE, MARRIAGE, RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

- reciprocal rights and duties, Chap. II.
- arrangement varying rights, 65, 66
- rights of husband, 65
- guardianship of minor wife, 66
 - widow, 66
- restraint of wife, 66, 67
- duty of husband, 67
- assault on wife, 67
- right of wife, to society and maintenance, 67
 - enforcement of right. *See* RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS
- suit for possession of wife, 67, 68
- cruelty, 68, 69
- adultery, 69, 71
- damages, 74
- summary remedies, 73, 74
- power of wife over property, 74, 75
- contract by wife, 75
 - necessaries, 75

HUSBAND AND WIFE—*continued*

- suit by wife, 75
- power of husband over wife's property, 76, 444
- suits between, 76
- gifts by husband to wife, 438, 441-444
 - of immovable property, 441-444
- succession to *stridhana*, Mitakshara school, 450
 - Mayukha school, 453
 - Bengal school, 459, 460

HUSBAND'S *BANDHUS*, *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451

HUSBAND'S BROTHER,
stridhana, Mitakshara, 451
 Mayukha, 454
 Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451

HUSBAND'S BROTHER'S SON,
stridhana, Mitakshara, 451
 Mayukha, 454
 Bengal school, 460

HUSBAND'S DAUGHTER. *See* STEPDAUGHTER

HUSBAND'S DAUGHTER'S SON. *See* STEPDAUGHTER'S SON

HUSBAND'S FATHER,
stridhana, Mitakshara, 451
 Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S FATHER'S FATHER AND HIS ISSUE, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER AND HIS ISSUE, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,
stridhana, Mitakshara, 451

HUSBAND'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S MOTHER, *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451

HUSBAND'S *SAKULYAS*, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S *SAMANIPRAVAS*, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S *SAMANODIKAS*, *stridhana*, Mayukha, 454
 Mitakshara, 451
 Bengal school, 467

HUSBAND'S *SAPINDAS*, *stridhana*, Mayukha, 454
 Mitakshara, 450, 451

HUSBAND'S SISTER, *stridhana*, Mayukha, 454

HUSBAND'S SISTER'S SON,
stridhana, Mitakshara, 451
 Bengal school, 461

HUSBAND'S SON. *See* STEPSON

HUSBAND'S SON'S SON. *See* STEPSON'S SON

HUSBAND'S SON'S SON'S SON. *See* STEPSON'S SON'S SON

HUSBAND'S WIFE. *See* CO-WIFE

IDIOCY. *See* INSANITY, 370, 371

IDOL,

bequest to, 539

endowment for worship, 555

proprietary rights, 555, 556

lost or broken, 556

non-existing, gift to, 556

custody, 557

revocation of endowment, 574

attachment of offerings, 575

attachment and partition of worship, 342, 574, 575

ILLATOM ADOPTION, 160, 161

ILLEGAL PURPOSE, 310-312

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. *See* HINDUS

of Hindus, 25, 98

marriage, 39

rights, 99

maintenance, 99, 208, 209

guardianship, 214

inheritance, 382-385, 423

coparcener, Mitakshara school, 227, 228

ILLEGITIMATE DAUGHTER, 388

does not inherit to father, 388

inherits to mother, 462

ILLEGITIMATE SON (inheritance),

twice-born classes, 382, 423

Sudras, Mitakshara school, 382, 383

competition with other heirs, 385

does not succeed to collaterals, 385

his son, 386

Bengal school, 423

inherits to mother, 462

IMMORAL CUSTOM. *See* CUSTOM

IMMORAL PURPOSE, 310-312

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY. *See* WOMAN

gift by husband to wife, 441-444

IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY. *See* PARTITION, 259-262

grant by Government, 30, 260

maintenance of widow, 79

son born after adoption, 188

divesting on adoption, 198, 199

savings, 262

IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY—*continued.*

- instances, 259-262
- whether coparcenary, 263, 264
- transfer or devise, 264, 265
- charge for necessity, 265
- discontinuance of custom, 262
- debts, 324
- illegitimate son, 385
- widow, 387
- daughter's son, 390
- inheritance to, Chap. XVII.
- principles of inheritance, 515, 516
- Mitakshara school, 516-519
- Bengal school, 519
- fresh stock of descent, 520

IMPOTENCE,

- marriage, 35
- restitution of conjugal rights, 72
- adoption, 109, 110
- exclusion from coparcenership, 228, 229
- inheritance, 370, 371

IMPROVEMENTS,

- by purchaser, 307, 513
- in partition suit, 355

IMPURITY, adoption, 110, 111

INAM,

- stridhana*, 439
- in woman's name, 466

INCOME,

- female owner, 471, 476
- of endowment, 559
- mohunt, 561, 562

INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, superseded Hindu law, 8

INFANT. *See* MINORINHERITANCE. *See* BENGAL SCHOOL, EXCLUSION FROM INHERITANCE, HEIR, IMPARTIBLE ESTATE, MITAKSHARA SCHOOL, SAPINDA, SAKULYA, SAMANO DAKA

- application of Hindu law, 3
- converts to Islam, 24
- adopted son, 179-182
- principles, Chap. X.
- to what property applies, 361
- property vested in deceased, 362
- vesting, 362
- divesting, 363
- right not acquired through others, 363-365
- disinheritance, 365
- alteration of course of, 365, 532
- stock of descent, 365
- nearest heir, 365

INHERITANCE—*continued*.

- rights of women, 366, 367
- when *per stirpes*, 367
- when *per capita*, 367, 368
- exclusion from, 368–375. *See* EXCLUSION
- order according to Mitakshara, Chap. XI.
- connection between religion and law, 376–378
- fixed rules, 376
- differences between schools, 376, 377
- Mitakshara school guiding principle, 377
 - sapinda* relationship, 377, 378
 - classes of heirs, 378, 379
 - divided and undivided, 380, 381
- female heirs in Bombay, 410–413
 - Madras, 413, 414
- reunion, 414, 415
- Bengal school, Chap. XII.
 - spiritual benefit, 417
 - females, 417
- stridhan* property, Chap. XIV. *See* STRIDHANA
 - principle, 446
 - maiden's property, 446, 447
 - presents by bridegroom, 447
- impartible estate, Chap. XVII.
- attempt to alter law of, 532

INJUNCTION,

- to restrain adoption, 166, 167
- at instance of reversioner, 503
 - subsequent reversioner, 505, 506

INSANITY,

- marriage, 34, 35
- restitution of conjugal rights, 71
- adoption, 109
- exclusion from coparcenership, 228, 229
 - inheritance, 371, 372

INSOLVENCY of a coparcener, 313

INTEREST. *See* DAMDUPAT

- liability of sons, 313, 322
- powers of manager, 27
- mortgage for necessity, 485

INTERMARRIAGE, rules as to, 38–46

INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORITIES, 11

INVALID ADOPTION,

- cases, 202
- effects, 202–205

INVESTMENTS,

- from coparcenary property, 246
- from *stridhan*, 440
- by female owner, 474, 475

JACTITATION OF MARRIAGE, 61

JAINS,

- governed by Hindu law, 23
- by what school governed, 27
- proof of customs, 32
- adoptions, 102
 - termination of power, 131
 - relationship, 145
 - ceremonies, 153
 - afterborn son, 188
- powers of sonless widow, 469

JATS, marriage with husband's brother, 45

JOINT FAMILY, Chap. VI. *See* COPARCENARY PROPERTY, COPARCENERS,

- MANAGER, PARTITION, SEPARATION
- marriage expenses, 52, 53, 235, 289
- of what consists, 218
- rights of members, 218, 219 *See* COPARCENERS
- property. *See* COPARCENARY PROPERTY
- according to the Mitakshara, 219, 220
- disintegration, 219, 220
- presumption of union, 220-223
- separation in dwelling, 221
- new families, 223
- application of proceeds, 266
- use of name of member, 257, 258
- possession of property, 259
- management and disposal of property, Chap. VII.

JOINT GIFT IN WILL, 540

JOINT POWER OF ADOPTION, 115

JOINT TENANCY, 239. *See* COPARCENARY PROPERTY

JOINT TRANSFER, 239

JOTI, inheritance to, 415, 416

JUDGE, duty of, 2

KANINA SON, 100

KAYA MARRIAGE, 55

KAYASTHAS, 22, *note* 6

KHOJAS, 24

- transfers and gifts to unborn persons, 524, *note* 5

KING. *See* ESCHEAT

- rights of, on escheat, 416

KRITAKA SON, 101

KRITRIMA SON. *See* ADOPTION

- in ancient times, 101
- adoption of, 99, 126, 157-160
- effect of adoption, 201, 202

KSHATRIYAS, 22

KSHETRAJA SON, 100

LAMENESS,

adoption, 109

exclusion from coparcenership, 228, 229
inheritance, 371, 372

LAND ACQUISITION,

female owner's share, 473

property of endowment, 565

LEASES,

by manager of family, 274

by female owner, 476

permanent, 476

by manager of endowment, 563, 565

LEGACY. *See* BEQUEST, DEVISE

to joint family, 250

LEGISLATION. *See* Acts

LEGITIMACY, presumption as to, 99

LEPA, 419

LEPROSY,

restitution of conjugal rights, 69

adoption, 109

exclusion from coparcenership, 228, 229
inheritance, 372

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. *See* ADMINISTRATION

LIMB, ABSENCE OF, 370, 371

LIMITATION. *See* ACKNOWLEDGMENT

suits for restitution of conjugal rights, 72

for maintenance, 96

to set aside adoption, 168-170

to declare adoption valid, 170

for joint possession, 233, 234

right to claim property as separate, 246

when one coparcener barred, 269

alienation by manager, 306

by widow, 482

mortgage for debt of father, 314

debt of father, 322

separation by loss of share, 248

suit for partition, 352

suit by reversioners to avoid alienation, 504

by subsequent reversioner, 507, 508

for possession on death of female, 509

lease of endowed property, 565, 566

to recover property of endowment, 566

LOSS OF CASTE. *See* CASTE

LOST PROPERTY, recovery of, 252, 253

LUBBAIS, 25

LUNACY. *See* INSANITY, MARRIAGE

MADRAS PRESIDENCY. *See* ADOPTION

Hindu law administered in, 3, 4

female heirs, 413, 414

MAHARASHTRA SCHOOL, 13

works of authority, 18, 19

peculiarities, 21

adoption, 124-126

MAHOMEDAN RELIGION, effect of conversion to, 24, 25

MAIDEN. *See* DAUGHTER

stridhana, 438

inheritance to, 446, 447

presents by bridegroom, 447

MAINTENANCE,

when marriage void, 46

of wife, 67, 76-78

not dependent on property 77

abandonment of Hinduism, 77

dissolution of marriage, 77

husband excluded from inheritance, 77

place, 77, 78

separate, 78

release of right, 78

loss of right, 78, 84, 97

remedies, 95

of widow, 78, 79

effect of suit for partition, 79

where property forfeited. 79

of mother, 79, 80

from relatives of husband, 79, 80

residence, 80-82

loss of right, 82, 97

"starving maintenance," 83

burden of proof, 83, 84

transfer of right, 84

attachment, 84

effect of transfer of property, 84, 89-94

gift or will, 84, 85

of concubine, 85

independent means of support, 85, 86

previous provision, 86

separate property of husband, 86

amount, 86-88

religious ceremonies, 87

funeral expenses, 88

postponed to debts, 88

how far a charge, 89-91

agreement, 89-91

decree, 89-91

transfer pending suit, 93

MAINTENANCE—*continued*.

- widow in possession, 93, 94
- right against procceds, 94
- suit for, 94, 95
- arrear, 94, 95
- future, 95
- parties to suit, 95
- limitation, 96
- duty of Court, 96
- alteration of order, 97
- execution of decree, 98
- order by magistrate, 98
- of widow on adoption, 198
- of person invalidly adopted, 202-204
- of children, 206-209
- of married daughter, 207
- of illegitimate children, 99, 207, 208, 209, 382
- of daughter-in-law, 209, 210, 211
- of son-in-law, 211
- impartible property, 211
- grandchildren, 211
- parents, 211, 212
- stepson, 212
- grandparents, 212
- sister, 212
- duty of heir, 212 213
- persons excluded from inheritance and coparcenership, 228
- members of coparcenary and their dependents, 234, 235
- duty of manager, 271
- sale or charge by manager, 289
- provision on partition, 355
- property given to woman for, 438
 - savings from, 476
- alienation to provide for, 483, 484

MAJORITY, AGE OF,

- marriage, 46, 47
- adoption, 106, 107

MALABAR LAW,

- marriage, 58
- adoption, 106
- wills, 545

MANAGER OF ENDOWMENT, 556

- powers, 557, 558, 561, 562, 564
- position, 559
- duty, 559, 560
- application of income, 559
- decision of majority, 559
- deposition by foreign state, 563
- suit by, 563, 564
- debts and alienation, 564, 565
- personal liability, 564
- repudiation, 566

MANAGER OF ENDOWMENT—*continued*.

- successor bound, 566
- adverse possession against, 567
- debts of predecessor, 567
- devolution of trust, 568-572
- hereditary right, 569, 570
- Court of Wards, 570
- prescriptive right, 571
- alienation of management, 573, 574
 - attachment of, 574, 575
 - partition of, 575, 576
- removal of, 580, 581
- under Religious Endowments Act, 586
 - accounts, 590

MANAGEMENT OF JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY, Chap. VII. *See*

MANAGER OF JOINT FAMILY

- special arrangement, 273, 274

MANAGER OF JOINT FAMILY, Chap. VII. *See* FATHER

- guardian of infant's share, 215, 270, 271
- to give information to coparceners, 235
- suit by coparcener, 236
- decree against, 267, 278-282
- what he is, 270
- representation of authority, 271
- duty, 271, 272
- arrangement as to management, 273, 274
- account, 272-274
- powers, 274, 275, 277
- family business, 274-276
- debts, 276
- promissory notes, 276
- election by creditor, 276, 277
- cannot bind coparceners personally, 277
- compromise, 277
- fraud, 277, 278
- arrangements as to property, 278
- discretion, 272
- suits by, 278-283
- suit on mortgage, 280-282
- alienation and charge, 283-290
 - without assent of coparceners, 283
- can bind minor, when necessity, 285-290
 - acting under authority of Court, 287
- matters to be regarded, 287, 288
- what is necessity, 288-290
- (discretion, 290
- money borrowed on personal credit, 290
- duty of purchaser or mortgagee, 290, 291
- current account, 291
- judgment debt, 291
- authority of Court, 291
- effect of inquiry, 292
- nature of inquiry, 293
- consent of coparceners, 293

MANAGER OF JOINT FAMILY—*continued*.

- burden of proof, 293-296
- representations, 295
- recital of necessity, 296
- adequacy of price, 296
- fraud, 297
- charge for portion of advance, 297
- setting aside alienation, 304-307
- limitation, 306

MANU, 11

MARRIAGE, Chap. I. *See* DIVORCE, HUSBAND AND WIFE REMARRIAGE

RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS

- application of Hindu law, 3-5
- creation of relationship, 33
- object and necessity, 33
- duty of guardian, 33, 34
- who may marry, 34-38
 - defects, 34
 - lunacy, 34, 35
 - impotence, 35
 - age, 35
- polygamy, 36
- agreement as to second marriage 37
- bigamy of woman, 36, 37
- remarriage after divorce, 37
 - of widow, 37
- of betrothed girl, 37
- restrictions on, 37
- restrictions on intermarriage, 38-46
 - identity of caste, 38
 - Hindu and Christian, 39
 - illegitimate persons, 39
 - between Hindu and non-Hindu 39
 - difference of *gotra*, 39, 40
 - prohibited degrees, 40-46
 - stepmother's relations, 43
 - affinity, 44
 - adopted son, 44, 45, 201
 - widows, 45
- effect of void, 46
- who may give, 46-49
- consent of ward, 48
- delegation, 48
- loss of right, 48
- remedy of guardian, 48, 49
- control by Court, 49
- guardian appointed by Court, 49
- wards of Bengal and Madras Courts of Wards, 49
- selection of husband by girl, 49
- absence of guardian's consent, 49
- powers of Court, 49, 50
- consent to remarriage of widow, 51
- force or fraud, 51

MARRIAGE—*continued.*

- payment to guardian, 51, 52
 - bridegroom, 52
- marriage brocage contracts, 52
- expenses, 52, 53, 235, 271, 289
- forms, 54-58
- ceremonies, 58-61
- breach of promise, 59
- death of betrothed, 59
- conditional, 60, 61
- remarriage of widow, 61
- consummation, 61
- questions as to validity, 61, 62
- licitation of, 61
- presumption as to validity, 62
- presumption as to form, 62, 63
- proof, 62, 63
- transfer of property out of which provision to be made, 90, 91
- provision on partition, 355, 356
- gifts at, 420, 421
- compensation for second, 437
- expenses, alienation to provide, 289, 484, 485
- effect on will, 543

MARRIAGE BROCAGE, 52

MARRIAGE EXPENSES. *See* MARRIAGE

MARRIED MAN, adoption of, 146, 147

MATERNAL GRANDFATHER. *See* MOTHER'S FATHER

- right to give in marriage, 47
- property inherited from, 241-243

MATRI BANDHUS, 400

- order of succession, 401, 408-410

MAYUKHA, 18, 19

- succession of cognates, 402
- devolution of *stridhana*, 452-455
- Sulka*, 452
- gifts, 452
- Yautaka stridhana*, 452
- other property, 452, 453
- succession to childless woman, 453-455

MEMONS, 24

MERWARA, Hindu law administered in, 5

MESNE PROFITS, 307

MINE worked by female owner, 477

MINOR. *See* MINORITY

- adoption by, 106-108
- permission to adopt by, 106-108
- adoption by minor widow, 126, 127
- gift in adoption, 136, 137

MINOR—*continued.*

- family business, 275, 276
- partition, 328-330
- reunion, 360
- gift to, 521

MINORITY. *See* MAJORITY

- Hindu law administered, 3-5
- restitution of conjugal rights, 70, 71

MISREPRESENTATION, adoption, 152

MISTAKE,

- adoption, 152
- partition, 344

MITAKSHARA, 16

MITAKSHARA SCHOOL, 12-14, 16. *See* COPARCENARY PROPERTY, COPARCENERS, INHERITANCE, JOINT FAMILY

- subdivisions, 13, 14
 - differences between, 21
- works of authority, 16-20
- difference from Bengal school, 20, 21, 376, 377
- to what property inheritance applies, 361
- guiding principle of inheritance, 377
- classes of heirs, 378, 376
- meaning of *sapinda*, 379
- succession of *sagotra sapindas*, 380 *et seq.*
- relationship of half blood, 392, 393
- remote *sapinda* heirs, 394 *et seq.*
- samanodakas*, 379, 380, 397
- bandhus*, 397 *et seq.*
- inheritance to impartible estate, 516-519

MITHILA SCHOOL, 14

- works of authority, 20
- adoption, 126
- inheritance of daughters, 388
- devolution of *stridhana*, 456, 457

MOHUNT. *See* ENDOWMENT, MANAGER OF ENDOWMENT

- inheritance to, 415, 416
- position and power, 561-563
- who may be, 562
- may own property, 562
- succession to, 568-572
- removal of, 580-581

MOLESLEM GIRASIAS, 24, 25

MORTGAGE. *See* BURDEN OF PROOF, COPARCENERS, FATHER, MANAGER

- suit by manager, 280-282
- by manager, 283 *et seq.*
 - what lender to regard, 287, 288
 - application of money, 292, 294
- nature of inquiry, 293
- consent of coparceners, 283, 293, 306
- fraud, 296

MORTGAGE—*continued.*

- charge for portion, 297
- of share, effect of partition, 303
- sale to pay off 288, 289, 482, 485
- woman not bound to, 485
- by woman, 478 *et seq.*
- consent of reversioners, 486-489

MOTHER. *See* WOMAN

- right to give in marriage, 47
- maintenance, 79, 211, 212
- gift in adoption, 134-136
- guardianship, 214
 - loss of right, 215, 216
- share on partition, 333
- inheritance, Mitakshara, 390
 - Mayukha, 390
 - Bengal school, 426, 427
 - maiden's property, 446
 - sulka*, Mitakshara, 447, 448
 - stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
 - Mayukha 454, 455
 - Smriti Chandrika, 455
 - Mithila school, 456
 - Bengal school, 459, 460

MOTHER'S BROTHER,

- Mitakshara, 404, 408
- Bengal school, 431
- inheritance to *stridhana*, 452, 454

MOTHER'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 407

MOTHER'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,

- Mitakshara, 405
- Bengal school, 431, 432

MOTHER'S BROTHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 406

MOTHER'S BROTHER'S SON,

- Mitakshara, 401, 405
- Bengal school, 421, 431

MOTHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON,

- Mitakshara, 406
- Bengal school, 431, 433

MOTHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON,

- Mitakshara, 405
- Bengal school, 431

MOTHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 405

MOTHER'S FATHER. *See* MATERNAL GRANDFATHER

- Mitakshara, 404
- Bengal school, 431

MOTHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER. *See* MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON

- MOTHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON. *See* MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S BROTHER'S SON'S SON. *See* MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 408
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON. *See* MOTHER'S SISTER'S SON
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 406
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 405, 406
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 405, 406
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 407, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 364
Mitakshara, 406, 409
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 406, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 407, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 406, 409
Bengal school, 432, 433
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 406, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 405, 406, 409
Bengal school, 432, 433.
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 405, 406
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432

- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 406, 409
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SONS,
SON, Mitakshara, 406, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 469
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
SON,
Mitakshara, 406, 409
Bengal school, 432, 433
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SONS DAUGHTER'S
SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 406, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 406, 409
Bengal school, 432, 433
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 405
Bengal school, 432
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S
SON, Mitakshara, 405, 406, 409
- MOTHER'S FATHER'S SISTER'S SON. *See* MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S
DAUGHTER'S SON
- MOTHER'S MOTHER, inheritance to maiden's property, 447
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER, Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara,
398, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitak-
shara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON, Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S
SON, Mitakshara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitak-
shara, 409

- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 398, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON.
Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara. 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara,
409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER, Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,
Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S
SON, Mitakshara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON, Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
SON, Mitakshara, 449
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S
SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 410
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara,
409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S
DAUGHTER'S SON, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S FATHER'S FATHER'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON,
Mitakshara, 409
- MOTHER'S MOTHER'S SISTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 398, 409
- MOTHER'S SISTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 407
- MOTHER'S SISTER'S SON, 364
adoption of, 142
inheritance, Mitakshara, 398, 403
Bengal school, 431
- MOTHER'S SISTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 406
- MOTIVE, for adoption, 102
- MOVABLE PROPERTY,
powers of father, 265
female owner, 469, 470
- MURDER, by heir, 373

MUTTS,

- origin, 560, 561
- object, 561

NAIRS, form of marriage, 58

NAMBUDRI BRAHMINS,

- application of Hindu law, 23
- adoption of girl, 103
 - by widow, 121, 161, 162
- ceremonies, 153

NARADA, 11

NATIVE CHRISTIANS. *See* CHRISTIANS

NECESSARIES, supplied to wife, 75

NECESSITY. *See* MANAGER

- sale or charge by female owner, 478 *et seq.*
- proof, 510-512
- portion only proved, 512, 513
- impartible estates, 265

NIRNAYA SINDHU, 17, 19

NISHADA, 101

NITYA DVYAMUSHYAYANA, 190-193

NIYOGA, 45

- obsolete, 139
- in adoption, 139-140

NUCLEUS, proof of, 256, 257

OBSTRUCTED HERITAGE 241, 242, 253

OFFENCES,

- proof of marriage, 63
- against wife, 67
- theft, 76

OFFERINGS at temple, 557, 558

OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE, alienation of coparcenary property, 313

ORISSA, by what school governed, 13, *note* 1

ORPHAN, adoption of, 148

OUDH,

- Hindu law administered in, 5
- adoptions, 150

OUDH TALUQDARS, wills of, 545

OUSTER from family property, 231

PAISACHA MARRIAGE, 56

PALAKA PUTRA, 100

PALAYAM, impartible, 260

PARASARA MADHAVYA, 17, 18

PARENT AND CHILD, Chaps. III., IV., V. *See* FATHER, MAINTENANCE

PARINAYYA (nuptial gifts), inheritance to, 456

PARTIES,

- suit for maintenance, 95
- as to adoption, 167, 168
 - coparcenary property, 233, 267, 268
 - on business contracts, 267, 269
 - on mortgage by father, 280-282, 315, 316
 - for partition, 352

PARTITION, Chap. IX.

- Hindu law, administered 3-5
- right of coparceners, 236
- share is coparcenary property, 244
- liability for debts after, 323
- what is, 325
- who entitled, 325-331
- tenure holders, 325
- Bengal school, 326
- Mitakshara school, 326, 327
- agreement not to, 325
- condition in will, 326
- son, grandson, and great grandson, 326, 327
- between women, 327, 328
- minor coparcener, 328-330
- birth of son, after, 330
- absent coparceners, 330, 331
- purchaser of share, 331
- rights of wife, 331, 332
 - mother, 333
 - grandmother, 334, 335
 - stepmother, 333, 334
 - great grandmother, 335
- effect on rights of widow, 79
- gift by husband, 335
- effect on mortgage, 303
- rights in share, 242, 336, 337
- effect of sale on right, 336
- loss of right, 336
- enforcement of right, 336, 337
- sister, 337
- allotment of shares, 337-340
 - between father and sons, 338
 - unequal division by father, 338
 - father represents son, 338
 - between brothers and their sons, 339
 - shares of deceased brothers, 339
 - different branches, 339, 340
 - sons by different mothers, 340
 - partial partition, 340, 343, 344, 352, 353, 354
- subject of, 341-343
 - impartible property, 326, 341

PARTITION—*continued.*

- all property to be divided, 341
 - leaseholds, 341
 - family dwelling-house, 341, 357
 - indivisible property, 342
 - places and rights of worship, etc., 342, 343, 575, 576
- separation, how effected. *See* SEPARATION
- parties to partition, 343
- test of partition, 346
- definition in petitions, etc., 347, 348
- act or declaration by one coparcener, 348
- loss of share by limitation, 348
- proof, 349, 350
- conversion from Hinduism, 350
- decree, 350, 351
- order for sale, 351
- suit, 351, 352
- parties to suit, 352
- property in suit, 352-355
 - partial, 353
 - purchaser, 354
- inquiry as to property, 354, 355
- account of moneys profits, 355
- improvements, 355
- provision for debts, etc., 355
- portion improved or dealt with by coparcener, 356
- account of expenses, 356
- partition by Court, 356
- power to order sale, 356, 357
- procedure, 358
- when transfer of share of dwelling-house, 357
- revenue paying estates, 359
- mortgage of undivided share, 299, 301, 302
- accident, mistake, fraud, 344
- by Revenue Authorities, 359
- does not annul filial relation, 359
- reunion, 359, 360

PARTITION, SHARE ON,
 powers of women, 335, 336
 interference by Court, 473

PARVANA SRADDHA, 417-419**PATNAM**, impartible, 261**PAUNARBHAVA SON**, 100**PAYMENT** to one member of family, 285

PERMISSION TO ADOPT. *See* ADOPTION
 only to wife or widow, 113
 form, 114
 construction, 117
 time for exercise, 128, 129
 exhaustion of, 129, 130
 termination of, 130, 131

PERMISSION TO ADOPT—*continued.*

burden of proof, 171, 172

presumption, 177

PERPETUITIES,

rules against, 536, 538, 539

PERSONA DESIGNATA, gift or devise to, 204, 205

PILGRIMAGE, by widow, 481

PINDAS, 403, 404, 418, 419*PITRI BANDHUS*, 400

order of succession, 401, 407, 408

PITRIDATTA, inheritance, Bengal school, 458

POLYANDRY, 36

inheritance, 380

POLYGAMY,

Christians, 23, *note* 6 ; 36

Hindus, 36

restitution of conjugal rights, 70

POSSESSION. *See* ADVERSE POSSESSION

POST-NUPTIAL ARRANGEMENT for separation, 65, 66

POWER TO ADOPT. *See* ADOPTION, PERMISSION TO ADOPT

PRAJAPATYA MARRIAGE, 55

PRESUMPTION,

as to school, 26, 27

validity of marriage, 62

form of marriage, 62, 63

of marriage in prosecutions, 63

of legitimacy, 99

permission to adopt, 177

joint family, 220–223

property of joint family, 220, 239, 240, 257, 258, 259

new family, 223

separate property of owner of impartible estate, 262

property held by coparcener, 257–259

sale in execution of decree against father, 320

PRIMOGENITURE, 518

PRITIDATTA,

described, 438

inheritance, Mayukha, 452

Smriti Chandrika, 455

PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT, 545

PROHIBITION of adoption, 120, 124

PROMISSORY NOTE by manager, 276

PROOF. *See* **BURDEN OF PROOF, CUSTOM, PRESUMPTION**
 of marriage, 62
 of terms of endowment, 553, 554
 of adoption, 171, 172, 174, 175
 of separation, 349-351
 in suit as to alienation by woman, 510-512

PROSTITUTE,
 adoption by, 31, 163, 164
 daughter (inheritance), 388, 449
 inheritance to, 462

PUNJAB,
 Hindu law administered in, 4, 5
 adoption, 126
 relationship, 145
 ceremonies, 153
 rights of adopted son in natural family, 189

PUNJAB SCHOOL, 14
 adoption, 126, 145, 153

PURCHASE. *See* **PURCHASER**
 of property subject to maintenance, 80, 81, 89-93

PURCHASER. *See* **BURDEN OF PROOF**
 duty in sale by manager, 290, 291
 application of money, 292
 nature of inquiry, 293
 subsequent, 293
 charge for portion, 297
 fraud, 296
 of undivided share, 299-303
 from father, 306
 alienation, how set aside, 304-307
 compensation, when purchase set aside, 307, 314
 sale in execution of decree against father, 318-320
 of share, partition, 331, 352

PURDAHNASHIN,
 consent by, 489
 alienation by, 511

PUTRIKA PUTRA, 100

QUARRY, powers of female owner, 477

RAGHUNANDANA'S SMRITI, 15

RAJ, impartible, 259, 260

RAKSHASA MARRIAGE, 56

RAPE, by husband, 67

RATIFICATION,
 of adoption, 128
 of alienation, 486

RECEIVER,

- in suit by reversioner, 505
- for partition, 352
- management of endowment, 549

RECITAL OF NECESSITY, 290, 296

REDEMPTION, right of sons, 316

REGISTRATION,

- of permission to adopt, 114
- of adoption in Oudh, 150

REGULATIONS. *See* LIST, p. xcvi, xcvi

RELATIONSHIP,

- prohibited degrees in marriage, 40-46
- exceptions, 42
- stepmother's relations, 43
- affinity, 44
- adopted son, 44, 45

RELEASE. *See* RELINQUISHMENT
of right of maintenance, 78RELIGION. *See* CHANGE OF RELIGION
connection with law of inheritance, 376

RELIGION, CHANGE OF, 23, 24

- divorce, 64
- restitution of conjugal rights, 70
- adoption, 110
- gift in adoption, 137
- guardianship, 216
- effect on coparcenership, 350
- inheritance, 374, 375

RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES,

- of wife, expenses, 76
- of widow, expenses, 87
- adoption when son incapable, 104
- adoption, 153-155
 - delegation, 155
 - presumption, 177
- Kritima adoption, 159
- of parents, etc, 212
- sale by manager for, 289, 290
- alienation by woman, 480, 481, 483, 484

RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS. *See* ENDOWMENTS, RELIGIOUS USAGES AND
INSTITUTIONS
bequest for, 539, 540

RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT, 585-595

RELIGIOUS PURPOSES. *See* ENDOWMENTS, RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS
alienation for, 289, 480, 481
by mother, 481

RELIGIOUS STUDENT, inheritance to, 415, 416

RELIGIOUS USAGES AND INSTITUTIONS,

- application of Hindu law, 3
- questions as to, 5-8

RELINQUISHMENT. *See* ABANDONMENT, RELEASE

- of rights by heir, 368, 375

REMARRIAGE,

- after divorce, 37
- of widow, 37, 45, 51, 82
- loss of rights, 369, 370
- prohibited degrees, 45
- consent of father, etc., 51
- ceremonies, 61
- debts, 76
- power of adoption, 132
- gift in adoption, 137
- guardianship, 216 217
- effect on inheritance, 369, 370
- relationship of children, 391

RENT, sale for arrears of, 498

- by widow, 498
- suit for, 498

RENUNCIATION,

- of adoption, 157
- of rights on adoption, 188
- of coparcenership, 230

REPAIRS, alienation to provide for, 483

REPUDIATION. *See* ALIENATION

REPUGNANT CONDITIONS IN GIFT OR WILL, 532, 53

RESIDENCE,

- of wife, 77, 78
- of widow, 80-82
- bequest of right of, 541

RES JUDICATA,

- as to adoption, 167, 168
- as to partition, 352

RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS, 67-73

- presumption as to marriage, 62
- defences to suit, 68-72
- condonation, 70
- right of suit, 72
- limitation, 72
- demand, 72
- form of decree, 72, 73
- conditional decree, 73
- execution of decree, 73

RESTRAINT OF WIFE, 66, 67

REUNION, 359, 360

- property on, 359

REUNION—*continued.*

- who may reunite, 359, 360
 - minor, 360
- burden of proof, 360
 - inheritance on, 391, 414, 415

REUNITED BROTHER, 414, 415

REUNITED HALF-BROTHER, 391, 414, 415

REVENUE. *See* GOVERNMENT REVENUE

REVENUE AUTHORITIES, partition by, 358, 359

REVENUE PAYING ESTATE, partition of, 358, 359

REVERSIONERS. *See* DECREE

- suit as to adoption, 164-167
- consent to alienation, 200, 486-490
- interest of, 499-501
- avoidance of alienation by female, 501
- suit to restrain waste, 501, 502
 - limitation, 504
- need not sue, 504
- neglect to get in property, 504
- right to oust female owner, 504, 505
- subsequent, when may sue, 505-507
- abatement 505
- acts derogatory to succession, 508
- possession at death of female, 508, 509
- proof in suit as to alienation, 510-512
- suits pending at death of woman, 513

REVOCATION. *See* CANCELLATION

- of permission to adopt, 114, 115
- of adoption, 157, 160
- of will not by adoption, 183, 184
- of endowment, 554

ROAD CESS,

- sale to provide, 483

SADAVARAT, bequest for, 550

SAGAI MARRIAGE, 57

SAGOTRA SAPINDAS,

- defined, 379, 420
- adoption of son of daughter of, 142
 - son of, 153, 154
- inheritance, according to Mitakshara, 380, 381 *et seq.*
- Bengal school, 483 *et seq.*

SAHODHA SON, 100

SAKULYAS,

- described, 419
- order of succession, 421, 433
- of husband, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461

- SALÉ.** *See* **MANAGER, PURCHASER**
 by female owner, 478-490
 consent of reversioners, 486-490
 by Court of Wards, 493
 in execution of decree against female, 496, 497
 for arrears of Government revenue, 498
 rent, 498
- SAMANAPRAVA,**
 of husband, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461
- SAMANODAKA,** 379, 380
 meaning, 379, 380
 Mitakshara, 397
 order of succession, 397
 Bengal school, 419, 420
 order of succession, 421, 433
 inheritance to *stridhana*, Mayukha, 454
 of husband to *stridhana*, Bengal school, 460
- SAMSKARA KAUSTABA,** 19
- SANHITAS,** 11
- SANNYASI,** 415, 416
- SAPINDAS,**
 consent to adoption, 120-126
 Mitakshara school, 378-381
 succession of, 381 *et seq.*
 mutual *sapinda* relationship, 400
 Bengal school, 417-419
 rules of succession, 419-423
 order of succession, 421-433
 inheritance to *stridhana*, Mayukha, 152-455
- SAPRATIBANDHADAYA,** 241, 242
- SARAKAM,** bequest for, 550
- SARASVATI VILASA,** 18
- SASTRAS,** 10, 11
- SAUDAYIKA,** power to deal with, 441, 442
- SCHEME FOR ENDOWMENT,**
 settlement, 554
 variation, 554
- SCHOOLS OF LAW,** 12-14
 works of authority, 14-20
 difference between, 20, 21
 governing locality, 26
 change by migration, 26, 27
- SELF-ACQUISITION.** *See* **SEPARATE PROPERTY**
- SENSE, ABSENCE OF,** 371
- SEPARATE PROPERTY,**
 liability for maintenance, 86
 loss by adverse possession, 234, 246

SEPARATE PROPERTY—*continued.*

- of owner of impartible estate, 262
- powers over, 248, 249
- what is, 248-251
- separate acquisitions, 249
- increased share, 247, 248
- practice of profession or occupation, 250, 251
- gifts and bequests, 251
- grants by Government, 251, 252
- recovery of lost property, 252, 253
- obstructed heritage, 253
- inheritance from mother, 253
- accretions, 254
- burden of proof, 254-259
- heir entitled to, 361

SEPARATED BROTHER, 391, 427

SEPARATED HINDU, heir to, 361

SEPARATION. *See* PARTITION

- arrangement between husband and wife, 65, 66
- Joint Family*,
 - in dwelling and food, 221
 - presumption, 220-223
 - how effected, 343-349
 - proof, 349, 350
 - act of stranger, 350
 - conversion from Hinduism, 350
 - decree, 350
 - order for sale, 351

SERVICE TENURES, impartible, 261, 262

SETTLEMENT, family, in Bengal and Oudh, 540

SEVERANCE. *See* PARTITION, SEPARATION

SHARES,

- Mitakshara law, 238
- alienation of undivided, 299-302
- sale in execution of decree, 300
- position of purchaser, 301, 302
- agreement not to sell, 302
- equity on setting aside alienation, 303
- effect of partition on mortgage of, 303

SHEBAIT. *See* ENDOWMENT, IDOL, MANAGER
inheritance, 188

SHIVA'S TEMPLE,
bequest for, 551

SHRADH. *See* SRADDHA.

SIKHS,

- governed by Hindu law, 23
- form of marriage, 58

SIMULTANEOUS ADOPTIONS, 149

SISTER,

- no right on partition, 337
- inherits in Western India, 393, 410, 411
- Mitakshara, 392, 393
- Madras, 413
- Bengal school, 427
- succession to *stridhana*, maiden's property, 447
 - Mitakshara, 451, 452
 - Bombay, 449, 455
 - Madras, 451
- powers, Bombay, 467

SISTER'S DAUGHTER, Bengal school, 429

SISTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON,

- adoption of, 142
- inheritance, Mitakshara, 404
 - Bengal school, 429
 - stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451

SISTER'S SON,

- adoption of, 141
- inheritance, 364, 366
 - Mitakshara, 392, 393, 402
 - Bengal school, 428, 429
 - succession to *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
 - Madras, 451
 - Mithila, 456
 - Bengal school, 460

SISTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 401, 403

SISTER'S SON'S SON'S SON, 403

SMALL CAUSE COURTS, law administered in, 4

SMRITI, 10

SMRITI OF RAGHUNANDANA, 15

SMRITI CHANDRIKA, 17

- succession of *sapindas*, 396
- reunion of *sapindas*, 415
- devolution of *stridhana*, 455, 456

SOHAG GRANTS, 263

“ SON ” includes adopted son, 179

SONS. See ADOPTION, COPARCENERS, FATHER, ILLEGITIMATE

- recognized in ancient times, 100, 101
- born after adoption, 187, 188
- maintenance, 206-209
- only son adoption, 145
 - as *dvyamushyana*, 191
- born after partition, 330
- succeed *per stirpes*, 367
- Mitakshara, 381, 382
 - competition with illegitimate sons, 383, 384
- Bengal school, 423

SONS—*continued*.

- inheritance to *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 449
 Mayukha, 452, 453
 Mithila, 456
 Bengal, 457-459
- impartible estate, 519, 520

SON-IN-LAW,

- maintenance, 211
- inheritance to *stridhana*, Bengal school, 461
- gift to, 485

SON'S DAUGHTER,

- Mitakshara, 386
- Bombay, 410, 411
- Madras, 413

SON'S DAUGHTER'S DAUGHTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 404

SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON, 366

- Mitakshara, 402
- Bengal school, 421, 426, 430

SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 403

SON'S SON,

- takes by representation, 365, 424
- succession, *per stirpes*, 367
- inheritance, Mitakshara, 385, 386
 Bengal school, 424
- succession to *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 450
 Mayukha, 452
 Bengal school, 457, 458, 459

SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON,

- Mitakshara, 402
- Bengal school. 421, 426, 430

SON'S SON'S DAUGHTER'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 403

SON'S SON'S SON,

- takes by representation, 365, 386, 424
- succeeds *per stirpes*, 367
- inheritance, Mitakshara school, 386
 Bengal school, 424
 stridhana, Mayukha, 452, 453
 Bengal school. 457, 458, 459

SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 394

SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 394

SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON'S SON, Mitakshara, 394

SON'S SON'S WIDOW, 364

SON'S WIDOW, 364. *See* DAUGHTER-IN-LAW
 in Bombay, 412, 413SON'S WIFE. *See* DAUGHTER-IN-LAWSOURCES. *See* HINDU LAW

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,

- of agreement to marry, 59
- adopt, 167
- where invalid sale, 298

SRADH,

- connection with inheritance, Mitakshara, 376, 378
- Bengal school, 417, 418
- alienation to provide for, 289, 480, 481, 484

SRIKRISHNA, 15

SRUTI (Vedas), 10

STAMP on permission to adopt, 114

“STARVING MAINTENANCE,” 83

STATUTES. See LIST, p. xcvi

STEPBROTHER. See HALF-BROTHER

STEPDAUGHTER,

- succession to *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
- Mithila, 457

STEPDAUGHTER'S SON,

- succession to *stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
- Mayukha, 454
- Mithila, 457

STEPMOTHER. See MARRIAGE

- marriage with her relations, 43
- no right to give in marriage, 48
- or in adoption, 136
- right on partition, 333, 334
- inheritance 366
- Mitakshara, 390
- Bombay, 412, 413
- after sister, 411
- Bengal school, 427

STEPSISTER'S SON, Mitakshara, 402

STEPSON,

- maintenance, 212
- stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
- Mayukha, 454
- Bengal school, 457, 458, 459, 461

STEPSON'S SON,

- stridhana*, Mitakshara, 451
- Mayukha, 454
- Bengal school, 457, 458, 459

STEPSON'S SON'S SON, *stridhana*, Bengal school, 457, 458

STRIDHANA, Chap. XIII.,

- unchastity not bar to inheritance, 369
- physical defects, 374
- meaning, 434, 435

STRIDHANA—continued.

- classification, 435
- descriptions, 435-440
- Yautaka*, 435
- Sulka*, 436, 437. See *SULKA*.
- Adhivedanika*, 437
- property for maintenance, 438
- property owned before marriage, 438
- gifts by husband, 438
- gifts by strangers, 438
- mechanical arts, labour and skill, 439
- investments, 440
- acquired by adverse possession, 440
- power to deal with it, 440-444, 527
 - gift by husband, 441-444
- powers of widow, 444, 445
- inheritance to, Chap. XIV.
 - principle, 446
 - maiden's property, 446, 447
 - according to Mitakshara, 447-452
 - Sulka*, 447
 - other property, 448-452
 - survivorship, 450
 - according to Mayukha, 452-455
 - Smṛiti Chandrika*, 455, 456
 - Mithila school, 456, 457
 - Bengal school, 457-461
- escheat, 462
- illegitimate children, 462
- dancing-girls and prostitutes, 462, 463

SUCCESSION. See OBSTRUCTED HERITAGE, UNOBSTRUCTED HERITAGE,
INHERITANCE

- application of Hindu law, 3
- converts to Islam, 24

SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE, 508

SUCCESSIVE ADOPTIONS, 129, 130

SUDHIVIVEKA, 20

SUDRAS, 23

- have no special *gotra*, 40
- adoption, age of boy, 146, 147
- relationship of mother to adoptive father, 144

SUIT. See PARTIES, RESTITUTION, REVERSIONER

- by married woman, 75
- for maintenance, 94-97
- by coparcener, 236, 267-269
- by manager, 279-283
- by female owner, 494
- abatement, 505, 513
- by manager of endowment, 563, 564
- in respect of endowments, 576-580
- under Religious Endowments Act, 590-594

SULKA,

described, 436, 437

inheritance to, according to Mitakshara, 447, 448
 Mayukha, 452
 Smriti Chandrika, 455
 Mithila school, 456
 Bengal school, 460

SUNI BORAHS, 24, 25**SUNNUD,** *stridhana*, 439**SUPERSESSON (ADHIVEDANA),** 36. *See* ADHIVEDANIKA**SURETY,** 311, 312**SURRENDER** by female heir, 490, 491**SURVIVORSHIP,**

adopted son, 179, 184

coparceners, 237

stridhana, 449**SUTRAS,** 10**SVAYANDATTAKA SON.** 101**TAGORE CASE,** 530-536**TARWAD,** maintenance, 235**TEMPLE,**

suits as to rights of worship, 546

bequests for, 551

offerings, 557, 558

possession and management, 537, 538

brotherhoods attached to, 560

transfer to trustees, 585, 586

Government not to hold charge of, 595

TENURE HOLDERS, partition, 325**TESTAMENTARY GUARDIAN,** 213, 216, 217**THEFT,** husband and wife, 76**TITLE OR HONOUR,** adopted son, 181**TRADE.** *See* FAMILY TRADE**TRANSFER.** *See* ALIENATION

of subject of gift, 521, 522

of temple to trustees, 585, 586

TRUSTS, 540, 541

for endowments, 547

TRUSTEE OF ENDOWMENT. *See* ENDOWMENT, MANAGER
 decision of majority, 559**UNAPPROPRIATED INCOME,** female owner, 476**UNASSOCIATED BROTHER,** 399, 427

H.L.

- UNBORN PERSON,
 inheritance, 362
 gift to, in will, 533-538
 under Hindu Wills Act, 543
- UNCERTAINTY as to endowment, 550-552
- UNCHASTITY,
 loss of right of maintenance, 78, 82, 97
 to share on partition, 336
 of adoption, 132
 to inheritance, by widow, 368
 other heirs, 368, 369
 stridhan property, 369
- UNCLE. *See* FATHER'S BROTHER, MOTHER'S BROTHER
- UNCLE'S WIDOW, 366
- UNDUE INFLUENCE, adoption, 152
- UNITED PROVINCES, Hindu law administered in, 4, 5
- UNOBSTRUCTED HERITAGE 241, 242
- UPANISHADS, 10
- USAGE. *See* CUSTOM
- UTERINE BROTHER. *See* BROTHER
- VAISYAS, 23
- VANAPRASTHA, 415, 416
 inheritance to, 415
- VEDANGAS, 10
- VEDAS, 10
- VESTING,
 on adoption, 178, 193-195
 of inheritance, 362
- VESTING ORDER, 270
- VIJNANESHWARA, 16
- VIRAMITRODAYA, 18, 19
- VIVADA CHANDRA, 20
- VIVADA CHINTAMANI, 20
- VIVADA RATNAKARA, 20
- VYAVAHARA CHINTAMANI, 20
- VYAVAHARA MAYUKHA. *See* MAYUKHA
- VYAVAHARA NIRNAYA, 18
- WAIVER of rights on adoption, 188
- WAJIB-UL-ARZ, statement as to adoption, 175
- WARDS. *See* COURT OF WARDS

WASTE,

- by limited female owner, 473, 474
- suit to restrain, 501-504
- by subsequent reversioner, 505-507

WIDOW. See DECREE, MAINTENANCE, REMARRIAGE, WILL, WOMAN

- remarriage, 37
 - prohibited degrees, 45
- guardianship of minor, 66
- debts of remarried, 76
- maintenance, 78, 79
 - amount, 86-88
- residence, 80-82
- funeral expenses, 88
- adoption by, 118 *et seq.* *See* ADOPTION
- gift in adoption, 134, 135
- alienations, 199, 200
 - consent of reversioners, 200
- right on partition, 327, 332-336
- as such, only heir to husband, 364
- except in Bombay, 366
- unchastity, 78, 82, 97, 132, 368
- of disqualified person, 374
- competition with illegitimate son, 384, 385
- inheritance, Mitakshara school, 386, 387
- divesting, 193-195, 387, 424
- of *gotraja sapinda*, heir in Bombay, 412, 413, 454
- of son, 412
- of *bandhus*, 412
- Bengal school, 417, 424
- powers over *stridhana*, 444, 445
 - inherited property, 464-466. *See* WOMAN
- movable property, 469, 470
- nature of estate, 465, 466, 471, 472
- management when more than one, 474
- alienation when more than one, 480
- pilgrimage, 481
- surrender of estate, 490, 491
- disclaimer, 490, *note* 5

WIDOWER, adoption by, 106**WIFE. See Co-WIFE, HUSBAND AND WIFE, MAINTENANCE, RESTITUTION, STRIDHANA**

- guardianship, 66
- maintenance, 67, 76-78
 - remedies, 94-97
- assent to adoption, 111, 112
- permission to adopt, 112-118
- right on partition, 331, 332
- of disqualified person, 374
- gifts to, by husband, 438
 - immovables, 441-443

WILL, Chap. XVIII.,

- property subject to maintenance, 84, 85
- right of widow to dispute, 90

WILL—*continued.*

- meaning of words "father" and "son," 178, 179
- not revoked by adoption, 186, 187
- condition as to partition, 320
- devise by husband to wife, 441-443
- of wife, 443
- of restricted female owner, 471, 493 527
- powers of woman under, 491, 492
- definition, 525
- law of gifts, 526
- subject of will, 526, 527
- testamentary capacity, 527
- stridhana*, 527
- form, 527, 528, 543, 544
- construction, 528-530
- technical words, 530
- presumption that whole interest passes, 531, 532
- attempt to alter law of inheritance, 532
- repugnant condition, 532, 533
- bequest to unborn person, 533-539
- gift to a class, 534, 535
- Hindu Transfers and Bequests Act, 536
- Hindu Disposition of Property Act, 536-539
- religious and charitable endowments, 539, 540
- joint gift, 540
- power of appointment, 540
- perpetuities, 540
- trusts, 540, 541
- gift over, 541
- accumulations, 542
- Hindu Wills Act, 542-545
- execution, 543, 544
- in Malabar, 545
- in Oudh, 545

WOMAN. *See FEMALE HEIR, STRIDHANA*

- cannot adopt, 412
- coparcener, Mitakshara law, 228
- partition, 327, 328
- inherits by express texts, 366
- Western India, 366, 367
- powers over inherited property, Chap. XV.
- limited powers, 464-466
- estate created by contract, etc., 465
- not fresh stock of descent, 464
- cannot alter estate, 466
- Bombay law, 467, 468
- movable property, 469, 470
- will, 471
- share on partition, 327, 328, 331-3
- nature of estate, 465, 466, 471, 472
- interference by Court, 473, 474
- additions to estate, 474
- accumulations, 474, 475
- unappropriated income, 475, 476

WOMAN—*continued*.

- savings from maintenance, 476
- leases, 476
- quarry or mine, 477
- alienation for her life, 477
- sale of personal interest, 478
- when she can alienate, 478 *et seq.*
- latitude in exercise of powers, 485
- consent of reversioners, 486-490
- surrender, 490, 491
- disclaimer, 490, *note* 5
- abandonment of worldly affairs, 491
- powers under will, 491, 492
 - by Court, 492
- debts not charged on property, 492, 493
- represents estate in proceedings and suits, 493, 494
- decree against, 494-496
- compromise, 495
- parties to suit, 496
- sale in execution of decree, 496-498
- sale for arrears of Government revenue, 498
 - rent, 498
- unauthorized acts voidable, 498
- neglect to get in property, 504
- ouster by reversioner, 504, 505
- who can dispute her acts, 501 *et seq.*
- receiver, 505
- proof in suit as to alienation, 510-512
- management of endowment 557, 569

WOMAN'S PROPERTY. See *STRIDHANA*

WORSHIP,

- suit as to, 547
- alienation of turn, 573, 574
- attachment, 574, 575
- partition, 575

YAJNAVALKYA, 11

YAUTAKA STRIDHANA,

- defined, 435
- inheritance to, Mayukha, 452, 453, 454
 - Smriti Chandrika, 458
 - Bengal school, 457, 458